THE JOURNAL

OF THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF

BUDDHIST STUDIES

EDITOR-IN-CHIEF
A. K. Narain
University of Wisconsin, Madison, USA

EDITORS
Heinz Bechert
Universitdt Gottingen, FRG

Leon Hurvitz
UBC, Vancouver, Canada

Lewis Lancaster
University of California, Berkeley, USA

Alexander W. MacDonald
Universite de Paris X, Nanterre, France

B.J. Stavisky
WNIIR, Moscow, USSR

Alex Way man

Columbia University, New York, USA

ASSOCIATE EDITOR
Stephan Beyer
University of Wisconsin, Madison, USA

Volume 3

1980

Number 2

CONTENTS
I. ARTICLES
1.

2.

3.
4.
5.

A Yogacara Analysis of the Mind, Based on the Vijndna Section

of Vasubandhu's Pancaskandhaprakarana with Gunaprabha's Commentary, by Brian Galloway
T h e Realm of Enlightenment in Vijnaptimdtratd: The Formulation of the "Four Kinds of Pure Dharmas", by Noriaki
Hakamaya, translated from the Japanese by John Keenan
Hu-Jan Nien-Ch'i (Suddenly a Thought Rose) Chinese Understanding of Mind and Consciousness, by Whalen Lai
Notes on the Ratnakuta Collection, by K. Priscilla Pedersen
T h e Sixteen Aspects of the Four Noble Truths and Their
Opposites, by Alex Wayman

21
42
60
67

II. SHORT PAPERS

1.
2.
3.

Kaniska's Buddha Coins The Official Iconography of

Sakyamuni & Maitreya, by Joseph Cribb
"Buddha-Mazda" from Kara-tepe in Old Termez (Uzbekistan):
A Preliminary Communication, by Boris J. Stavisky
FausbpU and the Pali Jatakas, by Elisabeth Strandberg

79
89
95

III. BOOK REVIEWS

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

6.

Love and Sympathy in Theravada Buddhism, by Harvey B.

Aronson
103
Chukan to Vuishiki (Madhyamika and Vijriaptimatrata), by
Gadjin Nagao
105
Introduction a la connaissance des hlvin bal de Thailande,
by Anatole-Roger Peltier
107
Buddhism, Imperialism, and War. Burma and Thailand in
Modern History, by Trevor Ling.
109
Zhongguo foxue yuanliu liiejiang
(Brief lectures on the origins and development of Chinese
Buddhology), by Lu Cheng
111
T h e Jaina Path of Purification, by Padmanabh S. Jaini
112

IV. NOTES AND NEWS

1. Minutes of the Joint Meeting of the Executive Committee
and the Board of Directors of the 2nd Annual Conference
of the IABS at Nalanda, 1979
116
Contributors

118

A Yogacara Analysis of the Mind, Based

on the Vijndna section of Vasubandhu's
Pancaskandhaprakararia with
Guijaprabha's Commentary 1

by Brian Galloway

Buddhist philosophy concerns itself both with the exposition of ultimate

reality and the functioning of samsdra. For ultimate reality, most
Mahayanists historically have preferred the analyses of the Madhyamika
school; but for the functioning of samsara, the Yogacara school seems to
have the more subtle and complex theory.
Before discussing it, however, we must decide how we are to deal
with the many technical terms found in its literature. There are those
who feel that technical terms should not be translated at all, and others
who translate them in some very idiosyncratic and inconsistent ways,
based on a supposedly superior understanding that they alone possess.
As for the first, it only needs to be pointed out that leaving a term
untranslated does not guarantee that we will understand it properly.
Having said this, it is apparent that our first task is to understand the
word's meaning, and this can only be done by examining the usage of
the word in the various contexts in which it is found, and by taking note
of the explicit definition of the word, if an explicit definition is found in
the literature. Then, having understood the word, we may indeed find
that there is an accurate English term with the same range of meaning.
Concerning the second group, we may say that their impressionistic and haphazard method of translating might be justified in dealing
with texts written cryptically from the standpoint of ultimate reality,
provided that the translator shares the profundity of insight of the
original author. But it will hardly do in scientific/technical literature of
the Yogacara type. By scientific/technical I mean that this literature is
analogous to modern scientific exposition: it uses technical terms
7

