Name- Upasana Detha, 141, III year Political Science, IFP Assignment

Critically evaluate the evolution, challenges and

prospects of Sino-Indian relationship.
International system is a system of anarchy, where states do not choose their
neighbour, but learn to live with them. In this scenario, when two states
recognize each other as sovereign and mutually agree for diplomatic dialogues
influencing multiple areas of political, economic, or cultural co-operation,
bilateralism begins. Bilateralism on one hand defines the functioning of two
states at various levels of interaction while on the other hand it is itself a
resultant of this systemic interaction. A critical evaluation of bilateral relation
between two countries demands analysis of (i) extent/ level of
conflict/competition/ co-operation global, regional, bilateral, etc. (ii) knowledge
and mutual understanding- both internal (size, geography, culture, history,
economic development, technology, national capacity, social structure, public
mood, political organisation, leadership, etc.) and external ( role in power
structure, international organisations, reaction to other states, alliances, etc.)
which determine the area of convergence and divergence on both high and
low political issues (iii) shared results degree of contribution or input in their
interest spheres (iv) wider effects- sphere influenced by relations spill-over a
phrase used by Chietigj Bajpaee.
This essay is an attempt to study the statics, dynamics and kinematics of
bilateral relation of China and India. The essay is divided in four sections- First
section, conceptualises foreign policy as defined by J.N. Dixit, followed by
locating current profiles of China and India in global power structure. The second
section uses historical periodisation on the evolving nature of Sino-India ties in
global order to understand the level and extent of conflict/ co-operation. On the
basis of sphere of interactions discerned, the third section attempts to unravel
the challenges in Sino-Indian ties. The fourth section extrapolates from the past
and dwells with the future prospects of this relation. Based on the observations
an explicate rather than defending conclusion is attempted.

CONCEPTUALISING FOREIGN POLICY AND LOCATING INDIA AND

CHINA IN GLOBAL ORDER
A countrys foreign policy, also called foreign relation policy, consists of selfinterest strategies chosen by the state to safeguard its national interests and to
achieve its goals within its international relations milieu. Among many scholars,
J.N. Dixit describes foreign policy of a country as a statement of what it stands
for and the role that it takes upon itself and projects to the world at large. It is
seldom static but at constant flux. However, a study of factors affecting foreign
policy can be conducted by analysis and locating the country profiles in global
order.
Historically, both share the credit of being the richest and oldest civilisations.
Geographically located in Asia, China is the fourth largest landmass while India is
the seventh largest country and both demographically share the highest and
second highest population respectively. Politically, China is a communist state
with one party socialist government, India on the other hand is federal
parliamentary republic. Militarily, both are nuclear power states and rank third

and fourth in conventional war making capability across land, air and sea. In
economic sphere, with Renminbi (yuan) and Rupee as their currency, IMF and
World Bank report suggests they share first and third rank in GDP (PPP)
respectively. As Chinas growth depends on foreign capital and export market
and Indias growth on internal sources, both the countries also share an interest
in ensuring a development guaranteeing international environment. Hence, they
are members of international organisations like, BRICS, ADB, ASEAN (dialogue
partners), ILO, IMF, ICC (national committees), etc. Other than this China shares
a seat in UNSC as permanent member. Even more, both carry a sentiment for fair
representation at various international organisation.
David Scott suggests that the simultaneous rise of China and India is a
fundamental factor for understanding the twenty-first century. On placing their
rise in global order, Ashley J. Tellis point becomes evident that the recent
renaissance of China and India is owed in large measure to their productive
integration into liberal economic order built and sustained by American
hegemony in post-war period. Seeing the accelerated growth, scholars even
believe that China is likely to overtake U.S. soon and India will follow up in next
two decades. This suggests a phenomenon of shift of power from West to East, in
what has been called the Asian Century. However, the future of this Asian
Century will to a large extent depend upon the relationship between the two
regional giants, China and India, and the bilateral relationship between China
and India claims Harsh V. Pant will define the contours of new international
political architecture in Asia and world at large. This necessitates an
understanding of the evolving nature of this relationship.

