6 Raquel Santos vs. Court of Appeals

2/19/2016
SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATEDVOLUME592
Petition granted, Civil Case No. 05112452 entitled Anita

Cheng vs. Sps. William Sy and Tesse Sy reinstated.
Note.When a party files a criminal case for violation
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, his civil action for recovery of
the amount of the dishonored check is impliedly instituted
therein pursuant to Section 1(b) of Rules 111 of the 2000
Rules on Criminal Procedure. (Chieng vs. Santos, 531
SCRA 730 [2007])
o0o
G.R. No. 174986.July 7, 2009.*
ARMAND O. RAQUELSANTOS and ANNALISSA

MALLARI, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
FINVEST SECURITIES CO., INC., respondents.
G.R. No. 175071.July 7, 2009.*
PHILIPPINE STOCK EXCHANGE, INC., petitioner, vs.

FINVEST SECURITIES CO., INC., respondent.
G.R. No. 181415.July 7, 2009.*
FINVEST SECURITIES CO., INC., petitioner, vs. TRANS

PHIL MARINE ENT., INC. and ROLAND H. GARCIA,
respondents.
Pleadings and Practice It is well to note that petitioners
appeal from the decision of the lower court was deemed abandoned
when they failed to file their appellants brief.The CA properly
shunned petitioners prayer to further modify the assailed
judgment to include a beginning balance for the accounting
ordered. It is well to note that petitioners appeal from the
decision of the lower court was
http://www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/00000152f8b766ecadb32007003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False
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_______________
*THIRD DIVISION.
170
170
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

RaquelSantos vs. Court of Appeals
deemed abandoned when they failed to file their appellants brief.

Not having filed an appeal, petitioners could not have obtained
any affirmative relief from the appellate court other than what
they obtained, if any, from the lower court. After all, a party who
does not appeal from a judgment can no longer seek modification
or reversal of the same. He may oppose the appeal of the other
party only on grounds consistent with the judgment. The
appealed decision becomes final as to the party who does not
appeal.
Courts The Court is not in a position to grant the relief
prayed for since the proper beginning balance, if indeed necessary,
is not determinable from the records.The Court is not in a
position to grant the relief prayed for since the proper beginning
balance, if indeed necessary, is not determinable from the records.
In fact, petitioners, being in possession of the records relative to
the missing stock certificates, have the means to determine the
beginning balance. In their motion for reconsideration of the CA
Decision, petitioners themselves acknowledge that the parties
must set the beginning balance and only in case of dispute will
the courts be called upon to intervene.
Same Even without the prayer for a particular remedy, proper
relief may be granted by the court if the facts alleged in the
complaint and evidence adduced so warrant.It is true that lack
of prayer for a specific relief will not deter the court from granting
that specific relief. Even without the prayer for a particular
remedy, proper relief may be granted by the court if the facts
alleged in the complaint and the evidence adduced so warrant.
The prayer in the complaint for other reliefs equitable and just in
the premises justifies the grant of a relief not otherwise
specifically prayed for. Admittedly, even if an issue has not been
raised in the complaint but evidence has been presented thereon,
the trial court may grant relief on the basis of such evidence. A
court may rule and render judgment on the basis of the evidence
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before it, even though the relevant pleading has not been
previously amended, provided that no surprise or prejudice to the
adverse party is thereby caused. So long as the basic
requirements of fair play have been met, as where litigants were
given full opportunity to support their respective contentions and
to object to or refute each others evidence, the court may validly
treat the pleadings as if they have been amended to conform to
the evidence and proceed to adjudicate on the basis of all the
evidence before it.
171
VOL. 592, JULY 7, 2009
171
Same Contracts A court has no alternative but to enforce the

contractual stipulations in the manner they have been agreed upon
and written.Article 1159 of the Civil Code provides that
contracts have the force of law between the contracting parties
and should be complied with in good faith. Being the primary law
between the parties, the contract governs the adjudication of their
rights and obligations. A court has no alternative but to enforce
the contractual stipulations in the manner they have been agreed
upon and written.
Same Same Obligations Under the law on contracts, mora
solvendi or debtors default is defined as a delay in the fulfillment
of an obligation, by reason of a cause imputable to the debtor.
Article 2112 of the Civil Code also gives the pledgee the same
right to sell the thing pledged in case the pledgors obligation is
not satisfied in due time. Under the law on contracts, mora
solvendi or debtors default is defined as a delay in the fulfillment
of an obligation, by reason of a cause imputable to the debtor.
There are three requisites necessary for a finding of default. First,
the obligation is demandable and liquidated second, the debtor
delays performance and third, the creditor judicially or
extrajudicially requires the debtors performance.
Same Obligations A debt is liquidated when the amount is
known or is determinable by inspection of the terms and conditions
of relevant documents.A debt is liquidated when the amount is
known or is determinable by inspection of the terms and
conditions of relevant documents. Under the attendant
circumstances, it cannot be said that Finvests debt is liquidated.
At the time PSE left the negotiating table, the exact amount of
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Finvests fines, penalties and charges was still in dispute and as

yet undetermined. Consequently, Finvest cannot be deemed to
have incurred in delay in the payment of its obligations to PSE. It
cannot be made to pay an obligation the amount of which was not
fully explained to it. The public sale of the pledged seat would,
thus, be premature.
Obligations Contracts Rescission The right of a party to
rescission under Article 1191 of the Civil Code is predicated on a
breach of faith by the other party who violates the reciprocity
between them.The right of a party to rescission under Article
1191 of the Civil Code is predicated on a breach of faith by the
other party who violates the reciprocity between them. In a
contract of sale, the seller
172
172

obligates itself to transfer the ownership of and deliver a

determinate thing, and the buyer to pay therefor a price certain in
money or its equivalent. In some contracts of sale, such as the sale
of real property, prior physical delivery of the thing sold or its
representation is not legally required, as the execution of the
Deed of Sale effectively transfers ownership of the property to the
buyer through constructive delivery. Hence, delivery of the
certificate of title covering the real property is not necessary to
transfer ownership.
Sales Shares of Stock In the sale of shares of stock, physical
delivery of a stock certificate is one of the essential requisites for
the transfer of ownership of the stocks purchased.In the sale of
shares of stock, physical delivery of a stock certificate is one of the
essential requisites for the transfer of ownership of the stocks
purchased. Section 63 of the Corporation Code provides thus:
SEC. 63. Certificate of stock and transfer of shares.The capital
stock of stock corporations shall be divided into shares for which
certificates signed by the president or vicepresident,
countersigned by the secretary or assistant secretary, and sealed
with the seal of the corporation shall be issued in accordance with
the bylaws. Shares of stock so issued are personal property and
may be transferred by delivery of the certificate or certificates
indorsed by the owner or his attorneyinfact or other person
legally authorized to make the transfer. No transfer, however,
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shall be valid, except as between the parties, until the transfer is

