Patterns of Development and Nationalism: Basque and Catalan Nationalism before the Spanish

Civil War
Author(s): Juan Diez Medrano
Source: Theory and Society, Vol. 23, No. 4 (Aug., 1994), pp. 541-569
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/657890
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Patterns of development and nationalism: Basque and

Catalan nationalism before the Spanish Civil War
JUAN DfEZ MEDRANO
University of California, San Diego

Bizkaya, if dependent on Spain, cannot address

God, cannot, in practice, be Catholic.
Sabino Arana
From its constituting a nationality, Catalonia
derives its right to form a separate state, a Catalan
state. From the current political arrangements,
from Catalonia's long standing cohabitation with
other peoples, derives a certain element of unity, of
community, which these peoples ought to preserve
and consolidate.
ValentiAlmirall

These quotations from two of the major ideologues of Basque and

Catalan nationalism, respectively, reflect two radically different conceptions of what the nation is and two significantly different political
programs for the Basque Country and Catalonia: independence and
adherence to tradition for the former, federalism/confederalism and a
secular and capitalist organization of society for the latter. The Basque
and Catalan nationalist movements differed substantially in their character despite the fact that they developed simultaneously in two ethnically distinct Spanish communities, that stood out in terms of their high
level of industrial development relative to the rest of Spain, and that
had experienced intense immigration from the poorest regions of
Spain. Therefore, this contrast between Basque and Catalan nationalism questions the suitability of explanations of peripheral nationalism
that stress the role of relative levels of development, of cultural distinctiveness, and of the socially disruptive effects of the arrival of large
numbers of immigrants. While these explanations may be useful to
explain the emergence and dynamics of nationalism, they are ill-suited
to explain what constitutes the exclusive focus of this article, that is, differences in the character of nationalist movements.
Theory and Society 23: 541-569, 1994.
? 1994 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

542
To explain these programmatic differences, I analyze how specific patterns of development impinged on the different social groups that
formed Basque and Catalan society. More precisely, I focus on how
pre-industrial social groups in these societies experienced capitalist
development and on the type of ties that the Basque and Catalan capitalist elites established with the Spanish economy and polity.

Relative levels of development and peripheral political nationalism

Contrary to what scholars in the modernization theory tradition, the
internal colonialism tradition, and other theoretical traditions1 would
predict, nationalism in Spain has always been stronger in its most
developed areas, the Basque Country and Catalonia, than in its less
developed areas, such as Galicia. In 1977, Nairn suggested that uneven
development is the primary explanation of nationalism and, therefore,
that peripheral nationalism is as likely in overdeveloped as in underdeveloped peripheral areas.2 Nairn sees uneven regional development
as an inevitable outcome of capitalist expansion that leads to peripheral nationalism whenever regional inequalities overlap with ethnic differentiation.3 Like Linz and Douglass,4 Nairn posits that having imperial possessions keeps states from seeing a need to build national
identities, largely because they are able to extract large revenues from
their colonies.5 According to these authors, while empires last and do
not weigh too heavily on the peripheral regions of the core state, peripheral regions tend to accept subordination to the core. However,
when the empire begins to unravel, peripheries will rebel against the
new financial, political, and military demands made by the core.
Nairn emphasizes the role of uneven development as a mobilizing
force: both underdeveloped regions and "over-developed"6 regions are
likely to promote nationalist movements when state membership no
longer presents advantages. In underdeveloped regions nationalist
movements mobilize the population against the persistence of ethnic
economic inequality, while in over-developed regions nationalist movements mobilize the population to push for state reforms that will promote further regional development.7
The Spanish case fits Nairn's explanation for the development of peripheral nationalism quite well. The development of Basque and Catalan nationalism was in part an indirect consequence of Spain's loss of
its imperial possessions. The achievement of independence by the

543
Latin American colonies throughout the nineteenth century worsened
the state of Spain's public finances, already strained by the European
wars of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.8 Faced with
this crisis and in order to extract more revenues and to promote economic development in Spain, absolutist and constitutional monarchs
enacted centralization measures (political, juridical, and cultural).
These policies impinged most severely upon the two communities that
had preserved their particular political and juridical institutions the
longest and that were still distinguished from the rest of Spain by language: Catalonia and the Basque Provinces. In both communities, centralization policies were opposed by significant segments of their socioeconomic elites, who by the end of the nineteenth century, in the spirit
of the time,9 began to articulate their grievances through nationalist
mobilization. In the case of Catalonia, the independence of Cuba in
1898 also had harmful economic consequences that intensified conflict between the Catalan bourgeoisie and the Spanish state.
The impact of the loss of the colonies on the development of Basque
and Catalan nationalism, however, should not be over-emphasized, for
it cannot account for their programmatic features. Nairn cannot
explain, for instance, the separatist and reactionary character of
Basque nationalism, which differed dramatically from the pro-capitalist
and generally non-separatist character of Catalan nationalism. Only the
latter fits his expectations about the character of nationalism in an
overdeveloped region.
The Basque anomaly raises serious doubts about the validity of a
sociological explanation of types of nationalism based on levels of
development. Differences in the character of Basque and Catalan
nationalism also reveal the limitations of previous sociological work on
the relationship between economic development and nationalism
(modernization theory, ethnic competition theory, the reactive ethnicity
perspective).10 Indeed, neither underdevelopment nor relative levels of
ethnic competition can explain differences in the character of Basque
and Catalan nationalism, since both regions were overdeveloped and
characterized by similar levels of ethnic competition.
To account for the different types of nationalism that developed in the
Basque Country and Catalonia one needs to stress the role of class
interests" in mediating the effects of development processes on nationalist political mobilization. This strategy, which by no means
implies that ethnic conflict is only class conflict in disguise,l2 has been

544
used by many historians or comparative historical sociologists13 who
have studied nationalism. It treats ethnic groups as socially differentiated groups in which social actors pursue both ethnic and class interests through political action.14In doing so, it opens up alternative ways
of explaining peripheral nationalism, focused as much on class conflict
within ethnic groups as on center-periphery conflict.15
Unfortunately, work in this historically oriented tradition focuses
almost exclusively on the relationship between class interests and
nationalism. What is missing in this work but present in the three sociological traditions criticized above is an emphasis on the relationship
between development and nationalism. In this article, I link the two
approaches by analyzing how development processes shape nationalism by creating constellations of class and ethnic interests that provide
a context for center-periphery relations and for class relations within
peripheral regions. However, unlike previous work on the relationship
between development and nationalism, I stress specific patterns of
development instead of levels of development. I demonstrate the relevance of two major components of these different patterns of development in accounting for the differences between Basque and Catalan
nationalism: The extent to which traditional societies were able to
benefit from capitalist development during the transition to the capitalist mode of production and the strength of the ties established by emerging capitalist elites with the state's economy and polity. My two hypotheses are:
1) That traditionalist and separatist political nationalism was more
intense in the Basque Country than in Catalonia because the Catalan
peasantry and pre-industrial elites were better able to adapt to and
benefit from nineteenth-century capitalist industrialization than were
the Basque peasantry and pre-industrial elites.
2) That the relative weight of traditionalist and separatist political
nationalism was more intense in the Basque Country than in Catalonia
because the Basque capitalist elite was not nationalist while the Catalan
capitalist elite was. Although the Catalan capitalist elite was not separatist, it became nationalist because, unlike the Basque elite, it was not
able to directly influence the Spanish state's decisions - through
presence in the government or through the lobbying power of its industrial associations.