EVOLUTION OF SINO-INDIA TIES

Different scholars have used different methods to periodise Sino- Indian
relations. The most comprehensive thematic classification is by Professor P.
Lazarus Samraj and Sibaram Badatya in an article, Fa Xian to Panchsheel.
The various themes are- (i) A history of cultural and trade tie (1st century trade
by silk route and Buddhism transmission to visit by Admiral Zheng in 1405) (ii)
Beginning of India-China Political relations (Sino-Sikh War 1841 and signing of
Treaty of Chushul 1842) (iii) India-China Relations during the Colonial Era (British
invasion and control of Lhasa 1904, Anglo-Chinese Convention 1906, Anglo-Tibet
Shimla Accord 1914, goodwill visits by Nehru 1939, Tai Chi-Tao and Tiu Hsu 1939,
S. Radhakrishnan 1941) (iv) Indias support to Chinas Freedom (support in
parliamentary debates by B. Prasad, HV Kamath and Nehru sent medical team to
China 1949) (v) India China relation in Post-Independence Era (India first noncommunist nation to recognise Chinas independence, K.M. Panikkar Indian
Ambassador to China, 1950) (vi) Korean Crisis and India-China Relations (India
opposed UNSC resolution of branding China as aggressor in 1950 and advocated
for UNSC membership for China) (vii) Indias support for Chinas Admission to
United Nations (India rejected US bid to recognize Taiwan and remained
committed to one China policy, India boycotted San Francisco Peace Treaty)
(viii) India-China Agreement on Trade in Tibet 1954 (Panchsheel Agreement
1954) (ix) High Level Diplomatic Visits and Emergence of Hindi-Chini-Bhai-Bhai
Spirit (Chinese PM Zhou Enlai visit 1954, poem by Mao Zedong on Sino-India
Friendship) (x) India-China Relations and the Afro-Asian Solidarity at Bandung
Conference (India facilitated Chinas inclusion in Geneva Conference 1954 as well

as Afro Asian Conference 1955, Lhasa Protocol 1955, Chinas support for Goa
Liberation, visit by S. Radahakrishnan to China 1957, Tibet Uprising 1959).
However, from analytical convenience, David M. Malone has divided modern
history of Sino-India Relation (1950 onwards) into four periods. The first, from
1950 to 1962, was a period of purported friendship and ideological congruence
around anti-imperialist foreign policy objective. This soon deteriorated following
China's repression and invasion of Tibet, the flight of Dalai Lama in 1959, and the
escalation of the border disputes between China and India which finally led to a
war in 1962 between the two countries. This war, although a short one had a
long lasting impact on Sino Indian ties. However, second period of 1962 to
1976 is even described as Sino-Indian Cold War by scholars like W.P.S. Sidhu
and J.D. Yuan. During this period each aligned with others enemy in an effort to
undermine others and augment self-security- China allied with Pakistan while
India allied with USSR. After 1976, during the third period, efforts were made
by both sides to normalise the relationship, and this led to tentative
reapproachment through carefully managed process of dialogue. A warming
trend in relations was facilitated by Rajiv Gandhis visit to China in 1988.
However, in 1998, India pointed to China as the justification for its second round
of nuclear tests since 1974. This reduced diplomatic bilateral relations to a zerosum game. Economic relations, however, saw a new face ever since. This was
the step to fourth period of uncertainty from 1998 onwards.
The fourth period started with many high level diplomatic visits- MEA visit to
China 1999, Ex-Indian PM Atal Bihari Vajpayee visit 2003 which led to signing of
Joint Declaration expressing China is not a threat to India and opening of
traditional trading post between Tibet and Sikkim- Nathu La pass, China was
granted an observer state role in SAARC in 2005, Ex-Indian PM Manmohan Singh
visit to China 2008, the two states signed a Shared Vision on 21 st century
declaration of partnership for peace and prosperity and exercised an army
counterterrorism exercise- Join Hands-2008. However, three major instances
deteriorated the ties. First, in 2009 China took its territorial dispute with India to
Asian Development bank and blocked a loan application by India for
development projects in the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh which China
continues to claim as a part of its territory. There is a rising alarm in India
because of Chinese cross border intrusions and Beijings contestation of every
single Indian administrative and political action in the state. Second, China even
denied visas to Indian citizens of Arunachal Pradesh. Third, the presence of
Chinese troops in Gilgit-Baluchistan area of POK in 2010 further aggrieved the
tensions.
The bilateral ties were turning unpredictable, at the regional level too anxieties
were felt at two instances. First, Indian Sources Report that China has encircled
India through its policy of String of Pearls- on the north, northwest and
northeast by developing naval base at Gwader Port in Pakistan, Maldvies, Great
Coco island in Myanmar, Chittagong port in Bangladesh. It even helped Sri Lanka
to combat LTTE and has presence at Gulf of Aden. Chinese nuclear capable submarines operate in India Ocean in order to combat piracy. Thus, Beijings policy is
to encircle and attack India, if needed. Second, at South Asian level Indias
protectionist tendencies have allowed China to don the mantle of regional

