Met A Governance

doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9299.2009.01780.
META-GOVERNANCE: VALUES, NORMS AND

PRINCIPLES, AND THE MAKING OF HARD CHOICES
JAN KOOIMAN AND SVEIN JENTOFT
Meta-governance or governance of governance is a concept that raises questions regarding

how values, norms and principles underpin governance systems and governing approaches.
Values, norms and principles pertain both to substantive governance issues, for instance, related
to sustainable resource use, and to governance system issues in themselves, for instance, regarding
their institutional design. This article deals primarily with the latter. Thus the interactive perspective
serves as basis for developing a coherent set of meta-governance principles. We argue that an explicit,
deliberated and decided upon set of meta-governance principles as an integral part of governance
can help in making hard substantive governance choices easier. Interactive learning plays a key role
in governance processes when public and private governing actors have to make such hard choices.
In the article, examples from natural resource governance will serve as illustrations for the more
conceptual argumentation and reasoning.
INTRODUCTION
In governance practice, norms, principles and values often play a rather obscure role.
They underpin all decisions since they inspire those who govern how to think and make
judgements about how the world works and how to act in particular situations. However,
they often remain implicit. When they are made explicit, they are rarely absolute. They
are not always deliberated, and when addressed they often lead to nothing concrete and
practical. Implicitly or explicitly, governance means choosing between them. Such choices
are always complicated, not just because they may require complex philosophical and
ethical reasoning, but also because the value positions and normative notions contained in
them are often in conflict. For example, the concept of sustainable development is intended
to resolve such conflicts in natural resource governance. However, it may also be seen
as an oxymoron. It is questionable to what degree development and sustainability can
be reconciled. Nevertheless, it reflects a choice of values and therefore an ambition to
attempt to make the two compatible. But which of the two has priority and why? Many
natural resource governance issues imply such conflicts, and it can be assumed that for
other areas of governance this is not the same?
In the same way that governance choices can be differentiated, so can governance norms,
principles and, maybe, even values. Some values and norms, such as those pertaining
to human rights, are universal and part of substantive governance choices everywhere,
although not always explicit. Some values and norms are specific to certain situations,
settings and cultures, such as those related to the relation between man and nature. In
comparison, principles are more imperative and concrete; they are derived from values
and norms and are, therefore, usually more limited in scope. For instance, in dealing with
natural resources, the so-called precautionary principle is subsumed under the more
general values of care and responsibility.
Jan Kooiman is Professor Emeritus, Erasmus University Rotterdam and Visiting Scholar at the University of Amsterdam.
Svein Jentoft is in the Norwegian College of Fishery Science, University of Troms.
Public Administration Vol. 87, No. 4, 2009 (818836)
2009 The Authors. Journal compilation 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ,
UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.
META-GOVERNANCE: VALUES, NORMS AND PRINCIPLES
819
Values, norms and principles relate both to substantive choices such as those directly
related to the depletion of the fish resource or the influence of global warming on
coastal zones, and to governance system issues, such as how to select a governance
instrument to fight depletion or how to empower indigenous people in coastal zones. Metagovernance, that is, the governance of governance, occurs in our opinion when governance
system values, norms and principles are discussed, formulated and applied in governing
processes. In this article, we deal with the relation between substantive issues and metagovernance in the context of hard (substantive) choices. We argue that such choices can
be made less hard when the values, norms and principles guiding governance itself are
made coherent and explicit. In other words, when the processes in which substantive
issues are formulated and the choices inherent in them are made, are not haphazard ones
but guided by an explicit set of meta-governance principles which are deliberated by and
made explicit to all concerned, public and private, in an interactive learning context.
This article grew out of the authors experience in working with a general conceptual
approach on interactive governance (Kooiman 2003), and employing it to the governance
of fisheries on a global scale (Kooiman et al. 2005a; Bavinck et al. 2005). The aim of the
article is three-fold. First, we want to bring meta-governance a step further conceptually
by drawing from lessons learned from its application within the concrete field of marine
resource and coastal zone governance. Second, we hope to make a contribution to the
discussion of collective choice in meta-governance. And third, we show how the interactive perspective of governance helps in coping with hard governance choices. A key issue
here is interactive learning. Briefly, then, in this article, we argue that:
1. Within the interactive governance perspective, hard choices are not something to
be left to the state alone. It is a responsibility that should be shared between the
state, private markets and civil society organizations.
2. Hard governance choices usually have to do with value conflicts of an incompatible, incommensurable and incomparable nature. It is therefore important that
the governance norms and principles for the ways these choices come about are
made explicit.
In this article we develop a coherent set of governance norms or principles. The discussion is organized as follows. We start by summarizing the essentials of interactive
governance theory, focusing on its meta-component. Second, following our conception
of interactive governance, we discuss what we mean by meta-governance and what
principles we believe are most essential in the governance of areas such as fisheries and
coastal zones. Third, we address the issue of values and hard choices related to different
perceptions of rationality. Finally, we discuss how interactive learning is important to
choice since it allows public and private actors in governance processes to reconcile their
differences through a process that is inherently communicative.
INTERACTIVE GOVERNANCE
The term governance has become a catchword in the social sciences as well as in the
policy world. As is the case with terms that have become part of popular vocabulary,
governance has different meanings for different people (for a recent overview, see Kjr
2004; Schuppert 2005). Remarkably, most versions of it are part of specifications such as
good governance, network governance, global governance, European governance,
while general theorizing on the concept remains rare.
2009 The Authors. Journal compilation 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
820
Our governance perspective works from the assumption that societies are governed by
a combination of governing efforts by all kinds of actors and entities, public as well as
non-public (Kooiman 2003). These mixes are answers to changes in societal dynamics
and ever growing societal diversity and complexity. In terms of responses to major
societal issues, we need to look not only to the state but also to the market as well as civil
society, each with its own expertise and responsibility. Our perspective also focuses on
how governance occurs on different societal scales, from the local to the global level with
overlapping, cross-cutting authorities and responsibilities. This implies the awareness,
not only of the limitations of the command-and-control form of governance, but also
of the need for other ways of governance involving broader sets of actors. Instead of
seeing governance interactions exclusively as a matter for traditional public governors,
this calls for a socio-political perspective. Against this background, we define interactive
governance as the whole of interactions instigated to solve societal problems and to
create societal opportunities; including the formulation and application of principles
guiding those interactions and care for institutions that enable or control them.
The perspective on governance advanced here proposes that societies are made up of a
large numbers of interacting governance actors, who are constrained or enabled in their
actions by structures. Actors, in this perspective, are any social unit possessing agency or
power of action. These include individuals, associations, leaders, firms, departments, international bodies, and so on. Structures refer to the frameworks within which actors operate,
which limits or expands their action potentials and which they either will or must take
into account. These include culture, law, agreements, material and technical possibilities,
and the many other dimensions which constitute the world we live in. According to sociological reasoning, actors are continuously making changes to these structures while at the
same time being subjected to their influence (Berger and Luckmann 1966; Giddens 1984).
Interactive governance is conceptually divided into three major components. In accordance with the actor or intentional level of governance interactions we distinguish three
elements at this level: images, instruments, and action. All governing activities can be
characterized by these three elements. We also distinguish between three governance
modes: self, co-, and hierarchical governance. These can be seen as the major structural
forms in which these governance interaction processes take place. All governance activities
