On the Compatibility of Free Will and Divine Foreknowledge

An Account Based on Augustines Refutation of Cicero

Submitted to Dr. Matthew Walz

By James Berquist
IPS Philosophy
3/17/2010

Introduction:
Is it possible that there be both foreknowledge of events and that the wills behind the
events remain free? Cicero, as presented by Augustine, is adamant that the two cannot be
reconciled. His argument is simple, and all the more powerful for that simplicity. If there is
foreknowledge of events, then they must happen in a certain order. But, if a certain order of
things, then a certain order of causes, for nothing can happen if not preceded by some efficient
cause.1 Therefore, all things would happen in accord with a fixed chain of causality. Such a
chain of causality would lead to a necessity in the happening of all events, and thus do away
with choice. This ultimately leads Cicero to deny foreknowledge of future things, in order to
make men free.2 Augustine states that in so doing Cicero makes them sacrilegious.3 This is
because the acceptance of divine foreknowledge, of course, is necessary for a man of faith.
Cicero, however, is simply anxious to respect his own experience of choice.
So, are they irreconcilable, as Cicero would have it? Must men of faith abandon their
free will in order to uphold divine omniscience? Augustine presents a very clear response, The
religious mind chooses both, confesses both, and maintains both by the faith of piety.4 So, the
Christian, according to Augustine, must hold both that his will is free and that his future actions
are nonetheless foreknown.
With such a response to Cicero, Augustine has purposefully given himself the task of
explaining how it is that ones faith confesses both without being in logical contradiction. This
1

Augustine, City of God in Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Vol. 2, Augustine: City of God and On Christian Doctrine,
ed. Philip Schaff (Peabody, Mass.: Hendrickson Publishers, 1994), 90
2
Augustine, City of God, 90
3
Ibid., 91
4
Ibid., 91

task he performs admirably, inasmuch as a careful examination of Augustines explanation in

City of God shows that not only are the two, namely divine foreknowledge and free will, able to
exist together, but that the correct understanding of them demands that they do so.
Now, in approaching any difficulty it is clearly necessary to know what exactly that
difficulty is, and what it entails. Further, if solutions have been proposed, it is wise to pay
attention to them, or at least to the best among them. Finally, it is good to be aware as to how
ones own time views the difficulty and the proposed solutions. This is because argument is not
only about coming to the truth, but about sharing that truth. It is the nature of truth to be held
by many and not made inaccessible through any one persons possession of it. Even if an
argument holds the truth, it may nonetheless ignore that aspect of the problem which inhibits
the understanding of those currently interested. Thus an awareness of recent thought on the
subject is worth considering.
So, in order to explicate Augustines answer in the City of God to the fullest extent, I
propose a definite order of consideration. First of all, the problem itself needs to be
understood. Augustine gives the apparent contradiction complete attention; he does not gloss
over the difficulty at all.
Secondly, there is a truly serviceable answer given by Boethius, in his Consolation of
Philosophy. His answer is worthy of consideration and evaluation. This evaluation will be of the
position itself, but with an eye to how it is viewed in contemporary literature on the subject. A
fair examination of the argument will show that the traditional response, while not wrong or

even really incomplete, nonetheless leaves one aspect of the problem apparently unanswered,
and that it is this aspect that keeps contemporary writers concerned.
Finally, I intend to lay out Augustines solution in the City of God. The response therein
includes, and, moreover, is for the sake of that underlying premise which solves the aspect the
more traditional answer relies upon.

Part I: The Problem

In the City of God, Augustine presents the difficulty from both directions. First he lays
out the difficulty as was presented above. If there is divine foreknowledge, then there is an
order in which all things will happen. If there is an order of happenings, then there is an order
of causes, since all things are caused. But, if there is an order of causes, how can all happenings
not be already determined? Such determination of all happenings and events precludes any
possibility of things happening in any other way than in the way determined. But if this is so,
there is no such thing as a free will, a will that may choose one way or the other.
After presenting it this way, Augustine starts with the possibility of free will. If there is
free will then there is not a certain order of causes; and if there is not a certain order of
causes, then there is not a certain order of things foreknown by God.5 So, if there is no certain
order in happenings and events, then there cannot be certain knowledge of them.
The problem clearly revolves around the question of the order of things. Having a
certain order, there is determination. Having no determination, then there is no certain order.

