SECTION 4 - No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of

speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people

peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress
of grievances.
Obscenity
Miller v. California (mass mailing campaign of adult material)
At a minimum, prurient, patently offensive depiction or description of
sexual conduct must have serious literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value to merit First Amendment protection. The basic
guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a) whether to the average
person, applying contemporary standards would find the work, taken
as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b) whether the work
depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct
specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the
work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value. obscenity is an issue proper for judicial determination
and should be treated on a case to case basis and on the judges
sound discretion.
To require a State to structure obscenity proceedings around
evidence of a national "community standard" would be an exercise in
futility. Thus the Court herein (a) reaffirm the Roth holding that
obscene material is not protected by the First Amendment; (b) hold
that such material can be regulated by the States, subject to the
specific safeguards enunciated above, without a showing that the
material is "utterly without redeeming social value"; and (c) hold that
obscenity is to be determined by applying "contemporary community
standards," not "national standards."
Gonzales v. Kalaw-Katigbak (classification of movie as for adults only
allowed only if changes are made)
The power of the Board is limited to the classification of films, but it
cannot impose a censorship in the production of movies, which
would constitute a prior restraint. Any restraint must show proof of a
clear and present danger of a substantive evil. The test to this is
whether to the average person, applying contemporary community
standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole
appeal to prurient interest.

Pita v. CA (confiscation of Pinoy Playboy without warrant)

The test for obscenity is whether it has a corrupting tendency, or
when it can be said that it is offensive to human sensibilities. There
has been no uniformity even with American jurisprudence regarding
the issue of whether obscenity is included in the guaranty of free
speech or not, but if such pictures are shown in art exhibits for the
sake of art to be viewed by art enthusiasts, there would be no
offense, but if it is for commercial purposes then it may be viewed by
people whose aim is to satisfy their lust and desires materials
which are not entitled to constitutional protection. In the case
presented, there is no challenge to the right of the state in the
exercise of police power to suppress obscene materials, provided
that they are proven to be obscene but these materials cannot just
be deemed obscene because of ones opinion. In cases involving the
freedom of expression, the courts have always been on the side of
the exercise of the right, but a clear and present danger that would
make state interference justifiable. The Court is not convinced that
sufficient proof was shown to justify the seizure, for no lawful court
order was even presented authorizing the respondents.
Barnes v. Glen Theater (nude dancers)
The requirement for the nude dancers to wear pasties-as provided by
Indianas public indecency statute does not violate the First
Amendment. What is prohibited is nudity in general and not the
eroticism. The court stated that when speech and nonspeech
elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently
important governmental interest can justify incidental limitations. The
statute passed the OBrien test even though it limited expressive
activity.
F.C.C. v. Pacifica Foundation (monologue on radio Filthy words)
The prohibition, however, has never been construed to deny the
Commission the power to review the content of completed
broadcasts in the performance of its regulatory duties. The
Commission found the language used in the monologue as
"patently offensive," though not necessarily obscene. American
jurisprudence provides that the commission is not prevented from
canceling the license of a broadcaster who persists in a course of
improper programming. It is within the Commissions power to
regulate the broadcast of obscene, indecent or profane language.

Broadcast media have established a uniquely pervasive presence

in the lives of the people. Furthermore, broadcasting is uniquely
accessible to children. These thereby justify that there is
government interest in regulation of an otherwise protected
expression in order to promote the welfare of its youth.
Renton v. Playtime Theater (prohibition of adult theater from 1000 ft
of residential zone, church park, or 1 mile from school)
The Renton ordinance does not completely prohibit adult theaters. It
is a form of time, place, and manner regulation, which is acceptable
as long as it is designed to serve a substantial governmental interest
and does not unreasonably limit alternative avenues of
communication. It is aimed not at the content of the films shown at
"adult motion picture theatres," but rather at the secondary effects of
such theaters on the surrounding community. It was created to
prevent crime, protect the city's retail trade, maintain property values,
and generally "protect and preserve the quality of the citys
neighborhoods, commercial districts, and the quality of urban life.
Bethel School District v. Fraser (student speech nominating other
student at assembly; disruptive conduct rule)
The first amendment guarantees wide freedom in matter of adult
public discourse but it does not follow that simply because offensive
expression may not be prohibited to adults in making a political point,
the same would be permitted to children in public school. It would be
highly proper for public school education to prohibit the use of vulgar
and offensive terms in public discourse. Nothing in the constitution
prohibits the regulation of certain modes of expressionsespecially
to schools. The schools must not only teach what is confined in
books and the curriculum but also shared values of a civilized social
order mediums are the teachers as well as their parents.
Jurisprudence acknowledged limitationsin reaching unlimited
audience where the speech is sexually explicit [Ginsberg v. New
York]. The court also recognizes the interest in protecting minors
from exposure to vulgar and offensive spoken language [FCC v.
Pacifica Foundation].
Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier (principal prohibiting articles in high school
paper)

First Amendment rights of students in the public schools are not

automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings,
and must be applied in light of the special characteristics of the
school environment. A school need not tolerate student speech that
is inconsistent with its basic educational mission, even though the
government could not censor similar speech outside the school.
The school newspaper here cannot be characterized as a forum for
public expression. School facilities may be deemed to be public
forums only if school authorities have, by policy or by practice,
opened the facilities for indiscriminate use by the general public, or
by some segment of the public, such as student organizations.
Fernando v. CA (seizure of porn from Music Fair)
As obscenity is an unprotected speech which the State has the right
to regulate, the State in pursuing its mandate to protect, as parens
patriae, the public from obscene, immoral and indecent materials
must justify the regulation or limitation. There is no perfect definition
of obscenity but the latest word is that of Miller v. California.
Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code: To be held liable, the
prosecution must prove that (a) the materials, publication, picture or
literature are obscene; and (b) the offender sold, exhibited, published
or gave away such materials. Necessarily, that the confiscated
materials are obscene must be proved. The law does not require that
a person be caught in the act of selling, giving away or exhibiting
obscene materials to be liable, for as long as the said materials are
offered for sale, displayed or exhibited to the public. In the present
case, we find that petitioners are engaged in selling and exhibiting
obscene materials.
Assembly and Petition
Navarro v. Villegas (assemblies at Plaza Miranda on weekends)
-Primacias v. Fuguso: Mayor possesses reasonable discretion to
determine or specify the streets or public places to be used for the
assembly in order to secure convenient use thereof and provide

proper policing to minimize risks of disorder and to maintain public

safety and order
-Public rally at Plaza Miranda poses a clear and present danger of
public disorders, which is why rallies there will be allowed only on
weekends and holidays

assembly, but their unauthorized absences which produced adverse

effects on their students, which is conduct prejudicial to the service.
Their remedy is with the legislative body, which would be a long and
tedious process rendering strikes an inadequate action for the
redress of their grievances.

PBM Employees v. PBM (hierarchy of rights)

The demonstration was an exercise of their free expression and
assembly. There is the primacy of human rights, in their acts against
the abuses of the police, over the companys property rights.

Bayan v. Ermita
The BP 880 requires the permit to rally, wherein the mayor has the
duty to grant the permit unless there is a clear and present danger. It
is a content-neutral regulation referring to the time, place and
manner. The CPR on the other hand, is unconstitutional for its failure
to adhere to the maximum tolerance policy (allow rallies without
permits unless they are violent).

JBL Reyes v. Bagatsing (rally from Luneta to near US embassy)

Free speech, like free press, is the liberty to discuss publicly and
truthfully matters of public concern without censorship or
punishment. The mayor failed to show the clear and present danger
in denying their request to hold a rally near the US embassy.
Malabanan v. Ramento (student assembly)
The assembly was held in private premises, hence, only the consent
of the owner is required. Students continue to enjoy the freedom to
express their views without shedding their constitutional rights at the
school gate. Hence, they may express their opinion except by
conduct that is disruptive of classes.
Principles to Guide Schools:
1. Right to assembly and speech are guaranteed to students.
2. Discussion cannot be subjected to prior restraint or
subsequent punishment.
3. Assemblies in school: permit must be sought from authorities
who are devoid of power to deny requests arbitrarily,
although there may be conditions as to the time and place.
4. Violation: penalty be proportionate.
Tolentino v. Sec of Finance (cooperatives)
Exemption of taxes of cooperatives is not granted by the
Constitution. The VAT is not a regulation, nor impedes rights.
Acosta v. CA (teachers mass demonstration)
The right to association does not guarantee the right to strike. In the
absence of law, public employees have no right to engage in work
stoppages. The teachers in this case are being penalized not for their

Pader v. People (P.I.; oral defamation)

The words of the petitioner constitute only slight oral defamation
since it was not a deliberate attack to damage the vice mayoral
candidates reputation, but it was due to his anger that arose from an
incident coupled with his drunkenness.