strictly; it analyzes and categorizes; impressionistic or vague ramblings

are utterly foreign to it. T h e difference between it and modern scientific thought is only that the Buddhist technical writing takes as given the
thesis that there exists, objectively and in real truth, a state of mind,
possible for a human being to develop, that is qualitatively different
from and better than ordinary consciousness: different, in that it
makes all worldly considerations pale into insignificance; better, in that
it makes for true happiness both for oneself and for the others that one
helps.
I have goen into the matter of Yogacara technical terms in a
previous article, "Vijndna, Samjnd, and Manas," which was printed in
the Middle Way, Vol. 53, No. 2 (Summer 1978). There I argued that the
words in the title have been incorrectly translated in the past, 2 and
proposed the translations given in this chart:

vijndna
samjnd
manas

Correct
Translation

Formerly
Prevailing Tr.

perception
recognition
consciousness

(consciousness)
(perception)
(mind)

T o recapitulate my arguments of that article: vijndna is what happens

when there is a sense organ, a sense object, no obstruction between
them, and a mind that functions properly; it is the first mental event
that occurs and does not involve any "thinking" of vitarka-vicara or
kalpand. It is "the naked, unadorned, apprehension of each stimulus"
(Conze quoting the Abhidharmakosa*); it "grasps the mere object" or
"the object alone" (don tsam 'dzin to: Gunaprabha in his commentary on
Vasubandhu's Pancaskandhaprakarana*). Vijndna therefore does not
correspond to the English word "consciousness", which always involves
an idea of selfhood (as I show by quotation from the Oxford English
Dictionary), but to perception in its strict, modern, scientific sense, that
is, sense-perception. (Thus vijndna corresponds to the German Wahrnehmung, not to Bewusstsein.)
Some may argue that the word "perception" (here I am bringing
in new arguments, not present in my earlier article) is properly the
translation of the logical term pratyaksa. So it is, but this does not pose a
problem here, because vijndna and pratyaska really mean the same
thing. In Dignaga's Pramdnasamuccaya we find that pratyaksam kalpand8

podham5 which is exactly what is said of vijndna. "When the eye comes in
contact with a color, for instance blue, visual consciousness [sic] arises
which is awareness of the presence of a color; but it does not recognise
that it is blue. T h e r e is no recognition at this stage" (Rahula in What the
Buddha Taught6). Dignaga, while discussing pratyaksa, adduces this
quotation from an unspecified Abhidharma treatise:
caksurvijndnasamahgi nilam vijndndti no tu nilamiti (Daa-2)7
"One who can perceive by the eye perceives blue, but not 'this is blue."'
T h e point is that Dignaga quotes this as an explanation of the nature
of pratyaksa, though this word never appears there, and the quotation is
couched entirely in terms of vijndna (the verb vijndndti is used). That is,
he takes pratyaksa and vijndna to be fundamentally the same. The
reason for using pratyaksa rather than the older term is probably twofold: it was desirable to have a special term for use in the context of
epistemology//logic (pramdna)', and over the centuries the word vijndna
perhaps became debased in that there grew up around it a mass of
vague impressions (while its fundamental meaning of course remained
unchanged).
T o return to my former article, I think I have shown that samjnd
means "recognition." Gunaprabha states that samjnd, "having discerned
the same object [as in a prior perception), grasps it with sureness" ('du
shes ni yul de nyid yong su bead nas nges par 'dzin pa ste).H Vasubandhu's
definition of samjnd, on which Gunaprabha is commenting, is this:
"grasping an object by its sign" (yul la mtshan par 'dzin pa).* Sthiramati,
another commentator on this same text, explains that "a sign is the
particular of an object, blue, yellow, etc.; it is the basis of classification
of a phenomenon. Grasping by a sign is thinking, 'This is blue, this is
yellow' (mtshan ma ni yul gyi bye brag sngon po dang ser po la sogs pa dmigs pa
rnam par gzhag pa 'i rgyu 'o.dela mtshan mar 'dzin pa ni 'di ni sngon po 'o 'di ni
serpo'o zhes rtogpa'o).10 Rahula uses the word "recognition" as a definition of samjnd (though he translates it differently): samjnd "recognizes
that it is blue."'' Buddhagosa, in his Visuddhimagga, defines it exactly as
does Vasubandhu, and compares it to what happens when a carpenter
sees a pile of wood that he has previously marked with a sign to indicate
what type of wood it is (he recognizes it as previously classified).
As for manas, this is explicitly stated in Abhidharma works (including the present one, as we shall see) to be associated with the illusion of
self, which means that it is really "consciousness" in English.
9

