G.R. No.

202666, September 29, 2014

RHONDA AVE S. VIVARES AND SPS. MARGARITA AND DAVID
SUZARA, Petitioners, v. ST. THERESAS COLLEGE, MYLENE RHEZA
T. ESCUDERO, AND JOHN DOES, Respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO JR., J.:
The individuals desire for privacy is never absolute, since participation
in society is an equally powerful desire. Thus each individual is
continually engaged in a personal adjustment process in which he
balances the desire for privacy with the desire for disclosure and
communication of himself to others, in light of the environmental
conditions and social norms set by the society in which he lives.
~ Alan Westin, Privacy and Freedom (1967)
The Case

that some seniors at STC posted pictures online, depicting themselves

from the waist up, dressed only in brassieres. Escudero then asked her
students if they knew who the girls in the photos are. In turn, they
readily identified Julia, Julienne, and Chloe Lourdes Taboada (Chloe),
among others.
Using STCs computers, Escuderos students logged in to their
respective personal Facebook accounts and showed her photos of the
identified students, which include: (a) Julia and Julienne drinking hard
liquor and smoking cigarettes inside a bar; and (b) Julia and Julienne
along the streets of Cebu wearing articles of clothing that show
virtually the entirety of their black brassieres. What is more,
Escuderos students claimed that there were times when access to or
the availability of the identified students photos was not confined to
the girls Facebook friends,4 but were, in fact, viewable by any
Facebook user.5
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Upon discovery, Escudero reported the matter and, through one of her
students Facebook page, showed the photos to Kristine Rose Tigol
(Tigol), STCs Discipline-in-Charge, for appropriate action. Thereafter,
following an investigation, STC found the identified students to have
deported themselves in a manner proscribed by the schools Student
Handbook, to wit:
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Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the

Rules of Court, in relation to Section 19 of A.M. No. 08-1-16SC,1 otherwise known as the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data.
Petitioners herein assail the July 27, 2012 Decision2 of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 14 in Cebu City (RTC) in SP. Proc. No. 19251-CEB,
which dismissed their habeas data petition.

1.

Possession of alcoholic drinks outside the school campus;

2.

Engaging in immoral, indecent, obscene or lewd acts;

3.

Smoking and drinking alcoholic beverages in public places;

4.

Apparel that exposes the underwear;

5.

Clothing that advocates unhealthy behaviour; depicts

obscenity; contains sexually suggestive messages, language
or symbols; and

6.

Posing and uploading pictures on the Internet that entail

ample body exposure.

The Facts
Nenita Julia V. Daluz (Julia) and Julienne Vida Suzara (Julienne), both
minors, were, during the period material, graduating high school
students at St. Theresas College (STC), Cebu City. Sometime in
January 2012, while changing into their swimsuits for a beach party
they were about to attend, Julia and Julienne, along with several
others, took digital pictures of themselves clad only in their
undergarments. These pictures were then uploaded by Angela Lindsay
Tan (Angela) on her Facebook3 profile.
Back at the school, Mylene Rheza T. Escudero (Escudero), a computer
teacher at STCs high school department, learned from her students

On March 1, 2012, Julia, Julienne, Angela, and the other students in

the pictures in question, reported, as required, to the office of Sr.

Celeste Ma. Purisima Pe (Sr. Purisima), STCs high school principal and
ICM6Directress. They claimed that during the meeting, they were
castigated and verbally abused by the STC officials present in the
conference, including Assistant Principal Mussolini S. Yap (Yap),
Roswinda Jumiller, and Tigol. What is more, Sr. Purisima informed their
parents the following day that, as part of their penalty, they are barred
from joining the commencement exercises scheduled on March 30,
2012.
A week before graduation, or on March 23, 2012, Angelas mother, Dr.
Armenia M. Tan (Tan), filed a Petition for Injunction and Damages
before the RTC of Cebu City against STC, et al., docketed as Civil Case
No. CEB-38594.7 In it, Tan prayed that defendants therein be
enjoined from implementing the sanction that precluded Angela from
joining the commencement exercises. On March 25, 2012, petitioner
Rhonda Ave Vivares (Vivares), the mother of Julia, joined the fray as
an intervenor.
On March 28, 2012, defendants in Civil Case No. CEB-38594 filed their
memorandum, containing printed copies of the photographs in issue as
annexes. That same day, the RTC issued a temporary restraining order
(TRO) allowing the students to attend the graduation ceremony, to
which STC filed a motion for reconsideration.
Despite the issuance of the TRO, STC, nevertheless, barred the
sanctioned students from participating in the graduation rites, arguing
that, on the date of the commencement exercises, its adverted motion
for reconsideration on the issuance of the TRO remained unresolved.
Thereafter, petitioners filed before the RTC a Petition for the Issuance
of a Writ of Habeas Data, docketed as SP. Proc. No. 19251-CEB 8 on the
basis of the following considerations:

privacy. Corollarily, respondents knew or ought to have known

that the girls, whose privacy has been invaded, are the victims
in this case, and not the offenders. Worse, after viewing the
photos, the minors were called immoral and were punished
outright;
4.

The photos accessed belong to the girls and, thus, cannot be

used and reproduced without their consent. Escudero,
however, violated their rights by saving digital copies of the
photos and by subsequently showing them to STCs officials.
Thus, the Facebook accounts of petitioners children were
intruded upon;

5.

The intrusion into the Facebook accounts, as well as the

copying of information, data, and digital images happened at
STCs Computer Laboratory; and

6.

All the data and digital images that were extracted were boldly
broadcasted by respondents through their memorandum
submitted to the RTC in connection with Civil Case No. CEB38594.

To petitioners, the interplay of the foregoing constitutes an invasion of

their childrens privacy and, thus, prayed that: (a) a writ of habeas
data be issued; (b) respondents be ordered to surrender and deposit
with the court all soft and printed copies of the subject data before or
at the preliminary hearing; and (c) after trial, judgment be rendered
declaring all information, data, and digital images accessed, saved or
stored, reproduced, spread and used, to have been illegally obtained in
violation of the childrens right to privacy.

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1.

The photos of their children in their undergarments (e.g., bra)

were taken for posterity before they changed into their
swimsuits on the occasion of a birthday beach party;

2.

The privacy setting of their childrens Facebook accounts was

set at Friends Only. They, thus, have a reasonable
expectation of privacy which must be respected.

3.

Respondents, being involved in the field of education, knew or

ought to have known of laws that safeguard the right to

Finding the petition sufficient in form and substance, the RTC, through
an Order dated July 5, 2012, issued the writ of habeas data. Through
the same Order, herein respondents were directed to file their verified
written return, together with the supporting affidavits, within five (5)
working days from service of the writ.
In time, respondents complied with the RTCs directive and filed their
verified written return, laying down the following grounds for the
denial of the petition, viz: (a) petitioners are not the proper parties to
file the petition; (b) petitioners are engaging in forum shopping; (c)
the instant case is not one where a writ of habeas data may issue; and

(d) there can be no violation of their right to privacy as there is no

reasonable expectation of privacy on Facebook.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On July 27, 2012, the RTC rendered a Decision dismissing the petition
for habeas data. The dispositive portion of the Decision pertinently
states:
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WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the Petition is

hereby DISMISSED.
The parties and media must observe the aforestated confidentiality.
xxxx

availability of the Writ of Habeas Data

The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose
right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by
an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a
private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or
storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home and
correspondence of the aggrieved party.11 It is an independent and
summary remedy designed to protect the image, privacy, honor,
information, and freedom of information of an individual, and to
provide a forum to enforce ones right to the truth and to informational
privacy. It seeks to protect a persons right to control information
regarding oneself, particularly in instances in which such information is
being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful
ends.12
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SO ORDERED.9
To the trial court, petitioners failed to prove the existence of an actual
or threatened violation of the minors right to privacy, one of the
preconditions for the issuance of the writ of habeas data. Moreover,
the court a quo held that the photos, having been uploaded on
Facebook without restrictions as to who may view them, lost their
privacy in some way. Besides, the RTC noted, STC gathered the
photographs through legal means and for a legal purpose, that is, the
implementation of the schools policies and rules on discipline.
Not satisfied with the outcome, petitioners now come before this Court
pursuant to Section 19 of the Rule on Habeas Data.10

In developing the writ of habeas data, the Court aimed to protect an

individuals right to informational privacy, among others. A
comparative law scholar has, in fact, defined habeas data as a
procedure designed to safeguard individual freedom from abuse in the
information age.13 The writ, however, will not issue on the basis
merely of an alleged unauthorized access to information about a
person. Availment of the writ requires the existence of a nexus
between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life,
liberty or security on the other.14 Thus, the existence of a persons
right to informational privacy and a showing, at least by substantial
evidence, of an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in
life, liberty or security of the victim are indispensable before the
privilege of the writ may be extended.15
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The Issues
The main issue to be threshed out in this case is whether or not a writ
of habeas data should be issued given the factual milieu. Crucial in
resolving the controversy, however, is the pivotal point of whether or
not there was indeed an actual or threatened violation of the right to
privacy in the life, liberty, or security of the minors involved in this
case.
Our Ruling
We find no merit in the petition.
Procedural issues concerning the

Without an actionable entitlement in the first place to the right to

informational privacy, a habeas datapetition will not prosper. Viewed
from the perspective of the case at bar, this requisite begs this
question: given the nature of an online social network (OSN)(1) that
it facilitates and promotes real-time interaction among millions, if not
billions, of users, sans the spatial barriers, 16 bridging the gap created
by physical space; and (2) that any information uploaded in OSNs
leaves an indelible trace in the providers databases, which are outside
the control of the end-usersis there a right to informational
privacy in OSN activities of its users? Before addressing this point,
We must first resolve the procedural issues in this case.
The writ of habeas data is not only confined to
cases of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearancesContrary to respondents submission, the Writ

of Habeas Data was not enacted solely for the purpose of

complementing the Writ of Amparo in cases of extralegal killings and
enforced disappearances.
Section 2 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data provides:

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Sec. 2. Who May File. Any aggrieved party may file a petition for the
writ of habeas data.However, in cases of extralegal killings and
enforced disappearances, the petition may be filed by:
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(a) Any member of the immediate family of the

aggrieved party, namely: the spouse,
children and parents; or
(b) Any ascendant, descendant or collateral
relative of the aggrieved party within the
fourth civil degree of consanguinity or
affinity, in default of those mentioned in the
preceding paragraph. (emphasis supplied)
Had the framers of the Rule intended to narrow the operation of the
writ only to cases of extralegal killings or enforced disappearances, the
above underscored portion of Section 2, reflecting a variance ofhabeas
data situations, would not have been made.
Habeas data, to stress, was designed to safeguard individual freedom
from abuse in the information age.17 As such, it is erroneous to limit
its applicability to extralegal killings and enforced disappearances only.
In fact, the annotations to the Rule prepared by the Committee on the
Revision of the Rules of Court, after explaining that the Writ of Habeas
Data complements the Writ of Amparo, pointed out that:
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The writ of habeas data, however, can be availed of as an

independent remedy to enforce ones right to privacy, more
specifically the right to informational privacy.The remedies
against the violation of such right can include the updating,
rectification, suppression or destruction of the database or information
or files in possession or in control of respondents.18 (emphasis Ours)
Clearly then, the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Data may also be
availed of in cases outside of extralegal killings and enforced

disappearances.
Meaning of engaged in the gathering,
collecting or storing of data or informationRespondents
contention that the habeas data writ may not issue against STC, it not
being an entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data
or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence
of the aggrieved party, while valid to a point, is, nonetheless,
erroneous.
To be sure, nothing in the Rule would suggest that the habeas
data protection shall be available only against abuses of a person or
entity engaged in the business of gathering, storing, and collecting of
data. As provided under Section 1 of the Rule:
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Section 1. Habeas Data. The writ of habeas data is a remedy

available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security
is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public
official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged
in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information
regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the
aggrieved party. (emphasis Ours)
The provision, when taken in its proper context, as a whole, irresistibly
conveys the idea that habeas data is a protection against unlawful acts
or omissions of public officials and of private individuals or entities
engaged in gathering, collecting, or storing data about the aggrieved
party and his or her correspondences, or about his or her family. Such
individual or entity need not be in the business of collecting or storing
data.
To engage in something is different from undertaking a business
endeavour. To engage means to do or take part in something.19 It
does not necessarily mean that the activity must be done in pursuit of
a business. What matters is that the person or entity must be
gathering, collecting or storing said data or information about the
aggrieved party or his or her family. Whether such undertaking carries
the element of regularity, as when one pursues a business, and is in
the nature of a personal endeavour, for any other reason or even for
no reason at all, is immaterial and such will not prevent the writ from
getting to said person or entity.
To agree with respondents above argument, would mean unduly
limiting the reach of the writ to a very small group, i.e., private

persons and entities whose business is data gathering and storage,

and in the process decreasing the effectiveness of the writ as an
instrument designed to protect a right which is easily violated in view
of rapid advancements in the information and communications
technologya right which a great majority of the users of technology
themselves are not capable of protecting.
Having resolved the procedural aspect of the case, We now proceed to
the core of the controversy.
The right to informational privacy on Facebook
The Right to Informational Privacy
The concept of privacy has, through time, greatly evolved, with
technological advancements having an influential part therein. This
evolution was briefly recounted in former Chief Justice Reynato S.
Punos speech, The Common Right to Privacy,20 where he explained the
three strands of the right to privacy, viz: (1) locational or situational
privacy;21 (2) informational privacy; and (3) decisional privacy.22 Of the
three, what is relevant to the case at bar is the right to
informational privacyusually defined as the right of individuals
to control information about themselves. 23
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With the availability of numerous avenues for information gathering

and data sharing nowadays, not to mention each systems inherent
vulnerability to attacks and intrusions, there is more reason that every
individuals right to control said flow of information should be protected
and that each individual should have at least a reasonable expectation
of privacy in cyberspace. Several commentators regarding privacy and
social networking sites, however, all agree that given the millions of
OSN users, [i]n this [Social Networking] environment, privacy is no
longer grounded in reasonable expectations, but rather in some
theoretical protocol better known as wishful thinking.24
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It is due to this notion that the Court saw the pressing need to provide
for judicial remedies that would allow a summary hearing of the
unlawful use of data or information and to remedy possible violations
of the right to privacy.25 In the same vein, the South African High
Court, in its Decision in the landmark case, H v. W,26 promulgated on
January 30, 2013, recognized that [t]he law has to take into account
the changing realities not only technologically but also socially or else
it will lose credibility in the eyes of the people. x x x It is imperative
that the courts respond appropriately to changing times, acting
cautiously and with wisdom. Consistent with this, the Court, by
developing what may be viewed as the Philippine model of the writ

of habeas data, in effect, recognized that, generally speaking, having

an expectation of informational privacy is not necessarily
incompatible with engaging in cyberspace activities, including
those that occur in OSNs.
The question now though is up to what extent is the right to privacy
protected in OSNs? Bear in mind that informational privacy involves
personal information. At the same time, the very purpose of OSNs is
socializingsharing a myriad of information,27 some of which would
have otherwise remained personal.
Facebooks Privacy Tools: a response to
the clamor for privacy in OSN activities
Briefly, the purpose of an OSN is precisely to give users the ability to
interact and to stay connected to other members of the same or
different social media platform through the sharing of statuses,
photos, videos, among others, depending on the services provided by
the site. It is akin to having a room filled with millions of personal
bulletin boards or walls, the contents of which are under the control
of each and every user. In his or her bulletin board, a user/owner can
post anythingfrom text, to pictures, to music and videosaccess to
which would depend on whether he or she allows one, some or all of
the other users to see his or her posts. Since gaining popularity, the
OSN phenomenon has paved the way to the creation of various social
networking sites, including the one involved in the case at bar,
www.facebook.com (Facebook), which, according to its developers,
people use to stay connected with friends and family, to discover
whats going on in the world, and to share and express what matters
to them.28
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Facebook connections are established through the process of

friending another user. By sending a friend request, the user invites
another to connect their accounts so that they can view any and all
Public and Friends Only posts of the other. Once the request is
accepted, the link is established and both users are permitted to view
the other users Public or Friends Only posts, among others.
Friending, therefore, allows the user to form or maintain one-to-one
relationships with other users, whereby the user gives his or her
Facebook friend access to his or her profile and shares certain
information to the latter.29
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To address concerns about privacy,30 but without defeating its purpose,