545
The relative prosperity of Catalan agriculture compared with Basque
agriculture and the predominance of a capital goods industry in the
Basque Country versus a consumer goods industry in Catalonia were
the main structural factors that shaped the political attitudes of the
peasantry, pre-industrial elites, and capitalist groups in both regions.
The comparative focus of this article contributes to the explanation of
Basque and Catalan nationalism.'6 It builds upon Linz's work by isolating those economic factors which intensified the crisis of the Old
Regime in the Basque Country compared with Catalonia, by analyzing
the major causes of the different attitudes of capitalist elites in both
regions toward nationalism, and by supporting these explanations with
precise empirical information, something that is lacking in previous
work on pre-Civil War Basque and Catalan nationalism. These are
important analytical gaps in the literature on Basque and Catalan
nationalism. Scholars writing on the Basque Country have provided a
plausible interpretation of the development of a traditionalist form of
nationalism, but have not explained why the bourgeoisie did not sponsor more decisively a bourgeois form of nationalism. Conversely, those
writing on Catalonia explain why the bourgeoisie became nationalist
but do not explain why a traditionalist form of nationalism was all but
absent from the Catalan political scene.17
I have relied here on secondary literature, on the writings of the most
influential nationalist ideologues and political leaders in both Catalonia
and the Basque Country, and on the Spanish Directory of Corporations and Financial Institutions of 1922. The information contained in
this directory (company, sector of the economy, location, assets, and
members of the board of directors) has been transferred to a computer
database, and to my knowledge this is the first systematic analysis of
this valuable source of information.18 It provides a very useful tool to
measure two major elements of the explanation offered in this article:
the difference in the sizes of Basque and Catalan capitalism and the difference in strength of the economic ties that Basque and Catalan capitalist elites established with the rest of Spain in the first third of this
century.
Basque nationalism: 1876-1936
Basque nationalism developed between the end of the Second Carlist
War (1872-1876) and the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939).19 Nationalist leaders were members of the lower middle class, who sponsored a

546
traditionalist form of nationalism, and members of the local bourgeoisie, who sponsored a liberal form of nationalism. As many authors have
noted, the Basque capitalist elite was not nationalist and supported the
monarchic Conservative and Liberal parties.20
Until 1898, traditionalist and liberal nationalist leaders ran separate
political organizations, the Basque Nationalist Party and the Uni6n
Vasco-Navarra respectively. They were unsuccessful, however, because
the traditionalist and liberal constituencies favored political parties
with a Spanish orientation. The lack of political support for Basque
nationalism explains why the leaders of its two branches eventually
formed a coalition in 1898, despite profound ideological differences.
This coalition kept the name of the Basque Nationalist Party (BNP).
Thereafter, although the pro-business sector of the Basque Nationalist
Party provided many of the BNP's candidates to General Elections and
prevented extremist nationalists from gaining complete control of the
Basque Nationalist Party, ideological hegemony and legitimacy belong
to traditionalism. This hegemony was exemplified by and reproduced
through control over the main party newspapers. Traditionalism was
also the ideology of the BNP's electoral base and that of the party militants who, because of the mass character of the BNP's party organization, had great leverage over party decisions. In particular, traditionalists showed their political and ideological superiority by winning a
greater number of votes in the one election in which representatives of
the traditionalist and liberal branches of the BNP competed electorally
against each other, Bilbao's 1922 Municipal Election.21
I refer to the hegemonic type of Basque nationalism as traditionalist
nationalism.22Its indisputable ideologue was the founder and highly
charismatic leader of the Basque Nationalist Party, Sabino Arana.
Arana was the son of a prominent Carlist supporter as were most of the
early leaders of Basque nationalism. His nationalism, which dominated
Basque nationalist discourse until the Spanish Civil War,23was a defensive reaction against what he saw as the harmful influence of liberalism
in Basque society. His articles span the duration of his political life,
from 1890 to 1903, the year in which he died, and through them one
can see clearly delineated a political program essentially informed by
religious concerns.
Arana presented his struggle for Basque independence as a struggle for
the religious salvation of the Basque race through complete isolation

547
In his view,languagewas as
from other peoples, especiallySpaniards.24
much a shield against change as political independence.25Similarly,
Arana hated Spanishimmigrantsbecause they were importantagents
of change in the traditions and culture of the Basque country,they
representedmore secular views than the ones prevailingamong the
Basque population, and they generally supported the Socialist party,
instead of adheringto a "religiouslyfounded"system of paternalistic
relationsbetweenemployerand worker.
Finally,Arana'sequallyvicious attackson those groups of Basque origin who had facilitatedthe penetrationof liberalisminto the Basque
Country suggest that his attacks on immigrantswere related to their
secularvalues and to the changesthey were introducingin the Basque
Country,ratherthan to other factors, such as economic competition.
The target of his attackswere the rulers of Vizcaya, the Basque economic and political elites, and the Basque intelligentsia.Not even his
capitalistpoliticalpartnersin the BNP were sparedhis invectives,thus
reflectingthe gulf separatingthe two conceptions of nationalismthat
coexistedin the BNP.26
The nationalistideology described above remained hegemonic until
the Spanish Civil War and is exemplified in the doctrinal principles
agreed upon by the BNP in 1930.27Specifically,these principlesproclaimed that Catholicismwas the true religionof the Basque Country,
that political independence was both a right and the objective to be
achievedby the Basque people, that efforts needed to be made to preserve and strengthenthe Basque race, and that the old practices and
traditionalinstitutions of the Basque provinces should be re-established.
The nationalistcoalition formed in 1898 between anti-centralistliberals and traditionalistsdid not increase the appeal of Basque nationalism to the Basque electorate.Despite a noticeable increasein its level
of organizationover the years and an exceptionaland short-livedelectoral success in the 1918 General election, the Basque Nationalist
Party did not have much popular appeal until the Spanish Second
Republic.Capitaliststended to vote for the Spanishconservativeand
liberal parties ("dynastic"parties),rural areas were largely controlled
by the Carlistparty,a traditionalistSpanishparty,which advocated a
returnto the forms of social and political organizationthat prevailed
during the Old Regime,28and the working class, made up mostly of
immigrants,supported the Spanish Socialist Party.Thus, the Basque

548
Nationalist Party had little support outside the industrial province of
Vizcaya and even in Vizcaya it was relatively strong only at the municipal level.
During the Second Republic (1931-1936) the BNP became one of the
leading political parties in two of the three Basque provinces, Vizcaya
and Guipuzcoa. Basque nationalists benefited from a transfer of votes
from traditionalist parties and dynastic parties to the Basque Nationalist Party. According to Heiberg,29 in rural areas this vote came from
farmers who, because of growing employment opportunities in industry in neighboring cities, had gained increasing economic independence, which freed them from the political hold of small Carlist landlords. The rise in support for the BNP in urban areas is less well understood, but it has been suggested that segments of the Basque local
bourgeoisie used their votes to punish the Basque economic elite for its
support of the failed economic policies adopted during the Primo de
Rivera dictatorship (1923-1930).30 The paradoxical consequence of
these shifts in electoral behavior was that while most of Spain sided
with the leftist Popular Front, in the Basque Country, one of the two
leading industrial regions in Spain, the left was a minority compared to
conservative forces.31
During the Republican years, Basque nationalists, like Catalan nationalists, demanded and worked for a Statute of Autonomy. Various factors contributed, however, to a delay in its approval: the clericalism and
xenophobic content of the first draft of the Statute, which made it
unpalatable to the Spanish left; popular opposition in the provinces of
Navarre and Alava to inclusion in the Basque autonomous community;
and opposition by the centralist Spanish Right to the third draft submitted to the Spanish parliament. Eventually, the Spanish Socialists
supervised the drafting of a fourth, more democratic, moderate, and
somewhat vague Statute,32which was approved in October of 1936. By
then, however, the Spanish Civil War had already begun.

Catalan nationalism (1876-1936)

The period 1876-1936 witnessed the development of a bourgeois and
a progressive type of nationalism in Catalonia, both of which questioned the centralized character of the Spanish state and favored intervention in Spanish affairs.33The former was represented by the nationalist ideology and programs of the Lliga and was led by businessmen

