MENCIDOR, JOSE NIKKO M.

BL 3
SPECIAL PENAL LAWS
BP 22
AC NO. 12-2000
AC NO. 13-2001
PD 1689
BP 22: JUDICIAL LEGISLATION OR NOT?
ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 12-2000
In the Vaca case (GR No. 131714), the Court, modified the sentence rendered by the lower
court for violation of BP 22. It deleted the penalty of imprisonment and imposed a fine amounting
to double the amount of the bounced check. In the Rosa Lim case (GR No. 130038), the Court
sentenced the drawer of the bounced check and deleted the penalty of imprisonment. Likewise,
it provided for subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
The AC in fact enhances the negotiability of checks by fast-tracking the resolution of BP 22
cases. In effect, the circular will significantly declog the court dockets, since the enactment of BP
22, courts have become collection agents for unpaid creditors. Further, it simply pursued the
principle of serving the ends of criminal justice in fixing the penalty within the range of discretion
allowable under Sec 1 of BP 22 by taking into account the rationale behind the ISL, to redeem
valuable human material and to prevent unnecessary deprivation of personal liberty and
economic usefulness with due regard to the protection of social order.
BP 22: CONSTITUTIONAL OR NOT?
In Lozano v Martinez (146 SCRA 323), it laid to rest the issues of constitutionality of BP 22. In
fine, it stated unequivocally the following:
a. BP 22 does not conflict with the constitutional prohibition against imprisonment
for non-payment of debt.
The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a
worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is not
the non-payment of an obligation which the law punishes. The law is not intended or
designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain
of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation.
Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is proscribed by the
law. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an offense against
public order.
The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private interests of the
parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the community at
large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury
to the public. The harmful practice of putting valueless commercial papers in circulation,
multiplied a thousand fold, can very wen pollute the channels of trade and commerce,
injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public
interest. The enactment of BP 22 is a declaration by the legislature that, as a matter of
public policy, the making and issuance of a worthless check is deemed public nuisance to
be abated by the imposition of penal sanctions.
b. Checks are not mere contracts, but substitutes for money; non-impairment of
contract clause applies only to lawful contracts; and
The freedom of contract which is constitutionally protected is freedom to enter into
"lawful" contracts. Contracts which contravene public policy are not lawful. Besides, we
must bear in mind that checks can not be categorized as mere contracts. It is a
commercial instrument which, in this modem day and age, has become a convenient
substitute for money; it forms part of the banking system and therefore not entirely free
from the regulatory power of the state.
c. It does not violate the equal protection clause.

Petitioners contend that the payee is just as responsible for the crime as the drawer of the
check, since without the indispensable participation of the payee by his acceptance of the
check there would be no crime. This argument is tantamount to saying that, to give equal
protection, the law should punish both the swindler and the swindled. Moreover, the clause
does not preclude classification of individuals, who may be accorded different treatment
under the law as long as the classification is no unreasonable or arbitrary.
BP 22 MAY BE VIOLATED IN TWO WAYS:
1. By making or drawing and issuing any check to apply on account or for value,
knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit
with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its
presentment, which check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for
insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same
reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop
payment.
ELEMENTS under First Paragraph of Section 1:
a. That a person makes or draws and issues any check.
b. That the check is made or drawn and issued to apply on account for value.
c. That the person who makes or draws and issues the check knows at the time of its issue
that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of
such check in full upon its
presentment.
d. That the check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or
credit, or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without
any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop its payment.
2. Having sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank when he makes or
draws and issues a check, by failing to keep sufficient funds or to maintain a credit
to cover the full amount of the check if presented within a period of ninety (90)
days from the date appearing thereon, for which reason it is dishonored by the
drawee bank.
ELEMENTS under Second Paragraph of Section 1:
a. That a person has sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank when he makes or
draws and issues a check.
b. That he fails to keep sufficient funds or to maintain a credit to cover the full amount of the
check if presented within a period of 90 days from the date appearing thereon.
c. That the check is dishonoured by the drawee bank.
The gravamen of BP 22 is the issuance of the check, not the non-payment of an obligation.
(Lozano v Martinez) The mere issuance, irrespective of the intent, makes the issuer, drawer, or
maker liable. The issuers knowledge of the insufficiency of funds is presumed from the dishonor
of the check.
The mere act of issuing a rubber check is malum prohibitum, a crime punished by special law
without need of proving an ill motive for the act. (People v Langgui)
Included in the word check are crossed checks, memorandum checks, foreign checks, and
cashiers checks. The purpose of crossing a check is to ensure that the check will be encashed by
the rightful payee.
The issuance of a check not intended for encashment has the same effect like any other check.
(Dico v Court of Appeals). The mere act of issuing a worthless check is covered by BP 22
(People v Chua). BP 22 does not make any distinction as to whether the checks within its
contemplation are issued in payment of an obligation or merely to guarantee the said obligation.
Cruz v Court of Appeals (GR No. 108738)
BP 22 is applicable where dishonored checks are issued merely in the form of deposit or
guarantee. Malice and intent are inconsequential. Cross checkes or ristricted checks are
negotiable instruments within the coverage of BP 22.

