(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER TERM, 2011

Syllabus
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

HOLDER, ATTORNEY GENERAL v. MARTINEZ

GUTIERREZ

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE NINTH CIRCUIT
No. 101542. Argued January 18, 2012Decided May 21, 2012*
Title 8 U. S. C. 1229b(a) authorizes the Attorney General to cancel the
removal of an alien from the United States who, among other things,
has held the status of a lawful permanent resident (LPR) for at least
five years, 1229b(a)(1), and has lived in the United States for at
least seven continuous years after a lawful admission, 1229b(a)(2).
These cases concern whether the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA
or Board) should impute a parents years of continuous residence or
LPR status to his or her child. That issue arises because a child may
enter the country lawfully, or may gain LPR status, after one of his
parents doesmeaning that a parent may satisfy 1229b(a)(1) or
1229b(a)(2), while his child, considered independently, does not. In
In re Escobar, 24 I. & N. Dec. 231, the BIA concluded that an alien
must meet 1229b(a)s requirements on his own. But the Ninth Circuit found the Boards position unreasonable, holding that
1229b(a)(1) and 1229b(a)(2) require imputation. See MercadoZazueta v. Holder, 580 F. 3d 1102; Cuevas-Gaspar v. Gonzales, 430
F. 3d 1013.
Respondent Martinez Gutierrez illegally entered the country with
his family in 1989, when he was 5 years old. Martinez Gutierrezs father was lawfully admitted to the country two years later as an LPR.
But Martinez Gutierrez was neither lawfully admitted nor given LPR
status until 2003. Two years after that, he was apprehended for
smuggling undocumented aliens across the border. Admitting the offense, he sought cancellation of removal. The Immigration Judge

* Together with No. 101543, Holder, Attorney General v. Sawyers,

also on certiorari to the same court.

HOLDER v. MARTINEZ GUTIERREZ

Syllabus
concluded that Martinez Gutierrez qualified for relief because of his
fathers immigration history, even though Martinez Gutierrez could
not satisfy 1229b(a)(1) or 1229b(a)(2) on his own. Relying on Escobar, the BIA reversed. The Ninth Circuit then granted Martinez
Gutierrezs petition for review and remanded the case to the Board
for reconsideration in light of its contrary decisions.
Respondent Sawyers was lawfully admitted as an LPR in October
1995, when he was 15 years old. At that time, his mother had already resided in the country for six consecutive years following a lawful entry. After Sawyers was convicted of a drug offense in August
2002, the Government began removal proceedings. The Immigration
Judge found Sawyers ineligible for cancellation of removal because he
could not satisfy 1229b(a)(2). The BIA affirmed, and Sawyers petitioned the Ninth Circuit for review. There, he argued that the Board
should have counted his mothers years of residency while he was a
minor toward 1229b(a)(2)s 7-year continuous-residency requirement. The Court of Appeals granted the petition and remanded the
case to the BIA.

Held: The BIAs rejection of imputation is based on a permissible construction of 1229b(a). Pp. 613.
(a) The Board has required each alien seeking cancellation of removal to satisfy 1229b(a)s requirements on his own, without relying
on a parents years of continuous residence or immigration status.
That position prevails if it is a reasonable construction of the statute,
whether or not it is the only possible interpretation or even the one a
court might think best. See e.g., Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 843844, and n. 11. The
BIAs approach satisfies this standard.
The Boards position is consistent with the statutes text. Section
1229b(a) does not mentionmuch less requireimputation. Instead,
it simply calls for the alien to meet the prerequisites for cancellation of removal. See 1101(a)(13)(A) and (a)(33). Respondents contend that this language does not foreclose imputation, but even if so,
that is not enough to require the Board to adopt that policy. Pp. 67.
(b) Neither does the statutes history and context mandate imputation. Section 1229b(a) replaced former 212(c) of the Immigration
and Nationality Act (INA), which allowed the Attorney General to
prevent the removal of an alien with LPR status who had maintained
a lawful unrelinquished domicile of seven consecutive years in this
country. Like 1229b(a), 212(c) was silent on imputation. But every
Court of Appeals that confronted the question concluded that, in determining eligibility for 212(c) relief, the Board should impute a
parents years of domicile to his or her child. Based on this history,
Sawyers contends that Congress would have understood 1229b(a)s