This may seem to be a great fuss about a few words; but these are
words of absolute and crucial importance. We cannot simply assume
that we know what they mean. These terms must be thought about; they
must be investigated seriously on a theoretical level and in a scientific
fashion. Of course, there are those who prefer to translate technical
terms however they see fit at a given moment, drawing on the latest
fashionable jargon of twelve different Western philosophical and
linguistic systems; but this sort of impressionist method of translation is
simply not accurate, authentic, or appropriate for serious scientific
Abhidharma works, however useful it may be when one is pretending
to be profound.
We usually think of the mind (the subject of this paper) as the
objective correlative of consciousness. But this is not the Buddhist view.
In Buddhism, the starting point of any discussion of the mind is not
consciousness but perception (vijndna); consciousness comes later. The
mind is seen as a group of perception-processes: sometimes as a group of
six, at other times as a group of eight. Vasubandhu, in his discussion of
perception, which becomes a discussion of the mind, in his Pancaskandhapraharana (which we shall now examine in detail together with
Gunaprabha's commentary), 12 begins by asking the time-honored
question, What is perception? He answers his own question thusly:
vijndnam dlambanavijnaptihl
"Perception is the manifestation of a phenomenon." Now we have two
more technical terms to discuss.
In calling the perceived object a "phenomenon" we are avoiding
asserting that any real object exists; phenomena may be expressions of
reality or illusions. This is in keeping with the Yogacara belief that real
objects do not in fact exist philosophically.
For "manifestation" as a translation oi'vijnapti see Apte's Practical
Sanskrit-English Dictionary, wherein he defines it as "communication"
and "announcement." T h e manifestation of course takes place in the
mind.
Gunaprabha, in his commentary, now tells us that the phenomena
are of six kinds. Why only six? Gunaprabha and Vasubandhu are Yogacarins who intend to elaborate a doctrine of eight kinds, but they wish
first to establish the traditional-Buddhist six as a foundation on which
to build. Gunaprabha therefore lists the six; let us list them here
10

together with the corresponding sense-organs (called "supports" or

asraya in Buddhism) and the perceptions.
Perception
(vijndna)

Support
{asraya)

Phenomenon
(dlambana)

eye-perception
ear-perception
nose-perception
tongue-perception
body-perception
consciousness
perception

eye
ear
nose
tongue
body
consciousness
(manas)

forms (rupa)
sounds
smells
tastes
tangibles
elements {dharrna)

Concerning these terms, first we observe that it is unimportant whether

we use singular or plural forms; in English, plurals are perhaps better
here to indicate that we are not dealing with abstractions but with
specific realities.
Form (rupa) here means objects perceived by the eye, hence
"sights"; it should be noted carefully, however, that the same word
iorm/rupa has another meaning, in which it includes all of the abovelisted phenomena plus the first five supports (the material senseorgans), plus something called "unmanifest form" (avijnaptirupa).
(Aside from this last, rupa in this sense corresponds to the Western
concept of "matter" which is based on the idea that tangibles (sprastavya)
are basic but also can be apprehended also by form, sound, smell, etc.)
One has to j u d g e from context whether iorm/rupa means sight-objects
or all manifest and unmanifest form (vijnaptyavijnaptirupa).
T h e "elements" (dharrna) in the above chart as objects of consciousness (manas) are not all elements in the Yogacara list of one hundred
elements. All are grouped into five categories as follows.
Form (rupa) in the larger sense
Mind (citta), the eight perceptions about to be discussed
Mentals (caitta), certain mental functions, mostly emotions
Non-Mentals (citta-viprayukta), certain functions and processes
Uncompoundeds (asamskrta), including tathatd
T h e elements meant in the present instance as objects of consciousness
(manas) are the mentals, the non-mentals, the uncompoundeds, and
avijnaptirupa. Concerning the six phenomena listed, Gunaprabha now
11

