FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 151942. November 27, 2003.]

Spouses GREGORIO GO and JUANA TAN GO, petitioners, vs.
JOHNSON Y. TONG; COURT OF APPEALS; and Honorable Judge
JUAN NABONG of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 32, Manila ,
respondents.

Marbibi and Associates Law Office for petitioners.

Efren Dela Cruz for private respondents.
SYNOPSIS
Petitioner Juana Tan Go issued a cashier's check bearing the words "Final
Payment/Quitclaim," payable to private respondent. Private respondent deposited
the check but the same was dishonored because the words "Final
Payment/Quitclaim" was already erased. His request for the replacement of the
check was not granted, so he led a complaint for sum of money, damages and
attorney's fees. During the pendency of the case, petitioners' son led a criminal
complaint against private respondent for falsification of the check, but the same was
dismissed. Subsequently, a supplemental complaint was led by private respondent
praying for an increased amount of damages sought to be recovered due to the
damages caused by the ling of a criminal complaint for falsication against him by
petitioners' son. Thereafter, petitioners deposited to the court the money
representing the amount of the check which was later on released to private
respondent by an order issued by public respondent. Considering the huge amount
involved, the public respondent issued another order allowing private respondent to
pay the docket fees on staggered basis. Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was
denied. Petitioners led a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA)
alleging that respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
said orders, but the CA ruled that the orders were not issued with grave abuse of
discretion. Hence, this petition.
In denying the petition, the Supreme Court ruled that private respondent was
entitled to the deposit because it represented the amount indicated on the check
that undeniably belonged to him. Moreover, there was an understanding between
the parties that petitioners would deposit the amount, which private respondent
could withdraw if he so desired. Lastly, petitioners failed to assail, within the
prescribed period, the order allowing the release of the money because they allowed
more than one year to lapse before assailing it.
The Court also held that while the payment of the prescribed docket fee is a
jurisdictional requirement, even its nonpayment at the time of ling does not
automatically cause the dismissal of the case, as long as the fee is paid within the

applicable prescriptive or reglementary period, more so when the party involved

demonstrates a willingness to abide by the rules prescribing such payment.
While the cause of action of private respondent was supposed to prescribe in four
(4) years, he was allowed to pay, and he in fact paid the docket fee in a year's time.
This period cannot be deemed unreasonable. The Court sustained the CA's ndings
absolving respondent judge of any capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
SYLLABUS
1.
REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; RULE 65 NOT A SUBSTITUTE FOR RULE
45. Rule 45 of the Rules of Court specically states that in all cases, the CA's
decisions, nal orders or resolutions regardless of the nature of the action or
proceedings involvedmay be appealed to this Court through a petition for review,
which is just a continuation of the appellate process involving the original case. On
the other hand, a special civil action under Rule 65 is an independent suit based on
the specic grounds provided therein. As a general rule, certiorari cannot be availed
of as a substitute for the lost remedy of an ordinary appeal, including that under
Rule 45.
2.
ID.;
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; CERTIORARI ; PRIOR MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION, NECESSARY. [B]efore certiorari may be availed of, a
petitioner must have led with the lower court a motion for reconsideration of the
act or order complained of. This requirement enables the lower court to pass upon
and correct its mistakes in the rst instance, without the intervention of the higher
tribunal. While there are exceptions to this rule, petitioners have not convinced this
Court that they are entitled thereto.
3.
ID.; ID.; ID.; CONDITIONS THEREFOR TO LIE; NOT PRESENT IN CASE AT BAR.
[F]or certiorari to lie against respondent judge, the abuse of discretion committed
must be grave, as when power is exercised arbitrarily or despotically by reason of
passion or personal hostility; and such exercise must be so patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of positive duty, or to a virtual refusal to perform it or to act
in contemplation of law. These conditions are absolutely wanting in the present
case.
4.
ID.; ACTIONS; COMMENCEMENT OF; WHERE THE FILING OF THE INITIATORY
PLEADING IS NOT ACCOMPANIED BY PAYMENT OF THE DOCKET FEE, THE COURT
MAY ALLOW PAYMENT OF THE FEE WITHIN A REASONABLE TIME BUT IN NO CASE
BEYOND THE APPLICABLE PRESCRIPTIVE OR REGLEMENTARY PERIOD; CASE AT
BAR. The Court claried the rule in Sun Insurance thus: ". . . It is not simply the
ling of the complaint. or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the
prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subjectmatter or nature of the action. Where the ling of the initiatory pleading is not
accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee
within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or