economic leader. Bangladesh and Sri Lanka sees India as more interested in
creating barriers than regional integration. In Nepal and Bhutan instead of India
emerging as facilitator of socio-economic development, Chinas development
assistance is having larger impact.
India and China also have increasingly participated alongside each other in a
complex web of global economic diplomacy eliciting frequent, if often tacitly,
cooperation as in multilateral negotiations over strategies to combat climate
change. While relations have generally improved in bilateral and international
forums, the relationship remains one of uncertainty and occasional antagonism,
marked by Chinas emergence as a global power and the courting of India by
other powers such as USA, as important not just in its own right but also,
potentially, as a counterweight to Chinese power and regional influence. In this
light Chinese President Xi Jjingpings visit 2014, Foreign Minister Sushma
Swarajs visit in February 2015 and Modi's visit to China in September 2014 and
May 2015 focused not just on economy but also on confidence building measures
and communication between military commands.

CHALLENGES IN SINO-INDIAN TIES

Chietigj Bajpaee points that while the SinoIndian relationship has improved in
recent years, it continues to oscillate between periods of cordiality and
competition. As both states are still in the midst of state building, sovereignty is
a key priority. However, the fundamental mismatch of threat perceptions
between both states, rooted in the shifting balance of power and conflicting
signals in the bilateral relationship continue to pester the relation. In order to
understand the spillover of the SinoIndian relationship from the bilateral to
regional levels, the section is divided into four broad areas of concern- (i) the
evolving global order (ii) the challenges of regional security (iii) key problems of
the global commons (iv) emerging non-traditional security concerns.
GLOBAL ORDER
First, in context of evolving global order, perception towards existing global
order acts as a challenge in India-China relations. On the question of degree of
sovereignty demanded both the states differ. China sees the West and the US in
particular as the main threat to this sovereignty and has opposed them at every
step. India on the other hand is relatively less concerned by the threats posed by
other states. Second, in context of evolving global order, International
Economic System acts as challenge in India-China relations. First, both countries
disagree over the role of state owned enterprises in international economic
system. While China stresses reforming the state owned enterprises, India
advises reforming the entire system itself. Second, differences on the issue of
continuance of the US Dollar as the global reserve currency exist. China argues
that the world needs a new global reserve currency or multicurrency system.
India fears destabilization and see no need for any immediate change. Thereby,
producing parallel goals with a never meeting corollary. Third, in context of
evolving global order, global non-proliferation act as a challenge in Sino-India
relations. First, on the issue of global non-proliferation system Indian
policymakers have expressed clear opinions while the Chinese counterparts have