recorded in the books of the corporation so as to show the names
of the parties to the transaction, the date of the transfer, the
number of the certificate or certificates and the number of shares
transferred. No shares of stock against which the corporation
holds any unpaid claim shall be transferable in the books of the
corporation.
Same Same Breach of Contract Finvests failure to deliver
the stock certificates representing the shares of stock purchased by
TMEI and Garcia amounted to a substantial breach of their
contract which gave rise to a right to rescind the sale.For a valid
transfer of stocks, the requirements are as follows: (a) there must
be delivery of the stock certificate (b) the certificate must be
endorsed by the owner or his attorneyinfact or other persons
legally authorized to make the transfer and (c) to be valid against
third parties, the transfer must be recorded in the books of the
corporation. Clearly, Finvests failure to deliver the stock
certificates representing the shares of stock
173
VOL. 592, JULY 7, 2009
173
purchased by TMEI and Garcia amounted to a substantial breach

of their contract which gave rise to a right to rescind the sale.
Obligations Contracts Rescission Rescission creates the
obligation to return the object of the contract.Rescission creates
the obligation to return the object of the contract. This is evident
from Article 1385 of the Civil Code which provides: ART. 1385.
Rescission creates the obligation to return the things which were
the object of the contract, together with their fruits, and the price
with its interest consequently, it can be carried out only when he
who demands rescission can return whatever he may be obliged to
restore. Neither shall rescission take place when the things which
are the object of the contract are legally in the possession of third
persons who did not act in bad faith. In this case, indemnity for
damages may be demanded from the person causing the loss. To
rescind is to declare a contract void at its inception and to put an
end to it as though it never was. Rescission does not merely
terminate the contract and release the parties from further
obligations to each other, but abrogates it from the beginning and
restores the parties to their relative positions as if no contract has
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been made.
PETITIONS for review on certiorari of the decisions and

resolutions of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Efren C. Carag for petitioners Armand O. Raquel
Santos, et al.
Rodrigo, Berenguer & Guno for petitioner Philippine
Stock Exchange, Inc.
Martinez and Perez Law Offices for Finvest Securities,
Co., Inc.
Marlon B. Mercado for TransPhil Marine Ent., Inc., et
al.
174
174

NACHURA,J.:
Three petitions, arising from related events, were
consolidated by this Court: G.R. Nos. 174986 and 175071
are petitions for review assailing the Court of Appeals (CA)
Decision1 in CAG.R. CV No. 85176 dated August 9, 2006,
and Resolution dated October 11, 2006 and G.R. No.
181415 is a petition for review assailing the CA Decision2
in CAG.R. CV No. 85430 dated September 3, 2007, and
Resolution dated January 24, 2008. These cases cropped up
from the failure of Finvest Securities Co., Inc. (Finvest) to
meet its obligations to its clients and the Philippine Stock
Exchange (PSE), allegedly caused by mishandling of
Finvests funds and property by its officers.
G.R. Nos. 174986 and 175071
Finvest is a stock brokerage corporation duly organized
under Philippine laws and is a member of the PSE with one
membership seat pledged to the latter. Armand O. Raquel
Santos (RaquelSantos) was Finvests President and
nominee to the PSE from February 20, 1990 to July 16,
1998.3 Annalissa Mallari (Mallari) was Finvests
Administrative Officer until December 31, 1998.4
In the course of its trading operations, Finvest incurred
liabilities to PSE representing fines and penalties for non
payment of its clearing house obligations. PSE also
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received reports that Finvest was not meeting its

obligations to its
_______________
1 Penned by Associate Justice Ramon M. Bato, Jr., with Associate
Justices Edgardo P. Cruz and Vicente Q. Roxas, concurring Rollo (G.R.
No. 174986), pp. 2939.
2Penned by Associate Justice Celia C. LibreaLeagogo, with Associate
Justices Amelita G. Tolentino and Regalado E. Maambong, concurring
Rollo (G.R. No. 181415), pp. 3553.
3Records (Civil Case No. 001589), Vol. I, p. 1.
4Id., at p. 2.
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VOL. 592, JULY 7, 2009
175
clients.5 Consequently, PSE indefinitely suspended Finvest

from trading. The Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) also suspended its license as broker.6
On June 17, 1998, PSE demanded from Finvest the
payment of its obligations to the PSE in the amount of
P4,267,339.99 and to its (Finvests) clients within 15 days.7
PSE also ordered Finvest to replace its nominee, Raquel
Santos.8
Upon failure of Finvest to settle its obligations, PSE
sought authority from the SEC to take over the operations
of Finvest in accordance with PSEs undertaking pursuant
to Section 22(a)(5)9 of the Revised Securities Act. On July
22, 1998, SEC acted favorably on PSEs request and
authorized it to take over the operations of Finvest in order
to continue preserving
_______________
5Id., at p. 19.
6Id., at p. 18.
7Id., at p. 19.
8Id., at p. 29.
9 Sec. 22(a)(5) of the Revised Securities Act (now Sec. 33.1[d] of The
Securities Regulation Code) provides:
SEC.22.Registration of exchange.(a) Any exchange may be
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registered with the Commission as an exchange under the terms and

conditions hereinafter provided in this Section, by filing a registration
statement in such form as the Commission may prescribe, setting forth
the information and accompanied by the following supporting documents
below specified:
xxxx
(5)An undertaking that in the event a member firm becomes
insolvent or when the exchange shall have found that the financial
condition of its member firm has so deteriorated that it cannot readily
meet the demands of its customers for the delivery of securities and/or
payment of sales proceeds, the exchange shall, upon order of the
Commission, take over the operation of the insolvent member firm and
immediately proceed to settle the member firms liabilities to its
customers: Provided, That stock exchanges in operation upon the
effectivity of this Act shall have one year within which to submit the
undertaking.
176
176

the latters assets. Finvest was duly informed of the SECs

decision and was advised to refrain from making any
payment, delivery of securities, or selling or otherwise
encumbering any of its assets without PSEs approval.10
As of August 11, 1998, Finvests total obligation to PSE,
representing penalties, charges and fines for violations of
pertinent rules, was pegged at P5,990,839.99.11 Finvest
promised to settle all obligations to its clients and to PSE
subject to verification of the amount due, but Finvest
requested a deadline of July 31, 1999.12 PSE granted
Finvests request, with the warning that, should Finvest
fail to meet the deadline, PSE might exercise its right to
sell Finvests membership seat and use the proceeds
thereof to settle its obligations to the PSE, its member
brokers and its clients.13 On the same day, Finvest
requested an appointment with PSEs concerned officer to
reconcile, confirm and update the amount of the penalties,
charges and fines due PSE. Finvest also advised PSE that
it would be represented by Mr. Ernesto Lee, its consultant,
during the said meeting.14 After consultation with Mr. Lee,
PSE revised its computation of the penalties, charges and
fines and reduced the amount due to P3,540,421.17.15
In a Letter dated September 8, 1998, Finvest appealed
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to PSE for the approval of the following: (1) that it be given

a period of up to March 30, 1999 to settle claims of clients,
subject to proper documents and verification of balance
and (2) that it be allowed to settle its liabilities to PSE at
an amount lower than P4,212,921.13 (representing
penalties, charges and fines at P3,540,421.17 plus
sanctions for violation of rules at P675,500.00), considering
that it had never unduly exposed
_______________
10Records (Civil Case No. 001589), Vol. I, pp. 117119.
11Id., at p. 21.
12Id., at p. 22.
13Id., at pp. 2425.
14Id., at p. 27.
15Id., at p. 28.
177
VOL. 592, JULY 7, 2009
177
PSE to any legal and financial risks in connection with its

