Annex VIII of Technical Volume 4

CONVENTIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS,
SAFETY STANDARDS, LAWS AND REGULATIONS
VIII1.
INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION CONVENTION CONCERNING THE
PROTECTION OF WORKERS AGAINST IONINZING RADIATIONS [VIII1]
Relevant articles from this Convention [VIII1] include:
Article 3
1. In the light of knowledge available at the time, all appropriate steps shall be taken to ensure
effective protection of workers, as regards their health and safety, against ionizing radiations.
2. Rules and measures necessary for this purpose shall be adopted, and data essential for
effective protection shall be made available.
Article 5
Every effort shall be made to restrict the exposure of workers to ionizing radiations to the lowest
practicable level, and any unnecessary exposure shall be avoided by all parties concerned.
Article 6
1. Maximum permissible doses of ionizing radiations which may be received from sources
external to or internal to the body and maximum permissible amounts of radioactive
substances which can be taken into the body shall be fixed in accordance with Part I of this
Convention for various categories of workers.
2. Such maximum permissible doses and amounts shall be kept under constant review in the
light of current knowledge.
Article 8
Appropriate levels shall be fixed in accordance with Article 6 for workers who are not directly
engaged in radiation work, but who remain or pass where they may be exposed to ionizing radiations
or radioactive substances.
Article 9
1. Appropriate warnings shall be used to indicate the presence of hazards from ionizing
radiations. Any information necessary in this connection shall be supplied to the workers.
Article 13
Circumstances shall be specified, by one of the methods of giving effect to the Convention mentioned
in Article 1, in which, because of the nature or degree of the exposure or a combination of both, the
following action shall be taken promptly:
(a) the worker shall undergo an appropriate medical examination;
(b) the employer shall notify the competent authority in accordance with its requirements;
(c) persons competent in radiation protection shall examine the conditions in which the worker's
duties are performed;
(d) the employer shall take any necessary remedial action on the basis of the technical findings
and the medical advice.

VIII2.

CONVENTION ON EARLY NOTIFICATION OF A NUCLEAR ACCIDENT [VIII2]

Article 2 of this Convention [VIII2] states that in the event of a nuclear accident or radiological
emergency the State Party has to:
(a) forthwith notify, directly or through the International Atomic Energy Agency (hereinafter
referred to as the "Agency"), those States which are or may be physically affected as specified
in article 1 and the Agency of the nuclear accident, its nature, the time of its occurrence and
its exact location where appropriate; and
(b) promptly provide the States referred to in sub-paragraph (a), directly or through the
Agency, and the Agency with such available information relevant to minimizing the
radiological consequences in those States.
Further, with a view to minimizing the radiological consequences, States Parties may notify in the
event of nuclear accidents other than those specified in Article 1 of the Early Notification Convention
(Article 3) [VIII2].
Other aspects of this Convention are presented in detail in Technical Volume 3.
VIII3.
CONVENTION ON ASSISTANCE IN THE CASE OF A NUCLEAR ACCIDENT OR
RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY
Relevant articles from this Convention [VIII3] include:
Article 1. General provisions
1. The States Parties shall cooperate between themselves and with the International Atomic
Energy Agency (hereinafter referred to as the "Agency") in accordance with the provisions of
this Convention to facilitate prompt assistance in the event of a nuclear accident or
radiological emergency to minimize its consequences and to protect life, property and the
environment from the effects of radioactive releases.
2. To facilitate such cooperation States Parties may agree on bilateral or multilateral
arrangements or, where appropriate, a combination of these, for preventing or minimizing
injury and damage which may result in the event of a nuclear accident or radiological
emergency.
3. The States Parties request the Agency, acting within the framework of its Statute, to use its
best endeavours in accordance with the provisions of this Convention to promote, facilitate
and support the cooperation between States Parties provided for in this Convention.
Article 2. Provision of assistance
1. If a State Party needs assistance in the event of a nuclear accident or radiological emergency,
whether or not such accident or emergency originates within its territory, jurisdiction or
control, it may call for such assistance from any other State Party, directly or through the
Agency, and from the Agency, or, where appropriate, from other international
intergovernmental organizations (hereinafter referred to as "international organizations").
2. A State Party requesting assistance shall specify the scope and type of assistance required
and, where practicable, provide the assisting party with such information as may be necessary
for that party to determine the extent to which it is able to meet the request. In the event that it
is not practicable for the requesting State Party to specify the scope and type of assistance
required, the requesting State Party and the assisting party shall, in consultation, decide upon
the scope and type of assistance required.

3. Each State Party to which a request for such assistance is directed shall promptly decide and
notify the requesting State Party, directly or through the Agency, whether it is in a position to
render the assistance requested, and the scope and terms of the assistance that might be
rendered.
4. States Parties shall, within the limits of their capabilities, identify and notify the Agency of
experts, equipment and materials which could be made available for the provision of
assistance to other States Parties in the event of a nuclear accident or radiological emergency
as well as the terms, especially financial, under which such assistance could be provided.
5. Any State Party may request assistance relating to medical treatment or temporary relocation
into the territory of another State Party of people involved in a nuclear accident or
radiological emergency.
6. The Agency shall respond, in accordance with its Statute and as provided for in this
Convention, to a requesting State Party's or a Member State's request for assistance in the
event of a nuclear accident or radiological emergency by:
(a) making available appropriate resources allocated for this purpose;
(b) transmitting promptly the request to other States and international organizations which,
according to the Agency's information, may possess the necessary resources; and
(c) if so requested by the requesting State, co-ordinating the assistance at the international
level which may thus become available.
VIII4.

CONVENTION ON NUCLEAR SAFETY

Relevant articles from this Convention [VIII4] include:

Article 15. Radiation protection
Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that in all operational states the
radiation exposure to the workers and the public caused by a nuclear installation shall be kept as low
as reasonably achievable and that no individual shall be exposed to radiation doses which exceed
prescribed national dose limits.
Article 16. Emergency preparedness
Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that there are on-site and off-site
emergency plans that are routinely tested for nuclear installations and cover the activities to be carried
out in the event of an emergency.
For any new nuclear installation, such plans shall be prepared and tested before it commences
operation above a low power level agreed by the regulatory body.
VIII5.
JOINT CONVENTION ON THE SAFETY OF SPENT FUEL MANAGEMENT AND
ON THE SAFETY OF RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT
Relevant articles from this Convention include [VIII5]:
Article 4. General safety requirements
Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that at all stages of spent fuel
management, individuals, society and the environment are adequately protected against radiological
hazards.
In so doing, each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to:

.
(iv)

provide for effective protection of individuals, society and the environment, by applying
at the national level suitable protective methods as approved by the regulatory body, in
the framework of its national legislation which has due regard to internationally endorsed
criteria and standards;

Article 6. Siting of proposed facilities

1. Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that procedures are established
and implemented for a proposed radioactive waste management facility:
.
(ii)

to evaluate the likely safety impact of such a facility on individuals, society and the
environment;

Article 11. General safety requirements

Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that at all stages of radioactive waste
management, individuals, society and the environment are adequately protected against radiological
hazards.
In so doing, each Contracting party shall take the appropriate steps to:
.
(iv)

provide for effective protection of individuals, society and the environment, by applying at
the national level suitable protective methods as approved by the regulatory body, in the
framework of its national legislation which has due regard to internationally endorsed
criteria and standards;

Article 13. Siting of proposed facilities

1. Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that procedures are established
and implemented for a proposed radioactive waste management facility:
.
(ii)

to evaluate the likely safety impact of such a facility on individuals, society and the
environment, taking into account possible evolution of the site conditions of disposal
facilities after closure;

Article 24. Operational radiation protection

1. Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that during the operating lifetime
of a spent fuel or radioactive waste management facility:
.
(iii)
.

measures are taken to prevent unplanned and uncontrolled releases of radioactive materials
into the environment.

3. Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that during the operating lifetime
of a regulated nuclear facility, in the event that and unplanned or uncontrolled release of
radioactive materials into the environment occurs, appropriate corrective measures are
implemented to control the release and mitigate its effects.
Article 25. Emergency preparedness
1. Each Contracting Party shall ensure that before and during operation of a spent fuel or radioactive
waste management facility there are appropriate on-site and, if necessary, off-site emergency
plans. Such emergency plans should be tested at an appropriate frequency.
VIII6.

INTERNATIONAL GUIDELINES AND RECOMMENDATIONS

VIII6.1. Pertinent Recommendations by the International Commission on Radiological

Protection (ICRP)
VIII6.1.1. ICRP Publication 60: The 1990 Recommendations
The 1990 Recommendations of ICRP Publication 60 [VIII6] consolidated the System of Radiation
Protection and its three principles of justification, optimization of protection, and application of dose
limits. It introduced the terminology of constraints and the concept of risk constraints and provided a
framework for advice on radiation protection issues pertaining to accidents and emergencies.
In the 1990 Recommendations, the ICRP recommended dose limits for public exposures. These limits
were described as aimed at ensuring that no individual is exposed to radiation risks that are judged to
be unacceptable from [all the relevant] practices in any normal circumstances. Furthermore, dose
limits ... apply only to the sum of dose contribution from a relevant set of exposures and not to those
from all sources of radiation, and in particular, the ICRP defines the scope of its dose limits for
public exposure by confining it to the doses incurred as the result of practices. Doses incurred in
situations where the only available protective action takes the form of intervention are excluded from
the scope of the dose limits. An effective dose limit of 1 mSv in a year was recommended, with the
proviso that in special circumstances, a higher value of effective dose could be allowed in a single
year, provided that the average over five years does not exceed 1 mSv per year.
VIII6.1.2. ICRP Reports extending and supplementing Publication 60
ICRP Publication 63 [VIII7], while aimed at the protection of members of the public, also
considered the protection of emergency workers. It expressed recommended intervention levels as a
range of optimized intervention values. If the potential averted dose is greater than the upper
intervention level then the countermeasure should, if possible under the circumstances, be introduced.
If the averted dose falls inside the range then it is recommended to apply the three principles of
radiation protection justification, optimization and the use of dose limits in order to reach a
decision.
Several years later, ICRP Publication 82 [VIII8] discussed the application of the System of Radiation
Protection to prolonged radiation exposures (which could result from accidents) affecting members of
the public, and provided generic reference levels for interventions in such situations. It discussed
several specific situations, gave various examples of prolonged exposure situations, and provided
quantitative recommendations on intervention levels and intervention exemption levels. In particular,
it established a range from a total existing annual dose of ~100 mSv, above which intervention would
almost always be justifiable, via ~10 mSv, below which intervention would not likely be justifiable,
and down to the different concept of an additional annual dose of ~0.01 mSv as an exemption level
for practices.

ICRP Publication 96 [VIII9] discussed the adaptation of the System of Protection and the emergency
planning to possible radiation attacks. Similarities to and differences from radiation emergencies due
to accidents were enumerated. The report compiled earlier, still valid advice and new observations
concerning the management of radiation emergencies and therefore constitutes an accessible practical
handbook.
The scope of ICRP Publication 77 [VIII10] is somewhat different; it provides basic and general
guidance on the disposal of radioactive waste, which will usually arise from radiation accidents. In
addition, it establishes a generic dose constraint for members of the public from a single installation,
0.3 mSv/y. It also emphasizes the importance when collective doses are presented of also providing
information about their disaggregation along dimensions of time, space, individual dose, etc.
In ICRP Publication 91 [VIII11], the Commission noted that no internationally agreed criteria or
policies explicitly addressed protection of the environment from ionizing radiation, and it was
difficult to determine or demonstrate whether or not the environment was adequately protected from
potential impacts of radiation under different circumstances. The report suggested a framework by
which a policy for the protection of non-human species could be achieved. The primary purpose of
developing such a framework was to fill a conceptual gap in radiation protection; it did not reflect any
particular concern over environmental radiation hazards.
VIII6.1.3. ICRP Recommendations introduced contemporaneously with the Fukushima Daiichi
accident
The current set of fundamental Recommendations of ICRP Publication 103 [VIII12] was published
in 2007. Thus, they were known to regulators and operators. They had been incorporated into the
2011 interim International Basic Safety Standards issued by the IAEA [VIII13], but they had not yet
been implemented in national legislation, neither Japan nor elsewhere.
The 2007 Recommendations of the ICRP extended the scope of optimization of protection in
emergency and existing exposure situations, and the Recommendations heralded follow-up reports on
optimization in different situations. Those reports appeared in 2009 as ICRP Publication 109
[VIII14] on emergency exposure situations and ICRP Publication 111 [VIII15] on existing
exposure situations.
The 2007 Recommendations also broadened the scope of environmental protection, recognizing that
that the environment should be considered not only in planned exposures situations but also in
existing and emergency exposures situations, and pointing out that the ICRP approach to
environmental protection should be compatible with other approaches being taken to protect the
environment, particularly from those risks arising from similar human activities. It also recognized
that the underlying objectives for protection of the environment were different from those for
protection of humans.
VIII6.1.4. ICRP Publication 103
The 2007 Recommendations of the ICRP approach radiation protection issues by way of the exposure
situation (planned, emergency or existing) rather than processes (practices or interventions). They
stress that optimization is the primary means of dose and risk limitation, and that it should be applied
similarly in all situations. The Recommendations provide guidance on the concepts of dose and risk
constraints, i.e., levels of individual dose/risk to be taken into account, servings as boundaries for the
optimization process. Similar concepts of individual dose/risk are also applied in emergency and
existing exposure situations, serving as the boundary for optimization in these exposure situations.
ICRP uses the term reference level in such situations. They thus highlight that optimization of
protection is usually multi-dimensional even in strictly planned situations. Similar levels of individual