Ibid., 91

The order in events is the fundamental question under dispute. Granting free will and thus no
certain order seems to deny divine prescience; granting divine prescience affirms a certain
order and seems to destroy free will.

Part II: The Traditional Solution

A) Boethius
The traditional solution bases itself on a particular notion of eternality. This notion is
first present in Augustines Confessions. Therein he lays out a possible situation of a creature
that knows past present and future in the same way as he, Augustine, knows a psalm. 6
Following this, Augustine says, Far be it that you, Creator of the universe, Creator of souls and
bodies, far be it that in such wise you should know future and past far more deeply do you
know them.7 The far more deeply mode of knowing is that of eternal knowing. God is
unchangeably eternal, and as such there is no change in Him as He knows or views the past,
present, and future. Any creature, however, must experience change when knowing and
experiencing that which is foreknown. The example of the psalm admirably fills out Augustines
point as he considers himself changing in thought as he proceeds through the psalm that he
knows.
God, then, is unchanged throughout His act of knowing and thinking, and thus must be
viewing the whole of time at once. Otherwise His perception would change as the future came
to fulfillment. He is outside of time, and is nonetheless always cognizant of it.

6
7

Augustine, Confessions, trans. John K. Ryan (New York: Doubleday, 1960), 303
Augustine, Confessions, 303

Boethius, in his Consolation of Philosophy, affirms this notion of Gods foreknowledge

and presents it in his defense of human freedom.
Since then, every judgment comprehends the subject present to it according to
its own nature, and since God lives in the eternal present, His knowledge
transcends all movement of time, and abides in its simplicity of the immediate
present (Gods knowledge) regards all things in its simple comprehension as if
they were all now taking place Why then do you imagine that things are
necessary when illuminated by this divine light, since even men do not impose
necessity on things that they see?8
So, Gods knowledge is different in kind than ours because He is not a temporal being. Rather,
He sees all at once, which is in agreement with Augustines position in his Confessions, and
seeing by itself does not require the determination of the thing seen.
This solution to the quandary is by no means absurd. It makes the distinction between
Gods mode of knowing and ours. Just because mankind knows events in succession does not
mean that succession is the only way to know reality. Further, the divine mode of knowing does
not compromise the act of willing at any one moment. Rather it is simply cognizant of the
whole at once.
B) Contemporary Literature
There has been more than a little interest in this question. Many theologians and
philosophers feel the need to answer this question one way or the other, since it concerns the
freedom of the will. It is important inasmuch as we ourselves want to know that our salvation
or damnation is a matter of justice. After all, can we respect, let alone worship, a being who
rewards and punishes us according to that which we perform by necessity?

Boethius, Consolation of Philosophy, trans. Richard Green (New York: Bobbs-Merril Company Inc., 1962), 116-117

Among, however, the many articulations of the difficulty at hand, there are some that
pertain more to the traditional solution and to Augustines particular treatment in the City of
God. It is these accounts that are most pertinent to our current consideration.
Nelson Pike, for one, has dwelt extensively on the subject in numerous articles 9 and his
book, God and Timelessness. By the term timelessness, Pike understands the being outside of
time in the sense understood by Boethius. In his book, Pike claims that timelessness gets rid of
the necessity placed on events by the foreknowledge of those events. After all, nothing is being
seen before it happens; rather it is all seen at once. But, he further argues, while timelessness
may place God outside of time, nevertheless such a quality in God would not allow Him to know
the now.10 God would know all the nows, but not the now. Being outside of time, Pike argues,
God cannot see reality as successive, and thus cannot know it as it is in itself. God would know
all of history, but not where in history the actual temporal position exists. So, God would not
be strictly omniscient.
On the other hand, Pike argues, if one does not resort to timelessness, then mens wills
are bound by necessity.11 This latter position he also deals with in his articles. He holds, in
particular, that if Gods knowledge is true because God is omniscient, then the foreknowledge
he has necessitates that Smith do p at time t, meaning it is not in Smiths power to do
otherwise.