Facebook was armed with different privacy tools designed to regulate
the accessibility of a users profile31 as well as information uploaded by
the user. In H v. W,32 the South Gauteng High Court recognized this

ability of the users to customize their privacy settings, but did so

with this caveat: Facebook states in its policies that, although it
makes every effort to protect a users information, these privacy
settings are not fool-proof.33
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For instance, a Facebook user can regulate the visibility and

accessibility of digital images (photos), posted on his or her personal
bulletin or wall, except for the users profile picture and ID, by
selecting his or her desired privacy setting:
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(a) Public - the default setting; every Facebook user can view the
photo;
(b) Friends of Friends - only the users Facebook friends and their
friends can view the photo;
(b) Friends - only the users Facebook friends can view the photo;
(c) Custom - the photo is made visible only to particular friends and/or
networks of the Facebook user; and
(d) Only Me - the digital image can be viewed only by the user.
The foregoing are privacy tools, available to Facebook users, designed
to set up barriers to broaden or limit the visibility of his or her specific
profile content, statuses, and photos, among others, from another
users point of view. In other words, Facebook extends its users an
avenue to make the availability of their Facebook activities reflect their
choice as to when and to what extent to disclose facts about
[themselves] and to put others in the position of receiving such
confidences.34 Ideally, the selected setting will be based on ones
desire to interact with others, coupled with the opposing need to
withhold certain information as well as to regulate the spreading of his
or her personal information. Needless to say, as the privacy setting
becomes more limiting, fewer Facebook users can view that users
particular post.
STC did not violate petitioners daughters right to privacy
Without these privacy settings, respondents contention that there is
no reasonable expectation of privacy in Facebook would, in context, be
correct. However, such is not the case. It is through the availability
of said privacy tools that many OSN users are said to have a
subjective expectation that only those to whom they grant
access to their profile will view the information they post or
upload thereto.35
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This, however, does not mean that any Facebook user automatically

has a protected expectation of privacy in all of his or her Facebook

activities.
Before one can have an expectation of privacy in his or her OSN
activity, it is first necessary that said user, in this case the children
of petitioners, manifest the intention to keep certain posts
private, through the employment of measures to prevent
access thereto or to limit its visibility.36 And this intention can
materialize in cyberspace through the utilization of the OSNs
privacy tools. In other words, utilization of these privacy tools
is the manifestation, in cyber world, of the users invocation of
his or her right to informational privacy.37
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Therefore, a Facebook user who opts to make use of a privacy tool to

grant or deny access to his or her post or profile detail should not be
denied the informational privacy right which necessarily accompanies
said choice.38 Otherwise, using these privacy tools would be a
feckless exercise, such that if, for instance, a user uploads a photo or
any personal information to his or her Facebook page and sets its
privacy level at Only Me or a custom list so that only the user or a
chosen few can view it, said photo would still be deemed public by the
courts as if the user never chose to limit the photos visibility and
accessibility. Such position, if adopted, will not only strip these privacy
tools of their function but it would also disregard the very intention of
the user to keep said photo or information within the confines of his or
her private space.
We must now determine the extent that the images in question were
visible to other Facebook users and whether the disclosure was
confidential in nature. In other words, did the minors limit the
disclosure of the photos such that the images were kept within their
zones of privacy? This determination is necessary in resolving the issue
of whether the minors carved out a zone of privacy when the photos
were uploaded to Facebook so that the images will be protected
against unauthorized access and disclosure.
Petitioners, in support of their thesis about their childrens privacy right
being violated, insist that Escudero intruded upon their childrens
Facebook accounts, downloaded copies of the pictures and showed
said photos to Tigol. To them, this was a breach of the minors privacy
since their Facebook accounts, allegedly, were under very private or
Only Friends setting safeguarded with a password.39Ultimately, they
posit that their childrens disclosure was only limited since their profiles
were not open to public viewing. Therefore, according to them, people
who are not their Facebook friends, including respondents, are barred

from accessing said post without their knowledge and consent. As

petitioners children testified, it was Angela who uploaded the subject
photos which were only viewable by the five of them,40 although who
these five are do not appear on the records.
Escudero, on the other hand, stated in her affidavit 41 that my students
showed me some pictures of girls clad in brassieres. This student [sic]
of mine informed me that these are senior high school [students] of
STC, who are their friends in [F]acebook. x x x They then said [that]
there are still many other photos posted on the Facebook accounts of
these girls. At the computer lab, these students then logged into their
Facebook account [sic], and accessed from there the various
photographs x x x. They even told me that there had been times when
these photos were public i.e., not confined to their friends in
Facebook.
In this regard, We cannot give much weight to the minors testimonies
for one key reason: failure to question the students act of showing the
photos to Tigol disproves their allegation that the photos were
viewable only by the five of them. Without any evidence to corroborate
their statement that the images were visible only to the five of them,
and without their challenging Escuderos claim that the other students
were able to view the photos, their statements are, at best, selfserving, thus deserving scant consideration.42
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It is well to note that not one of petitioners disputed Escuderos sworn

account that her students, who are the minors Facebook friends,
showed her the photos using their own Facebook accounts. This only
goes to show that no special means to be able to view the allegedly
private posts were ever resorted to by Escuderos students,43 and that
it is reasonable to assume, therefore, that the photos were, in reality,
viewable either by (1) their Facebook friends, or (2) by the public at
large.
Considering that the default setting for Facebook posts is Public, it
can be surmised that the photographs in question were viewable to
everyone on Facebook, absent any proof that petitioners children
positively limited the disclosure of the photograph. If such were the
case, they cannot invoke the protection attached to the right to
informational privacy. The ensuing pronouncement in US v. GinesPerez44 is most instructive:
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[A] person who places a photograph on the Internet precisely intends

to forsake and renounce all privacy rights to such imagery, particularly
under circumstances such as here, where the Defendant did not

employ protective measures or devices that would have controlled

access to the Web page or the photograph itself.45
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Also, United States v. Maxwell46 held that [t]he more open the
method of transmission is, the less privacy one can reasonably expect.
Messages sent to the public at large in the chat room or e-mail that is
forwarded from correspondent to correspondent loses any semblance
of privacy.
That the photos are viewable by friends only does not necessarily
bolster the petitioners contention. In this regard, the cyber community
is agreed that the digital images under this setting still remain to be
outside the confines of the zones of privacy in view of the following:

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(1 Facebook allows the world to be more open

) and connected by giving its users the tools to
interact and share in any conceivable way;47
(2 A good number of Facebook users befriend
) other users who are total strangers;48
(3 The sheer number of Friends one user has,
) usually by the hundreds; and
(4 A users Facebook friend can share49 the
) formers post, or tag50 others who are not
Facebook friends with the former, despite its
being visible only to his or her own Facebook
friends.
It is well to emphasize at this point that setting a posts or profile
details privacy to Friends is no assurance that it can no longer be
viewed by another user who is not Facebook friends with the source of
the content. The users own Facebook friend can share said content or
tag his or her own Facebook friend thereto, regardless of whether the
user tagged by the latter is Facebook friends or not with the former.
Also, when the post is shared or when a person is tagged, the
respective Facebook friends of the person who shared the post or who
was tagged can view the post, the privacy setting of which was set at
Friends.
To illustrate, suppose A has 100 Facebook friends and B has 200. A

and B are not Facebook friends. If C, As Facebook friend, tags B in As

post, which is set at Friends, the initial audience of 100 (As own
Facebook friends) is dramatically increased to 300 (As 100 friends plus
Bs 200 friends or the public, depending upon Bs privacy setting). As a
result, the audience who can view the post is effectively expanded
and to a very large extent.
This, along with its other features and uses, is confirmation of
Facebooks proclivity towards user interaction and socialization rather
than seclusion or privacy, as it encourages broadcasting of individual
user posts. In fact, it has been said that OSNs have facilitated their
users self-tribute, thereby resulting into the democratization of
fame.51 Thus, it is suggested, that a profile, or even a post, with
visibility set at Friends Only cannot easily, more so automatically, be
said to be very private, contrary to petitioners argument.
As applied, even assuming that the photos in issue are visible only to
the sanctioned students Facebook friends, respondent STC can hardly
be taken to task for the perceived privacy invasion since it was the
minors Facebook friends who showed the pictures to Tigol.
Respondents were mere recipients of what were posted. They did not
resort to any unlawful means of gathering the information as it was
voluntarily given to them by persons who had legitimate access to the
said posts. Clearly, the fault, if any, lies with the friends of the minors.
Curiously enough, however, neither the minors nor their parents
imputed any violation of privacy against the students who showed the
images to Escudero.
Furthermore, petitioners failed to prove their contention that
respondents reproduced and broadcasted the photographs. In fact,
what petitioners attributed to respondents as an act of offensive
disclosure was no more than the actuality that respondents appended
said photographs in their memorandum submitted to the trial court in
connection with Civil Case No. CEB-38594.52 These are not tantamount
to a violation of the minors informational privacy rights, contrary to
petitioners assertion.
In sum, there can be no quibbling that the images in question, or to be
more precise, the photos of minor students scantily clad, are personal
in nature, likely to affect, if indiscriminately circulated, the reputation
of the minors enrolled in a conservative institution. However, the
records are bereft of any evidence, other than bare assertions that
they utilized Facebooks privacy settings to make the photos visible
only to them or to a select few. Without proof that they placed the
photographs subject of this case within the ambit of their protected

zone of privacy, they cannot now insist that they have an expectation
of privacy with respect to the photographs in question.
Had it been proved that the access to the pictures posted were limited
to the original uploader, through the Me Only privacy setting, or that
the users contact list has been screened to limit access to a select
few, through the Custom setting, the result may have been different,
for in such instances, the intention to limit access to the particular
post, instead of being broadcasted to the public at large or all the
users friends en masse, becomes more manifest and palpable.
On Cyber Responsibility
It has been said that the best filter is the one between your
childrens ears.53 This means that self-regulation on the part of OSN
users and internet consumers in general is the best means of avoiding
privacy rights violations.54 As a cyberspace community member, one
has to be proactive in protecting his or her own privacy.55 It is in this
regard that many OSN users, especially minors, fail. Responsible social
networking or observance of the netiquettes56 on the part of
teenagers has been the concern of many due to the widespread notion
that teenagers can sometimes go too far since they generally lack the
people skills or general wisdom to conduct themselves sensibly in a
public forum.57
cralawla wlibrary

Respondent STC is clearly aware of this and incorporating lessons on

good cyber citizenship in its curriculum to educate its students on
proper online conduct may be most timely. Too, it is not only STC but a
number of schools and organizations have already deemed it important
to include digital literacy and good cyber citizenship in their respective
programs and curricula in view of the risks that the children are
exposed to every time they participate in online
activities.58 Furthermore, considering the complexity of the cyber world
and its pervasiveness, as well as the dangers that these children are
wittingly or unwittingly exposed to in view of their unsupervised
activities in cyberspace, the participation of the parents in disciplining
and educating their children about being a good digital citizen is
encouraged by these institutions and organizations. In fact, it is
believed that to limit such risks, theres no substitute for parental
involvement and supervision.59
cralawlawlibrary

As such, STC cannot be faulted for being steadfast in its duty of

teaching its students to be responsible in their dealings and activities
in cyberspace, particularly in OSNs, when it enforced the disciplinary
actions specified in the Student Handbook, absent a showing that, in

the process, it violated the students rights.

OSN users should be aware of the risks that they expose themselves
to whenever they engage in cyberspace activities. Accordingly, they
should be cautious enough to control their privacy and to exercise
sound discretion regarding how much information about themselves
they are willing to give up. Internet consumers ought to be aware that,
by entering or uploading any kind of data or information online, they
are automatically and inevitably making it permanently available
online, the perpetuation of which is outside the ambit of their control.
Furthermore, and more importantly, information, otherwise private,
voluntarily surrendered by them can be opened, read, or copied by
third parties who may or may not be allowed access to such.
It is, thus, incumbent upon internet users to exercise due diligence in
their online dealings and activities and must not be negligent in
protecting their rights. Equity serves the vigilant. Demanding relief
from the courts, as here, requires that claimants themselves take
utmost care in safeguarding a right which they allege to have been
violated. These are indispensable. We cannot afford protection to
persons if they themselves did nothing to place the matter within the
confines of their private zone. OSN users must be mindful enough to
learn the use of privacy tools, to use them if they desire to keep the
information private, and to keep track of changes in the available
privacy settings, such as those of Facebook, especially because
Facebook is notorious for changing these settings and the sites layout
often.
In finding that respondent STC and its officials did not violate the
minors privacy rights, We find no cogent reason to disturb the findings
and case disposition of the court a quo.
In light of the foregoing, the Court need not belabor the other
assigned errors.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED.
The Decision dated July 27, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
14 in Cebu City in SP. Proc. No. 19251-CEB is hereby AFFIRMED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

cralawred

Peralta, Villarama, Jr., Reyes, and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.

DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
"The concept of liberty would be emasculated if it does not
likewise compel respect for one's personality as a unique
individual whose claim to privacy and non-interference demands
respect."1
This Petition for Review on Certiorari2 under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court assails the July 10, 2007 Decision3 and the September
11, 2007 Resolution4 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CEB-SP No. 01473.
Factual Antecedents
On August 23, 2005, petitioner-spouses Bill and Victoria Hing
filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaue City a
Complaint5 for Injunction and Damages with prayer for issuance
of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction/Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO), docketed as Civil Case MAN-5223 and
raffled to Branch 28, against respondents Alexander Choachuy,
Sr. and Allan Choachuy.