evolve within these three modes or within mixes of them. Finally, we conceptualize three
orders of governance. These contain the three basic sorts of societal governance activities,
problem solving and opportunity creation (first-order), design, care and maintenance of
governance institutions (second-order) and the formulation and application of norms and
principles for all other governance activities.
As these three basic components (elements, modes and orders) form the conceptual
basis for formulating meta-norms and -principles, we devote the next section to them.
Governance elements
Interactive governance, as an intentional activity, consists of three components: images,
instruments and action.
Images
Images constitute the guiding lights in terms of the how and why of governance. Images
come in many types: visions, metaphors, models, knowledge, facts, judgements, presuppositions, hypotheses, convictions, ends and goals. They not only relate to specific issues
821
at hand, but to fundamental social, political and ethical questions, often of a systemic
nature such as in value or knowledge systems.
Instruments
These constitute the intermediating element of interactive governance. They link images
to action. Contrary to what the instrumental toolkit metaphor suggests, however,
instruments are not a neutral medium in fact, their design, choice and application
frequently elicit strife. It is clear that the choice of instruments is not free; ones position in
society determines the type and range available. In addition, instruments have a variety
of applicability, some being general and others specific.
Action
The last element of interactive governance is action or the putting of instruments into
effect. This includes the implementation of policies according to set guidelines, which is
often a dry and routine affair. However, action may also consist of mobilizing other actors
in a new and uncharted direction. In this case, actors rely on convincing and socially
penetrating images and sufficient socio-political will or support. The interactive aspect of
governance thus emerges succinctly.
Governance modes
At the structural level of governance interactions, we distinguish between three modes of
governance that differ according to their locus: hierarchical governance, self-governance
and co-governance. All societies are governed through a mixture of these three modes.
Hierarchical governance
This is characteristic of the interactions between a state and its citizens, but it is also not
uncommon in the market as well as in civil society, for instance, in large organizations
such as corporations. Steering and control are key concepts in this approach although, in
practice, these concepts are more intricate than often imagined. In recent years our perceptions of hierarchical governance have become redefined, for example, the commanding
state has been transformed into a regulatory one, delivering state activities into enabling
ones and benevolence into activating roles.
Self-governance
In modern society, this refers to the situation in which actors take care of themselves,
outside the purview of government. This is a ubiquitous phenomenon, quite distinct from
government intention or policy. We emphasize that self-governance is not a governmentcreated capacity, such as deregulation or privatization, but comes about of its own
accord. In fact, without sustaining a capacity for self-governance, societal governance is
an impossible task.
Co-governance
Here the essential element is that societal parties join hands with a common purpose in
mind, and stake their identity and autonomy in the process. Governance theory contains
numerous manifestations of co-governance, including public-private partnerships,
networks, regimes and co-management.
822
Governance orders
The third aspect of our conceptual framework relates to orders of governance. The issue
here is neither geographical nor temporal; it concerns levels (or rings) of activities. We
distinguish three concentric circles: first-order, second-order and meta-governance.
First-order governing
The outer ring deals with day-to-day affairs, and is termed first-order governing, taking
place wherever people and their organizations interact in order to solve societal problems
and create opportunities. First-order governing represents the nitty-gritty of governance
activity. In diverse, complex and dynamic societies, first-order governing faces special
challenges. It starts with the identification of problems. After all, problems are not an
objective reality; they become such only in the minds of societal actors. Once problems, and
problem systems, have been identified, attention shifts to the solution space. Opportunities
show somewhat different patterns. It is important throughout to retain the diversity,
complexity and dynamics of governance situations, since only then will problems and
solutions remain close to (modern) societal reality.
Second-order governing
This focuses on the institutional arrangements within which first-order governing takes
place: systems of agreements; rules; rights; laws; norms; roles and procedures. Institutions
provide the framework for first-order governance and constitute the meeting ground of
those governed and those governing. Institutions reflect the diversity, dynamics and
complexity of the societies they are part of and the governance systems they unite. Their
maintenance and design is thus a special governance task.
Third-order or meta-governance
This takes us to the centre of the concentric circles, feeding into, binding and evaluating
the entire governance exercise by setting and applying normative governance principles.
As meta is among the main subjects of this article, we pay special attention to it in the
section that follows.
META-GOVERNANCE
Although this is not the place for a detailed discussion of what others have said about the
meta-governance concept, there are main areas of commonality between most of these
approaches. Jessop states that meta-governance as governance involves the organisation
of the conditions for governance in its broadest sense (2003, p. 107). In the ways these
conditions are worked out, however, differences also appear. For instance, Sorensen
and Torfing (2007) distinguish four theoretical approaches to meta-governance interdependency theory, governability theory, integration theory, and governmentality theory
each with their own uses of the concept, and all based upon special approaches to
governance itself. Whitehead (2003) even goes as far as seeing meta-governance as a
counter process to governance.
Our approach to meta-governance, however, differs from others in at least two ways.
In the first place we do not see meta-governance primarily as related to the state (as
most others do), for example, governments formulating sets of ground rules for all those
active in governance, that is, public, private and mixed types such as networks. We see
it as a major governance activity of public and private actors together and interactively,
823
responsible as they are for societal meta-governance (we will come back to this in the
final section). Secondly, and more fundamentally, we follow original meta-theorists (for
example, Sklair 1988), who deem it important that meta-considerations are cast in other
terms than the subject itself. This leads us to couch our ideas on meta-governance in such
ways that it differs qualitatively from all other components of governance, that is to say, in
purely normative standards and quality measuring rods (see the next section for further
discussion). For others in the field, normative notions in meta-governance are part of a
whole set of other governing ways, means and tools.
Our approach to meta-governance involves the following outline of its meaning
and role:
The governance order where values, norms and principles are advanced according to
which governance practices can be formed and evaluated.
Meta-governing is an essential part of governance. It is needed to guide the institutional
and problem-solving choices, ex ante in underpinning future oriented activities, and ex post
in appraising governance activities by serving as criteria for evaluation. Public and private
governors and those governed alike take responsibility for governing how to govern.
Some components of meta-governance have an ethical stance whose sources can be found
in religious thought or schools of philosophy, such as those pertaining to justice. Other
meta-governance sources are of a more applied normative nature, such as efficiency
or effectiveness. Their pedigree is that of practical experience, recently made into the
normative cornerstones of a branch of governance derived from market experience but
also applied in the public sphere.
We distinguish values from norms, norms from principles and choices from principles.
This distinction, however, is not a basic one in that it is not based upon a thorough
analysis of their inherent qualities; that would be the subject of a paper with purposes
other than those aimed for here. Rather, the distinction has a more conceptual purpose
and is related to the way we look at meta-governance. We hypothesize a dynamic metagovernance process in which, on the one hand, we see societal debates on all kinds of
normative notions evolving and, on the other hand, by meta-concepts practised in actual
governance activities where such notions are tested and fed back into these debates. We
conceptualize these debates in four steps from values to choices, complete with feedback
loops; in actual meta-governance these will naturally follow more random patterns. The
way we see the distinction between these four concepts is shown in figure 1.
In our conceptualization, values are the most general and fundamental notions, and
choices the most applied and specific. Norms and principles have an intermediate position
in this sequence. This pertains, in particular, to principles, which we see as partly basic,
that is to say, founded in general notions of right or wrong, but applied in the sense that
Debate
Value
Norm
Principle
Choice
(e.g. Equality.Justice..DifferenceProperty right)
Application
FIGURE 1 Meta-governance process

