Taylor vs. Manila Electric Railroad and Light Co.
Taylor vs. Manila Electric Railroad and Light Co.
Taylor vs. Manila Electric Railroad and Light Co.
of the fact that the little girl, 9 years of age, who was within him at the time when he put the match to the contents
of the cap, became frightened and ran away.
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True, he may not have known and probably did not know the precise nature of the explosion which might be
expected from the ignition of the contents of the cap, and of course he did not anticipate the resultant injuries
which he incurred; but he well knew that a more or less dangerous explosion might be expected from his act, and
yet he wilfully, recklessly, and knowingly produced the explosion. It would be going far to say that "according to
his maturity and capacity" he exercised such and "care and caution" as might reasonably be required of him, or
that defendant or anyone else should be held civilly responsible for injuries incurred by him under such
circumstances.
The law fixes no arbitrary age at which a minor can be said to have the necessary capacity to understand and
appreciate the nature and consequences of his own acts, so as to make it negligence on his part to fail to exercise
due care and precaution in the commission of such acts; and indeed it would be impracticable and perhaps
impossible so to do, for in the very nature of things the question of negligence necessarily depends on the ability
of the minor to understand the character of his own acts and their consequences; and the age at which a minor can
be said to have such ability will necessarily depends of his own acts and their consequences; and at the age at
which a minor can be said to have such ability will necessarily vary in accordance with the varying nature of the
infinite variety of acts which may be done by him. But some idea of the presumed capacity of infants under the
laws in force in these Islands may be gathered from an examination of the varying ages fixed by our laws at which
minors are conclusively presumed to be capable of exercising certain rights and incurring certain responsibilities,
though it cannot be said that these provisions of law are of much practical assistance in cases such as that at bar,
except so far as they illustrate the rule that the capacity of a minor to become responsible for his own acts varies
with the varying circumstances of each case.
We are satisfied that the plaintiff in this case had sufficient capacity and understanding to be sensible of the
danger to which he exposed himself when he put the match to the contents of the cap; that he was sui juris in the
sense that his age and his experience qualified him to understand and appreciate the necessity for the exercise of
that degree of caution which would have avoided the injury which resulted from his own deliberate act; and that
the injury incurred by him must be held to have been the direct and immediate result of his own willful and
reckless act, so that while it may be true that these injuries would not have been incurred but for the negligence
act of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises, nevertheless plaintiff's own act was the
proximate and principal cause of the accident which inflicted the injury.