Petitioners alleged that they are the registered owners of a parcel

of land (Lot 1900-B) covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. 42817 situated in Barangay Basak, City of Mandaue,
Cebu;6 that respondents are the owners of Aldo Development &
Resources, Inc. (Aldo) located at Lots 1901 and 1900-C, adjacent
to the property of petitioners;7 that respondents constructed an
auto-repair shop building (Aldo Goodyear Servitec) on Lot 1900C; that in April 2005, Aldo filed a case against petitioners for
Injunction and Damages with Writ of Preliminary Injunction/TRO,
docketed as Civil Case No. MAN-5125;8 that in that case, Aldo
claimed that petitioners were constructing a fence without a valid
permit and that the said construction would destroy the wall of its
building, which is adjacent to petitioners property; 9 that the court,
in that case, denied Aldos application for preliminary injunction
for failure to substantiate its allegations;10 that, in order to get
evidence to support the said case, respondents on June 13, 2005
illegally set-up and installed on the building of Aldo Goodyear
Servitec two video surveillance cameras facing petitioners
property;11 that respondents, through their employees and without
the consent of petitioners, also took pictures of petitioners ongoing construction;12 and that the acts of respondents violate
petitioners right to privacy.13 Thus, petitioners prayed that
respondents be ordered to remove the video surveillance
cameras and enjoined from conducting illegal surveillance.14
In their Answer with Counterclaim, respondents claimed that
they did not install the video surveillance cameras, 16nor did they
order their employees to take pictures of petitioners
construction.17 They also clarified that they are not the owners of
Aldo but are mere stockholders.18
15

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On October 18, 2005, the RTC issued an Order 19 granting the
application for a TRO. The dispositive portion of the said Order
reads:

WHEREFORE, the application for a Temporary Restraining Order

or a Writ of Preliminary Injunction is granted. Upon the filing and
approval of a bond by petitioners, which the Court sets
at P50,000.00, let a Writ of Preliminary Injunction issue against
the respondents Alexander Choachuy, Sr. and Allan Choachuy.
They are hereby directed to immediately remove the revolving
camera that they installed at the left side of their building
overlooking the side of petitioners lot and to transfer and operate
it elsewhere at the back where petitioners property can no longer
be viewed within a distance of about 2-3 meters from the left
corner of Aldo Servitec, facing the road.
IT IS SO ORDERED.20
Respondents moved for a reconsideration21 but the RTC denied
the same in its Order22 dated February 6, 2006.23Thus:
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED
for lack of merit. Issue a Writ of Preliminary Injunction in
consonance with the Order dated 18 October 2005.
IT IS SO ORDERED.24
Aggrieved, respondents filed with the CA a Petition for
Certiorari25 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with application
for a TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On July 10, 2007, the CA issued its Decision26 granting the
Petition for Certiorari. The CA ruled that the Writ of Preliminary
Injunction was issued with grave abuse of discretion because
petitioners failed to show a clear and unmistakable right to an
injunctive writ.27 The CA explained that the right to privacy of
residence under Article 26(1) of the Civil Code was not violated
since the property subject of the controversy is not used as a
residence.28 The CA alsosaid that since respondents are not the

owners of the building, they could not have installed video

surveillance cameras.29 They are mere stockholders of Aldo,
which has a separate juridical personality.30 Thus, they are not the
proper parties.31 The fallo reads:

PRIVATE ACTIVITIES OF PETITIONER SPOUSES HING,

THEIR CHILDREN AND EMPLOYEES.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is

hereby rendered by us GRANTING the petition filed in this case.
The assailed orders dated October 18, 2005 and February 6,
2006 issued by the respondent judge are hereby ANNULLED and
SET ASIDE.

THE X X X CA COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT

RULED THAT SINCE THE OWNER OF THE BUILDING IS ALDO
DEVELOPMENT AND RESOURCES, INC. THEN TO SUE
RESPONDENTS CHOACHUY CONSTITUTES A
PURPORTEDLY UNWARRANTED PIERCING OF THE
CORPORATE VEIL.

III.

SO ORDERED.32
IV.
Issues
Hence, this recourse by petitioners arguing that:
I.
THE X X X CA COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT
ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE THE ORDERS OF THE RTC
DATED 18 OCTOBER 2005 AND 6 FEBRUARY 2006 HOLDING
THAT THEY WERE ISSUED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION.

THE X X X CA COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT

IGNORED THE SERIOUS FORMAL DEFICIENCIES OF BOTH
THE PETITION AND THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
DATED 15 MARCH 2006 OF RESPONDENTS CHOACHUY AND
GAVE X X X THEM DUE COURSE AND CONSIDERATION.33
Essentially, the issues boil down to (1) whether there is a violation
of petitioners right to privacy, and (2) whether respondents are
the proper parties to this suit.
Petitioners Arguments

II.
THE X X X CA COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT
RULED THAT PETITIONER SPOUSES HING ARE NOT
ENTITLED TO THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION ON
THE GROUND THAT THERE IS NO VIOLATION OF THEIR
CONSTITUTIONAL AND CIVIL RIGHT TO PRIVACY DESPITE
THE FACTUAL FINDINGS OF THE RTC, WHICH
RESPONDENTS CHOACHUY FAILED TO REFUTE, THAT THE
ILLEGALLY INSTALLED SURVEILLANCE CAMERAS OF
RESPONDENTS CHOACH[U]Y WOULD CAPTURE THE

Petitioners insist that they are entitled to the issuance of a Writ of

Preliminary Injunction because respondents installation of a
stationary camera directly facing petitioners property and a
revolving camera covering a significant portion of the same
property constitutes a violation of petitioners right to
privacy.34 Petitioners cite Article 26(1) of the Civil Code, which
enjoins persons from prying into the private lives of
others.35 Although the said provision pertains to the privacy of
anothers residence, petitioners opine that it includes business
offices, citing Professor Arturo M. Tolentino.36 Thus, even

assuming arguendo that petitioners property is used for

business, it is still covered by the said provision.37
As to whether respondents are the proper parties to implead in
this case, petitioners claim that respondents and Aldo are one
and the same, and that respondents only want to hide behind
Aldos corporate fiction.38 They point out that if respondents are
not the real owners of the building, where the video surveillance
cameras were installed, then they had no business consenting to
the ocular inspection conducted by the court.39
Respondents Arguments
Respondents, on the other hand, echo the ruling of the CA that
petitioners cannot invoke their right to privacy since the property
involved is not used as a residence.40 Respondents maintain that
they had nothing to do with the installation of the video
surveillance cameras as these were installed by Aldo, the
registered owner of the building,41as additional security for its
building.42 Hence, they were wrongfully impleaded in this case. 43
Our Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.
The right to privacy is the right to be let alone.
The right to privacy is enshrined in our Constitution44 and in our
laws. It is defined as "the right to be free from unwarranted
exploitation of ones person or from intrusion into ones private
activities in such a way as to cause humiliation to a persons
ordinary sensibilities."45 It is the right of an individual "to be free
from unwarranted publicity, or to live without unwarranted
interference by the public in matters in which the public is not
necessarily concerned."46 Simply put, the right to privacy is "the
right to be let alone."47

The Bill of Rights guarantees the peoples right to privacy and

protects them against the States abuse of power. In this regard,
the State recognizes the right of the people to be secure in their
houses. No one, not even the State, except "in case of overriding
social need and then only under the stringent procedural
safeguards," can disturb them in the privacy of their homes.48
The right to privacy under Article 26(1)
of the Civil Code covers business offices
where the public are excluded
therefrom and only certain individuals
are allowed to enter.
Article 26(1) of the Civil Code, on the other hand, protects an
individuals right to privacy and provides a legal remedy against
abuses that may be committed against him by other individuals. It
states:
Art. 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy
and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons. The
following and similar acts, though they may not constitute a
criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages,
prevention and other relief:
(1) Prying into the privacy of anothers residence;
xxxx
This provision recognizes that a mans house is his castle, where
his right to privacy cannot be denied or even restricted by others.
It includes "any act of intrusion into, peeping or peering
inquisitively into the residence of another without the consent of
the latter."49 The phrase "prying into the privacy of anothers

residence," however, does not mean that only the residence is

entitled to privacy. As elucidated by Civil law expert Arturo M.
Tolentino:

expectation of privacy must be determined on a case-to-case

basis since it depends on the factual circumstances surrounding
the case.54

Our Code specifically mentions "prying into the privacy of

anothers residence." This does not mean, however, that only the
residence is entitled to privacy, because the law covers also
"similar acts." A business office is entitled to the same privacy
when the public is excluded therefrom and only such individuals
as are allowed to enter may come in. x x x50 (Emphasis supplied)

In this day and age, video surveillance cameras are installed

practically everywhere for the protection and safety of everyone.
The installation of these cameras, however, should not cover
places where there is reasonable expectation of privacy, unless
the consent of the individual, whose right to privacy would be
affected, was obtained. Nor should these cameras be used to pry
into the privacy of anothers residence or business office as it
would be no different from eavesdropping, which is a crime under
Republic Act No. 4200 or the Anti-Wiretapping Law.

Thus, an individuals right to privacy under Article 26(1) of the

Civil Code should not be confined to his house or residence as it
may extend to places where he has the right to exclude the public
or deny them access. The phrase "prying into the privacy of
anothers residence," therefore, covers places, locations, or even
situations which an individual considers as private. And as long
as his right is recognized by society, other individuals may not
infringe on his right to privacy. The CA, therefore, erred in limiting
the application of Article 26(1) of the Civil Code only to
residences.
The "reasonable expectation of
privacy" test is used to determine
whether there is a violation of the right
to privacy.
In ascertaining whether there is a violation of the right to privacy,
courts use the "reasonable expectation of privacy" test. This test
determines whether a person has a reasonable expectation of
privacy and whether the expectation has been violated.51 In Ople
v. Torres,52 we enunciated that "the reasonableness of a persons
expectation of privacy depends on a two-part test: (1) whether, by
his conduct, the individual has exhibited an expectation of
privacy; and (2) this expectation is one that society recognizes as
reasonable." Customs, community norms, and practices may,
therefore, limit or extend an individuals "reasonable expectation
of privacy."53 Hence, the reasonableness of a persons

In this case, the RTC, in granting the application for Preliminary

Injunction, ruled that:
After careful consideration, there is basis to grant the application
for a temporary restraining order. The operation by respondents
of a revolving camera, even if it were mounted on their building,
violated the right of privacy of petitioners, who are the owners of
the adjacent lot. The camera does not only focus on respondents
property or the roof of the factory at the back (Aldo Development
and Resources, Inc.) but it actually spans through a good portion
of the land of petitioners.
Based on the ocular inspection, the Court understands why
petitioner Hing was so unyielding in asserting that the revolving
camera was set up deliberately to monitor the on[-]going
construction in his property. The monitor showed only a portion of
the roof of the factory of Aldo. If the purpose of respondents in
setting up a camera at the back is to secure the building and
factory premises, then the camera should revolve only towards
their properties at the back. Respondents camera cannot be
made to extend the view to petitioners lot. To allow the
respondents to do that over the objection of the petitioners would
violate the right of petitioners as property owners. "The owner of

a thing cannot make use thereof in such a manner as to injure the

rights of a third person."55

defendants act or omission which had violated the legal right of

the former."57

The RTC, thus, considered that petitioners have a "reasonable

expectation of privacy" in their property, whether they use it as a
business office or as a residence and that the installation of video
surveillance cameras directly facing petitioners property or
covering a significant portion thereof, without their consent, is a
clear violation of their right to privacy. As we see then, the
issuance of a preliminary injunction was justified. We need not
belabor that the issuance of a preliminary injunction is
discretionary on the part of the court taking cognizance of the
case and should not be interfered with, unless there is grave
abuse of discretion committed by the court.56 Here, there is no
indication of any grave abuse of discretion. Hence, the CA erred
in finding that petitioners are not entitled to an injunctive writ.

In ruling that respondents are not the proper parties, the CA

reasoned that since they do not own the building, they could not
have installed the video surveillance cameras.58 Such reasoning,
however, is erroneous. The fact that respondents are not the
registered owners of the building does not automatically mean
that they did not cause the installation of the video surveillance
cameras.

This brings us to the next question: whether respondents are the

proper parties to this suit.
A real party defendant is one who has a
correlative legal obligation to redress a
wrong done to the plaintiff by reason of
the defendant's act or omission which
had violated the legal right of the
former.
Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 2. Parties-in-interest. A real party-in-interest is the party
who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit,
or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise
authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be
prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest.
A real party defendant is "one who has a correlative legal
obligation to redress a wrong done to the plaintiff by reason of the

In their Complaint, petitioners claimed that respondents installed

the video surveillance cameras in order to fish for evidence,
which could be used against petitioners in another case.59 During
the hearing of the application for Preliminary Injunction, petitioner
Bill testified that when respondents installed the video
surveillance cameras, he immediately broached his concerns but
they did not seem to care,60 and thus, he reported the matter to
the barangay for mediation, and eventually, filed a Complaint
against respondents before the RTC.61 He also admitted that as
early as 1998 there has already been a dispute between his
family and the Choachuy family concerning the boundaries of
their respective properties.62 With these factual circumstances in
mind, we believe that respondents are the proper parties to be
impleaded.
Moreover, although Aldo has a juridical personality separate and
distinct from its stockholders, records show that it is a familyowned corporation managed by the Choachuy family.63
Also quite telling is the fact that respondents, notwithstanding
their claim that they are not owners of the building, allowed the
court to enter the compound of Aldo and conduct an ocular
inspection. The counsel for respondents even toured Judge
Marilyn Lagura-Yap inside the building and answered all her
questions regarding the set-up and installation of the video
surveillance cameras.64 And when respondents moved for
reconsideration of the Order dated October 18, 2005 of the RTC,

one of the arguments they raised is that Aldo would suffer

damages if the video surveillance cameras are removed and
transferred.65 Noticeably, in these instances, the personalities of
respondents and Aldo seem to merge.
All these taken together lead us to the inevitable conclusion that
respondents are merely using the corporate fiction of Aldo as a
shield to protect themselves from this suit. In view of the
foregoing, we find that respondents are the proper parties to this
suit.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision
dated July 10, 2007 and the Resolution dated September 11,
2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 01473 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Orders dated October
18,2005 and February 6, 200[6] of Branch 28 of the Regional Trial
Court of Mandaue City in Civil Case No. MAN-5223 are hereby
REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 203254, October 08, 2014