BP 22 APPLIES ALSO TO FOREIGN CHECKS.

De Villa v Court of Appeals (GR No. 87416)
Foreign checks, provided they are either drawn and issued in the Philippines though payable
outside thereof, are covered by the law. The records of the Batasan, Vol III, unmistakably show
that the intention of the
lawmakers is to apply the law to whatever currency may be the
subject thereof.

BP 22: VENUE
People v Yabut (GR No. L-42847)
the venue of the offense lies at the place where the check was executed and delivered to
the payee and that the place where a check was written, signed or dated does not necessarily fix
the place where it was executed, as what is of decisive importance is the delivery thereof which
is the final act essential to its consummation as an obligation.
Lim v Rodrigo ( GR No. L-76974)
The "delivery" contemplated by law "must be to a person who takes it
(the bad check) as
holder, which means the payee or indorsee of a bill or note, who is in possession of it, or the
bearer thereof.
Que v People (154 SCRA 160)
The determinative factor is the place of issuance of the check.
The Ministry of Justice, citing People vs. Yabut, laid down the following guidelines in Memorandum
Circular No. 4 dated December 15, 1981, to wit:
(1) Venue of the offense lies at the place where the check was executed and delivered;
(2) The place where the check was written, signed or dated does not necessarily fix the place
where it was executed, as what is of decisive importance is the delivery thereof which is
the final act essential to its consummation as an obligation.
SEC 1 (b), Rule 111 of the Rules of Court:
(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include the
corresponding civil action. No reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed.
Upon filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions, the offended party shall pay in full the
filing fees based on the amount of the check involved, which shall be considered as the actual
damages claimed. Where the
complaint or information also seeks to recover liquidated,
moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, the offended party shall pay additional filing
fees based on the amounts alleged therein. If the amounts are not so alleged but any of these
damages are subsequently awarded by the court, the filing fees based on the amount awarded
shall constitute a first lien on
the judgment.
Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet commenced, it may
be consolidated with the criminal action upon application with the court trying the latter case. If
the application is granted, the trial of both actions shall proceed in accordance with section 2 of
this Rule governing consolidation of the civil and criminal actions. (cir. 57-97)
Lim v Court of Appeals ( GR No. 107898)
There are certain crimes in which some acts material and essential to the crimes and
requisite to their consummation occur in one municipality or territory and some in another, in
which event, the court of either has
jurisdiction to try the cases, it being understood
that the first court taking cognizance of the case excludes the other. These are the so-called
transitory or continuing crimes under which violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is categorized. In other
words, a person charged with a transitory crime may be validly tried in any municipality or
territory where the offense was in part committed.