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Syllabus
language to provide for imputation. But in enacting 1229b(a), Congress eliminated the very termdomicileon which the appeals
courts had founded their imputation decisions. And the doctrine of
congressional ratification applies only when Congress reenacts a
statute without relevant change. See Jama v. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 543 U. S. 335, 349.
Nor do the INAs purposes demand imputation. As respondents
correctly observe, many provisions of immigration law advance the
goals of promoting family unity and providing relief to aliens with
strong ties to this country. But these are not the INAs only goals,
and Congress did not pursue them at all costs. For example, aliens
convicted of aggravated felonies are ineligible for cancellation of
removal, regardless of the strength of their family ties, see
1229b(a)(3). In addition, as these cases show, not every alien with
LPR status can immediately get the same for a spouse or minor child.
A silent statute cannot be read as requiring imputation just because
that rule would be family-friendly. Pp. 710.
(c) Respondents advance two additional arguments for why the
Boards position is not entitled to Chevron deference. First, they
claim that the Boards approach to 1229b(a) is arbitrary because it is
inconsistent with the Boards acceptance of imputation under other,
similar provisions that are silent on the matter. See 1182(k) and
1181(b). But the Boards decision in Escobar provided a reasoned
explanation for these divergent results: The Board imputes matters
involving an aliens state of mind, while declining to impute objective
conditions or characteristics. See 24 I. & N. Dec., at 233234, and
n. 4. Section 1229b(a) hinges on the objective facts of immigration
status and place of residence. See id., at 233. So the Boards
approach to 1229b(a) largely follows from one straightforward
distinction.
Second, respondents claim that the BIA adopted its no-imputation
rule only because it thought Congress had left it no other choice. But
Escobar belies this contention.
The Board did explain how
1229b(a)s text supports its no-imputation policy. But the Board also brought its experience and expertise to bear on the matter: It noted that there was no precedent in its decisions for imputing status or
residence, and it argued that allowing imputation under 1229b(a)
would create anomalies in the statutory scheme. Escobar thus expressed the BIAs view that statutory text, administrative practice,
and regulatory policy all pointed toward disallowing imputation. In
making that case, the opinion reads like a multitude of agency interpretations to which this and other courts have routinely deferred.
Pp. 1013.
No. 101542, 411 Fed. Appx. 121; No. 101543, 399 Fed. Appx. 313,

HOLDER v. MARTINEZ GUTIERREZ

Syllabus
reversed and remanded.

KAGAN, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

Cite as: 566 U. S. ____ (2012)

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

Nos. 101542 and 101543

_________________

ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., ATTORNEY GENERAL,

PETITIONER
101542
v.
CARLOS MARTINEZ GUTIERREZ
ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., ATTORNEY GENERAL,
PETITIONER
101543
v.
DAMIEN ANTONIO SAWYERS
ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
[May 21, 2012]

JUSTICE KAGAN delivered the opinion of the Court.

An immigration statute, 8 U. S. C. 1229b(a), authorizes
the Attorney General to cancel the removal of an alien
from the United States so long as the alien satisfies certain criteria. One of those criteria relates to the length of
time an alien has lawfully resided in the United States,
and another to the length of time he has held permanent
resident status here. We consider whether the Board of
Immigration Appeals (BIA or Board) could reasonably
conclude that an alien living in this country as a child
must meet those requirements on his own, without counting a parents years of residence or immigration status.
We hold that the BIAs approach is based on a permissible
construction of the statute.

HOLDER v. MARTINEZ GUTIERREZ

Opinion of the Court

The immigration laws have long given the Attorney

General discretion to permit certain otherwise-removable
aliens to remain in the United States. See Judulang v.
Holder, 565 U. S. ___, ___ (2011) (slip op., at 24). The
Attorney General formerly exercised this authority by
virtue of 212(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act
(INA), 66 Stat. 187, 8 U. S. C. 1182(c) (1994 ed.), a provision with some lingering relevance here, see infra, at 79.
But in 1996, Congress replaced 212(c) with 1229b(a)
(2006 ed.). That new section, applicable to the cases before us, provides as follows:
(a) Cancellation of removal for certain permanent residents
The Attorney General may cancel removal in the case
of an alien who is inadmissible or deportable from the
United States if the alien
(1) has been an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence for not less than 5 years,
(2) has resided in the United States continuously
for 7 years after having been admitted in any status, and
(3) has not been convicted of any aggravated felony. Ibid.
Section 1229b(a) thus specifies the criteria that make an
alien eligible to obtain relief from the Attorney General.
The first paragraph requires that the alien have held the
status of a lawful permanent resident (LPR) for at least
five years. And the second adds that the alien must have
lived in the United States for at least seven continuous
years after a lawful admission, whether as an LPR or in

