Military Policy Evidence

Africa Command (AFRICOM) is not a single actor, is small, and is needed to remain
in the GHoA because it works with other African governments and entities.
Aji Fatou Faal, January 14, 2011. The Daily Observer (Banjul). US Embassy Holds Lectures
On Africom. The Daily Observer (Banjul).
http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.libraries.smu.edu/lnacui2api/results/docview/docview.do?
docLinkInd=true&risb=21_T22680917665&format=GNBFI&sort=RELEVANCE&startDocNo=1
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si=361872&docNo=2
the Africa Command is the result of an internal reorganisation of the
US military command structure, creating one administrative headquarters responsible for
the Secretary of Defense for US military relations with the 53 African countries.
According to him, the US Africa Command enables the department of Defense and other
elements of the US government to work in concert with partners to achieve a more stable
environment in which political and economic growth can take place. "US Africa Command is
consolidating the efforts of three existing headquarters' commands into one that is focused
solely on Africa and helps to coordinate US government contributions on the continent," he
remarked.
He added, "however, many nations on the African Continent continue to rely on the
international community for assistance with security concerns. From the US perspective, it
makes strategic sense to help build the capability for African partners, and organizations
such as the Africa Standby Force, to take the lead in establishing a secure environment.
This security will, in turn, set the groundwork for increased political stability and economic
growth," he explained.
He reiterated that the United States has consulted extensively with African governments,
the African Union and others, and confirmed that the United States plans to continue these
consultations and to work closely with African governments' regional organisations, and the
international community. Lt. Col. Sousa also disclosed that US Africa Command was
established in October 2007 and operated under US European Command during its first
year. "October 1, 2008 marked the US Africa Command's transition to Independent Unified
Command Status. It is now focused on synchronising hundreds of activities inherited from
three regional commands that previously coordinated US military relations in Africa," he
revealed.
He further stated that the command inherits a small but meaningful US military
presence already existing in numerous African nations, to include Camp Lemonier in
Djibouti, as well as Defense Department personnel assigned to US Embassies and diplomatic
missions to coordinate Defense Department programmes supporting US diplomacy. "Any
additional presence on the continent will take place only in full diplomatic consultation and
agreement with potential host nations. We believe AFRICOM will be more effective if some
members of staff are physically living and working on the continent, where they can meet
face-to-face with their counterparts in African governments and non-governmental
organisations," he concluded.
US presence allows continued intelligence-gathering for Al Shababs campaign of