tells us, "Their assimilation (khongdu chudpa) is manifestation, is perception. These are the six beginning perceptions (pravrttivijndna)"
He continues, explaining the exact relationship between a perception, its corresponding "support", or sense-organ, and its corresponding "phenomenon", or object. (Rather than translate with painful
literalness, "If it be asked, what is eye-perception, it is . . ." I prefer to
give, "Eye-perception is . ..")
"Eye-perception is the various manifestations of which the eye is
the support and forms are the phenomena; ear-perception is the
various manifestations of which the ear is the support and sounds the
phenomena; nose-perception is the various manifestations of which
the nose is the support and smells the pheonmena; tongue-perception
is the various manifestations of which the tongue is the support and
tastes the phenomena; body-perception is the various manifestations
of which the body is the support and tangibles the phenomena;
consciousness-perception (manovijndna) is the various manifestations
of which consciousness (manas) is the support and [certain] elements
the phenomena."
T h e next passage is somewhat confusingly written. Vasubandhu
tells us that perception "is mind (citta) and consciousness (manas),
because it is variegated (citra) and the support of consciousness (yid rten
byedpa, }mana-dsraya).
Perception (vijndna)
mind (citta)

Consciousness (manas)

Variegated (citra)

Support of consciousness

I .

What he means is this: "The six perceptions constitute the mind in the
traditional Buddhist view; this mind is variegated, or a variety, because
there is a sixfold variety of perception-processes, and because (as
Gunaprabha will tell you) within each of the six there is a variety of
forms to be perceived. (Also, there is the pleasing pun of citra with citta.)
But the mind is more than this. T h e six perceptions form the support
of a seventh that arises on the foundation of the six. And this seventh is
consciousness (manas)."
Gunaprabha tells us exactly how this arising takes place: "As it is
said,
12

Right after the cessation of the six,

Whate'er perception comes is consciousness.
That which occurs right after the stopping of whatever-it-may-be is
called consciousness (manas). For example, the son of one may be the
father of another, the fruit of one [tree J becomes the seed of another,
and likewise when the six fruits of the beginning perceptions are
stopped, they become supports of the arising of another perception,
and hence are called the supports of consciousness. So the mind has
been explained as the six beginning perceptions."
But, we must add, it has been explained as six perceptions giving
rise to the seventh, called consciousness (manas). And this must not be
confused with consciousness-perception (manovijndna).
Now comes the crucial part. Vasubandhu here defines the mind
in a completely different way; but the new view will turn out to be fully
compatible with the old; it will supply a deep basis or foundation for the
old view. He states:
"In reality, the mind is the storehouse perception (dlayavijndna);
because it is the assembly (cita, another play on citta) of the seeds (bija) of
all compoundings (satnskdra)." In this word sam means together, while
kdra is the vrdhhi form of kr 'make, do' plus a. Whitney, in his Sanskrit
Grammar (sees. 1145 and 1148b-c) says that such a formation may be
either a nomen actionis or a nomen agentis; thus our word may be translated either "compoundings" or "compounders"; the Tibetan 'du byed
could stand for either; the first is almost certainly correct and could
also have an agentive force. (Cf. asarnskrtal 'du ma byasl uncompoundeds.)
T h e word has at least two meanings: generally, all worldly things,
including all the five skandhas (See Rahula, What the Buddha Taught, p.
22 & no. 2, p. 57 8c n. 2); that is, all things that consist of component
parts, hence all things that are subject to analysis (separation into
parts); in this sense we are tempted to translate "compoundeds" which
is probable and linguistically possible (though this would more specifically be samskrta). Excluded are space (dkdsa), two kinds of cessation
(nirodha), and suchness (tathatd).
Specifically, in the Abhidharma, as here, sarnskdras are the caittadharmas other than feeling (vedand) and recognition (samjnd), plus the
cittaxnprayuktadharmas. Since the sarnskdras here are specific elements we
are tempted to call them "compounders", things that make up a
compounding; but for both senses "compoundings" may be the best
13

solution. Psychologically samskdras are "unconscious tendencies."