See Divine Omniscience and Voluntary action, Philosophical Review (1965), Of God and Freedom: A Rejoinder,
Philosophical Review (1966)
10
Nelson Pike, God and Timelessness (New York: Schocken Books, 1970), Ch. V
11
Nelson Pike, God and Timelessness, Ch. IV

Another author, Paul Helm, argues against Pike first position, and attempts a
resuscitation of the traditional notion of timelessness.12 However, after arguing for this, he
nonetheless agrees with Pikes position that foreknowledge, even that of a timeless and
omniscient God, destroys free will. There cannot be free will even if Gods knowledge of
human actions is timeless.13 His reasoning is straightforward, and very similar to Pikes. If it is
the case that God knows with certainty, then it is impossible that anything other than that
which He knows come about. But, free will is based on the premise that one may do otherwise.
Both, then, agree as to the fundamental problem of foreknowledge and free will. Pike
has stated that timelessness solves the difficulty insofar as it means that God does not know
something before it happens, hence we can be understood to cause his knowledge. But, he is
absolutely certain that if God knows something before it happens, then happen it must. Helm
points out that, regardless of Gods timelessness, it will still be the case that God knows actions
as following upon each other, and thus according to the before and after. Therefore, even if
God is timeless, there is still a certain order of events and causes. Helm, then, is resigned to
what Pike is unable to get around. Whether or not God is in time, Gods knowledge of all events
in time necessitates a certain order in those events. Pike, in trying to escape, negates Gods
omniscience. Helm points out that he, Pike, does not actually negate the omniscience of God,
but neither does he escape the problem of a certain order to things. In effect, none of them
have moved beyond Ciceros formulation of the problem. Certain and necessary order has yet
to be successfully avoided or explained.

12
13

Paul Helm, Timelessness and Foreknowledge, Mind (1975), 516

Ibid., 527

The traditional solution makes it clear that Gods eternity means He sees all at once,
thus seeing the event as it is happening. But how, one may still ask, does this solve the difficulty
of a necessary order of causes and events? In short, perhaps Gods timelessness solves the
difficulty, but it is not immediately apparent how it does so, as evidenced by the positions of
Pike and Helm.

Part III: Augustines Solution

A) Augustine
In his introduction to Boethius Consolation of Philosophy, Richard Green claims that
Augustine, insofar as he is a theologian, is able to merely affirm both sides of the seeming
contradiction, and leave it at that.14 But, Green argues, Boethius must go farther since he is a
logician and speculative philosopher.
Well, (leaving aside the somewhat questionable way of characterizing theologians) it is
undoubtedly true that Augustine affirms both sides of the seeming contradiction under
discussion. To say he leaves it at that, though, is certainly not true.
It is the case that one might initially think Augustine is simply denying the reasonable
contradiction involved, and chastising impious reason where he says,
Now, against the sacrilegious and impious darings of reason, we assert both that
God knows all things and that we do by free will all that we do and feel to be
done by us only because we will it.15
However, after this passage, the mode and substance of his argument make it clear that he is
not denying logical consequence. This should be clear as the argument proceeds.
14
15

Boethius, Consolation of Philosophy, xix

Augustine, City of God, 91

First of all, then, Augustine makes a curious claim.