reglementary period." Plainly, while the payment of the prescribed docket fee is a
jurisdictional requirement, even its nonpayment at the time of ling does not
automatically cause the dismissal of the case, as long as the fee is paid within the
applicable prescriptive or reglementary period; more so when the party involved
demonstrates a willingness to abide by the rules prescribing such payment. While
the cause of action of private respondent was supposed to prescribe in four (4)
years, he was allowed to pay; and he in fact paid the docket fee in a year's time. We
do not see how this period can be deemed unreasonable. Moreover, on his part
there is no showing of any pattern or intent to defraud the government of the
required docket fee. We sustain the CA's ndings absolving respondent judge of any
capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J :
p

As a rule, docket fees should be paid upon the ling of the initiatory pleadings.
However, for cogent reasons to be determined by the trial judge, staggered
payment thereof within a reasonable period may be allowed. Unless grave abuse of
discretion is demonstrated, the discretion of the trial judge in granting staggered
payment shall not be disturbed.

The Case
Petitioner assails the September 18, 2001 Decision 1 and the January 21, 2002
Resolution 2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 58942. The decretal
portion of the Decision reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED." 3

The assailed Resolution denied petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration.

The Facts
The facts of the case are summarized by the CA in this wise:
"Petitioner Juana Tan Go (petitioner Juana) purchased a cashier's check
dated September 13, 1996 from the Far East Bank and Trust Company
(FEBTC) Lavezares, Binondo Branch in the amount of P500,000.00, payable
to Johnson Y. Tong (private respondent).
"On petitioner Juana's instruction, the cashier's check bore the words 'Final
Payment/Quitclaim' after the name of payee private respondent allegedly to
insure that private respondent would honor his commitment that he would
no longer ask for further payments for his interest in the 'informal business
partnership' which he and she had earlier dissolved.
"After the check was delivered to private respondent, he deposited it with

the words 'Final Payment/Quitclaim' already erased, hence, it was not

honored.
"Private respondent's counsel subsequently wrote the manager of FEBTC
Lavezares Branch informing that the words 'Final Payment/Quitclaim' on the
check had been 'inadvertently erased without being initialed by your bank or
the purchaser thereof' and thus requesting that the check be replaced with
another payable to 'Johnson Tong-Final Settlement/Quitclaim' with the same
amount, the bank charges therefor to be paid by his client-private
respondent.
"FEBTC did not grant the request of private respondent's counsel, hence,
private respondent led a complaint against FEBTC and petitioner Juana and
her husband Gregorio Go at the Manila RTC, for sum of money, damages,
and attorney's fees, subject of the case at bar.
"Answering the Complaint, therein defendants-herein petitioners Juana and
her husband and FEBTC alleged that the erasure of the words 'Final
Payment/Quitclaim' was intentional on private respondent's part, reective of
his intention to collect more from petitioner Juana, hence, the non-issuance
of a replacement check was justied, unless private respondent was sincere
in abiding with the 'terms agreed upon.'
"During the pendency of the case, petitioner's son, George Tan Go, led a
criminal complaint against private respondent for falsication of the check.
The criminal complaint was dismissed, however, by the Manila Prosecutor's
Office.
"On July 17, 1998, private respondent requested public respondent for leave
to le Supplemental Complaint. Acting on the request, public respondent
suggested to him 'to le a Motion to admit' within fteen (15) days, copy
furnished petitioners who were given the same number of days from receipt
to file their Comment.
"On August 25, 1998, private respondent led a 'Motion for Leave to File a
Supplemental Complaint and to Admit the Attached Supplemental Complaint'
which Supplemental Complaint alleged that petitioners 'used' their son to le
the criminal complaint for falsication against him which caused damages,
hence, the prayer for an increase in the amount of moral and exemplary
damages sought to be recovered from P2.5 million to P55 million and
praying for the award of actual damages of P58,075.00. The motion was set
for hearing on September 4, 1998. Copy of the motion to petitioners was
sent by registered mail.