dose/risk are also applied in emergency and existing exposure situations, but some features are
different than in planned situations, and, therefore, the ICRP prefers to use the term reference level
in such situations.
The Recommendations define public exposure as exposure incurred by members of the public from
radiation sources, excluding any occupational or medical exposure and the normal local natural
background radiation and dose limit as the value of the effective dose or the equivalent dose to
individuals from planned exposure situations that shall not be exceeded [VIII12]. This is
conceptually similar to the description of dose limits for public exposure in the 1990
Recommendations as quoted above [VIII6].
In emergency or existing exposure situations, the issue is whether or not to reduce extant doses, and
how much, rather than to control prospectively additional doses that might result from planned
operations. In planned exposure situations, the optimization of protection can be constrained by the
use of individual dose/risk constraints (to avoid unfair inequalities in dose/risk distribution). In
emergency or existing exposure situations it may be impossible to select dose distributions at will, i.e.,
doses may be greater than values normally considered appropriate when the source is under control.
Thus optimization takes place from whatever dose distribution exists. Nevertheless, boundaries on
individual dose are applied, and are called reference levels rather than constraints.
The 2007 Recommendations of the ICRP define reference levels as the level of dose or risk,
above which it is judged to be inappropriate to plan to allow exposures to occur, and below which
optimization of protection should be implemented, with the caveat that the chosen value for a
reference level will depend upon the prevailing circumstances of the exposure under consideration.
Considering that at doses higher than 100 mSv, there is an increased likelihood of deterministic
effects and a significant risk of cancer, the ICRP recommended that the maximum value for a
reference level is 100 mSv incurred either acutely or in a year, with the caveat that exposures above
100 mSv incurred either acutely or in a year would be justified only under extreme circumstances,
either because the exposure is unavoidable or in exceptional situations such as the saving of life or the
prevention of a serious disaster.
This implies that in some (rare) circumstances, reference levels up to 100 mSv in a year might be
acceptable, depending upon the prevailing circumstances of the exposure under consideration.
VIII6.1.5. ICRP Publication 104
The 2007 Recommendations of the ICRP were supplemented with a stand-alone report, ICRP
Publication 104 [VIII16], on the scope of radiation protection. This sets out why and how some
exposure situations are excluded from regulatory control (essentially because they cannot be
controlled by any reasonable means), and why and how some exposure situations are exempted from
some or all regulatory requirements (because the requirements are unwarranted).
Thus, the report describes exclusion criteria for defining the scope of radiation protection regulations,
exemption criteria for planned exposure situations, and the application of these concepts in emergency
exposure situations and in existing exposure situations.
The report also addresses various specific exposure situations. It provides quantitative criteria,
intended only as generic suggestions to regulators for defining the regulatory scope. It points out that
an individual dose criterion of ~10 Sv/y has been widely used for the purposes of exemption without
further consideration. However, this should not be the sole criterion. The principle of optimization
rather than just the triviality of individual doses should be considered as the basis for exemption.

VIII6.1.6. ICRP Publication 109

This report [VIII14] discusses reference levels in the context of emergency exposure situations. It
points out that more complete protection is offered by simultaneously considering all exposure
pathways and all relevant protection options when deciding on the optimum course of action in an
overall protection strategy. The report also considers the transition from an emergency exposure
situation to an existing exposure situation. This decision may happen at any time during an emergency
exposure situation once urgent protective actions are no longer needed and control has been regained
over the source. The decision to transition to management as an existing exposure situation may take
place at different geographical locations at different times. The transfer should be undertaken in a
coordinated and fully transparent manner and should be understood by all parties involved.
VIII6.1.7. ICRP Publication 111
The companion issue, ICRP Publication 111 [VIII15], starts where ICRP Publication 109 ends, with
the transition from emergency to existing exposure situations. It provides guidance for the protection
of people living in long term contaminated areas, resulting from either a nuclear accident or a
radiation emergency. It considers the effects of such events on the affected population, including the
pathways of human exposure, the types of exposed populations and the characteristics of exposures.
Quoting the good results of self-help programmes after the Chernobyl accident, it emphasizes the
value of stakeholder involvement and providing the affected population with the means to know and
influence doses.
Although the focus is on radiation protection considerations, the report also recognizes the complexity
of post-accident situations, which cannot be managed without addressing all the affected domains of
daily life, i.e., environmental, health, economic, social, psychological, cultural, ethical, political, etc.
ICRP is currently working to address some of the lessons learned from the Fukushima Daiichi
accident as updates to ICRP Publications 109 and 111.
VIII6.1.8. Protection of the environment: ICRP Publications 108, 114 and 124
Practical guidance on environmental protection as envisaged in the 2007 ICRP Recommendations is
provided in several reports. ICRP Publication 108 [VIII17] outlines the concept and use of a small
set of reference animals and plants (RAPs). RAPs are, by definition, points of reference, although
other organisms could be identified, relevant to each situation and geographic location. A set of
Derived Consideration Reference Levels (DCRLs) was also defined that are specific to each of the
different types of RAPs. A DCRL can be considered as a band of dose rate, spanning one order of
magnitude, within which there is some chance of causing deleterious effects in individuals of a given
RAP category arising from exposures to ionizing radiation. ICRP Publication 114 [VIII18] provides
transfer parameters for RAPs, and ICRP Publication 124 [VIII19] discusses protection of the
environment under different exposure situations.
VIII6.1.9. Evolution of ICRP concepts: When to act, what is the goal?
ICRP Publication 82 [VIII8] proposes the use of generic reference levels of existing annual dose for
intervention in prolonged exposure situations (such as after a radiation emergency). It concludes that
an existing annual dose rising towards 100 mSv will almost always justify intervention, and
(somewhat more controversially) that below an existing annual dose of about 10 mSv, intervention is
not likely to be justifiable (in radiation protection terms) for some prolonged exposure situations. This
position is based on several considerations, including natural background radiation levels and the
detriment expected at such radiation levels. There are also many caveats that point out that sometimes
intervention will be justified below an annual dose of 10 mSv, and that radiation protection
considerations are just one decision aiding input into the decision making.

The 2007 Recommendations of ICRP [VIII12] recommend the use of reference levels of residual
dose (after the application of protective strategies), to be selected between 1 and 20 mSv per year,
according to the situation. The main factors to be considered for setting the reference levels are the
feasibility of controlling the situation and the past experience with the management of similar
situations. A key change with the 2007 Recommendations is the universal application of optimization.
Reference levels are not targets to be achieved, but values to guide the optimization process.
Optimization must always be considered. In most existing exposure situations, the exposed
individuals, as well as the authorities, wish to reduce exposures to levels that are close to what is
considered as normal.
Once protective actions have been implemented, the reference level may function as a benchmark
against which protection options can be judged retrospectively. The distribution of resulting doses
may or may not include exposures above the reference level, depending on the success of the strategy.
Efforts should be aimed at reducing exposures that are above the reference level, if possible. The
objective is that optimized protection strategies, or a progressive range of such strategies, will reduce
individual doses to below the reference level. Exposures below the reference level should not be
ignored; these exposure circumstances should also be assessed to ascertain whether protection is
optimized. An endpoint for the optimization process must not be fixed a priori; the optimized level of
protection will depend on the situation.
ICRP Publication 111 [VIII15] points out that in most existing exposure situations, the level of
exposure is mainly driven by individual behaviour because it is usually not possible to control at the
source. This usually results in a very heterogeneous distribution of exposures, which calls for an
individual management approach. The concept of an average individual (which may be useful in
planned exposure situations) is not appropriate here. Justification of protection strategies applies
initially to the fundamental decision at the end of the emergency exposure situation to allow people to
live permanently in long term contaminated areas. Several areas may be defined with relevant
conditions according to a graded approach.
The reference level of residual annual dose for the optimization of protection of people living in
contaminated areas should be selected in the lower part of the 120 mSv/year band recommended in
the 2007 Recommendations of the ICRP. According to ICRP Publication 111, past experience has
demonstrated that a typical value used for constraining the optimization process in long term postaccident situations is 1 mSv/year. However, one should take into account the prevailing circumstances
and adopt intermediate reference levels to improve the situation progressively.
VIII6.2.