But an order of causes in which the highest efficiency is attributed to the will of
God we neither deny nor do we designate it by the name of fate.16
This explicitly acknowledges that there is an order of causes, and that God is at the heart of
those causes. This seems not only to confirm the Ciceronian dilemma, but to add Gods
causality to the problem. How can man be free if his actions are part of a chain of causes that
stem from God?
Next, Augustine quotes Psalm 62.
God hath spoken once; these two things have I heard, that power belongeth
unto God. Also unto Thee, O God, belongeth mercy: for Thou wilt render unto
every man according to his works.17
This psalm points out two things, both of which Augustine needs to hold. First, it shows all
power as coming from God, and doing so from a God who made one speech, presumably one
Word. Augustine interprets this as saying Gods power has caused all things, even unto their
powers, and is unchangeable in His nature, pointing to the eternality of God. Now, while he
doesnt explicitly elaborate on this point, he is clearly bringing to mind Gods eternality, and
hence timelessness. This will become an important part of his argument, and will relate it to the
traditional solution. Secondly, it is proclaimed that God will render to every man according to
his works. This scripture passage should bring solace. God is all powerful and has granted power
unto all things. But, He is a just God as well. Augustine is using Scripture to affirm that we are
responsible for our actions, making it imperative that we have a free will.
To explicate the psalm, Augustine says,

16
17

Ibid., 91
Ibid., 91

It does not follow that, though there is for God a certain order of all causes,
there must be nothing depending on the free exercise of our wills, for our wills
themselves are included in that order of causes which is certain to God, and is
embraced by His foreknowledge He who foreknew all causes of things would
certainly among those causes not be ignorant of our wills.18
In line with this, he further adds,
In His supreme will resides the power which acts on the wills of all created
spirits For, as He is the creator of all natures, so also is He the bestower of all
powers (Wills) have no power except that he has bestowed on them.19
Concluding,
Wherefore our wills have just so much power as God willed and foreknew that
they should have; and therefore whatever power they have, they have it within
most certain limits; and whatever they are to do, they are most assuredly to do,
for He whose foreknowledge is infallible foreknew that they would have the
power to do it, and would do it.20
So, Augustine wants to say that God is the cause of all things, and this includes the very power
of our willing. Insofar as God causes all things, so far does He know them. Our wills cannot be a
mystery to Him in themselves, or in their action, since He causes them as they are.
B) Gods Causality and Human Freedom
This should be a startling claim on Augustines part. He is proposing that the only way to
solve the certain order question is to acknowledge that God is causing all things. The
traditional solution seemed to be good precisely insofar as it got away from saying that God
must be causing all actions if it is the case that He knows them before they are performed. Are
we then to resolve the question by abandoning the idea of solving the paradox? Worse yet, is
Augustine giving away our free will?

18

Ibid., 91
Ibid., 91-92
20
Ibid., 92
19

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Far from it. We do many things which, if we were not willing, we would certainly not
do.21 Augustine is still keenly aware that we will what we will when we will it. No, Augustine is
not asking us to rethink our freedom, at least not the fact that we are free, but he is asking us
to rethink something far more profound. He is asking us to rethink God. God, as Creator, is
Someone we can never fully comprehend. We may know that He is, and, to some extent, what
attributes He has. But, what He is in Himself, that is beyond us. This is what Augustines answer
pushes us to see, acknowledge, and accept. We are natural, God is supernatural. Only with that
realization, the realization that God is beyond, can we at least start to solve the paradox of
freedom and certain order.
So, our wills themselves are included in that order of causes which is certain to God.
Gods causality includes our causality. What do you have that you have not received?22 All
that we have is given us, including our causality. All we possess and hold, including our wills, is a
gift. For, as He is the creator of all natures, so also is He the bestower of all powers. Our very
act of willing is given, for it has being. A man has no power through himself; he is a created
thing. What he has must be given.
Gods causality, then, is not of the human realm. It is of a kind that we cannot
comprehend, because the actuality it brings to that which it causes is not necessarily external to
that thing. It can be internal; otherwise, the things caused could not exist. If God does not make
a thing as it is, including its interior being, how could that thing be? While it is impossible to
fully conceive of such a powerful cause, nonetheless, our knowledge of creation, and what it

