454 U.S.

235
102 S.Ct. 252
70 L.Ed.2d 419

PIPER AIRCRAFT COMPANY, Petitioner,

v.
Gaynell REYNO, Personal Representative of the Estate of
William Fehilly, et al. HARTZELL PROPELLER, INC.,
Petitioner, v. Gaynell REYNO, Personal Representative of the
Estate of William Fehilly, et al.
Nos. 80-848, 80-883.
Argued Oct. 14, 1981.
Decided Dec. 8, 1981.
Rehearing Denied Jan. 25, 1982.

See 455 U.S. 928, 102 S.Ct. 1296.

Syllabus
s235s Respondent, as representative of the estates of several citizens
and residents of Scotland who were killed in an airplane crash in Scotland
during a charter flight, instituted wrongful-death litigation in a California
state court against petitioners, which are the company that manufactured
the plane in Pennsylvania and the company that manufactured the plane's
propellers in Ohio. At the time of the crash the plane was registered in
Great Britain and was owned and operated by companies organized in the
United Kingdom. The pilot and all of the decedents' heirs and next of kin
were Scottish subjects and citizens, and the investigation of the accident
was conducted by British authorities. Respondent sought to recover from
petitioners on the basis of negligence or strict liability (not recognized by
Scottish law), and admitted that the action was filed in the United States
because its laws regarding liability, capacity to sue, and damages are more
favorable to respondent's position than those of Scotland. On petitioners'
motion, the action was removed to a Federal District Court in California
and was then transferred to the United States District Court for the Middle
District of Pennsylvania, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1404(a). The District
Court granted petitioners' motion to dismiss the action on the ground of
forum non conveniens. Relying on the test set forth in Gulf Oil Corp. v.

Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 67 S.Ct. 839, 91 L.Ed. 1055, and analyzing the
"private interest factors" affecting the litigants' convenience and the
"public interest factors" affecting the the forum's convenience, as set forth
in Gilbert, the District Court concluded that Scotland was the appropriate
forum. However, the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the District
Court had abused its discretion in conducting the Gilbert analysis and that,
in any event, dismissal is automatically barred where the law of the
alternative forum is less favorable to the plaintiff than the law of the
forum chosen by the plaintiff.
Held :
1. Plaintiffs may not defeat a motion to dismiss on the ground of forum
non conveniens merely by showing that the substantive law that would be
applied in the alternative forum is less favorable to the plaintiffs than that
of the chosen forum. The possibility of a change in substantive law should
ordinarily not be given conclusive or even substantial weight in the forum
non conveniens inquiry. Canada Malting Co. v. Paterson Steamships,
Ltd., 285 U.S. 413, 52 S.Ct. 413, 76 L.Ed. 837. Pp. 247-255.
(a) Under Gilbert, supra, dismissal will ordinarily be appropriate where
trial in the plaintiff's chosen forum imposes a heavy burden on the
defendant or the court, and where the plaintiff is unable to offer any
specific reasons of convenience supporting his choice. If substantial
weight were given to the possibility of an unfavorable change in law,
however, dismissal might be barred even where trial in the chosen forum
was plainly inconvenient, and the forum non conveniens doctrine would
become virtually useless. Such an approach not only would be inconsistent
with the purpose of the forum non conveniens doctrine, but also would
pose substantial practical problems, requiring that trial courts determine
complex problems in conflict of laws and comparative law, and increasing
the flow into American courts of litigation by foreign plaintiffs against
American manufacturers. Pp. 248-252.
(b) Nor may an analogy be drawn between forum non conveniens
dismissals and transfers between federal courts pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
1404(a), which was construed in Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 84
S.Ct. 805, 11 L.Ed.2d 945, as precluding a transfer if it resulted in a
change in the applicable law. The statute was enacted to permit change of
venue between federal courts, and although it was drafted in accordance
with the doctrine of forum non conveniens, it was intended to be a revision
rather than a codification of the common law. District courts were given
more discretion to transfer under 1404(a) than they had to dismiss on

grounds of forum non conveniens. Van Dusen v. Barrack, supra,

distinguished. Pp. 253-254.
2. The District Court properly decided that the presumption in favor of the
plaintiff's forum choice applied with less than maximum force when the
plaintiff or (as here) the real parties in interest are foreign. When the
plaintiff has chosen the home forum, it is reasonable to assume that the
choice is convenient; but when the plaintiff or real parties in interest are
foreign, this assumption is much less reasonable and the plaintiff's choice
deserves less deference. Pp. 255-256. 3. The forum non conveniens
determination is committed to the trial court's sound discretion and may
be reversed only when there has been a clear abuse of discretion. Here, the
District Court did not abuse its discretion in weighing the private and
public interests under the Gilbert analysis and thereby determining that
the trial should be held in Scotland. Pp. 257-261.
(a) In analyzing the private interest factors, the District Court did not act
unreasonably in concluding that fewer evidentiary problems would be
posed if the trial were held in Scotland, a large proportion of the relevant
evidence being located there. The District Court also correctly concluded
that the problems posed by the petitioners' inability to implead potential
Scottish third-party defendantsthe pilot's estate, the plane's owners, and
the charter companysupported holding the trial in Scotland. Pp. 257259.
(b) The District Court's review of the factors relating to the public interest
was also reasonable. Even aside from the question whether Scottish law
might be applicable in part, all other public interest factors favor trial in
Scotland, which has a very strong interest in this litigation. The accident
occurred there, all of the decedents were Scottish, and apart from
petitioners, all potential parties are either Scottish or English. As to
respondent's argument that American citizens have an interest in ensuring
that American manufacturers are deterred from producing defective
products and that additional deterrence might be obtained by trial in the
United States where they could be sued on the basis of both negligence
and strict liability, any incremental deterrence from trial in an American
court is likely to be insignificant and is not sufficient to justify the
enormous commitment of judicial time and resources that would be
required. Pp. 259-261.
630 F.2d 149, 3rd Cir. reversed.
James M. FitzSimons, New York City, for Piper Aircraft.

Warner W. Gardner, Washington, D. C., for Hartzell Propeller, Inc.

Daniel C. Cathcart, Los Angeles, Cal., for respondents.
Justice MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court.

These cases arise out of an air crash that took place in Scotland. Respondent,
acting as representative of the estates of several Scottish citizens killed in the
accident, brought wrongful-death actions against petitioners that were
ultimately transferred to the United States District Court for the Middle District
of Pennsylvania. Petitioners moved to dismiss on the ground of forum non
conveniens. After noting that an alternative forum existed in Scotland, the
District Court granted their motions. 479 F.Supp. 727 (1979). The United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed. 630 F.2d 149 (1980).
The Court of Appeals based its decision, at least in part, on the ground that
dismissal is automatically barred where the law of the alternative forum is less
favorable to the plaintiff than the law of the forum chosen by the plaintiff.
Because we conclude that the possibility of an unfavorable change in law
should not, by itself, bar dismissal, and because we conclude that the District
Court did not otherwise abuse its discretion, we reverse.

