Chase Nat. Bank v. United States, 278 U.S. 327 (1929)

278 U.S.
327
49 S.Ct. 126
73 L.Ed. 405
CHASE NAT. BANK OF CITY OF NEW YORK et al.

v.
UNITED STATES.
No. 77.
Argued Nov. 17 and 18, 1928.
Decided Jan. 2, 1929.
Messrs. Dallas S. Townsend, of New York City, and Wm. Marshall

Bullitt, of Louisville, Ky., for Chase Nat. Bank of City of New York.
[Argument of Counsel from pages 328-331 intentionally omitted]
Mr. Alfred A. Wheat, of Washington, D. C., for the United States.
Mr. Justice STONE delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case comes here from the Court of Claims, under section 288, title 28, U.
S. Code (28 USCA 288), 43 Stat. 939, on certified questions of law
concerning which instructions are desired for the proper disposition of the
cause. The facts certified are:
On September 13, 1922, after the effective date of the Revenue Act of 1921,
Herbert W. Brown procured three insurance policies on his life aggregating
$200,000, each naming his wife as beneficiary. Each policy reserved to the
insured the right to change the beneficiary. All premiums on the policies were
paid by the insured. On April 10, 1924, he died testate, leaving the plaintiff
below his executor and an estate subject to the estate tax imposed by the
Revenue Act of 1921, c. 136, 42 Stat. 227. The tax as assessed by the
commissioner included $9,146.76 imposed by reason of the inclusion in the
estate of the proceeds of the three insurance policies, less $40,000 exemption
authorized by the statute. The executor paid the tax and upon denial of a claim
for refund brought the present suit in the Court of Claims to recover the tax as
illegally assessed.
The questions certified are:

3
Question I: Whether the tax imposed by the final clause of section 402(f),
Revenue Act of 1921, 42 Stat. 278, on life insurance policies payable in terms
to beneficiaries 'other than the decedent or his estate' is a direct tax on property
and void because not apportioned.
Question II: Whether the $9,146.76 tax imposed bears such an unreasonable
relation to the subject-matter of the tax as to render it void.
Similar questions were mooted by counsel, but not decided, in Lewellyn v.

Frick, 268 U. S. 238, 251, 45 S. Ct. 487, 69 L. Ed. 934.
Section 401 of the Revenue Act of 1921 imposes a tax upon 'the transfer of the
net estate of every decedent' dying after the passage of the act, and section 402
provides: 'That the value of the gross estate of the decedent shall be determined
by including the value at the time of his death of all property, * * * tangible or
intangible. * * * (f) To the extent of the amount receivable by the executor as
insurance under policies taken out by the decedent upon his own life; and to the
extent of the excess over $40,000 of the amount receivable by all other
beneficiaries as insurance under policies taken out by the decedent upon his
own life.' By section 406 the executor is required to pay the tax but if so paid
he is given by section 408 the right to recover from the beneficiaries a part of
the tax and by section 409 they are made personally liable for a share of it if
not so paid.
In the present case there is no question of the construction of the statute. The
tax is plainly imposed by the explicit language of sections 401 and 402(f) if
those sections are constitutionally applied. Plaintiff challenges the validity of
the tax on the ground that it is not an excise or privilege tax but a direct tax on
property, the insurance policies or their proceeds, and so is invalid because not
apportioned as required by article 1, 2, 9, of the federal Constitution, and
that in any case the measure of the tax and the methods of securing its payment
are so arbitrary and capricious as to violate the due process clause of the Fifth
Amendment.
The statute in terms taxes transfers. Like provisions in earlier acts have been
generally upheld as imposing a tax on the privilege of transferring the property
of a decedent at death, measured by the value of the interest transferred or
which ceases at death. Cf. Y. M. C. A. v. Davis, 264 U. S. 47, 50, 44 S. Ct.
291, 68 L. Ed. 558; Edwards v. Slocum, 264 U. S. 61, 62, 44 S. Ct. 293, 68 L.
Ed. 564; New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U. S. 345, 349, 41 S. Ct. 506, 65
L. Ed. 963, 16 A. L. R. 660; Nichols v. Coolidge, 274 U. S. 531, 47 S. Ct. 710,
71 L. Ed. 1184, 52 A. L. R. 1081.
9
It is true, as emphasized by plaintiff, that the interest of the beneficiaries in the