549
In contrastwith bourgeoisnationand membersof the intelligentsia.34
alism, progressive nationalism,which was represented by the party
EsquerraRepublicana,was led almost exclusivelyby members of the
intelligentsia. One major difference between Basque and Catalan
nationalismis, therefore,that the capitalistelite and the intelligentsia
were more nationalistin Cataloniathanin the BasqueCountry.
Both bourgeois and progressive nationalist leaders and ideologues
agreed that Cataloniaconstituted a distinct moral community,with a
common culture(in which languageplayed a pivotal role), a common
history,and a common character,all of which distinguishedit from the
rest of Spain.They differedfromBasquetraditionalistnationalistsin the
non-racistnatureof their discourse,in their acceptanceof modernity,
and in thatthey rarelyadvocatedindependence.Althoughtheirgeneral
justificationfor nationalist political mobilization was that Catalonia
constituteda nation, Catalannationalistauthors and political leaders
also pointed out that contemporaryconditionsin Spainweighedheavily in their decision to mobilize politically.The state'slow prestigeafter
the loss of Cuba and the Philippinesand its inabilityto facilitateeconomic developmentthroughoutSpain, its inabilityto guaranteeorder
and to promote industrialdevelopmentin Catalonia,and its threatto
Catalanculturaland juridicalinstitutionswere the major reasons that
nationalistleadersgaveto justifytheirnationalism.
The emergenceof Catalannationalismwas precededby a long process
of culturalrevival,common to other areas of Europe, that lasted the
entire nineteenthcentury,and was partlyinspiredby the rapid socioeconomic changesthat Cataloniaexperiencedduringthis period. This
increasingethnic awareness,however,did not lead to the formationof
nationalistpartiesuntilthe end of the century.
The main nationalistorganizationthat then developed, and the vehicle
for bourgeois nationalismduring the period before the Spanish Civil
War,was the Lliga Regionalista(renamed Lliga Catalanaduring the
SpanishSecond Republic).Its main politicalgoals were to end political
corruptionand state de-centralization.While the bourgeoisieattached
foremost importance to obtaining economic concessions from the
government,the intelligentsiawas more concerned with juridicaland
language matters. The Lliga dominated Catalan politics, along with
supra-regionalrepublicanparties, during the 1901-1923 period and,
despite losing its hegemony after Primo de Rivera's Dictatorship,
remained a major electoral force during the Second Republic. Fore-

550
most among the achievements of the Lliga during this period was the
creation of the Mancomunitat Catalana. This institution, founded in
1914, was a supraprovincial organization with the power to coordinate
the administration of the four Catalan provinces. Although it fell short
of providing political autonomy, it returned a sense of historical unity
to Catalonia. Through the Mancomunitat, the Lliga tried to implement
an ambitious program of economic, educational, and cultural reforms.
Among these reforms were the creation of a strong public-service infrastructure to facilitate economic development, the implementation of
policies to extend vocational training among workers, and the development of an ambitious cultural program, which focused on the promotion of the Catalan language and culture.35 Such policies reflected the
goals of the main groups that supported the Lliga: capitalists and members of the intelligentsia.
During the 1901-1936 period, the Catalan bourgeoisie represented by
the Lliga repeatedly opposed government policies, such as tariff protection for grain imports, which only benefitted agrarian interests from
the rest of Spain, and the taxation of industrial profits made during the
First World War, which was detrimental to the interests of the Catalan
business community. However, partly out of fear of the revolutionary
Catalan working class,36 the leaders of the Lliga never sought independence for Catalonia and even collaborated with the dictatorial
government of Primo de Rivera (1923-1930), which the Catalan bourgeoisie saw as the only means to restore order. In fact, the political
ambivalence of the leaders of the Lliga who, on the one hand, constantly opposed governmental policies and, on the other hand, sought the
government's authority whenever it needed to repress the working
class, eventually undermined the Lliga's social base and played into the
hands of progressive nationalism.
Progressive nationalism did not become hegemonic, however, until the
Spanish Second Republic. It is only then that Esquerra Republicana, in
coalition with the major anarchist union, the CNT, and with the Uni6
de Rabaissaires, a rural laborers organization, was able to secure
enough popular support to replace the Lliga as the major party in Catalonia.
The origins of progressive nationalism can be traced to the nineteenth
century, to numerous republican organizations with a federalist character that attracted members of the Catalan intelligentsia interested in
improving the economic and political conditions of the emerging

551
working class. During the period of hegemony of the Lliga Regionalista, however, nationalist republicanism remained a minor political
force, mostly because of the stigma of "conservatism" which was attached to nationalism during this period by the international labor
movement.
Unlike the leaders of the Lliga, nationalist republican leaders actively
opposed the government during the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera.
This opposition increased the political capital of progressive nationalism at the same time as it decreased that of bourgeois nationalism.
Moreover, it predisposed anarchists and other leftist political groups to
collaborate with nationalist republicans when democratic rule was restored.
In the decisive municipal elections of April 1931, whose outcome
brought about the Second Republic, Esquerra Republicana emerged as
the undisputable victor.37 Their program in those elections clearly
reflected their nationalist and reformist goals. They demanded the right
to self-determination (their goal being a confederation of Iberian
states), political and economic rights for workers, welfare measures for
mothers, children, and the elderly, agrarian reform, and the recognition
of human rights.
One day after the elections, Macia, the president of Esquerra, proclaimed the Catalan Republic, but was soon convinced by Spanish
republican leaders to settle for a less ambitious compromise that kept
Catalonia a part of Spain. This compromise consisted of the symbolic
re-establishment of the Generalitat, a Catalan medieval governing
body, while negotiations took place for the approval of a Statute of
Autonomy for Catalonia. This Statute was finally obtained in 1932.
A description of the convoluted dynamics that characterized Catalan
politics during the years preceding the Spanish Civil War is beyond the
scope of this article. Especially after 1935, Spain and Catalonia
entered a revolutionary spiral that tells us little about the social hegemony of one ideology or another in Catalonia, or about the reasons for
their hegemonic or non-hegemonic character. Suffice it to say that,
during those dramatic years, there was a trend toward separatism and
revolutionary anti-capitalist solutions as against more moderate alternatives. During those years, only the Catalan upper classes were firm in
their support of autonomy within a united Spain, while large sectors
within the intelligentsia and within the non-manual working-class sup-

552
ported a progressive form of nationalism aiming at a Spanish confederation, and the lower classes, less concerned about the nationalist
issue, demanded a drastic transformation of social relations.
Having outlined the main defining traits of Basque and Catalan nationalism in the pre-Civil War period, I now focus on those factors that
explain why nationalism took the form of traditionalist nationalism in
the Basque Country while bourgeois and progressive nationalism became dominant in Catalonia.

Rural development and rural stagnation in the context of

industrialization
The Catalan road
Catalonia's industrial transformation began in the eighteenth century,
earlier than in most Spanish regions. Its economic development was
primarily the product of the combination of two factors: agrarian
development and the full integration of Catalonia into the Spanish state.
In 1716, in the wake of the War of Succession that brought the Bourbon royal dynasty to Spain, Catalonia was fully incorporated into Spain
by the Decreto de Nueva Planta.38 This decree abolished Catalan
political and legal institutions that had until then preserved Catalan
autonomy. Full integration into Spain vastly increased the market for
Catalan producers, for Catalonia was able to participate more directly
in trade with the rest of Spain and with the colonies of Latin America.
Catalonia had the resources to benefit from the new trading opportunities. The most important of these resources was agrarian wealth. Low
population density and the Sentencia de Guadalupe, enacted by Ferdinand of Aragon in the sixteenth century to eliminate seigniorial abuses
and to grant freedom of movement to the peasantry, had favored the
development of a prosperous peasantry in Catalonia.
In the eighteenth century, demographic pressure and new commercial
opportunities in Latin America motivated large numbers of peasants to
specialize in the production of wine and eau-de-vie for export, under
increasing capitalist forms and relations of production.39 These
exports40 encouraged the development of a dynamic commercial sector, a thriving naval construction industry, and, from the early eighteen
hundreds, a modern textile industry.