2* A.
3

In July 1976, a small commercial aircraft crashed in the Scottish highlands

during the course of a charter flight from Blackpool to Perth. The pilot and five
passengers were killed instantly. The decedents were all Scottish subjects and
residents, as are their heirs and next of kin. There were no eyewitnesses to the
accident. At the time of the crash the plane was subject to Scottish air traffic
control.

The aircraft, a twin-engine Piper Aztec, was manufactured in Pennsylvania by

petitioner Piper Aircraft Co. (Piper). The propellers were manufactured in Ohio
by petitioner Hartzell Propeller, Inc. (Hartzell). At the time of the crash the
aircraft was registered in Great Britain and was owned and maintained by Air
Navigation and Trading Co., Ltd. (Air Navigation). It was operated by
McDonald Aviation, Ltd. (McDonald), a Scottish air taxi service. Both Air
Navigation and McDonald were organized in the United Kingdom. The
wreckage of the plane is now in a hangar in Farnsborough, England.

The British Department of Trade investigated the accident shortly after it

occurred. A preliminary report found that the plane crashed after developing a

spin, and suggested that mechanical failure in the plane or the propeller was
responsible. At Hartzell's request, this report was reviewed by a three-member
Review Board, which held a 9-day adversary hearing attended by all interested
parties. The Review Board found no evidence of defective equipment and
indicated that pilot error may have contributed to the accident. The pilot, who
had obtained his commercial pilot's license only three months earlier, was
flying over high ground at an altitude considerably lower than the minimum
height required by his company's operations manual.
6

In July 1977, a California probate court appointed respondent Gaynell Reyno

administratrix of the estates of the five passengers. Reyno is not related to and
does not know any of the decedents or their survivors; she was a legal secretary
to the attorney who filed this lawsuit. Several days after her appointment,
Reyno commenced separate wrongfuldeath actions against Piper and Hartzell in
the Superior Court of California, claiming negligence and strict liability.1 Air
Navigation, McDonald, and the estate of the pilot are not parties to this
litigation. The survivors of the five passengers whose estates are represented by
Reyno filed a separate action in the United Kingdom against Air Navigation,
McDonald, and the pilot's estate.2 Reyno candidly admits that the action against
Piper and Hartzell was filed in the United States because its laws regarding
liability, capacity to sue, and damages are more favorable to her position than
are those of Scotland. Scottish law does not recognize strict liability in tort.
Moreover, it permits wrongful-death actions only when brought by a decedent's
relatives. The relatives may sue only for "loss of support and society." 3

On petitioners' motion, the suit was removed to the United States District Court
for the Central District of California. Piper then moved for transfer to the
United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, pursuant to
28 U.S.C. 1404(a).4 Hartzell moved to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction, or in the alternative, to transfer.5 In December 1977, the District
Court quashed service on Hartzell and transferred the case to the Middle
District of Pennsylvania. Respondent then properly served process on Hartzell.

B
8

In May 1978, after the suit had been transferred, both Hartzell and Piper moved
to dismiss the action on the ground of forum non conveniens. The District Court
granted these motions in October 1979. It relied on the balancing test set forth
by this Court in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 67 S.Ct. 839, 91 L.Ed.
1055 (1947), and its companion case, Koster v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co.,
330 U.S. 518, 67 S.Ct. 828, 91 L.Ed. 1067 (1947). In those decisions, the Court
stated that a plaintiff's choice of forum should rarely be disturbed. However,

when an alternative forum has jurisdiction to hear the case, and when trial in
the chosen forum would "establish . . . oppressiveness and vexation to a
defendant . . . out of all proportion to plaintiff's convenience," or when the
"chosen forum [is] inappropriate because of considerations affecting the court's
own administrative and legal problems," the court may, in the exercise of its
sound discretion, dismiss the case. Koster, supra, at 524, 67 S.Ct., at 831-832.
To guide trial court discretion, the Court provided a list of "private interest
factors" affecting the convenience of the litigants, and a list of "public interest
factors" affecting the convenience of the forum. Gilbert, supra, 330 U.S. at
508-509, 67 S.Ct., at 843.6
9

After describing our decisions in Gilbert and Koster, the District Court
analyzed the facts of these cases. It began by observing that an alternative
forum existed in Scotland; Piper and Hartzell had agreed to submit to the
jurisdiction of the Scottish courts and to waive any statute of limitations
defense that might be available. It then stated that plaintiff's choice of forum
was entitled to little weight. The court recognized that a plaintiff's choice
ordinarily deserves substantial deference. It noted, however, that Reyno "is a
representative of foreign citizens and residents seeking a forum in the United
States because of the more liberal rules concerning products liability law," and
that "the courts have been less solicitous when the plaintiff is not an American
citizen or resident, and particularly when the foreign citizens seek to benefit
from the more liberal tort rules provided for the protection of citizens and
residents of the United States." 479 F.Supp., at 731.

10

The District Court next examined several factors relating to the private interests
of the litigants, and determined that these factors strongly pointed towards
Scotland as the appropriate forum. Although evidence concerning the design,
manufacture, and testing of the plane and propeller is located in the United
States, the connections with Scotland are otherwise "overwhelming." Id., at
732. The real parties in interest are citizens of Scotland, as were all the
decedents. Witnesses who could testify regarding the maintenance of the
aircraft, the training of the pilot, and the investigation of the accidentall
essential to the defenseare in Great Britain. Moreover, all witnesses to
damages are located in Scotland. Trial would be aided by familiarity with
Scottish topography, and by easy access to the wreckage.

11

The District Court reasoned that because crucial witnesses and evidence were
beyond the reach of compulsory process, and because the defendants would not
be able to implead potential Scottish third-party defendants, it would be "unfair
to make Piper and Hartzell proceed to trial in this forum." Id., at 733. The
survivors had brought separate actions in Scotland against the pilot, McDonald,

and Air Navigation. "[I]t would be fairer to all parties and less costly if the
entire case was presented to one jury with available testimony from all relevant
witnesses." Ibid. Although the court recognized that if trial were held in the
United States, Piper and Hartzell could file indemnity or contribution actions
against the Scottish defendants, it believed that there was a significant risk of
inconsistent verdicts.7
12

The District Court concluded that the relevant public interests also pointed
strongly towards dismissal. The court determined that Pennsylvania law would
apply to Piper and Scottish law to Hartzell if the case were tried in the Middle
District of Pennsylvania. 8 As a result, "trial in this forum would be hopelessly
complex and confusing for a jury." Id., at 734. In addition, the court noted that
it was unfamiliar with Scottish law and thus would have to rely upon experts
from that country. The court also found that the trial would be enormously
costly and time-consuming; that it would be unfair to burden citizens with jury
duty when the Middle District of Pennsylvania has little connection with the
controversy; and that Scotland has a substantial interest in the outcome of the
litigation.