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Opinion of the Court

some other immigration status.1 (The third paragraph is

not at issue in these cases.)
The question we consider here is whether, in applying
this statutory provision, the BIA should impute a parents
years of continuous residence or LPR status to his or her
child. That question arises because a child may enter the
country lawfully, or may gain LPR status, after one of
his parents does. A parent may therefore satisfy the requirements of 1229b(a)(1) and (2), while his or her
child, considered independently, does not. In these circumstances, is the child eligible for cancellation of removal?
The Ninth Circuit, the first court of appeals to confront
this issue, held that such an alien could obtain relief. See
Cuevas-Gaspar v. Gonzales, 430 F. 3d 1013 (2005). Enrique Cuevas-Gaspar and his parents came to the United
States illegally in 1985, when he was one year old. CuevasGaspars mother was lawfully admitted to the country
in 1990, as an LPR. But Cuevas-Gaspar was lawfully
admitted only in 1997, when he too received LPR status.
That meant that when Cuevas-Gaspar committed a removable offense in 2002, he could not independently satisfy 1229b(a)(2)s requirement of seven consecutive years of
residence after a lawful entry.2 (The parties agreed that
he just met 1229b(a)(1)s 5-year status requirement.) The
Board deemed Cuevas-Gaspar ineligible for relief on that
account, but the Ninth Circuit found that position unrea
1 The

INA defines admitted as referring to the lawful entry of

the alien into the United States after inspection and authorization by
an immigration officer. 8 U. S. C. 1101 (a)(13)(A). The 7-year clock of
1229b(a)(2) thus begins with an aliens lawful entry.
2 The 7-year clock stopped running on the date of Cuevas-Gaspars
offense under a statutory provision known as the stop-time rule. See
1229b(d)(1) (For purposes of this section, any period of continuous
residence . . . in the United States shall be deemed to end . . . when the
alien is served a notice to appear . . . or . . . when the alien has committed an offense . . . that renders the alien . . . removable from the United
States . . . , whichever is earliest).

HOLDER v. MARTINEZ GUTIERREZ

Opinion of the Court

sonable. According to the Court of Appeals, the Board

should have imputed to Cuevas-Gaspar his mothers
years of continuous residence during the time he lived
with her as an unemancipated minor. Id., at 1029. That
approach, the Ninth Circuit reasoned, followed from both
the INAs priorit[ization] of familial relations and the
Boards consistent willingness to make imputations from
a parent to a child in many areas of immigration law. Id.,
at 1026.
The Board responded by reiterating its opposition to
imputation under both relevant paragraphs of 1229b(a).
In In re Escobar, 24 I. & N. Dec. 231 (2007), the Board
considered whether a child could rely on a parents period
of LPR status to satisfy 1229b(a)(1)s 5-year clock. The
Board expressly disagree[d] with the reasoning of CuevasGaspar, rejecting the Ninth Circuits understanding of
both the statute and the Boards prior policies. 24 I. & N.
Dec., at 233234, and n. 4. Accordingly, the Board announced that it would decline to extend Cuevas-Gaspar
to any case involving 1229b(a)(1), and that it would
ignore the decision even as to 1229b(a)(2) outside the
Ninth Circuit. 24 I. & N. Dec., at 235. A year later, in
Matter of Ramirez-Vargas, 24 I. & N. Dec. 599 (2008), the
BIA took the final step: It rejected imputation under
1229b(a)(2) in a case arising in the Ninth Circuit, maintaining that the court should abandon Cuevas-Gaspar and
defer to the Boards intervening reasoned decision in
Escobar. See Ramirez-Vargas, 24 I. & N. Dec., at 600601
(citing National Cable & Telecommunications Assn. v.
Brand X Internet Services, 545 U. S. 967 (2005)).
The BIAs position on imputation touched off a split in
the courts of appeals. The Third and Fifth Circuits both
deferred to the BIAs approach as a reasonable construction of 1229b(a). See Augustin v. Attorney Gen., 520 F. 3d
264 (CA3 2008); Deus v. Holder, 591 F. 3d 807 (CA5 2009).
But in Mercado-Zazueta v. Holder, 580 F. 3d 1102 (2009),