BP 22: PRESCRIPTION
People v Pangilinan (Gr No. 152662)
Act No. 3326 entitled An Act to Establish Prescription for Violations of Special Acts and
Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin, as amended, is the law
applicable to BP Blg. 22 cases.
Appositely, the law reads:
SECTION 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise provided in such acts,
prescribe in accordance with the following rules: (a) xxx; (b) after four years for those punished
by imprisonment for more than one month, but less than two years; (c) xxx.
SECTION 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of
the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution
of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty
person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting
jeopardy.
Since BP Blg. 22 is a special law that imposes a penalty of imprisonment of not less than thirty
(30) days but not more than one year or by a fine for its violation, it therefore prescribes in four
(4) years in accordance with the
aforecited law. The running of the prescriptive period,
however, should be tolled upon the institution of proceedings against the guilty person.
BP 22: WRITTEN NOTICE OF DISHONOR
Domagsang v Court of Appeals (Gr No. 139292)
While Section 2 of B.P. 22 indeed does not state that the notice of dishonor be in writing, this
must be taken in conjunction with Section 3 of the law, i.e., that where there are no sufficient
funds in or credit with such drawee bank, such fact shall always be explicitly stated in the notice
of dishonor or refusal. A mere oral notice or demand to pay would appear to be insufficient for
conviction under the law. In our view, both the spirit and the letter of the Bouncing Checks Law
require for the act to be punished thereunder not only that the accused issued a check that is
dishonored, but also that the accused has actually been notified in writing of the fact of dishonor.
BP 22: DISPUTABLE PRESUMPTION OF KNOWLEDGE OF INSUFFICIENCY OF FUNDS
Caras v Court of Appeals (Gr No. 129900)
The absence of proof that petitioner received any notice informing her of the fact that her
checks were dishonored and giving her five banking days within which to make arrangements for
payment of the said checks prevents the application of the disputable presumption that she had
knowledge of the insufficiency of her funds at the time she issued the checks. Absent such
presumption, the burden shifts to the prosecution to prove that petitioner had knowledge of the
insufficiency of her funds when she issued the said check, otherwise, she cannot be held liable
under the law. Absent a clear showing that petitioner actually knew of the dishonor of her checks
and was given the opportunity to make arrangements for payment as provided for under the law,
we cannot with moral certainty
convict her of violation of B.P. Blg. 22. The failure of the
prosecution to prove that petitioner was given the requisite notice of dishonor is a clear ground
for her acquittal.
BP 22: NOTICE OF DISHONOR TO CORPORATION
Marigomen v Court of Appeals (Gr No. 153451)
Thus, if the drawer or maker is an officer of a corporation, the notice of dishonor to the said
corporation is not notice to the employee or officer who drew or issued the check for and in its
behalf.

Lao v Court of Appeals (GR No. 119178)

Responsibility under B.P. Blg. 22 is personal to the accused; hence, personal knowledge of
the notice of dishonor is necessary. Consequently, constructive notice to the corporation is not
enough to satisfy due process.
BP 22: PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE OF INSUFICIENCY OF FUNDS
Section 2 establishes prima facie evidence of knowledge of such insufficiency of funds or credit.
The making, drawing and issuance of a check, payment of which is refused by the drawee
because of insufficient funds in or credit with such bank, is prima facie evidence of knowledge of
insufficiency of funds or credit, when the check is presented within 90 days from the date of the
check.
People v Laggui (GR No. 76262-63)
the makers knowledge of the insufficiency of his funds is legally presumed from the dishonor
of his checks for insufficiency of funds.
EXCEPTIONS:
a. when the check is presented after 90 days from the date of the check
b. when the maker or drawer pays the holder thereof the amount due thereon, or makes
arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of such check within five banking days
after receiving notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee.
The element of knowledge of insufficiency of funds or credit is not present, and, therefore, the
crime does not exist, when the drawer either:
a. pays the holder of the check the amount due thereon within five banking days after
receiving notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee; or
b. makes arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of such check within five banking
days after notice of non-payment.
Danao v Court of Appeals (GR No. 122353)
The prima facie presumption in Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 gives the accused an opportunity to
satisfy the amount indicated in the check and thus avert prosecution. This opportunity, as this
Court stated in Lozano vs. Martinez, serves to mitigate the harshness of the law in its
application. In other words, if such notice of non-payment by the drawee bank is not sent to the
maker or drawer of the bum check, or if there is no proof as to when such notice was received
by the drawer, then the presumption or prima facie evidence as provided in Section 2 of B.P. Blg.
22 cannot arise,
since there would simply be no way of reckoning the crucial 5-day period.
BP 22: RULE OF PREFERENCE
ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 13-2001
This clarified that the clear tenor and intention of AC No. 12-2000 is not to remove imprisonment
as an alternative penalty, but to lay down a rule of preference in the application of the penalties
provided for in BP 22.
It further clarified that: Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 establishes a rule of preference in
the application of the penal provisions of B.P. Blg. 22 such that where the circumstances of both
the offense and the offender clearly indicate good faith or a clear mistake of fact without taint of
negligence, the imposition of a fine alone should be considered as the more appropriate penalty.
Needless to say, the determination of whether the circumstances warrant the imposition of a fine
alone rests solely upon the Judge. Should the Judge decide that imprisonment is the more
appropriate penalty, Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 ought not to be deemed a hindrance.
BP 22: DUTY OF DRAWEE; RULES OF EVIDENCE
Section 3 requires the drawee, who refuses to pay the check to the holder thereof, to cause to be
written, printed or stamped in plain language thereon, or attached thereto, the reason for his
dishonor or refusal to pay the same. Where there are no sufficient funds in or credit with it, the