IAEA safety standards

The status of the IAEA safety standards derives from the IAEAs Statute, which authorizes the IAEA
to establish or adopt, in consultation and, where appropriate, in collaboration with the competent
organs of the United Nations and with the specialized agencies concerned, standards of safety for
protection of health and minimization of danger to life and property, and to provide for their
application.
With a view to ensuring the protection of people and the environment from harmful effects of ionizing
radiation, the IAEA safety standards establish fundamental safety principles, requirements and
measures to control the radiation exposure of people and the release of radioactive material to the
environment, to restrict the likelihood of events that might lead to a loss of control over a nuclear
reactor core, nuclear chain reaction, radioactive source or any other source of radiation, and to
mitigate the consequences of such events if they were to occur. The standards apply to facilities and
activities that give rise to radiation risks, including nuclear installations, the use of radiation and
radioactive sources, the transport of radioactive material and the management of radioactive waste.

For those who are dealing with radiation protection issues, one of these standards is of overriding
importance: the so-called the Basic Safety Standards (BSS), described in some detail below.
The IAEA safety standards reflect an international consensus on what constitutes a high level of
safety for protecting people and the environment from harmful effects of ionizing radiation. They are
issued in the IAEA Safety Standards Series, which has three categories.
VIII6.2.1. Safety Fundamentals
Safety Fundamentals present the fundamental safety objective and principles of protection and safety,
and provide the basis for the safety requirements.
VIII6.2.2. Safety Requirements
An integrated and consistent set of Safety Requirements establishes the requirements that must be met
to ensure the protection of people and the environment, both now and in the future. The requirements
are governed by the objective and principles of the Safety Fundamentals. If the requirements are not
met, measures must be taken to reach or restore the required level of safety. The format and style of
the requirements facilitate their use for the establishment, in a harmonized manner, of a national
regulatory framework. Requirements, including numbered overarching requirements, are expressed
as shall statements. Many requirements are not addressed to a specific party, the implication being
that the appropriate parties are responsible for fulfilling them.
VIII6.2.3. Safety Guides
Safety Guides provide recommendations and guidance on how to comply with the safety
requirements, indicating an international consensus that it is necessary to take the measures
recommended (or equivalent alternative measures). The Safety Guides present international good
practices, and increasingly they reflect best practices, to help users striving to achieve high levels of
safety. The recommendations provided in Safety Guides are expressed as should statements.
VIII6.2.4. Provisions for the application of the IAEA safety standards
The principal users of safety standards in IAEA Member States are regulatory bodies and other
relevant national authorities. The IAEA safety standards are also used by co-sponsoring organizations
and by many organizations that design, construct and operate nuclear facilities, as well as
organizations involved in the use of radiation and radioactive sources.
The IAEA safety standards are applicable, as relevant, throughout the entire lifetime of all facilities
and activities existing and new utilized for peaceful purposes and to protective actions to reduce
existing radiation risks. They can be used by States as a reference for their national regulations in
respect of facilities and activities.
The IAEAs Statute makes the safety standards binding on the IAEA in relation to its own operations
and also on States in relation to IAEA assisted operations.
The IAEA safety standards also form the basis for the IAEAs safety review services, and they are
used by the IAEA in support of competence building, including the development of educational
curricula and training courses.
International conventions contain requirements similar to those in the IAEA safety standards and
make them binding on contracting parties. The IAEA safety standards, supplemented by international
conventions, industry standards and detailed national requirements, establish a consistent basis for
protecting people and the environment. There will also be some special aspects of safety that need to

10

be assessed at the national level. For example, many of the IAEA safety standards, in particular those
addressing aspects of safety in planning or design, are intended to apply primarily to new facilities
and activities. The requirements established in the IAEA safety standards might not be fully met at
some existing facilities that were built to earlier standards. The way in which IAEA safety standards
are to be applied to such facilities is a decision for individual States.
The scientific considerations underlying the IAEA safety standards provide an objective basis for
decisions concerning safety; however, decision makers must also make informed judgements and
must determine how best to balance the benefits of an action or an activity against the associated
radiation risks and any other detrimental impacts to which it gives rise.
VIII6.2.5. Interaction with other international organizations
The findings of the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation
(UNSCEAR) and the recommendations of international expert bodies, notably the International
Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP), are taken into account in developing the IAEA safety
standards. Some safety standards are developed in cooperation with other bodies in the United
Nations system or other specialized agencies, including the Food and Agriculture Organization of the
United Nations (FAO), the United Nations Environment Programme, the International Labour
Organization (ILO), the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency (OECD/NEA), the Pan American Health
Organization (PAHO) and the World Health Organization (WHO).
VIII6.3.

IAEA Safety Standards applicable in March 2011

The key Safety Standards addressing radiation protection in March 2011 were:
Safety Fundamentals: IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SF-1: Safety Principles (2006)
[VIII20];
Safety Requirements: International Basic Safety Standards for Protection against Ionizing
Radiation and for the Safety of Radiation Sources, Safety Series No. 115 (the BSS) (1996)
[VIII21];
Safety Requirements: Preparedness and Response for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency,
IAEA Safety Standards Series No. GS-R-2 (2002) [VIII22];
Safety Guide: Arrangements for Preparedness for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency, IAEA
Safety Standards Series No. GS-G-2.1 (2007)1 [VIII24].
Related Safety Requirements include Governmental, Legal and Regulatory Framework for Safety,
IAEA Safety Standards Series No. GSR Part 1 (2010) [VIII25].
The most relevant features of these standards are summarized below. They are also discussed in
considerable detail in a 2013 paper by Gonzlez et al. [VIII25]. That paper points out that the system
of radiation protection is not tailored to people who are involved in protection operations after an
accident, but who are not typical radiation workers (e.g., rescuers and volunteers intervening in
the aftermath of an accident).
VIII6.3.1. Safety Fundamentals SF-1
The Fundamental Safety Principles state: The fundamental safety objective is to protect people and
the environment from harmful effects of ionizing radiation. This objective must be achieved without
unduly limiting the operation of facilities or the conduct of activities that give rise to radiation risks.
Therefore, the system of protection and safety aims to assess, manage and control exposure to
1

Criteria for Use in Preparedness and Response for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency: General Safety Guide, IAEA
Safety Standards Series No. GSG-2, was published on 17 March 2011 [VIII23].