clearing accounts.16
In reply, PSE required Finvest to acknowledge within 30
days, in whole or in part, clients claims that had been filed
with the PSE and to settle all duly acknowledged claims by
December 31, 1998. PSE resolved to consider the request
for a reduction of its liabilities to PSE only after it had
settled all duly acknowledged claims of its clients.17
On February 3, 1999, PSE inquired from Finvest if it
had already settled all duly acknowledged claims of its
clients and its liabilities to PSE.18 PSE also demanded that
Finvest settle its liabilities to it not later than March 31,
1999. Finvest responded by proposing that the amount of
assessed penalties, charges and fines be reduced to 10%,
that is, P354,042.17 and that full payment of the clients
claims be deferred to June 30, 1999.19 Previously, Finvest
had also requested a written clearance from PSE for
renewal of the registration of its brokers and dealers with
the SEC.20
In its Letter of February 23, 1999, PSE informed Finvest
that it would only issue a written clearance after Finvest
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had settled its obligations to PSE and paid all

acknowledged liabilities to various clients.21 In response,
Finvest repeated its appeal to be allowed to fully operate
again and to pay a reduced amount on the ground that it
had no adequate funds because it had been the victim of
fraud committed by its employees.22
_______________
16Id., at pp. 3233.
17Id., at pp. 3435.
18Id., at p. 121.
19Id., at p. 122.
20Id., at p. 36.
21Id., at p. 37.
22Id., at pp. 3839.
178
178

On April 21, 1999, PSE again sent a demand letter to

Finvest, reminding the latter of the March 31, 1999
deadline.23
On April 26, 1999, Finvest requested a hearing to
determine the amount of its liability and to exhaust the
possibility of arriving at a reasonable solution, and
reiterated its appeal for the resumption of its operations.24
PSE brushed aside Finvests request, urging it instead to
settle all of its obligations by May 31, 1999 otherwise, PSE
would be forced to recommend to the SEC the liquidation of
its assets and sell its seat at public auction,25 pursuant to
its Pledge Agreement with Finvest. Finvest protested the
imposition of the deadline for being arbitrary on the ground
that the claims against it had not yet been established.26
At this juncture, Finvest filed a Complaint with the SEC
for accounting and damages with prayer for a temporary
restraining order and/or preliminary injunction and
mandamus against RaquelSantos, Mallari and PSE. The
complaint alleged that RaquelSantos and Mallari took
undue advantage of their positions by diverting to their
personal use and benefit the unaccounted stock certificates
and sales proceeds referred to in Annex X of the
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complaint, which was a list of the claims of Finvests clients

as of December 31, 1998. Finvest prayed that Raquel
Santos and Mallari be ordered to account for the missing
stock certificates and sales proceeds and to pay the profits
that would have accrued to Finvest. As against PSE, the
complaint alleged that PSE violated Finvests right to due
process by illegally and arbitrarily suspending Finvests
operations, thus compounding its inability to meet the
demands of its clients and by unilaterally and arbitrarily
imposing upon Finvest fines and penalties, without a
hearing. The complaint prayed that an injunction be
_______________
23Id., at p. 123.
24Id., at p. 44.
25Id., at p. 45.
26Id., at pp. 4647.
179
VOL. 592, JULY 7, 2009
179
issued to prevent PSE from initiating the liquidation of

Finvest and selling Finvests seat at public auction.
Alleging that RaquelSantos and Mallari failed to file
their Answer within the reglementary period, Finvest
moved for a partial judgment against them.27 On February
4, 2000, SEC, through a Hearing Panel, rendered a Partial
Judgment28 against RaquelSantos and Mallari, ordering
them to account for the missing stock certificates and pay
the damages that Finvest may sustain.
RaquelSantos and Mallari filed separate motions to set
aside the partial judgment, alleging nonreceipt of
summons. In an Order dated April 10, 2000, SEC denied
due course to the two motions.29 Thereafter, the SEC
Hearing Panel issued a writ of execution.30
Consequently, notices of garnishment and sale were
issued against RaquelSantos Manila Golf Shares and Sta.
Elena Golf Shares.31 RaquelSantos moved for the
cancellation of the notice of sale, arguing that there was no
basis for the sale of his shares as there was no money
judgment involved, only an accounting of the allegedly
missing stock certificates. According to him, only after it is
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established that there were missing certificates should he

be held accountable. In the same motion, RaquelSantos
also endeavored to make an accounting of the stock
certificates through the following documents: (a) a 35page
Stock Ledger of an inventory of securities/stock certificates
as of July 31, 1998 (b) a 24page inventory as of July 31,
1998 of stocks in the vault of Finvest and (c) a 5page
inventory of the securities on deposit with the Philippine
Central Depository, Inc.32
_______________
28Id., at pp. 157162.
29Id., at p. 256.
30Id., at pp. 268271.
31Id., at pp. 366371.
32Id., at pp. 392394.
180
180

On June 29, 2000, the parties entered into an

Agreement,33 approved by the SEC en banc in its Order34 of
July 11, 2000, to remand the case to the Securities
Investigation and Clearing Division for service of
summonses to RaquelSantos and Mallari. In turn, Raquel
Santos and Mallari agreed not to dispose of or transfer the
garnished properties in the meantime, but the writs of
garnishment would remain in force during the pendency of
the case.
Meanwhile, on June 5, 2000, the SEC Hearing Panel
granted Finvests motion for the issuance of a preliminary
injunction to enjoin PSE from initiating the liquidation of
Finvest and from selling its membership seat. The SEC
Hearing Panel ratiocinated that PSEs plan to sell Finvests
membership seat at public auction, despite the fact that its
claims against Finvest were yet to be determined in these
proceedings, was reason enough for the issuance of a
preliminary injunction.35 Upon posting of the required
bond, the SEC Hearing Panel issued a writ of preliminary
injunction on June 21, 2000.36
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With the enactment of the Securities Regulation Code,

the case was transferred to the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Makati City, and docketed as Civil Case No. 001589.
On October 2, 2001, the RTC issued an Order lifting the
garnishment of RaquelSantos Manila Golf Club share on
the ground that there must be a proper accounting to
determine the amount for which RaquelSantos and
Mallari were to be held jointly and severally liable to
Finvest before a writ of garnishment may be validly
issued.37 As a result, Finvest filed a motion for
reconsideration and a motion to respect the SEC en banc
Order dated July 11, 2000. The motions were denied
_______________
33Records (Civil Case No. 001589), Vol. II, p. 7.
34Id., at p. 6.
36Id., at p. 457.
37Records (Civil Case No. 001589), Vol. II, pp. 6166.
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VOL. 592, JULY 7, 2009
181
by the RTC in its May 30, 2002 Order.38 Through a petition