So Vasubandhu has now defined the mind as the sarvasamskdrabijacita, the assembly of the seeds of all unconscious tendencies or
"compoundings." Gunaprabha now tells us, '"All compoundings'
means the passional elements {klistadharma). They arise from four
conditions (pratyaya)" His next words are more easily comprehended
in the form of a chart:
Basic condition
(hetupratyaya)

Perfumings (vdsand) dwelling in

the storehouse perception

Ruling condition
{adhipatipratyaya)

Six sense organs

Immediate condition
(samanantarapratyaya)

Consciousness (manas)

Phenomenal condition
{dlambanapratyaya)

Form, sounds, smells, etc.

Hetu is often translated as "cause", but a causeforces the result, whereas

a hetu merely provides the basis on which the result can occur. It
provides, in other words, the context within which the result can occur.
It should, therefore, be translated as basis. In Buddhist thought there is
no real "causation" at all, since events merely take place within a net of
interrelationships; they are dependent on each other in a sense (conditioned origination, pratityasamutpdda), but they do not force each other;
they merely assist (in the French sense of being present): "this present,
that occurs."
It has been suggested that vdsand might better be translated as
"experientially initiated potentiality of experience" or some such. But
if Vasubandhu and others had wanted to use such an expression, they
could easily have done so in Sanskrit: anubhavasambhavdnubhavasakyatd
might serve. If one translates vdsand literally as "perfuming" the idea is
clearer. If one dips a cloth into perfumed water and then hangs it out to
dry, the perfume that has pervaded the cloth remains in it after the
water has all evaporated. Similarly the experiences and passions
remain in the storehouse perception (the Unconscious of Western
thought) after the initial stimulus is gone. The mind has been semipermanently affected (since nothing at all is truly permanent in
Buddhism) and thus is called perfumed by the perfumings {vdsand) of
former action. T h e word perfuming does make the idea clear, and that is
why such a word was chosen by Vasubandhu and others in the first
14

place, rather than the more complicated phrase given above.

Now Gunaprabha wishes to explain the process of the generation
of the compoundings, the perfumings, and the storehouse perception
itself. Beginning with the beginning perceptions (prai>rttivijndna)< he
states:
"Supported on the eye etc. and on form etc., eye-perception etc.
arises. Immediately afterwards, the consciousness-perception (yid kyi
rnam par shes pa, manovijndna) becomes aware of (rtog go) the object
(visaya). From completed awareness arises lust (rdga) and the other
passions (klesa). Then action (karma) arises, which is called compoundings
(samskdra) of meritorious (pimya), sinful (apunya), or neutral character.
Compoundings are here to be seen as mentation (cetand). When the
action of their birth is stopped, they produce perfumings (vdsand) in
the storehouse perception. In this way the passional elements produce
perfumings in the storehouse perception. From the greater and
greater assembling (cita) of all seeds of perfumings comes the mind."
All this can best be seen in a chart (here "6P" means the six beginning
perceptions; "SP" means the eighth or storehouse perception):
Six organs
6P manovijiidna + Passions (klesa)
Six phenomena
Action (karma)
Compoundings (samskdra)
Mentation (cetand)

