Disclosure Car

Download as pdf or txt
Download as pdf or txt
You are on page 1of 82

DONT KNOW? BETTER KNOW!

KNOW BETTER: CONSUMER LAW FOR


ALL
John ONeal
ONeal Law Office
7 Battleground Court, Suite 212
Greensboro, NC 27408
Phone: (336) 510-7904
Fax: (336) 510-7965
Website: www.oneallawoffice.com
Blog: www.oneallawoffice.wordpress.com
E-mail: oneallaw@triadbiz.rr.com

FAILURE TO DISCLOSE VEHICLE DAMAGE OR DISCREPANCY


I.

SELLER OR TRANSFEROR OF VEHICLE HAS STATUTORY DUTY TO


DISCLOSE, IN WRITING, THE FOLLOWING DAMAGE OR
DISCREPANCIES IF KNOWN:
A.

Salvage Damage [N.C.G.S. 20-71.4(a)(2)]

Definition: Any motor vehicle damaged by collision or other occurrence to the


extent that the cost of repairs rendering the vehicle safe for use on public roadways would
exceed 75% of its fair market value. (Repairs shall include the cost of parts and labor.)
Salvage means the vehicles Certificate of Title may have a brand1)
Signs:
Frame rattle
Welded parts
1

N.C.G.S. 20-71.3. (h) A branded title for a salvage motor vehicle damaged by
collision or other occurrence shall be issued as follows:
(1) For motor vehicles up to and including six model years old, a branded title
shall be issued if the cost of repairs, including parts and labor, exceeds
seventy-five percent (75%) of its fair market value at the time of the
collision or other occurrence.
(2) For motor vehicles more than six model years old, a branded title shall be
issued if the cost of repairs, including parts and labor and excluding
the cost to replace the air bag restraint system, exceeds seventy-five
percent (75%) of its fair market value at the time of the collision or
other occurrence.
(i) Once the Division has issued a branded title for a motor vehicle all subsequent
titles for that motor vehicle shall continue to reflect the branding.

Uneven seams and gaps between doors, trunk, hood, and other panels of
vehicle
Hood or trunk that will not close squarely
Fresh undercoating of paint on wheel wells, chassis, or engine
Chipping paint or non-matching paint
Uneven tread wear pattern on tires
Vehicle history indicates previous ownership of vehicle by insurance
company
Flood Damage [N.C.G.S. 20-71.4(a)(2)]

B.

Definition: A motor vehicle that has been submerged or partially submerged in


water to the extent that damage to the body, engine, transmission or differential has
occurred.
Signs:

Visible signs of water damage or intrusion


Mildew smell through vents and airways of vehicle
Feeling of moisture on vehicle upholstery (seats, carpet, trunk)
Appearance of discoloration or stains on vehicle upholstery
Rust spots on screws, door hinges, hood springs, trunk latches or brackets
under the dashboard
Brittle wires beneath the dashboard
Inconsistent operation or non-operation of several of the following vehicle
features: power and electronics systems such as interior/exterior lights,
windows and door locks, radio, cigarette lighter, heater and air conditioner
Vehicle was previously owned or titled in a state prone to floods or with a
recent flood (ex: Florida, Louisiana, Texas, New Jersey)
Reconstructed Vehicle [N.C.G.S. 20-71.4(a)(2)]

C.

Definition: A motor vehicle required to be registered that has been materially


altered from original construction due to the removal, addition or substitution or essential
parts. (This includes glider kits and custom assembled vehicles.)
25% Damage Rule [N.C.G.S. 20-71.4(a)(1)]

D.

E.

Applies to vehicles no more than five years old


If seller knows of damage to vehicle that cost over 25% of the vehicles
value at time of repairs, this must be disclosed. Note the 25% excludes the
cost to replace the air bag restraint system.
Damage can be collision or other occurrence
New Car Damage [N.C.G.S. 20-305.1(e)(1)]

F.

Dealers are required to disclose in writing any damage and repair that
exceeds five percent of the manufacturers suggested retail price.
Not required to disclose any damage to glass, tires, or bumpers if the
damaged item has been replaced with original or comparable equipment.
Odometer Disclosure [N.C.G.S. 20-347(a)]
Applies to sales and leases of vehicles less than 10 years old
Must ID vehicle, state name and address of transferor and transferee,
and certification if the odometer reading is accurate or inaccurate

II. WHAT TO DO IF YOU SUSPECT THE VEHICLE HAS AN INTEGRITY


ISSUE:
1. Have vehicle inspected by expert (ex: ASE Certified mechanic, vehicle damage
expert who has served as witness)
2. Take pictures of and record visible and audible signs of damage
3. Obtain CarFax or AutoCheck report for vehicle
4. Obtain certified title history for vehicle
5. Try to obtain accident reports for prior incidents with vehicle
6. Try to locate and obtain vehicle repair invoices, statements
III.