"Public respondent, by Order of September 4, 1998, noting that petitioners

had been furnished copy of the 'Motion for Leave' . . . but that there had
been no comment thereon, granted the motion and admitted the
Supplemental Complaint.

"Petitioners and FEBTC's Comment-Opposition were subsequently filed.

"Petitioners and FEBTC led their respective Motions for Reconsideration of
the September 4, 1998 Order.
"On November 18, 1998, petitioners led a Manifestation of Deposit and
deposited to the RTC Clerk of Court the amount of P500,000.00
representing the amount of the check, 'subject to the condition that it shall
remain deposited until the disposition of the case.'
"Petitioners' and FEBTC's separate Motions for Reconsideration of the
September 4, 1998 Order were later denied by Order of December 4, 1998,
hence, petitioners led their Answer dated December 18, 1998 to the
Supplemental Complaint with Counterclaim, alleging as Special Armative
defenses the following:
'5.
As already intimated, the defendants are not a party to the
aforementioned criminal complaint, but only their son George who
took it upon himself to le it in his own right, without their involvement
in any way, hence, said incident cannot be pleaded as supplement to
the original complaint, much less as a new cause of action without
impleading George Go as party defendant.
'6.
Plainti cannot prosecute his Supplemental Complaint, and the
same should be dismissed, unless the corresponding docket fee and
legal fees for the monetary claims in the amount of P55,057,075.00
are paid for. . . .'
"On February 5, 1999, public respondent, acting on the verbal
manifestation/motion of private respondent's counsel, allowed the release of
petitioners' P500,000.00 deposit to private respondent.
"By order of November 17, 1999, public respondent, 'in the interest of
justice and because of the huge amount of outlay involved (the Court
considers the business climate and the peso crunch prevailing),' allowed
private respondent to rst deposit P25,000.00 on or before December 15,
1999 and P20,000.00 every month thereafter until the full amount of docket
fees is paid, and 'only then shall the deposits be considered as payment of
docket fees.'
"Petitioners led a Motion for Reconsideration of the November 17, 1999
Order which was, by Order of April 11, 2000, denied.
"Thus arose the present petition led on May 30, 2000 which ascribes to
public respondent the commission of grave abuse of discretion in issuing
the Orders of February 5, 1999 (allowing the release of the P500,000.00
deposit to private respondent), November 17, 1999 (allowing the payment,
on staggered basis, of the docket fees for the Supplemental Complaint) and
April 11, 2000 (denying the Motion for Reconsideration of the November 17,
1999 Order)." 4

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In their Petition for Certiorari before the CA, petitioners alleged that respondent
judge committed grave abuse of discretion when he issued the Orders dated
February 5, 1999, 5 November 17, 1999 6 and April 11, 2000. 7
According to the CA, petitioners failed to assail, within the prescribed period,
respondent judge's February 5, 1999 Order allowing the release of the money
deposited by them. It was only in their May 30, 2000 Petition before the CA that
they questioned the Order. Moreover, the appellate court held that, anyway, private
respondent was entitled to the deposit, which represented the amount indicated on
the check that belonged to him.
As to the November 17, 1999 Order allowing private respondent to pay the docket
fee on a staggered basis and the April 11, 2000 Order denying the Motion for
Reconsideration thereof, the CA held that " Sun Insurance Oce Ltd. . . . permits the
payment of the prescribed docket fee within a reasonable period but in no case
beyond the applicable prescriptive or regular period." 8 In that case, the court a quo
opined that the docket fee payment scheme imposed by the respondent judge
"cannot be said to have been issued with grave abuse of discretion." 9
Hence, this Petition. 10

The Issues
In their Memorandum, 11 petitioners submit the following issues for our
consideration:
"Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals committed grave and
serious errors which [are] tantamount to grave abuse of discretion when it
upheld the validity of the Orders dated Feb[ruary] 5, 1999, November 17,
[1999] and April 11, 2000 issued by public respondent Hon. Judge Juan
Nabong of RTC Branch 32 of Manila, in Civil Case No. 97-81935.
"Whether or not public respondent Judge Juan Nabong committed grave
abuse of discretion in not suspending the proceedings pending appeal with
the Honorable Court of Appeals, and in . . . refusing to inhibit himself." 12

The Court's Ruling

The Petition has no merit.