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Opinion of the Court

the Ninth Circuit doubled down on its contrary view,

declaring the BIAs position unreasonable and requiring
imputation under both 1229b(a)(1) and (a)(2). See id.,
at 1103 ([T]he rationale and holding of Cuevas-Gaspar
apply equally to the five-year permanent residence and
the seven-year continuance residence requirements of
1229b(a)).
B
Two cases are before us. In 1989, at the age of five,
respondent Carlos Martinez Gutierrez illegally entered
the United States with his family. Martinez Gutierrezs
father was lawfully admitted to the country two years
later as an LPR. But Martinez Gutierrez himself was
neither lawfully admitted nor given LPR status until
2003. Two years after that, Martinez Gutierrez was apprehended for smuggling undocumented aliens across the
border. He admitted the offense, and sought cancellation
of removal. The Immigration Judge concluded that Martinez Gutierrez qualified for relief because of his fathers
immigration history, even though Martinez Gutierrez
could not satisfy either 1229b(a)(1) or 1229b(a)(2) on his
own. See App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 101542, pp. 20a
22a (citing Cuevas-Gaspar, 430 F. 3d 1013). The BIA
reversed, and after entry of a removal order on remand,
reaffirmed its disposition in an order relying on Escobar,
see App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 101542, at 5a6a. The
Ninth Circuit then granted Martinez Gutierrezs petition
for review and remanded the case to the Board for reconsideration in light of the courts contrary decisions. See
411 Fed. Appx. 121 (2011).
Respondent Damien Sawyers was lawfully admitted as
an LPR in October 1995, when he was 15 years old. At
that time, his mother had already resided in the country
for six consecutive years following a lawful entry. After
Sawyerss conviction of a drug offense in August 2002, the

HOLDER v. MARTINEZ GUTIERREZ

Opinion of the Court

Government initiated removal proceedings. The Immigration Judge found Sawyers ineligible for cancellation of
removal because he was a few months shy of the seven
years of continuous residence required under 1229b(a)(2).
See App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 101543, p. 13a. (No one
doubted that Sawyers had by that time held LPR status
for five years, as required under 1229b(a)(1).) The Board
affirmed, relying on its reasoning in Escobar. See In
re Sawyers, No. A44 852 478, 2007 WL 4711443 (Dec.
26, 2007). Sawyers petitioned the Ninth Circuit for
review, arguing that the Board should have counted his
mothers years of residency while he was a minor toward
1229b(a)(2)s 7-year requirement. As in Gutierrez, the
Court of Appeals granted the petition and remanded the
case to the BIA. See 399 Fed. Appx. 313 (2010).
We granted the Governments petitions for certiorari,
564 U. S. ___ (2011), consolidated the cases, and now
reverse the Ninth Circuits judgments.
II
The Board has required each alien seeking cancellation
of removal to satisfy 1229b(a)s requirements on his own,
without counting a parents years of continuous residence
or LPR status. That position prevails if it is a reasonable
construction of the statute, whether or not it is the only
possible interpretation or even the one a court might think
best. See Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 843844, and n. 11
(1984); see also INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U. S. 415,
424425 (1999) (according Chevron deference to the
Boards interpretations of the INA). We think the BIAs
view on imputation meets that standard, and so need not
decide if the statute permits any other construction.
The Boards approach is consistent with the statutes
text, as even respondents tacitly concede.
Section
1229b(a) does not mention imputation, much less require