for certiorari, the October 2, 2001 Order of the RTC was
subsequently modified by the CA on December 9, 2002. The
CA held that the sale of RaquelSantos share in Manila
Golf Club was valid, subject to the outcome of the main
case (Civil Case No. 001589). The parties were further
enjoined to comply with their obligations under the July 11,
2000 Order of the SEC en banc.39
In the meantime, PSE filed a Motion to Dissolve the
Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Motion for
Reconsideration40 on the ground that it had the legal
obligation to make the appropriate recommendations to the
SEC on whether or not it would be to the best interest of all
concerned for Finvest to be liquidated at the soonest
possible time.
On April 28, 2003, the RTC issued a judgment in Civil
Case No. 001589 in favor of Finvest:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered directing that the writ
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of preliminary injunction issued on June 21, 2000 be declared

permanent. Respondents RaquelSantos and Mallari are ordered
to render an accounting of the stock certificates listed in Annex A
of the Complaint.
SO ORDERED.41
The trial court noted that Finvest had not been remiss
in addressing its dispute with the PSE. When PSE
manifested its intent to liquidate Finvest and sell its seat
at public auction, the amount of Finvests liability was still
unsettled, which thus makes it doubtful whether Section
22(a)(5) would apply. On the issue between Finvest and its
officers (RaquelSantos and Mallari), the trial court held
that Finvest could rightfully demand an accounting from
them and hold them
_______________
38Id., at p. 414.
39Records (Civil Case No. 001589), Vol. III, p. 251.
40Records (Civil Case No. 001589), Vol. II, pp. 6876.
41Records (Civil Case No. 001589), Vol. III, p. 285.
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182

liable for unaccounted securities since RaquelSantos

exercised control and supervision over the trading
operations of Finvest and he and Mallari had custody of all
securities traded.
On September 12, 2003, Finvest sought a partial
reconsideration of the RTC Judgment praying that: (a)
Finvests indefinite suspension by PSE be lifted (b)
RaquelSantos and Mallari be ordered to render an
accounting of the stock certificates within 60 days from
receipt of the judgment, and upon failure to do so, to jointly
and severally pay Finvest P18,184,855.89, the value of the
stocks as of December 31, 1998 and (c) RaquelSantos be
ordered to liquidate his cash advances amounting to
P3,143,823.63 within 60 days from receipt of the judgment
or, in case of failure to do so, to consider the same as
unliquidated cash advances.42
On the prayer to lift the indefinite suspension of Finvest
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by PSE, the trial court found that there was, in fact, a need
to allow Finvests operation to continue to enable it to
negotiate the terms and modes of payments with its
claimants, settle its obligations and fully ascertain its
financial condition. On the prayer to set a period within
which to render the accounting, the trial court held that
there was no need to set a period as Section 4, Rule 39 of
the Rules on Civil Procedure already directs when such
kind of judgment is enforceable. Accordingly, the RTC
modified its earlier decision in its Order dated February 1,
2005, thus:
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs Motion for Partial Reconsideration is
partially granted as follows
a)The indefinite suspension of operation of plaintiff Finvest
Corporation by the defendant Philippine Stock Exchange is
lifted and
b)The Annex A in the dispositive portion of the Judgment
dated April 28, 2003 is modified to read as Annex X.
_______________
42Id., at p. 290.
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VOL. 592, JULY 7, 2009
183

All other reliefs are denied.43
PSE appealed to the CA. Finvest likewise filed a partial

appeal. RaquelSantos and Mallari also filed an appeal
with the CA but the same was deemed abandoned when
they failed to file their appellants brief.44 The appeals of
Finvest and PSE were docketed as CAG.R. CV No. 85176.
On August 9, 2006, the CA rendered a Decision granting
Finvests petition, thus:
WHEREFORE, plaintiffappellant Finvests partial appeal of
the April 28, 2003 Judgment of the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City, Branch 138 is hereby GRANTED to the effect that
defendantsappellants Armand O. RaquelSantos and Annalissa
Mallari are hereby given a period of sixty (60) days from the
finality of this decision to render an accounting and in the event
that they will fail to do so, they are hereby ordered to jointly and
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severally pay Finvest the amount of eighteen million one hundred

eightyfour thousand eight hundred fiftyfive pesos and eighty
nine centavos (P18,184,855.89), and for defendantappellant
RaquelSantos to pay three million one hundred fortythree
thousand eight hundred twentythree pesos and sixtythree
centavos (P3,143,823.63). As for the appeal of defendantappellant
Philippine Stock Exchange, the same is hereby DENIED for lack
of merit.
SO ORDERED.45
For expediency and in the interest of speedy disposition

of justice, the CA set a 60day period within which Raquel
Santos and Mallari would render an accounting. The
appellate court agreed that RaquelSantos and Mallari
were guilty of gross negligence or bad faith for the wrongful
disposition of the proceeds of the sale of the shares of stock
that were in their custody. According to the CA, this
circumstance justified the order for them to pay
P18,184,855.89, representing the various claims of clients,
and for RaquelSantos to pay
_______________
43CA Rollo (CA G.R. CV No. 85176), p. 61.
44Id., at p. 162.
45Rollo (G.R. No. 174986), p. 38.
184
184

P3,143,823.63, representing unliquidated cash advances, in

the event they failed to render the necessary accounting
within the given period. Significantly, the CA also noted
that RaquelSantos and Mallari did not even dispute the
affidavit of Mr. Ernesto Lee regarding the schedule of
claims.
The CA opined that paragraph 5(a) of the Pledge
Agreement, giving PSE the right to sell Finvests seat in
case of default, pertained to default in the payment of
obligations already determined and established. The
validity of the fines and penalties imposed by the PSE was
yet to be substantiated. PSE could not insist on selling
Finvests seat unless its claims had been resolved with
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finality. It was, thus, proper to enjoin PSE from exercising

whatever rights it had under the Pledge Agreement.
In their motion for reconsideration,46 RaquelSantos and
Mallari protested the CAs order to hold them jointly and
severally liable for the claims of Finvests clients on the
ground that this relief was not even prayed for in Finvests
complaint. They insisted that the proper procedure to
render an accounting was to specify the beginning balance,
tack the values therefor, render an accounting, and adjudge
them liable for the deficiency, if any. They averred that the
beginning balance must be set out by the parties or, in case
of dispute, by the courts. PSE likewise filed a motion for
reconsideration47 reiterating its arguments.
On October 11, 2006, the CA denied the respective
motions for reconsideration of the PSE and RaquelSantos
and Mallari.48 The CA dismissed PSEs motion for
reconsideration for being a mere rehash of its arguments.
As for the issues raised by RaquelSantos and Mallari, the
CA pronounced that its order to hold RaquelSantos and
Mallari liable for the claims in case they failed to account
for them was well within the
_______________
46CA Rollo (CA G.R. CV No. 85176), pp. 181184.
47Id., at pp. 186194.
48Rollo (G.R. No. 174986), pp. 4142.
185
VOL. 592, JULY 7, 2009
185
reliefs prayed for by Finvest in its Complaint. The CA

added that RaquelSantos and Mallari could follow the
proposed accounting procedure when they rendered an
accounting pursuant to the courts order.
RaquelSantos and Mallari and the PSE filed separate
petitions for review on certiorari with this Court, docketed
as G.R. Nos. 174986 and 175071, respectively, assailing the
August 9, 2006 CA Decision and October 11, 2006
Resolution. This Court directed the consolidation of the two
petitions.
G.R. No. 181415
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The Court likewise directed the consolidation of G.R. No.