553

The textileindustry,whose developmentwas also facilitatedby the preexistence of a proto-industrialurban sector,41was the backbone of
Catalanindustrialization.Fromthe 1830s to the 1850s the Catalantextile industryunderwent a technological revolution that brought it to
Europeanstandards.This progressis indicatedby Catalonia'sindex of
industrialproduction,whichtrebledbetween 1840 and 1860. By 1860,
the Catalantextile industryhad capturedabout eighty percent of the
Spanishmarketfor textileproducts.
The growthpotentialof this dynamicsector,42however,was limitedby
the small size of the Spanish market and by high production costs,
whichcurtailedthe abilityof Catalanindustryto compete abroad.Consequently,the Catalancapitalistsector came to depend on protectionist
legislationenactedby the Spanishgovernment.This economic dependence on Spain and working-classunrest during this early period of
industrialization,43
explainwhy the Catalancapitalistclass never sponsored separatistsolutions.
In summary,between 1800 and the Spanish Civil War, Catalonia
advanced rapidly in the industrializationprocess. Throughout the
nineteenth century, the Catalan countryside prospered and farmers
invested their profits in commerce and industry.The investment of
small agrarianand industrialcapitalin industrywas also facilitatedby
the relativelysmall capital requirementsof the modern textile industry.44The Catalanprocess of industrializationensureda relativelyfluid
transitionfrom a ruralto an urban society and the developmentof a
culturaland economic affinitybetweenruraland urbanCatalonia.45
The making of Basque iron-based industry

With almost three percent of the Spanish population in 1800, the

Basque Countryproduced only two percent of the SpanishGDP and
was one of the poorest regions in Spain.46This poverty reflected the
limits of Basque agricultureand the commercialand industrialcrises
created by the Napoleonic Wars,the loss of the Latin American colonies, and the loss of marketsfor iron due to more competitiveNorthern
Europeanproduction.
In the followingdecades the Basque commercialbourgeoisiefollowed
differentstrategiesto adjustto these new conditions.It made low-risk
investmentsin public debt and real estate, lobbied for the privatization

554
of mining, took steps to mechanize iron production,and favored the
transferof customshouses, traditionallylocated on the borderbetween
Castileand the Basqueprovinces,to the coast.
These transformationswere so successfulthatbetween 1800 and 1860
the Basque Country'sGDP increased faster than that of any other
region except for Madrid and Catalonia.47Unlike development in
Catalonia,however,developmentin the Basque Countrywas uneven.
In the Basque Country,developmentin commerce and industrytook
place despite crises in the agriculturalsector and even at the expense of
agriculture.While Catalancapitalistdevelopmentwas partly initiated
by broad segments of the peasantry,Basque capitalist development
harmedthe peasantry.Indeed,land speculationand the privatizationof
municipalland and of mining,both of whichhad traditionallyprovided
supplementaryrentsto the peasantry,and risingconsumerprices associated with the transferof customs houses to the coast, created unrest
amongthe peasantry.
The discoveryin 1856 of the Bessemer process for the productionof
steel by the "direct method" revolutionized the iron industry.The
Bessemer process allowed for the productionof iron at very low cost
and in verylargequantities,and requiredthe exclusiveuse of hematites,
with very low phosphoric content, which were more abundant and
closer to the surfacein the Basque Countrythan almost anywhereelse
in Europe.
The dramaticincreasein demandfor Basqueiron ore thatfollowed the
discoveryof the Bessemerprocess resultedin a spectacularrise in iron
ore exports.Althoughthese exportswere almost entirelycontrolledby
foreign interests they generated extensive economic activity in the
BasqueCountryitself.They attractedinvestorsand workers,promoted
a formidablecapital accumulationwhich benefitteda numberof local
capitalistsinvolvedin the miningsector, and createdincentivesfor the
development of industrialsectors related to iron production.48This
industry,like Catalan industry,needed protection because lack of a
cheap source of coal made Basqueindustrialproductstoo expensiveto
compete in foreignmarkets.
The negative side of this spectacularindustrialrevolutionwas that it
had highly dislocatingeffects on Basque society and benefittedonly a
very small group within the traditionalcommercial and landowning
elites.49This group comprised individuals who had purchased the

555
best mines in the years before the export boom, when foreign ownership of mines was still forbidden. These mine owners then made their
fortunes by charging high rents to and becoming stockholders in the
foreign companies that began to exploit these mines in the eighteen
seventies. Later on, they invested their capital in industrial and financial activities. Meanwhile, most commercial capitalists, iron manufacturers, and big landowners were unable to compete against foreign
capitalists and against the new Basque capitalist elite.

Patternsof development,social structure,and political mobilization

Catalan capitalist industrial development was endogenous and driven
in part by agrarian capitalist growth. Basque industrial capitalist development, on the other hand, took place without agrarian capitalist
growth and was greatly distorted by foreign demand and investment,
which fostered formidable capital accumulation during the last two
decades of the nineteenth century.
The different ways in which Catalan and Basque rural areas experienced capitalism explain why the Basque peasantry rejected capitalism
while the Catalan peasantry largely adapted to it. Indeed, Carlism and
traditionalist nationalism - two different strategies to block the transition to a capitalist society - were stronger in the Basque country than
anywhere else in Spain.
For most of the nineteenth century, the Carlist party represented the
aspirations of those sectors in Spanish society who opposed socioeconomic and political change. During the two Carlist Wars (1833-1840, 1872-1876) which pitted Carlists against Liberals, Carlism was
particularly strong in both the Basque Country and in Catalonia, but
much stronger in the former than in the latter. Indeed, support for
Carlism in Catalonia, already much weaker than in the Basque Country
in the first Carlist War, decreased considerably throughout the nineteenth century, while it remained very high in the Basque Country until
the Spanish Civil War.50
The loss of two wars deeply divided Carlists - or Traditionalists as they
are also known - throughout Spain. Some sectors within the Carlist
movement even began to approximate their views to those of the Conservative Party in power.5 Consequently some groups within the
Basque Carlist community tried to find new ways to achieve their tradi-

556

tionalistgoals.The ideology of nationalism,then so popularin Europe,

offered the possibility of preservingtraditionalBasque social organization by isolatingthe Basque Countryfrom the rest of Spain. Arana
himself describes the mental process which led many Basque Carlists
towardnationalism,when explaininghow his brotherLuis "converted"
(sic) him to nationalism:
...and he made such an effort to demonstrate to me that Carlism was an
unnecessary, inconvenient, and harmful way to prevent Spanish influence, to
break-up ties with Spain, and even to recover the seigniorial tradition, that
my mind, understanding that my brother knew history better than me and
that he was incapable of lying to me, started to doubt, and I resolved to study
with serenity the history of Biscay and to firmly adhere to the truth.52

Arana rationalizedhis shift from Carlismto separatistnationalismby

sayingthat the Basque provinceshad alwaysbeen sovereign,and were
thereforeentitled to independenceif membershipin Spain threatened
the survivalof the Basqueculture.
The dislocatingeffects of foreigndemandand investmentin the Basque
Countryafter the Second CarlistWar also explainwhy a greaterproportionof the urbanand ruralmiddle classes supporteda traditionalist
form of nationalismin the BasqueCountrythanin Catalonia.Members
of this traditionalmiddle class, whose wealth still derivedfrom urban
and ruralproperty,clungthe longestto the Basqueidea of the "Fueros"
- that is the Basquetraditionalautonomouspoliticalinstitutions- after
they were banned at the end of the Second Carlist War.53Indeed, these

old institutions,in which rural communities were over-represented,

were theironly hope to counterthe economic powerof the new capitalist-elite.Theirchangefroma pro-"Fueros"
positionto nationalismwas a
semanticmore than an ideologicalone as the followingpassagefrom a
ArturoCampi6nshows:
speechgivenin 1906 by the leading"Fuerista"
We proudly called ourselves "Fueristas" in riskier times than today's. However, given that there is a new term which is more graphic, more intense and
thoroughly expressive, and that this term does not allow the mild-hearted or
those who see themselves as sophisticated (which is the same) to take refuge
under it, I declare, without renouncing my past, without subscribing to new
ideas, without adopting new attitudes, and, instead, in agreement with my
own modest history, that I renounce the old label and from now on will call
myself a nationalist (sic).54

In the end, however,regardlessof the relativeproportionsof traditional

middle-classgroups excluded from the benefits of capitalistdevelop-

557
ment in each region, what made these groups more salient in Basque
nationalismwas that in the Basque Country the classes above them
were not nationalistwhile in Catalonia they were. The next section
explains why the Basque upper capitalist classes did not become
nationalistwhile the Catalandid.