drawee bank shall explicitly state that fact in the notice of dishonor or refusal. If the drawee bank
received an order to stop payment from the drawer, the former shall state in the notice that
there were no sufficient funds in or credit with it for the payment in full of the check, if such be
the fact.
In all prosecutions under BP 22, the introduction in evidence of any unpaid and dishonored check
with the drawees refusal to pay stamped or written thereon, or attached thereto, shall be prima
facie evidence of:
a. the making or issuance of the check;
b. the due presentment to the drawee for payment and the dishonour thereof; and
c. the fact that the same was proplerly dishonored for the reason written, attached or
stamped by the drawee on such dishonored check.
The prosecution has to present in evidence only the unpaid and dishonored check with the
drawees refusal to pay stamped or written thereon, or attached thereto.
It would not be necessary to prove:
a. the making or issuance of the check by the drawer;
b. the due presentment of the check to the drawee for the payment and the dishonor
thereof; and
c. the fact that the same was properly dishonored for the reason written, stamped or
attached by the drawee on the dishonored check.
BP 22: PARTIES LIABLE; ENDORSERS; CO-SIGNER
1. The person liable is one who by the terms of the check is required to pay the same.
2. The check should be presented to the bank and be subsequently dishonored.
3. There needs to be due presentment of the check to the bank and notice of dishonor be
given to the drawer.
4. The reasons for dishonor or stop payment must be stated in the notice of dishonor.
Preferably, the dishonored check shoould be attached to the notice sent to the drawer be
it a corporation, partnership or private individuals.
Violation of BP 22 makes mention of maker or drawer and not endorsers. Penal statutes are
striclty construed. Where the law does not include it excludes (inclusio unius est exclusio
alterius). The mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another thing not mentioned. It
follows therefore that an endorser is not liable unless conspiracy is clearly proven. The endorser,
though not criminally liable, is civilly liable.
Dingle v Intermediate Appellate Court (GR No. L-75243)
a co-signer of a check, who co-signs with the maker or drawer, who has no knowledge of
the issuance of the check and its dishonor, is not liable for violation of BP 22.
BP 22: MORAL TURPITUDE
Santos v Court of Appeals (319 SCRA 609)
A person who is likewise found guilty of violating BP 22 should not be allowed to avail of the
Probation Law. To allow otherwise would depreciate the
seriousness of her malefactions, that
is, for having issued 54 unfunded checks.
Lozano v Martinez
The thrust of the law is to prohibit under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless
checks and putting them in circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest,
the practice is prescribed by the law. The law punishes the act not as an offense against
property but an offense against public order.
Tak Ng v Republic (GR No. L-13017)
Moral turpitude has been defines as an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the
private and social duties which a man owes his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to