insurance policies effected by decedent 'vested' in them before his death and
that the proceeds of the policies came to the beneficiaries, not directly from the
decedent, but from the insurer. But until the moment of death the decedent
retained a legal interest in the policies which gave him the power of disposition
of them and their proceeds as completely as if he were himself the beneficiary
of them. The precise question presented is whether the termination at death of
that power and the consequent passing to the designated beneficiaries of all
rights under the policies freed of the possibility of its exercise may be the
legitimate subject of a transfer tax, as is true of the termination by death of any
of the other legal incidents of property through which its use or economic
enjoyment may be controlled.
10
A power in the decedent to surrender and cancel the policies, to pledge them as
security for loans and the power to dispose of them and their proceeds for his
own benefit during his life which subjects them to the control of a bankruptcy
court for the benefit of his creditors, Cohen v. Samuels, 245 U. S. 50, 38 S. Ct.
36, 62 L. Ed. 143 (see Burlingham v. Crouse, 228 U. S. 459, 33 S. Ct. 564, 57
L. Ed. 920, 46 L. R. A. (N. S.) 148), and which may, under local law applicable
to the parties here, subject them in part to the payment of his debts, Domestic
Relations Law, N. Y. (chapter 14, Consol. Laws), 52; Kittel v. Domeyer, 175
N. Y. 205, 67 N. E. 433; Guardian Trust Co. v. Straus, 139 App. Div. 884, 123
N. Y. S. 852, affirmed 201 N. Y. 564, 95 N. E. 1129, is by no means the least
substantial of the legal incidents of ownership, and its termination at his death
so as to free the beneficiaries of the policy from the possibility of its exercise
would seem to be no less a transfer within the reach of the taxing power than a
transfer effected in other ways through death.
11
In Saltonstall v. Saltonstall, 276 U. S. 260, 48 S. Ct. 225, 72 L. Ed. 565, a tax

had been imposed by state statute on the succession to a remainder interest
which had vested under a trust created before the enactment of the taxing act. It
was objected that the tax was void as retroactive and hence in conflict with the
Fourteenth Amendment of the federal Constitution under the ruling in Nichols
v. Coolidge, supra, later applied in Untermyer v. Anderson, 276 U. S. 440, 48
S. Ct. 353, 72 L. Ed. 645. But by the provisions of the trust indenture a power
of disposition of the remainder had been reserved to the settlor to be exercised
by him at any time during his life, with the concurrence of one trustee, and we
held that the freeing of the remainder of the possibility of the exercise of that
power, through its termination by the death of the settlor, effected a transfer
which was the appropriate subject of a succession tax and that the tax was not
retroactive since the termination of the power which was prerequisite to the
complete succession did not occur until after the enactment of the statute. The
court said (page 271 of 276 U. S. (48 S. Ct. 227)):
12
'So long as the privilege of succession has not been fully exercised it may be
reached by the tax. See Cahen v. Brewster, 203 U. S. 543 (27 S. Ct. 174, 51 L.
Ed. 310, 8 Ann. Cas. 215); Orr v. Gilman, 183 U. S. 278 (22 S. Ct. 213, 46 L.
Ed. 196); Chanler v. Kelsey (205 U. S. 466, 27 S. Ct. 550, 51 L. Ed. 882)
supra; Moffitt v. Kelly (218 U. S. 400, 31 S. Ct. 79, 54 L. Ed. 1086, 30 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 1179) supra; Nickel v. Cole (256 U. S. 222, 41 S. Ct. 467, 65 L. Ed.
900) supra. And in determining whether it has been so exercised technical
distinctions between vested remainders and other interests are of little avail, for
the shifting of the economic benefits and burdens of property, which is the
subject of a succession tax, may even in the case of a vested remainder be
restricted or suspended by other legal devices. A power of appointment
reserved by the donor leaves the transfer, as to him, incomplete and subject to
tax. Bullen v. Wisconsin, 240 U. S. 625 (36 S. Ct. 473, 60 L. Ed. 830). The
beneficiary's acquisition of the property is equally incomplete whether the
power be reserved to the donor or another.'
13
That, it is true, was said of a succession tax, and we are here concerned with a
transfer tax. The distinction was there important for it was at least doubtful
whether upon the death of the settlor there was any such termination, as to him,
of a power of control over the remainder such as would have been subject to a
tax levied exclusively on transfers, since the power was not vested in him
alone, but in him and another. See Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co., 278 U. S.
339, 49 S. Ct. 123, 73 L. Ed. decided this day. But we think that the rule
applied in Saltonstall v. Saltonstall, supra, to a succession tax is equally
applicable to a transfer tax where, as here, the power of disposition is reserved
exclusively to the transferor for his own benefit. Such an outstanding power
residing exclusively in a donor to recall a gift after it is made is a limitation on
the gift which makes it incomplete as to the donor as well as to the donee,and
we think that the termination of such a power at death may also be the
appropriate subject of a tax upon transfers.
14
But the plaintiff says that the tax here must be deemed to be a tax on property
because the beneficiaries' interests in the policies were not transferred to them
from the decedent, but from the insurer, and hence there was nothing to which a
transfer or privilege tax could apply. Obviously, the word 'transfer' in the
statute, or the privilege which may constitutionally be taxed, cannot be taken in
such a restricted sense as to refer only to the passing of particular items of