11

radiation so that radiation risks, including risks of health effects and risks to the environment, are
reduced to the extent reasonably achievable.
The three general principles of radiation protection, which concern justification, optimization of
protection and application of dose limits, are expressed in Safety Principles 4 (justification of facilities
and activities), 5 (optimization of protection), 6 (limitation of risks to individuals) and 10 (protective
actions to reduce existing or unregulated radiation risks).
Protection of the environment is covered in Safety Principle 7 (protection of present and future
generations), which states that the general intent of the measures taken for the purposes of
environmental protection has been to protect ecosystems against radiation exposure that would have
adverse consequences for populations of a species.
VIII6.3.2. Safety Requirements No. SS 115 (1996): International Basic Safety Standards for
Protection against Ionizing Radiation and for the Safety of Radiation Sources (the BSS)
The Safety Requirements No. SS 115 (the BSS) [VIII21] were published in 1996, co-sponsored by
FAO, ILO, OECD/NEA, PAHO and WHO and based primarily on the 1990 ICRP Recommendations.
The BSS established basic requirements for the protection of people and the environment against the
risks of exposure to ionizing radiation, and for the safety of sources that deliver such exposure.
At the time of the Fukushima Daiichi NPP accident, the 1996 Edition of the BSS was in the final
stages of revision. The revised BSS was published in November 2011 as an interim version [VIII13];
the final version was published in 2014 [VIII26].
The BSS incorporates the concepts of practices and interventions from ICRP Publication 60 [VIII6].
The BSS includes emergency situations, such as those created by environmental contamination in the
aftermath of an accident. The situations that may require intervention include: chronic exposure to
naturally occurring sources of radiation such as radon in dwellings and to radioactive residues from
past activities and events; and emergency situations such as those created by environmental
contamination in the aftermath of an accident.
The requirements for practices include requirements for administration, radiation protection,
management, technical arrangements and verification. The radiation protection requirements for
practices include justification of practices, dose limits for individuals, optimization for protection and
safety, and dose constraints for sources.
The dose limits for practices established by the BSS are as follows:
Dose limits for occupational exposure:
an effective dose of 20 mSv per year averaged over five consecutive years;
an effective dose of 50 mSv in any single year;
an equivalent dose to the lens of the eye of 150 mSv in a year;
an equivalent dose to the extremities (hands and feet) or the skin of 500 mSv in a year.
Dose limits for members of the public:
an effective dose of 1 mSv in a year;
in special circumstances, an effective dose of up to 5 mSv in a single year provided that the
average dose over five consecutive years does not exceed 1 mSv per year;
an equivalent dose to the lens of the eye of 15 mSv in a year;
an equivalent dose to the skin of 50 mSv in a year.

12

The requirements for intervention include requirements for administration and for radiation
protection. The radiation protection requirements for intervention include justification of intervention,
optimization of intervention, and action levels.

TABLE VIII1 ACTION LEVEL OF DOSE FOR ACUTE EXPOSURE

Organ or tissue

Projected absorbed dose to the

organ or tissue in less than 2 days
(Gy)

Whole body (bone marrow)

Lung

Skin

Thyroid

Lens of the eye

Gonads

The possibility of deterministic effects for doses greater than about 0.1 Gy (delivered over less than
2 days) to the foetus should be taken into account in considering the justification and optimization of
actual intervention levels for immediate protective action.
An intervention is justified if it is expected to achieve more good than harm, having regard to health,
social and economic factors. Regarding the protection of workers undertaking an intervention, the
BSS requires that
when undertaking intervention, all reasonable efforts shall be made to keep doses to
workers below twice the maximum single year dose limit, except for life saving actions, in
which every effort shall be made to keep doses below ten times the maximum single year
dose limit in order to avoid deterministic effects on health. In addition, workers undertaking
actions in which their doses may approach or exceed ten times the maximum single year dose
limit shall do so only when the benefits to others clearly outweigh their own risk. [VIII21]

TABLE VIII2 ACTION LEVEL OF DOSE RATE FOR CHRONIC EXPOSURE

Organ or tissue

Equivalent dose rate (Sv/y)

Gonads

0.2

Lens of the eye

0.1

Bone marrow

0.4

The BSS states that protective actions will almost certainly be justified if the projected dose or the
dose rate to any individual is otherwise likely to lead to serious injury.

13

TABLE VIII3 URGENT PROTECTIVE ACTIONS

Action

Avertable dose

Sheltering
Iodine prophylaxis

10 mSv in a period of no more than 2 days

100 mGy (committed absorbed dose to the thyroid)

Evacuation

50 mSv in a period of no more than 1 week

TABLE VIII4 GENERIC ACTION LEVELS FOR FOODSTUFFS (CONSISTENT WITH CODEX
ALIMENTARIUS COMMISSION GUIDELINE LEVELS FOR RADIONUCLIDES IN FOOD MOVING IN
INTERNATIONAL TRADE FOLLOWING ACCIDENTAL CONTAMINATION)
Radionuclides

Foods destined for general

consumption (kBq/kg)

Milk, infant foods and

drinking water (kBq/kg)

Cs-134, Cs-137, Ru-103,

Ru-106, Sr-89

I-131

0.100

Sr-90

0.10

Am-241, Pu-238, Pu-239

0.01

0.001

TABLE VIII5 LONG TERM ACTIONS

Action

Avertable dose

Initiating temporary relocation

30 mSv in a month

Terminating temporary relocation

30 mSv in a month

Considering permanent resettlement

1 Sv in a lifetime

VIII6.3.3. Safety Requirements GS-R-2: Preparedness and Response for a Nuclear or Radiological
Emergency (2002)
IAEA Safety Standards No. GS-R-2 [VIII22] establishes the requirements for an adequate level of
preparedness and response for a nuclear or radiological emergency in any State. Their implementation
is intended to minimize the consequences for people, property and the environment of any nuclear or
radiation emergency. The fulfilment of these requirements will also contribute to the harmonization of
arrangements in the event of a transnational emergency. The requirements are intended to be applied
by authorities at the national level by means of adopting legislation, establishing regulations and
assigning responsibilities.
The types of practices and sources covered by these requirements include: fixed and mobile nuclear
reactors; facilities for the mining and processing of radioactive ores; facilities for fuel reprocessing
and other fuel cycle facilities; facilities for the management of radioactive waste; the transport of
radioactive material; sources of radiation used in industrial, agricultural, medical, research and
teaching applications; facilities using radiation or radioactive material; and satellites and radiothermal
generators using radiation sources or reactors. The requirements also cover emergencies arising from
radiation sources of an unknown or untraceable origin.