the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and or conduct contrary to
justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.
BP 22: DOUBLE JEOPARDY
People v Reyes (GR No. 101127-31)
While the filing of the two sets of Information under the provisions of BP 22 and under the
provisions of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, on estafa, may refer to identical acts
committed by the petitioner, the prosecution thereof cannot be limited to one offense, because
a single criminal act may give rise to a multiplicity of offenses and where there is variance or
differences between the elements of an offense in one law and another law as in the case at bar
there will be no double jeopardy because what the rule on double jeopardy prohibits refers to
identity of elements in the two (2) offenses. Otherwise stated, prosecution for the same act is
not prohibited. What is forbidden is prosecution for the same offense.
To constitute estafa by issuance of postdating checks, the act of postdating or issuing a
check in payment of an obligation must be the efficient cause of the defraudation; as such, it
should be either prior to or simultaneous with the act of fraud. The offender must be able to
obtain money or property from the offended party because of the issuance of the check, whether
postdated or not. It must be shown that the person to whom the check was delivered would not
have parted with his money or property were it not for the issuance of the check by the other
party. Stated otherwise, the check should have been issued as an inducement for the surrender
by the party deceived of his money or property and not in payment of a pre-existing obligation.
BP 22 DISTINUGUISHED FROM ESTAFA BY POSTDATING OR ISSUING BAD CHECKS
Ada v Virola (GR No. 82346-47)
A scrutiny of the two laws involved shows that the two offenses punished therein are different
and distinct from each other. In the crime of Estafa by postdating or issuing bad check/s under
the Revised Penal Code, deceit and damage are two essential elements of the offense and have
to be established with satisfactory proof to warrant convictions with the further requisite that
deceit in causing the defraudation must be prior to or simultaneous with the commission of the
fraud. For violation of the Bouncing Checks Law under B.P. 22, on the other hand, these elements
are not necessary, the essential element being knowledge on the part of the maker or drawer of
the check of the insufficiency of his funds. The gravamen of the offense is the act of making and
issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment and
not the non-payment of an obligation.
Distinction between the two offenses is further found in their nature. Whereas the offense under
article 315, par. 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code is a malum in se requiring proof of criminal intent
on the part of the offender as an essential ingredient focusing mainly on the damage caused to
the property rights of the victim, the crime under B.P. 22 makes the mere act of issuing a
worthless check malum prohibitum wherein criminal intent need not be proved because it is
presumed and considered a violation thereof as one committed against public interest.
With these distinctions clarified, We hold that there is no Identity of offenses here involved for
which legal jeopardy in one case may be invoked in the other considering that the offenses
charged in the informations for Estafa and for violation of B.P. 22 are perfectly distinct in point of
law however nearly they may be connected in point of fact. The evidence required to prove one
offense is not the same evidence required to prove the other. The defense of double jeopardy
cannot therefore prosper.
PD 1689: SYNDICATED ESTAFA
Galvez and Guy v Court of Appeals (GR No. 187919)
Under Section 1 of PD No. 1689, the elements of syndicated estafa are:
a. estafa or other forms of swindling as defined in Artilce 315 and 316 of the RPC is
committed;
b. the estafa or swindling is committed by a syndicate of five or more persons; and

c. defraudation results in the misappropriation of moneys contributed by stockholders, or

members of rural banks, cooperatives, samahang nayon/s, or farmers associations or of
funds solicited by
corporations/associations from the general public.
Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1689 speaks of a syndicate formed with the intention of
carrying out the unlawful scheme for the misappropriation of the money contributed by the
members of the association. In other words, only those who formed and manage associations
that receive contributions from the general public who misappropriated the contributions can
commit syndicated estafa.
People v Balasa (GR No. 106357)
Similarly, the fact that the entity involved was not a rural bank, cooperative, samahang
nayon or farmers' association does not take the case out of the coverage of P.D. No. 1689. Its
third "whereas clause" states that it also applies to other "corporations/associations operating on
funds solicited from the general public." The foundation fits into these categories as it "operated
on funds solicited from the general public." To construe the law otherwise would sanction the
proliferation of minor-league schemers who operate in the countryside. To allow these crimes to
go unabated could spell disaster for people from the lower income bracket, the primary target of
swindlers. Again, P.D. No. 1689 penalizes offenders with life imprisonment to death regardless of
the amount involved, provided that a syndicate committed the crime. A syndicate is defined in
the same law as "consisting of five or more persons formed with the intention of carrying out the
unlawful or illegal act, transaction, enterprise or scheme." If the offenders are not members of a
syndicate, they shall nevertheless be held liable for the acts prohibited by the law but they shall
be penalized by reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua if the amount of the fraud is more than
one hundred thousand pesos.
Galvez v Court of Appeals (GR No. 187919)
The Court summarized how PD 1689 should be interpreted:
a. PD 1689 also covers commercial banks;
b. the swindling must be committed through the association or corporation, which operates
on funds solicited from the general public;
c. when the number of the accused are five or more, the crime is syndicated estafa and the
penalty is capital punishment;
d. when the number of accused is less than five, the criminal liability is reclusion
temporal (12 years and 1 day to 20 years) to reclusion perpetua (20 years and 1 day to 40
years); and
e. PD 1689 does not apply regardless of the number of the accused, when, (a) the entity
soliciting funds from the general public is the victim and not the means through which the
estafa is committed, or (b) the offenders are not owners or employees who used the
association to perpetrate the crime, in which case, Article 315 (2) (a) of the Revised Penal
Code applies.