DR. JOY MARGATE LEE, Petitioner, v. P/SUPT. NERI A.
ILAGAN, Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the
Decision2 dated August 30, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 224 (RTC) in SP No. 12-71527, which extended the
privilege of the writ of habeas data in favor of respondent Police
Superintendent Neri A. Ilagan (Ilagan).
The Facts
In his Petition for Issuance of the Writ of Habeas Data3 dated June 22,
2012, Ilagan alleged that he and petitioner Dr. Joy Margate Lee (Lee)
were former common law partners. Sometime in July 2011, he visited
Lee at the latters condominium, rested for a while and
thereafter,proceeded to his office. Upon arrival, Ilagan noticed that his
digital camera was missing.4 On August 23, 2011, Lee confronted
Ilagan at the latters office regarding a purported sex video (subject

video) she discovered from the aforesaid camera involving Ilagan and
another woman. Ilagan denied the video and demanded Lee to return
the camera, but to no avail.5 During the confrontation, Ilagan
allegedly slammed Lees head against a wall inside his office and
walked away.6Subsequently, Lee utilized the said video as evidence in
filing various complaints against Ilagan, namely: (a) a criminal
complaint for violation of Republic Act No. 9262,7otherwise known as
the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004,
before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati; and (b) an
administrative complaint for grave misconduct before the National
Police Commission (NAPOLCOM).8 Ilagan claimed that Lees acts of
reproducing the subject video and threatening to distribute the same
to the upper echelons of the NAPOLCOM and uploading it to the
internet violated not only his right to life, liberty, security, and privacy
but also that of the other woman, and thus, the issuance of a writ
of habeas data in his favor is warranted.9
Finding the petition prima facie meritorious, the RTC issued a Writ
of Habeas Data10 dated June 25, 2012, directing Lee to appear before
the court a quo, and to produce Ilagans digital camera, as well as the
negative and/or original of the subject video and copies thereof, and to
file a verified written return within five (5) working days from date of
receipt thereof.
In her Verified Return11 dated July 2, 2012, Lee admitted that she
indeed kept the memory card of the digital camera and reproduced the
aforesaid video but averred that she only did so to utilize the same as
evidence in the cases she filed against Ilagan. She also admitted that
her relationship with Ilagan started sometime in 2003 and ended
under disturbing circumstances in August 2011, and that she only
happened to discover the subject video when Ilagan left his camera in
her condominium. Accordingly, Lee contended that Ilagans petition for
the issuance of the writ of habeas data should be dismissed because:
(a) its filing was only aimed at suppressing the evidence against Ilagan
in the cases she filed; and (b) she is not engaged in the gathering,
collecting, or storing of data regarding the person of Ilagan. 12
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision13 dated August 30, 2012, the RTC granted the privilege of
the writ of habeas data in Ilagans favor, and accordingly, ordered the
implementing officer to turn-over copies of the subject video to him,
and enjoined Lee from further reproducing the same. 14
The RTC did not give credence to Lees defense that she is not

engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data regarding the

person of Ilagan, finding that her acts of reproducing the subject video
and showing it to other people, i.e., the NAPOLCOM officers, violated
the latters right to privacy in life and caused him to suffer humiliation
and mental anguish. In this relation, the RTC opined that Lees use of
the subject video as evidence in the various cases she filed against
Ilagan is not enough justification for its reproduction. Nevertheless,
the RTC clarified that it is only ruling on the return of the aforesaid
video and not on its admissibility before other tribunals. 15
Dissatisfied, Lee filed this petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue for the Courts resolution is whether or not the RTC
correctly extended the privilege of the writ of habeas data in favor of
Ilagan.
The Courts Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC, or the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data (Habeas
Data Rule), was conceived as a response, given the lack of effective
and available remedies, to address the extraordinary rise in the
number of killings and enforced disappearances.16 It was
conceptualized as a judicial remedy enforcing the right to privacy,
most especially the right to informational privacy of
individuals,17 which is defined as the right to control the collection,
maintenance, use, and dissemination of data about oneself.18
As defined in Section 1 of the Habeas Data Rule, the writ of habeas
data now stands as a remedy available to any person whose right to
privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an
unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private
individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing
of data or information regarding the person, family, home, and
correspondence of the aggrieved party. Thus, in order to support
a petition for the issuance of such writ, Section 6 of the Habeas
Data Rule essentially requires that the petition sufficiently alleges,
among others, [t]he manner the right to privacy is violated or
threatened and how it affects the right to life, liberty or
security of the aggrieved party. In other words, the petition must
adequately show that there exists a nexus between the right to

privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security
on the other .19 Corollarily, the allegations in the petition must be
supported by substantial evidence showing an actual or threatened
violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the
victim.20 In this relation, it bears pointing out that the writ of habeas
data will not issue to protect purely property or commercial concerns
nor when the grounds invoked in support of the petitions therefor are
vague and doubtful.21
In this case, the Court finds that Ilagan was not able to sufficiently
allege that his right to privacy in life, liberty or security was or would
be violated through the supposed reproduction and threatened
dissemination of the subject sex video. While Ilagan purports a privacy
interest in the suppression of this video which he fears would
somehow find its way to Quiapo or be uploaded in the internet for
public consumption he failed to explain the connection between such
interest and any violation of his right to life, liberty or security. Indeed,
courts cannot speculate or contrive versions of possible transgressions.
As the rules and existing jurisprudence on the matter evoke, alleging
and eventually proving the nexus between ones privacy right to the
cogent rights to life, liberty or security are crucial in habeas datacases,
so much so that a failure on either account certainly renders a habeas
data petition dismissible, as in this case.
In fact, even discounting the insufficiency of the allegations, the
petition would equally be dismissible due to the inadequacy of the
evidence presented. As the records show, all that Ilagan submitted in
support of his petition was his self-serving testimony which hardly
meets the substantial evidence requirement as prescribed by
the Habeas Data Rule. This is because nothing therein would indicate
that Lee actually proceeded to commit any overt act towards the end
of violating Ilagans right to privacy in life, liberty or security. Nor
would anything on record even lead a reasonable mind to
conclude22 that Lee was going to use the subject video in order to
achieve unlawful ends say for instance, to spread it to the public so
as to ruin Ilagans reputation. Contrastingly, Lee even made it clear in
her testimony that the only reason why she reproduced the subject
video was to legitimately utilize the same as evidence in the criminal
and administrative cases that she filed against Ilagan. 23 Hence, due to
the insufficiency of the allegations as well as the glaring absence of
substantial evidence, the Court finds it proper to reverse the RTC
Decision and dismiss the habeas data petition.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated August
30, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 224 in SP

No. 12-71527is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the

Petition for Issuance of the Writ of Habeas Data filed by respondent
P/Supt. Neri A. Ilagan isDISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

abatement, as a public nuisance, of a malicious,

scandalous and defamatory newspaper, or other
periodical. A state court order abated the Press and
enjoined the Defendants, publishers of the Press
(Defendants), from publishing or circulating such
defamatory and scandalous periodicals.
Issue. Whether a statute authorizing such proceedings is
consistent with the conception of the liberty of the press
as historically conceived and guaranteed?

Near v Minnesota
Brief Fact Summary. A Minnesota law that gagged a
periodical from publishing derogatory statements about
local public officials was held unconstitutional by the
Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court).
Synopsis of Rule of Law. The freedom of press is
essential to the nature of a free state but that freedom
may be restricted by the government in certain situations.

Facts. The Saturday Press (the Press) published attacks

on local officials. The Press claimed that the chief of
police had illicit relations with gangsters. Minnesota
officials obtained an injunction in order to abate the
publishing of the Press newspaper under a state law that
allowed this course of action. The state law authorized

Held. No. Judgment of the state court reversed. The fact

that the liberty of press may be abused by miscreant
purveyors of scandal does not effect the requirement that
the press has immunity from previous restraints when it
deals with official misconduct. Subsequent punishment
for such abuses as may exist is the appropriate remedy,
consistent with the constitutional privilege. Therefore, a
statute authorizing such proceedings is not consistent
with the conception of the liberty of the press as
historically conceived and guaranteed and is thus,
unconstitutional. The statute in question cannot be
justified by reason of the fact that the publisher is
permitted to show, before injunction issues, that the
matter published is true and is published with good
motives and for justifiable ends. This statute, if upheld,
could lead to a complete system of censorship. Thus, the

statute is a substantial infringement on the liberty of the

press and in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of
the Constitution. Dissent. This statute does not operate
as a previous restraint on publication within proper
meaning of that phrase. Discussion. The Supreme Court
of the United States (Supreme Court) in this case
extended the presumption against prior restraint in the
licensing context to judicial restraints as well.

Brief Fact Summary. The Supreme Court of the United

States (Supreme Court) held that the Government failed
to meet the requisite burden of proof needed to justify a
prior restraint of expression when attempting to enjoin the
New York Times and Washington Post from publishing
contents
of
a
classified
study.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. Any system of prior restraints
on expression comes to the Supreme Court bearing a
heavy presumption against its invalidity. The Government
thus creates a heavy burden of showing justification for
the enforcement of such a restraint.

Facts. The United States sought to enjoin the New York

Times and Washington Post from publishing contents of a
confidential study about the Governments decision
making with regards to Vietnam policy. The District Court
in the New York Times case and the District Court and
the Court of Appeals in the Washington Post case held
that the Government had not met the requisite burden
justifying
such
a
prior
restraint.
Issue. Whether the United States met the heavy burden
of showing justification for the enforcement of such a
restraint on the New York Times and Washington Post to
enjoin them from publishing contents of a classified
study?
Held. No. Judgments of the lower courts affirmed. The order of
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit is reversed and
remanded with directions to enter a judgment affirming the
District Court. The stays entered June 25, 1971, by the Court
are

vacated.

The

mandates

shall

issue

forthwith.

Dissent. The scope of the judicial function in passing upon

activities of the Executive Branch in the field of foreign affairs
is very narrowly restricted. This view is dictated by the doctrine
of Separation of Powers. The doctrine prohibiting prior
restraints does not prevent the courts from maintaining status

quo

long

enough

to

act

responsibly.

The United States has not met the very heavy burden, which it

The First Amendment is only part of the Constitution. The

must meet to warrant an injunction against publication in these

cases should be remanded to be developed expeditiously.

cases.

Concurrence. To find that the President has inherent power

The ultimate issue in this case is whether this Court or the

to halt the publication of news by resort to the courts would

Congress has the power to make this law. It is plain that

wipe out the First Amendment of the United States

Congress has refused to grant the authority the Government

Constitution

seeks from this Court.

[Constitution].

The First Amendment of the Constitution leaves no room for

governmental restraint on the press. There is, moreover, no
statute barring the publication by the press of the material that
the

Times

and

Post

seek

to

publish.

The First Amendment of the Constitution tolerates no prior

judicial restraints of the press predicated upon surmise or
conjecture that untoward consequences may result. Thus, only
governmental allegation and proof that publication must
inevitably, directly and immediately cause the occurrence of an
event kindred to imperiling the safety of a transport already at
sea can support the issuance of an interim restraining order.
Unless and until the Government has clearly made its case,
the First Amendment of the Constitution commands that no
injunction

be

issued.

The responsibility must be where the power is. The Executive

must have the large duty to determine and preserve the
degree of internal security necessary to exercise its power
effectively. The Executive is correct with respect to some of the
documents here, but disclosure of any of them will not result in
irreparable

danger

to

the

public.

PUNO, J.:

This is a petition for review of the Decision

dated March 24, 1995 of the respondent Court of
Appeals affirming the action of the respondent
Board of Review for Motion Pictures and Television
which x-rated the TV Program Ang Iglesia ni Cristo.
Petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo, a duly organized
religious organization, has a television program
entitled Ang Iglesia ni Cristo aired on Channel 2
every Saturday and on Channel 13 every

Sunday. The program presents and propagates

petitioners religious beliefs, doctrines and practices
often times in comparative studies with other
religions.
Sometime in the months of September,
October and November 1992, petitioner submitted
to the respondent Board of Review for Motion
Pictures and Television the VTR tapes of its TV
program Series Nos. 116, 119, 121 and 128. The
Board classified the series as X or not for public
viewing on the ground that they offend and
constitute an attack against other religions which is
expressly prohibited by law.
Petitioner pursued two (2) courses of action
against the respondent Board. On November 28,
1992, it appealed to the Office of the President the
classification of its TV Series No. 128. It
succeeded in its appeal for on December 18, 1992,
the Office of the President reversed the decision of
the respondent Board. Forthwith, the Board
allowed Series No. 128 to be publicly telecast.
On December 14, 1992, petitioner also filed
against the respondent Board Civil Case No. Q-9214280, with the RTC, NCR, Quezon City.
Petitioner alleged that the respondent Board
[1]

acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of

discretion in requiring petitioner to submit the VTR
tapes of its TV program and in x-rating them. It
cited its TV Program Series Nos. 115, 119, 121
and 128. In their Answer, respondent Board
invoked its power under P.D. No. 1986 in relation
to Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code.
On January 4, 1993, the trial court held a
hearing on petitioners prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction. The parties orally argued
and
then
marked
their
documentary
evidence. Petitioner submitted the following as its
exhibits, viz.:
(1) Exhibit A, respondent Boards Voting Slip for
Television showing its September 9, 1992 action
on petitioners Series No. 115 as follows:[2]

REMARKS:
There are some inconsistencies in the particular
program as it is very surprising for this program to show
series of Catholic ceremonies and also some religious
sects and using it in their discussion about the
bible. There are remarks which are direct criticism
which affect other religions.

Need more opinions for this particular program. Please

subject to more opinions.
(2) Exhibit A-1, respondent Boards Voting Slip for
Television showing its September 11, 1992
subsequent action on petitioners Series No. 115 as
follows:[3]

REMARKS:
This program is criticizing different religions, based on
their own interpretation of the Bible.
We suggest that the program should delve on explaining
their own faith and beliefs and avoid attacks on other
faith.
(3) Exhibit B, respondent Boards Voting Slip for
Television showing its October 9, 1992 action on
petitioners Series No. 119, as follows:[4]

REMARKS:
The Iglesia ni Cristo insists on the literal translation of
the bible and says that our (Catholic) veneration of the
Virgin Mary is not to be condoned because nowhere it is
found in the bible that we should do so.
This is intolerance and robs off all sects of freedom of
choice, worship and decision.