SECTION 5 - No law shall be made respecting an establishment

of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free
exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship,
without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed.
No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or
political rights.
Non Establishment
Aglipay v. Ruiz (postage stamps for the Eucharistic Congress)
The Act contemplates no religious position. The issuance of stamps
is not inspired by any sectarian domination, nor is it sold for the
benefit of the Catholic Church, nor are the profits given to them. The
purpose was to advertise the Philippines, and attract tourists. The
event was taken advantage as it was an event with international
importance.
Garces v. Estenzo (acquisition of San Vicente Ferrer image)
The assailed resolution does not establish any religion nor abridge
religious liberty or appropriate money for the benefit of any sect. The
image was purchased with private funds, not with taxes. The image
was purchased in celebration of the fiesta, which is a socio-religious
affair to relieve monotony.
School District v. Schempp (reading of 10 bible verses in school)
Any law hoping to survive the prohibitions of the Establishment
Clause must have a secular purpose and a primary effect that
neither advances nor inhibits religion. The non-establishment clause
impedes the government from setting up a church or from passing
laws, which aid some, all religion, or prefer one over the other. The
reading of the bible as part of curricular activities is a religious
ceremony violating the establishment clauses mandate of
maintaining government neutrality.
Board of Education v. Allen (book lending to secular students)
The test in determining whether the statute violates the nonestablishment clause is: What are the purpose and primary effect of
the enactment? If either advances or inhibits religion then the
enactment exceeds the scope of legislative power. There must be a
secular purpose and effect. The statutes purpose is to further the
educational opportunities available to the youth. The petitioners fail

to show that the effects are contrary to the purpose. The books lent is
approved by public school authorities, ensuring that they are secular.
The financial benefit is to persons and children and not schools.
Lemon v. Kurtzman (salary supplement to nonpublic school teachers)
3 tests: First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose;
second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither
advances nor inhibits religion. Finally, the statute must not foster
an excessive government entanglement with religion.
A comprehensive, discriminating, and continuing state
surveillance of teachers to avail of this salary supplement will
inevitably be required to ensure that these restrictions are obeyed
and the First Amendment otherwise respected. Unlike a book, a
teacher cannot be inspected once so as to determine the extent
and intent of his or her personal beliefs and subjective acceptance of
the limitations imposed by the First Amendment. These prophylactic
contacts will involve excessive and enduring entanglement
between state and church.
Tilton v. Richardson (grant to build facilities)
Legitimate Secular objective - Nation's colleges and universities
are encouraged and assisted in their efforts to accommodate
rapidly growing numbers of youth who aspire to a higher
education
The crucial question is not whether some benefit accrues to a
religious institution as a consequence of the legislative program, but
whether its principal or primary effect advances religion. College
students are less impressionable and less susceptible to religious
indoctrination. Correspondingly, the necessity for intensive
government surveillance is diminished and the resulting
entanglements between government and religion lessened.
A recipient institution's obligation not to use the facility for sectarian
instruction or religious worship would appear to expire at the end of
20 years, the period of federal interest. Limiting the prohibition for
religious use of the structure to 20 years obviously opens the facility
to use for any purpose at the end of that period. To this extent the Act
therefore trespasses on the Religion Clauses.

Country of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union (crche at

county courthouse; xmas tree and menorah at Grant Street entrance)
In Lynch it was concluded that the government's use of religious
symbolism is unconstitutional if it has the effect of endorsing
religious beliefs, and the effect of the government's use of
religious symbolism depends upon its context. When evaluating
the effect of government conduct under the Establishment Clause,
we must ascertain whether the challenged governmental action
is sufficiently likely to be perceived by adherents of the
controlling denominations as an endorsement, and by the non
adherents as a disapproval, of their individual.
The Establishment Clause does not limit only the religious content of
the government's own communications. It also prohibits the
government's support and promotion of religious communications by
religious organizations. The crche therefore violative of the clause.
The menorah here stands next to a Christmas tree and a sign
saluting liberty. Although Christmas trees once carried religious
connotations, today they typify the secular celebration of Christmas.
In these circumstances, then, the combination of the tree and the
menorah communicates, not a simultaneous endorsement of both
the Christian and Jewish faiths, but instead, a secular celebration of
Christmas coupled with an acknowledgment of Chanukah as a
contemporaneous alternative tradition.
Zobrest v. Catalina (sign language interpreter to deaf student)
Government programs that neutrally provide benefits to a broad
class of citizens defined without reference to religion are not readily
subject to an Establishment Clause challenge just be- cause
sectarian institutions may also receive an attenuated financial
benefit.
Because the IDEA creates no financial incentive for parents to
choose a sectarian school, an interpreter's presence there cannot be
attributed to state decision- making. Under the IDEA, no funds
traceable to the government ever find their way into sectarian
schools' coffers. The only indirect economic benefit a sectarian
school might receive by dint of the IDEA is the disabled child's tuition.

Capitol Square Review Board v. Ku Klux Clan (cross at plaza)

Respondents' religious display in Capitol Square was private
expression. Our precedent establishes that private religious speech,
far from being a First Amendment orphan, is as fully protected under
the Free Speech Clause as secular private expression. The right to
use government property for one's private expression depends upon
whether the property has by law or tradition been given the status of
a public forum, or rather has been reserved for specific official uses. t
may impose reasonable, content-neutral time, place, and manner
restrictions, but it may regulate expressive content only if such a
restriction is necessary, and narrowly drawn, to serve a compelling
state interest. These strict standards apply since Capitol Square is a
traditional public forum.
There is a crucial difference between government speech endorsing
religion, which the Establishment Clause forbids, and private speech
endorsing religion, which the Free Speech and Free Exercise
Clauses protect. By its terms that Clause applies only to the words
and acts of government. It was never meant, and has never been
read by this Court, to serve as an impediment to purely private
religious speech connected to the State only through its occurrence
in a public forum.
The transferred endorsement test (critical mass of communications
may be perceive district as endorsing a religion) would also disrupt
the settled principle that policies providing incidental benefits to
religion do not contravene the Establishment Clause.
Religious expression cannot violate the Establishment Clause
where it (1) is purely private and (2) occurs in a traditional or
designated public forum, publicly announced and open to all on
equal terms.
Manosca v. CA (birth site of Felix Manalo; expropriation)
While it is true that INC members will get more benefit in this
expropriation, the advantage is merely incidental and secondary in
nature. That only a few would benefit from it does not diminish the
character and essence of public use. The property is taken for the
distinctive contributions of Felix Manalo to the culture of the country
rather than to commemorate his leadership of the INC.

Islamic Dawah Council v. Executive Secretary (Halal)

To classify as halal is a religious function, as standards are drawn
from religious beliefs. EO 46 encroached on the religious freedom of
Muslim organizations to interpret for Filipino Muslims what food is fit
for consumption. The state has forced them to accept their
interpretation of the Quran. Only the prevention of an immediate and
grave danger can justify the infringement on religious freedom, which
is accorded a preferred status.
Taruc v. Dela Cruz (excommunication)
Expulsion of members of a religious organization is best left to the
discretion of the officials, laws and canons of the organization. The
courts cannot exercise control, as their membership depends on
members conforming to church regulations. The court should not
touch doctrinal or disciplinary differences. The power of exclusion
is an ecclesiastical matter, which the court has no power over.
UCCP v. Bradford UCC Inc. (separation of BUCCI from UCCP)
The SC ruled that the matter at hand is not purely an ecclesiastical
affair. BUCCI has the power under the law to effect disaffiliation such
that it should be given legal consequence and granted recognition.
UCCP and BUCCI, being corporate entities and grantees of primary
franchises, are subject to the jurisdiction of the SEC in matters that
are legal and corporate.
Ecclesiastical matters concerns doctrine, creed, worship of the
church and adoption and enforcement within a religious organization
of laws and regulations for the government of the membership and
the power of excluding those unworthy of membership.
Imbong v. Ochoa (contraceptives funding)
The establishment and free exercise clauses were not designed to
serve contradictory purposes. They have a single goal-to promote
freedom of individual religious beliefs and practices. In simplest
terms, the free exercise clause prohibits government from inhibiting
religious beliefs with penalties for religious beliefs and practice, while
the establishment clause prohibits government from inhibiting
religious belief with rewards for religious beliefs and practices. In
other words, the two religion clauses were intended to deny

government the power to use either the carrot or the stick to

influence individual religious beliefs and practices.
In the same breath that the establishment clause restricts what the
government can do with religion, it also limits what religious sects
can or cannot do with the government. They can neither cause the
government to adopt their particular doctrines as policy for everyone,
nor can they not cause the government to restrict other groups. To do
so, in simple terms, would cause the State to adhere to a particular
religion and, thus, establishing a state religion.
The petitioners are misguided in their supposition that the State
cannot enhance its population control program through the RH Law
simply because the promotion of contraceptive use is contrary to
their religious beliefs. Indeed, the State is not precluded to pursue its
legitimate secular objectives without being dictated upon by the
policies of any one religion. One cannot refuse to pay his taxes
simply because it will cloud his conscience. The demarcation line
between Church and State demands that one render unto Caesar
the things that are Caesar's and unto God the things that are God's.
Free Exercise
Victoriano v. Elizalde (union membership for INC)
The purpose of R.A. 3350, not including members of sects
prohibiting affiliation in labor organizations, is secular, worldly, and
temporal, not spiritual or religious or holy and eternal. It was intended
to serve the secular purpose of advancing the constitutional
right to the free exercise of religion, by averting that certain
persons be refused work, or be dismissed from work, or be
dispossessed of their right to work and of being impeded to pursue a
modest means of livelihood, by reason of union security agreements.
Any legislation whose effect or purpose is to impede the observance
of one or all religions, or to discriminate invidiously between the
religions, is invalid. But if the stage regulates conduct by enacting,
within its power, a general law which has for its purpose and effect
to advance the state's secular goals, the statute is valid despite its
indirect burden on religious observance, unless the state can
accomplish its purpose without imposing such burden. When

general laws conflict with scrupples of conscience, exemptions

ought to be granted unless some "compelling state interest"
intervenes. It may not be amiss to point out here that the free
exercise of religious profession or belief is superior to contract
rights.
Cantwell v. Connecticut (Jehovahs witnesses spreading the faith)
Because the local ordinance, requiring a permit allowed officials to
determine what causes should be considered religious, it violated the
First Amendment. The Supreme Court recognized the [First]
Amendment embraces two conceptsfreedom to believe and
freedom to act. The Court recognized an absolute freedom of
belief, placing questions of religious truth outside the Court system.
Cantwell had a First Amendment right to express his religious
message. The Court held, [Cantwell] had a right peacefully to impart
his views to others. Freedom of conscience and freedom to adhere
to such religious organization or form of worship as the individual
may choose cannot be restricted by law ... and [they] safeguard the
free exercise of the chosen form of religion. Neither federal nor state
governments could unduly infringe on the right to freely exercise
religion without a compelling state interest.
US v. Ballard (power to heal ; solicit funds)
Some of their representations might seem extremely improbable to a
great many people, but whether their beliefs are true or not is not the
concern of Court and is not the concern of the jury. The Amendment
embraces two concepts: freedom to believe, and freedom to act. The
first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be.
The religious views espoused by respondents might seem incredible,
if not preposterous, to most people. But if those doctrines are subject
to trial before a jury charged with finding their truth or falsity, then the
same can be done with the religious beliefs of any sect.
American Bible Society v. City of Manila (taxes on selling and
distribution of bibles)
The constitutional guaranty of the free exercise and enjoyment of
religious profession carries with it the right to disseminate religious
information. Any restraint to such right can only be justified like other
restraints of freedom of expression with the application of the CLEAR