Regional capitalism and the state: The role of capital-goods

production versus consumer-goods production

The differentpolitical strategiesfollowed by the Basque and Catalan

upper classes can be attributedto their relativeabilitydirectlyto influence state decisions. The previous section points out the formidable
effect that foreign demand and investmentin iron extractingactivities
had on Basque industrialization.Because of this, Basque development
achieved levels of capital accumulationunheardof in Catalonia.This
section focuses on the relative economic power of the Basque and
Catalancapitalistelites and its effects on the political power of these
two groups.I relyon the 1922 Directoryof Corporationsand Financial
Institutions.Since in 1922 the corporationwas alreadya majorinstitution in both Catalanand Basque society,this directoryprovidesa good
approximationof the main differencesin economic structurebetween
the two regions.55
The informationcontained in the directory shows that the sizes of
Basque and Catalancapitalismwere very similar.Accumulatednominal assets throughoutCatalanand Basque corporationsand financial
institutionsamountedto approximatelythe same figure (see Table 1).
Moreover,in both communitiesthe number of very large companies
(with nominal assets above ten million pesetas) was approximatelythe
same: Forty-ninein the Basque Country and forty-one in Catalonia.
Finally,at the Spanishlevel, the Basque Countryand Catalonia,along
with Madrid, were Spain's leading capitalist communities. Indeed,
among the two hundred largest Spanish corporations,fifty-fivewere
Basque and fifty were Catalan.Exchangingeconomic power for political power and ennoblement,many owners of the largestcorporations
were steadily incorporated into the Spanish "power bloc,"56which
included the most powerfulmembersof the Spanishlanded aristocracy,formingwhatMoya has called the "FinancialAristocracy."s7
Beyond these similarities,the Basque and Catalancapitaliststructures
differed in importantways. For instance, the distributionof corpora-

558
Table 1. Distribution by Nominal Assets of Basque and Catalan Corporations (1922)
Ntile

10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%

Nominal assets

Cumulative % of

Basque Country

Basque capital
they represent

100,000
229,000
350,600
524,500
1,000,000
1,500,000
2,500,000
4,363,194
10,000,000

Total accumulated assets

0.109
0.450
1.088
2.170
3.876
6.383
10.707
18.457
32.651
2,342,054,947

Nominal assets
Catalonia

Cumulative % of
Catalan capital
they represent

10,000
25,000
60,000
100,000
250,000
500,000
800,000
1,500,000
3,500,000

0.027
0.110
0.312
0.720
1.540
3.435
6.064
10.800
21.062

2,367,928,087

Source: Anuario Financiero y de Sociedades An6nimas [Directory of Corporations and

Financial Institutions] (1922).

tions by size was very different in the two communities, for capital was
far more concentrated in the Basque Country than in Catalonia (see
Table 1).
Moreover, as Table 2 shows, in 1922 the average corporation size in
Catalonia was half the size of the average corporation size in the
Basque Country. An analysis of variance included in this table demonstrates that only eleven percent of this difference in corporation size
can be explained by the different sectorial compositions of the Basque
and Catalan corporations. The remaining variance depends on the
relative average size of Basque and Catalan corporations within sectors
of the economy. This difference strongly supports the assertion that
before the Spanish Civil War small-firm capitalism characterized Catalan development while large-firm capitalism characterized Basque
development.
Finally, what better describes the contrast between Basque and Catalan
capitalism, simultaneously revealing the difference in economic power
of the two capitalist elites, is the average size of Basque and Catalan
financial institutions. As Table 2 shows, in 1922 there were ninety-nine
financial institutions in Catalonia compared with twenty-three in the
Basque Country but cumulative nominal assets in these financial institutions were twenty-one percent greater in the Basque Country than in
Catalonia.

559
Table 2. Mean corporation assets by region and sector (1922) (in Pesetas)
Grand mean: 2,932,741.603

Mean

Mean after
adjusting for

composition by
sector
Basque Country
Catalonia

4,495,307.0
2,182,422.2

521
1085

4,337,257.6
2,258,315.0

Means

Agriculture
Mining
Water, gas, electricity
Food, beverages, tobacco
Textiles
Leather, clothes, shoes
Paper, press, graphic arts
Chemical
Ceramic, glass, cement
Steel
Metallurgy
Construction
Transport, communication
Commerce
Financial
Hotels and similar
Diverse services
Foreign banks
Foreign mining

Basque Country

Catalonia

556,900.1
2,975,588.1
6,807,635.6
1,665,893.9
2,277,500.0
383,750.0
3,014,685.7
8,259,749.6
1,896,666.7
31,750,000.0
2,136,678.9
1,229,354.8
4,924,769.7

715,255.1 (32)
2,148,671.5 (67)
7,361,386.4 (83)
1,580,627.2 (114)
1,833,312.0 (83)
394,122.3 (47)
411,991.3 (46)
940,275.0 (100)
1,161,625.0 (16)
2,000,000.0 (3)
867,122.49(206)
1,132,916.7 (36)
4,831,256.5 (90)
3,367,777.8 (9)
4,337,500.1 (83)
1,248,916.7 (6)
437,608.7 (46)
1,589,597.6 (8)
1,260,040.0 (10)

21,485,000.0
1,950,000.0
859,772.7
5,843,832.0

(8)
(109)
(44)
(33)
(9)
(4)
(35)
(20)
(12)
(6)
(74)
(31)
(92)
(0)
(20)
(3)
(11)
(0)
(10)

Source: Anuario Financiero y de Sociedades An6nimas [Directory of Corporations and

Financial Institutions] (1922). ( ) Number of Corporations.
Note: Branches of the Bank of Spain have not been included.

In summ, because one can assume that, in early twentieth-century

Spain, levels of capital concentration and economic specialization were
indicators of the strength of involvement in the Spanish market, Basque
capitalism was clearly far more oriented towards the rest of Spain than
was Catalan capitalism. This means that, while in both communities
there was a very strong upper bourgeoisie, the relative weight of the
local bourgeoisie was much greater in Catalonia than in the Basque
Country. It also seems that the economic distance between groups
representing capitalism and groups representing traditional society was
much greater in the Basque Country than in Catalonia.

560
Further analysis of the data contained in the 1922 Directory of Corporations and Financial Institutions, now focused on members of the
boards of directors of these companies, supports the hypothesis that,
compared with Catalan capitalism, Basque capitalism maintained
stronger ties with Spanish capitalism.58 This analysis shows that out of
7,581 directors throughout Spain, 238 (14 percent of all directors in
Basque companies) belonged to the boards of both Basque and nonBasque corporations, compared to 158 who belonged to boards of
both Catalan and non-Catalan corporations (8 percent of all directors
in Catalan companies, see Table 3).
To gauge somewhat better the extent to which Basque and Catalan
capitalists tended to be involved in economic activities outside their
region, I have separately ranked directors in Catalan and Basque companies according to the accumulated assets of the Catalan or Basque
companies in which they were present, and selected the top one
hundred in each of the two communities.59 Analysis of the joint membership in regional and non-regional corporations of the top 100 directors in Catalonia and the Basque Country shows that forty-three out of
a hundred were directors in both Basque and non-Basque corporations, compared to only sixteen out of a hundred who were members of
both Catalan and non-Catalan corporations. Similar findings were
obtained by ranking directors according to the number of directorships that they held and selecting the top one hundred in each region.
Finally, in this review of the linkages between Basque and Catalan capitalism and the rest of Spain, it is worth considering the strength of the
Table 3. Distribution of directors of Spanish corporations and financial institutions
according to the location of the corporations in which they serve (1922)
N
Basque
Basque and other
Catalan
Catalan and other
Other in Spain

1,474
238
1,881
158
3,887

Source: Anuario Financiero y de Sociedades An6nimas [Directory of Corporations and

Financial Institutions] (1922).
Note: The Total Number of Directors is 7,581; the sum presented above does not add
up to this number because twenty directors belonged to the board of Catalan, Basque,
and Other Spanish Corporations simultaneously and thirty-five belonged to the board
of Catalan and Basque Corporations simultaneously.

561
economic ties Basque and Catalan capitalists maintained with the
Spanish state apparatus, for this conditioned the political attitudes of
Basque and Catalan capitalists toward the Spanish state. The literature
on this topic shows that Basque industry depended to a larger degree
upon state purchases than did Catalan industry.60This is undoubtedly
related to the economic sectors that were predominant in each community, capital-goods production in the Basque Country and consumergoods production in Catalonia. Consumers of Basque products were
typically other industries or the state, while private individuals were the
main consumers of Catalan products such as textiles (with the exception of army clothing). During the dictatorship of Miguel Primo de
Rivera (1923-1930) commercial relations between the state and
Basque industry intensified because of a vast program of public works
that was undertaken. According to Harrison, when the dictatorship
collapsed in 1930 and the new Finance Minister decided to halt infrastructural reforms, an economic crisis in Vizcaya, more severely hit by
this reversal than any other province, followed almost immediately.