(4) Exhibit C, respondent Boards Voting Slip for

Television showing its October 20, 1992 action on
petitioners Series No. 121 as follows:[5]

REMARKS:
I refuse to approve the telecast of this episode for
reasons of the attacks, they do on, specifically, the
Catholic religion.
I refuse to admit that they can tell, dictate any other
religion that they are right and the rest are wrong, which
they clearly present in this episode.
(5) Exhibit D, respondent Boards Voting Slip for
Television showing its November 20, 1992 action
on petitioners Series No. 128 as follows:[6]

REMARKS:
The episode presented criticizes the religious beliefs of
the Catholic and Protestants beliefs.
We suggest a second review.
(6) Exhibits E, E-1, petitioners block time contract
with ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation dated
September 1, 1992.[7]
(7) Exhibit F, petitioners Airtime Contract with Island
Broadcasting Corporation.[8]

(8) Exhibit G, letter dated December 18, 1992 of

former Executive Secretary Edelmiro A. Amante,
Sr., addressed to Henrietta S. Mendez reversing
the decision of the respondent Board which x-rated
the showing of petitioners Series No. 129. The
letter reads in part:

xxx xxx xxx

The television episode in question is protected by the
constitutional guarantee of free speech and expression
under Article III, Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution.
We have viewed a tape of the television episode in
question, as well as studied the passages found by
MTRCB to be objectionable and we find no indication
that the episode poses any clear and present danger
sufficient to limit the said constitutional guarantee.
(9) Exhibits H, H-1, letter dated November 26, 1992
of Teofilo C. Ramos, Sr., addressed to President
Fidel V. Ramos appealing the action of the
respondent Board x-rating petitioners Series No.
128.

On its part, respondent Board submitted the

following exhibits, viz.:
(1) Exhibit 1, Permit Certificate for Television
Exhibition No. 15181 dated December 18, 1992
allowing the showing of Series No. 128 under
parental guidance.

(2) Exhibit 2, which is Exhibit G of petitioner.

(3) Exhibit 3, letter dated October 12, 1992 of
Henrietta S. Mendez, addressed to the Christian
Era Broadcasting Service which reads in part:

xxx
In the matter of your television show Ang Iglesia ni
Cristo Series No. 119, please be informed that the Board
was constrained to deny your show a permit to
exhibit. The material involved constitute an attack
against another religion which is expressly prohibited
by law. Please be guided in the submission of future
shows.
After evaluating the evidence of the parties, the
trial court issued a writ of preliminary injunction on
petitioners bond of P10,000.00.
The trial court set the pre-trial of the case and
the parties submitted their pre-trial briefs. The pretrial briefs show that the parties evidence is
basically the evidence they submitted in the
hearing of the issue of preliminary injunction. The
trial of the case was set and reset several times as
the parties tried to reach an amicable accord. Their
efforts failed and the records show that after
submission of memoranda, the trial court rendered
[9]

a Judgment, on December 15,

dispositive portion of which reads:
[10]

1993,

the

xxx
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering
respondent Board of Review for Motion Pictures and
Television (BRMPT) to grant petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo
the necessary permit for all the series of Ang Iglesia ni
Cristo program.

Respondent Board appealed to the Court of

Appeals after its motion for reconsideration was
denied.

Petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo, however, is directed to

refrain from offending and attacking other existing
religions in showing Ang Iglesia ni Cristo program.

[14]

SO ORDERED.

On March 5, 1995, the respondent Court of

Appeals reversed the trial court. It ruled that: (1)
the respondent board has jurisdiction and power to
review the TV program Ang Iglesia ni Cristo, and
(2) the respondent Board did not act with grave
abuse of discretion when it denied permit for the
exhibition on TV of the three series of Ang Iglesia
ni Cristo on the ground that the materials constitute
an attack against another religion. It also found the
series indecent, contrary to law and contrary to
good customs.
[15]

Petitioner moved for reconsideration praying:

(a) for the deletion of the second paragraph of the
dispositive portion of the Decision, and (b) for the
Board to be perpetually enjoined from requiring
petitioner to submit for review the tapes of its
program. The respondent Board opposed the
motion. On March 7, 1993, the trial court granted
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. It ordered:
[11]

[12]

[13]

xxx

WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is

granted. The second portion of the Courts Order dated
December 15, 1993, directing petitioner to refrain from
offending and attacking other existing religions in
showing Ang Iglesia ni Cristo program is hereby deleted
and set aside. Respondents are further prohibited from
requiring petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo to submit for
review VTR tapes of its religious program Ang Iglesia
ni Cristo.

In this petition for review on certiorari under

Rule 45, petitioner raises the following issues:

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF

APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT ANG
IGLESIA NI CRISTO PROGRAM IS NOT
CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED AS A FORM
OF RELIGIOUS EXERCISE AND EXPRESSION.
II

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF

APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT BEING
AN EXERCISE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, THE
ANG IGLESIA NI CRISTO PROGRAM IS SUBJECT
TO THE POLICE POWER OF THE STATE ONLY IN
THE EXTREME CASE THAT IT POSES A CLEAR
AND PRESENT DANGER.

PROGRAM IS INDECENT AND CONTRARY TO

LAW AND GOOD CUSTOMS.
The basic issues can be reduced into two: (1)
first, whether the respondent Board has the power
to review petitioners TV program Ang Iglesia ni
Cristo, and (2) second, assuming it has the power,
whether it gravely abused its discretion when it
prohibited the airing of petitioners religious
program, series Nos. 115, 119 and 121, for the
reason that they constitute an attack against other
religions and that they are indecent, contrary to law
and good customs.
The first issue can be resolved by examining
the powers of the Board under P.D. No. 1986. Its
Section 3 pertinently provides:

III

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF

APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
MTRCB IS VESTED WITH THE POWER TO
CENSOR RELIGIOUS PROGRAMS.
IV

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF

APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE ANG
IGLESIA NI CRISTO, A PURELY RELIGIOUS

Sec. 3 Powers and Functions. The BOARD shall have

the following functions, powers and duties:
xxx xxx xxx
b) To screen, review and examine all motion pictures as
herein defined, television programs, including
publicity materials such as advertisements, trailers and
stills, whether such motion pictures and publicity
materials be for theatrical or non-theatrical distribution
for television broadcast or for general viewing, imported

or produced in the Philippines and in the latter case,

whether they be for local viewing or for export.

iv) Those which serve no other purpose but to satisfy

the market for violence or pornography;

c) To approve, delete objectionable portion from

and/or prohibit the importation, exportation,
production, copying, distribution, sale, lease, exhibition
and/or television broadcast of the motion
pictures, television programs and publicity materials,
subject of the preceding paragraph, which, in the
judgment of the BOARD applying contemporary
Filipino cultural values as standard, are objectionable
for being immoral, indecent, contrary to law and/or
good customs, injurious to the prestige of the Republic
of the Philippines and its people, or with a dangerous
tendency to encourage the commission of violence or of
a wrong or crime, such as but not limited to:

v) Those which tend to abet the traffic in and use of

prohibited drugs;

i) Those which tend to incite subversion, insurrection,

rebellion or sedition against the State, or otherwise
threaten the economic and/or political stability of the
State;
ii) Those which tend to undermine the faith and
confidence of the people, their government and/or duly
constituted authorities;
iii) Those which glorify criminals or condone crimes;

vi) Those which are libelous or defamatory to the good

name and reputation of any person, whether living or
dead;
vii) Those which may constitute contempt of court or of
any quasi-judicial tribunal, or pertain to matters which
are sub-judice in nature (emphasis ours).
The law gives the Board the power to screen,
review and examine all television programs. By
the clear terms of the law, the Board has the power
to approve, delete x x xand/or prohibit the x x x
exhibition and/or television broadcast of x x x
television programs x x x. The law also directs the
Board to apply contemporary Filipino cultural
values as standard to determine those which are
objectionable for being immoral, indecent, contrary
to law and/or good customs, injurious to the
prestige of the Republic of the Philippines and its
people, or with a dangerous tendency to
encourage the commission of violence or of a
wrong or crime.

Petitioner contends that the term television

program should not include religious programs like
its program Ang Iglesia ni Cristo. A contrary
interpretation, it is urged, will contravene Section 5,
Article III of the Constitution which guarantees that
no law shall be made respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof.The free exercise and enjoyment of
religious profession and worship, without
discrimination or preference, shall forever be
allowed.
We reject petitioners submission which need
not set us adrift in a constitutional voyage towards
an uncharted sea. Freedom of religion has been
accorded a preferred status by the framers of our
fundamental laws, past and present. We have
affirmed this preferred status well aware that it is
designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of
conscience, to allow each man to believe as his
conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to
live as he believes he ought to live, consistent with
the liberty of others and with the common good.
We have also laboriously defined in our
jurisprudence the intersecting umbras and
penumbras of the right to religious profession and
worship. To quote the summation of Mr. Justice
Isagani Cruz, our well-known constitutionalist:
[16]

[17]

Religious Profession and Worship

The right to religious profession and worship has a twofold aspect, viz., freedom to believe and freedom to act
on ones beliefs. The first is absolute as long as the belief
is confined within the realm of thought. The second is
subject to regulation where the belief is translated
into external acts that affect the public welfare.
(1) Freedom to Believe

The individual is free to believe (or disbelieve) as he

pleases concerning the hereafter. He may indulge his
own theories about life and death; worship any god he
chooses, or none at all; embrace or reject any religion;
acknowledge the divinity of God or of any being that
appeals to his reverence; recognize or deny the
immortality of his soul in fact, cherish any religious
conviction as he and he alone sees fit. However absurd
his beliefs may be to others, even if they be hostile and
heretical to the majority, he has full freedom to believe
as he pleases. He may not be required to prove his
beliefs. He may not be punished for his inability to do
so. Religion, after all, is a matter of faith. Men may
believe what they cannot prove. Every one has a right to
his beliefs and he may not be called to account because
he cannot prove what he believes.
(2) Freedom to Act on Ones Beliefs

But where the individual externalizes his beliefs in

acts or omissions that affect the public, his freedom
to do so becomes subject to the authority of the
State. As great as this liberty may be, religious freedom,
like all the other rights guaranteed in the Constitution,
can be enjoyed only with a proper regard for the rights
of others. It is error to think that the mere invocation
of religious freedom will stalemate the State and
render it impotent in protecting the general welfare.
The inherent police power can be exercised to prevent
religious practices inimical to society. And this is true
even if such practices are pursued out of sincere
religious conviction and not merely for the purpose of
evading the reasonable requirements or prohibitions of
the law.
Justice Frankfurter put it succinctly: The
constitutional provision on religious freedom
terminated disabilities, it did not create new
privileges. It gave religious liberty, not civil
immunity. Its
essence
is
freedom
from
conformity to religious dogma, not freedom
from conformity to law because of religious
dogma.
Accordingly, while one has full freedom to
believe in Satan, he may not offer the object of his
piety a human sacrifice, as this would be

murder. Those who literally interpret the Biblical

command to go forth and multiply are nevertheless
not allowed to contract plural marriages in violation
of the laws against bigamy. A person cannot refuse
to pay taxes on the ground that it would be against
his religious tenets to recognize any authority
except that of God alone. An atheist cannot
express his disbelief in acts of derision that wound
the feelings of the faithful. The police power can be
validly asserted against the Indian practice of
the suttee born of deep religious conviction, that
calls on the widow to immolate herself at the
funeral pile of her husband.
We thus reject petitioners postulate that its
religious program is per se beyond review by the
respondent Board. Its public broadcast on TV of its
religious program brings it out of the bosom of
internal belief. Television is a medium that reaches
even the eyes and ears of children. The Court
iterates the rule that the exercise of religious
freedom can be regulated by the State when it will
bring about the clear and present danger of some
substantive evil which the State is duty bound to
prevent, i.e., serious detriment to the more
overriding interest of public health, public morals,
or public welfare. A laissez faire policy on the
exercise of religion can be seductive to the liberal

mind but history counsels the Court against its

blind adoption as religion is and continues to be a
volatile area of concern in our country
today. Across the sea and in our shore, the
bloodiest and bitterest wars fought by men were
caused by irreconcilable religious differences. Our
country is still not safe from the recurrence of this
stultifying strife considering our warring religious
beliefs and the fanaticism with which some of us
cling and claw to these beliefs. Even now, we have
yet to settle the near century old strife in
Mindanao, the roots of which have been nourished
by the mistrust and misunderstanding between our
Christian and Muslim brothers and sisters. The
bewildering rise of weird religious cults espousing
violence as an article of faith also proves the
wisdom of our rule rejecting a strict let alone policy
on the exercise of religion. For sure, we shall
continue to subject any act pinching the space
for the free exercise of religion to a heightened
scrutiny but we shall not leave its rational
exercise to the irrationality of man. For when
religion divides and its exercise destroys, the
State should not stand still.
It is also petitioners submission that the
respondent appellate court gravely erred when it
affirmed the ruling of the respondent Board x-rating

its TV Program Series Nos. 115, 119, 121 and

128. The records show that the respondent Board
disallowed the program series for attacking other
religions. Thus, Exhibits A, A-1, (respondent
Boards Voting Slip for Television) reveal that its
reviewing members x-rated Series 115 for x x x
criticizing different religions, based on their own
interpretation of the Bible. They suggested that the
program should only explain petitioners x x x own
faith and beliefs and avoid attacks on other
faiths. Exhibit B shows that Series No. 119 was xrated because the Iglesia ni Cristo insists on the
literal translation of the bible and says that our
Catholic veneration of the Virgin Mary is not to be
condoned because nowhere it is found in the bible
that we should do so. This is intolerance x x x.
Exhibit C shows that Series No. 121 was x-rated x
x x for reasons of the attacks, they do on,
specifically, the Catholic religion. x x x (T)hey can
not tell, dictate any other religion that they are right
and the rest are wrong x x x. Exhibit D also shows
that Series No. 128 was not favorably
recommended because it x x x outrages Catholic
and Protestants beliefs. On second review, it was
x-rated because of its unbalanced interpretations
of some parts of the Bible. In sum, the
respondent Board x-rated petitioners TV program
series Nos. 115, 119, 121 and 128 because of
[18]

petitioners controversial biblical interpretations and

its attacks against contrary religious beliefs. The
respondent appellate court agreed and even held
that the said attacks are indecent, contrary to law
and good customs.
We reverse the ruling of the appellate court.
First. Deeply ensconced in our fundamental
law is its hostility against all prior restraints on
speech, including religious speech. Hence, any act
that restrains speech is hobbled by the
presumption of invalidity and should be greeted
with furrowed brows. It is the burden of the
respondent Board to overthrow this presumption. If
it fails to discharge this burden, its act of
censorship will be struck down. It failed in the case
at bar.
[19]

Second. The evidence shows that the

respondent Board x-rated petitioners TV series for
attacking other religions, especially the Catholic
church. An examination of the evidence, especially
Exhibits A, A-1, B, C, and D will show that the socalled attacks are mere criticisms of some of the
deeply held dogmas and tenets of other
religions. The videotapes were not viewed by the
respondent court as they were not presented as

evidence. Yet they were considered by the

respondent court as indecent, contrary to law and
good customs, hence, can be prohibited from
public viewing under Section 3(c) of PD 1986. This
ruling clearly suppresses petitioners freedom of
speech and interferes with its right to free exercise
of religion. It misappreciates the essence of
freedom to differ as delineated in the benchmark
case of Cantwell v. Connecticut, viz.:
[20]

xxx xxx xxx

In the realm of religious faith, and in that of political
belief, sharp differences arise. In both fields, the tenets
of one man may seem the rankest error to his
neighbor. To persuade others to his own point of view,
the pleader, as we know, at times, resorts to
exaggeration, to vilification of men who have been, or
are prominent in church or state or even to false
statements. But the people of this nation have ordained
in the light of history that inspite of the probability of
excesses and abuses, these liberties are, in the long
view, essential to enlightened opinion and right conduct
on the part of the citizens of democracy.
The respondent Board may disagree with the
criticisms of other religions by petitioner but that
gives it no excuse to interdict such criticisms,

however, unclean they may be.Under our

constitutional scheme, it is not the task of the State
to favor any religion by protecting it against an
attack by another religion. Religious dogmas and
beliefs are often at war and to preserve peace
among their followers, especially the fanatics, the
establishment clause of freedom of religion
prohibits the State from leaning towards any
religion.Vis-a-vis religious differences, the State
enjoys no banquet of options. Neutrality alone is its
fixed and immovable stance. In fine, respondent
board cannot squelch the speech of petitioner
Iglesia ni Cristo simply because it attacks other
religions, even if said religion happens to be the
most numerous church in our country. In a State
where there ought to be no difference between the
appearance and the reality of freedom of religion,
the remedy against bad theology is better
theology. The bedrock of freedom of religion is
freedom of thought and it is best served by
encouraging
the
marketplace
of
dueling
ideas. When the luxury of time permits, the
marketplace of ideas demands that speech should
be met by more speech for it is the spark of
opposite speech, the heat of colliding ideas that
can fan the embers of truth.