14

The requirements for radiation protection in GS-R-2 are taken from the BSS (Safety Series No. 115)
[VIII21] as presented above.
VIII6.3.4. Safety Requirements WS-R-3: Remediation of Areas Contaminated by Past Activities and
Accidents (2003)
IAEA Safety Standards No. WS-R-3 [VIII27] establishes the requirements for the remediation of
areas affected by radioactive residues as a result on uncontrolled events, such as accidents, and certain
types of past activities.
The situations dealt with in this publication are intervention situations in which areas, including land
and industrial sites, have been contaminated as a result of human activities, and this contamination
could cause the prolonged exposure to radiation of workers and members of the public. The
requirements in this publication apply to contamination resulting from past events (such as activities
at former weapon testing sites) and former authorized activities that are no longer under the provisions
of an operational authorization or licence and for which there are no provisions for proper closure.
The requirements also apply to past practices that were not adequately controlled, accidents at nuclear
facilities, and discharges and disposals that were managed in accordance with less stringent
requirements than those that applied later.
For contamination resulting from past activities and accidents, WS-R-3 requires that the level of
remediation be established on a site specific basis and in accordance with the radiation protection
principles that apply to intervention situations. Consequently, the remedial measures and protective
actions that are to be implemented thereafter shall be justified and optimized.
WS-R-3 states:
A generic reference level for aiding decisions on remediation is an existing annual effective
dose of 10 mSv from all sources, including the natural background radiation. This will normally
be assessed as the mean dose for an appropriately defined critical group. Remedial measures
would often be justified below the generic reference level and national authorities may define a
lower reference level for identifying areas that might need remediation. [VIII27]
VIII6.3.5. Safety Guide RS-G-1.7: Application of the Concepts of Exclusion, Exemption and
Clearance
IAEA Safety Standard No. RS-G-1.7 [VIII28] provides guidance to national authorities, including
regulatory bodies, and operating organizations on the application of the concepts of exclusion,
exemption and clearance as established in the BSS. The Safety Guide includes, in Table 1, specific
values of activity concentration for both radionuclides of natural origin and, in Table 2, those of
artificial origin that may be used for bulk amounts of material for the purpose of applying exclusion or
exemption. It also elaborates on the possible application of these values to clearance.
RS-G-1.7 states that national and international trade in commodities containing radionuclides with
activity concentrations below the values of activity concentration provided in Tables 1 and 2 should
not be subject to regulatory control for the purposes of radiation protection. In addition, RS-G-1.7
states:
Confirmation that the activity concentration values given in Tables 1 and 2 are not exceeded
should be obtained at the first point of entry into trade. This does not imply the need for
systematic monitoring of materials, but authorities in exporting States should ensure that
systems are in place to prevent unrestricted trade in material with higher activity
concentrations. In general, it should not be necessary for each importing State to set up its own

15

routine measurement programme solely for the purpose of monitoring commodities,

particularly if there is confidence in the controls exercised by the exporting State. [VIII28]
VIII6.4.

Revision of the BSS and other standards at the time of the accident

At the time of the accident, international requirements on emergency preparedness and response were
contained in GS-R-2 [VIII22] and the 1996 edition of the BSS (SS No. 115) [VIII21]. Revision of
the BSS commenced in 2007 and an interim edition of the update, GSR Part 3 was published in
November 2011 [VIII26]. Throughout this period, the existing requirements remained in place.
The structure of GSR Part 3 follows the recommendations of the ICRP, and all circumstances of
radiation exposure are considered. Chapter 4 covers emergency exposure situations, and Chapter 5
deals with existing exposure situations. Criteria for use in emergency preparedness and response are
covered in Schedule IV. Generic criteria for protective actions and other response actions in
emergency exposure situations to reduce the risk of stochastic effects are provided in an Annex. These
parts of the BSS are particularly applicable when evaluating the radiation consequences of the
Fukushima Daiichi accident.
The major changes from SS No. 115 to GSR Part 3 are:
The terminology of ICRP Publication 103 (planned exposure situations, emergency exposure
situations, and existing exposure situations) has been introduced and the concept of reference
level to replace the concepts of action level and intervention level.
The activity concentration values from RS-G-1.7 are included in Schedule I of the GSR Part 3 as
levels of exemption for bulk amounts of solid material and for clearance of solid material.
The dose limit for the lens of the eye in terms of equivalent dose of 20 mSv per year averaged
over 5 consecutive years and of 50 mSv in a single year.
Strengthened requirements for human imaging using radiation for purposes other than medical
diagnosis, medical treatment or biomedical research.
Strengthened requirements for the safety of radioactive sources by including some of the
provisions in the Code of Conduct for Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources.
Including basic requirements for the protection of the environment, consideration of
environmental protection criteria and the assessment of radiological impact, taking into account
explicitly the protection of flora and fauna when deemed necessary by the national authorities.
Strengthened requirements for medical exposure, including for justification of medical exposures.
Requirements for emergency exposure situations made consistent with the ICRP Publications 103
and 109, including a reference level for residual dose in range of 20-100 mSv.
VIII6.4.1. Arrangements for Preparedness for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency: Safety Guide.
IAEA Safety Standards No. GS-G-2.12
IAEA General Safety Guide No. GS-G-2.1 [VIII24] provides recommendations and guidance on the
implementation of selected requirements established in IAEA Safety Standards Series No. GS-R-2
[VIII22]. This guide describes appropriate responses (so called concepts of operations) to a range of
nuclear or radiological emergencies and includes:

Criteria for Use in Preparedness and Response for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency: General Safety Guide. IAEA
Safety Standards No. GSG-2, was published on 17 March 2011 [VIII23]. The generic criteria in GSG-2 and the revised
BSS are similar and the approach and terminology are consistent. The guide includes Table IV-1 and Table A-1 of the
revised BSS GSR Part 3 [VIII26]. A reference level of 20100 mSv is presented. GSG-2 also presents Operational
Intervention Levels (OILs) and Emergency Action Levels (EALs). Appendix II of GSG-2 includes default OILs for
deposition, individual contamination, and contamination of food, milk and drinking water.

16

 Description of emergency zones and areas and their suggested radius.

Description of abnormal facility conditions associated with specific emergency class and
immediate actions to be taken on-site and off-site upon declaration of the emergency class.
Description and overview of urgent protective actions and other response actions.
Description of adequate emergency related facilities and locations necessary to support
emergency response.
VIII6.5.