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Opinion of the Court

it. The provision calls for the aliennot, say, the alien
or one of his parentsto meet the three prerequisites for
cancellation of removal. Similarly, several of 1229b(a)s
other terms have statutory definitions referring to only a
single individual. See, e.g., 1101(a)(13)(A) (The terms
admission and admitted mean, with respect to an alien,
the lawful entry of the alien into the United States (emphasis added)); 1101(a)(33) (The term residence means
the place of general abode; the place of general abode of
a person means his principal, actual dwelling (emphasis
added)). Respondents contend that none of this language
forecloses imputation: They argue that if the Board
allowed imputation, [t]he alien seeking cancellation
would still have to satisfy the provisions durational
requirementsjust pursuant to a different computational
rule. Brief for Respondent Martinez Gutierrez in No. 10
1542, p. 16 (hereinafter Martinez Gutierrez Brief); see
Brief for Respondent Sawyers in No. 101543, pp. 11, 15
(hereinafter Sawyers Brief). And they claim that the
Boards history of permitting imputation under similarly
silent statutes supports this construction. Martinez
Gutierrez Brief 16; see Sawyers Brief 1516; infra, at 10
11. But even if soeven if the Board could adopt an
imputation rule consistent with the statutes textthat
would not avail respondents. Taken alone, the language of
1229b(a) at least permits the Board to go the other way
to say that the alien must meet the statutory conditions
independently, without relying on a parents history.
For this reason, respondents focus on 1229b(a)s history
and contextparticularly, the provisions relationship to
the INAs former 212(c) and its associated imputation
rule. Section 212(c)1229b(a)s predecessorgenerally
allowed the Attorney General to prevent the removal of an
alien with LPR status who had maintained a lawful
unrelinquished domicile of seven consecutive years in this
country. 8 U. S. C. 1182(c) (1994 ed.). Like 1229b(a),

HOLDER v. MARTINEZ GUTIERREZ

Opinion of the Court

212(c) was silent on imputation. Yet the Second, Third,

and Ninth Circuits (the only appellate courts to consider
the question) concluded that, in determining eligibility for
relief under 212(c), the Board should impute a parents
years of domicile to his or her child. See Rosario v. INS,
962 F. 2d 220 (CA2 1992); Lepe-Guitron v. INS, 16 F. 3d
1021, 10241026 (CA9 1994); Morel v. INS, 90 F. 3d 833,
840842 (CA3 1996). Those courts reasoned that at common law, a minors domicile was the same as that of its
parents, since most children are presumed not legally
capable of forming the requisite intent to establish their
own domicile. Rosario, 962 F. 2d, at 224; see Mississippi
Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U. S. 30, 48
(1989) (defining domicile as physical presence in a place
in connection with a certain state of mind concerning ones
intent to remain there). So by the time Congress replaced
212(c) with 1229b(a), the BIA often imputed a parents
years of domicile to a child in determining eligibility for
cancellation of removal. Sawyers argues that against this
backdrop, Congress would have understood the language
it chose [in 1229b(a)] to provide for imputation. Sawyers
Brief 10.
But we cannot conclude that Congress ratified an imputation requirement when it passed 1229b(a). As all parties
agree, Congress enacted 1229b(a)(1) and (a)(2) to resolve
an unrelated question about 212(c)s meaning. See id.,
at 17; Martinez Gutierrez Brief 28; Brief for Petitioner
25. Courts had differed on whether an aliens seven
consecutive years of domicile under 212(c) all had to
post-date the aliens obtaining LPR status. See CuevasGaspar, 430 F. 3d, at 10271028 (canvassing split). Congress addressed that split by creating two distinct durational conditions: the 5-year status requirement of subsection (a)(1), which runs from the time an alien becomes an
LPR, and the 7-year continuous-residency requirement of
subsection (a)(2), which can include years preceding the

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Opinion of the Court

acquisition of LPR status. In doing so, Congress eliminated the very termdomicileon which the appeals courts
had founded their imputation decisions. See supra, at 8.
That alteration dooms respondents position, because the
doctrine of congressional ratification applies only when
Congress reenacts a statute without relevant change. See
Jama v. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 543 U. S.
335, 349 (2005).3 So the statutory history here provides no
basis for holding that the BIA flouted a congressional
command in adopting its no-imputation policy.
Nor do the INAs purposes demand imputation here, as
both respondents claim. According to Martinez Gutierrez,
the BIAs approach contradicts that statutes objectives of
providing relief to aliens with strong ties to the United
States and promoting family unity. Martinez Gutierrez
Brief 40, 44; see Sawyers Brief 37. We agreeindeed, we
have statedthat the goals respondents identify underlie
or inform many provisions of immigration law. See Fiallo
v. Bell, 430 U. S. 787, 795, n. 6 (1977); INS v. Errico, 385
U. S. 214, 220 (1966). But they are not the INAs only
goals, and Congress did not pursue them to the nth degree. To take one example, 1229b(a)s third paragraph
makes aliens convicted of aggravated felonies ineligible for