Preliminary Issue:
Mode of Appeal
Private respondent argues that the instant Petition should have been brought under
Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court and not under Rule 65. On the other hand,
petitioners maintain that their suit questions interlocutory orders issued by the RTC
and thus falls within the ambit of Rule 65, under which questions of law and facts
may be raised.

We clarify. A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court may
be filed under the following condition:
"When any tribunal, board or ocer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and
there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law . . . ." 13

On the other hand, Rule 45 prevails under this circumstance:

"A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment or nal order or
resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial
Court or other courts whenever authorized by law, may le with the
Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. . . . ." 14

Rule 45 of the Rules of Court specically states that in all cases, the CA's decisions,
nal orders or resolutions regardless of the nature of the action or proceedings
involved may be appealed to this Court through a petition for review, which is
just a continuation of the appellate process involving the original case. 15 On the
other hand, a special civil action under Rule 65 is an independent suit based on the
specic grounds provided therein. As a general rule, certiorari cannot be availed of
as a substitute for the lost remedy of an ordinary appeal, including that under Rule
45. 16
Very recently, in Fortune Guarantee and Insurance Corporation v. CA , 17 this Court
had the occasion to discuss this matter. In that case, the petitioner alleged grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent trial court judge when the latter
issued the assailed Order granting a Motion for Execution Pending Appeal. Said the
Court in that case:
"[I]t must be pointed out that petitioner adopted the wrong mode of appeal
in bringing this case before us. The proper remedy of a party aggrieved by a
decision of the Court of Appeals is a petition for review under Rule 45 which
is not similar to a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. .
. . " 18

In the present case, petitioners are appealing a nal decision of the CA by resorting
to Rule 65, when their remedy should be based on Rule 45. 19 When an error of
judgment of the CA is brought up to this Court for review, the action is properly
designated as a petition for review and not a special civil action. 20 Thus, while the
instant Petition is one for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the
assigned errors are more properly addressed in a petition for review under Rule 45.
Accordingly, when parties adopt an improper remedy, as in this case, their petitions
may be dismissed outright. 21 However, in the interest of substantial justice, we
deem it wise to overlook procedural technicalities in order to rule speedily on this
case 22 and demonstrate that even without the procedural inrmity, the Petition
should be rejected due to its lack of merits.

First Issue:
Release of the Money Deposited
Petitioners argue that respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion when
he issued the February 5, 1999 Order allowing the release of their P500,000 bank
deposit. According to them, he "demonstrated his capacity for abuse of judicial
authority as the release of the money was made in direct contravention of [their]
condition thereto which was that the money shall remain deposited until the
disposition of this case." 23
We disagree. As correctly found by the CA, there was a prior understanding between
the parties that petitioners would deposit P500,000, which private respondent could
withdraw if he so desired. 24 Because petitioners claim that they deposited the
money as a sign of good faith, we see no reason why they should not abide by their
earlier agreement with private respondent. In fact, in their Manifestation of Deposit,
25 they even referred to the earlier hearing during which the deposit had been
agreed upon. This Manifestation shows that the deposit was indeed made pursuant
to their earlier agreement.
The CA was likewise correct in nding that petitioners had failed to assail, within
the prescribed period, the Order allowing the release of the money. 26 The
Manifestation of Deposit was received and approved by the RTC on November 18,
1998. On February 5, 1999, private respondent, through his counsel, made his oral
manifestation to withdraw the amount deposited. 27 It was only on May 30, 2000,
upon the ling of their Petition for Certiorari with the CA, when petitioners
questioned the Order allowing the withdrawal of the deposit.
If petitioners honestly believed that respondent judge had acted with grave abuse of
discretion when he issued the Order, why did they allow more than one year to
lapse before assailing it? In fact, they had not even led a motion for
reconsideration. Elementary is the rule that before certiorari may be availed of, a
petitioner must have led with the lower court a motion for reconsideration of the
act or order complained of. 28 This requirement enables the lower court to pass upon
and correct its mistakes in the rst instance, without the intervention of the higher
tribunal. 29 While there are exceptions to this rule, 30 petitioners have not convinced
this Court that they are entitled thereto.