21
22

Ibid., 92
1 Cor. 4:7

11

involves, requires us to acknowledge such a sort of causality. There is an inseparable barrier

between creator and created in that sense. The created thing is not purely independent in
itself, and thus cannot comprehend a power autonomously giving power. But, there must be
such a power. Otherwise, man could not exist, let alone exist as free.
All of this must push our understanding beyond our natural conception of causation.
When a man causes another creature to do something, he does so through an external force of
some sort. Gods causality doesnt need to do that. By viewing God as the power that gives
power, Augustine demonstrates that God causes and creates things as they are. So, when I say
man is free, I do not deny that God causes that freedom. When I say that God causes mans will,
I do not deny that the will is free. Gods causality creates things as they are in themselves.
Wherefore our wills have just so much power as God willed and foreknew that they
should have. Our wills, then, being in themselves caused, or rather being in themselves
created, have their very power and freedom through the one and eternal Word of God. God
causes the events by creating things as they are, not by forcing them against their power.
For if that is to be called our necessity which is not in our power (then) it is
manifest that our wills by which we live rightly or wickedly are not under such a
necessity But, if we define necessity to be that according to which we say that
it is necessary that anything be of such a nature I know not why we should
have any dread of that necessity taking away our free will23

23

Augustine, City of God, 92

12

So, once more, God causes our wills as they naturally exist, namely as free. There is necessity,
but, Augustine further points out, just as there is necessity in God that does not compromise
His omnipotence, so is there necessity in our wills which does not compromise our freedom.24
C) Gods Eternality, Certain Order of Events
Now that it is clear that mans will may be free and still caused, it similarly becomes
clear how the necessary order in events is not an unsolvable difficulty. This is on account of
Gods eternality.
Gods eternality is proclaimed in the psalm Augustine quotes, as is Gods
unchangeableness. Since God hath spoken once, His act of creation is not separate in itself
from any other act He has done. Thus, His single, eternal Word comprehends within it, as
Augustine argued, all the powers given to creatures, and all being. The speaking of the Word
includes all events, comprehends all happenings. The order is no secret to God, He is its
underlying cause. His knowledge is not outside the thing known. As Aquinas would put it, Gods
knowledge cannot be distinct from his causal act.25 For, God is simple.
So, while it is true to say that God knows all things because He causes them, it is just the
same to say that they are the way they are because He knows them that way. In other words,
God knows the order of events in the same way He causes those events. His knowledge is not
separate from His causality. Therefore, God knows what will happen before it happens in the
same way that He causes mans free will. There is nothing in that knowledge, then, which may
compromise the nature or action of the things known. In comprehending the order of things
24
25

Ibid., 92
Aquinas, Summa Theologiae (Taurini, Rome: Marietti, 1948), Ia, q. 14, a. 8

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and events, God knows the things as they are, namely contingent. So, there is contingency in
things. They could do otherwise, according to their own nature. Again, just as God creates and
knows mans freedom without compromising it, so does He know the contingent nature of
man. Cicero is thus answered, as are Pike and Helm. The question of order in events and causes
can be solved by a proper understanding of the nature of Gods causality and knowledge. When
properly understood, Gods act of causation need not interfere with the human will, though it
still causes that will internally.

Conclusion:
In conclusion, Augustine has shown us that the will of man can be subject to the
necessity of Gods causality, and that this necessity, due to Gods one simple act, includes a
certain order of events and happenings. But, the causal power of God is exercised internally in
creation, and thus informs our very power of willing and also the contingency of events. We do
what we will, as we will it. God knows what we will, for He knows the created will as the giver
of its being and the giver of its ability to will freely. God is beyond any conception we might
have of Him, but we must see Him as the author of all being, including any being that is in our
will. All is in His power, even unto our power. What do we have that has not been given us? But
our power is ours, and we do what we do through our own willing, which is included in the
causal knowledge of the Creator. To end with the words of St. Augustine,
It is not the case, therefore, that because God foreknew what would be in the
power of our wills, there is for that reason nothing to the power of our wills. For
He who foreknew this did not foreknow nothing.26

26

Augustine, City of God, 93

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