824
they are focused on the societal activity of governance. John Rawls well-known theory of
justice may serve as an example (1971). The value base is in its ethical foundation of the
equality of all living persons. Norms derived from this are that justice should prevail in
governance. A principle would be deduced from this norm. An example is the so-called
difference principle, the idea that inequality is only justified if it is to the advantage of
those who are less well off. This principle could then be applied when making choices with
regard to, for instance, the property rights in, say, natural resource governance, stating
that those rights should be established only as long as they benefit the poorest of natural
resource user-groups. The meta-principle to be applied here as we will show shortly
is responsiveness, since choice, design and development of property rights belong to the
category of institutional choice.
Governors, public as well as private, would be obliged to make the origin of their ideas
explicit: analytically, ethically and politically. When hard substantive governance choices
are being made, it is inevitable that fundamental assumptions and world views are at stake.
Interactive governance brings these notions to the surface so that they can be explained,
discussed, defended and evaluated before they are allowed to underpin the choices made.
We are not of the opinion that this is all that can be said about the nature of those
choices. Interests and power certainly also play a role in them. In fisheries and coastal
zones, the areas of our own research (Kooiman et al. 2005b), this is the order of the day,
where commercial actors, often supported by public authorities, lead hard choices more
towards short-term gains than long-term justice. What we want to stress, however, and
hope to show in the article, is that this has little to do with an interactive governance
approach to hard choices.
Meta-governance applies also to governance itself. Here we do not primarily refer to
the values and norms involved in a particular governance issue as such what in this
paper we call hard choices but the principles and values at play in their application
to governance activities, institutional arrangements and meta-governance practice themselves. This meta-order of governance activities is a key to it, since it formulates not only
principles for those activities themselves, but also establishes normative links between
all kinds of governance attributes. In other words, meta-governance can be considered
the mortar that binds all attributes of governance and makes it a whole. In the reality of
complex, dynamic and diverse societies, where so many parties at so many levels in so
many roles govern together, governance cannot operate without a reasoned and coherent
set of meta-governance norms and principles. What from one governing point of view
may seem quite sensible can completely lack sense from another. For instance, applying
individual transferable quotas to curb over-fishing as a governance instrument may be
perfectly defendable in one situation in the north, but disastrous in another one in the
south. Only by discussing the norms and principles leading towards such measures in
the open can their real value be made clear.
Ethical principles and other normative notions do play a role in actual governance
practice, for instance, in terms of voluntary codes as part of private governance (Webb
2004; van Tulder and van der Zwart 2006). However, the choice of such principles is
typically presented as a shopping list or a catalogue of normative notions and they have
no strong conceptual basis. The Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, developed
by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations, is an example
of such a set of ecological, economic, social and management norms introduced for this
industry (FAO 1995).
825
The way we want to approach the formulation of meta-governance principles is on the

basis of the governance perspective as developed above, that is to say, in terms of its
constituent elements, modes and orders of governance. For each of these we formulate a
principle that fits with that particular part of our conceptual framework for governance,
giving us a list of nine specific principles as a coherent basis for an overall appraisal
of meta-considerations for governance itself. They differ in some respects from earlier
versions because of the experiences gained working and reflecting on them since their
first publication (Kooiman 2003; Kooiman et al. 2005b). We present them as an effort in
systematic thinking, combining conceptual thought and practical experience. We do not
pretend that they are of a universal nature, but we suppose them to be of a general enough
nature to be also applicable in areas outside the natural resource governance in which
we have tested them. The text that follows is only a summary: we see this only as a basis
from which to start a discussion.
Principles for governing elements
Transparency as a principle for governance images
Having insight into governance, with all its issues, activities, underpinning ideas and
knowledge, is not easy, even if those involved have the inclination to govern in an
interactive way. Although the broad demand for such insight is relatively recent, Kant
and Rousseau had already insisted on its importance in public and even private affairs
(see Hood 2006, pp. 67). Recently, transparency (classically defined as when much is
known by many) has become a condition or even a requirement to gain insight into
the world of modern governance, although there are also doubts about such beneficial
roles for transparency (see Finkelstein 2000). Transparency asks for a governance system
to be open by allowing disclosure and encouraging dissemination. If it is not audiencedirected, however, it ignores the epistemic and ethical norms required for successful
communicative acts (ONeill 2006, p. 81).
Efficiency as a principle for the choice and application of instruments
Efficiency has long been among the goals of private management. With the recent ascendancy of market thinking in the public sector, it has become a public goal as well (see,
for example, Vining and Weimer 2005). The quest for efficiency reflects a deeper principle
of frugality and the broader cardinal rule: Thou shall not waste what thou hold most
dear (Kooiman et al. 2005b, p. 270). If money is what you hold most dear, you should
avoid wasting it. If a natural resource is what you care most about, then you should
take care of it. Many techniques are available to apply and measure efficiency: cost efficiency; productivity or economic efficiency; response time or operational efficiency; and
those modalities such as static or dynamic efficiency (for example, Harrison et al. 2004;
Harrington et al. 2004). All of these techniques have their own strengths and weaknesses,
and thus combinations of more than one method of efficiency analysis and application
are needed (see, for example, Geva-May 2001).
Accountability as a principle for governance action
Accountability refers to the fact that decision-makers do not enjoy unlimited autonomy
but have to justify their action viz-`a-viz affected parties (Held and Koenig-Archibugi
2004, p. 127). A useful set of conceptual dimensions is one where accountability is
divided into three assessment targets: giving account, holding account, and direction of
accountability (Brinkerhoff 2007). These different dimensions and aspects bring us to the
826
opinion that: (1) it is better to speak of systems of accountability where many aspects hang
closely together (Falconer 2002); (2) no fit for all formulas is available or even advisable
(Benner et al. 2004); and (3) broadening and refining of the norm to international bodies,
civil society and market parties, and co-arrangements such as networks and PPPs, imply
special accountability requirements (for example, Scholte 2004; Meadowcraft 2007).
Principles for governance modes
Respect as a principle for self-governance
Respect, that is, showing consideration for or avoiding intruding on persons and things, is
a general moral notion that is frequently linked to notions of autonomy. Respect for individual autonomy does not differ essentially from respect for the autonomy of collections
of individuals and their institutions. Respect for persons is more than an individual duty;
in the meta-governance perspective, it is also a collective responsibility (Ingram 1994,
pp. 1012). For instance, the respect shown by one user group for the natural resource
management regime of another user group has Kantian connotations; it is associated with
ideas about primal rights. Because that group has fished in that area for so long (or
whatever feature is judged important), it has the right to determine how resources are
used. Consequently, it has a right to our respect for its rules (Kooiman et al. 2005b, p. 274).
Equity as a principle for hierarchical governance
Equity can be defined as the quality, state or ideal of being just, impartial and fair. A useful
distinction is between two types: procedural equity and outcome equity. The first tries to
define rules for fair procedures and the second to assess outcomes or consequences of decisions or policies according to equitable criteria in the distribution of costs, benefits, hardships and burden sharing (Banuri et al. 1995). To overcome this duality, Rayner et al. (1999)
and Linnerooth-Bayer (1999) argue for an integrated approach (in their case, to climate
change), based upon the assumption that outcome and procedural issues around equity are
basically looked at from three ethical positions: libertarian, contractarian, and egalitarian.
Inclusion as a principle for co-governance
Inclusion concerns the right to be involved in making an impact on issues and decisions
with which one is concerned (Dahl 1989). Having a voice can, however, mean very different
things from being heard (but ignored) to being directly involved as an equal participant
in the process from the planning stage, via the final vote, to the actual implementation and
evaluation of the decision made (Nabli 2003). Inclusion as a principle for co-governance
employs the latter assumption, that is, where stakeholders form partnerships where their
role is one of substance rather than simply of form. Do others, such as those who do
not benefit directly or are not directly involved, also have a right of inclusion (Mikalsen
and Jentoft 2001)? Inclusion is also a principle for balancing power relations; that is, for
securing, for those who have less power, a guarantee that they can be involved if they
have things at stake that are important to them (Jentoft 2007).
Principles for governance orders
Effectiveness as a principle for problem solving and opportunity creation
Effectiveness can be considered a relatively reliable normative meta-criterion for evaluating problem solving and opportunity creation as first-order governing activities. It can be
defined as the ability to create a match between stated goals and their achievement. The
literature on evaluation and assessment is a rich source for developing conceptual ideas
827
on how to apply effectiveness criteria to these activities. Research traditions on evaluation