Third. The respondents cannot also rely on the

ground attacks against another religion in x-rating
the religious program of petitioner. Even a
sideglance at Section 3 of PD 1986 will reveal that
it is not among the grounds to justify an order
prohibiting the broadcast of petitioners television
program. The ground attack against another
religion was merely added by the respondent
Board in its Rules. This rule is void for it runs
smack against the hoary doctrine that
administrative rules and regulations cannot expand
the letter and spirit of the law they seek to enforce.
[21]

It is opined that the respondent board can still

utilize attack against any religion as a ground
allegedly x x x because Section 3 (c) of PD 1986
prohibits the showing of motion pictures, television
programs and publicity materials which are
contrary to law and Article 201 (2) (b) (3) of the
Revised Penal Code punishes anyone who
exhibits shows which offend any race or religion.
We respectfully disagree for it is plain that the word
attack is not synonymous with the word offend.
Moreover, Article 201 (2) (b) (3) of the Revised
Penal Code should be invoked to justify
the subsequent punishment of a show which
offends any religion. It cannot be utilized to
justify prior censorship of speech.It must be

emphasized that E.O. 876, the law prior to PD

1986, included attack against any religion as a
ground for censorship. The ground was not,
however, carried over by PD 1986. Its deletion is a
decree to disuse it. There can be no other
intent. Indeed, even the Executive Department
espouses this view. Thus, in an Opinion dated
November 28, 1985 then Minister of Justice, now
President of the Senate, Neptali Gonzales
explained:
xxx
However, the question whether the BRMPT (now
MTRCB) may preview and censor the subject television
program of INC should be viewed in the light of the
provision of Section 3, paragraph (c) of PD 1986, which
is substantially the same as the provision of Section 3,
paragraph (c) of E.O. No. 876-A, which prescribes the
standards of censorship, to wit: immoral, indecent,
contrary to law and/or good customs, injurious to the
prestige of the Republic of the Philippines or its people
or with dangerous tendency to encourage the
commission of violence, or of a wrong as determined by
the Board, applying contemporary Filipino cultural
values as standard. As stated, the intention of the Board
to subject the INCs television program to previewing
and censorship is prompted by the fact that its religious

program makes mention of beliefs and practices of other

religion. On the face of the law itself, there can
conceivably be no basis for censorship of said program
by the Board as much as the alleged reason cited by the
Board does not appear to be within the contemplation
of the standards of censorship set by law. (Italics
supplied)
Fourth. In x-rating the TV program of the
petitioner, the respondents failed to apply the
clear and present danger rule. In American Bible
Society v. City of Manila, this Court held: The
constitutional guaranty of free exercise and
enjoyment of religious profession and worship
carries with it the right to disseminate religious
information. Any restraint of such right can be
justified like other restraints on freedom of
expression on the ground that there is a clear and
present danger of any substantive evil which the
State
has
the
right
to
prevent.
In Victoriano vs. Elizalde Rope Workers
Union,
we further ruled that x x x it is only where it is
unavoidably necessary to prevent an immediate
and grave danger to the security and welfare of
the community that infringement of religious
freedom may be justified, and only to the
smallest extent necessary to avoid the danger.
[22]

[23]

The records show that the decision of the

respondent Board, affirmed by the respondent
appellate court, is completely bereft of findings of
facts to justify the conclusionthat the subject
video tapes constitute impermissible attacks
against another religion. There is no showing
whatsoever of the type of harm the tapes will
bring about especially the gravity and imminence
of the threatened harm. Prior restraint on
speech, including religious speech, cannot be
justified by hypothetical fears but only by the
showing of a substantive and imminent evil
which has taken the life of a reality already on
ground.
It is suggested that we re-examine the
application of clear and present danger rule to the
case at bar. In the United States, it is true that the
clear and present danger test has undergone
permutations. It was Mr. Justice Holmes who
formulated the test in Schenck v. US, as follows:
x x x the question in every case is whether the
words used are used in such circumstances and
are of such a nature as to create a clear and
present danger that they will bring about the
substantive evils that Congress has a right to
prevent. Admittedly, the test was originally
designed to determine the latitude which should be
[24]

given to speech that espouses anti-government

action. Bannered by Justices Holmes and
Brandeis, the test attained its full flowering in the
decade of the forties, when its umbrella was used
to protect speech other than subversive speech.
Thus, for instance, the test was applied to annul
a total ban on labor picketing. The use of the test
took a downswing in the 1950s when the US
Supreme Court decided Dennis v. United
States involving
communist
conspiracy.
In Dennis, the components of the test were
altered as the High Court adopted Judge Learned
Hands formulation that x x x in each case [courts]
must ask whether the gravity of the evil,
discounted by its improbability, justifies such
invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid
the danger. The imminence requirement of the test
was thus diminished and to that extent, the
protection of the rule was weakened. In 1969,
however, the strength of the test was reinstated
inBrandenburg v. Ohio, when the High Court
restored in the test the imminence requirement,
and even added an intent requirement which
according to a noted commentator ensured that
only speech directed at inciting lawlessness could
be punished. Presently in the United States, the
clear and present danger test is not applied to
protect low value speeches such as obscene
[25]

[26]

[27]

[28]

[29]

speech, commercial speech and defamation. Be

that as it may, the test is still applied to four
types of speech: speech that advocates
dangerous ideas, speech that provokes a hostile
audience reaction, out of court contempt and
release of information that endangers a fair trial.
Hence, even following the drift of American
jurisprudence, there is reason to apply the clear
and present danger test to the case at bar which
concerns speech that attacks other religions and
could readily provoke hostile audience reaction. It
cannot be doubted that religious truths disturb
and disturb terribly.
[30]

It is also opined that it is inappropriate to apply

the clear and present danger test to the case at
bar because the issue involves the content of
speech and not the time, place or manner of
speech. Allegedly, unless the speech is first
allowed, its impact cannot be measured, and the
causal connection between the speech and the evil
apprehended
cannot
be
established. The
contention overlooks the fact that the case at bar
involves videotapes that are pre-taped and hence,
their speech content is known and not an X
quantity. Given the specific content of the speech,
it is not unreasonable to assume that the
respondent Board, with its expertise, can

determine whether its sulphur will bring about the

substantive evil feared by the law.
Finally, it is also opined by Mr. Justice Kapunan
that x x x the determination of the question as to
whether or not such vilification, exaggeration or
fabrication falls within or lies outside the
boundaries of protected speech or expression is
a judicial function which cannot be arrogated by
an administrative body such as a Board of
Censors. He submits that a system of prior
restraint
may only be
validly
administered
by judges and not left to administrative agencies.
The same submission is made by Mr. Justice
Mendoza.
This thoughtful thesis is an attempt to
transplant another American rule in our
jurisdiction. Its seedbed was laid down by Mr.
Justice Brennan in his concurring opinion in the
1962 case of Manual Enterprise v. Day. By 1965,
the
US
Supreme
Court
in Freedman v. Maryland was ready to hold that
the teaching of cases is that, because only a
judicial
determination in
an
adversary
proceeding ensures the necessary sensitivity to
freedom of expression, only a procedure requiring
[31]

[32]

a judicial determination suffices to impose a valid

final restraint.
[33]

While the thesis has a lot to commend itself, we

are not ready to hold that it is unconstitutional for
Congress to grant an administrative body quasijudicial power to preview and classify TV programs
and enforce its decision subject to review by our
courts. As far back as 1921, we upheld this set-up
in Sotto vs. Ruiz, viz.:

is not libelous, is fundamentally a legal question. In

order for there to be due process of law, the
action of the Director of Posts must be subject
to revision by the courts in case he had abused
his discretion or exceeded his authority. (Exparte Jackson [1878], 96 U.S., 727; Public
Clearing House vs. Coyne [1903], 194 U.S.,
497; Post Publishing Co. vs. Murray [1916], 23Fed., 773)

[34]

The use of the mails by private persons is in the nature

of a privilege which can be regulated in order to avoid
its abuse. Persons possess no absolute right to put into
the mail anything they please, regardless of its character.
On the other hand, the exclusion of newspaper
and other publications from the mails, in the
exercise of executive power, is extremely delicate
in nature and can only be justified where the
statute is unequivocably applicable to the
supposed objectionable publication. In excluding
any publication for the mails, the object should be
not to interfere with the freedom of the press or
with any other fundamental right of the
people. This is the more true with reference to
articles supposedly libelous than to other
particulars of the law, since whether an article is or

As has been said, the performance of the

duty of determining whether a publication
contains printed matter of a libelous character
rests with the Director of Posts and involves
the
exercise
of
his
judgment
and
discretion. Every intendment of the law is in favor
of the correctness of his action. The rule is (and we
go only to those cases coming from the United
States Supreme Court and pertaining to the United
States Postmaster-General), that the courts will not
interfere with the decision of the Director of Posts
unless clearly of opinion that it was wrong. (Bates
& Guilid Co. vs. Payne [1904], 194 U.S.,
106; Smith vs. Hitchcock [1912], 226 U.S.,
63; Masses Pub. Co. vs. Patten[1917], 246 Fed.,
24. But see David vs. Brown [1900], 103 Fed., 909,
announcing a somewhat different doctrine and
relied upon by the Attorney-General).

To be sure, legal scholars in the United States

are still debating the proposition whether or
not courts alone are competent to decide whether
speech is constitutionally protected. The issue
involves highly arguable policy considerations and
can be better addressed by our legislators.
[35]

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision of the

respondent Court of Appeals dated March 24,
1995 is affirmed insofar as it sustained the
jurisdiction of the respondent MTRCB to review
petitioners TV program entitled Ang Iglesia ni
Cristo, and is reversed and set aside insofar as it
sustained the action of the respondent MTRCB xrating petitioners TV Program Series Nos. 115,
119, and 121. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Soj v sandiganbayan
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision denying
petitioners' request for permission to televise and broadcast live
the trial of former President Estrada before the Sandiganbayan.
The motion was filed by the Secretary of Justice, as one of the
petitioners, who argues that there is really no conflict between the
right of the people to public information and the freedom of the
press, on the one hand, and, on the other, the right of the
accused to a fair trial; that if there is a clash between these rights,
it must be resolved in favor of the right of the people and the
press because the people, as the repository of sovereignty, are
entitled to information; and that live media coverage is a
safeguard against attempts by any party to use the courts as
instruments for the pursuit of selfish interests.
On the other hand, former President Joseph E. Estrada reiterates
his objection to the live TV and radio coverage of his trial on the
ground that its allowance will violate the sub judice rule and that,
based on his experience with the impeachment trial, live media
coverage will only pave the way for so-called "expert
commentary" which can trigger massive demonstrations aimed at
pressuring the Sandiganbayan to render a decision one way or
the other. Mr. Estrada contends that the right of the people to

information may be served through other means less distracting,

degrading, and prejudicial than live TV and radio coverage.

audio-visual recordings shall be made under the supervision and

control of the Sandiganbayan or its Division as the case may be.

The Court has considered the arguments of the parties on this

important issue and, after due deliberation, finds no reason to
alter or in any way modify its decision prohibiting live or real time
broadcast by radio or television of the trial of the former president.
By a vote of nine (9) to six (6) of its members,1 the Court denies
the motion for reconsideration of the Secretary of Justice.

There are several reasons for such televised recording. First, the
hearings are of historic significance. They are an affirmation of
our commitment to the rule that "the King is under no man, but he
is under God and the law." (Quod Rex non debet esse sub
homine, sed sub Deo et Lege.) Second, the Estrada cases
involve matters of vital concern to our people who have a
fundamental right to know how their government is conducted.
This right can be enhanced by audio visual presentation. Third,
audio-visual presentation is essential for the education and civic
training of the people.