Perfumings (vdsand) SP

(Or is manovijridna an error for manas, which is stated elsewhere to arise

out of the six?)
T h e r e is a certain reciprocity in this causal chain. Gunaprabha
states, "As the storehouse perception is the basis (hetu) of all the passional
compoundings (klistasamskdra), so do they in turn form the basis (hetu)
of the storehouse perception." This might be represented by an arrow
going back from "SP" to "Action/Compoundings/Mentation." But
Gunaprabha does not say that the storehouse is the immediate basis of
action etc., so really the arrow should probably go from SP all the way
back to the six organs and phenomena; in that way the SP would form
the basis of Action, etc., through the causal chain. Now Gunaprabha
explains:
"The storehouse perception becomes transformed into two parts,
15

called basis (hetu) and fruit (phala)\ the basis being the perfumings, the
fruit being the ripening (rnam par smin pa), which means production
(skyed) by the perfumings of former action (purvakarmavdsand). Thus
we should see that on the basis of one, the other arises. For example,
the blazing of an oil lamp and its burning of the wick arise mutually at
the same time, and when there is a tent supported on three poles, one
supports another by means of the third so that they do not fall; so the
basis of arising, whatever it may be, should be understood to be the
storehouse perception.
"Since the storehouse is a perception, what is its phenomenon and
what is its mode?" Its phenomenon, of course, is the object that it
perceives; since the ear perceives sounds, the nose smells, etc., what
does the storehouse perceive, since it is said to be a perception?
Further, what is its mode (rnampa, dkdra)? This term apparently replaces
support (dsraya, rten)y since a support must be something material, and
the storehouse has no material support. Vasubandhu answers both
questions by essentially not answering them:
"Its phenomenon and mode are undiscerned {aparichinna, yongs
su ma chad pao)" Nor does Gunaprabha comment. The matter is
covered, though none too clearly, in Sthiramati's commentary to
Vasubandhu's Trimsika; but it is a matter for another paper.
Vasubandhu now tells us that the storehouse is "of one class and
continually produced" (rigs cigpa dangrgyun chagspar 'jugpa'o). "Of one
class" means, according to Gunaprabha, that it is morally indifferent
(neither good nor bad in its essence); while being continually produced
means that it is momentary (it is produced again every moment). "That
it has one nature {rang bzhin, svabhdva) is known by authority (dgama)
and reason (?nydya). T h e authority is the Blessed One's verse in the
[now lost?) Abhidharmasutra:
T h e realm of time without beginning is
T h e place where all the elements reside.
Since this exists, the realms of sentient beings
And also Blessed Rest, have been obtained.
Gunaprabha takes "the place where all the elements reside" to be
storehouse perception.
He has adduced this quotation in order to show an authority
the morally neutral character of the storehouse perception. But
same quotation serves equally to show that the storehouse exists in
16

the
for
the
the

first place, as against those who do not believe in one's existence.

Vasubandhu and Gunaprabha now try to demonstrate its existence by
means of reason.
First, they point to the meditational states called cessation attainment (nirodhasamdpatti), non-recognition attainment (asamjnisamdpatti),
and (plain) non-recognition (asamjnd). When one is in these states, the
six beginning perceptions "also known as object-manifestation (visyavijnaptiy are stopped; when one leaves these states, the six arise again.
They must have been stored somewhere; that somewhere is the storehouse perception. Gunaprabha asks: "If we do not accept a storehouse
perception, from what basis ihetu) will the six beginning perceptions
arise? Therefore we must accept a storehouse perception."
Further, it is maintained that without a storehouse perception it
would be impossible to enter, or more importantly to leave, the round
(samsdra). This is also supported by the scriptural verse quoted above.
Finally, it is maintained that the storehouse is the basis even of the
material body. Gunaprabha states: "Since these various {gang yin pa)
seeds of all passionate elements (samklistadharma) dwell in it, it is called
the storehouse perception. Again, it dwells in them as the actuality of
the basis iyang na de dag la rgyu'i dngos pot gnas pa'o, }hetuvastu)"
Vasubandhu now identifies the storehouse with certain other
technical terms that were perhaps current in certain circles in his day:
"The storehouse perception is itself the ground (gzhi nyid; tddhdra,
ladhisfhdna) of all seeds, is the storehouse of the body, is the basical
(hetuka). [The two sentences of Gunaprabha quoted just above occur
here.] It is that which resides in the body; again, it is appropriating
(dddna) perception because it appropriates a body." Here Gunaprabha
quotes the Sandhinirmocanasutra:
Appropriating perception is profound and fine,
And all the seeds flow onward like a river:
It is not right to view it as a self;
I did not teach it to the immature. 1 3
Gunaprabha's comments are of little philosophical interest here, and
he does not explain how an immaterial storehouse perception can give
rise to a material body; one assumes that to the Yogacarins, materiality
itself is an illusion anyway.
Here the exposition of the storehouse perception in itself is
finished; but Vasubandu takes an extremely important step here. He
17