3 Sawyers contends that 1229b(a)(2)s replacement termresided

continuouslyis a term of art in the immigration context which
incorporates an intent component and so means the same thing as
domiciled. Sawyers Brief 2526 (emphasis deleted). Thus, Sawyers
argues, we should read 1229b(a) as reenacting 212(c) without meaningful change. See id., at 25. But even assuming that Congress could
ratify judicial decisions based on the term domicile through a new
statute using a synonym for that term, we do not think resided continuously qualifies. The INA defines residence as a persons principal, actual dwelling place in fact, without regard to intent, 8 U. S. C.
1101(a)(33) (emphasis added), and we find nothing to suggest that
Congress added an intent element, inconsistent with that definition, by
requiring that the residence have been maintained continuously for 7
years.

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Opinion of the Court

cancellation of removal, regardless of the strength of their

family ties. See 1229b(a)(3). And more generallyas
these very cases shownot every alien who obtains LPR
status can immediately get the same for her spouse or
minor children. See Brief for Petitioner 3132, and n. 9
(providing program-specific examples). We cannot read a
silent statute as requiring (not merely allowing) imputation just because that rule would be family-friendly.
Respondents stronger arguments take a different
tackthat we should refuse to defer to the Boards decision even assuming Congress placed the question of imputation in its hands. Respondents offer two main reasons.
First, they contend that the Boards approach to 1229b(a)
cannot be squared with its acceptance of imputation under
other, similar statutory provisions. This wil[d] and [u]nexplained inconsistency, Sawyers asserts, is the very
paradigm of arbitrary agency action. Sawyers Brief
13, 41 (emphasis deleted); see Martinez Gutierrez Brief
5254. Second, they argue that the Board did not appreciate its own discretion over whether to allow imputation.
The Board, they say, thought Congress had forbidden
imputation, and so did not bring its experience and
expertise to bear on the issue. Id., at 31 (quoting PDK
Labs. Inc. v. DEA, 362 F. 3d 786, 797 (CADC 2004)); see
Sawyers Brief 3839. These arguments are not insubstantial, but in the end neither persuades us to deny the Board
the usual deference we accord to agency interpretations.
Start with the claim of inconsistency. The BIA has
indeed imputed parental attributes to children under
other INA provisions that do not mention the matter.
Section 1182(k), for example, enables the Attorney General to let certain inadmissible aliens into the country if he
finds that inadmissibility was not known to, and could
not have been ascertained by the exercise of reasonable
diligence by, the immigrant before the time of departure.
Like 1229b(a), that provision refers to a single person

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11

Opinion of the Court

(the immigrant) and says nothing about imputation. But

the BIA has consistently imputed a parents knowledge
of inadmissibility (or lack thereof ) to a child. See, e.g.,
Senica v. INS, 16 F. 3d 1013, 1015 (CA9 1994) (Therefore,
the BIA reasoned, the children were not entitled to relief
under [1182(k)] because [their mothers] knowledge was
imputed to them); In re Mushtaq, No. A43 968 082, 2007
WL 4707539 (BIA, Dec. 10, 2007) (per curiam); In re Ahmed, No. A41 982 631, 2006 WL 448156 (BIA, Jan. 17,
2006) (per curiam).
Similarly, the Board imputes a parents abandonment
(or non-abandonment) of LPR status to her child when
determining whether that child can reenter the country as
a returning resident immigran[t] under 1181(b). See
Matter of Zamora, 17 I. & N. Dec. 395, 396 (1980) (holding that a voluntary and intended abandonment by the
mother is imputed to an unemancipated minor child for
purposes of applying 1181(b)); Matter of Huang, 19 I.
& N. Dec. 749, 755756 (1988) (concluding that a mother
and her children abandoned their LPR status based
solely on the mothers intent); In re Ali, No. A44 143 723,
2006 WL 3088820 (BIA, Sept. 11, 2006) (holding that a
child could not have abandoned his LPR status if his
mother had not abandoned hers). And once again, that is
so even though neither 1181(b) nor any other statutory
provision says that the BIA should look to the parent in
assessing the childs eligibility for reentry.
But Escobar provided a reasoned explanation for these
divergent results: The Board imputes matters involving an
aliens state of mind, while declining to impute objective
conditions or characteristics. See 24 I. & N. Dec., at 233
234, and n. 4. On one side of the line, knowledge of inadmissibility is all and only about a mental state. See, e.g.,
Senica, 16 F. 3d, at 1015; In re Ahmed, 2006 WL 448156.
Likewise, abandonment of status turns on an aliens intention of . . . returning to the United States to live as a