and effectiveness all have their specific contributions to make, such as emphasizing more
rationalistic or more hermeneutic values (Van Vught 1987). Studies of organizations
are classic examples of effectiveness research, although not generally considered as conclusive, with doubts about their validity and reliability. The preference is usually for
multi-method approaches (see Altschuld and Zheng 1995; Todd 2001).
Responsiveness as a principle governing institutions
As a central principle for setting a standard for institutions responsiveness seems to be
an appropriate one and may apply to actors as well as to institutions (Pitkin 1967; Etzioni
1968; Kaufmann et al. 1986). With varying emphases, responsiveness is regarded as having
the quality to respond to wishes. Pitkin discusses responsiveness relatively narrow in the
context of a theory of representation. From a broader point of view, but still focusing on
the public realm, Kaufmann et al. discuss it for public services to be evaluated by a multidimensional set of standards such as legality, economy, effectiveness and responsiveness
(1986, p. 792). An even broader concept of responsiveness is formulated by Etzioni, who
sees it as an essential element of an active society, and puts it squarely in a meta-context
by using phrases such as to be active is to be responsive (1968, p. 7). The two-way character of responsiveness is one of its key elements: those governing should be responsive
to the wishes of the governed, and the governed to measures taken by their governors.
Moral responsibility as a principle for meta-governance
Finally, we come to defining a principle for meta-governance itself: how do we want
meta-governance itself to be governed and by what? Although there may be other candidates for this task, we choose moral responsibility as the most basic principle for this
specific governance task, expressing that governance itself is fundamentally ethical and
can be justified in accordance with some generally accepted values. It also subsumes other
concepts such as social responsibility, corporate responsibility and political responsibility.
In the literature, all these ascriptions have raised moral questions that have been subject
of philosophical and ethical debate (Duff 2000: 290 ff; Goodin 1998). The importance of
the ethical basis of responsibility can be seen in the way this finds its way into recent
literature applied to public as well as private realms at all societal levels: global (Young
2004), collective (Corlett 2001), institutions (Williams 2006), state (Miller 2004), public
administration (Pollitt et al. 2007), corporations (Collier and Fuller 2005), societal, organizational and individual levels (Randel 2002). We underline that the term responsibility
for has a moral loading for governors and governed alike. It is not something to be left
to discussions between moral specialists or to the exclusive agenda of ethical institutions.
To the contrary, ethical and moral questions are the essence of the governance domain; in
a fundamental sense, they are the foundations of them.
VALUES AND HARD CHOICES
To answer questions of what might make choices easy, moderate or hard, we draw
on a literature addressing what is called the (in)compatibility, (in)comparability or
(in)commensurability of values. The relevance of this body of thought can be expressed
as follows: Every choice situation is governed by some value (Chang 1997, p. 7). Easy
choices are characterized by values that are basically comparable, commensurable and
compatible. Moderate choices involve mixes of comparable and commensurable values.
828
Hard choices are those where the values at stake are incomparable, incommensurable and
incompatible. Or, put differently, easy choices can be dealt with on the basis of exchanges
between or within the scope of one value, while moderate choices make trade-offs between
different but comparable or commensurable values. In hard choices, on the other hand,
these options are not available: choices are of the eitheror type and incommensurable.
Incomparability means that items cannot be compared; they simply are of a different kind
(Chang 1997). Notably, we are aware that some see it the other way around: Incompatible
moral claims become incommensurable when trade-offs become unavailable because
there is no common currency (Lukes 1991, p. 11). Raz uses them synonymously (Raz,
quoted by Chang 1997, p. 1). There is also the use of incomparability; values are not only
of different kind, but attempts to compare them may break down (MacLean 1998).
This discussion is of importance because it relates to the discussions on the pros and
cons of the application of techniques such as costbenefit analysis and the reasoning
behind them. There are those who are of the opinion that there are no incompatible
or incomparable values. In the view of Chang (and others), comparability is essential,
because without comparability there are no trade-offs between costs and benefits, no
maximization of utility, no good consequences of value, nor the possibility that practical
reason might guide choices if alternatives are incomparable (Chang 1997, pp. 23). Those
in favour of this kind of economic and politico-economic reasoning and the theoretical (and
normative) basis for them rely, in one way or other, on comparability, commensurability
and compatibility, as Chang has clearly expressed.
Therefore, it is understandable that opponents of these economic and politicoeconomic concepts challenge their theoretical basis. For example, Radin (1996) argues
that commensurability is central to what is called commodification and, in particular,
to universal commodification. In a similar vein we find argumentation in environmental
policy studies, where the issue of treating choices as simple trade-offs is discussed
(Bromley and Paavola 2002). In the opinion of these scholars, the tendency is to consider
values expressed in environmental policies as commensurable. For example, Holland
(2002) shows that the assumption of comparability, which underlies these pleas for tradeoffs, no longer goes unchallenged. Not seeing trade-offs as the major form of rational
choice making does not deny the existence of tough decisions to the contrary. . . the
exchange or trade-off model fails utterly to explain the toughness of tough decisions. They
only conceal the toughness of choice (Holland 2002, p. 25).
There is also a tendency to emphasize the instrumental side of dealing with plural
values in choice situations. This might be an attempt to force a plurality of values into a
mould, or to misrepresent them, in order to make them commensurable with a particular
purpose, for example, for the practice of costbenefit analysis (MacLean 1998, p. 110). If
the alternatives in a choice situation can be phrased in terms of one overriding criterion or
comparable value, then a trade-off might be possible and the conflict lessened. Generally,
in environmental-economic theories, this is a common way of looking at choices. We
do not argue that in situations where politico-economic techniques are used, trade-offs
between values at stake and rational choices are impossible. In terms of difficulty, thus
of importance, they are, in our opinion, of the medium type of choices but limited
to specific governance situations in which trade-offs seem a feasible way of rational
choice-making.
In one way or another most, if not all, theories see governing choices as being guided
by rationality concepts. This seems logical: which governor, public or private, wants to
be said to be irrational? However, limiting choices as a question of rationality or looking
829
at rational choice behaviour does not help all that much. There are many contradictory
theories and concepts trying to explain choice as rational. This has not only to do with
the multitude of rationality concepts utilized, but also with the ways in which the relation
between rationality and choice is conceptualized. Max Webers distinction between instrumental and value rationality comes to mind here the former stressing that things may
have value in themselves regardless of their functional utility (Weber 1978). In fact, we
argue that interactive governance is indeed an issue of value rationality as much as instrumental rationality, for instance, because of its emphasis of issues such as participation
and the relevance of ethics. Governance as a concept and practice generally stresses the
importance of addressing, deliberating and applying both types of rationality. This is in
contrast with conventional management theories, which for the most part typically talk
about and make recommendations with regard to instrumental values, that is, how to
accomplish goals with the least effort or most cost-effectiveness.
In the section that follows, we distinguish between four rationality types that we believe
are relevant to societal governance. They may be seen as choice models, in other words,
as building blocks for a meta-choice perspective.
Actor-bounded conceptions of rational choice
Bounded rationality
Herbert Simon (1957) conceived the idea of bounded-rationality. According to Simon,
actors are always rational within limits. Their learning capacities and their ability to
acquire and process information are never complete. They cannot know what all the
alternative action opportunities are nor predict with full certainty what the positive and
negative outcomes will be. Thus, they make choices that provide results that they can
live with, that are good enough under given circumstances. Then, according to Simon,
satisficing rather than maximizing behaviour is rational in that it responds to finite
means towards a particular end. The bounded rational actor overcomes his limitations by
setting out procedures or following operating rules, for instance, rules of thumb, to reach
a satisfactory outcome. Although Simon assumes that the boundaries may be opening up
and widening, they still do not disappear.
Rational reasoning
Giving reasons for ones choices is considered to be the most common denominator of
all conceptual perspectives on rationality. As stated by Simon (1995, p. 48): Virtually all
human behaviour is rational. People usually have reasons for what they do, and when
asked, can opine what these reasons are. In real life, however, decision makers often
rationalize. The reasons follow rather than precede action. This can be rational in the sense
that, for example, because of the complexity of a governance issue the consequences can
only be judged after the decision has been taken.
A weak, if not the weakest form of rationality to be applied in governance might
be a rational choice based upon reasons, irrespective of what these reasons may be
(Lupia et al. 2000, p. 7). To find out what this form of rationality might mean, one must
probe deeper into the analysis of how people reason about why they do what they do. In
this perspective, choice must be regarded as an individuals contemplation of plausible
reasons for action, and then taking that action (choice) for which the individual can muster
best reasons, and preferences or utility do not count as reasons (Bromley and Paavola
2002, p. 265).
830
Collectively oriented perspectives on rational choice