often remained silent, obscure or ambiguous. Second, India and China diverge
over how to manage the outlier states that never signed the NPT. Although China
has never explicitly answered this question, but it appears to oppose the partial
integration of some states as evinced by its opposition to US-India civilian
nuclear co-operation. Other than this, China has repeatedly endorsed a South
Asian nuclear-weapon-free zone and strongly supports a Middle Eastern Nuclear
Weapon free zone. In contrast, India believes the NPT regime should treat
outliers as partners in non-proliferation efforts by considering the threats they
face and engaging with them. In words of T.P. Sreenivasan Indian believes that
the treaty is frozen in time and space and needs to be more inclusive. Thus, it
builds an ambiguous but Great wall of ideology conflicts between the two.
Fourth, in the context of evolving global order, competition for wider global roles
act as a challenge in India-China relations. As focus of power is shifting from
West to East, an Asian Century with competing regional giants India and China
is predicted. This creates a tussle for power and struggle for ideological
arrogance between the two nations.
REGIONAL SECURITY
Regional security works as challenge on questions pertaining to both Asian
security and stability in Southern Asia. Discussing Stability in Southern Asia, Li Li
and Srinath Raghavan argue four major challenges exist in India and China
relations. First, no mutual agreement on the exact alignments of the SinoIndian
border at west (Ladakh), middle (Uttarakhand and Himachal Pradesh), and east
(Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh) makes border dispute a thorn in the bilateral
relationship. Added to this is the perception of threat as China continues to
outpace India in border development projects. Second, the most prominent
element of divergence pertains to democracy promotion. India seeks to promote
democracy in the region to influence the policies pursued by states against
sections of regions own populations. China on the other hand does not share this
interest. Third, Chinese and Indian perceptions of security threats diverge most
conspicuously in the non-traditional realm. While India and China share many
mutual security threats, they emphasize different non-traditional security
threats. China has focused on drug trafficking and organized crime emanating
from the region while India has instead focused on environmental and natural
resource issues. Fourth, the intimacy of the Sino-Pakistani relationship has also
been an irritant in the Sino Indian relationship and that in an ideal world the two
relationships would be delinked from each other. Fifth, although both accept the
American as indispensable actor, however their regard for sovereignty define
their enthusiasm. China seeks US that does not interfere with Chinas rise while
India seeks US as a combatting force against extremism and terrorism especially
in Pakistan. Thus, two points become evident. At the bilateral level, due to
limited people-to-people contacts, cultural barriers, and rising levels of
nationalism mistrust prevails. At the regional level, security dilemma, difference
in ideology and threat perception acts as gulf in their relation.
SECURITY IN THE GLOBAL COMMONS

First, in the security of global commons, security in maritime commons works as

challenge in India and China relations. The Chinese anti-India and Indian antiChina maritime defensive policy String of Pearl and Necklace of Diamond
added to perceptions of the role of US in global maritime order provide wider
disagreements. Beijing and New Delhi have different views about what military
practices are permissible in exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of other states. This
view is reflective even in their different reaction to US China on one hand
routinely confronts US naval vessels and aircraft operating in its EEZ, India on the
other hand studiously avoids such confrontations. Thus, challenging scope of cooperation by shaping incongruent ideologies. Second, in security of global
commons, space security works as a challenge in India and China relations.
Dingli Shen and Bharat Gopalswamy suggest that Chinese space program since
inception has been a military effort. However, with relative lack of resources
Indian space program from its start had entirely been a civilian endeavor.
However, Chinas anti-satellite test was the primary catalyst for the
weaponization of Indias space program. Thus, recently Indian national security
managers support military tasks. Hence, challenge of militarization of space
exists. Third, in security of global commons, cyber security act as challenge for
India-China relations. First, with the increasing connectivity demand for
uncensored internet has increased. States action to contain information by
censorship has widely been criticized not only in India but China too recently
witnessed protest at Shanghai 2013. Thus, challenging domestic political
stability. Second, India is fearful of Trojan Horse technologies which could be
deployed by Chinese telecommunications giants like Huawei. Thus, even in cyber
security suspicion fetters India-China relation.
NON-TRADITIONAL SECURITY CONCERNS
First, in the non-traditional security concerns, the search for energy security
acts as challenge in India-China relations. Lack of indigenous resources coupled
with increasing energy needs will lead to Indo-China competition for resources
oil and natural gas, industrial and construction material etc. Zha Daojiong
observes conflict is expected in the future in the regions where the latter remains
active at this juncture Middle East (Iran and Saudi Arabia) and Asia-Pacific
region (Myanmar and South and East China seas). Second, in the non-traditional
security concerns, environmental issues acts as challenge to India-China
relations. First, evident differences in strategies act as challenge as China and
India appear to have invested dissimilar amounts of resources in environmental
management. China has spent significant sums in an effort to clean up
environment. While India is still vacillating between green growth strategies and
no strategy at all. Ligia Noronha warns that environmental challenges may fall
even more by the wayside as Indias economic growth slows. Second, China and
India further differ over degree of external authority that is acceptable in
international environmental agreements. China may support an enforcement
mechanism that is managed by an international legal authority or at least guided
by meaningful rules to ensure compliance. Noronha on the other hand suggest
that India finds the notion of delegation external authority troubling. Thus,
resource competition and differing level of concern for environment can spark a