181415, which stems from a case between Finvest and two
of its clients, TransPhil Marine Enterprises, Inc. (TMEI)
and Roland Garcia. The facts of the case are as follows:
TMEI and Roland Garcia filed a complaint against
Finvest with the SEC praying for the delivery of stock
certificates and payment of dividends on the stocks they
purchased. The Complaint alleged that, from February 4,
1997 to July 31, 1997, TMEI and Roland Garcia purchased
shares of stock of Piltel Corporation through Finvest. In
particular,
TMEI
purchased
63,720
shares
for
P1,122,863.13 while Garcia purchased 40,000 shares for
P500,071.25. Finvest failed to deliver to them the stock
certificates despite several demands. TMEI and Roland
Garcia also claimed that they were entitled to the
dividends declared by Piltel from the time they purchased
the shares of stock.
In its Answer, Finvest asserted that it could not have
complied with complainants demand for the delivery of the
stock certificates because it was under indefinite
suspension since October 1997 and it had no means to
verify or validate their claims.
During the pretrial stage, TMEI amended its complaint
by modifying its prayer for a refund of the value of the
undelivered shares of stock, instead of the delivery of the
stock cer
186
186

tificates plus payment of dividends.49 In the hearing

conducted by the trial court for the purpose of determining
the propriety of admitting the amended complaint, Finvest
manifested that it had no objection to the admission of the
amended complaint, and that it would no longer file an
amended answer. Both parties manifested that they were
no longer presenting any additional evidence hence, the
case was submitted for decision.50
On April 29, 2003, the RTC rendered a Decision in Civil
Case No. 001579, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered ordering the respondent
to return to complainant Trans[Phil] Marine Enterprises[,] Inc.[,]
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the value of the undelivered shares of stock of Piltel equivalent to

P1,122,863.13 and to complainant Roland H. Garcia the value of
the undelivered shares of stock of Piltel equivalent to
P500,071.25, both with interest thereon at the legal rate from the
date of the filing of the Complaint.
SO ORDERED.51
On June 6, 2005, the RTC modified its earlier decision.

The amount of P1,122,863.13 in the dispositive portion was
reduced to P1,078,313.13 based on evidence showing that
2,025 Piltel shares, equivalent to P44,550.00, had been
delivered to TMEI, which fact was not denied by the
latter.52
Finvest appealed to the CA. On September 3, 2007, the
CA rendered a Decision53 affirming the RTC Decision.
Applying Article 1191 of the Civil Code, the CA declared
that since Finvest failed to comply with its obligation to
deliver to TMEI and Garcia the shares of stock, Finvest
was bound to return the amounts paid by them.
_______________
49Records (Civil Case No. 001579), pp. 120121.
50Id., at p. 251.
51Rollo (G.R. No. 181415), pp. 6061.
52Id., at p. 63.
53Supra note 2.
187
VOL. 592, JULY 7, 2009
187
On January 24, 2008, the CA denied Finvests motion for

reconsideration54 hence, the petition for review on
certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 181415.
The Petition in G.R. No. 174986
Petitioners RaquelSantos
following issues:
and
Mallari
raise
the
A.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN

NOT FIXING A BEGINNING BALANCE FOR THE
ACCOUNTING ORDERED.
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B.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAD NO

JURISDICTION TO ORDAIN THE PAYMENT OF THE
SUPPOSED
UNLIQUIDATED
PETITIONER RAQUELSANTOS.55
ADVANCES
OF
While conceding that they have to render an accounting

of the claims stated in Annex X, petitioners bewail the
lack of statement of the beginning balance therefor. They
aver that a sweeping order for them to answer all these
claims does not meet the standards of fair play. They insist
that, as pointed out in their motion for reconsideration filed
with the CA, the proper procedure is to specify the
beginning balance first.56 Petitioners, therefore, pray that
judgment be rendered fixing the beginning balance for the
accounting ordered.
Petitioners further aver that the CA exceeded its
jurisdiction when it ordered them to pay unliquidated cash
advances. Petitioners point out that said unliquidated cash
advances were not alleged, and payment thereof was not
prayed for, in the complaint.57 The alleged cash advances
were only mentioned in the Supplemental Affidavit
submitted by Mr.
_______________
54Rollo (G.R. No. 181415), pp. 5758.
55Rollo (G.R. No. 174986), p. 171.
56Id., at pp. 171173.
57Id., at pp. 173175.
188
188

Ernesto Lee to the trial court.58 They, therefore, pray that

the order for RaquelSantos to liquidate or pay his cash
advances be deleted.
PSE assigns the following errors:
THE
HONORABLE
I.
COURT OF
APPEALS
FAILED
TO
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CONSIDER THE EVIDENCE CLEARLY SHOWING THAT THE

AMOUNT OF LIABILITY OF RESPONDENT HAD ALREADY
BEEN DETERMINED, SUBSTANTIATED AND ESTABLISHED
NOT ONLY BY PETITIONER BUT ALSO WITH THE FULL
KNOWLEDGE AND PARTICIPATION OF RESPONDENT.
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED
IN ENJOINING PETITIONER PSE FROM ENFORCING AND
EXERCISING
ITS
RIGHT
UNDER
THE
PLEDGE
AGREEMENT.
III.
APPEAL BY CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 45 IS PROPER
CONSIDERING THAT THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS MISAPPREHENDED THE FACTS OF THE CASE.59
PSE contends that appeal by certiorari is proper

considering that the CA misapprehended the facts of the
case. For one, the CA failed to consider the fact that PSEs
claim against Finvest had been duly ascertained, computed
and substantiated. PSE points out that it has made several
demands on Finvest for the payment of its obligations and
the amount due has been computed after consultation with
Finvests representative, Mr. Ernesto Lee. In fact, in his
Letter dated September 8, 1998, Finvests Chairman, Mr.
Abelardo
_______________
58Id., at pp. 175176.
59Rollo (G.R. No. 175071), pp. 201202.
189
VOL. 592, JULY 7, 2009
189
Licaros, already acknowledged the amount of Finvests

liabilities and obligations to PSE in the amount of
P4,212,921.13. Finvest even proposed that its outstanding
obligations to PSE be reduced to 10% of the total amount
due and the deadline for its payment be extended.
Considering, therefore, that Finvest already acknowledged
and ascertained its obligations with PSE and yet it
defaulted in the payment thereof, PSE had the right to sell
at public auction Finvests pledged seat pursuant to the
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Pledge Agreement and in accordance with Article 2112 of

the Civil Code.
In this petition, Finvest raises the following grounds:
I.
WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION
OF THE TRIAL COURT WHICH ORDERED THE RETURN OF
THE VALUE OF THE UNDELIVERED SHARES OF STOCK AT
THE TIME OF THE PURCHASE, WHICH AWARD OF
DAMAGES HAVE NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED BY EVIDENCE.
II.
WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RENDERING THE DECISION
WHICH TENDS TO BE IN CONFLICT WITH ANOTHER
DECISION OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
(SPECIAL FOURTEENTH DIVISION) IN CAG.R. CV NO. 85176
(NOW PENDING BEFORE THE HONORABLE SUPREME
COURT AS G.R. NO. 174986) INSOFAR AS THE AWARD OF
DAMAGES TO RESPONDENTS IS CONCERNED, WHICH
CONFLICTING FINDING WAS THE SAME SITUATION
HEREIN PETITIONER SOUGHT TO AVOID WHEN IT MOVED
FOR THE CONSOLIDATION OF BOTH CASES BEFORE THE
TRIAL COURT.60
_______________
60Rollo (G.R. No. 181415), p. 21.
190
190