13

In opposing the motions to dismiss, respondent contended that dismissal would

be unfair because Scottish law was less favorable. The District Court explicitly
rejected this claim. It reasoned that the possibility that dismissal might lead to
an unfavorable change in the law did not deserve significant weight; any
deficiency in the foreign law was a "matter to be dealt with in the foreign
forum." Id., at 738.

C
14

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed
and remanded for trial. The decision to reverse appears to be based on two
alternative grounds. First, the Court held that the District Court abused its
discretion in conducting the Gilbert analysis. Second, the Court held that
dismissal is never appropriate where the law of the alternative forum is less
favorable to the plaintiff.

15

The Court of Appeals began its review of the District Court's Gilbert analysis
by noting that the plaintiff's choice of forum deserved substantial weight, even
though the real parties in interest are nonresidents. It then rejected the District
Court's balancing of the private interests. It found that Piper and Hartzell had
failed adequately to support their claim that key witnesses would be unavailable
if trial were held in the United States: they had never specified the witnesses
they would call and the testimony these witnesses would provide. The Court of

Appeals gave little weight to the fact that Piper and Hartzell would not be able
to implead potential Scottish third-party defendants, reasoning that this
difficulty would be "burdensome" but not "unfair," 639 F.2d, at 162.9 Finally,
the court stated that resolution of the suit would not be significantly aided by
familiarity with Scottish topography, or by viewing the wreckage.
16

The Court of Appeals also rejected the District Court's analysis of the public
interest factors. It found that the District Court gave undue emphasis to the
application of Scottish law: " 'the mere fact that the court is called upon to
determine and apply foreign law does not present a legal problem of the sort
which would justify the dismissal of a case otherwise properly before the
court.' " Id., at 163 (quoting Hoffman v. Goberman, 420 F.2d 427 (CA3 1970)).
In any event, it believed that Scottish law need not be applied. After conducting
its own choice-of-law analysis, the Court of Appeals determined that American
law would govern the actions against both Piper and Hartzell.10 The same
choice-of-law analysis apparently led it to conclude that Pennsylvania and
Ohio, rather than Scotland, are the jurisdictions with the greatest policy
interests in the dispute, and that all other public interest factors favored trial in
the United States.11

17

In any event, it appears that the Court of Appeals would have reversed even if
the District Court had properly balanced the public and private interests. The
court stated:

18

"[I]t is apparent that the dismissal would work a change in the applicable law
so that the plaintiff's strict liability claim would be eliminated from the case.
But . . . a dismissal for forum non conveniens, like a statutory transfer, 'should
not, despite its convenience, result in a change in the applicable law.' Only
when American law is not applicable, or when the foreign jurisdiction would,
as a matter of its own choice of law, give the plaintiff the benefit of the claim to
which she is entitled here, would dismissal be justified." 630 F.2d, at 163-164
(footnote omitted) (quoting DeMateos v. Texaco, Inc., 562 F.2d 895, 899 (CA3
1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 904, 98 S.Ct. 1449, 55 L.Ed.2d 494 (1978)).

19

In other words, the court decided that dismissal is automatically barred if it

would lead to a change in the applicable law unfavorable to the plaintiff.

20

We granted certiorari in these cases to consider the questions they raise

concerning the proper application of the doctrine of forum non conveniens. 450
U.S. 909, 101 S.Ct. 1346, 67 L.Ed.2d 333 (1981).12

II
21

The Court of Appeals erred in holding that plaintiffs may defeat a motion to
dismiss on the ground of forum non conveniens merely by showing that the
substantive law that would be applied in the alternative forum is less favorable
to the plaintiffs than that of the present forum. The possibility of a change in
substantive law should ordinarily not be given conclusive or even substantial
weight in the forum non conveniens inquiry.

22

We expressly rejected the position adopted by the Court of Appeals in our

decision in Canada Malting Co. v. Paterson Steamships, Ltd., 285 U.S. 413, 52
S.Ct. 413, 76 L.Ed. 837 (1932). That case arose out of a collision between two
vessels in American waters. The Canadian owners of cargo lost in the accident
sued the Canadian owners of one of the vessels in Federal District Court. The
cargo owners chose an American court in large part because the relevant
American liability rules were more favorable than the Canadian rules. The
District Court dismissed on grounds of forum non conveniens. The plaintiffs
argued that dismissal was inappropriate because Canadian laws were less
favorable to them. This Court nonetheless affirmed:

23

"We have no occasion to enquire by what law the rights of the parties are
governed, as we are of the opinion that, under any view of that question, it lay
within the discretion of the District Court to decline to assume jurisdiction over
the controversy. . . . '[T]he court will not take cognizance of the case if justice
would be as well done by remitting the parties to their home forum.' " Id., at
419-420, 52 S.Ct., at 414, quoting Charter Shipping Co. v. Bowring, Jones &
Tidy, 281 U.S. 515, 517, 50 S.Ct. 400, 414, 74 L.Ed. 1008 (1930).

24

The Court further stated that "[t]here was no basis for the contention that the
District Court abused its discretion." 285 U.S., at 423, 52 S.Ct., at 415-16.

25

It is true that Canada Malting was decided before Gilbert, and that the doctrine
of forum non conveniens was not fully crystallized until our decision in that
case. 13 However, Gilbert in no way affects the validity of Canada Malting.
Indeed, by holding that the central focus of the forum non conveniens inquiry is
convenience, Gilbert implicitly recognized that dismissal may not be barred
solely because of the possibility of an unfavorable change in law.14 Under
Gilbert, dismissal will ordinarily be appropriate where trial in the plaintiff's
chosen forum imposes a heavy burden on the defendant or the court, and where
the plaintiff is unable to offer any specific reasons of convenience supporting
his choice.15 If substantial weight were given to the possibility of an

unfavorable change in law, however, dismissal might be barred even where trial
in the chosen forum was plainly inconvenient.
26

The Court of Appeals' decision is inconsistent with this Court's earlier forum
non conveniens decisions in another respect. Those decisions have repeatedly
emphasized the need to retain flexibility. In Gilbert, the Court refused to
identify specific circumstances "which will justify or require either grant or
denial of remedy." 330 U.S., at 508, 67 S.Ct., at 843. Similarly, in Koster, the
Court rejected the contention that where a trial would involve inquiry into the
internal affairs of a foreign corporation, dismissal was always appropriate.
"That is one, but only one, factor which may show convenience." 330 U.S., at
527, 67 S.Ct., at 833. And in Williams v. Green Bay & Western R. Co., 326
U.S. 549, 557, 66 S.Ct. 284, 288, 90 L.Ed. 311 (1946), we stated that we would
not lay down a rigid rule to govern discretion, and that "[e]ach case turns on its
facts." If central emphasis were placed on any one factor, the forum non
conveniens doctrine would lose much of the very flexibility that makes it so
valuable.