Communicative rationality
Actors producing patterns of interactions use language to coordinate their actions. In this
coordination, Habermas holds, actors are oriented towards reaching an understanding
in concrete, practical situations. Communicative rationality characterizes interactions
between social actors striving for a common definition of reality by means of
communicating (Habermas 1984, 1987; see also White 1995, pp. 3643). The essence
of communicative rationality is striving for consensus based upon critical weighing of
arguments. This may lead to acceptance of an argument by one party as given by another or
by the mutual adaptation of views by all parties concerned. Communicative rationality, as
phrased by Habermas and the debate it provoked, is a prime source for testing arguments
and reasons given in the collective processes of making choices and decisions.
Interactive learning as rationality
A more dynamic analytical approach is to conceptualize collective choice as interactive
learning. Learning is the process in which information becomes knowledge (Jentoft et al.
1999). Governance allows for mutual, interactive learning for decision making. Learning
can take two different forms: (1) single-loop learning; (2) double-loop or meta-learning
(what Bateson (1972) called deutero learning). This is learning how to learn; in our case it
is learning to make governance a learning process. Double-loop learning happens when
the basic variables and conditions that create disparity at the first level are identified and
changed. Interactive learning is a process in which participants learn from each other and
from each others learning. How learning proceeds throughout an institutional process as
a cause and effect and as a force shaping the change process itself is also an important
governance question.
Comparing perspectives
These different approaches to rationality create an opportunity to locate and conceptualize various kinds of choice situations related to different kinds of rationality. This is
important as already mentioned because it is generally assumed that choice-making
is a rational activity, whatever rationality might mean in a particular situation. In other
words, rationality and choice meet when a choice arises and asks for a certain rationality
to be applied in a particular decision to be made. A way to establish this relation between
different types of choice and the kind of rationality belonging to them is to distinguish
four types of decision situations, each asking for their particular type of choice based
upon a fitting type of rationality:
1. The simplest decision situation is where a unitary actor (for example, a public
or private organization) has to make a governance choice in which values do
not play a salient role. It may perhaps be a complicated one, but not in terms of
the values involved. In such a situation, Simons concept of bounded rationality
seems to be a proper choice strategy.
2. Somewhat more difficult is the choice situation where the issue is not especially value laden, but where several parties are involved. Here a systematic
and transparent decision-making process on the basis of Habermas concept of
communicative rationality is the most fitting choice strategy.
3. Where a unitary actor is placed before an issue with high value content, the main
challenge seems to be to convince those bearing the effects of it of the reasonableness of the choice made, but the choice itself remains the responsibility of the actor.
831
4. This is not so in the situation where several parties have to make a choice together
and the situation is value laden, perhaps values are even incommensurable: the
real hard choices. In such a situation we assume that a common and interactive
learning strategy is the most rational strategy.
Since these situations are where interactive governance is particularly needed, we devote
the final section to what we mean by interactive learning.
CHOICE AS INTERACTIVE LEARNING
Hard choices in governance will usually mean a choice situation where many values
compete for attention. In this case, whatever we do would be wrong. . . and in part
precisely from the absence of a yardstick, a circumstance that leaves us confused. . .
(Holland 2002, p. 25). This is the sort of choice where we would have to look for other
ways to bring conflicting values together, for example, in natural resource management
when use values are up against conservation values, aesthetic values or heritage values,
or when efficiency concerns conflict with distributional ones, economic versus cultural
values and so forth. In those choice situations, governance would aim at reasoned
principles rather than calculated outcomes. For those choices we must be using some
procedure that differs fundamentally from the deductive rational procedure (Denzau and
North 2000, p. 31). This procedure, in their eyes, is essentially about learning not direct
learning on an individual level, because the world is too complex for a single individual to
learn directly how it all works (Denzau and North 2000, p. 34), but interactive, culturally
framed learning in which ideology and institutions play a crucial role. In the opinion of
these authors, culture provides human beings with shared mental models, necessary to
interpret and bring order into their environment. This is also why interactive governance
is of such great importance in dealing with hard choices. There are models available that
weigh alternatives based upon different and even incompatible value systems. However,
in the last resort, socio-political processes guided by the proper governing institutional
arrangements must decide upon which values and whose values should have priority. In
order to cope with hard choices, it is wise for the bearers of the various value systems
to be allowed to participate in one way or another in some form of interactive learning
process. This is in fact the only way in which the true nature of those values can come
alive, where differences in expertise and opinion can be identified, and where potential
areas of consensus can be explored.
The process by which values, principles, concerns, goals and means are determined
must, according to the governance principles outlined above, be at the very least open,
transparent and participatory, because the choices will be hard choices all the way. Should
the process halt at one stage because hard choices are too tough, rather than moving ahead
with the problem unresolved but suppressed, an alternative is to take one step back by
moving the deliberation to the higher governance order (that is, the meta) where values,
norms and principles are the issue. This is one of the aspects that distinguishes governance
from management. In management, attention is concentrated predominantly on goals and
means. In governance, on the other hand, effort is spent on reflecting and deliberating on
basic values, concerns and principles; this is where any rational governing process should
start and end. What makes our governance approach different from other approaches
to problem-solving and opportunity creation is its insistence on the precedence of
basic social, economic, political and ethical values, and on the governance principles to
be derived from them. Moreover, this perspective on governance also prescribes some
832
principles and guidelines as to the process through which these basic values, concerns and
principles can be deliberated a process of inclusion, communication and cooperation.
Thus, as a normative discourse, interactive governance makes claims about the necessity
of choosing among values and arriving at some operational principles interactively; it does
not necessarily make claims as to what these values and principles should be in particular
choice situations. The principles stated above, then, are to be understood as suggested
ones, but ones which we nevertheless believe are relevant for any discourse on governance.
This is the essence of governance in modern societies, a governance involving many
actors, groups and organizations government and non-government and where no
single actor has sufficient knowledge or action potential to dominate unilaterally in a
particular governance model (Kooiman 2003). The pooling of these resources is in itself
a problem and one that may be difficult to overcome. It would obviously help if actors
were to be constituted as a group, such as in a formal organization, and if incentives exist
to encourage involved and affected actors to share their knowledge. Thus, interactive
governance must allow for the pooling of specialized competencies, but also for mutual,
interactive learning throughout the decision-making process and afterwards. Learning
would then be both unilateral and multilateral and would form feedback loops. It would
occur at all levels of governance, from the level of practical problem solving, which
we have termed first-order governing, to the second and third order or meta level
of governance. Bateson (1972) calls learning at the meta-level deutero-learning, that is,
learning about learning. In governance situations, this would then be learning about
interactive learning, which is basically how to build social relations that are conducive to
making hard choices. At the first level, Argyris (1992) talks about single-loop learning,
while at the second order of governance his term for learning is double-loop. Single-loop
learning takes place when a mismatch between intentions and results is discerned and
corrected. In other words, single-loop learning is what happens at the level of first-order
governance. Double-loop learning at the second-order level happens when the basic