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Opinion of the Court

permanent resident, Zamora, 17 I. & N. Dec., at 396; the

Board thus explained that imputing abandonment is
consistent with the . . . longstanding policy that a child
cannot form the intent necessary to establish his or her
own domicile, Escobar, 24 I. & N. Dec., at 234, n. 4. And
as that analogy recalls, the 7-year domicile requirement of
the former 212(c) also involved intent and so lent itself to
imputation. See Rosario, 962 F. 2d, at 224; supra, at 8.
But the 5- and 7-year clocks of 1229b(a) fall on the other
side of the line, because they hinge not on any state of
mind but on the objective facts of immigration status and
place of residence. See Escobar, 24 I. & N. Dec., at 233
([W]e find that residence is different from domicile because it contains no element of subjective intent (quoting Cuevas-Gaspar, 430 F. 3d, at 1031 (Fernandez, J.,
dissenting))). The BIAs varied rulings on imputation thus
largely follow from one straightforward distinction.4
Similarly, Escobar belies respondents claim that the
BIA adopted its no-imputation rule only because it
thought Congress had left it no other choice. The Board,
to be sure, did not highlight the statutes gaps or ambiguity;
rather, it read 1229b(a)s text to support its conclusion
that each alien must personally meet that sections dura
4 Respondents aver that the BIA deviates from this principle in imputing to a child his parents firm resettlement in another country,
which renders an alien ineligible for asylum without regard to intent.
See Sawyers Brief 39; Martinez Gutierrez Brief 52. But the Government denies that it has a settled imputation rule in that context.
Reply Brief for Petitioner 13. And the sources on which respondents
rely are slender reeds: a 40-year old ruling by a regional commissioner
(not the Board itself) that considered the conduct of both the parents
and the child, see Matter of Ng, 12 I. & N. Dec. 411 (1967), and a Ninth
Circuit decision imputing a parents resettlement even though the
Board had focused only on the childs actions, see Vang v. INS, 146
F. 3d 1114, 1117 (1998). Based on these scant decisions, we cannot
conclude that the Board has any policy on imputing resettlement, let
alone one inconsistent with Escobar.

Cite as: 566 U. S. ____ (2012)

13

Opinion of the Court

tional requirements. See 24 I. & N. Dec., at 235. But the

Board also explained that there [was] no precedent in its
decisions for imputing status or residence, and distinguished those statutory terms, on the ground just explained, from domicile or abandonment of LPR status. Id.,
at 234; see id., at 233234, and n. 4. And the Board argued that allowing imputation under 1229b(a) would
create anomalies in administration of the statutory
scheme by permitting even those who had not obtained
LPR statusor could not do so because of a criminal
historyto become eligible for cancellation of removal.
See id., at 234235, and n. 5. The Board therefore saw
neither a logical nor a legal basis for adopting a policy
of imputation. Id., at 233. We see nothing in this decision
to suggest that the Board thought its hands tied, or that it
might have reached a different result if assured it could do
so. To the contrary, the decision expressed the BIAs view,
based on its experience implementing the INA, that statutory text, administrative practice, and regulatory policy all
pointed in one direction: toward disallowing imputation.
In making that case, the decision reads like a multitude
of agency interpretationsnot the best example, but far
from the worstto which we and other courts have routinely deferred. We see no reason not to do so here.
Because the Boards rejection of imputation under
1229b(a) is based on a permissible construction of the
statute, Chevron, 467 U. S., at 843, we reverse the Ninth
Circuits judgments and remand the cases for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.