AND PRESENT DANGER RULE. For religious institutions to be

covered by taxes, they must be performing business functions.
Dissemination of religious information does not need to be approved
by an official. Ordinance No. 2529 of the City not applicable since
the merchandise was not sold for profit. Applying taxes would impair
its free exercise of religious profession and dissemination of beliefs.
Ebralinag v. Division Superintendent (Jehovahs witness flag
ceremony)
The sole justification for a prior restraint or limitation on the exercise
of religious freedom is the existence of a grave and present danger
of a character both grave and imminent. Absent such a threat to
public safety, the expulsion of petitioners from the schools cannot be
justified.
Their right not to participate in the flag ceremony does not give them
the right to disrupt such patriotic exercises. While the highest regard
must be afforded to the free exercise of religion, this does not mean
that the school cannot discipline them should they commit breaches
of the peace by actions that offend both religious and patriotic
sensibilities of others.
Wiconsin v. Yoder (Amish childrens secondary education)
The states interest in educating children past the 8th grade does not
outweigh the religious freedom of parents under the Free Exercise
Clause of the First Amendment. States cannot force individuals to
attend school when it infringes on their First Amendment rights. The
State provided no evidence showing any great benefit to having two
extra years in the public schools. The Court contended that the
Amish community was a very successful social unit in American
society, a self-sufficient, law-abiding member of society, which paid
all of the required taxes and rejected any type of public welfare.
Pamil v. Teleron (election of priest; not allowed by Admin Code)
The Admin Code was enacted in 1917. The 1973 Constitution, which
was operative at that time, provides that No religious test shall be
required for the exercise of civil or political rights. Therefore, the
Admin Code provision is considered unconstitutional under this
Charter.
McDaniel v. Paty (election of ministers to the Legislature)

The statute violated the petitioners right to the free exercise of

religion under the First Amendment of the US Constitution, being
made applicable to states by the Fourteenth Amendment. Tennessee
averred that the reason for such prohibition was to avoid minister
being elected into a legislative seat, only to serve the sect he
represents, or stand for the detriment of others. However, the Court
found that such view was correct in the 18th century, but not through
the perspective of the American experience, which has shown no
substantial fear for clergymen getting elected into office.
Goldman v. Weinberger (prohibition on wearing yarmulke in the Air
Force by Orthodox Jew Rabbi)
The military is, by necessity, a specialized society separate from
civilian society. A review of military regulations challenged on First
Amendment grounds is far more deferential than constitutional
review of similar laws or regulations for civilians. Thus, Courts must
give great deference to the professional judgment of military
authorities concerning the relative importance of a particular military
interest.
The traditional outfitting of military personnel in standardized
uniforms encourages the subordination of personal preferences and
identities in favor of the overall group mission. Uniforms encourage a
sense of hierarchical unity by tending to eliminate outward individual
distinctions except rank. he Court held that those portions of
regulations challenged here reasonably and evenhandedly regulate
dress in the interest of militarys need for uniformity.
NOTE: 2 years later, Congress filed a provision in the annual
National Defense Authorization Act that a member of the armed
forces may wear an item of religious apparel while wearing the
uniform of the members armed force.
German v. Baranganan (Attend mass/ demonstration near
Malacanang)
The restriction imposed on the use of J.P. Laurel Street, was
established in the interest of national security. Petitioners are not
denied or restrained of their freedom of belief or choice of their
religion, but only in the manner by which they had attempted to
translate the same into action. Going to mass in the said chapel, as

contended, only hides the inner intention of getting near the

Malacanang to protest against the government. Thus, it poses
danger to national security, which can regulated.
One may believe in most anything, however strange, bizarre and
unreasonable the same may appear to others, even heretical when
weighed in the scales of orthodoxy or doctrinal standards. But
between the freedom of belief and the exercise of said belief, there is
quite a stretch of road to travel. If the exercise of said religious belief
clashes with the established institutions of society and with the law,
then the former must yield and give way to the latter. The
government steps in and either restrains said exercise or even
prosecutes the one exercising it
Tolentino v. Sec of Finance (VAT on bibles sold)
With regard to the imposition of tax as a violation of religious liberty,
the argument that the PBS should not be taxed because they
distribute free bibles is not enough to excuse them because, despite
that, they still also sell some copies to other people. At any rate
whether the PBS is liable for the VAT must be decided in concrete
cases, in the event it is assessed this tax by the CIR.
Centeno v. Villaon- Pornillos (solicitation for chapel without permit)
The statute regulating solicitation is not an abridgement of the
freedom of religion. It may be done in the Exercise of Police Power,
while it may be conceded that the construction of a church is a social
concern of the people and, consequently, solicitations appurtenant
thereto would necessarily involve public welfare. The State may
protect its citizens from fraudulent solicitation by requiring a stranger
in the community, before permitting him publicly to solicit funds for
any purpose, to establish his identity and his authority to act for the
cause, which he purports to represent. The State is likewise free to
regulate the time and manner of solicitation generally, in the interest
of public safety, peace, comfort, or convenience.
Lee v. Weisman (prayers at graduation ceremonies)
Allowing clergy who offer prayers as part of an official public school
graduation ceremony is inconsistent with the Establishment Clause.
CONTROL BY THE STATE - The government may not establish an

official or civic religion as a means of avoiding the establishment of a

religion with more specific creeds. State officials direct the
performance of a formal religious exercise at secondary schools'
promotional and graduation ceremonies. Lee's decision that prayers
should be given and his selection of the religious participant are
choices attributable to the State. The pamphlet and advice that the
prayers be nonsectarian directly controls the prayers content.
COERCION BY THE STATE - Prayer exercises in elementary and
secondary schools carry a particular risk of indirect coercion.
Lukumi v. City of Hialeah (animal sacrifices)
Jurisprudence establishes the general proposition that a law that is
neutral and of general applicability need not be justified by a
compelling governmental interest even if the law has the incidental
effect of burdening a particular religious practice (Smith doctrine).
The minimum requirement of neutrality is that a law not discriminate
on its face. A law fails the facial neutrality test if it refers to a religious
practice without a secular meaning discernable from the language or
context. Suppression of the central element of the Santeria worship
service as the object of the ordinances is evident. The legitimate
governmental interests in protecting the public health and preventing
animal cruelty could be addressed by restrictions other than the
prohibition of all Santeria sacrificial practice.
The second requirement, general applicability, means that categories
of selection are of paramount concern when a law has the incidental
effect of burdening religious practice. The FEC "protects religious
observers against unequal treatment." Inequality results when a
legislature decides that the governmental interests it seeks to
advance are worthy of being pursued only against conduct with a
religious motivation. The ordinances fail to prohibit nonreligious
conduct that endangers these interests in a similar or greater degree
than Santeria sacrifice does.
Lambs Chapel v. Center Moriches (use of school facilities to show
film on Christian family values)
Although the film is admittedly church related, it was still about child
rearing and family values. In other words, its topics fall under social
or civic purposes (Rule 10). Showing of the film would not have been

during school hours, would not have been sponsored by the school,
and would have been open to the public, not just to church members.
Moreover, there would have been no realistic danger that the
community would think that the District was endorsing religion or any
particular creed, and any benefit to religion or to the Church would
have been no more than incidental.
Long v. Basa (notice and hearing in expulsion from Church Assembly
Hall)
The Churchs by-laws do not require the Board to give prior notice in
cases of expulsion. Such resolution does not even need to state the
reason for such action. It may seem unreasonable and objectionable
but this shows the peculiar nature of a religious corporation vis--vis
an ordinary, profit- oriented corporation. It must be emphasized that
the relationship of a religious organization and its members is based
on the latters absolute adherence to a common religious belief.
As a general rule, there is no room for dissension in a religious
corporation. An action for expulsion on the ground of injurious or
inimical causes from church authorities is conclusive upon civil
courts.
INC v. CA (INC show classified as X by MTRCB)
The freedom to act on ones beliefs is a way where the individual
externalizes his beliefs in acts or omissions that affect the
public. His freedom to do this is subject to the authority of the
State. Any act that restrains speech is hobbled by the presumption of
invalidity. It is the burden of the respondent Board to overthrow this
presumption, which it failed to do. The so-called attacks are mere
criticisms of some of the deeply held dogmas and tenets of other
religions. The respondents cannot also rely on the ground attacks
against another religion in x- rating the religious program of petitioner
because it is not among the grounds to justify an order prohibiting the
broadcast of petitioners television program. In x-rating the TV
program of the petitioner, the respondents failed to apply the clear
and present danger rule.
Estrada v. Escritor (Jehovahs witness cohabiting but with declaration
pledging faithfulness)

The state has the burden of satisfying the compelling state interest to
justify the sanction:
1) The courts should look into the sincerity of the religious
belief without inquiring into the truth of the belief
2) The state has to establish that its purposes are legitimate
and compelling.
3) The state used the least intrusive means possible.
The free exercise of religion is a fundamental right that enjoys a
preferred position in the hierarchy of rights. The states broad interest
in protecting the institutions of marriage and family is not a
compelling state interest enforcing the concubinage charges against
Escritor. The Constitution adheres to the benevolent neutrality
approach that gives room for the accommodation of religious
exercises as required by the Free Exercise Clause. Even assuming
that there was a compelling state interest, the state failed to show
evidence that the means adopted in pursuing this interest is the least
restrictive to Escritors religious freedom.