geo-political rivalry in near future.

PROSPECTS OF SINO-INDIAN TIES

G. Venkat Raman suggest that in recent years, bilateral trade and economic
engagement in general between the two countries has increased. The rhetoric of
Chindia has caught the attention of policymakers and academics and has raised
a new kind of euphoria in bilateral ties. Sino-Indian engagement within
multilateral frameworks is leading to positive spinoffs in bilateral relations. The
recent phrase used by Indian PM Modi Inch (India China) towards MILES
(Millennium of Exceptional Synergy) on Xi Jingpings 2014 visit highlights the
prospects of India-China relations. For a systematic analysis section is divided
into four broad areas of concern- (i) the evolving global order (ii) the challenges
of regional security (iii) key problems of the global commons (iv) emerging nontraditional security concerns.
GLOBAL ORDER
First, in context of evolving global order, perception towards existing global
order serves as prospect for India-China relations. As J. Wang and C.R. Mohan
argue that China and India's views on the current global order have evolved
along a similar trajectory. First, valuing state sovereignty both oppose Western
led internal interventions in developing world and argue for a multipolar world.
Second, neither opposes international legal institutions in principle and has
increasingly integrated in US led international order. Third, both countries have
common interests on global matters such as climate change and regime change
and yearn for more representation in the international bodies. This provides a
wider framework for future cooperation. Second, in context of evolving global
order, International Economic System serves as a prospect in India-China
relations. While addressing China's and India's perceptions of the liberal
international economic order, Zhang Yunling and Anshuman Khanna argued that
both share same concern regarding open economic order. First, support comes
from the fact that global order has benefited states on both external integration
and internal reform policies. Second, both economies overtime aim at shedding
state control for a more market oriented system. Third, both advocate new area
for finance institutions orientation- China-transparency and sustainable
development, India- development finance for least developed countries. Hence,
highlighting areas of further cooperation. Third, in context of evolving global
order, global non-proliferation serves as prospect in Sino-India relation. Upon
tracing two instances-(i) In case of Iran, both China and India did not challenge
its right to peaceful nuclear technology however they were concerned about its
nuclear program. (ii) In case of North Korea, both condemned the nuclear
program, similarities in reaction can be inferred. Thus, as Li Bin and T.P.
Sreenivasan argued prospect lies in their agreement on the role of international
community in curbing the proliferation.
REGIONAL SECURITY
Regional security provide prospects on questions pertaining to both Asian