institutional variables and conditions that create disparity at the first level are identified
and changed. Argyris argues that more emphasis should be put on double- than on
single-loop learning: Although single loop actions are the most numerous, they are not
necessarily the most powerful. Double-loop actions the master programs control the
long range effectiveness, and hence, the ultimate destiny of the system (1992, p. 10).
Learning at the meta-order of governance requires that we deliberately question and
scrutinize fundamental assumptions and values. Such reasoning, for governing actors,
may be felt as threatening and they may be inclined to evade or resist it what Argyris
calls distancing. Consequently, governance changes often occur only at the margins,
new solutions are sought that are close to old ones, and these solutions do not attempt
radically to improve current affairs. Major crises are likely to cause more fundamental
value patterns to change, that is, trigger meta-learning. Even then, inert forces are at play
such as powerful stakeholders with an interest in maintaining the status quo. If so, hard
choices are simply suppressed or postponed.
This brings us to the way power may influence meta-governance learning processes.
Power is inherent in governance; the World Bank (2004) even defines governance in
terms of power, although in governance theories its role is not well enough recognized,
as Jentoft remarks (2007, p. 432). This role applies to all its components, including its
meta-aspects. Interactive learning as a way to deal with hard governance choices and
the conflicts accompanying those choices, therefore, will also be liable to the influence of
power. Power will be exerted at the level of agents interacting in learning processes, as
833
well as in the relational, collective and institutional dimensions of these processes. And
since knowledge is power, the reverse is also true. According to Foucault truth isnt
outside power or lacking in power: it is integral to power (quoted by Jentoft 2007, p. 433).
In the context of interactive learning, we can fully agree with the definition of power as
given by Arts and van Tatenhove: [P]ower is the organizational and discursive capacity
of agencies, either in competition with one another or jointly, to achieve outcomes in
social practices, a capacity which is however co-determined by the structural power of
those social institutions in which these agencies are embedded (2004, p. 347).
Interactive learning is a process by which participants learn from each other and from
each others learning. In the best of circumstances, these learning processes may occur at
all three levels. For learning to become a permanent feature of the governance process
rather than sporadic and ad hoc, second- and third-order/meta-learning is essential. This
learning has to be encouraged and explicitly planned for as inherent to the governance
process itself. How this can be done interactively is an interesting research issue. We
must then address some empirical questions: How are new opportunities for learning
and problem solving discovered at each level of governance? Are new opportunities
intentionally sought out or are they primarily stumbled upon? How is new knowledge
fed back into the governance process? Does meta-learning occur, and how does it change
governance and its institutions?
Interactive learning requires systematic recording and reflection on experiences made
throughout the governance process. How governing systems structure these exercises
will determine the capacity of governors to learn and to share what they learn. It is not
only a question of how individuals learn. The more challenging issue is how learning at
the individual level penetrates the governing system as a whole so that it persists over
time and becomes embedded in how the system works. One way to embed such learning
is in principles that are stated as formal guidelines for governance systems, for instance,
in the form of official ethical codes, publicized goals or in value accounting.
CONCLUSION
We have argued that governance should be founded on certain basic principles and work
according to a set of values that are made explicit. The analytical, ethical and political
convictions should be reflected upon and communicated to those governed as part of
the governance process. When problems are addressed and certain solutions ascribed to
these problems, inevitably, fundamental assumptions and worldviews are drawn upon
that should be brought to the surface so they can be explained, defended and examined.
This also applies to governance itself. The way problems are solved or opportunities
created, and the institutional frameworks enabling or controlling these activities, are also
built on normative notions. Some of these may be relatively well-known and explicit as
expected and worked out in traditional democratic governance modes but others may
remain obscure or less well-defined as in more experimental modes, where the boundaries
between public and private are hazy, complicated and constantly shifting. We claim that
both these fields of normative notions belong to the realm of governance.
Second, we believe that communication and hence the democratic process of decisionmaking would be strengthened if governors, stakeholders and others involved in governance were to agree on basic principles. Even if they cannot agree on what the principles
should be, they should at least be able to understand which concerns and stakes are important for themselves as well as for other involved parties. This can only happen if principles
834
are made clear and are made a subject for interactive learning. In our conceptualization,
values and norms come before principles, which again are followed by goals and means.
Principles express which values and norms are valid and determine which goals are
ethical and reasonable. Governance should start by clarifying which values and norms are
at stake, then identifying the fundamental principles and, from there, embark on making
choices in deciding the goals that should be pursued before finally turning to the means.
Third, we ask also of principles that they serve as a yardstick, something to relate to
when we evaluate and criticize current governance systems and practices, and suggest
reforms. Which conceptual and moral standards are we referring to when we make
judgements? How do actual governance systems and practices compare with our deeper
convictions and concerns? In addition, we are asking for consistency. The normative
foundations used in governance should be consistent. It does not make sense to propose
environmental or social policies on the basis of conflicting normative considerations. If
principles turn out to be inconsistent, incompatible or even incommensurable, this should
be made explicit to enable everyone concerned to follow the normative reasoning followed
and to help deal with the contradictions and dilemmas faced.
Fourth, governance should balance contextual and universal principles. In governance
there is always the possibility that principles differ because social practices and cultural
values differ, and those involved in governance should be sensitive to those differences.
Contextual and universal principles may well appear to be in conflict: as with, for instance,
human rights and local self-determination. What should happen in such cases cannot be
determined in advance. There are never any easy answers to how conflicts should be
resolved. In natural resource governance, as well as in other governance realms, we should
be prepared to accept the possibility that contextual principles and practices will have to
yield to universal ones. In regulatory enforcement, for example, there are limits to corporal
punishment. Individuals and groups have rights. We should not be oblivious, however,
to the possibility of alternative ways of solving conflicts between universal and contextual
principles that may minimize or eliminate conflicts altogether. Solutions ought not to
be imposed on communities. Communication and diplomacy are always preferable to
force, although situations are conceivable where the latter is called for as a last resort: for
instance, when regulatory measures are systematically and deliberately broken.
Finally, we argue that interactive governance is an approach to problem solving and
opportunity creation that stresses the need to involve people in a participatory process
that allows collective reasoning and interactive learning to occur. In a complex, diverse
and dynamic world, the political and managerial choices to be made and the institutional
framework we establish around them are necessarily also complex, dynamic and diverse.
However, these choices should be rooted in some basic principles, norms and values of considerable permanence and stability. What these are cannot be taken as given, but need to be
reflected and deliberated upon interactively among all those involved and affected by them
until a choice is made. In this paper we argue that such choices are rarely easy, and that
they involve values that are often contradictory that is, inconsistent, incompatible and
sometimes incommensurable. This demands approaches where the processes leading to
these choices have been thoroughly prepared. The methodology sketched out in this paper,
in which the major normative notions involved in such processes have been formulated, is,
however, not an assurance of effective and legitimate outcomes or that those (hard) choices
are actually made. However, the effort to bring them out into the open, where affected
interests are allowed to participate, is a necessary condition for this ever to happen. Enhancing the meta-governance quality of governance activities is an important value in itself.