Regional capitalist elites, the state, and the character of peripheral

nationalism
In the period that preceded the Spanish Civil War, the Basque Country
and Catalonia established themselves as the leaders of Spanish industrialization. During the process of industrialization the wealthiest
Basque and Catalan capitalist families were incorporated into the
Spanish power elite. However, the previous section has demonstrated
that, beyond rough similarities, the economic structure of the two
regions differed quite substantially. Basque capital was more powerful,
more concentrated, more oriented toward the rest of Spain, and more
closely dependent on the Spanish state. From a socio-structural
viewpoint the results of this situation were 1) the existence of a far
more numerous local bourgeoisie in Catalonia than in the Basque
Country and 2) the development in Spain of stronger economic linkages between Basque and non-Basque capitalism than between Catalan
and non-Catalan capitalism. In Catalonia, these two characteristics
explain the exclusion of the Catalan bourgeoisie from the power sphere
in which they had participated quite vigorously for a short period
immediately preceding the Restoration (1868-1874). After the loss of
Cuba in 1898, which was a heavy blow to Catalan capitalists, the main
Catalan business association, the Foment del Treball Nacional,
withdrew its support from the Spanish Conservative party and began to

562
act as a pressure group. In this respect, the Catalan capitalist elite, still
playing the Spanish card, supported a political outsider, General Polavieja, in his bid for state power. Polavieja, in return for this political
support, promised to grant fiscal autonomy to Catalonia, in a similar
arrangement to the one Basque capitalists had obtained in 1882 for
their region. In 1899, however, the government headed by Polavieja
and Silvela failed to deliver on its promise and, instead, approved a
budget which increased direct taxation of capital gains. After this
disappointment, Catalan capitalists veered resolutely toward what they
saw as the only strategy effectively to influence state policy, nationalism. They formed an alliance with groups belonging to the intelligentsia, who for many years had sponsored anti-centralist pro-Catalanist political agendas but had lacked sufficient economic resources to
achieve their goals.
Political events unfolded very differently for the Basque capitalist elite.
Because of their economic power and their close economic ties with
the Spanish state, Basque capitalists were always very well represented
among the Spanish political elite. A good reflection of the power
Basques had over the Spanish state was the enactment of fiscal autonomy for the Basque Country in 1882, after intense lobbying by one of
the heroes of Basque industrialization, Victor Chavarri. Unlike Catalan
capitalists, Basque capitalists did not need to rely on a form of regionalism to achieve their goals; instead they could rely very effectively on
their main business association, the Liga Vizcaina de Productores.61

Conclusion
The emergence and ideological characteristics of Basque and Catalan
nationalism in late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Spain are a
dramatic expression of conflict between modernity and tradition in the
ethnically heterogeneous Spanish state. Confirming Nair's theory of
peripheral nationalism, uneven development in Spain during the nineteenth century overlapped with spatially delimited ethnic communities,
Catalans and Basques, thus enhancing their ethnic identity and facilitating the expression of class conflict in nationalist terms. However, the
social bases and the ideologies of peripheral nationalism in each region
eventually came to reflect the different patterns of development that
they experienced and the relative economic power of their capitalist
elites. These structural factors shaped the Basque and Catalan nationalist movements through their influence on class conflict and class alli-

563
ances withinthe Basque Countryand Catalonia,as well as conflict and
alliancesbetweenthese classes and the Spanishstate.
Of course,differencesbetweenBasqueand Catalannationalismcannot
be explained in purely structuralterms. The developmentalfactors I
have outlined in this article helped to reproducelonger-termcultural
and economic processes, which had progressivelydefined the cultural
identityof the upper classes in Cataloniaand the Basque Country.Describing and explainingthis process, however,exceeds the objectives
set for this article.
This comparisonof Basque and Catalannationalismshows that "overdevelopment"does not necessarily lead to bourgeois or other proindustrializationnationalistideologies. In particular,the Basque case
illustrates that, as long as the leading classes of "overdeveloped"
regions are able to influence state political and economic decisions,
they will refrainfrom the formulationof nationalistprograms.Moreover,the Basque case shows that in the analysisof peripheralnationalism, scholars should focus simultaneouslyon the relationshipsestablished between the differentsocial classes in the peripheralcommunity
and the central state and on those establishedbetween classes within
the peripheralcommunity.

Acknowledgments

I would like to thankLe6n Zamosc, Carlos Waisman,Gershon Shafir,

Akos R6na-Tas,Karl Monsma, Juan Linz, Berit Dencker, and the
Theoryand Societyreviewersfor their extremelyuseful comments on
earlierdraftsof this article.

Notes
1. Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Pantheon Books, 1974);
Neil Smelser, "Mechanisms of Change and Adjustment to Change," in William
Faunce and William Form, editors, Comparative Perspectives on Industrial Society
(Boston: Little Brown, 1967) 33-54; Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1983); Michael Hechter, Internal Colonialism: The Celtic
Fringe of British National Development: 1536-1966 (London: Routledge and Kegan
Paul, 1975); Michael Hechter, "Group Formation and the Cultural Division of
Labor," American Journal of Sociology, vol. 84 (1978), 293-318; John Comaroff,
"Humanity, Ethnicity, Nationality: Conceptual and Comparative Perspectives on

564

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.
7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

the USSR," Theory and Society, vol. 20 (1991), 661-688; Donald L. Horowitz,
Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985).
Other explanations, such as Charles Tilly's in "States and Nationalism in Europe
since 1600," Working Paper 128 (New York: Center for Studies of Social Change,
New School for Social Research, 1991) 1-12, and Eric J. Hobsbawm's in Nations
and Nationalism since 1789. Programme, Myth, Reality (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1990) provide alternative but complementary arguments for the
development of popular nationalism during the nineteenth century. I emphasize
Nairn's argument because his discussion of nationalism facilitates the transition to
my own explanation of programmatic differences between Basque and Catalan
nationalism.
The greater ethnic mobilization potential that exists in these situations of overlap
has also been emphasized by Hechter, Internal and Horowitz, Ethnic, among
others.
Juan J. Linz, "Early State-Building and Late Peripheral Nationalism against the
State: The Case of Spain" in S. N. Eisenstadt and S. Rokkan, editors, Building States
and Nations, Vol. II, (Beverly Hills, Cal.: Sage, 1973) 32-116; William A.
Douglass, "Introduction," in William A. Douglass, editor, Basques Politics: A Case
Study in Ethnic Nationalism, (Reno: University of Nevada Press, 1985), 1-18.
Daniel A. Segal, "Nationalism, Comparatively Speaking," Journal of Historical
Sociology 1 (1986) 301-321. In his comparison of France with the Austro-Hungarian Empire, he presents a very different view of the effect of colonial possessions on the development of a national consciousness. According to him, colonial
possessions allow for the development of a national consciousness among the bourgeoisie. However, in view of the strength of peripheral nationalism in ex-Empires
such as Great Britain, Spain, and the Soviet Union, his argument does not hold,
unless qualifications are made by introducing the effect of uneven development into
the explanation.
Tom Nairn, The Break- Up, 72.
Donald Horowitz, Ethnic, provides a very similar distinction between the type of
nationalism that emerges in underdeveloped areas and what emerges in overdeveloped areas.
Jacques Barbier and Herbert Klein, "Revolutionary Wars and Public Finances: The
Madrid Treasury, 1784-1807," Journal of Economic History, vol. 41 (1981), 315-339.
See Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities (London: Verso, 1983) and Liah
Greenfeld, Nationalism. Five Roads to Modernity, (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1992) for discussions on the processes of "piracy" or "borrowing" of the
ideas of national identity, nationalism, and the nation.
Seymour M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan, Party Systems and Voter Alignments (New
York: Free Press, 1967); Ernest Gellner, Nations; Michael T. Hannan, "The
Dynamics of Ethnic Boundaries in Modern States," in Michael Hannan and J.
Meyer, editors, National Development and the World System: Educational, Economic, and Political Change, 1950-1970 (Chicago: Chicago University Press,
1979); Franqois Nielsen, "Ethnic Solidarity in Modern Societies," American Sociological Review 50, 133-149; Charles Tilly, "Ethnic Conflict in the Soviet Union,"
Theory and Society 20, 569-581 (especially 574-575); Michael Hechter, Internal.
Although the theories listed above acknowledge that social differentiation is negatively related to ethnic group formation (Michael Hechter, "Group Formation...";
Michael Hechter, "The Dynamics of Secession," Acta Sociologica 35 (1992), 1-17;

565

12.