1wphi1.nt

In lieu of live TV and radio coverage of the trial, the Court, by the
vote of eight (8) Justices,2 has resolved to order the audio-visual
recording of the trial.
What follows is the opinion of the majority.

lawphil.net

Considering the significance of the trial before the

Sandiganbayan of former President Estrada and the importance
of preserving the records thereof, the Court believes that there
should be an audio-visual recording of the proceedings. The
recordings will not be for live or real time broadcast but for
documentary purposes. Only later will they be available for public
showing, after the Sandiganbayan shall have promulgated its
decision in every case to which the recording pertains. The
master film shall be deposited in the National Museum and the
Records Management and Archives Office for historical
preservation and exhibition pursuant to law.4
For the purpose of recording the proceedings, cameras will be
inconspicuously installed in the courtroom and the movement of
TV crews will be regulated, consistent with the dignity and
solemnity of the proceedings. The trial shall be recorded in its
entirety, except such portions thereof as the Sandiganbayan may
decide should not be held public pursuant to Rule 119, 21 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. No comment shall be
included in the documentary except annotations which may be
necessary to explain certain scenes which are depicted. The

1awphil.net

Above all, there is the need to keep audio-visual records of the

hearings for documentary purposes. The recordings will be useful
in preserving the essence of the proceedings in a way that the
cold print cannot quite do because it cannot capture the sights
and sounds of events. They will be primarily for the use of
appellate courts in the event a review of the proceedings, rulings,
or decisions of the Sandiganbayan is sought or becomes
necessary. The accuracy of the transcripts of stenographic notes
taken during the trial can be checked by reference to the tapes.
On the other hand, by delaying the release of the tapes for
broadcast, concerns that those taking part in the proceedings will
be playing to the cameras and will thus be distracted from the
proper performance of their roles -- whether as counsel,
witnesses, court personnel, or judges -- will be allayed. The
possibility that parallel trials before the bar of justice and the bar
of public opinion may jeopardize, or even prevent, the just
determination of the cases can be minimized. The possibility that
judgment will be rendered by the popular tribunal before the court
of justice can render its own will be avoided.
At the same time, concerns about the regularity and fairness of
the trial -- which, it may be assumed, is the concern of those
opposed to, as much as of those in favor of, televised trials - will

be addressed since the tapes will not be released for public

showing until after the decision of the cases by the
Sandiganbayan. By delaying the release of the tapes, much of
the problem posed by real time TV and radio broadcast will be
avoided.
Thus, many important purposes for preserving the record of the
trial can be served by audio-visual recordings without impairing
the right of the accused to a fair trial.
Nor is the right of privacy of the accused a bar to the production
of such documentary. In Ayer Productions Pty. Ltd. V.
Capulong,5 this Court set aside a lower court's injunction
restraining the filming of "Four Day Revolution," a documentary
film depicting, among other things, the role of then Minister of
National Defense Juan Ponce Enrile in the 1986 EDSA people
power. This Court held: "A limited intrusion into a person's privacy
has long been regarded as permissible where that person is a
public figure and the information sought to be elicited from him or
to be published about him constitute matters of a public
character."6
No one can prevent the making of a movie based on the trial. But,
at least, if a documentary record is made of the proceedings, any
movie that may later be produced can be checked for its accuracy
against such documentary and any attempt to distort the truth can
thus be averted.
Indeed, a somewhat similar proposal for documentary recording
of celebrated cases or causes clbres was made was made way
back in 1971 by Paul Freund of the Harvard Law School. As he
explained:
In fairness let me refer to an American experience many
of my lay friends found similarly moving. An educational
television network filmed a trial in Denver of a Black
Panther leader on charges of resisting arrest, and

broadcast the document in full, in four installments,

several months after the case was concluded -concluded incidentally, with a verdict of acquittal.
No one could witness the trial without a feeling of
profound respect for the painstaking way in which the
truth was searched for, for the ways whereby law copes
with uncertainties and ambiguities through presumptions
and burden of proof, and the sense of gravity with which
judge and jury carried out their responsibilities.
I agree in general with the exclusion of television from the
courtroom, for the familiar good reasons. And yet the use
of television at a trial for documentary purposes, not for
the broadcast of live news, and with the safeguards of
completeness and consent, is an educational experiment
that I would be prepared to welcome. Properly
safeguarded and with suitable commentary, the depiction
of an actual trial is an agency of enlightenment that could
have few equals in its impact on the public understanding.
Understanding of our legal process, so rarely provided by
our educational system, is now a desperate need.7
Professor Freund's observation is as valid today as when it was
made thirty years ago. It is perceptive for its recognition of the
serious risks posed to the fair administration of justice by live TV
and radio broadcasts, especially when emotions are running high
on the issues stirred by a case, while at the same time
acknowledging the necessity of keeping audio-visual recordings
of the proceedings of celebrated cases, for public information and
exhibition, after passions have subsided.
WHEREFORE, an audio-visual recording of the trial of former
President Estrada before the Sandiganbayan is hereby ordered to
be made, for the account of the Sandiganbayan, under the
following conditions: (a) the trial shall be recorded in its entirety,

excepting such portions thereof as the Sandiganbayan may

determine should not be held public under Rule 119, 21 of the
Rules of Criminal Procedure; (b) cameras shall be installed
inconspicuously inside the courtroom and the movement of TV
crews shall be regulated consistent with the dignity and solemnity
of the proceedings; (c) the audio-visual recordings shall be made
for documentary purposes only and shall be made without
comment except such annotations of scenes depicted therein as
may be necessary to explain them; (d) the live broadcast of the
recordings before the Sandiganbayan shall have rendered its
decision in all the cases against the former President shall be
prohibited under pain of contempt of court and other sanctions in
case of violations of the prohibition; (e) to ensure that the
conditions are observed, the audio-visual recording of the
proceedings shall be made under the supervision and control of
the Sandiganbayan or its Division concerned and shall be made
pursuant to rules promulgated by it; and (f) simultaneously with
the release of the audio-visual recordings for public broadcast,
the original thereof shall be deposited in the National Museum
and the Records Management and Archives Office for
preservation and exhibition in accordance with law.
SO ORDERED.

FELICIANO, J.:
Petitioner Hal McElroy an Australian film maker, and his movie
production company, Petitioner Ayer Productions pty Ltd. (Ayer
Productions), 1 envisioned, sometime in 1987, the for commercial
viewing and for Philippine and international release, the histolic
peaceful struggle of the Filipinos at EDSA (Epifanio de los Santos
Avenue). Petitioners discussed this Project with local movie producer
Lope V. Juban who suggested th they consult with the appropriate
government agencies and also with General Fidel V. Ramos and
Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, who had played major roles in the
events proposed to be filmed.
The proposed motion picture entitled "The Four Day Revolution"
was endorsed by the Movie Television Review and Classification
Board as wel as the other government agencies consulted.
General Fidel Ramos also signified his approval of the intended
film production.
In a letter dated 16 December 1987, petitioner Hal McElroy
informed private respondent Juan Ponce Enrile about the
projected motion picture enclosing a synopsis of it, the full text of
which is set out below:

The Four Day Revolution is a six hour mini-series

about People Powera unique event in modern
history that-made possible the Peaceful revolution
in the Philippines in 1986.
Faced with the task of dramatising these rerkble
events, screenwriter David Williamson and history
Prof Al McCoy have chosen a "docu-drama" style
and created [four] fictitious characters to trace the
revolution from the death of Senator Aquino, to
the Feb revolution and the fleeing of Marcos from
the country.
These character stories have been woven through
the real events to help our huge international
audience understand this ordinary period
inFilipino history.
First, there's Tony O'Neil, an American television
journalist working for major network. Tony reflects
the average American attitude to the
Phihppinence once a colony, now the home of
crucially important military bases. Although Tony is
aware of the corruption and of Marcos'
megalomania, for him, there appears to be no
alternative to Marcos except the Communists.
Next, Angie Fox a fiery Australian photo-journalist.
A 'new girl in town,' she is quickly caught up in the
events as it becomes dear that the time has come
for a change. Through Angle and her relationship
with one of the Reform Army Movement Colonels
(a fictitious character), we follow the developing
discontent in the armed forces. Their dislike for
General Ver, their strong loyalty to Defense
Minister Enrile, and ultimately their defection from
Marcos.

The fourth fictitious character is Ben Balano, a

middle-aged editor of a Manila newspaper who
despises the Marcos regime and is a supporter an
promoter of Cory Aquino. Ben has two daughters,
Cehea left wing lawyer who is a secret member of
the New People's Army, and Eva--a -P.R. girl,
politically moderate and very much in love with
Tony. Ultimately, she must choose between her
love and the revolution.
Through the interviews and experiences of these
central characters, we show the complex nature
of Filipino society, and thintertwining series of
events and characters that triggered these
remarkable changes. Through them also, we meet
all of the principal characters and experience
directly dramatic recreation of the revolution. The
story incorporates actual documentary footage
filmed during the period which we hope will
capture the unique atmosphere and forces that
combined to overthrow President Marcos.
David Williamson is Australia's leading playwright
with some 14 hugely successful plays to his
credit(Don's Party,' 'The Club,' Travelling North)
and 11 feature films (The Year of Living
Dangerously,' Gallipoli,' 'Phar Lap').
Professor McCoy (University of New South
Wales) is an American historian with a deep
understanding of the Philippines, who has worked
on the research for this project for some 18
months. Together with Davi Wilhamgon they have
developed a script we believe accurately depicts
the complex issues and events that occurred
during th period .

The six hour series is a McElroy and McElroy coproduction with Home Box Office in American, the
Australian Broadcast Corporation in Australia and
Zenith Productions in the United Kingdom
The proposed motion picture would be essentially a re-enact.
ment of the events that made possible the EDSA revolution; it is
designed to be viewed in a six-hour mini-series television play,
presented in a "docu-drama" style, creating four (4) fictional
characters interwoven with real events, and utilizing actual
documentary footage as background.
On 21 December 1987, private respondent Enrile replied that
"[he] would not and will not approve of the use, appropriation,
reproduction and/or exhibition of his name, or picture, or that of
any member of his family in any cinema or television production,
film or other medium for advertising or commercial exploitation"
and further advised petitioners that 'in the production, airing,
showing, distribution or exhibition of said or similar film, no
reference whatsoever (whether written, verbal or visual) should
not be made to [him] or any member of his family, much less to
any matter purely personal to them.
It appears that petitioners acceded to this demand and the name
of private respondent Enrile was deleted from the movie script,
and petitioners proceeded to film the projected motion picture.
On 23 February 1988, private respondent filed a Complaint with
application for Temporary Restraining Order and Wilt of Pretion
with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, docketed as Civil Case
No. 88-151 in Branch 134 thereof, seeking to enjoin petitioners
from producing the movie "The Four Day Revolution". The
complaint alleged that petitioners' production of the mini-series
without private respondent's consent and over his objection,
constitutes an obvious violation of his right of privacy. On 24
February 1988, the trial court issued ex-parte a Temporary
Restraining Order and set for hearing the application for
preliminary injunction.

On 9 March 1988, Hal McElroy flied a Motion to Dismiss with

Opposition to the Petition for Preliminary Injunction contending
that the mini-series fim would not involve the private life of Juan
Ponce Enrile nor that of his family and that a preliminary
injunction would amount to a prior restraint on their right of free
expression. Petitioner Ayer Productions also filed its own Motion
to Dismiss alleging lack of cause of action as the mini-series had
not yet been completed.
In an Order 2 dated 16 March 1988, respondent court issued a writ
of Preliminary Injunction against the petitioners, the dispositive
portion of which reads thus:
WHEREFORE, let a writ of preliminary injunction
be issued, ordering defendants, and all persons
and entities employed or under contract with
them, including actors, actresses and members of
the production staff and crew as well as all
persons and entities acting on defendants' behalf,
to cease and desist from producing and filming
the mini-series entitled 'The Four Day Revolution"
and from making any reference whatsoever to
plaintiff or his family and from creating any
fictitious character in lieu of plaintiff which
nevertheless is based on, or bears rent
substantial or marked resemblance or similarity
to, or is otherwise Identifiable with, plaintiff in the
production and any similar film or photoplay, until
further orders from this Court, upon plaintiff's filing
of a bond in the amount of P 2,000,000.00, to
answer for whatever damages defendants may
suffer by reason of the injunction if the Court
should finally decide that plaintiff was not entitled
thereto.
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis supplied)

On 22 March 1988, petitioner Ayer Productions came to this

Court by a Petition for certiorari dated 21 March 1988 with an
urgent prayer for Preliminary Injunction or Restraining Order,
which petition was docketed as G.R. No. L-82380.
A day later, or on 23 March 1988, petitiioner Hal McElroy also
filed separate Petition for certiorari with Urgent Prayer for a
Restraining Order or Preliminary Injunction, dated 22 March
1988, docketed as G.R. No. L-82398.
By a Resolution dated 24 March 1988, the petitions were
consolidated and private respondent was required to file a
consolidated Answer. Further, in the same Resolution, the Court
granted a Temporary Restraining Order partially enjoining the
implementation of the respondent Judge's Order of 16 March
1988 and the Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued therein, and
allowing the petitioners to resume producing and filming those
portions of the projected mini-series which do not make any
reference to private respondent or his family or to any fictitious
character based on or respondent.
Private respondent seasonably filed his Consolidated Answer on
6 April 1988 invoking in the main a right of privacy.
I
The constitutional and legal issues raised by the present Petitions
are sharply drawn. Petitioners' claim that in producing and "The
Four Day Revolution," they are exercising their freedom of
speech and of expression protected under our Constitution.
Private respondent, upon the other hand, asserts a right of
privacy and claims that the production and filming of the projected
mini-series would constitute an unlawful intrusion into his privacy
which he is entitled to enjoy.
Considering first petitioners' claim to freedom of speech and of
expression the Court would once more stress that this freedom

includes the freedom to film and produce motion pictures and to

exhibit such motion pictures in theaters or to diffuse them through
television. In our day and age, motion pictures are a univesally
utilized vehicle of communication and medium Of expression.
Along with the press, radio and television, motion pictures
constitute a principal medium of mass communication for
information, education and entertainment. In Gonzales v.
Katigbak, 3former Chief Justice Fernando, speaking for the Court,
explained:
1. Motion pictures are important both as a
medium for the communication of Ideas and the
expression of the artistic impulse. Their effect on
the perception by our people of issues and public
officials or public figures as well as the pre cultural
traits is considerable. Nor as pointed out
in Burstyn v. Wilson(343 US 495 [19421) is the
Importance of motion pictures as an organ of
public opinion lessened by the fact that they are
designed to entertain as well as to inform' (Ibid,
501). There is no clear dividing line between what
involves knowledge and what affords pleasure. If
such a distinction were sustained, there is a
diminution of the basic right to free expression. ... 4
This freedom is available in our country both to locally-owned and
to foreign-owned motion picture companies. Furthermore the
circumstance that the production of motion picture films is a
commercial activity expected to yield monetary profit, is not a
disqualification for availing of freedom of speech and of
expression. In our community as in many other countries, media
facilities are owned either by the government or the private sector
but the private sector-owned media facilities commonly require to
be sustained by being devoted in whole or in pailt to revenue
producing activities. Indeed, commercial media constitute the bulk
of such facilities available in our country and hence to exclude
commercially owned and operated media from the exerciseof
constitutionally protected om of speech and of expression can

only result in the drastic contraction of such constitutional liberties

in our country.
The counter-balancing of private respondent is to a right of
privacy. It was demonstrated sometime ago by the then Dean
Irene R. Cortes that our law, constitutional and statutory, does
include a right of privacy. 5 It is left to case law, however, to mark
out the precise scope and content of this right in differing types of
particular situations. The right of privacy or "the right to be let
alone," 6 like the right of free expression, is not an absolute right. A
limited intrusion into a person's privacy has long been regarded as
permissible where that person is a public figure and the information
sought to be elicited from him or to be published about him constitute
of apublic character. 7 Succinctly put, the right of privacy cannot be
invoked resist publication and dissemination of matters of public
interest. 8 The interest sought to be protected by the right of privacy
is the right to be free from unwarranted publicity, from
the wrongful publicizing of the private affairs and activities of an
individual which are outside the realm of legitimate public concern. 9
Lagunzad v. Vda. de Gonzales, 10 on which private respondent
relies heavily, recognized a right to privacy in a context which
included a claim to freedom of speech and of
expression. Lagunzad involved a suit fortion picture producer as
licensee and the widow and family of the late Moises Padilla as
licensors. This agreement gave the licensee the right to produce a
motion Picture Portraying the life of Moises Padilla, a mayoralty
candidate of the Nacionalista Party for the Municipality of Magallon,
Negros Occidental during the November 1951 elections and for
whose murder, Governor Rafael Lacson, a member of the Liberal
Party then in power and his men were tried and convicted. 11 In the
judgment of the lower court enforcing the licensing agreement
against the licensee who had produced the motion picture and
exhibited it but refused to pay the stipulated royalties, the Court,
through Justice Melencio-Herrera, said:
Neither do we agree with petitioner's subon that
the Licensing Agreement is null and void for lack
of, or for having an illegal cause or consideration,