835
REFERENCES
Altschuld, J.W. and H.Y. Zheng. 1995. Assessing the Effect of Research Organizations, Evaluation Research, 2, 197216.
Argyris, C. 1992. On Organizational Learning. Cambridge: Blackwell.
Arts, B. and J. van Tatenhove. 2004. Policy and Power: A Conceptual Framework between the Old and the New Policy
Idioms, Policy Sciences, 37, 3, 33956.
Banuri, T., K. Goran-M
aler, M. Grubb, et al. 1995. Equity and Social Considerations, in J.P. Bruce, H. Lee and E.F. Haites (eds),
Climate Change 1995. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 81118.
Bateson, G. 1972. Steps to an Ecology of Mind. New York: Ballantine Books.
Bavinck, M., R. Chuenpagdee, M. Diallo, et al. 2005. Interactive Fisheries Governance: A Guide to Better Practice. Delft: Eburon.
Benner, T., W.H. Reinicke and J.M. Witte. 2004. Multisectoral Networks in Global Governance: Towards a Pluralistic System of
Accountability, Government and Opposition, 39, 2, 191210.
Berger, P.L. and T. Luckmann. 1966. The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge. Garden City, NY:
Anchor Books.
Brinkerhoff, J.M. 2007. Partnerships as Means to Good Governance: Towards an Evaluation Framework, in P. Glasbergen,
F. Biermann and A.P.J. Mol (eds), Partnerships, Governance and Sustainable Development: Reflections on Theory and Practice.
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, pp. 6889.
Bromley, D.W. and J. Paavola (eds). 2002. Economics, Ethics, and Environmental Policy. Oxford: Blackwell.
Chang, R. (ed.). 1997. Incommensurablity, Incomparability, and Practical Reason. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Collier, J. and T. Fuller. 2005. Corporations, Ethics and Global Futures, Introduction, Futures, Special Issue, 37, 23, 111.
Corlett, J.A. 2001. Collective Moral Responsibility. Journal of Social Philosophy, 31, 4, 57384.
Dahl, R.A. 1989. Democracy and its Critics. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Denzau, A.T. and D.C. North. 2000. Shared Mental Models: Ideologies and Institutions, in A. Lupia, M.D. McCubbins and
S.L. Popkin (eds), Elements of Reason. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 2346.
Duff, A.S. 2000. Information Society Studies. London: Routledge.
Etzioni, A. 1968. The Active Society. New York: The Free Press.
Falconer, J. 2002. Accountability in a Complex World, Emergence, 4, 4, 2538.
FAO. 1995. Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries. Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization.
Finkelstein, N. (ed.). 2000. Transparency in Public Policy: Great Britain and the United States. London: Macmillan.
Geva-May, I. 2001. Higher Education and Attainment of Policy Goals: Interpretations of Efficiency Indicators in Israel, Higher
Education, 42, 265305.
Giddens, A. 1984. The Constitution of Society. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
Goodin, R.E. 1998. Collective Responsibility, in D.R.E. Schmidtz and R.E. Goodin (eds), Social Welfare and Individual Responsibility.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 14554.
Habermas, J. 1987 [1984]. The Theory of Communicative Action, I and II. Boston, MA: Beacon Press.
Harrington, W., R.D. Morgenstern and T. Sterner. 2004. Choosing Environmental Policy. Washington, DC: Resources for the Future.
Harrison, J.P., M.N. Coppola and M. Wakefield. 2004. Efficiency of Federal Hospitals in the United States, Journal of Medical
Systems, 28, 5, 41122.
Held, D. and M. Koenig-Archibugi. 2004. Global Governance and Public Accountability, Introduction, Government and
Opposition, Special Issue, 39, 2, 12531.
Holland, A. 2002. Are Choices Trade-offs? in D.W. Bromley and J. Paavola (eds), Economics, Ethics, and Environmental Policy.
Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 1733.
Hood, C. (ed.). 2006. Transparency: A Key to Better Governance? Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Ingram, A. 1994. A Political Theory of Rights. Oxford: The Clarendon Press.
Jentoft, S., P. Friis, J. Kooiman and J.W. van der Schans. 1999. Knowledge-based Fisheries, in J Kooiman, S. Jentoft and
M. van Vliet. (eds), Creative Governance: Opportunities for Fisheries in Europe. Aldershot: Ashgate, pp. 23958.
Jentoft, S. 2007. In the Power of Power. The Understated Aspect of Fisheries and Coastal Management, Human Organization, 66,
4, 43847.
Jessop, B. 2003. Governance and Meta-governance: On Reflexivity, Requisite Variety and Requisite Irony, in H.P. Bang (ed.),
Governance as Social and Political Communication. Manchester: Manchester University Press, pp. 10166.
Kaufmann, X.F., G. Majone and V. Ostrom (eds). 1986. Guidance, Control and Evaluation of the Public Sector. Berlin: De Gruyter.
Kjr, A.M. 2004. Governance. Oxford: Polity Press.
Kooiman, J. 2003. Governing as Governance. London: Sage.
Kooiman, J., M. Bavinck, S. Jentoft and R. Pullin (eds). 2005a. Fish for Life: Interactive Governance for Fisheries. Amsterdam:
Amsterdam University Press.
Kooiman, J., S. Jentoft, M. Bavinck, et al. 2005b. Meta-principles, in J. Kooiman, M. Bavinck, S. Jentoft and R. Pullin (eds), Fish
for Life: Interactive Governance for Fisheries. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, pp. 26583.
836
Linnerooth-Bayer, J. 1999. Climate Change and Multiple Views of Fairness, in F.L. Toth
(ed.), Fair Weather. London: Earthscan,
pp. 4564.
Lukes, S. 1991. Moral Conflict and Politics. Oxford: The Clarendon Press.
Lupia A., M.D. McCubbins and S.L. Popkin (eds). 2000. Elements of Reason. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
MacLean, D. 1998. The Ethics of Cost-benefit Analysis: Incommensurable, Incompatible and Incomparable Values, in
M.M. Carrow, R.P. Churchill and J.J. Cordes (eds), Democracy, Social Values, and Public Policy. Westport, CT: Praeger,
pp. 10721.
Meadowcraft, J. 2007. Democracy and Accountability: The Challenge for Cross-sectoral Partnerships, in P. Glasbergen,
F. Biermann and A.P.J. Mol (eds), Partnerships, Governance and Sustainable Development: Reflections on Theory and Practice.
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, pp. 194213.
Mikalsen, K.H and S. Jentoft. 2001. From User-groups to Stakeholders? The Public Interest in Fisheries Management, Marine
Policy, 25, 4, 28192.
Miller, D. 2004. Holding Nations Responsible, Ethics, 114, 2, 24068.
Nabli, M.K. 2003. Inclusiveness and Better Governance. Washington, DC: The World Bank.
ONeill, O. 2006. Transparency and the Ethics of Communication, in C. Hood (ed.), Transparency: A Key to Better Governance?
Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 7590.
Pitkin, H. 1967. The Concept of Representation. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
Pollitt, C. 2007. Responsible Government, International Review Administrative Sciences, 73, 1, special issue.
Radin, M.J. 1996. Contested Commodities. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Randel, A.E. 2002. The Maintenance of an Organizations Socially Responsible Practice, Business and Society, 41, 1, 6183.
Rawls, J.A 1971. Theory of Justice. Cambridge. MA: The Belknap Press.
Rayner, S., E.I. Malone and M. Thompson. 1999. Equity Issues and Integrated Assessment, in F.L. Toth
(ed.), Fair Weather.
London: Earthscan, pp. 1243.
Scholte, J.A. 2004. Civil Society and Democratically Accountable Governance, Government and Opposition, 39, 2, 21133.
Schuppert, G.F. (ed.) 2005. Governance-Forschung. Baden-Baden: Nomos.
Simon, H.A. 1957. Models of Man: Social and Rational. New York: Wiley.
Simon, H.A. 1995. Rationality in Political Behavior, Political Psychology, 16, 4561.
Sklair, L. 1988. Transcending the Impasse: Metatheory, Theory and Empirical Research in the Sociology of Development and
Underdevelopment, World Development, 16, 697709.
Srensen, E. and J. Torfing. 2007. Theoretical Approaches to Metagovernance, in E. Srensen and J. Torfing (eds), Theories of
Democratic Network Governance. Basingstoke: Palgrave, pp. 16982.
Todd, S. 2001. Measuring the Effectiveness of Environmental Dispute Settlement Efforts, Environmental Impact Assessment
Review, 21, 1, 97110.
Van Tulder, R. and A. Van der Zwart. 2006. International Business-Society Management. London: Routledge.
Van Vught, F.A. 1987. Verklaringsmodellen bij Beleidsevaluatie: de Keuze tussen de Rationalistische en de Hermeneutische
Evaluatiemethodologie, in P.B. Lehning and J.B.D. Simonis (eds), Handboek Beleidswetenschap. Meppel: Boom, pp. 15476.
Vining, A.R. and D.L. Weimer. 2005. Economic Perspectives on Public Organizations, in E. Ferlie, L.E. Lynn Jr. and C. Pollitt
(eds), The Oxford Handbook of Public Management. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 20933.
Webb, K. (ed.). 2004. Voluntary Codes: Private Governance, the Public Interest and Innovation. Ottawa: Carleton University, Carleton
Research Unit for Innovation, Science and Environment.
Weber, M. 1978. Economy and Society, Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich (eds). Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
White, S.K. 1995. The Cambridge Companion to Habermas. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Whitehead, M. 2003. In the Shadow of Hierarchy: Meta-Governance, Policy Reform and Urban Regeneration in the West
Midlands, Area, 35, 1, 614.
Williams, G.T. 2006. Infrastructures of Responsibility: the Moral Tasks of Institutions, Applied Philosophy, 23, 2, 20721.
World Bank. 2004. Good Management Practice in Sustainable Fisheries: Policy Brief 12 (http://www.onefish.org/global/archive/
sifar/DfID_Keysheets/WBPolicyBrief12_l.htm) (21 September 2007).
Young, I.M. 2004. Responsibility and Global Labor Justice, Journal of Political Philosophy, 12, 4, 36588.
Date received 18 September 2007. Date accepted 30 June 2008.