TARGET DEFENDANTS:

Individual owner: could be judgment-proof; think about recoverability of a


potential judgment or settlement

Dealership: could have assets and insurance (ex: commercial general liability)

Surety: all dealers are required to have a motor vehicle surety bond [N.C.G.S.
20-288(e)]. Suit can be filed direct versus surety for acts and omissions of dealer.
Bernard v. Ohio Casualty Insurance Company, 79 N.C. App. 306, 339 S.E.2d 20
(1986). Only certain claims are covered by the bond--dealer's violation of either
Article 12 or Article 15 of Chapter 20 of the General Statutes of North Carolina.
Auto dealer fraud is a violation of article 12. Triplett v. James, 45 N.C. App. 96,
262 S.E.2d 374, cert. denied, 300 N.C. 202, 269 S.E.2d 621 (1980). Surety only
liable for compensatory damages; no punitive damages or treble damages.

Prior dealers, sellers, transferors: a consumer will be deemed an indirect


purchaser for purposes of Chapter 75 claims and can thus sue previous owners of
the vehicle (Hyde v Abbott Laboratories, 123 N.C. App. 572, 473 S.E.2d 680
(1996). Accrual of statute of limitations on claim depends on nature of claim
being asserted: fraud (runs from date of discovery of fraud) v contract (runs from
the date of the breach). SOL for Chapter 75 claims is four years. N.C.G.S. 7516.2.

IV.

POTENTIAL CAUSES OF ACTION:

Fraud
Negligent misrepresentation
Breach of contract
Breach of warranty
N.C.G.S. 20-71.4 (failure to disclose salvage or flood or reconstructed
condition)
N.C.G.S. 20-348 (odometer disclosure violation)Allows for the greater of
treble damages or $1,500.00 plus attorneys fees
Chapter 75/UDAP---if you can show knowledge and some extreme
circumstances (ex: prior sale and failure to disclose by same dealer/seller, evidence of
efforts to conceal damage, questionable pass of NC safety inspection especially when
the inspector is employed by dealer/seller). Dealer failure to conduct inspection when
dealer knows vehicle was in an accident may support a Chapter 75 claim (especially if
the dealer misrepresents the condition of the vehicle to a consumer). Huff v. Autos
Unlimited, Inc., 124 N.C. App. 410, 477 S.E.2d 86 (1996).
PLEADING NOTE: In order to properly plead a cause of action under N.C.G.S. 2071.4(a) and N.C.G.S. 20-348(a), a plaintiff must allege fraudulent intent in addition to a
violation of the provisions of N.C.G.S. 20-71.4(a). Bowman v Alan Vester Ford
Lincoln Mercury, 151 N.C App. 603, 566 S.E.2d 818 (2002).
SEEK HELP!
Contact a member of the Consumer Areas of Practice Section of your NCAJ!

20-71.4. Failure to disclose damage to a vehicle shall be a misdemeanor.


(a) It shall be unlawful for any transferor of a motor vehicle to do any of the
following:
(1) Transfer a motor vehicle up to and including five model years old when
the transferor has knowledge that the vehicle has been involved in a
collision or other occurrence to the extent that the cost of repairing that
vehicle, excluding the cost to replace the air bag restraint system,
exceeds twenty-five percent (25%) of its fair market retail value at the
time of the collision or other occurrence, without disclosing that fact in
writing to the transferee prior to the transfer of the vehicle.
(2) Transfer a motor vehicle when the transferor has knowledge that the
vehicle is, or was, a flood vehicle, a reconstructed vehicle, or a salvage
motor vehicle, without disclosing that fact in writing to the transferee
prior to the transfer of the vehicle.
(a1) For purposes of this section, the term "five model years" shall be calculated by
counting the model year of the vehicle's manufacture as the first model year and the
current calendar year as the final model year. Failure to disclose any of the information
required under subsection (a) of this section that is within the knowledge of the transferor
will also result in civil liability under G.S. 20-348. The Commissioner may prepare forms
to carry out the provisions of this section.
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person to remove the title or supporting documents to
any motor vehicle from the State of North Carolina with the intent to conceal damage (or
damage which has been repaired) occurring as a result of a collision or other occurrence.
(c) It shall be unlawful for any person to remove, tamper with, alter, or conceal the
"TOTAL LOSS CLAIM VEHICLE" tamperproof permanent marker that is affixed to the
doorjamb of any total loss claim vehicle. It shall be unlawful for any person to
reconstruct a total loss claim vehicle and not include or affix a "TOTAL LOSS CLAIM
VEHICLE" tamperproof permanent marker to the doorjamb of the rebuilt vehicle.
Violation of this subsection shall constitute a Class I felony, punishable by a fine of not
less than five thousand dollars ($5,000) for each offense.
(d) Violation of subsections (a) and (b) of this section shall constitute a Class 2
misdemeanor.
(e) The provisions of this section shall not apply to a State agency that assists the
United States Department of Defense with purchasing, transferring, or titling a vehicle to
another State agency, a unit of local government, a volunteer fire department, or a
volunteer rescue squad. (1987, c. 607, s. 1; 1987 (Reg. Sess., 1988), c. 1105, s. 3; 1989, c.
455, s. 4; 1989 (Reg. Sess., 1990), c. 916, s. 2; 1993, c. 539, s. 337; 1994, Ex. Sess., c.
24, s. 14(c); 1998-212, s. 27.8(b); 2003-258, s. 2; 2009-550, s. 2(a).)
20-347. Disclosure requirements.
(a) In connection with the transfer of a motor vehicle, the transferor shall disclose the
mileage to the transferee in writing on the title or on the document used to reassign the
title. This written disclosure must be signed by the transferor, including the printed name,
and shall contain the following information:
(1) The odometer reading at the time of the transfer (not to include tenths of
miles);