while it is true that petitioner bad pled the rights to

the book entitled "The Moises Padilla Story," that
did not dispense with the need for prior consent
and authority from the deceased heirs to portray
publicly episodes in said deceased's life and in
that of his mother and the member of his family.
As held in Schuyler v. Curtis, ([1895],147 NY
434,42 NE 31 LRA 286.49 Am St Rep 671), 'a
privilege may be given the surviving relatives of a
deperson to protect his memory, but the privilege
wts for the benefit of the living, to protect their
feelings and to preventa violation of their own
rights in the character and memory of the
deceased.'
Petitioners averment that private respondent did
not have any property right over the life of Moises
Padilla since the latter was a public figure, is
neither well taken. Being a public figure ipso facto
does not automatically destroy in toto a person's
right to privacy. The right to invade a person's
privacy to disseminate public information does not
extend to a fictional or novelized representation of
a person, no matter how public a he or she may
be (Garner v. Triangle Publications, DCNY 97 F.
Supp., SU 549 [1951]). In the case at bar, while it
is true that petitioner exerted efforts to present a
true-to-life Story Of Moises Padilla, petitioner
admits that he included a little romance in the film
because without it, it would be a drab story of
torture and brutality. 12
In Lagunzad, the Court had need, as we have in the instant case,
to deal with contraposed claims to freedom of speech and of
expression and to privacy. Lagunzad the licensee in effect
claimed, in the name of freedom of speech and expression, a
right to produce a motion picture biography at least partly
"fictionalized" of Moises Padilla without the consent of and

without paying pre-agreed royalties to the widow and family of

Padilla. In rejecting the licensee's claim, the Court said:
Lastly, neither do we find merit in petitioners
contention that the Licensing Agreement infringes
on the constitutional right of freedom of speech
and of the press, in that, as a citizen and as a
newspaperman, he had the right to express his
thoughts in film on the public life of Moises Padilla
without prior restraint.The right freedom of
expression, indeed, occupies a preferred position
in the "hierarchy of civil liberties" (Philippine
Blooming Mills Employees Organization v.
Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., 51 SCRA 191
[1963]). It is not, however, without limitations. As
held in Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, 27
SCRA 835, 858 [1960]:
xxx xxx xxx
The prevailing doctine is that the clear and
present danger rule is such a limitation. Another
criterion for permissible limitation on freedom of
speech and the press, which includes such
vehicles of the mass media as radio, television
and the movies, is the "balancing of interest test"
(Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando on the Bill of
Rights, 1970 ed. p. 79). The principle "requires a
court to take conscious and detailed consideration
of the interplay of interests observable in given
situation or type of situation" (Separation Opinion
of the late Chief Justice Castro in Gonzales v.
Commission on Elections, supra, p. 899).
In the case at bar, the interests observable are
the right to privacy asserted by respondent and
the right of freedom of expression invoked by
petitioner. taking into account the interplay of

those interests, we hold that under the particular

circumstances presented, and considering the
obligations assumed in the Licensing Agreement
entered into by petitioner, the validity of such
agreement will have to be upheld particularly
because the limits of freedom of expression are
reached when expression touches upon matters
of essentially private concern." 13
Whether the "balancing of interests test" or the clear and present
danger test" be applied in respect of the instant Petitions, the
Court believes that a different conclusion must here be reached:
The production and filming by petitioners of the projected motion
picture "The Four Day Revolution" does not, in the circumstances
of this case, constitute an unlawful intrusion upon private
respondent's "right of privacy."
1. It may be observed at the outset that what is involved in the
instant case is a prior and direct restraint on the part of the
respondent Judge upon the exercise of speech and of expression
by petitioners. The respondent Judge has restrained petitioners
from filming and producing the entire proposed motion picture. It
is important to note that in Lagunzad, there was no prior restrain
of any kind imposed upon the movie producer who in fact
completed and exhibited the film biography of Moises Padilla.
Because of the speech and of expression, a weighty presumption
of invalidity vitiates. 14 The invalidity of a measure of prior restraint
doesnot, of course, mean that no subsequent liability may lawfully be
imposed upon a person claiming to exercise such constitutional
freedoms. The respondent Judge should have stayed his hand,
instead of issuing an ex-parte Temporary Restraining Order one day
after filing of a complaint by the private respondent and issuing a
Preliminary Injunction twenty (20) days later; for the projected motion
picture was as yet uncompleted and hence not exhibited to any
audience. Neither private respondent nor the respondent trial Judge
knew what the completed film would precisely look like. There was,
in other words, no "clear and present danger" of any violation of any
right to privacy that private respondent could lawfully assert.

2. The subject matter of "The Four Day Revolution" relates to the

non-bloody change of government that took place at Epifanio de
los Santos Avenue in February 1986, and the trian of events
which led up to that denouement. Clearly, such subject matter is
one of public interest and concern. Indeed, it is, petitioners'
argue, of international interest. The subject thus relates to a
highly critical stage in the history of this countryand as such, must
be regarded as having passed into the public domain and as an
appropriate subject for speech and expression and coverage by
any form of mass media. The subject mater, as set out in the
synopsis provided by the petitioners and quoted above, does not
relate to the individual life and certainly not to the private life of
private respondent Ponce Enrile. Unlike in Lagunzad, which
concerned the life story of Moises Padilla necessarily including at
least his immediate family, what we have here is not a film
biography, more or less fictionalized, of private respondent Ponce
Enrile. "The Four Day Revolution" is not principally about, nor is it
focused upon, the man Juan Ponce Enrile' but it is compelled, if it
is to be historical, to refer to the role played by Juan Ponce Enrile
in the precipitating and the constituent events of the change of
government in February 1986.
3. The extent of the instrusion upon the life of private respondent
Juan Ponce Enrile that would be entailed by the production and
exhibition of "The Four Day Revolution" would, therefore, be
limited in character. The extent of that intrusion, as this Court
understands the synopsis of the proposed film, may be generally
described as such intrusion as is reasonably necessary to keep
that film a truthful historical account. Private respondent does not
claim that petitioners threatened to depict in "The Four Day
Revolution" any part of the private life of private respondent or
that of any member of his family.
4. At all relevant times, during which the momentous events,
clearly of public concern, that petitioners propose to film were
taking place, private respondent was what Profs. Prosser and
Keeton have referred to as a "public figure:"

A public figure has been defined as a person who,

by his accomplishments, fame, or mode of living,
or by adopting a profession or calling which gives
the public a legitimate interest in his doings, his
affairs, and his character, has become a 'public
personage.' He is, in other words, a celebrity.
Obviously to be included in this category are
those who have achieved some degree of
reputation by appearing before the public, as in
the case of an actor, a professional baseball
player, a pugilist, or any other entertainment. The
list is, however, broader than this. It includes
public officers, famous inventors and
explorers, war heroes and even ordinary soldiers,
an infant prodigy, and no less a personage than
the Grand Exalted Ruler of a lodge. It includes, in
short, anyone who has arrived at a position where
public attention is focused upon him as a person.
Such public figures were held to have lost, to
some extent at least, their tight to privacy. Three
reasons were given, more or less indiscrimately,
in the decisions" that they had sought publicity
and consented to it, and so could not complaint
when they received it; that their personalities and
their affairs has already public, and could no
longer be regarded as their own private business;
and that the press had a privilege, under the
Constitution, to inform the public about those who
have become legitimate matters of public
interest. On one or another of these grounds, and
sometimes all, it was held that there was no
liability when they were given additional publicity,
as to matters legitimately within the scope of the
public interest they had aroused.
The privilege of giving publicity to news, and other
matters of public interest, was held to arise out of

the desire and the right of the public to know what

is going on in the world, and the freedom of the
press and other agencies of information to tell
it. "News" includes all events and items of
information which are out of the ordinary humdrum routine, and which have 'that indefinable
quality of information which arouses public
attention.' To a very great extent the press, with its
experience or instinct as to what its readers will
want, has succeeded in making its own
definination of news, as a glance at any morning
newspaper will sufficiently indicate. It includes
homicide and othe crimes, arrests and police
raides, suicides, marriages and divorces,
accidents, a death from the use of narcotics, a
woman with a rare disease, the birth of a child to
a twelve year old girl, the reappearance of one
supposed to have been murdered years ago, and
undoubtedly many other similar matters of
genuine, if more or less deplorable, popular
appeal.
The privilege of enlightening the public was not,
however, limited, to the dissemination of news in
the scene of current events. It extended also to
information or education, or even entertainment
and amusement, by books, articles, pictures, films
and broadcasts concerning interesting phases of
human activity in general, as well as the
reproduction of the public scene in newsreels and
travelogues. In determining where to draw the
line, the courts were invited to exercise a species
of censorship over what the public may be
permitted to read; and they were understandably
liberal in allowing the benefit of the doubt. 15
Private respondent is a "public figure" precisely because, inter
alia, of his participation as a principal actor in the culminating

events of the change of government in February 1986. Because

his participation therein was major in character, a film
reenactment of the peaceful revolution that fails to make
reference to the role played by private respondent would be
grossly unhistorical. The right of privacy of a "public figure" is
necessarily narrower than that of an ordinary citizen. Private
respondent has not retired into the seclusion of simple private
citizenship. he continues to be a "public figure." After a successful
political campaign during which his participation in the EDSA
Revolution was directly or indirectly referred to in the press, radio
and television, he sits in a very public place, the Senate of the
Philippines.
5. The line of equilibrium in the specific context of the instant case
between the constitutional freedom of speech and of expression
and the right of privacy, may be marked out in terms of a
requirement that the proposed motion picture must be fairly
truthful and historical in its presentation of events. There must, in
other words, be no knowing or reckless disregard of truth in
depicting the participation of private respondent in the EDSA
Revolution. 16 There must, further, be no presentation of the
private life of the unwilling private respondent and certainly no
revelation of intimate or embarrassing personal facts. 17 The
proposed motion picture should not enter into what Mme. Justice
Melencio-Herrera in Lagunzad referred to as "matters of
essentially private concern." 18 To the extent that "The Four Day
Revolution" limits itself in portraying the participation of private
respondent in the EDSA Revolution to those events which are
directly and reasonably related to the public facts of the EDSA
Revolution, the intrusion into private respondent's privacy cannot
be regarded as unreasonable and actionable. Such portrayal may
be carried out even without a license from private respondent.
II
In a Manifestation dated 30 March 1988, petitioner Hal McElroy
informed this Court that a Temporary Restraining Order dated 25
March 1988, was issued by Judge Teofilo Guadiz of the Regional

Trial Court of Makati, Branch 147, in Civil Case No. 88-413,

entitled "Gregorio B. Honasan vs. Ayer Productions Pty. Ltd.,
McElroy Film Productions, Hal McElroy, Lope Juban and PMP
Motion for Pictures Production" enjoining him and his production
company from further filimg any scene of the projected miniseries film. Petitioner alleged that Honasan's complaint was a
"scissors and paste" pleading, cut out straight grom the complaint
of private respondent Ponce Enrile in Civil Case No. 88-151.
Petitioner Ayer Productions, in a separate Manifestation dated 4
April 1988, brought to the attention of the Court the same
information given by petitoner Hal McElroy, reiterating that the
complaint of Gregorio B. Honasan was substantially identical to
that filed by private respondent herein and stating that in refusing
to join Honasan in Civil Case No. 88-151, counsel for private
respondent, with whom counsel for Gregorio Honasan are
apparently associated, deliberately engaged in "forum shopping."
Private respondent filed a Counter-Manifestation on 13 April 1988
stating that the "slight similarity" between private respondent's
complaint and that on Honasan in the construction of their legal
basis of the right to privacy as a component of the cause of action
is understandable considering that court pleadings are public
records; that private respondent's cause of action for invasion of
privacy is separate and distinct from that of Honasan's although
they arose from the same tortious act of petitioners' that the rule
on permissive joinder of parties is not mandatory and that, the
cited cases on "forum shopping" were not in point because the
parties here and those in Civil Case No. 88-413 are not identical.
For reasons that by now have become clear, it is not necessary
for the Court to deal with the question of whether or not the
lawyers of private respondent Ponce Enrile have engaged in
"forum shopping." It is, however, important to dispose to the
complaint filed by former Colonel Honasan who, having refused
to subject himself to the legal processes of the Republic and
having become once again in fugitive from justice, must be
deemed to have forfeited any right the might have had to protect
his privacy through court processes.

WHEREFORE,
a) the Petitions for Certiorari are GRANTED DUE COURSE, and
the Order dated 16 March 1988 of respondent trial court granting
a Writ of Preliminary Injunction is hereby SET ASIDE. The limited
Temporary Restraining Order granted by this Court on 24 March
1988 is hereby MODIFIED by enjoining unqualifiedly the
implementation of respondent Judge's Order of 16 March 1988
and made PERMANENT, and
b) Treating the Manifestations of petitioners dated 30 March 1988
and 4 April 1988 as separate Petitions for Certiorari with Prayer
for Preliminary Injunction or Restraining Order, the Court, in the
exercise of its plenary and supervisory jurisdiction, hereby
REQUIRES Judge Teofilo Guadiz of the Regional Trial Court of
Makati, Branch 147, forthwith to DISMISS Civil Case No. 88-413
and accordingly to SET ASIDE and DISSOLVE his Temporary
Restraining Order dated 25 March 1988 and any Preliminary
Injunction that may have been issued by him.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an

important or substantial governmental interest; if the
Facts of the case: David O'Brien burned his draft card

governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free

at a Boston courthouse. He said he was

expression; and if the incidential restriction on alleged First

expressing his opposition to war. He was

Amendment freedoms is not greater than is essential to the

convicted under a federal law that made the

furtherance of that interest."

destruction or mutilation of drafts card a crime.

Question Was the law an unconstitutional

infringement of O'Brien's freedom of speech?
Conclusion No. The 7-to-1 majority, speaking through Chief
Justice Earl Warren, established a test to determine whether
governmental regulation involving symbolic speech was
justified. The formula examines whether the regulation is
unrelated to content and narrowly tailored to achieve the
government's interest. "[W]e think it clear," wrote Warren," that
a government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the