13.

14.

15.

16.

17.
18.

Francois Nielsen, "Ethnic Solidarity...") and positively related to ethnic-group

mobilization (Hudson Meadwell, "Ethnic Nationalism and Collective Choice
Theory," Comparative Political Studies 22, 139-154), they do not take into account
class interests in their explanation of nationalism.
Indeed, I subscribe to the view that individuals' political behavior is partly motivated by a desire to protect ethnic-group interests. On this issue, Donald Horowitz,
Ethnic; Donald Horowitz, "How to Begin Thinking Comparatively About Soviet
Ethnic Problems," in Alexander Motyl, editor, Thinking Theoretically About Soviet
Nationalities. History and Comparison in the Study of the USSR (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), 9-23.
One can include in this tradition the following recent publications: Miroslav Hroch,
Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); Kathryn Verdery, Transylvanian Villagers (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983); Segal, "Nationalism;" Eric J. Hobsbawm, Nations;
John Comaroff, "Humanity;"Liah Greenfeld, Nationalism.
Hechter's recent work, under the influence of rational-choice theory, has the virtue
of taking the individual as the starting point and of viewing nationalist political
mobilization as a social movement that needs to be studied using the theoretical
tools developed by the social movements literature. See Michael Hechter, Principles of Group Solidarity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987); Michael
Hechter, "Nationalism as Group Solidarity," Ethnic and Racial Studies 10, 415-426; Michael Hechter, "The Dynamics." Although his focus thus far has been on
the external rewards and penalties that determine an individual's participation in
ethnic collective action, a strategy focused on individuals and on their utility
schedules could also be used to develop hypotheses about other types of nationalist
behavior, such as voting behavior and the decision to create a nationalist organization, that are less sensitive to selective rewards and penalties imposed by nationalist
organizations.
Marianne Heiberg, "Urban Politics and Rural Culture: Basque Nationalism," in
Stein Rokkan and Derek W. Urwin, editors, The Politics of Territorial Identity
(London: Sage Publications, 1982) 355-387. She points out that Basque nationalism is particularly interesting because of the important role intra-ethnic group conflict played in its development, 358.
Pierre Vilar, La Catalogne dans L'Espagne Moderne: Recherche sur les fondements
des Structures Nationales. (Paris: S.E.V.P.E.N, 1962); Juan J. Linz, "Early State;"
Stanley Payne, El Nacionalismo Vasco (Barcelona: Dopesa, 1974); Javier Corcuera, Origenes, Ideologia, y Organizaci6n del Nacionalismo Vasco (1876-1904)
(Madrid: Siglo XXI, 1979); Antonio Elorza, Ideologias del Nacionalismo Vasco
(San Sebastian: Haranburu, 1978); Juan Pablo Fusi, Pluralismo y Nacionalidad
(Madrid: Alianza, 1984); Faustino Migu6lez and Carlota Sole, Classes Socials i
Poder Politic en Catalunya (Barcelona: PPU, 1987), among others.
These explanatory gaps are also present in Eric J. Hobsbawm's own analysis of
Basque and Catalan nationalism; see Nations, 119-120.
The Anuario Financiero y de Sociedades An6nimas was published annually from
1914 to at least the late 1950s by a private publishing company, based in the
Basque industrial city of Bilbao. For many years, the two persons responsible for its
publication were Ibafiez and Marco-Gardoqui. The year of 1922 was the first year
for which extensive information was provided for both financial and non-financial
corporations, which explains why I did not choose an earlier date. The stated goal
of this publication was to inform businessmen. Although the information for this

566

19.

20.

21.

22.

23.

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

29.

publication was voluntarily provided by the companies themselves, the authors of

this publication provide comparative figures to demonstrate the completeness of its
coverage. Copies of this directory can be found in many Spanish libraries. The
library of the Banco de Espafia, in particular, owns the entire collection. Manuel
Gonzalez Portilla (La Formaci6n de la Sociedad Capitalista en el Pais Vasco, 1876-1913 [San Sebastian: Haranburu, 1981]) and other researchers often use the information contained in this directory, but so far nobody had transferred its information to a computer database. Gonzalez Portilla suggested the idea of using it for my
research, and I would like to thank Santiago de la Hoz, Maria Teresa Delgado, and
Sarolta Petro for their assistance in creating this dataset.
Stanley Payne, El Nacionalismo; Juan J. Solozabal, El Primer Nacionalismo Vasco
(Madrid: Tucar, 1975); Antonio Elorza, Ideologias; Javier Corcuera, Origenes;
Jose Luis De La Granja, El Nacionalismo Vasco durante la II Republica (Madrid:
CIS, 1986).
Javier Corcuera, Origenes; Javier Cuesta, El Carlismo Vasco: 1876-1900 (Madrid:
Siglo XXI, 1985); Stanley Payne, El Nacionalismo; Antonio Elorza, Ideologias. In
my own empirical research, by contrasting the names of leading members of the
major political parties in the Basque Country with the names of members of the
Board of Directors in Spanish corporations and financial institutions, I have been
able to confirm that indeed the Basque capitalist elite was not nationalist.
The BNP had previously split along the Traditionalist/Liberal cleavage; while the
Traditionalist sector retained the name of the party, the more Liberal branch competed under the name Comunidad Nacionalista Vasca (Basque Nationalist Community).
There is little agreement on how to classify forms of nationalism (Ernest Gellner,
Nations; Ernst Haas, "What is Nationalism and Why should we Study It" International Organization 40, 707-744; Liah Greenfeld, Nationalism). In this article, I
have chosen the terms traditionailst, bourgeois, and progressive, because they fit
better into my characterization of the two nationalist movements throughout the
twentieth-century, which I elaborate in a forthcoming book comparing the two
movements. However, using Haas's definitions, one can say that Basque nationalism is a mixture of the traditional and restorative types of synchretist nationalist
ideology. Catalan nationalism, on the other hand, presents elements of two types of
nationalism; the bourgeois form of nationalism is a mixture of the liberal Whig and
the syncretist synthetic types defined by Haas, while the progressive form of nationalism falls into what Haas calls the Liberal Jabobin nationalist ideology.
Engracio de Arantzadi, who succeeded Arana as one of the main ideologues of the
BNP, provides a telling illustration of this ideological continuity in his book
Ereintza, Siembra de Nacionalismo Vasco, 1894-1914, which was published in
1935 (San Sebastian: Aunamendi, 1980).
Sabino de Arana, Obras Escogidas (San Sebastian: Haranburu, 1965 [1897]);
73-75.
Ibid, 207.
Javier Corcuera, Origenes, 158.
Antonio Elorza, Ideologias; Jose Luis De la Granja, El Nacionalismo.
Jose Extramiana, Historia de las Guerras Carlistas (San Sebastian: Haranburu,
1980); John F. Coverdale, The Basque Phase of Spain's First Carlist War (New
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984); Vicente Garmendia, La Ideologia Carlista (1968-1876) (Zarauz: Diputaci6n Foral de Guipiizcoa, 1984).
Marianne Heiberg, "Inside the Moral Community: Politics in a Basque Village" in
William Douglas, editor, Basque Politics, 295.

567
30.
31.
32.
33.

34.
35.
36.
37.

38.

39.
40.

41.

Juan Pablo Fusi, Pluralismo; Jose Luis De la Granja, El Nacionalismo.