terrorism.
NICHOLAS KULISH, MARK MAZZETTI and ERIC SCHMITT; Nicholas Kulish reported from
Nairobi, and Mark Mazzetti and Eric Schmitt from Washington. 2013 The New York Times.
Carnage In Mall Shows Resilience Of Terror Group .Late Edition: Final. Section A; Column
0; Foreign Desk; Pg. 1
si=6742&docNo=14
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/23/world/africa/kenya-mall-carnage-shows-shababresilience.html
NAIROBI, Kenya -- The ferocious armed political movement known as [Al] Shabab is on the
ropes in Somalia, losing territory and influence in its home country.
Yet this weekend [Al] Shabab showed that they are as dangerous as ever as a terrorist
force, keeping Kenyan forces at bay through two days at the Westgate mall in Nairobi even
as the militants mounted a coordinated attack against African Union forces in Mogadishu,
according to senior American counterterrorism and diplomatic officials.
Some officials warned that [Al] Shabab could be signaling a wider offensive, particularly
within Kenya, despite their losses in recent years at the hands of the African Union and
Kenyan troops in its home country.
''What we're witnessing is Al Shabab taking its asymmetric attacks into Kenya at the same
time it's intensifying its pattern of attacks in Somalia,'' said one senior American official who
has been monitoring classified intelligence reports and diplomatic cables since the attack
started Saturday.
Counterterrorism officials say that [Al] Shabab's sophistication has only increased as it has
made common cause with groups including franchises of Al Qaeda in Yemen and Northern
Africa and the Boko Haram organization in Nigeria, sharing tactics, techniques, training and
financing.
Now, it is clear that the group is using those resources to punish Kenya on its own soil,
mostly for its role within Somalia, but also, to some degree, because of growing American
support for the Kenyan security forces.
In recent years, Kenya has worked closely with the Americans on military cooperation,
hunting Al Qaeda and combating piracy. The C.I.A. station in Nairobi is among the largest in
Africa. And the United States ambassador to Kenya, Robert F. Godec, was formerly the State
Department's deputy coordinator for counterterrorism.
One senior American official said there had not been any increased ''chatter'' -- electronic
intercepts -- in recent days about a possible attack against a major target in Nairobi. But
the Westgate mall was one of at least three major shopping malls in the Kenyan capital
about which American Embassy officials had expressed concerns over faulty security to
Kenyan authorities.
Then, the Shabab's ranks swelled amid growing anger inside Somalia over the brutal urban
tactics used by Ethiopian troops, who had invaded the country to dislodge the Islamic
Courts Union from the capital. [Al] Shabab fighters waged a bloody insurgency campaign
against the Ethiopians, carrying out hit and run attacks and planting roadside bombs.
In a few short years, the group consolidated its control over a large swath of Somali
territory, but then suffered setbacks as the African Union and Kenya, among others, became
more deeply involved. The Shabab withdrew from the cities in the face of superior military
forces fairly quickly, often in the space of a day, regrouping in the countryside.
But they preserved their core fighting force -- estimated by the United Nations Monitoring
Group on Somalia and Eritrea at about 5,000 -- and avoided direct confrontations. And since
then it ha[ve] seemed to gather momentum in terms of terrorist attacks.
There have long been concerns that the Shabab were increasing their ability to strike
abroad, first stoked by its bombing attack against soccer fans in Kampala, Uganda, in 2010,
killing 76.
But despite its threats to strike at American interests -- and the propaganda value it has
gained by showing the American ties of some of its members -- most experts say the
group's focus is still on getting foreign troops out of Somalia. The attack in Uganda was
explicitly for that country's role in the African Union force operating in Somalia. And now the
attack in Kenya was a blow for one of the group's most constant military antagonists.
Mr. Bryden said the significance of the Westgate attack lay partly in how it seemed to signal
a change of tactics for the Shabab -- moving from coordinated suicide bombings with a high
risk of being foiled toward more direct operations that still kill dozens, sow fear, and
undermine support in Nairobi for the Kenyan mission in Somalia.
''Shabab is both far more fractured than it has been and arguably more radicalized,'' said
Vanda Felbab-Brown, senior fellow at the Brookings Institution and an expert in
nontraditional security threats. ''They are far more limited in what they can do in Somalia,
and that drives spectacular attacks abroad.''
As rank-and-file members left, the result was a group that was even more radical. The
military setbacks raised the stakes. ''The leadership needs to demonstrate they are still
alive, both abroad and to their own fighters,'' Ms. Felbab-Brown said.
A 2011 report by the Monitoring Group described the deep well of support that Shabab had
inside Kenya, with various religious and cultural organizations inside the country raising both
money and fighters for militant activities.
The region has made strides, but threats exist which put these progresses in
danger.
Al Shababs threat and power has increased since the US reduced its military
presence in the region.
Alex Godfrey May 2015, Assistant Director, Studies administration for [of] the Council on
Foreign Relations Studies Program. The Danger of Al-Shabaabs Evolution. New York
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Council on Foreign Relations has issued the following news release:

This is a guest post by Alex Dick-Godfrey, Assistant Director, Studies administration for the
Council on Foreign Relations Studies Program.
In the past five years, the Somali jihadist group al-Shabaab has lost most of its senior
leadership, surrendered its control of southern Somalia, and seen its cash flow shrink. The
group has certainly seen better times. But as the success of recent attacks in Kenya and
Mogadishu indicate, the group is regaining some of its previous stature but as a
fundamentally different group. Al-Shabaab is now more decentralized and has a larger
geographic focus. Given regional dynamics, an inept Kenyan security response, refugee
flows from Yemen, [because of] a diminished United States presence, this new
embodiment of al-Shabaab is becoming increasingly difficult to counter.
Internal shifts began in 2013. Infighting among various factions coupled with a series of
catastrophic military defeats at the hands of international forces caused the group to
change its structure and priorities. Al-Shabaab evolved from an organization with clear
leadership to a more decentralized, diffuse organization, in part thanks to a degradation of
core leadership due to U.S. drone strikes. With the shift in leadership, the organizations
goals became more ambiguous. Instead of seeking to rule Somalia, it is principally seeking
to spoil the political process in Somalia and disrupt governance in East Africa.
Beyond the structural changes of the group, Kenyan domestic policies have helped alShabaab. Anemic responses to the West Gate Mall and Garissa University attacks by the
authorities vividly illustrate how inept Kenya has been at responding to al-Shabaabs
updated tactics. More importantly, however, the Kenyan domestic security reaction has been
counterproductive. In the wake of recent attacks, the Kenyan government announced that it
plans to forcibly displace several hundred thousand Somali refugees from northern Kenya by
closing the Dadaab refugee camp. They also plan to erect an Israeli style wall on the KenyaSomalia boarder. Provocative policies like these will likely exacerbate tensions between the
government and the two million ethnic Somalis living in Kenya. Al-Shabaab will, as it always
has, take advantage of such a golden recruitment opportunity.
[Do we allow] Al-Shabaab will continue its current pattern of attacks[?] likely undeterred by
the United States. Coupled with Kenyas inability to deter the group[?] and a favorable
global context, al-Shabaab looks like a more dangerous threat than even at the height of its
power.
The USs military presence is not large, and it is not a world police, but a defensive
aid.
Peter Baker (Baker; Washington Post Staff Writer ), 2008, The Washington Post. No Bases
Planned for Africa, Bush Says; Maryland. FOREIGN; Pg. A12.
President Tries to Ease Concern on Continent Over Expanding Military Presence.
si=8075&docNo=3
The concept behind AFRICOM was that it would be more integrated with civilian efforts and
focused on "soft power" rather than traditional military muscle. It would work closely with
other nations and humanitarian organizations to coordinate relief, security, peacekeeping
and other missions. Gen. William E. Ward, the first commander, has a State Department
diplomat as one of his deputies.
The U.S. military has a modest presence in Africa. The Combined Joint Task Force-Horn
of Africa set up in 2002 maintains about 1,800 personnel in Djibouti, where it coordinates
counterterrorism operations. The Pentagon also has military trainers helping local forces in
various countries and a handful of military advisers in Sudan.
Bush's next and final stop on this trip will be Thursday in Liberia, which has a strong
history of close relations with the United States and has volunteered to host a base.
Chinese Influence Detrimental to the Region

Strategic Studies Institute Africom at 5 years: the maturation of a new U.S.
combatant command (2013)
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB1164.pdf
At the end of the day, these critics of AFRICOM should be more concerned about
what China brings to Africa, not what the United States brings. Aside from Chinas
arms sales to nations such as Sudan, Western donors are concerned that the
Chinese governments no strings attached approach to development risks undoing
decades of Western efforts to promote good governance, revenue transparency, and
responsible natural resource development in Africa; corrupts African elites; unfairly
promotes Chinas interests at the expense of other non-African nations by violating
OECD norms for aid and trade credits; free-rides on Highly Indebted Poor Country
debt relief; and risks new unsustainable debts for African nations.

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Africa Command (AFRICOM) is not a single actor, is small, and is needed to remain

US presence allows continued intelligence-gathering for Al Shababs campaign of

Council on Foreign Relations has issued the following news release:

Chinese Influence Detrimental to the Region

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