27

In fact, if conclusive or substantial weight were given to the possibility of a

change in law, the forum non conveniens doctrine would become virtually
useless. Jurisdiction and venue requirements are often easily satisfied. As a
result, many plaintiffs are able to choose from among several forums.
Ordinarily, these plaintiffs will select that forum whose choice-of-law rules are
most advantageous. Thus, if the possibility of an unfavorable change in
substantive law is given substantial weight in the forum non conveniens
inquiry, dismissal would rarely be proper.

28

Except for the court below, every Federal Court of Appeals that has considered
this question after Gilbert has held that dismissal on grounds of forum non
conveniens may be granted even though the law applicable in the alternative
forum is less favorable to the plaintiff's chance of recovery. See, e. g., Pain v.
United Technologies Corp., 205 U.S.App.D.C. 229, 248-249, 637 F.2d 775,
794-795 (1980); Fitzgerald v. Texaco, Inc., 521 F.2d 448, 453 (CA2 1975),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1052, 96 S.Ct. 781, 46 L.Ed.2d 641 (1976); Anastasiadis
v. S.S. Little John, 346 F.2d 281, 283 (CA5 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 920,
86 S.Ct. 1368, 16 L.Ed.2d 440 (1966).16 Several courts have relied expressly on
Canada Malting to hold that the possibility of an unfavorable change of law
should not, by itself, bar dismissal. See Fitz- gerald v. Texaco, Inc., supra;
Anglo-American Grain Co. v. The S/T Mina D'Amico, 169 F.Supp. 908 (ED
Va.1959).

29

The Court of Appeals' approach is not only inconsistent with the purpose of the

forum non conveniens doctrine, but also poses substantial practical problems. If
the possibility of a change in law were given substantial weight, deciding
motions to dismiss on the ground of forum non conveniens would become quite
difficult. Choice-of-law analysis would become extremely important, and the
courts would frequently be required to interpret the law of foreign jurisdictions.
First, the trial court would have to determine what law would apply if the case
were tried in the chosen forum, and what law would apply if the case were tried
in the alternative forum. It would then have to compare the rights, remedies,
and procedures available under the law that would be applied in each forum.
Dismissal would be appropriate only if the court concluded that the law applied
by the alternative forum is as favorable to the plaintiff as that of the chosen
forum. The doctrine of forum non conveniens, however, is designed in part to
help courts avoid conducting complex exercises in comparative law. As we
stated in Gilbert, the public interest factors point towards dismissal where the
court would be required to "untangle problems in conflict of laws, and in law
foreign to itself." 330 U.S., at 509, 67 S.Ct., at 843.
30

Upholding the decision of the Court of Appeals would result in other practical
problems. At least where the foreign plaintiff named an American manufacturer
as defendant,17 a court could not dismiss the case on grounds of forum non
conveniens where dismissal might lead to an unfavorable change in law. The
American courts, which are already extremely attractive to foreign plaintiffs,18
would become even more attractive. The flow of litigation into the United
States would increase and further congest already crowded courts.19

31

The Court of Appeals based its decision, at least in part, on an analogy between
dismissals on grounds of forum non conveniens and transfers between federal
courts pursuant to 1404(a). In Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 84 S.Ct.
805, 11 L.Ed.2d 945 (1964), this Court ruled that a 1404(a) transfer should
not result in a change in the applicable law. Relying on dictum in an earlier
Third Circuit opinion interpreting Van Dusen, the court below held that that
principle is also applicable to a dismissal on forum non conveniens grounds.
630 F.2d, at 164, and n. 51 (citing DeMateos v. Texaco, Inc., 562 F.2d, at 899).
However, 1404(a) transfers are different than dismissals on the ground of
forum non conveniens.

32

Congress enacted 1404(a) to permit change of venue between federal courts.

Although the statute was drafted in accordance with the doctrine of forum non
conveniens, see Revisor's Note, H.R.Rep. No. 308, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., A132
(1947); H.R.Rep. No. 2646, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., A127 (1946), it was intended
to be a revision rather than a codification of the common law. Norwood v.
Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S. 29, 75 S.Ct. 544, 99 L.Ed. 789 (1955). District courts

were given more discretion to transfer under 1404(a) than they had to dismiss
on grounds of forum non conveniens. Id., at 31-32, 75 S.Ct., at 546.
33

34

The reasoning employed in Van Dusen v. Barrack is simply inapplicable to

dismissals on grounds of forum non conveniens. That case did not discuss the
common-law doctrine. Rather, it focused on "the construction and application"
of 1404(a). 376 U.S., at 613, 84 S.Ct., at 807-08.20 Emphasizing the remedial
purpose of the statute, Barrack concluded that Congress could not have
intended a transfer to be accompanied by a change in law. Id., at 622, 84 S.Ct.,
at 812. The statute was designed as a "federal housekeeping measure," allowing
easy change of venue within a unified federal system. Id., at 613, 84 S.Ct., at
807-08. The Court feared that if a change in venue were accompanied by a
change in law, forum-shopping parties would take unfair advantage of the
relaxed standards for transfer. The rule was necessary to ensure the just and
efficient operation of the statute.21
We do not hold that the possibility of an unfavorable change in law should
never be a relevant consideration in a forum non conveniens inquiry. Of course,
if the remedy provided by the alternative forum is so clearly inadequate or
unsatisfactory that it is no remedy at all, the unfavorable change in law may be
given substantial weight; the district court may conclude that dismissal would
not be in the interests of justice.22 In these cases, however, the remedies that
would be provided by the Scottish courts do not fall within this category.
Although the relatives of the decedents may not be able to rely on a strict
liability theory, and although their potential damages award may be smaller,
there is no danger that they will be deprived of any remedy or treated unfairly.

III
35

The Court of Appeals also erred in rejecting the District Court's Gilbert
analysis. The Court of Appeals stated that more weight should have been given
to the plaintiff's choice of forum, and criticized the District Court's analysis of
the private and public interests. However, the District Court's decision
regarding the deference due plaintiff's choice of forum was appropriate.
Furthermore, we do not believe that the District Court abused its discretion in
weighing the private and public interests.

A.
36

The District Court acknowledged that there is ordinarily a strong presumption

in favor of the plaintiff's choice of forum, which may be overcome only when
the private and public interest factors clearly point towards trial in the

alternative forum. It held, however, that the presumption applies with less force
when the plaintiff or real parties in interest are foreign.