Petitioners claim that they learned of the existence of the Order only after more
than one year had passed, and of the withdrawal of the deposit only after their new
counsel had appeared.
We are not persuaded. It is undeniable that petitioners actively prosecuted their
case during the period when they were allegedly still ignorant of the existence of
the Order dated February 5, 1999. Whether such ignorance was due to negligence
or mere oversight will not release them from its effects.
More important, the CA was correct in holding that, ultimately, private respondent

was entitled to the deposit, because it represented the amount indicated on the
check that undeniably belonged to him. In all the pleadings they led, petitioners
never denied that the amount of P500,000 properly belonged to him. He correctly
argued as follows:
"There is no question, and it is admitted by petitioners in their Manifestation
of Deposit, dated November 16, 1998 . . . that the amount of P500,000
deposited by them with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, represented the
amount covered by Far East Bank & Trust Company Cashier's Check No.
041A-0000032561.
"It is likewise admitted by the parties that the said FEBTC Cashier's Check
No. 041A-0000032561 was paid (payable) to and belong to private
respondent." 31

Second Issue:
Payment of Docket Fee
Petitioners argue that respondent judge and the CA erred in allowing private
respondent to pay the docket fee on a staggered basis. According to them, the Order
dated November 17, 1999 was "unprecedented in the annals of the Philippine
judicial system." 32 They describe the allegedly anomalous situation in this wise:
"Thus, we have perhaps . . . in the case at bar . . . the only known case in
Philippine judicial history where a supplemental complaint was admitted
without the payment of the FULL docket fees. And not only that, said fees
were made payable over a mind-boggling, over-expanded period of nearly
two (2) years!" 33

Petitioners make contradictory assertions when they aver that the circumstances in
the present case do not meet the parameters set by the Court in Sun Insurance
Oce Ltd. (SIOL) v. Asuncion, 34 then make a complete volte face by arguing that
the former is inapplicable, because there is no under-assessment of the docket fee in
the instant case.
The Court clarified the rule in Sun Insurance thus:
". . . . It is not simply the ling of the complaint or appropriate initiatory
pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial
court with jurisdiction over the subject-matter or nature of the action.
Where the ling of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of
the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable
time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary
period." 35 (Emphasis supplied)

Plainly, while the payment of the prescribed docket fee is a jurisdictional

requirement, even its nonpayment at the time of ling does not automatically
cause the dismissal of the case, as long as the fee is paid within the applicable
prescriptive or reglementary period; 36 more so when the party involved
demonstrates a willingness to abide by the rules prescribing such payment. 37

While the cause of action of private respondent was supposed to prescribe in four
(4) years, 38 he was allowed to pay; and he in fact paid the docket fee in a year's
time. 39 We do not see how this period can be deemed unreasonable. Moreover, on
his part there is no showing of any pattern or intent to defraud the government of
the required docket fee. We sustain the CA's ndings absolving respondent judge of
any capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
Ruled the appellate court:
"The Sun Insurance Oce Ltd. case permits the payment of the prescribed
docket fee 'within a reasonable period but in no case beyond the applicable
prescriptive or regular period.' Since the prescriptive period to le the
complaint subject of the present petition which is an action upon an injury to
the right of private respondent, is four years and the scheme of payment of
the docket fees in the amount of P252,503.50 given by public respondent
called for an implementation thereof within one year, as in fact private
respondent manifested in his Rejoinder that he had fully paid the said
amount on December 12, 2000, then the assailed Orders of November 17,
1999 and April 11, 2000 cannot be said to have been issued with grave
abuse of discretion." 40 (Citations omitted)

To be sure, for certiorari to lie against respondent judge, the abuse of discretion
committed must be grave, as when power is exercised arbitrarily or despotically by
reason of passion or personal hostility; and such exercise must be so patent and
gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty, or to a virtual refusal to perform
it or to act in contemplation of law. 41 These conditions are absolutely wanting in
the present case.

Final Issue:
Inhibition and Suspension of Proceedings
Finally, petitioners ascribe grave abuse of discretion to respondent judge for not
inhibiting himself from this case and for not suspending the proceedings in the RTC
pending the resolution of the Petition for Certiorari before the appellate court.
We need not belabor these questions, because they were never raised before the
CA. It is well-settled that parties are not permitted to raise before this Court issues
that were not taken up below. 42
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED, and the assailed Decision and
Resolution AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
ADCETI

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C .J ., Ynares-Santiago, Carpio and Azcuna, JJ ., concur.

