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    Rule of Reasonable Construction

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    1994sameer
    This document discusses the rule of reasonable construction for interpreting statutes. It provides three examples of how courts have applied this rule: 1) In R v Allen, the court interpreted the word "marry" in an offense statute to mean "go through a marriage ceremony" to avoid an impossible interpretation and uphold the defendant's conviction for bigamy. 2) In Ramji Missar v. State of Bihar, the court determined the crucial date for applying a probation statute was the date of sentencing, not the date of offense, in order to achieve the statute's objective of rehabilitating youth offenders. 3) In Annapurna Biscuit Manufacturing Co. v. Commissioner of Sales Tax

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    Rule of Reasonable Construction

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    1994sameer
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    This document discusses the rule of reasonable construction for interpreting statutes. It provides three examples of how courts have applied this rule: 1) In R v Allen, the court interpreted the word "marry" in an offense statute to mean "go through a marriage ceremony" to avoid an impossible interpretation and uphold the defendant's conviction for bigamy. 2) In Ramji Missar v. State of Bihar, the court determined the crucial date for applying a probation statute was the date of sentencing, not the date of offense, in order to achieve the statute's objective of rehabilitating youth offenders. 3) In Annapurna Biscuit Manufacturing Co. v. Commissioner of Sales Tax

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    This document discusses the rule of reasonable construction for interpreting statutes. It provides three examples of how courts have applied this rule: 1) In R v Allen, the court interpreted the word "marry" in an offense statute to mean "go through a marriage ceremony" to avoid an impossible interpretation and uphold the defendant's conviction for bigamy. 2) In Ramji Missar v. State of Bihar, the court determined the crucial date for applying a probation statute was the date of sentencing, not the date of offense, in order to achieve the statute's objective of rehabilitating youth offenders. 3) In Annapurna Biscuit Manufacturing Co. v. Commissioner of Sales Tax

    Copyright:

    © All Rights Reserved
    Download as DOCX, PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
    Download as docx, pdf, or txt
    2K views2 pages

    Rule of Reasonable Construction

    Uploaded by

    1994sameer
    This document discusses the rule of reasonable construction for interpreting statutes. It provides three examples of how courts have applied this rule: 1) In R v Allen, the court interpreted the word "marry" in an offense statute to mean "go through a marriage ceremony" to avoid an impossible interpretation and uphold the defendant's conviction for bigamy. 2) In Ramji Missar v. State of Bihar, the court determined the crucial date for applying a probation statute was the date of sentencing, not the date of offense, in order to achieve the statute's objective of rehabilitating youth offenders. 3) In Annapurna Biscuit Manufacturing Co. v. Commissioner of Sales Tax

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    © All Rights Reserved
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    Rule of Reasonable Construction

    Every statute has a purpose, an objective. If the literal meaning collides


    with the reason of enactment of the statute then the intention of the law
    should be taken up so that the actual meaning of the statute can be
    properly understood. This rule mainly stresses upon the intention of the
    legislature to bring up the statue and the sensible and not the prima facie
    meaning of the statute. This helps us clear the errors caused due to faulty
    draftsmanship. However this rule also has its own limitations. The intent of
    the statute is in itself a surmise and the rule is usually avoided to
    complete the quest for interpretation unless the intent in itself can be
    interpreted properly.
    In R v Allen[1] The defendant was charged with the offence of bigamy
    under s.57 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861. The statute states
    'whosoever being married shall marry any other person during the lifetime
    of the former husband or wife is guilty of an offence'. Under a literal
    interpretation of this section the offence would be impossible to commit
    since civil law will not recognise a second marriage any attempt to marry
    in such circumstances would not be recognised as a valid marriage.
    The court applied the rule of reasonable construction and held that the
    word 'marry' should be interpreted as 'to go through a marriage
    ceremony'. The defendant's conviction was upheld.
    Citation:[1] (1872) LR 1 CCR 367
    In Ramji Missar v. State of Bihar[2] in construing section 6 of the Probation of
    Offenders Act, 1958, the Supreme Court laid down that the crucial date on which the age of
    the offender had to be determined is not the date of offence, but the date on which the
    sentence is pronounced by the trial court An accused who on the date of offence was below
    21 years of age but on the date on which the judgment pronounced, if he was above 21
    years, he is not entitled to the benefit of the statute. This conclusion reached having regard
    to the object of the Act. The object of the Statute is to prevent the turning of the youthful
    offenders into criminals by their association with the hardened criminals of mature age within
    the walls of the prison. An accused below 21 years is entitled to the benefit of the Act by
    sending him under the supervision of the probation officer instead of jail.
    Citation: [2] AIR 1963 SC 1088: (1963) Supp 2 SCR 745
    In Annapurna Biscuit Manufacturing Co. v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, U P.,[3] Sales
    Tax was fixed at two per cent, of the turnover in the case of cooked food under section 3A
    of the U.P. Sales Tax Act, 1948. The appellant firm engaged in the business of biscuit

    manufacture and sale. Whether biscuits though intended for human consumption, can be
    construed as cooked food and liable to be taxed as per the notification issued under the
    said provision. Held that if an expression is capable of a wider meaning, the question
    whether the wider or narrower meaning should be accepted depends on the context of the
    statute. Here biscuit was not covered within the words cooked food. However, where the
    precise words used are plain and unambiguous the court is bound to construe them in their
    ordinary sense and not to limit plain words in an Act of Parliament by consideration of policy
    which has to decided not by court but by Parliament itself.

    Citation: [3] AIR 1981 SC 1656

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