Iglesia Filipino Independiente v. Heirs of Taezo (selling of church land

by bishop)
There was no consent to the contract of sale as Supreme Bishop
Rev. Ga had no authority to give such consent. Under petitioners
Canons, any sale of real property requires not just the consent of the
Supreme Bishop but also the concurrence of the laymens
committee, the parish priest, and the Diocesan Bishop, as
sanctioned by the Supreme Council. However, petitioners Canons
do not specify in what form the conformity of the other church entities
should be made known. Here, the trial court found that the laymens
committee indeed made its objection to the sale known to the
Supreme Bishop.
Even though the free exercise of religion (Article III, Section 5) was
not expressly mentioned in the case, such was applied by the
Supreme Court in observing the rules and regulation of IFI
pertaining to the alienation of land without court interference
pursuant to the aforementioned Corporation Code provision.

In Re Request Muslim Employees (Muslims excused from work

every Friday)
The need of the State to prescribe government office hours as well
as to enforce them uniformly to all civil servants, Christians and
Muslims alike, cannot be disregarded. The said rule enjoins all civil
servants, of whatever religious denomination, to render public
service of no less than eight hours a day or forty (40) hours a week.
To allow the Muslim employees in the Judiciary to be excused from
work from 10:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. every Friday (Muslim Prayer Day)
during the entire calendar year would mean a diminution of the
prescribed government working hours. For then, they would be
rendering service twelve (12) hours less than that required by the
civil service rules for each month. The performance of religious
practices, whether by the Muslim employees or those belonging to
other religious denominations, should not prejudice the courts and
the public. The remedy of the Muslim employees, with respect to
their request to be excused from work from 10:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m.
every Friday during the entire calendar year, is legislative, which is to
ask Congress to enact a legislation expressly exempting them from
compliance with the prescribed government working hours.

SECTION 6 - The liberty of abode and of changing the same

within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except
upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be
impaired except in the interest of national security, public
safety, or public health, as may be provided by law.

Villavicenio v. Lukban (Manila mayor deported prostitutes)

Forcibly displacing these women from Manila deprived them of
freedom of abode just as if they were imprisoned. They also have no
money and personal belongings that prevented them to go anywhere
but Davao. There is no law that empowers a Mayor to force any
citizen of the Philippines to change their domicile from Manila to any
other locality. In fact, Philippine penal law punishes a public officer
who, not being expressly authorized by law or regulation, compels
any person to change his residence.
Marcos v. Manglapus (return of Marcos family to the Philippines)
The request of the Marcoses to be allowed to return to the
Philippines cannot be considered solely based on constitutional
provisions guaranteeing liberty of abode and right to travel. The right
to return is not a part of ones right to travel. Since it should be
properly addressed by the residual power of the President, which is
her paramount duty to protect and safeguard the people of the
Philippines. There was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the president since, during the time of the case there were
communist insurgencies and allowing Marcos to come how may only
intensify their violence. Also the Philippines is only just starting to
recover from the hardship of the Marcoses. Their return can
tantamount to economic collapse.
Silverio v. CA (cancelled passport for failure to appear in court)
A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from
leaving thePhilippines. This is a necessary consequence of the
nature and function of a bail bond. The condition imposed upon
petitioner to make himself available at all times whenever the court
requires his presence operates as a valid restriction on his right to
travel. When by law jurisdiction is conferred on a Court or judicial
officer, all auxillary writs, process and other means necessary to
carry it into effect may be employed by such Court or officer. Silverio
has posted bail but has violated the conditions thereof by failing to
appear before the Court when required. Those orders and processes
would be rendered nugatory if an accused were to be allowed to
leave or to remain, at his pleasure, outside the territorial confines of
the country.
Santiago v. Vasquez (prayer for cancellation of bail bond)

The courts possess certain inherent powers which may be said to be

implied from a general grant of jurisdiction. Furthermore, the court
has the inherent power to make interlocutory orders necessary to
protect its jurisdiction. Such being the case, with the more reason
may a party litigant be subjected to proper coercive measures where
he disobeys a proper order or commits a fraud on the court or the
opposing party, the result of which the jurisdiction of such court
would be ineffectual.
By subjecting herself under the obligations of bail bond, petitioner
holds herself amenable at all times to the order and processes of the
court. As a necessary consequence of the nature and function of a
bail bond, a condition imposed upon the petitioner to make herself
available at all times whenever the court required her presence
operates as a valid restriction on her right to travel. Therefore, she
may legally be prohibited from leaving for abroad during the
pendency of her case. Article III section 6 of the 1987 Constitution
should by no means be construed as delimiting the inherent power of
the Courts to use all means necessary to carry out their order into
effect in criminal cases before them.
Marcos v. Sandiganbayan (Imeldas medical treatment abroad)
The subject lay beyond the competence of the court, and hence, it
only followed the prudent course available of seeking the opinion of
specialists in that field. Courts are allowed to invite amici curiae to
shed light on recondite points of law, there is no reason for denying
them assistance on other subjects. The Sandiganbayan disregarded
the findings and recommendations of petitioners own physicians
because petitioner failed to prove the necessity for a trip abroad. But
a person's right to travel is subject to the usual constraints imposed
by the very necessity of safeguarding the system of justice. In such
cases, whether the accused should be permitted to leave the
jurisdiction for humanitarian reason is a matter of the court's sound
discretion.
Yap v. CA (certification of place of residence to post bail)
The right to change abode and travel within the Philippines, being
invoked by the petitioner are not absolute rights. The order of the
court of appeals releasing petitioner on bail constitutes lawful order
as contemplated in Section 6 Article III. The condition imposed by the

Court of Appeals is simply consistent with the nature and function of

a bail bond, which is to ensure that the petitioner will make himself
available at all times whenever the court requires his presence.
Mirasol v. DPWH (motorcycle regulation on toll ways)
AO 1 does not infringe upon petitioners right to travel but merely
bars motorcycles, bicycles, tricycles, pedicabs, and any nonmotorized vehicles as the mode of traveling along limited access
highways. Several cheap, accessible and practical alternative modes
of transport are open to petitioners. There is nothing oppressive in
being required to take a bus or drive a car instead of ones scooter,
bicycle, calesa, or motorcycle upon using a toll way. The right to
travel does not mean the right to choose any vehicle in traversing a
toll way. The right to travel refers to the right to move from one place
to another.
A toll way is not an ordinary road. As a facility designed to promote
the fastest access to certain destinations, its use, operation, and
maintenance require close regulation. Public interest and safety
require the imposition of certain restrictions on toll ways that do not
apply to ordinary roads. As a special kind of road, it is but reasonable
that not all forms of transport could use it.
OAS v. Macarine (lack of travel authority of court administrator)
Section 6, Article III of the 1987 Constitution allows restrictions on
ones right to travel provided that such restriction is in the interest of
national security, public safety or public health as may be provided
by law. This, however, should by no means be construed as limiting
the Courts inherent power of administrative supervision over lower
courts. OCA Circular No. 49-2003 does not restrict but merely
regulates, by providing guidelines to be complied by judges and court
personnel, before they can go on leave to travel abroad. To "restrict"
is to restrain or prohibit a person from doing something; to "regulate"
is to govern or direct according to rule.
Republic v. Roque
Human Security Act is constitutional with respect to the impairment of
the right to travel of persons suspected of terrorism.