goes back to the seventh perception, "consciousness", manas, for

another look at it. We saw it before as arising out of the six beginning
perceptions. Now we shall see it as rising out of the storehouse, or
eighth perception; we shall see it in its relation to the storehouse.
"In reality, the consciousness {manas) has the storehouse perception for its phenomenon." Gunaprabha: "This means that it phenomenalizes [sees! the storehouse perception as a self." ("dngos su nayid ni
kun gzhi mam par shes pa la dmigs te" shes bya ba ni, kun gzhi rnam par shes pa
la bdag tu dmigs zhes bya bai tha tshiggo.) Vasubandhu: "It is that which is
associated with the constant delusion of self (dtmamoha), view of self
(dtmadrsti), egoism of self (dtmamdna), and lust for self (dtmardga), and so
on." u Gunaprabha: "It is explained as operating always, and arises as
good (kusala), bad (akusala), and indifferent. His saying 'It is of one
class' means [in contrast to what it means for the storehouse perception I
that it has a passionate (klista) nature (rang bzhin, ?svabhdva). 'It is continually produced' means that it is momentary. It operates always, but
'It is not present in an Arhat, on the Noble Path, or at the time of the
cessation-attainment.' In the last two it is prevented from producing
perfumings; when one rises out of them, the seeds arise again from it.
In Arhatship they cease completely.
"With that, we have explained the eight perceptions that constitute
the perception aggregate, [to wit] the six beginning perceptions, the
storehouse perception, and the passionate consciousness (klistamanas).
T h e perception-aggregate has been explained."
So our chart of perceptions above requires these two additions:
Perception

Mode (dkdra)

Phenomenon

Consciousness (rnanas)
aka klistamanas

(not specified)

Storehouse Perception
(falsely seen as self)

Storehouse Perception
(alayavijndna)

Undiscerned
(aparichinna)

Undiscerned
(aparichinna)

This has been only one section of a very elementary Yogacara

treatise, and the kind of problems that we encounter here should warn
us against the error of thinking that we can fully understand this
doctrine quickly or easily or without rigorous scientific analysis.
Of course, such a treatise as this may raise more questions than it
answers: for instance, how to reconcile the three views of manas presented:
as a sense organ giving rise to manovijndna; as arising from the six
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beginning perceptions; as arising from the storehouse perception. But

before studying this treatise we did not know enought even to ask the
question.

NOTES
1. I have used the edition of the Derge Tanjur. I have not been able to obtain the
Sanskrit of the Vasubandhu, and in any case I do not know whether it is the original or a
retranslation from the Tibetan; if the latter, there would be no advantage in using it. In
most cases, the Sanskrit equivalent of a given Tibetan term is known; in a few cases above
I give the Tibetan where I am unsure of the Sanskrit.
I have translated or paraphrased essentially everything that Vasubandhu and
Gunaprabha say here; a few minor points are passed over cursorily. In a couple of places
their writing is not as clear as it might be (they at one point seem to be trying to talk about
two things at once); I have tried to straighten things out a bit in my exposition, but
certainly I have not changed any of the ideas or technical terms, and all important points
are translated verbatim.
2. Vijnana has been occasionally translated as perception, but never so far as I am
aware with any explanation of why this is correct and the more usual translation wrong. 1
think it better to bring the whole matter out into the open.
Throughout this paper I engage in discussion of the meanings of individual
Sanskrit words: this is not mere "philology" because we investigate the words not for their
own sake, but in order to understand the phifmophiral ideas they express. One cannot
understand an idea unless one first understands the words used to explain it! Dereliction
of this principle is widespread, because people prefer to avoid the difficulties (and they
are genuine difficulties) of dealing strictly with these technical terms; and this enables
them (in some cases) to read their own ideas into the texts.
T h e reader will note that my translations of technical terms are often quite literal
(when I think that the literal meaning most clearly expresses the idea, as it often does),
and sometimes a modest departure fom literalness (when it seems better to translate the
meaning than the word, so to speak). Always I give the Sanskrit original if it can be
ascertainedunlike certain people, I am bound to say.
I d o not believe in translating words inconsistently, but hold to the principle of one
English word for one Sanskrit word in the overwhelming majority of cases. Some maintain that the profundity and complexity of Buddhist philosophical thought constitutes an
excuse for their own terminological inconsistency and obfuscation (a hyper-intellectual
but essentially frivolous point of view, in that it does not meet the real requirements). On
the contrary, the more profound, subtle, and complex the thought, the more necessary is
terminological exactitude.
3. E. Conze, Huddhvit Thought in India (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1973),
p. 189.
4. Gunaprabha's commentary on Vasubandhu's Pancaskandhaprakarartu: Derge
Tanjur si lbl-31b7. Unfortunately, when working on this text, I neglected to take down
the specific page numbers. Nevertheless the quotation will be found to be accurate.