Finvest insists that the trial court and the CA had no

basis in awarding in favor of respondents damages
equivalent to the value of the undelivered shares of stock
purchased by TMEI and Garcia. Finvest posits that there
was no evidence to show that respondents were entitled
thereto.
Finvest further contends that the order for them to pay
the said shares of stock is in conflict with the CA Decision
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in CAG.R. CV No. 85176, ordering Finvests officers to

render an accounting or to pay the value of stock
certificates that included those covering the shares of stock
purchased by TMEI and Garcia. According to Finvest, the
two judgments caused an apparent confusion as to who
would ultimately be held liable for the subject shares.
Respondents counter that they have sufficiently proven
the value of the shares of stock through the buy
confirmation slips, vouchers and official receipts, which
they presented in evidence. They submit that liability for
these undelivered shares of stock of its officers is a
corporate liability that Finvest may not pass on to its
erring officers.
The Courts Ruling
G.R. No. 174986
The petition of RaquelSantos and Mallari has no merit.
The CA properly shunned petitioners prayer to further
modify the assailed judgment to include a beginning
balance for the accounting ordered. It is well to note that
petitioners appeal from the decision of the lower court was
deemed abandoned when they failed to file their appellants
brief. Not having filed an appeal, petitioners could not have
obtained any affirmative relief from the appellate court
other than what they obtained, if any, from the lower court.
After all, a party who does not appeal from a judgment can
no longer seek modification or reversal of the same. He
may oppose the appeal of the other party only on grounds
consistent with the
191
VOL. 592, JULY 7, 2009
191
judgment.61 The appealed decision becomes final as to the

party who does not appeal.
Moreover, we find no reason, at this point, to amend or
modify the judgment of the CA just to include a statement
of the beginning balance for the accounting ordered. This
pertains to the manner in which petitioners would comply
with the order to render an accounting upon its execution,
which matter should not concern this Court at the moment.
In any case, the Court is not in a position to grant the
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relief prayed for since the proper beginning balance, if

indeed necessary, is not determinable from the records. In
fact, petitioners, being in possession of the records relative
to the missing stock certificates, have the means to
determine the beginning balance. In their motion for
reconsideration of the CA Decision, petitioners themselves
acknowledge that the parties must set the beginning
balance and only in case of dispute will the courts be called
upon to intervene.62
Although petitioners may no longer seek affirmative
relief from the trial courts decision, they may, however,
oppose any modification of, or advance such arguments as
may be necessary to uphold or maintain, the said decision.
Considering that the order directing the payment of
unliquidated cash advances is a modification of the trial
courts decision, petitioners have every right to oppose the
same.
To recall, respondent Finvests cause of action against
petitioners was for accounting and damages, arising from
the allegedly missing stock certificates. In relation to such
cause of action, Finvest alleged in the Complaint that
petitioners had sole authority and custody of the stock
certificates and that they took undue advantage of their
positions in diverting to their personal benefit the proceeds
from the sale of the shares of stock. Finvest, therefore,
prayed that RaquelSantos
_______________
61Silliman University v. FonteloPaalan, G.R. No. 170948, June 26,
2007, 525 SCRA 759, 771.
62CA Rollo (CA G.R. CV No. 85176), p. 183.
192
192

and Mallari be held jointly and severally liable to account

for and/or to pay for all missing stock certificates and
payables listed in Annex X [of the Complaint] and for any
other subsequent claims and the corresponding profits that
could have accrued to the corporation and damages that
the corporation may sustain by reason of and/or in relation
to such missing or unaccounted stock certificates, payables,
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and any other subsequent claims.

In refuting petitioners stance that the CA erred in
granting a relief not prayed for in the Complaint,
respondent argues that the order for RaquelSantos to
liquidate or pay his cash advances was well within its
prayer for the payment of damages that Finvest will
sustain in relation to the missing stock certificates.
It is true that lack of prayer for a specific relief will not
deter the court from granting that specific relief. Even
without the prayer for a particular remedy, proper relief
may be granted by the court if the facts alleged in the
complaint and the evidence adduced so warrant. The
prayer in the complaint for other reliefs equitable and just
in the premises justifies the grant of a relief not otherwise
specifically prayed for.63
Admittedly, even if an issue has not been raised in the
complaint but evidence has been presented thereon, the
trial court may grant relief on the basis of such evidence. A
court may rule and render judgment on the basis of the
evidence before it, even though the relevant pleading has
not been previously amended, provided that no surprise or
prejudice to the adverse party is thereby caused.64 So long
as the basic requirements of fair play have been met, as
where litigants were given full opportunity to support their
respective conten
_______________
63United Overseas Bank of the Philippines v. Rosemoor Mining and
Development Corporation, G.R. No. 172651, October 2, 2007, 534 SCRA
528, 551.
64Vlason Enterprises Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 369 Phil. 269,
304305 310 SCRA 26, 59 (1999).
193
VOL. 592, JULY 7, 2009
193
tions and to object to or refute each others evidence, the

court may validly treat the pleadings as if they have been
amended to conform to the evidence and proceed to
adjudicate on the basis of all the evidence before it.65
Notably, the Complaint did not allege that petitioner
RaquelSantos obtained from Finvest cash advances that
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he failed to liquidate. The alleged cash advances were

disclosed to the court in the Supplemental Affidavit66 that
Mr. Ernesto Lee submitted to the court. Attached to the
Supplemental Affidavit were copies of disbursement
vouchers and checks representing the cash advances made
by petitioner RaquelSantos.
We note that petitioner RaquelSantos did not protest
the order for him to pay the cash advances in his Motion for
Reconsideration of the CA Decision. He raises the issue for
the first time in this petition, which should not be allowed.
A question that was never raised in courts below cannot be
allowed to be raised for the first time on appeal without
offending basic rules of fair play, justice and due process.67
In any case, petitioner RaquelSantos had every
opportunity to refute the Supplemental Affidavit, together
with the vouchers and checks, but he did not submit any
counter evidence. Petitioner is clearly estopped from
questioning the order for him to pay the cash advances.
G.R. No. 175071
PSEs petition is without merit.
Article 1159 of the Civil Code provides that contracts
have the force of law between the contracting parties and
should be
_______________
65 TalisaySilay Milling Co., Inc. v Asociacion de Agricultores de
TalisaySilay, Inc., G.R. No. 91852, August 15, 1995, 247 SCRA 361, 378.
66Records, Vol. II, Civil Case No. 001589, pp. 250260.
67Ysmael v. Court of Appeals, 376 Phil. 323, 335 318 SCRA 215, 227
(1999).
194
194