SECTION 7 - The right of the people to information on matters of

public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records,
and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts,
transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research

data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the

citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
Legaspi v. CSC (civil service eligibility of sanitarians in health dept)
This does not give the agency concerned any discretion to grant or
deny access. In case of denial of access, the government agency
has the burden of showing that the information requested is not of
public concern, or, if it is of public concern, that the same has been
exempted by law from the operation of the guarantee. To safeguard
the constitutional right, every denial of access by the government
agency concerned is subject to review by the courts.
In determining whether or not particular information is of public
concern there is no rigid test which can be applied. "Public concern"
like "public interest" is a term that eludes exact definition. It is for the
courts to determine in a case by case basis whether the matter at
issue is of interest or importance, as it relates to or affects the public.
The respondent has failed to cite any provision in the Civil Service
Law which would limit the petitioner's right to know who are, and who
are not, civil service eligibles. We take judicial notice of the fact that
the names of those who pass the civil service examinations, as in bar
examinations and licensure examinations for various professions, are
released to the public. Hence, there is nothing secret about one's
civil service eligibility, if actually possessed. Petitioner's request is,
therefore, neither unusual nor unreasonable. The civil service
eligibility of a sanitarian being of public concern, and in the
absence of express limitations under the law upon access to the
register of civil service eligibles for said position, the duty of the
respondent Commission to confirm or deny the civil service eligibility
of any person occupying the position becomes imperative.
Valmonte v. Belmonte Jr. (clean loan list of BP from GSIS on
guaranty of Imelda)
The GSIS is a trustee of contributions from the government and its
employees and the administrator of various insurance programs for
the benefit of the latter. Undeniably, its funds assume a public
character.
Considering the nature of its funds, the GSIS is expected to manage

its resources with utmost prudence and in strict compliance with the
pertinent rules and regulations. It is therefore the legitimate concern
of the public to ensure that these funds are managed properly
with end in view of maximizing the benefits that accrue to the insured
government employees. A system of limited government safeguards
a private sector, which belongs to the individual, firmly distinguishing
it from the public sector, which the state can control.
The right to privacy belongs to the individual in his private
capacity, and not to public and the government agencies like
the GSIS. Moreover, the right cannot be invoked by juridical entities
like the GSIS. A corporation has no right of privacy in its name
since the entire basis of the right to privacy is an injury to the feelings
and sensibilities of the party and a corporation would have no such
ground for relief. Neither can the GSIS through its General manager,
the respondent, invoke the right to privacy of its borrowers. The right
is purely personal in nature, and hence, may be invoked only by the
person whose privacy is claimed to be violated.
The government, WHETHER carrying out its sovereign attributes or
running some business, discharges the SAME FUNCTION of service
to the people. Consequently, that the GSIS, in granting the loans,
was exercising proprietary function would NOT justify the exclusion
of transactions from the coverage and scope of right to information.
Aquino-Sarmiento v. Morato (MTRCB voting slips)
The decree (PD 1986) creating the respondent board supports the
position that the respondent boards very existence is public in
character. It was created to serve public interest. Therefore, the
respondents can lay no valid claim to privacy. The right to privacy
belongs to the individual acting in his private capacity and not to a
governmental agency or officers tasked with, and acting in, the
discharge of public duties. There can be no invasion of privacy in the
case at bar since what is sought to be divulged is a product of action
undertaken in the course of performing official functions.
Osmena v. Comelec (validity of RA prohibiting media to sell of give
freely print space or airtime except to COMELEC for campaign)
The provision is content neutral and regulatory. The infringement of

the freedom of speech is to merely incidental to further such interest,

and the interest that the state wants to protect be greater than the
infringement of speech or expression. The freedom of speech is not
totally suppressed but only regulated.
Echegaray v. SOJ (non-disclosure of death penalty procedure - date)
The provisions of the death penalty do not violate the
constitutional guarantee of peoples right to information of public
concern. RA 8177 provides that the court that designates the date of
execution is the trial court which convicted the accused. The
judgment is entered 15 days after its promulgation, and 10 days
thereafter, the records are remanded to the court below including a
certified copy of the judgment for execution Regarding the date of
execution, Section 15 of the implementing rules must be read in
conjunction with the last sentence of Section 1 of R.A. No. 8177
which provides that the death sentence shall be carried out not
earlier than 1 year nor later than 18 months from the time the
judgment imposing the death penalty became final and executory,
without prejudice to the exercise by the President of his executive
clemency powers at all times. The convict is thus given at least 18
months with which he can seek executive clemency or attend to his
spiritual affairs.
Chavez v. PCGG (negotiations between PCGG and Marcos heirs)
Public disclosure of negotiations and agreements may be demanded.
Ill-gotten wealth is without a doubt, a matter of public concern
and in invested with public interest therefore, may be demanded.
Although information and transactions pertained to in the
provision of the Constitution had not been exactly defined and that
there are no specific laws indicating such limitations as to its scope,
there are some recognized restrictions: 1) national security matters
and intelligence information 2) trade secrets and banking
transactions 3) criminal matters4) other confidential information
(diplomatic correspondence, closed-door Cabinet meetings,
executive sessions of either house of Congress, and internal
deliberations of the Supreme Court).
Gonzales v. Narvasa (names of executive officials with multiple
positions and recipients of luxury cars seized by Bureau of Customs)

The right to information is classified as a public right and when a

mandamus proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the
requirement of personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact that the
petitioner is a citizen, and therefore, part of the general public, which
possesses the right. It is for the courts to determine in a case-bycase basis whether the matter at issue is of interest or importance,
as it relates to or affects the public.
Thus, the Executive Secretary has a constitutional and statutory duty
to answer petitioner's letter dealing with matters which are
unquestionably of public concern that is, appointments made to
public offices and the utilization of public property. He is obliged
to allow the inspection and copying of the same subject to the
reasonable limitation required for the orderly conduct of official
business.
Chavez v. PEA (sale of lands of public domain, Manila Bay
reclamation)
The constitutional right to information includes official information on
on- going negotiations before a final agreement. Requiring a
consummated contract will keep the public in the dark until the
contract, which may be grossly disadvantageous to the government
or even illegal, becomes a fait accompli. This negates the State
policy of full transparency on matters of public concern, a situation
which the framers of the Constitution could not have intended. The
right covers three categories of information which are matters of
public concern, namely: (1) official records; (2) documents and
papers pertaining to official acts, transactions and decisions; and (3)
government research data used in formulating policies.
The information that petitioner may access on the renegotiation of
the JVA includes evaluation reports, recommendations, legal and
expert opinions, minutes of meetings, terms of reference and other
documents attached to such reports or minutes, all relating to the
JVA. However, the right to information does not compel PEA to
prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the like relating to the
renegotiation of the JVA. The exercise of the right is also subject to
reasonable regulations to protect the integrity of the public records
and to minimize disruption to government operations, like rules

specifying when and how to conduct the inspection and copying.

Hilado v. Reyes (records regarding collection of money against
deceased)
It is for the Courts to determine on a case-to-case basis whether the
matter at issue is of interest or importance as it relates to or affect
the public. Unlike court orders and decisions, pleadings and other
documents filed by parties to a case need not be matters of public
concern or interest. If information sought is not of public concern
or interest, denial of access thereto does not violate a citizens
constitutional right to information.

certified list which the same provision requires to be posted in the

polling places on election day. To stretch the coverage of the
prohibition to the absolute is to read into the law something that is
not intended. There is absolutely nothing in R.A. No. 7941 that
prohibits the COMELEC from disclosing or even publishing through
mediums other than the Certified List of the names.

Sabio v. Gordon (EO 1 exempting PCGG members from testifying)

Petitioners have no reasonable expectation of privacy over matters
involving their offices in a corporation where the government has
interest. Certainly, such matters are of public concern and over which
the people have the right to information. The right to privacy is not
absolute where there is an overriding compelling state interest. As
public figures, the Members of the former Batasang Pambansa enjoy
a more limited right to privacy as compared to ordinary individuals,
and their actions are subject to closer scrutiny.

Berdin v. Mascarinas (copy of the tax ordinance)

The reason for the delay was adequately explained and was even
attributed to petitioners failure to pay for the cost of reproduction of
the ordinance. Thus, while access to official records may not be
prohibited, it certainly may be regulated. The regulation may come
either from statutory law and from the inherent power of an officer to
control his office and the records under his custody and to exercise
some discretion as to the manner in which persons desiring to
inspect, examine, or copy the record may exercise their rights. The
Municipal Treasurer in the case at bar exercised this discretion by
requiring petitioners to pay for the cost of reproduction of Tax
Ordinance No. 88-11-36. Such a requirement is reasonable under
the circumstances considering that the ordinance is quite voluminous
consisting of more than a hundred pages.

Bantay v. COMELEC (release of nominees for party-lists before

elections)
By refusing to reveal the names of the nominees of the various partylist groups, COMELEC has violated the right to information and free
access to documents as guaranteed by the Constitution. Like all
constitutional guarantees, however, the right to information and its
companion right of access to official records are not absolute. The
peoples right to know is limited to matters of public concern and is
further subject to such limitation as may be provided by law.
Similarly, the policy of full disclosure is confined to transactions
involving public interest and is subject to reasonable conditions
prescribed by law.

Chavez v. NHA (Smoky Mountain Reclamation Project JVA of

NHA)
The government agencies, without need of demand from anyone,
must bring into public view all the steps and negotiations leading to
the consummation of the transaction and the contents of the
perfected contract. Such information must pertain to definite
propositions of the government, meaning official recommendations or
final positions reached on the different matters subject of negotiation.
The government agency, however, need not disclose intra-agency or
inter-agency recommendations or communications during the stage
when common assertions are still in the process of being formulated
or are in the exploratory stage.

The last sentence of Sec. 7 of R.A. 7941: [T]he names of the partylist nominees shall not be shown on the certified list is certainly not a
justifying card for the COMELEC to deny the requested disclosure.
The prohibition imposed on the COMELEC under said Sec. 7 is
limited in scope and duration, meaning, that it extends only to the

Neri v. Senate (ZTE scandal executive privilege)

The claim of privilege was properly invoked, since it was the head of
the department who had control over the matter protection of
economic and diplomatic relations.