37

The District Court's distinction between resident or citizen plaintiffs and

foreign plaintiffs is fully justified. In Koster, the Court indicated that a
plaintiff's choice of forum is entitled to greater deference when the plaintiff has
chosen the home forum. 330 U.S., at 524, 67 S.Ct., at 831-832.23 When the
home forum has been chosen, it is reasonable to assume that this choice is
convenient. When the plaintiff is foreign, however, this assumption is much
less reasonable. Because the central purpose of any forum non conveniens
inquiry is to ensure that the trial is convenient, a foreign plaintiff's choice
deserves less deference.24

B
38

The forum non conveniens determination is committed to the sound discretion

of the trial court. It may be reversed only when there has been a clear abuse of
discretion; where the court has considered all relevant public and private
interest factors, and where its balancing of these factors is reasonable, its
decision deserves substantial deference. Gilbert, 330 U.S., at 511-512, 67 S.Ct.,
at 844-845; Koster, 330 U.S., at 531, 67 S.Ct., at 835. Here, the Court of
Appeals expressly acknowledged that the standard of review was one of abuse
of discretion. In examining the District Court's analysis of the public and
private interests, however, the Court of Appeals seems to have lost sight of this
rule, and substituted its own judgment for that of the District Court.

(1)
39
40

In analyzing the private interest factors, the District Court stated that the
connections with Scotland are "overwhelming." 479 F.Supp., at 732. This
characterization may be somewhat exaggerated. Particularly with respect to the
question of relative ease of access to sources of proof, the private interests point
in both directions. As respondent emphasizes, records concerning the design,
manufacture, and testing of the propeller and plane are located in the United
States. She would have greater access to sources of proof relevant to her strict
liability and negligence theories if trial were held here.25 However, the District
Court did not act unreasonably in concluding that fewer evidentiary problems
would be posed if the trial were held in Scotland. A large proportion of the
relevant evidence is located in Great Britain.

41

The Court of Appeals found that the problems of proof could not be given any
weight because Piper and Hartzell failed to describe with specificity the

evidence they would not be able to obtain if trial were held in the United States.
It suggested that defendants seeking forum non conveniens dismissal must
submit affidavits identifying the witnesses they would call and the testimony
these witnesses would provide if the trial were held in the alternative forum.
Such detail is not necessary.26 Piper and Hartzell have moved for dismissal
precisely because many crucial witnesses are located beyond the reach of
compulsory process, and thus are difficult to identify or interview. Requiring
extensive investigation would defeat the purpose of their motion. Of course,
defendants must provide enough information to enable the District Court to
balance the parties' interests. Our examination of the record convinces us that
sufficient information was provided here. Both Piper and Hartzell submitted
affidavits describing the evidentiary problems they would face if the trial were
held in the United States.27
42

The District Court correctly concluded that the problems posed by the inability
to implead potential third-party defendants clearly supported holding the trial in
Scotland. Joinder of the pilot's estate, Air Navigation, and McDonald is crucial
to the presentation of petitioners' defense. If Piper and Hartzell can show that
the accident was caused not by a design defect, but rather by the negligence of
the pilot, the plane's owners, or the charter company, they will be relieved of all
liability. It is true, of course, that if Hartzell and Piper were found liable after a
trial in the United States, they could institute an action for indemnity or
contribution against these parties in Scotland. It would be far more convenient,
however, to resolve all claims in one trial. The Court of Appeals rejected this
argument. Forcing petitioners to rely on actions for indemnity or contributions
would be "burdensome" but not "unfair." 630 F.2d, at 162. Finding that trial in
the plaintiff's chosen forum would be burdensome, however, is sufficient to
support dismissal on grounds of forum non conveniens.28

(2)
43
44

The District Court's review of the factors relating to the public interest was also
reasonable. On the basis of its choice-of-law analysis, it concluded that if the
case were tried in the Middle District of Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania law would
apply to Piper and Scottish law to Hartzell. It stated that a trial involving two
sets of laws would be confusing to the jury. It also noted its own lack of
familiarity with Scottish law. Consideration of these problems was clearly
appropriate under Gilbert ; in that case we explicitly held that the need to apply
foreign law pointed towards dismissal.29 The Court of Appeals found that the
District Court's choice-of-law analysis was incorrect, and that American law
would apply to both Hartzell and Piper. Thus, lack of familiarity with foreign
law would not be a problem. Even if the Court of Appeals' conclusion is

correct, however, all other public interest factors favored trial in Scotland.
45

Scotland has a very strong interest in this litigation. The accident occurred in its
airspace. All of the decedents were Scottish. Apart from Piper and Hartzell, all
potential plaintiffs and defendants are either Scottish or English. As we stated
in Gilbert, there is "a local interest in having localized controversies decided at
home." 330 U.S., at 509, 67 S.Ct., at 843. Respondent argues that American
citizens have an interest in ensuring that American manufacturers are deterred
from producing defective products, and that additional deterrence might be
obtained if Piper and Hartzell were tried in the United States, where they could
be sued on the basis of both negligence and strict liability. However, the
incremental deterrence that would be gained if this trial were held in an
American court is likely to be insignificant. The American interest in this
accident is simply not sufficient to justify the enormous commitment of judicial
time and resources that would inevitably be required if the case were to be tried
here.

IV
46

The Court of Appeals erred in holding that the possibility of an unfavorable

change in law bars dismissal on the ground of forum non conveniens. It also
erred in rejecting the District Court's Gilbert analysis. The District Court
properly decided that the presumption in favor of the respondent's forum choice
applied with less than maximum force because the real parties in interest are
foreign. It did not act unreasonably in deciding that the private interests pointed
towards trial in Scotland. Nor did it act unreasonably in deciding that the public
interests favored trial in Scotland. Thus, the judgment of the Court of Appeals
is

47

Reversed.

48

Justice POWELL took no part in the decision of these cases.

49

Justice O'CONNOR took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases.

50

Justice WHITE, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

51

I join Parts I and II of the Court's opinion. However, like Justice BRENNAN
and Justice STEVENS, I would not proceed to deal with the issues addressed in
Part III. To that extent, I am in dissent.

52

Justice STEVENS, with whom Justice BRENNAN joins, dissenting.

53

In No. 80-848, only one question is presented for review to this Court:

54

"Whether, in an action in federal district court brought by foreign plaintiffs

against American defendants, the plaintiffs may defeat a motion to dismiss on
the ground of forum non conveniens merely by showing that the substantive
law that would be applied if the case were litigated in the district court is more
favorable to them than the law that would be applied by the courts of their own
nation." Pet. for Cert. in No. 80-848, p. i.