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5. M. Hattori, tr. LHgndga on Perception, being the Pratyaksa pariccheda of Digndga's

Pramanasamuccaya (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard U.P., 1968), sec. C. of Ski. text (pages
unnumbered in Skt.). Pratyaksa like vijiuina is named after sense organs (aha) (sec. Daa-1).
T h e two are not exactly identical, since vipidna appears within the discussion of pratyaksa as
its specificity (where injhdna has at least two aspects [according to the logicians in general I,
object-cognition [insayavijndna] and the cognition of that cognition). But it is clear that
they both are within the range of meaning of the English word perception. At any rate,
they bear much closer resemblance to each other than either does to "consciousness",
which is something else entirely.
6. W. Rahula, What the Buddiiu Taught (New York: Grove Press, 1959), p. 23. In
case anyone wonders why Theravada sources are used in the discussion of a Mahayana
text, it is because the meaning of standard Abhidharma technical terms is the same in
both traditions. T h e Mahayanists after all built their Abhidharma thought on the same
early-Buddhist foundations.
7. Hattori, op. ctt. Sec. Daa-2.
8. See n. 4 above.
9. Locnt.
10. Derge Tanjur shi 195b6ff.
1 1. Rahula loc. cit.
12. See n. 4 above.
13. This quotation also warns us against seeing the SP as a self. i It is a kind of
continuity (santdna), to be sure, that plants for instance are continuities without selfhood
(a supposed self in plants is one of a number of wrong views refuted by the Buddha in one
of the HInayana Sutras). In the Ratnardsi Sutra quoted by Saniideva (Sihasamuccaya,
Bendall, p. 201, Vaidya p. I l l , Eng. trans, p. 195) plants are stated to be asvdmika and
amama (without "I" or "mine"). As Rahula says, "If we can understand that in his life we
can continue without a permanent, unchanging substance like Self or Soul, why can't we
understand that those forces themselves can continue without a Self or Soul behind them
after the non-functioning of the body?" (Ibid., p. 33. He also points out, p. 65 n. 1, that the
Ijankdxiatnra emphatically denies selfhood in the Alayavtjndna or Tathdgatagarbhu, p. 68 f f.
of Suzuki, pp. 7 8 - 7 9 of Skt.) That a continuity is not a self is implicit in the Vajracchedikd,
which denies dtman, sattva, jiva, and pudgala, but not continuity, or functioning entities in
general. The accusation that the Vogacarins tend towards a self-theory is simply without
foundation.
14. Mohti or mi'ufhi. drsti, mdna, and rdga or sneha are four of the six passions, a
subdivision within the mentals (caittadhanna). These four dhamias, then, when associated
with the illusion of dtman, are the constant accompaniments of the manas. Five other
elements also accompany it, according to Sthiramati in his commentary to Vasubandhu's
Trimsikd: the five "everpresents" (.\arvatraga) jthat I have listed in the List of Technical
Terms |.

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