Codex Alimentarius guideline levels for radionuclides in food

The Codex Alimentarius Commission, established by FAO and WHO in 1963, develops harmonized
international food standards, guidelines and codes of practice to protect the health of consumers and
ensure fair practices in the food trade. The commission also promotes coordination of all food
standards work undertaken by international governmental and non-governmental organizations.
Collaboration between the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the Codex Alimentarius concerns
the use of international food safety standards in the context of the Agreement on the Application of
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement). The SPS Agreement and the Agreement on
Technical Barriers to Trade (the TBT Agreement) try to ensure that regulations, standards, testing and
certification procedures do not create unnecessary obstacles, while also providing members of the
public with the right to implement measures to achieve legitimate policy objectives, (such as the
protection of the human environment), within the separate areas of their legal coverage. Both
agreements encourage the international harmonization of food standards. Importantly, the SPS
Agreement cites the food safety standards, guidelines and recommendations of the Codex
Alimentarius for facilitating international trade and protecting public health.
The reference made to the food safety standards of the Codex Alimentarius in the SPS Agreement
means that the Codex has far reaching implications for resolving trade disputes. WTO members that
wish to apply stricter food safety measures than those set by the Codex may be required to justify
these measures scientifically.
The Codex General Standard for Contaminants and Toxins in Food and Feed provides guideline
levels that apply to radionuclides contained in foods destined for human consumption and traded
internationally, which have been contaminated following a nuclear or radiological emergency. These
guideline levels apply to food after reconstitution or as prepared for consumption, i.e. not to dried or
concentrated foods, and are based on an intervention exemption level of 1 mSv in a year3. As far as
generic radiological protection of food consumers is concerned, when radionuclide levels in food do
not exceed the corresponding guideline levels, the food should be considered as safe for human
consumption. When the guideline levels are exceeded, national governments decide whether and
under what circumstances the food should be distributed within their territory or jurisdiction. National
governments may wish to adopt different values for internal use within their own territories where the
assumptions concerning food distribution that have been made to derive the guideline levels may not
apply, e.g. in the case of wide-spread radioactive contamination. For foods that are consumed in small
quantities, such as spices, that represent a small percentage of total diet and hence a small addition to
the total dose, the guideline levels may be increased by a factor of 10.
The Codex guideline levels are given in Table VIII6.

The concept of exemption was introduced in ICRP Publication 60 [VIII6] and explained in Publication 82 [VIII8], which
advises on situations of prolonged radiation exposure and proposes a generic intervention exemption dose limit of around
1 mSv annually for members of the public from radionuclides in major commodities such as food. Publication 104 [VIII16]
provides additional guidance on exemption.

17

TABLE VIII6. CODEX REVISED GUIDELINE LEVELS FOR RADIONUCLIDES IN FOODS

CONTAMINATED FOLLOWING A NUCLEAR OR RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY FOR USE IN
INTERNATIONAL TRADE
Guideline Level (Bq/kg)
Radionuclides in Foods
Infant Foods*
Pu-238, Pu-239, Pu-240, Am-241

Other foods

10

100

100

S-35**, Co-60, Sr-89, Ru-103, Cs-134, Cs-137,

Ce-144, Ir-192

1 000

1 000

H-3***, C-14, Tc-99

1 000

10 000

Sr-90, Ru-106, I-129, I-131, U-235

When intended for use as such.

This represents the value for organically bound sulphur.
***
This represents the value for organically bound tritium.
**

In deriving the guideline levels, it is assumed that adults consume 550 kg of food and infants 200 kg
of food per year. It is assumed that 10% of all food consumed in the year following the emergency is
contaminated, although it is noted that this may not apply to infants. The most conservative values of
the radionuclide specific and age specific ingestion dose coefficients from [VIII21] have been used.
The following additional points apply to the Codex guideline levels:
Infant foods are defined as those foods prepared and packaged specifically for infants in their first
year of life.
Activity concentrations from specific radionuclides should be summed within radionuclide groups
but each group should be treated independently.
The guideline levels apply to food as it is consumed. For instance, dried food should be
reconstituted before comparison of measured levels of radionuclides with the guideline levels.
Higher levels should be applied to foods such as spices, which are eaten in small volumes.
VIII7.

JAPANESE REGULATORY INSTRUMENTS

These comprise laws issued by the National Diet (the Japanese Parliament), ordinances issued by
various ministries of the Japanese government, regulations issued by central and prefectural
authorities, and internal rules set by the operating organization, TEPCO.
There were some issues which were not fully covered in the regulatory system of Japan. For such
issues, Japanese regulators looked to other sources e.g., the ICRP 2007 Recommendations and the
IAEA 2011 interim BSS [VIII13].
VIII7.1.

Relevant laws

VIII7.1.1. The Atomic Energy Basic Law [VIII29]

The Atomic Energy Basic Law states that its objectives are to secure energy resources for the future
and to promote the research, development and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes
(Chapter 1). It goes on to establish a framework for the regulation of nuclear activities, specific
aspects of which are to be dealt with in subsequent, separate acts. The Basic Law in Chapter 2 created
the Atomic Energy Commission and the Nuclear Safety Commission. Its provisions also deal in very

18

broad terms with the mining of nuclear source materials (Chapter 4), control over nuclear fuel
materials (Chapter 5), control over nuclear reactors (Chapter 6), protection from radiation hazards
(Chapter 8) and compensation for damage caused by nuclear activities (Chapter 9). These provisions,
in effect, only demonstrate the states intention to exercise regulatory powers in these areas by means
of subsequent legislation.
VIII7.1.2. Laws governing radiation protection: The Prevention Law [VIII30] and the Regulation
Law [VIII31]
The Prevention Law regulates the use, sale, lease, disposal or any other handling of radioisotopes and
ionizing radiation-generating equipment in order to prevent ionizing radiation hazards and to secure
public safety (Section 1). Pursuant to this law, applications must be submitted to the Nuclear
Regulation Authority (NRA) (until April 2013 to the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science
and Technology (MEXT)) for any activity connected with radioisotopes or equipment that was
generating ionizing radiation. Granting of the licence depends on whether the site, structure and
equipment proposed conform to the standards laid down by the Ordinance of the Prime Minister
(No. 56, 30 September 1960), and whether potential hazards from ionizing radiation have been dealt
with satisfactorily (Sections 6, 7 and 7-2).
Under the Reactor Regulation Law, Ministerial Ordinances and other regulations are established
such as the Notice on Dose Limits related to radiation protection, which sets out dose limits for
exposure to ionizing radiation for nuclear power plant and nuclear related facilities. The Prevention
Law also sets out dose limits for radioisotope facilities. In addition, there are also the Regulations on
the Prevention of Ionizing Radiation Hazards [VIII32].
Under the relevant laws, the Radiation Council established in MEXT (moved to the NRA after its
establishment in September 2012) recommended dose limits for radiation workers and radiation
workers engaged in emergency situations, based on the penultimate (1990) fundamental
Recommendations of the ICRP [VIII6].
VIII7.2.

Relevant Ordinances

VIII7.2.1. Protection of persons occupationally exposed to ionizing radiation

This is covered by the Ordinance on Prevention of Ionizing Radiation Hazards [VIII32]. This
ordinance contains, among other topics, dose limits for workers, including special limits for women,
for pregnant women and for emergency situations, as shown in Table VIII-7 below. This particular
ordinance covers only exposure to ionizing radiation from radioactive substances. However, the same
dose limits are also provided in several other ordinances, under laws dealing with other sources of
radiation. All regulatory documents concerning ionizing radiation, regardless of which law is
involved, are scrutinized by the Radiation Council established in the NRA so as to ensure full
consistency.