55

In No. 80-883, the Court limited its grant of certiorari, see 450 U.S. 909, 101
S.Ct. 1346, 67 L.Ed.2d 33, to the same question:

56

"Must a motion to dismiss on grounds of forum non conveniens be denied

whenever the law of the alternate forum is less favorable to recovery than that
which would be applied by the district court?" Pet. for Cert. in No. 80-883, p. i.

57

I agree that this question should be answered in the negative. Having decided
that question, I would simply remand the case to the Court of Appeals for
further consideration of the question whether the District Court correctly
decided that Pennsylvania was not a convenient forum in which to litigate a
claim against a Pennsylvania company that a plane was defectively designed
and manufactured in Pennsylvania.

Avco-Lycoming, Inc., the manufacturer of the plane's engines, was also named
as a defendant. It was subsequently dismissed from the suit by stipulation.

The pilot's estate has also filed suit in the United Kingdom against Air
Navigation, McDonald, Piper, and Hartzell.

See Affidavit of Donald Ian Kerr MacLeod, App. A19 (affidavit submitted to
District Court by petitioners describing Scottish law). Suits for damages are
governed by The Damages (Scotland) Act 1976.

Section 1404(a) provides: "For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the
interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other
district or division where it might have been brought."

The District Court concluded that it could not assert personal jurisdiction over

Hartzell consistent with due process. However, it decided not to dismiss

Hartzell because the corporation would be amenable to process in
Pennsylvania.
6

The factors pertaining to the private interests of the litigants included the
"relative ease of access to sources of proof; availability of compulsory process
for attendance of unwilling, and the cost of obtaining attendance of willing,
witnesses; possibility of view of premises, if view would be appropriate to the
action; and all other practical problems that make trial of a case easy,
expeditious and inexpensive." Gilbert, 330 U.S., at 508, 67 S.Ct., at 843. The
public factors bearing on the question included the administrative difficulties
flowing from court congestion; the "local interest in having localized
controversies decided at home"; the interest in having the trial of a diversity
case in a forum that is at home with the law that must govern the action; the
avoidance of unnecessary problems in conflict of laws, or in the application of
foreign law; and the unfairness of burdening citizens in an unrelated forum with
jury duty. Id., at 509, 67 S.Ct., at 843.

The District Court explained that inconsistent verdicts might result if petitioners
were held liable on the basis of strict liability here, and then required to prove
negligence in an indemnity action in Scotland. Moreover, even if the same
standard of liability applied, there was a danger that different juries would find
different facts and produce inconsistent results.

Under Klaxon v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 61 S.Ct. 1020, 85
L.Ed. 1477 (1941), a court ordinarily must apply the choice-of-law rules of the
State in which it sits. However, where a case is transferred pursuant to 28
U.S.C. 1404(a), it must apply the choice-of-law rules of the State from which
the case was transferred. Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 84 S.Ct. 805, 11
L.Ed.2d 945 (1946). Relying on these two cases, the District Court concluded
that California choice-of-law rules would apply to Piper, and Pennsylvania
choice-of-law rules would apply to Hartzell. It further concluded that California
applied a "governmental interests" analysis in resolving choice-of-law
problems, and that Pennsylvania employed a "significant contacts" analysis.
The court used the "governmental interests" analysis to determine that
Pennsylvania liability rules would apply to Piper, and the "significant contacts"
analysis to determine that Scottish liability rules would apply to Hartzell.

The court claimed that the risk of inconsistent verdicts was slight because
Pennsylvania and Scotland both adhere to principles of res judicata.

10

The Court of Appeals agreed with the District Court that California choice-oflaw rules applied to Piper, and that Pennsylvania choice-of-law rules applied to

Hartzell, see n. 8, supra. It did not agree, however, that California used a
"governmental interests" analysis and that Pennsylvania used a "significant
contacts" analysis. Rather, it believed that both jurisdictions employed the
"false conflicts" test. Applying this test, it concluded that Ohio and
Pennsylvania had a greater policy interest in the dispute than Scotland, and that
American law would apply to both Piper and Hartzell.
11

The court's reasoning on this point is somewhat unclear. It states:

"We have held that under the applicable choice of law rules Pennsylvania and
Ohio are the jurisdictions with the greatest policy interest in this dispute. It
follows that the other public interest factors that should be considered under the
Supreme Court cases of Gilbert and Koster favor trial in this country rather
than Scotland." 630 F.2d, at 171.
The Court of Appeals concluded as part of its choice-of-law analysis that the
United States had the greatest policy interest in the dispute. See n. 10, supra. It
apparently believed that this conclusion necessarily implied that the forum non
conveniens public interest factors pointed toward trial in the United States.

12

We granted certiorari in No. 80-848 to consider the question "[w]hether, in an

action in federal district court brought by foreign plaintiffs against American
defendants, the plaintiffs may defeat a motion to dismiss on the ground of
forum non conveniens merely by showing that the substantive law that would
be applied if the case were litigated in the district court is more favorable to
them than the law that would be applied by the courts of their own nation." We
granted certiorari in No. 80-883 to consider the question whether "a motion to
dismiss on grounds of forum non conveniens [should] be denied whenever the
law of the alternate forum is less favorable to recovery than that which would
be applied by the district court."
In this opinion, we begin by considering whether the Court of Appeals properly
held that the possibility of an unfavorable change in law automatically bars
dismissal. Part II, infra. Since we conclude that the Court of Appeals erred, we
then consider its review of the District Court's Gilbert analysis to determine
whether dismissal was otherwise appropriate. Part III, infra. We believe that it
is necessary to discuss the Gilbert analysis in order to properly dispose of the
cases.
The questions on which certiorari was granted are sufficiently broad to justify
our discussion of the District Court's Gilbert analysis. However, even if the
issues we discuss in Part III are not within the bounds of the questions with
respect to which certiorari was granted, our consideration of these issues is not
inappropriate. An order limiting the grant of certiorari does not operate as a

jurisdictional bar. We may consider questions outside the scope of the limited
order when resolution of those questions is necessary for the proper disposition
of the case. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 48 S.Ct. 564, 72
L.Ed. 944 (1928); McCandless v. Furlaud, 293 U.S. 67, 55 S.Ct. 42, 79 L.Ed.
202 (1934); Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767, 87 S.Ct. 1414, 18 L.Ed.2d 515
(1967).
13