security and stability in southern Asia. Chinese and Indian objectives in Southern
Asia are not as opposed as is sometimes imagined. Addressing Asian Security
concern Xia Liping and Srikanth Kondapalli suggest that the region is defined by
young states struggling to protect their interests in a large competitive
international system. It makes national reunification, strategic autonomy and
economic growth as primary concern. This stresses the importance of
multilateral international cooperation, collective security measures and multilevel security dialogues. Moreover as seen by the welcome response of both the
countries towards Myanmar's reform process and each other's increasing active
role in Afghanistan. It can be deduced that although competition exists but core
strategic interests are not consistently diametrically opposed. Thus, prospects for
positive development with proactive and positive role in resolving the region's
disputes with force as the last resort is expected.
SECURITY IN THE GLOBAL COMMONS
First, in security of global commons, security in maritime commons provides
prospects for India-China Relation. Since global maritime system is crucial to the
continued prosperity of China and India argues Zhang Haiwen and Vijay Sakhuja,
this affirms that UNCLOS (UN Convention on Law of Sea) is the new foundation
for maritime regime. Both China and India agree that force can be used to
protect UNCLOS derived right along with multilateral maritime arrangements.
Second, in security of global commons, space security provides prospects for
India China Relations. Both China and India view space as a critical arena for
advancing their economic and national security goals. Thus, both countries follow
government oriented space programs which are comprehensive, encompassing
both civilian and military dimensions of space technology. The prospect lies in
not letting the security dilemma between two states to turn into an arms race in
space. Third, in security of global commons, cyber security provides prospects
for India-China relations. With Chinas rise as a major industrial entity and Indias
emergence as an information technology powerhouse, Tang Lan and Subimal
Bhattacharjee both affirm that China and India have steadily growing cyberspace
programs that are of mounting importance to their national economies.
Moreover, cybersecurity acquires more impetus because China is one of the few
countries that has a highly dedicated, state-supported cyber-corps of civilian
and military specialist focusing on Integrated Network Electronic Warfare
strategy. Lan lists four types of cyber threat, all of which Bhattacherjee echoeshacking, illegal online activities, cyberterrorism, and the militarization of
cyberspace. This suggests similarity in treat recognition. In addition further scope
of cooperation rises as (i) both India and China confronts actions in cyberspace
that threaten their political stability as cyber-attacks (ii) both India and China are
increasingly engaging in public-private partnership to overcome national cyber
security challenges.
NON-TRADITIONAL SECURITY CONCERNS
First, in the non-traditional security concerns, the search for energy security
serves as prospect for India-China relations. Both India and China are

experiencing high and rising rates of energy consumption over the several
decades. Both China and India rely heavily on coal, this reliance- despite its
deleterious environment impact-is unlikely to decrease substantially in either
country. This brings in a call for involvement in world energy governance
mechanisms. Second, in the non-traditional security concerns, environmental
issues serves as prospect to India-China relations. Chinese Zhang Shiqui and
Indian Ligia Noronha argue that due to national concentration on rapid economic
growth both China and India have encountered severe domestic environmental
stress. Added to this Health and environmental problems are pervasive in China
and India forcing intense use of resources in production as well as consumption.
Among many challenges, both countries see pollution, climate change and the
deterioration of the domestic environmental quality as a greatest immediate
threats. Noronha cites threats to natural resources and global environmental
problems as the other major challenges in India. Thus, the prospect lie in the way
both deal with global environment i.e. international negotiation among all states
and through the existing institution of global governance.

CONCLUSION
Continuity and Change are inalienable features of a working foreign policy. It
does not mean any contradiction; rather balancing the both is the key for any
successful foreign policy. Both China and India are rising at the same time in an
Asia Pacific strategic landscape that is in flux. Partly arising from the sheer size
of the two giants, China and India count enormously in the narrative of the 21st
century. They count both as individual nations as well as in terms of their
bilateral relationship. Although economic cooperation and bilateral political as
well as socio cultural exchanges are at an all-time high, it has done little to
assuage their concerns vis-a-vis each other's intentions. The relationship
between Asias two great powers can be best characterized as one of global
cooperation on transnational issues especially vis--vis the West, geostrategic
rivalry at the regional level in the form of growing commercial exchange in some
cases bilateral competition. Beijings and New Delhis divergent behaviors are
shaped by the unique histories governing their formation as modern state, the
stark contrasts in their political regime and development model along with their
ongoing territorial dispute and geopolitical rivalries. The recent bilateral visits are
an attempt to forge ties despite differences. Patterns of cooperation already
established on climate and trade, however involvement of third party- U.S. or
Pakistan has not smoothened relation over the history. As Indo-China relation has
sustained from time immemorial it can be concluded that interactions and
processes define the course of history and policy.