19

TABLE VIII7. DOSE LIMITS FOR RADIATION WORKERS

Quantity
Effective dose

Equivalent dose

Normal working conditions

Emergenciesf

100 mSv/5 yearsa

50 mSv in a yearb
Womenc 5 mSv/3 monthsd
Pregnant womene:
External exposure 2 mSv
Internal exposure 1 mSv

100 mSv in an event

Lens of the eye: 150 mSv in a yearb

Skin: 500 mSv in a yearb
Pregnant womene:
Abdominal surface 2 mSv

Lens of the eye: 300 mSv in an event

Skin: 1000 mSv in an event

Five-year periods beginning 1 April 2001;

Year beginning 1 April 2001;
c
Unless diagnosed as unable to become pregnant;
d
Quarters of a year beginning 1 April, 1 July, 1 October, 1 January;
e
From being diagnosed as pregnant until birth;
f
Women must not be engaged in emergency work involving high doses unless diagnosed as unable to become pregnant.
b

For normal working conditions, the dose limits as applied to male workers are fully in line with the
1990 [VIII6] and 2007 [VIII12] ICRP Recommendations and the IAEA 1996 [VIII21] and 2011
[VIII13]. The limits for pregnant women are expressed in roughly the same way as in the 1990 ICRP
Recommendations and thus aim to achieve broadly the same level of protection for the foetus as for
members of the public, in line with the intention of all of these ICRP and IAEA documents.
However, there are also some significant deviations from the international guidance, all in the
direction of the Japanese regulations being stricter. The most important difference is that there are
formal dose limits for emergencies. The international guidance points out that dose limits are not
intended for emergency situations. The limit on effective dose in the Japanese regulations, 100 mSv,
corresponds to a reference level in the international guidance, exposures above which would only be
justifiable if the exposure is unavoidable or in exceptional situations such as life-saving or prevention
of serious disasters. For such situations, the guidance is that every effort shall be made to keep
effective doses below 500 mSv.
Furthermore, in Japan women are barred from emergency work involving high doses unless they are
unable to become pregnant; the international guidance is that females who have declared that they are
pregnant or nursing should not participate in such activities. Also, for normal working conditions,
there is a limit on dose rate to women of reproductive capacity. The ICRP recommends no special
occupational dose limit for women in general, and there is no such limit in the BSS.
The ordinance also covers many other topics, among them education and training of workers and their
medical examinations.
VIII7.2.2. Protection of the public from ionizing radiation
A dose limit for members of the public of 1 mSv in a year, in line with ICRP Recommendations and
IAEA Basic Safety Standards, is provided for exposures due to radioactive sources (including nuclear
installations) in the Prevention Law. Operators internal rules and guidelines.

20

A regulatory system does not just include the government components. The internal rules and
guidelines decided by the operator in order to ensure compliance and safe, reliable operation also
form an important part of the regulatory system.
TEPCO has a comprehensive set of manuals on radiation protection topics. These reiterate the
existing regulations and the dose limits that apply and set out the operating procedures required to
ensure compliance with those regulations. The following areas are covered:
Basic issues (three manuals, comprising in all some 250 pages, on radiation protection
management basics, radiation work management, and dose control management);
Controlled areas (three manuals, covering RCA management, registration procedures and
materials);
Management of personal radiation protection equipment;
Management of radiation measurement equipment;
Management of calibration sources;
Management of environmental monitoring.
The manuals are quite detailed and include comprehensive specifications of responsibilities and
accountabilities within the organization. They emphasize the importance of optimization of radiation
protection and keeping doses as low as reasonably achievable.

21

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[VIII1] INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION, Convention Concerning the Protection of Workers
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[VIII2] Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, INFCIRC/335, IAEA, Vienna (1986).
[VIII3] Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency,
INFCIRC/336, IAEA, Vienna (1986).
[VIII4] Convention on Nuclear Safety, INFCIRC/449, IAEA, Vienna (1994).
[VIII5] Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste
Management, INFCIRC/546, IAEA, Vienna (1997).
[VIII6] INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION, 1990 Recommendations
of the International Commission on Radiological Protection, Publication 60, Pergamon Press, Oxford
and New York (1991).
[VIII7] INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION, Principles for
Intervention for Protection of the Public in a Radiological Emergency, Publication 63, Pergamon Press,
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[VIII8] INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION, Protection of the Public
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[VIII9] INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION, Protecting People
Against Radiation Exposure in the Event of a Radiological Attack, Publication 96, Elsevier, Oxford
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[VIII10] INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION, Radiological Protection
Policy for the Disposal of Radioactive Waste, Publication 77, Pergamon Press, Oxford and New York
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[VIII11] INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION, A Framework for
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[VIII12] INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION, The 2007
Recommendations of the International Commission on Radiological Protection, Publication 103,
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[VIII13] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Radiation Protection and Safety of Radiation
Sources: International Basic Safety Standards (Interim Edition), IAEA Safety Standards Series No.
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[VIII14] INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION, Application of the
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[VIII15] INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION, Application of the
Commission's Recommendations to the Protection of People Living in Long-term Contaminated Areas
after a Nuclear Accident or a Radiation Emergency, Publication 111, Elsevier, Oxford (2009).
[VIII16] INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION, Scope of Radiological
protection Control Measures, Publication 104, Elsevier, Oxford (2007).
[VIII17] INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION, Environmental
Protection: The Concept and Use of Reference Animals and Plants, Publication 108, Elsevier, Oxford
(2008).
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Protection: Transfer Parameters for Reference Animals and Plants, Publication 114, Elsevier, Oxford
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[VIII19] INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION, Protection of the
Environment under Different Exposure Situations, Publication 124, Pergamon Press, Oxford and New
York (2014).
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ATOMIC
ENERGY
COMMUNITY,
FOOD
AND
AGRICULTURE
ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS, INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY
AGENCY, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION, INTERNATIONAL MARITIME
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ORGANIZATION, UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME, WORLD HEALTH
ORGANIZATION, Fundamental Safety Principles, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SF-1, IAEA,
Vienna (2006).
[VIII21] FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS,
INTERNATIONAL
ATOMIC
ENERGY
AGENCY,
INTERNATIONAL
LABOUR

22

ORGANIZATION, OECD NUCLEAR ENERGY AGENCY, PAN AMERICAN HEALTH

ORGANIZATION, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, International Basic Safety Standards for
Protection against Ionizing Radiation and for the Safety of Radiation Sources, Safety Series No. 115,
IAEA, Vienna (1996). (This publication is superseded by GSR Part 3 (2014)).
[VIII22] FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS,
INTERNATIONAL
ATOMIC
ENERGY
AGENCY,
INTERNATIONAL
LABOUR
ORGANIZATION, OECD NUCLEAR ENERGY AGENCY, PAN AMERICAN HEALTH
ORGANIZATION, UNITED NATIONS OFFICE FOR THE COORDINATION OF
HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, Preparedness and Response for
a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. GS-R-2, IAEA, Vienna
(2002).
[VIII23] FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS,
INTERNATIONAL
ATOMIC
ENERGY
AGENCY,
INTERNATIONAL
LABOUR
ORGANIZATION, PAN AMERICAN HEALTH ORGANIZATION, WORLD HEALTH
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