The doctrine of forum non conveniens has a long history. It originated in

Scotland, see Braucher, The Inconvenient Federal Forum, 60 Harv.L.Rev. 908,
909-911 (1947), and became part of the common law of many States, see id., at
911-912; Blair, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens in Anglo-American
Law, 29 Colum.L.Rev. 1 (1929). The doctrine was also frequently applied in
federal admiralty actions. See, e. g., Canada Malting Co. v. Paterson
Steamships, Ltd.; see also Bickel, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens As
Applied in the Federal Courts in Matters of Admiralty, 35 Cornell L.Q. 12
(1949). In Williams v. Green Bay & Western R. Co., 326 U.S. 549, 66 S.Ct.
284, 90 L.Ed. 311 (1946), the Court first indicated that motions to dismiss on
grounds of forum non conveniens could be made in federal diversity actions.
The doctrine became firmly established when Gilbert and Koster were decided
one year later.
In previous forum non conveniens decisions, the Court has left unresolved the
question whether under Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82
L.Ed. 1188 (1938), state or federal law of forum non conveniens applies in a
diversity case. Gilbert, 330 U.S., at 509, 67 S.Ct., at 843; Koster, 330 U.S., at
529, 67 S.Ct., at 834; Williams v. Green Bay & Western R. Co., supra, 326
U.S., at 551, 558-559, 66 S.Ct., at 288-289. The Court did not decide this issue
because the same result would have been reached in each case under federal or
state law. The lower courts in these cases reached the same conclusion:
Pennsylvania and California law on forum non conveniens dismissals are
virtually identical to federal law. See 630 F.2d, at 158. Thus, here also, we need
not resolve the Erie question.

14

See also Williams v. Green Bay & Western R. Co., supra, 326 U.S., at 555, n. 4,
66 S.Ct., at 287, n. 4 (citing with approval a Scottish case that dismissed an
action on the ground of forum non conveniens despite the possibility of an
unfavorable change in law).

15

In other words, Gilbert held that dismissal may be warranted where a plaintiff
chooses a particular forum, not because it is convenient, but solely in order to
harass the defendant or take advantage of favorable law. This is precisely the
situation in which the Court of Appeals' rule would bar dismissal.

16

Cf. Dahl v. United Technologies Corp., 632 F.2d 1027, 1032 (CA3 1980)
(dismissal affirmed where "Norwegian substantive law will predominate the
trial of this case and the mere presence of a count pleaded under Connecticut
law but which may have little chance of success does not warrant a different
conclusion"). But see DeMateos v. Texaco, Inc., 562 F.2d 895, 899 (CA3 1977)
(dictum) (principle that 1404(a) transfer should not result in change in law is
no less applicable to dismissal on grounds of forum non conveniens ), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 904, 98 S.Ct. 1449, 55 L.Ed.2d 494 (1978). The court below
relied on the dictum in DeMateos in reaching its decision. See infra, at 253-254.

17

In fact, the defendant might not even have to be American. A foreign plaintiff
seeking damages for an accident that occurred abroad might be able to obtain
service of process on a foreign defendant who does business in the United
States. Under the Court of Appeals' holding, dismissal would be barred if the
law in the alternative forum were less favorable to the plaintiff even though
none of the parties are American, and even though there is absolutely no nexus
between the subject matter of the litigation and the United States.

18

First, all but 6 of the 50 American StatesDelaware, Massachusetts, Michigan,

North Carolina, Virginia, and Wyoming offer strict liability. 1 CCH Prod.
Liability Rep. 4016 (1981). Rules roughly equivalent to American strict
liability are effective in France, Belgium, and Luxembourg. West Germany and
Japan have a strict liability statute for pharmaceuticals. However, strict liability
remains primarily an American innovation. Second, the tort plaintiff may
choose, at least potentially, from among 50 jurisdictions if he decides to file suit
in the United States. Each of these jurisdictions applies its own set of malleable
choice-of-law rules. Third, jury trials are almost always available in the United
States, while they are never provided in civil law jurisdictions. G. Gloss,
Comparative Law 12 (1979); J. Merryman, The Civil Law Tradition 121
(1969). Even in the United Kingdom, most civil actions are not tried before a
jury. 1 G. Keeton, The United Kingdom: The Development of its Laws and
Constitutions 309 (1955). Fourth, unlike most foreign jurisdictions, American
courts allow contingent attorney's fees, and do not tax losing parties with their
opponents' attorney's fees. R. Schlesinger, Comparative Law: Cases, Text,
Materials 275-277 (3d ed. 1970); Orban, Product Liability: A Comparative
Legal RestatementForeign National Law and the EEC Directive, 8 Ga.J.Int'l
& Comp.L. 342, 393 (1978). Fifth, discovery is more extensive in American
than in foreign courts. R. Schlesinger, supra, at 307, 310, and n. 33.

19

In holding that the possibility of a change in law unfavorable to the plaintiff

should not be given substantial weight, we also necessarily hold that the
possibility of a change in law favorable to defendant should not be considered.
Respondent suggests that Piper and Hartzell filed the motion to dismiss, not

simply because trial in the United States would be inconvenient, but also
because they believe the laws of Scotland are more favorable. She argues that
this should be taken into account in the analysis of the private interests. We
recognize, of course, that Piper and Hartzell may be engaged in reverse forumshopping. However, this possibility ordinarily should not enter into a trial
court's analysis of the private interests. If the defendant is able to overcome the
presumption in favor of plaintiff by showing that trial in the chosen forum
would be unnecessarily burdensome, dismissal is appropriateregardless of
the fact that defendant may also be motivated by a desire to obtain a more
favorable forum. Cf. Kloeckner Reederei und Kohlenhandel v. A/S Hakedal,
210 F.2d 754, 757 (CA2) (defendant not entitled to dismissal on grounds of
forum non conveniens solely because the law of the original forum is less
favorable to him than the law of the alternative forum), cert. dism'd by
stipulation, 348 U.S. 801, 75 S.Ct. 17, 99 L.Ed. 633 (1954).
20

Barrack at least implicitly recognized that the rule it announced for transfer
under 1404(a) was not the common-law rule. It cited several decisions under
1404(a) in which lower courts had been "strongly inclined to protect plaintiffs
against the risk that transfer might be accompanied by a prejudicial change in
applicable state laws." 376 U.S., at 630, n. 26, 84 S.Ct., at 816, n. 26. These
decisions frequently rested on the assumption that a change in law would have
been unavoidable under common law forum non conveniens, but could be
avoided under 1404(a). See, e. g., Greve v. Gibraltar Enterprises, Inc., 85
F.Supp. 410, 414 (NM 1949).

21

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has expressly
rejected the contention that rules governing transfers pursuant to 1404(a) also
govern forum non conveniens dismissals. Schertenleib v. Traum, 589 F.2d 1156
(1978).