Presidential communications privilege is the guarantee of the candor

of advisors close to the President; only to those with operational
proximity to direct presidential decision-makingare covered. It is
fundamental to the operation of government. The presidential
communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may be
overcome by a showing of adequate need, such that the information
sought likely contains important evidence and by the unavailability of
the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.
Suplico v. Neda (copies of the NBN contract that was abandoned)
It appears that during one of the Senate hearings on the NBN
project, copies of the supply contract were readily made available to
petitioners. Evidently, the said prayer has been complied with and is,
thus, mooted.
Akbayan v. Aquino (JPEPA negotiations)
The categories of information that may be considered privileged
includes matters of diplomatic character and under negotiation and
review. In this case, the privileged character of the diplomatic
negotiations has been categorically invoked and clearly explained by
respondents. The secrecy of negotiations with foreign countries is
not violative of the constitutional provisions of freedom of speech or
of the press nor of the freedom of access to information. It is
reasonable to conclude that the Japanese representatives submitted
their offers with the understanding that historic confidentiality would
govern the same. Disclosing these offers could impair the ability of
the Philippines to deal not only with Japan but with other foreign
governments in future negotiations.
Diplomatic negotiations, therefore, are recognized as privileged in
this jurisdiction, the JPEPA negotiations constituting no exception. It
bears emphasis, however, that such privilege is only presumptive.
For as Senate v. Ermita holds, recognizing a type of information as
privileged does not mean that it will be considered privileged in all
instances. Only after a consideration of the context in which the claim
is made may it be determined if there is a public interest that calls for
the disclosure of the desired information, strong enough to overcome
its traditionally privileged status.
North Cotabato v. GRP Panel (MOA-AD constitutionality)

The MOA-AD is a matter of public concern, and therefore, the people

have the right to be informed regarding the status of said agreement.
It involves sovereignty and territorial integrity of the State, which
directly affects the lives of the public at large.
The respondents cannot invoke the doctrine of executive privilege,
since explicit provisions in E.O 3 provides for continuing consultation
and dialogue on both national and local levels. The E.O. even
recognizes that publics right even before the GRP makes its official
recommendations or before the government proffers its definite
propositions. This defense was also waived by the respondents
when they showed the final draft of the MOA-AD in camera.
Guingona v. COMELEC (documents on 2010 election preparation)
It is a matter of public concern in consonance with transparency.
Antolin v. Damondon (copies of questionnaire to accounting board
exam)
It is for the court to determine on a case to case basis whether the
matter at issue is of interest or of importance, as it relates to or
affects the public. We have also recognized the need to preserve a
measure of confidentiality on some matters. The national board
examinations are matters of public concern. The populace in
general would understandably be interested in fair and competent
administration of these exams in order to ensure that only those
qualified are admitted into the accounting profession.
Center for People v. COMELEC (source code for automated election
system)
The pertinent portion of Section 12 of R.A. 9369 is clear in that once
an AES technology is selected for implementation, the Commission
shall promptly make the source code of that technology available and
open to any interested political party or groups which may conduct
their own review thereof. The COMELEC has offered no reason not
to comply with this requirement of the law.
Francisco v. TRB (toll operation agreement of TRB and PNCC)
The Court believes that the most commercial contracts, including
financial ones, carry a standard of confidentiality to protect its
proprietary data and/or intellectual property rights. However, it may

be waived when required by law to be received by someone

authorized by law. The court believes that, even though it is the
obligation of the government to make information available to the
public, such access to information does not mean that the
government becomes an open house to access such information.

papers of general circulation. The aim here was to satisfy the

peoples constitutional right to information on matters of public
concern. This is one of the most important reasons as to why the
submission is mandatory. A post-election completion of the list of
nominees would defeat this constitutional purpose.

IDEALS v. PSALM - gocc (privatization of NPC)

The court reiterated that the constitutional right to information
includes official information on on-going negotiations before a final
contract. The information, however, must constitute definite
propositions by the government and should not cover recognized
exceptions like privileged information, military and diplomatic secrets
and similar matters affecting national security and public order.
Unlike the disclosure of information which is mandatory under the
Constitution,
the
other
aspect
of
the
peoples
righttoknowrequiresademandorrequestforonetogainaccesstodocume
nts and paper of the particular agency. Moreover, the duty to disclose
covers only transactions involving public interest, while the duty to
allow access has a broader scope of information which embraces not
only transactions involving public interest, but any matter contained
in official communications and public documents of the government
agency.
Privatization and Management Office v. Strategic Alliance (public
bidding of government stocks in PNCC)
The courts a quo held that because of the peoples constitutional
right to information on matters of public concern, petitioner has a
duty to disclose the derivation of the indicative price to respondent. It
does not follow that respondent is entitled to the award.
Cocofed v. COMELEC (COCOFEDs accreditation cancelled)
Failure to submit the list of five nominees before the election
warrants cancellation of registration as expressly mentioned in
Section 8 of RA No. 7941. Although the party-list group is entitled to
no more than three seats in Congress, the requirement in Section 8
of RA No. 7941 on the submission of not less than five nominees is
still mandatory. In another COMELEC resolution, it was mentioned
that there must be immediate publication of the list in two national

SECTION 8 The right of the people, including those employed

in the public and private sectors, to form unions, associations,
or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be
abridged.

Tupas v. NHC (membership in labor organizations of NHC

employees)
The right to unionize or to form organizations is now explicitly
recognized and granted to employees in both the governmental and
the private sectors. The right to form unions is a fundamental right
safeguarded by the Bill of the Rights under the Constitution.
Furthermore, Sec 3 Art. XIII of the Constitution protects the rights of
all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and
negotiations. With respect to government employees, Par 5, Sec 2
Art. IX-B of the Constitution provides the right to unionize wherein it
mandates that the right to self-organization shall not be denied to
government employees.
SSS Employees v. CA (SSS employees on strike)
The 1987 Constitution drafts would show that in recognizing the right
of government employees to organize, the commissioners intended
to limit the right to the formation of unions or associations only,
without including the right to strike. Considering that the SSS is a
government-controlled corporation with an original charter, having
been created under R.A. No. 1161, its employees are part of the civil
service and are covered by the Civil Service Commission's
memorandum prohibiting strikes. Hence, the strike was illegal.
Instead of resorting to strikes, walk-outs, and other temporary work
stoppages, government employees may through their unions or
associations, either petition the Congress for the betterment of the
terms and conditions of employment, which are within the ambit of
legislation or negotiate with the appropriate government agencies for
the improvement of those, which are not fixed by law.
Manila Public School Teachers Association v. Laguio, Jr. (mass
actions or public school teachers for redress of grievances)
This Court had already definitively ruled that employees in the public
(civil) service, unlike those in the private sector, do not have the right
to strike, although guaranteed the right to self- organization, to
petition Congress for the betterment of employment terms and
conditions and to negotiate with appropriate government agencies for
the improvement of such working conditions as are not fixed by law.
UPCSU v. Laguesma (right of managers to join labor orgs)
The right guaranteed in Art. III, 8 is subject to the condition that its

exercise should be for purposes "not contrary to law." In the case of

Art. 245, there is a rational basis for prohibiting managerial
employees from forming or joining labor organizations.
Note: only managerial not supervisory employees are prohibited.
Sta. Clara Homeowners v. Gaston (purchase of lot before creation of
homeowners association)
The constitutionally guaranteed freedom of association includes the
freedom not to associate. The right to choose with whom one will
associate oneself is the very foundation and essence of that
partnership. It should be noted that the provision guarantees the right
to form, an association. It does not include the right to compel others
to form or join one.
Private respondents cannot be compelled to become members of the
SCHA by the simple expedient of including them in its Articles of
Incorporation and By-laws without their express or implied consent.
PADCOM v. Ortigas (transferee to become members of owners
association)
The provision on automatic membership was annotated in the
Certificate of Title and made a condition in the Deed of Transfer in
favor of PADCOM. Consequently, it is bound by and must comply
with the covenant. PADCOMs contention that the automatic
membership clause is a violation of its freedom of association is
misplaced. PADCOM was never forced to join the association. It
could have avoided such membership by not buying the land from
TDC. Nobody forced it to buy the land when it bought the building
with the annotation of the condition or lien on the Certificate of Title
thereof and accepted the Deed. PADCOM voluntarily agreed to be
bound by and respect the condition, and thus to join the Association.

SECTION 9 Private property shall not be taken for public use

without just compensation.
Expropriation in General; Reversion
Vda. De Ouna v. Republic (reversion; expansion of Lahug airport)

1.
2.

The abandonment of the public use for which the subject properties
were expropriated entitled the petitioners Ouanos, et al. and
respondents Inocian, et al. to reacquire them. It is well settled that
the taking of private property by the Governments power of eminent
domain is subject to two mandatory requirements:
That it is for a particular public purpose; and
That just compensation be paid to the property owner.
These requirements partake of the nature of implied conditions that
should be complied with to enable the condemnor to keep the
property expropriated. The taking of private property, consequent to
the Governments exercise of its power of eminent domain, is always
subject to the condition that the property be devoted to the specific
public purpose for which it was taken. Corollarily, if this particular
purpose or intent is not initiated or not at all pursued, and is
peremptorily abandoned, then the former owners, if they so desire,
may seek the reversion of the property, subject to the return of the
amount of just compensation received.
Power to Undertake Expropriation Case
Iron and Steel Authority v. CA (substitution of the Republic)
Iron and Steel Authority, created through PD 272, was vested with
some of the powers or attributes normally associated with juridical
personality but did not possess general or comprehensive juridical
personality separate and distinct from that of the Government. The
ISA in fact appears to the Court to be a non-incorporated agency or
instrumentality of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines.
ISA may thus be properly regarded as an agent or delegate of the
Republic of the Philippines. When the statutory term of a nonincorporated agency expires, the powers, duties and functions as
well as the assets and liabilities of that agency revert back to, and
are re-assumed by, the Republic of the Philippines. The Philippines
is entitled to be substituted in the expropriation proceedings as partyplaintiff in lieu of ISA, the statutory term of ISA having expired.