complied with in good faith. Being the primary law

between the parties, the contract governs the adjudication
of their rights and obligations. A court has no alternative
but to enforce the contractual stipulations in the manner
they have been agreed upon and written.68
The Pledge Agreement between PSE and Finvest was
entered into pursuant to PSEs bylaws which requires a
member to pledge its membership seat to secure the
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payment of all debts or obligations due PSE and its other

members arising out of, or in connection with, the present
or future contracts of such member with PSE and its
members. In case of default in the payment of obligations,
the Pledge Agreement explicitly grants PSE the right to
sell Finvests pledged seat, viz.:
5.Default. In the event of a default by the PLEDGOR in respect to
the Obligations or upon the failure of the PLEDGOR to comply with any
of the provisions of this Agreement, the PLEDGEE may
(a)cause the public sale at any time as the PLEDGEE may
elect at its place of business or elsewhere and the
PLEDGEE may, in all allowable cases, acquire or purchase
the Pledged Seat and hold the same thereafter in its own
right free from any claim of the PLEDGOR
(b)apply, at its option, the proceeds of any said sale, as well
as all sums received or collected by the PLEDGEE from or
on account of such Pledged Seat to (i) the payment of
expenses incurred or paid by the PLEDGEE in connection
with any sale, transfer or delivery of the Pledged Seat, and
(ii) payment of the Obligations and all unpaid interests,
penalties, damages, expenses, and charges accruing on the
Obligations or pursuant to the Bylaws and this Agreement.
The balance shall be returned to the PLEDGOR.69
_______________
68Pryce
Corporation
v.
Philippine
Amusement
and
Gaming
Corporation, G.R. No. 157480, May 6, 2005, 458 SCRA 164, 175176.
69Rollo (G.R. No. 175071), p. 93.
195
VOL. 592, JULY 7, 2009
195
Article 2112 of the Civil Code also gives the pledgee the
same right to sell the thing pledged in case the pledgors
obligation is not satisfied in due time.
Under the law on contracts, mora solvendi or debtors
default is defined as a delay in the fulfillment of an
obligation, by reason of a cause imputable to the debtor.
There are three requisites necessary for a finding of
default. First, the obligation is demandable and liquidated
second, the debtor delays performance and third, the
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creditor judicially or extrajudicially requires the debtors

performance.70
In the present petition, PSE insists that Finvests
liability for fines, penalties and charges has been
established, determined and substantiated, hence,
liquidated.
We note however that both trial court and CA have
ruled otherwise. Factual findings of the trial court,
particularly when affirmed by the CA, are generally
binding on the Court.71 This is because the trial courts
findings of fact are deemed conclusive and we are not duty
bound to analyze and weigh all over again the evidence
already considered in the proceedings below.72 The Court is
not a trier of facts and does not normally undertake a re
examination of the evidence presented by the contending
parties during the trial of the case.73 The Courts
jurisdiction over a petition for review on certiorari is
limited to reviewing only errors of law, not of fact, unless
the factual findings complained of are devoid of sup
_______________
70 Selegna Management and Development Corporation v. United
Coconut Planters Bank, G.R. No. 165662, May 3, 2006, 489 SCRA 125,
138.
71Titan Construction Corporation v. UniField Enterprises, Inc., G.R.
No. 153874, March 1, 2007, 517 SCRA 180, 186.
72Calicdan v. Cendaa, G.R. No. 155080, February 5, 2004, 422 SCRA
272, 276.
73Delos Santos v. Elizalde, G.R. Nos. 141810, February 2, 2007, 514
SCRA 14, 33.
196
196

port from the evidence on record or the assailed judgment

is based on a misapprehension of facts.74
The findings of fact of both the trial court and the CA
are fully supported by the records. They plainly show that
the parties were negotiating to determine the exact amount
of Finvests obligations to PSE, during which period PSE
repeatedly moved the deadlines it imposed for Finvest to
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pay the fines, penalties and charges, apparently to allow

for more time to thresh out the details of the computation
of said penalties. In the middle of those talks, PSE
unceremoniously took steps to sell the pledged seat at
public auction, without allowing the negotiations to come to
a conclusion. This sudden decision of PSE deprived Finvest
a sporting chance to settle its accountabilities before
forfeiting its seat in the stock exchange. Without that seat,
Finvest will lose its standing to trade and do business in
the stock exchange.
A debt is liquidated when the amount is known or is
determinable by inspection of the terms and conditions of
relevant documents.75 Under the attendant circumstances,
it cannot be said that Finvests debt is liquidated. At the
time PSE left the negotiating table, the exact amount of
Finvests fines, penalties and charges was still in dispute
and as yet undetermined. Consequently, Finvest cannot be
deemed to have incurred in delay in the payment of its
obligations to PSE. It cannot be made to pay an obligation
the amount of which was not fully explained to it. The
public sale of the pledged seat would, thus, be premature.
G.R. No. 181415
Finvests petition is denied.
_______________
74Concepcion v. Court of Appeals, 381 Phil. 90, 96 324 SCRA 85, 91
(2000).
75 Selegna Management and Development Corporation v. United
Coconut Planters Bank, supra note 72, at p. 141.
197
VOL. 592, JULY 7, 2009
197
The CA was correct in applying Article 1191 of the Civil

Code, which indicates the remedies of the injured party in
case there is a breach of contract:
ART.1191.The power to rescind obligations is implied in
reciprocal ones, in case one of the obligors should not comply with
what is incumbent upon him.
The injured party may choose between the fulfillment and the
rescission of the obligation, with the payment of damages in
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either case. He may also seek rescission, even after he has chosen
fulfillment, if the latter should become impossible.
Initially, respondents sought the fulfillment of Finvests

obligation to deliver the stock certificates, instead of a
rescission. They changed their minds later and amended
the prayer in their complaint and opted for a refund of the
purchase price plus damages. The trial court allowed the
amendment, there being no objection from Finvest.
The right of a party to rescission under Article 1191 of
the Civil Code is predicated on a breach of faith by the
other party who violates the reciprocity between them.76 In
a contract of sale, the seller obligates itself to transfer the
ownership of and deliver a determinate thing, and the
buyer to pay therefor a price certain in money or its
equivalent. In some contracts of sale, such as the sale of
real property, prior physical delivery of the thing sold or its
representation is not legally required, as the execution of
the Deed of Sale effectively transfers ownership of the
property to the buyer through constructive delivery. Hence,
delivery of the certificate of title covering the real property
is not necessary to transfer ownership.
In the sale of shares of stock, physical delivery of a stock
certificate is one of the essential requisites for the transfer
of
_______________
76Sps. Velarde v. Court of Appeals, 413 Phil. 360, 373 361 SCRA 56,
68 (2001).
198
198