22

At the outset of any forum non conveniens inquiry, the court must determine
whether there exists an alternative forum. Ordinarily, this requirement will be
satisfied when the defendant is "amenable to process" in the other jurisdiction.
Gilbert, 330 U.S., at 506-507, 67 S.Ct., at 842. In rare circumstances, however,
where the remedy offered by the other forum is clearly unsatisfactory, the other
forum may not be an adequate alternative, and the initial requirement may not
be satisfied. Thus, for example, dismissal would not be appropriate where the
alternative forum does not permit litigation of the subject matter of the dispute.
Cf. Phoenix Canada Oil Co. Ltd. v. Texaco, Inc., 78 F.R.D. 445 (Del.1978)
(court refuses to dismiss, where alternative forum is Ecuador, it is unclear
whether Ecuadorean tribunal will hear the case, and there is no generally
codified Ecuadorean legal remedy for the unjust enrichment and tort claims
asserted).

23

In Koster, we stated that "[i]n any balancing of conveniences, a real showing of

convenience by a plaintiff who has sued in his home forum will normally
outweigh the inconvenience the defendant may have shown." 330 U.S., at 524,
67 S.Ct., at 831-832. See also Swift & Co. Packers v. Compania Colombiana
del Caribe, 339 U.S. 684, 697, 70 S.Ct. 861, 869, 94 L.Ed. 1206 (1950) ("suit
by a United States citizen against a foreign respondent brings into force
considerations very different from those in suits between foreigners"); Canada
Malting Co. v. Paterson Steamships, Ltd., 285 U.S., at 421, 52 S.Ct., at 415 ("
[t]he rule recognizing an unqualified discretion to decline jurisdiction in suits in
admiralty between foreigners appears to be supported by an unbroken line of
decisions in the lower federal courts").
As the District Court correctly noted in its opinion, 479 F.Supp., at 731; see
also n. 10, supra, the lower federal courts have routinely given less weight to a
foreign plaintiff's choice of forum. See, e. g., Founding Church of Scientology
v. Verlag, 175 U.S.App.D.C. 402, 408, 536 F.2d 429, 435 (1976); Paper
Operations Consultants Int'l, Ltd. v. Hong Kong Amber, 513 F.2d 667, 672
(CA9 1975); Fitzgerald v. Texaco, Inc., 521 F.2d 448, 451 (CA2 1975), cert.
denied,
423 U.S. 1052, 96 S.Ct. 781, 46 L.Ed.2d 641 (1976); Mobil Tankers Co. v.
Mene Grande Oil Co., 363 F.2d 611, 614 (CA3), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 945, 87
S.Ct. 318, 17 L.Ed.2d 225 (1966); Ionescu v. E. F. Hutton & Co. (France), 465
F.Supp. 139 (SDNY 1979); Michell v. General Motors Corp., 439 F.Supp. 24,
27 (ND Ohio 1977).
A citizen's forum choice should not be given dispositive weight, however. See
Pain v. United Technologies Corp., 205 U.S.App.D.C. 229, 252-253, 637 F.2d
775, 796-797 (1980); Mizokami Bros. of Arizona, Inc. v. Baychem Corp., 556
F.2d 975 (CA9 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1035, 98 S.Ct. 770, 54 L.Ed.2d
783 (1978). Citizens or residents deserve somewhat more deference than
foreign plaintiffs, but dismissal should not be automatically barred when a
plaintiff has filed suit in his home forum. As always, if the balance of
conveniences suggests that trial in the chosen forum would be unnecessarily
burdensome for the defendant or the court, dismissal is proper.

24

See Pain v. United Technologies Corp., supra, 205 U.S.App.D.C. at 253, 637
F.2d, at 797 (citizenship and residence are proxies for convenience); see also
Note, Forum Non Conveniens and American Plaintiffs in the Federal Courts,
47 U.Chi.L.Rev. 373, 382-383 (1980).
Respondent argues that since plaintiffs will ordinarily file suit in the
jurisdiction that offers the most favorable law, establishing a strong

presumption in favor of both home and foreign plaintiffs will ensure that
defendants will always be held to the highest possible standard of
accountability for their purported wrongdoing. However, the deference
accorded a plaintiff's choice of forum has never been intended to guarantee that
the plaintiff will be able to select the law that will govern the case. See supra,
at 247-250.
25

In the future, where similar problems are presented, district courts might
dismiss subject to the condition that defendant corporations agree to provide the
records relevant to the plaintiff's claims.

26

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has expressly
rejected such a requirement. Fitzgerald v. Texaco, Inc., supra, at 451, n. 3. In
other cases, dismissals have been affirmed despite the failure to provide
detailed affidavits. See Farmanfarmaian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 437 F.Supp. 910,
924 (SDNY 1977), aff'd., 588 F.2d 880 (CA2 1978). And in a decision handed
down two weeks after the decision in this case, another Third Circuit panel
affirmed a dismissal without mentioning such a requirement. See Dahl v.
United Technologies Corp., 632 F.2d 1027 (1980).
The Court of Appeals apparently relied on an analogy to motions to transfer
under 28 U.S.C. 1404(a). 630 F.2d, at 160-161. It cited Marbury-Pattillo
Construction Co. v. Bayside Warehouse Co., 490 F.2d 155, 158 (CA5 1974),
and Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. v. Ritter, 371 F.2d 145, 148 (CA10 1967), which
suggest an affidavit requirement in the 1404(a) context. As we have
explained, however, dismissals on grounds of forum non conveniens and
1404(a) transfers are not directly comparable. See supra, at 253-254.

27

See Affidavit of Ronald C. Scott, App. to Pet. for Cert. of Hartzell Propeller,
Inc., A75; Affidavit of Charles J. McKelvey, App. to Pet. for Cert. of Piper
Aircraft Co. 1f. The affidavit provided to the District Court by Piper states that
it would call the following witnesses: the relatives of the decedents; the owners
and employees of McDonald; the persons responsible for the training and
licensing of the pilot; the persons responsible for servicing and maintaining the
aircraft; and two or three of its own employees involved in the design and
manufacture of the aircraft.

28

See Pain v. United Technologies Corp., 205 U.S.App.D.C., at 244, 637 F.2d, at
790 (relying on similar argument in approving dismissal of action arising out of
helicopter crash that took place in Norway).

29

Many forum non conveniens decisions have held that the need to apply foreign
law favors dismissal. See, e. g., Calavo Growers of California v. Belgium, 632
F.2d 963, 967 (CA2 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1084, 101 S.Ct. 871, 66

L.Ed.2d 809 (1981); Schertenleib v. Traum, 589 F.2d, at 1165. Of course, this
factor alone is not sufficient to warrant dismissal when a balancing of all
relevant factors shows that the plaintiff's chosen forum is appropriate. See, e.
g., Founding Church of Scientology v. Verlag, 175 U.S.App.D.C., at 409, 536
F.2d, at 436; Burt v. Isthmus Development Co., 218 F.2d 353, 357 (CA5), cert.
denied, 349 U.S. 922, 75 S.Ct. 661, 99 L.Ed. 1254 (1955).