Sangguniang Bayan of Balanga passed Resolution No. 12, s-88

annulling the Mayor's permit issued to petitioner and advising the
Mayor to revoke the permit "to operate a public market."The SB's
Resolution merely mentioned the plan to acquire the Lot for
expansion of the Balanga Public Market adjacent thereto. The SB
doesn't actually maintain a public market on the area. Until
expropriation proceedings are instituted in court, the landowner
cannot be deprived of its right over the land.
Republic v. Salem (title not cancelled until paid)
The expropriation consists in 2 stages: 1) determination of the
authority to exercise the power of eminent domain and propriety of its
exercise in the context of the facts involved. It ends with an order, if
not a dismissal, declaring that the government has a lawful right to
take the property sought, upon payment of just compensation. 2) The
determination by the court of the just compensation. It is only upon
the completion of these two stages that expropriation is said to have
been completed. Until the action for expropriation has been
completed and terminated, ownership over he property remains with
the registered owner. Consequently, the latter can exercise all rights
pertaining to an owner, including the right to dispose of his property,
subject to the power of the State ultimately to acquire it through
expropriation.
Elements of "Taking"
Republic of Vda. de Castelvi (rent by military)
The requisites for taking are:
1. The expropriator must enter a private property;
2. The entry must be for more than a momentary period;
3. It must be under warrant or color of authorities;
4. The property must be devoted for public use or otherwise
informally appropriated or injuriously affected; and
5. The utilization of the property for public use must be such a way
as to oust the owner and deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the
property.

Right of Owner Before Expropriation

Greater Balanga v. Mun. of Balanga (rights prior to expropriation)

Under Sec. 4, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, just compensation is

to be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint. The
Supreme Court has ruled that when the taking of the property sought

to be expropriated coincides with the commencement of the

expropriation proceedings, or takes place subsequent to the filing of
the complaint for eminent domain, the just compensation should be
determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint.
US v. Causby (navigable airspace)
The United States had conceded in oral argument that if flights over
the Respondents property rendered it uninhabitable then there
would be a taking compensable under the Fifth Amendment. The
measure of the value of the property taken is the owners loss, not
the takers gain. The airspace is a public highway. But it is obvious
that if the landowner is to have the full enjoyment of his land, he must
have exclusive control of the immediate reaches of the enveloping
atmosphere. If this were not true then landowners could not build
buildings, plant trees or run fences. Flights over private land are not
a taking, unless, like here, they are so low and frequent as to be a
direct and immediate interference with the enjoyment of the land.
Republic v. PLDT (requiring PLDT to contract with the govt)
The parties can not be coerced to enter into a contract where there is
no agreement. However, The Republic may, in the exercise of the
sovereign power of eminent domain, require the telephone company
to permit interconnection of the government telephone system and
that of the PLDT, as the needs of the government service may
require, subject to the payment of just compensation to be
determined by the court. There is no cogent reason appears why the
said power may not be availed of to impose only a burden upon the
owner of condemned property, without loss of title and possession.
If, under section 6, Article XIII, of the Constitution, the State may, in
the interest of national welfare, transfer utilities to public ownership
upon payment of just compensation, there is no reason why the
State may not require a public utility to render services in the general
interest, provided just compensation is paid therefor. Ultimately, the
beneficiary of the interconnecting service would be the users of both
telephone systems, so that the condemnation would be for public
use.
Penn Central Transportation v. NY City
There restriction of the Landmark Preservation Commission on Penn

Centrals request to construct a building on top of the terminal does

not constitute a taking of property. If a law or rule interferes with the
present use of the property, it constitutes as a taking. In this case,
the law, which the LPC follows simply prohibits the petitioner from
occupying portions of the airspace above the terminal.
OSG v. Ayala (free parking)
Title to and/or possession of the parking facilities remain/s with
respondents, the prohibition against their collection of parking fees
from the public, for the use of said facilities, is already tantamount to
a taking or confiscation of their properties. The State is not only
requiring that respondents devote a portion of the latters properties
for use as parking spaces, but is also mandating that they give the
public access to said parking spaces for free. Such is already an
excessive intrusion into the property rights of respondents. Not only
are they being deprived of the right to use a portion of their
properties as they wish, they are further prohibited from profiting from
its use or even just recovering therefrom the expenses for the
maintenance and operation of the required parking facilities.
The total prohibition against the collection by respondents of parking
fees from persons who use the mall parking facilities has no basis in
the National Building Code or its IRR. The State also cannot impose
the same prohibition by generally invoking police power, since said
prohibition amounts to a taking of respondents property without
payment of just compensation.
"Public Use"
Sumulong v. Guerrero (housing is for public use)
The public use requirement for a valid exercise of the power of
eminent domain is a flexible and evolving concept influenced by
changing conditions. As long as the purpose of the taking is public,
then the power of eminent domain comes into play. In this case,
socialized housing comes within the ambit of public purpose.
Housing is a basic human need. Shortage in housing is a matter of
state concern since it directly and significantly affects public health,
safety, the environment and in sum, the general welfare.
Phil. Columbian Assn. v. Hon. Panis (housing project)

The City of Manila, acting through its legislative branch, has the
express power to acquire private lands in the city and subdivide
these lands into home lots for sale to bona fide tenants or occupants
thereof, and to laborers and low- salaried employees of the city. That
only a few could actually benefit from the expropriation of the
property does not diminish its public use character. It is simply not
possible to provide all at once land and shelter for all who need
them.
Province of Camarines Sur v. CA (expropriation to establish a pilot
farm for non-traditional crops)
There has been a shift from the literal to a broader interpretation of
public purpose or public use for which the power of eminent
domain may be exercised. The old concept was that the condemned
property must actually be used by the general public before the
taking thereof could satisfy the constitutional requirement if public
use. Under the new concept, public use means public advantage,
convenience, or benefit, which tends to contribute to the general
welfare and prosperity of the community.
The establishment if a pilot development center would be to the
direct benefit and advantage of the people of Cam Sur. The court
stresses that the power of expropriation is superior to the power to
distribute lands under the land reform program. Ordinarily, it is the
legislative branch of the LGU that shall determine whether the use of
property sought to be expropriated shall be public. The courts defer
to such legislative determination and will intervene only when a
particular undertaking has no real relation to public use.
Just Compensation
City of Manila v. Estrada
The general rule that the market value of the land taken is the just
compensation to which the owner of condemned property is entitled
under the law meets with our unqualified approval. "Just
compensation," therefore, as used in section 246 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, means a fair and full equivalent for the loss sustained."
The compensation must be just to the public as well as to the
owners.

Municipality of Daet v. CA (conversion into a public park)

The value of lands expropriated must be reckoned as of the time of
the actual possession not as of the time of the filing of the complaint.
Where property is taken ahead of the filing of the condemnation
proceedings, the value thereof may be enhanced by the public
purpose for which it is taken, the entry of the plaintiff upon the
property may have depreciated its value thereby, or there may have
been a natural increase in the value of the property from the time it is
taken to the time the complaint is filed, due to general economic
conditions. The owner of the private property should be
compensated only for what he actually loses, it is not intended that
his compensation shall extend beyond his loss or injury. And what he
loses is only the actual value of his property at the time it is taken.
This means that the value of the property may increase or decrease
from the time the case fro expropriation is filed. Just compensation
requires that the owner be compensated for what he actually loses.
The compensation should be valued at P36,500, which is the value
at the time of the judgment by the trial court.
EPZA v. Dulay
Under P.D. No. 1533, the basis of just compensation shall be the fair
and current market value declared by the owner of the property
sought to be expropriated or such market value as determined by the
assessor, whichever is lower. Therefore, there is no more need to
appoint commissioners as prescribed by Rule 67 of the Revised
Rules of Court and for said commissioners to consider other highly
variable factors in order to determine just compensation.
The Court is constrained to declare the provisions of the Decrees on
just compensation unconstitutional and void and accordingly dismiss
the instant petition for lack of merit. The method of ascertaining just
compensation
under
the
aforecited
decrees
constitutes
impermissible encroachment on judicial prerogatives. It tends to
render this Court inutile in a matter, which under the Constitution is
reserved to it for final determination. The determination of "just
compensation" in eminent domain cases is a judicial function.
San Roque v. Republic
Without full payment, there can be no transfer of title from the land
owner to the expropriator. Thus, the Republics failure to pay just

compensation precluded the perfection of its title over the lot sought
to be expropriated. In fact, the Court has upheld the right of the
unpaid owner to recover the property if within 5 years from the
decision, the expropriator fails to effect payment. Eminent domain
cases are strictly construed against the expropriator. The payment of
just compensation is an indispensable requisite for the exercise of
the States sovereign power of eminent domain.

two lines.The factor of functionality strongly militates against the

choice of Fernando Rein and Del Pan Streets, while the factor of
social and economic impact bears grievously on the residents of
Cuneta Avenue. While the issue would seem to boil down to a choice
between people, on one hand, and progress and development, on
the other, it is to be remembered that progress and development are
carried out for the benefit of the people.

Judicial Review

Manotoc v. NHA
The government, in taking of personal/private property, must show a
reasonable or practical necessity. In this case, there is no showing
whatsoever as to why the properties involved were singled out for
expropriation through decrees or what necessity impelled the
particular choices or selections. The area where the property is
located is well developed, there are no squatters and it is a thriving
commercial area.