ownership of the stocks purchased. Section 63 of the

Corporation Code provides thus:
SEC.63.Certificate of stock and transfer of shares.The
capital stock of stock corporations shall be divided into shares for
which certificates signed by the president or vicepresident,
countersigned by the secretary or assistant secretary, and sealed
with the seal of the corporation shall be issued in accordance with
the bylaws. Shares of stock so issued are personal property and
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may be transferred by delivery of the certificate or certificates

indorsed by the owner or his attorneyinfact or other person
legally authorized to make the transfer. No transfer, however,
shall be valid, except as between the parties, until the transfer is
recorded in the books of the corporation so as to show the names
of the parties to the transaction, the date of the transfer, the
number of the certificate or certificates and the number of shares
transferred.
No shares of stock against which the corporation holds any
unpaid claim shall be transferable in the books of the
corporation.77
For a valid transfer of stocks, the requirements are as

follows: (a) there must be delivery of the stock certificate
(b) the certificate must be endorsed by the owner or his
attorneyinfact or other persons legally authorized to make
the transfer and (c) to be valid against third parties, the
transfer must be recorded in the books of the corporation.78
Clearly, Finvests failure to deliver the stock certificates
representing the shares of stock purchased by TMEI and
Garcia amounted to a substantial breach of their contract
which gave rise to a right to rescind the sale.
Rescission creates the obligation to return the object of
the contract. This is evident from Article 1385 of the Civil
Code which provides:
_______________
77Emphasis supplied.
78Bitong v. Court of Appeals, 354 Phil. 516, 541 292 SCRA 503, 529
(1998).
199
VOL. 592, JULY 7, 2009
199

ART.1385.Rescission creates the obligation to return the
things which were the object of the contract, together with their
fruits, and the price with its interest consequently, it can be
carried out only when he who demands rescission can return
whatever he may be obliged to restore.
Neither shall rescission take place when the things which are
the object of the contract are legally in the possession of third
persons who did not act in bad faith.
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In this case, indemnity for damages may be demanded from the

person causing the loss.
To rescind is to declare a contract void at its inception

and to put an end to it as though it never was. Rescission
does not merely terminate the contract and release the
parties from further obligations to each other, but
abrogates it from the beginning and restores the parties to
their relative positions as if no contract has been made.79
Mutual restitution entails the return of the benefits that
each party may have received as a result of the contract. In
this case, it is the purchase price that Finvest must return.
The amount paid was sufficiently proven by the buy
confirmation receipts, vouchers, and official/provisional
receipts that respondents presented in evidence. In
addition, the law awards damages to the injured party,
which could be in the form of interest on the price paid,80 as
the trial court did in this case.
Lastly, we address respondents concern over Finvests
attempt to pass its liability for the undelivered stock
certificates to its officers. We find that, contrary to
Finvests stance, the CA Decision in CAG.R. CV No. 85176,
which is the subject of the two other petitions for review
before this Court, is not in conflict with our present
resolution. While the decision in the
_______________
79Sps. Velarde v. Court of Appeals, supra note 76, at p. 375 pp. 6970.
80See Congregation of the Religious of the Virgin Mary v. Orola, G.R.
No. 169790, April 30, 2008, 553 SCRA 578.
200
200

other case adjudges Finvests officers liable to Finvest for

the missing stock certificates, the assailed decision in this
petition makes Finvest directly responsible to its clients for
undelivered stock certificates. Moreover, even if Finvests
officers are blameworthy, we cannot hold them solidarily
liable, as they were not impleaded as parties to this case.
Consolidation of cases does not make the parties to one
case parties to the other.
32/33
2/19/2016
WHEREFORE, the petitions in G.R. No. 174986 and

G.R. No. 175071 are DENIED. The CA Decision in CAG.R.
CV No. 85176 dated August 9, 2006 and Resolution dated
October 11, 2006 are AFFIRMED.
The petition in G.R. No. 181415 is likewise DENIED.
The CA Decision in CAG.R. CV No. 85430 dated
September 3, 2007 and Resolution dated January 24, 2008
are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
YnaresSantiago
(Chairperson),
Velasco, Jr. and Peralta, JJ., concur.
ChicoNazario,
Petitions denied, judgment in CA G.R. CV No. 85430

dated September 3, 2007 and resolution dated January 24,
2008 affirmed.
Note.The terms of a contract have the force of law
between the parties. (Co Chien vs. Sta Lucia Realty and
Development, Inc., 513 SCRA 570 [2007])
o0o
Copyright2016CentralBookSupply,Inc.Allrightsreserved.
33/33

6 Raquel Santos vs. Court of Appeals

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2/19/2016

Petition granted, Civil Case No. 05112452 entitled Anita

G.R. No. 174986.July 7, 2009.*

ARMAND O. RAQUELSANTOS and ANNALISSA

PHILIPPINE STOCK EXCHANGE, INC., petitioner, vs.

G.R. No. 181415.July 7, 2009.*

FINVEST SECURITIES CO., INC., petitioner, vs. TRANS

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

deemed abandoned when they failed to file their appellants brief.

VOL. 592, JULY 7, 2009

RaquelSantos vs. Court of Appeals

Same Contracts A court has no alternative but to enforce the

Finvests fines, penalties and charges was still in dispute and as

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

obligates itself to transfer the ownership of and deliver a

shall be valid, except as between the parties, until the transfer is

VOL. 592, JULY 7, 2009

RaquelSantos vs. Court of Appeals

purchased by TMEI and Garcia amounted to a substantial breach

PETITIONS for review on certiorari of the decisions and

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

received reports that Finvest was not meeting its

VOL. 592, JULY 7, 2009

RaquelSantos vs. Court of Appeals

clients.5 Consequently, PSE indefinitely suspended Finvest

registered with the Commission as an exchange under the terms and

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

the latters assets. Finvest was duly informed of the SECs

to PSE for the approval of the following: (1) that it be given

VOL. 592, JULY 7, 2009

RaquelSantos vs. Court of Appeals

PSE to any legal and financial risks in connection with its

had settled its obligations to PSE and paid all

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

On April 21, 1999, PSE again sent a demand letter to

complaint, which was a list of the claims of Finvests clients

VOL. 592, JULY 7, 2009

RaquelSantos vs. Court of Appeals

issued to prevent PSE from initiating the liquidation of

established that there were missing certificates should he

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

On June 29, 2000, the parties entered into an

With the enactment of the Securities Regulation Code,

VOL. 592, JULY 7, 2009

RaquelSantos vs. Court of Appeals

by the RTC in its May 30, 2002 Order.38 Through a petition

of preliminary injunction issued on June 21, 2000 be declared

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

liable for unaccounted securities since RaquelSantos

VOL. 592, JULY 7, 2009

RaquelSantos vs. Court of Appeals

PSE appealed to the CA. Finvest likewise filed a partial

severally pay Finvest the amount of eighteen million one hundred

For expediency and in the interest of speedy disposition

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

P3,143,823.63, representing unliquidated cash advances, in

finality. It was, thus, proper to enjoin PSE from exercising

VOL. 592, JULY 7, 2009