property directly from the decedent to the transferee. It must, we think, at least
include the transfer of property procured through expenditures by the decedent
with the purpose, effected at his death, of having it pass to another. Section
402(c) taxes transfers made in contemplation of death. It would not, we assume,
be seriously argued that its provisions could be evaded by the purchase by a
decedent from a third person of property, a savings bank book for example, and
its delivery by the seller directly to the intended beneficiary on the purchaser's
death, or that the measure of the tax would be the cost and not the value or
proceeds at the time of death. It is of some significance also that by the local
law applicable to the insurer and the insured in this case, a beneficiary's rights
in the policy and its proceeds are deemed to be the proceeds of the premiums
expended by the insured and as such recoverable in full by one having an
equitable claim attaching to the premiums. Holmes v. Gilman, 138 N. Y. 369,
34 N. E. 205, 20 L. R. A. 566, 34 Am. St. Rep. 463.
15
The plaintiff points to no requirement, constitutional or statutory, that the

termination of the power of disposition of property by death whereby the
transfer of property is completed, which we have said is here the subject of the
tax, must be preceded by a transfer directly from the decedent to the recipient
of his bounty, of the property subject to the power. And we see no necessity to
debate the question whether the policies themselves were so transferred, for we
think the power to tax the privilege of transfer at death cannot be controlled by
the mere choice of the formalities which may attend the donor's bestowal of
benefits on another at death, or of the particular methods by which his purpose
is effected, so long as he retains control over those benefits with power to direct
their future enjoyment until his death. Termination of the power of control at
the time of death inures to the benefit of him who owns the property subject to
the power and thus brings about, at death, the completion of that shifting of the
economic benefits of property which is the real subject of the tax, just as
effectively as would its exercise, which latter may be subjected to a privilege
tax, Chanler v. Kelsey, 205 U. S. 466, 27 S. Ct. 550, 51 L. Ed. 882. 'To make a
distinction between a general power and a limitation in fee is to grasp at a
shadow while the substance escapes.' Sugden, Powers (8th Ed.) 396; see Gray,
Perpetuities (3d Ed. 1915) 526(b). And the nonexercise of the power may be
as much a disposition of property testamentary in nature as would be its
exercise at death, Bullen v. Wisconsin, 240 U. S. 625, 36 S. Ct. 473, 60 L. Ed.
830; cf. United States v. Robbins, 269 U. S. 315, 327, 46 S. Ct. 148, 70 L. Ed.
285; Cohen v. Samuels, supra.
16
The objection urged by plaintiff under the second question, that the statutory
method of fixing the tax and securing its payment infringes the Fifth
Amendment, need not detain us. It is said that both the tax on those who share
in the decedent's estate and that paid by the beneficiaries is larger than it
otherwise would be if the proceeds of the insurance has not been included in the
decedent's gross estate. But the increase in the tax to both is a consequence of
including the amount of the policies in the gross estate in determining the net
which is made the measure of the graduated transfer tax. The objection
amounts to no more than saying that if the transfer of the policies or their
proceeds be taxed, they should not be included with the other property of the
estate in determining the rate of the tax. As it is the termination of the power of
disposition of the policies by decedent at death which operates as an effective
transfer and is subjected to the tax, there can be no objection to measuring the
tax or fixing its rate by including in the gross estate the value of the policies at
the time of death, together with all the other interests of decedent transferred at
his death. Stebbins v. Riley, 268 U. S. 137, 45 S. Ct. 424, 69 L. Ed. 884, 44 A.
L. R. 1454. The inclusion in the gross estate of gifts made in contemplation of
death under section 402(c) has a like effect.
17
Other objections to the operation of the statute are not discussed either because
they are not of weight or are not presented by the certified facts.
18
The questions propounded by the Court of Claims in form suggest that the tax
is one imposed by the statute upon the policies. This we have shown is not the
case. It is the transfer, which is a concomitant of the criteria laid down by the
statute for imposing the tax, which is the subject of the tax. The tax is not on
the policies, but we answer the questions as if inquiring about the true subject
of the tax.
19
Both questions are answered, No.
20
Mr. Justice McREYNOLDS concurs in the result.
21
Mr. Justice SUTHERLAND and Mr. Justice BUTLER dissent.

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278 U.S.

CHASE NAT. BANK OF CITY OF NEW YORK et al.

Messrs. Dallas S. Townsend, of New York City, and Wm. Marshall

The questions certified are:

Similar questions were mooted by counsel, but not decided, in Lewellyn v.

It is true, as emphasized by plaintiff, that the interest of the beneficiaries in the

In Saltonstall v. Saltonstall, 276 U. S. 260, 48 S. Ct. 225, 72 L. Ed. 565, a tax

such a restricted sense as to refer only to the passing of particular items of

The plaintiff points to no requirement, constitutional or statutory, that the

Both questions are answered, No.

Mr. Justice McREYNOLDS concurs in the result.

Mr. Justice SUTHERLAND and Mr. Justice BUTLER dissent.

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