Note: Aspects of the exercise of eminent domain subject to judicial

review:
Adequacy of the compensation
Necessity of the taking
Public use character of the purpose
De Knecht v. Bautista (EDSA extension)
The necessity of taking is a question of fact, subject to judicial
review. The government may not capriciously or arbitrarily choose
what private property should be taken. A landowner is covered by the
mantle of protection due process affords. It is a mandate of reason. It
frowns on arbitrariness. It is the antithesis of any governmental act
that smacks of whim or caprice. It negates state power to act in an
oppressive manner. It is, as had been stressed so often, the
embodiment of the sporting idea off air play. In that sense, it stands
as a guaranty of justice. That is the standard that must be met by any
governmental agency in the exercise of whatever competence is
entrusted to it.
The Solicitor General justifies the change to Del Pan Fernando
Rein Streets on the ground that the government "wanted to minimize
the social impact factor or problem involved." It is doubtful whether
the extension of EDSA along Cuneta Avenue can be objected to on
the ground of social impact. The improvements and buildings along
Cuneta Avenue to be affected by the extension are mostly motels.. It
is clear that the choice of Fernando Rein Del Pan Streets as the
line through which the EDSA should be extended to Roxas
Boulevard is arbitrary and should not receive judicial approval. The
Human Settlements Commission concluded that the cost factor is so
minimal that it can be disregarded in making a choice between the

The determination of just compensation based on respondents

contention under PD 1533, which states that the market value of the
property prior to the recommendation or decision of the appropriate
Government Office to acquire the property, is not fair. The reckoning
point for the value of the property for the purpose of just
compensation must be based from the time a formal notice was
made known to the owner of the property. Such formal notice
contemplates a hearing or a judicial proceeding laid down by Rule 67
of the Revised Rules of Court. In this case, the Presidents public
announcement that the government shall acquire subject properties
for the fire victims is not sufficient. NHA can only acquire property
through a proceeding, judicial or otherwise. In addition, the market
value stated by the city assessor alone cannot substitute for the
courts judgment in expropriation proceedings. Such would be a
violation of the due process and eminent domain provisions of the
Constitution.

Republic v. De Knecht (EDSA extension)

An expropriation proceeding that was determined by final judgment
of this Court could be subject of a subsequent legislation for
expropriation. While it is true that said final judgment of this Court on

the subject becomes the law of the case between the parties, it is
equally true that the right of the Republic to take private properties
for public use upon the payment of the just compensation is so
provided in the Constitution and our laws. Such expropriation
proceedings may be undertaken by the Republic not only by
voluntary negotiation with the land owners but also by taking
appropriate court action or by legislation. B.P. Blg. 340, expropriating
the subject properties, therefore effectively superseded the aforesaid
final and executory decision of this Court.

SECTION 10 No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall

be passed.
Home Building and Loan Assn. v. Blaisell (extended mortgage
redemption)

The Minnesota law, extending the time in which mortgagers could

pay back their debts, was a legitimate use of its police powers since
Minnesota faced massive economic difficulties.
The Contract Clause was established to counter the ignoble array of
legislative schemes of State legislatures which were designed to
defeat the obligations of debtors owed to creditors by interfering with
contractual arrangements. The Framers feared that if private
contracts were not respected, the destruction of credit would result,
and credit was essential to the prosperity of the Nations economy.
The Contract Clause was not intended to confer absolute rights onto
private parties entering into contracts. Rather, it was intended to
serve as qualified right, over which the State retained some power to
control, for the benefits of the Nation as a whole. The question to be
asked is whether legislative action is reasonably appropriate to the
achievement of a legitimate end.
Rutter v. Esteban (unreasonable delay of 8 years)
Moratorium laws have been adopted "during times of financial
distress, especially when incident to, or caused by, a war." The
Moratorium Law is a valid exercise by the State of its police power,
being an emergency measure. Although the obligations of the
contract were impaired, the impairment was within the police power
of the State as that power was called into exercise by the public
economic emergency, which the legislature had found to exist. The
State also continues to possess authority to safeguard the vital
interest of its people. Not only are existing laws read into contracts in
order to fix obligations as between the parties, but the reservation of
essential attributes of sovereign power is also read into contracts as
a postulate of the legal order.

terminated because of the closure of the establishment. Without said

law, employees like private respondents in this case will lose benefits
to which they are entitled for their long years of service. Although
they were absorbed by the new management of the hacienda, in the
absence of any showing that the latter has assumed the
responsibilities of the former employer, they will be considered as
new employees and the years of service behind them would amount
to nothing.
The guarantee on non-impairment is not absolute and unqualified.
The prohibition is not to read with literal exactness like a
mathematical formula, for it prohibits unreasonable impairments only.
In spite of the constitutional prohibition, the State continues to
possess authority to safeguard the vital interests of its people.
Legislation appropriate to safeguard said interest may modify or
abrogate contracts already in effect. Therefore, Art. 284 is not
violative of the non-impairment clause.
Presley v. Bel-Air Village Asso (Deed of Restrictions stating that the
lot be used only for residential and not commercial purposes)
Since the provisions of the Deed of Restrictions are in the nature of
contractual obligations freely entered into by the parties, they are
valid and can be enforced against the petitioner. However, these
contractual stipulations on the use of the land even if said conditions
are annotated on the torrens title can be impaired if necessary to
reconcile with the legitimate exercise of police power.

The true test, therefore, of the constitutionality of a moratorium

statute lies in the determination of the period of suspension of the
remedy. It is required that such suspension be definite and
reasonable, otherwise it would be violative of the constitution.

The Court upholds the Sangalang doctrine (absolving the Ayala

Corporation, finding that is not liable for the opening of Jupiter Street
to the general public given that had reclassified Jupiter Street into a
'high density commercial zone), seeing no reason why the petitioner
should be singled out and prohibited from putting up her hot pan de
sal store since the area has been long commercialized and the
records indicate that commercial buildings, offices, restaurants, and
stores have already sprouted in this said area.

Abella v. NLRC
A separation pay law can be given retroactive effect to apply to
existing contracts. Art. 284 of the Labor Codes (granting separation
pay) purpose is the protection of the worker whose employment is

Miners Association v. Factoran

The prohibition contained in the constitutional provisions against
impairing the obligation of contracts is not an absolute one. Such
provisions have no application to statute relating to public subjects

within the domain of the general legislative powers of the State and
involving the public rights and welfare of the entire community
affected by it. They do not prevent a proper exercise by the State of
its police powers.
The exploration, development and utilization of the country's natural
resources are matters vital to the public interest and the general
welfare of the people. Accordingly, the State, in the exercise of its
police power in this regard, may not be precluded by the
constitutional restriction on non- impairment of contract from altering,
modifying and amending the mining leases or agreements granted
under EO 211.
Ortigas v. Feati Bank
The limitations on the use of land imposed by contract yield to a
reasonable exercise of police power, hence, zoning regulations are
superior to contractual restrictions on the use of the property.While
non-impairment of contracts is constitutionally guaranteed, the rule is
not absolute, since it has to be reconciled with the legitimate exercise
of police power. The exercise of the power may be judicially inquired
into and corrected only if it is capricious, whimsical, unjust or
unreasonable, there having been a denial of due process or a
violation of any other applicable constitutional guarantee. Public
welfare when clashing with the individual right to property should
prevail through the state's exercise of its police power.
The Municipal Council of Mandaluyong was reasonably justified
under the circumstances in passing the subject resolution, declaring
the western part of Highway 54, now EDSA, from Shaw Boulevard to
the Pasig River as an industrial and commercial zone. The motives
behind the passage of the questioned resolution being reasonable,
and it being a "legitimate response to a felt public need," not
whimsical or oppressive, the non-impairment of contracts clause of
the Constitution will not bar the municipality's proper exercise of the
power. Herein, the municipality of Mandaluyong exercised police
power to safeguard or promote the health, safety, peace, good order
and general welfare of the people in the locality. EDSA, a main traffic
artery, which runs through several cities and municipalities in the
Metro Manila area, supports an endless stream of traffic and the
resulting activity, noise and pollution are hardly conducive to the

health, safety or welfare of the residents in its route.

Hacienda Luisita v. PARC
A law authorizing interference, when appropriate, in the contractual
relations between or among parties is deemed read into the contract
and its implementation cannot successfully be resisted by force of
the non-impairment guarantee. There is, in that instance, no
impingement of the impairment clause, the non-impairment
protection being applicable only to laws that derogate prior acts or
contracts by enlarging, abridging or in any manner changing the
intention of the parties. Impairment, in fine, obtains if a subsequent
law changes the terms of a contract between the parties, imposes
new conditions, dispenses with those agreed upon or withdraws
existing remedies for the enforcement of the rights of the parties.
Necessarily, the constitutional proscription would not apply to laws
already in effect at the time of contract execution.
Goldenway Merchandising Corp v. Equitable PCI (redemption period)
The purpose of the non-impairment clause of the Constitution is to
safeguard the integrity of contracts against unwarranted interference
by the State.
Sec. 47 of RA 8791, providing for a shorter redemption period, than
Act 3135 (stipulated in the contract as applicable) did not divest
juridical persons of the right to redeem their foreclosed properties but
only modified the time for exercise of such right by reducing the oneyear redemption period originally provided in Act No. 3135. A shorter
term is deemed necessary for juridical persons to reduce the period
of uncertainty of ownership and enable mortgagee-banks to dispose
sooner of these acquires assets. Such amendment embodied one of
a safe and sound practice aimed at ensuring the solvency or liquidity
of our banks. The provision amending the redemption period was
based on a reasonable classification and germane to the purpose of
the law.
Pryce Corp v. China Banking Corp (rehabilitation plan)
Corporate rehabilitation is one of many statutorily provided remedies
for businesses that experience a downturn. Rather than leave the
various creditors unprotected, legislation now provides for an orderly
procedure of equitably and fairly addressing their concerns.

Successful rehabilitation of a distressed corporation will benefit its

debtors, creditors, employees, and the economy in general. The
court may approve a rehabilitation plan even over the opposition of
creditors holding a majority of the total liabilities of the debtor if, in its
judgment, the rehabilitation of the debtor is feasible and the
opposition of the creditors is manifestly unreasonable.