Copyright of Public Administration is the property of Blackwell Publishing Limited and its content may not be
copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written
permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use.

Met A Governance

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Met A Governance

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Met A Governance

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9299.2009.01780.

META-GOVERNANCE: VALUES, NORMS AND

Meta-governance or governance of governance is a concept that raises questions regarding

META-GOVERNANCE: VALUES, NORMS AND PRINCIPLES

JAN KOOIMAN AND SVEIN JENTOFT

META-GOVERNANCE: VALUES, NORMS AND PRINCIPLES

JAN KOOIMAN AND SVEIN JENTOFT

META-GOVERNANCE: VALUES, NORMS AND PRINCIPLES

(e.g. Equality.Justice..DifferenceProperty right)

FIGURE 1 Meta-governance process

JAN KOOIMAN AND SVEIN JENTOFT

META-GOVERNANCE: VALUES, NORMS AND PRINCIPLES

The way we want to approach the formulation of meta-governance principles is on the

JAN KOOIMAN AND SVEIN JENTOFT

META-GOVERNANCE: VALUES, NORMS AND PRINCIPLES

on how to apply effectiveness criteria to these activities. Research traditions on evaluation

JAN KOOIMAN AND SVEIN JENTOFT

META-GOVERNANCE: VALUES, NORMS AND PRINCIPLES

JAN KOOIMAN AND SVEIN JENTOFT

Collectively oriented perspectives on rational choice

META-GOVERNANCE: VALUES, NORMS AND PRINCIPLES

JAN KOOIMAN AND SVEIN JENTOFT

META-GOVERNANCE: VALUES, NORMS AND PRINCIPLES

JAN KOOIMAN AND SVEIN JENTOFT

META-GOVERNANCE: VALUES, NORMS AND PRINCIPLES

JAN KOOIMAN AND SVEIN JENTOFT

Date received 18 September 2007. Date accepted 30 June 2008.

Public Administration Vol. 87, No. 4, 2009 (818836)

You might also like