Ibid, 566.
Juan Pablo Fusi, Pluralismo.
Isidre Molas, Lliga Catalana II Vols (Barcelona: Edicions 62, 1971); Santiago
Alberti, El Republicanisme Catald i la Restauraci6 Mondrquica (Barcelona: Alberti,
1972); Xavier Cuadrat, Socialismo y Anarquismo en Catalura (1899-1911)
(Madrid: Ediciones de la Revista del Trabajo, 1976); Borja De Riquer and Miquel
Izard, Coneixer la Historia de Catalunya, Vol. 4 (Barcelona: Vicens Vives, 1983);
Gabriel Sirvent, "Algunes Notes sobre la Implantaci6 Sindical de Socialistes i
Anarquistes a Catalunya, abans dels Anys de la Primera Guerra Mundial," in
Manuel Gonzalez Portilla, Jordi Maluquer de Motes, and Borja de Riquer
Permanyer, editors, Industrializaci6n y Nacionalismo, (Bellaterra: Universitat
Aut6noma de Barcelona, 1985), 555-568; S. Tavera Garcia "Notes sobre L'Anarco-Sindicalisme Basc i Catala, 1917-1920," in Manuel Gonzalez Portilla et al.,
Industrializaci6n y Nacionalismo, 569-578; Joan Culla i Clara, El Republicanisme
Lerrouxista a Catalunya (1901-1923) (Barcelona: Curial, 1986); Manuel Lladonosa
i Vall-Llebrera, Catalanisme i Moviment Obrer: El CADCI entre 1903 i 1923 (Montserrat: Publications de l'Abadia de Montserrat, 1988); M. Dolors Ivern i Salva,
Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (1931-1936) (Montserrat: Publicacions de
l'Abadia de Montserrat, 1989). My own empirical research, in which I contrast the
names of nationalist and non-nationalist leaders with the names of members in the
Board of Directors of Spanish corporations and financial institutions confirms
these studies' findings.
See works in note 33.
De Riquer and Izard, Coneixer, 170.
Juan J. Linz, "Early."
One important factor that has also been mentioned to explain the sudden appeal of
Esquerra Republicana among the Catalan working class was the shift to the right by
the supra-regional Republican party, which until then had attracted most of the
popular vote.
I use the word "fully" because there is growing evidence that integration was proceeding quite fast in the years preceding the War of Succession, both at the economic and cultural levels; see Carlos Martinez Shaw, Cataluna en la Carrera de
Indias (Barcelona: Critica, 1981); David Laitin, "Language and the Construction of
States: The Case of Catalonia in Spain," Wilder House Working Papers 10 (1991),
1-33.
Pere Pascual, Agricultura i Industrialitzaci6 a la Catalunya del Segle XIX, (Barcelona: Critica, 1990); Pierre Vilar, La Catalogne.
Research on the type of merchandises that were exported has been hampered by
the lack of official statistics on the composition by product of exports to foreign
countries. Although authors agree that Catalans also exported textile products to
Latin America, the dominant view is that these industrial products represented a
tiny percentage of total exports and that only a very small proportion of the industrial goods that were produced in Catalonia were exported. See J. K. J. Thomson, A
Distinctive Industrialization. Cotton in Barcelona, 1728-1832 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), Albert Carreras, "Cataluna, Primera Regi6n Industrial de Espana," in Jordi Nadal and Albert Carreras, editors, Pautas Regionales de
la Industrializaci6n Espanola (siglos XIX y XX), (Barcelona: Ariel, 1990), 3-22;
Pere Pascual, Agricultura.
J. K. J. Thomson, A Distinctive, 12-13.

568
42. Jordi Nadal, El Fracaso de la Industrializaci6n en Espana, (Barcelona: Ariel, 1975).

43. JuanJ. Linz,"Early,"57-59.

44. Pedro Tedde, "BancaPrivaday CrecimientoEcon6mico en Espafia,1874-1913,"
in Papeles de Economia Espanola 20 (1984), 169-184.
45. Pierre Vilar, La Catalogne; Jaume Vicens Vives, Industrials i Politics al Segle XIX

(Barcelona:Vicens Vives, 1958); Jordi Maluquerde Motes, "La Historia Econ6mica de Catalufia," in Papeles de Economia Espafiola 20 (1984), 268-280;

Albert Carreras,"Fuentesy Datos parael AnalisisRegionalde la Industrializaci6n

Espafiola,"in Jordi Nadal and Albert Carreras,editors, PautasRegionales,3-22;
Pere Pascual, Agricultura.

46. AlbertCarreras,"Fuentes."
47. AlbertCarreras,"Fuentes."
48. Ibid; Antonio Escudero, "CapitalMinero y Formaci6n de Capital en Vizcaya
(1876-1913)," in Jordi Nadal and Albert Carreras,PautasRegionales,106-123;
Emiliano Fernandez de Pinedo, La industrializaci6n en el Norte de Espana, (Barce-

lona:Critica,1988).
49. Manuel Gonzalez Portilla, La Formaci6n;Emiliano Fernandez de Pinedo, La
Industrializaci6n; Albert Carreras, "Fuentes."

50. The clergy,smalllandowners,and peasantswere the main social actors supporting

Carlismin the two communities.A detailedcomparativestudyof the causesfor the
war, for its greaterintensityin the Basque Countryand in Catalonia,and for the
reasons why it was strongestin the Basque Country,has not yet been conducted
and is beyond the scope of this article (Juan Diez Medrano, Divided Nations,
forthcoming).However, a comparativeanalysis based on the literaturethat has
been publishedon the CarlistWarssuggeststhat the relativelevel of development
of agriculturein the two regionsultimatelyexplainsthe differentintensityof popular support to Carlismin the two regions, by determiningthe intensityof ruralurbanconflict(Pere Pascual,Industrializaci6;
Josep M. Mundeti Gifre,La Primera
GuerraCarlinaa Catalunya[Barcelona:Publicacionsde l'Abadiade Montserrat,
1990]; Miquel Izard, "El Rechazo a la Modernizaci6nCapitalista,Cataluiiay
Euskadi,Similitudesy Diferencias,"in Manuel Gonzalez Portillaet al., Industrializaci6n, 375-387; John F. Coverdale, The Basque Phase of Spain's First Carlist

War,[NewJersey:PrincetonUniversityPress, 19841;Vicente Garmendia,La Ideologia; Jose Extramiana, Historia; Stanley Payne, El Nacionalismo; Emiliano Fernandez de Pinedo, Crecimiento; Pablo Fernandez Albadalejo, La Crisis delAntiguo

Regimenen Guipuzcoa[Madrid:Akal, 1975]; JaumeTorres Elias, Liberalismoy

RebeldiaCampesina,[Barcelona:Ariel, 19731).
51. Javier Cuesta, El Carlismo.
52. Cited in Javier Corcuera, Origenes.

53. As is well known now, the preservationor suppressionof the Fueros was not the
origin of the war, nor one of its major themes (JavierCorcuera, Origenes).The
Spanishcentralgovernment,however,used its militaryvictoryto eliminatethem,as
partof its centralizingefforts.For severalyears afterthe revocationof the Fueros,
the restorationof these traditionalrightsand institutionswas in the politicalagenda
of all majorpoliticalgroupsin the Basque Country,includingindustrialcapitalists.
However, in 1882, an economic agreement - the "ConciertosEcon6micos" was signed between Basque authoritiesand the central governmentwhich gave
Basque authoritiesfiscal autonomy.This measurewas greetedwith enthusiasmby
the wealthiest Basque capitalists,who then decided to abandon the pro-Fueros
cause.

569
54. J. Corcuera,Origenes,129.
55. Actually,the corporationwas more extendedin the Basque Countrythan in Catalonia,wheresmallfamilyfirmswere relativelymore common.
56. Manuel Tuii6n de Lara, Estudios sobre el Siglo XIX Espahol, (Madrid: Siglo XXI,

1972).
57. Carlos Moya, El Poder Economico en Espaia, (Madrid: Tucar, 1975).

58. The fact thatmajorcapitalownersstill tended to be membersof the Boardsof their

companies in this historical period (they also participatedin political contests),
justifiesthe use of this Directory.In the absenceof informationon the place of origin of all directors,this analysishas used informationon the provincewhere corporationswere located, to comparethe numberof directorsbelongingboth to the
Board of Basqueand of non-Basque(outside of the BasqueCountry)corporations
with the numberof Directors that belonged both to the Board of Catalanand of
non-Catalancorporations.
59. Because of theirintense involvementin Basqueor Catalaneconomic activitiesone
can define these top 100 directors as Basque or Catalan,regardlessof place of
birth.Moreover,linkingthe names includedin these lists with biographicalinformation availableon these persons and personalknowledgeof typicalCatalanand
Basque names suggeststhat these people were indeed Basque or Catalanby ethnicityas well as by intensityof economicinvolvementin the region.
60. JosephHarrison,"LaIndustriaPesada;"ManuelGonzalezPortilla,La Formacion;
ManuMontero,Mineros.
6 1. Ignacio Arana Perez, La Ligna Vizcaina de Productores y la Politica Econ6mica de
la Restauraci6n. 1894-1914, (Bilbao, Caja de Ahorros Vizcaina, 1988).