Footnotes
1.

Annex "A" of the Petition; rollo, pp. 5967; penned by Justice Conchita Carpio
Morales (Division chair and now a member of this Court), with the concurrence of
Justices Candido V. Rivera and Juan Q. Enriquez Jr. (members).

2.

Annex "B" of the Petition; id., pp. 6870.

3.

CA Decision, p. 7; id., p. 66.

4.

CA Decision, pp. 25; id., pp. 6164.

5.

Annex "C" of the Petition; id., p. 71.

6.

Annex "D" of the Petition; id., p. 72.

7.

Annex "E" of the Petition; id., p. 73.

8.

CA Decision, p. 7; id., p. 66.

9.

Ibid.

10.

This case was deemed submitted for decision on December 2, 2002, upon this
Court's receipt of petitioners' Reply to Memorandum, which was signed by Atty.
Teresita C. Marbibi. Earlier or on October 24, 2002, this Court received petitioners'
Memorandum signed by the same counsel. On the other hand, private
respondent's Memorandum, signed by Atty. Efren N. de la Cruz was led with this
Court on November 5, 2002.

11.

Rollo, pp. 311341.

12.

Petitioners' Memorandum, p. 12; rollo, p. 322.

13.

1 of Rule 65 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court.

14.

1 of Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court.

15.

Heirs of Pagobo v. CA, 345 Phil. 1119, October 16, 1997.

16.

Ibid.

17.

G.R. No. 110701, March 12, 2002.

18.

Id., p. 5, per De Leon Jr., J.

19.

The Director of Lands v. CA, 342 Phil. 239, July 28, 1997.

20.

Cruz v. CA, 369 Phil. 161, July 2, 1999.

21.

Fortune Guarantee and Insurance Corporation v. CA, supra ; Sea Power Shipping
Enterprises Inc. v. CA, 360 SCRA 173, June 28, 2001.

22.

Ibid.; Caraan v. CA, 289 SCRA 579, April 24, 1998.

23.

Petitioners' Memorandum, pp. 1314; rollo, pp. 323324.

24.

See Order dated November 11, 1998; records, p. 211.

25.

Records, pp. 213214.

26.

CA Decision, p. 6; rollo, p. 65.

27.

See Order dated February 5, 1999; records, p. 237.

28.

Sevillana v. I.T. Corp., 356 SCRA 451, April 16, 2001; Indiana Aerospace
University v. CHED, 356 SCRA 367, April 4, 2001; Seagull Shipmanagement and
Transport Inc. v. NLRC, 388 Phil. 906, June 8, 2000.

29.

Abraham v. NLRC , 353 SCRA 739, March 6, 2001; Seagull Shipmanagement and
Transport Inc. v. NLRC, supra.

30.

Indiana Aerospace University v. CHED , supra; Marawi Marantao General Hospital

Inc. v. CA, 349 SCRA 321, January 16, 2001.

31.

Private respondent's Memorandum, p. 10; rollo, p. 351. Emphasis in the original.

32.

Petitioners' Memorandum, p. 18; rollo, p. 328.

33.

Id., pp. 19 & 329.

34.

170 SCRA 274, February 13, 1989.

35.

Id., p. 285, per Gancayco, J.

36.

Suson v. CA, 278 SCRA 284, August 21, 1997.

37.

Teofilo Gensoli & Co. v. NLRC, 289 SCRA 407, April 22, 1998.

38.

Article 1146 of the Civil Code states:

"Art. 1146.

The following actions must be instituted within four years:

(1)

Upon an injury to the rights of the plaintiff;

(2)

Upon a quasi-delict."

39.

See Manifestation dated January 15, 2001; records, pp. 394409.

40.

CA Decision, p. 7; rollo, p. 66.

41.
42.

Benito v. Comelec , 349 SCRA 705, January 19, 2001; Miranda v. Abaya, 370 Phil.
642, July 28, 1999; Cuison v. CA, 289 SCRA 159, April 15, 1998.
Rupa Sr. v. CA, 380 Phil. 112, January 25, 2000.