(2) The date of the transfer;


(3) The transferor's name and current address;
(3a) The transferee's printed name, signature and current address;
(4) The identity of the vehicle, including its make, model, body type, and
vehicle identification number, and the license plate number most
recently used on the vehicle; and
(5) Certification by the transferor that to the best of his knowledge the
odometer reading
a. Reflects the actual mileage; or
b. Reflects the amount of mileage in excess of the designed
mechanical odometer limit; or
c. Does not reflect the actual mileage and should not be relied on.
(6), (7) Repealed by Session Laws 1989, c. 482, s. 2.
(a1) Before executing any transfer of ownership document, each lessor of a leased
motor vehicle shall notify the lessee in writing that the lessee is required to provide
written disclosure to the lessor regarding mileage. In connection with the transfer of
ownership of the leased motor vehicle, the lessee shall furnish to the lessor a written
statement signed by the lessee containing the following information:
(1) The printed name of the person making the disclosure;
(2) The current odometer reading (not to include tenths of miles);
(3) The date of the statement;
(4) The lessee's printed name and current address;
(5) The lessor's printed name, signature, and current address;
(6) The identity of the vehicle, including its make, model, year, body type, and
vehicle identification number;
(7) The date that the lessor notified the lessee of the disclosure requirements
and the date the lessor received the completed disclosure statement;
and
(8) Certification by the lessee that to the best of his knowledge the odometer
reading:
a. Reflects the actual mileage;
b. Reflects the amount of mileage in excess of the designed
mechanical odometer limit; or
c. Does not reflect the actual mileage and should not be relied on.
If the lessor transfers the leased vehicle without obtaining possession of it, the lessor
may indicate on the title the mileage disclosed by the lessee under this subsection, unless
the lessor has reason to believe that the disclosure by the lessee does not reflect the actual
mileage of the vehicle.
(b) Repealed by Session Laws 1973, c. 1088.
(c) It shall be unlawful for any transferor to violate any rules under this section or to
knowingly give a false statement to a transferee in making any disclosure required by
such rules.
(d) The provisions of this disclosure statement section shall not apply to the following
transfers:
(1) A vehicle having a gross vehicle weight rating of more than 16,000
pounds.

(2) A vehicle that is not self-propelled.


(2a) A vehicle sold directly by the manufacturer to any agency of the United
States in conformity with contractual specifications.
(3) A vehicle that is 10 years old or older.
(4) A new vehicle prior to its first transfer for purposes other than resale.
(5) A vehicle that is transferred by a State agency that assists the United States
Department of Defense with purchasing, transferring, or titling a
vehicle to another State agency, a unit of local government, a
volunteer fire department, or a volunteer rescue squad. (1973, c. 679,
s. 1; c. 1088; 1983, c. 387; 1989, c. 482, ss. 2-5; 1993, c. 553, s. 11;
2009-550, s. 2(d).)
20-305.1. Automobile dealer warranty obligations.
(e) Damage/Repair Disclosure. - Notwithstanding the provisions of subdivision
(d)(4) of this section and in supplementation thereof, a new motor vehicle dealer shall
disclose in writing to a purchaser of the new motor vehicle prior to entering into a sales
contract any damage and repair to the new motor vehicle if the damage exceeds five
percent (5%) of the manufacturer's suggested retail price as calculated at the rate of the
dealer's authorized warranty rate for labor and parts.
(1) A new motor vehicle dealer is not required to disclose to a purchaser that
any damage of any nature occurred to a new motor vehicle at any time
if the total cost of all repairs fails to exceed five percent (5%) of the
manufacturer's suggested retail price as calculated at the time the
repairs were made based upon the dealer's authorized warranty rate for
labor and parts and the damaged item has been replaced with original
or comparable equipment.
(2) If disclosure is not required under this section, a purchaser may not revoke
or rescind a sales contract or have or file any cause of action or claim
against the dealer or manufacturer for breach of contract, breach of
warranty, fraud, concealment, unfair and deceptive acts or practices, or
otherwise due solely to the fact that the new motor vehicle was
damaged and repaired prior to completion of the sale.
(3) For purposes of this section, "manufacturer's suggested retail price" means
the retail price of the new motor vehicle suggested by the
manufacturer including the retail delivered price suggested by the
manufacturer for each accessory or item of optional equipment
physically attached to the new motor vehicle at the time of delivery to
the new motor vehicle dealer which is not included within the retail
price suggested by the manufacturer for the new motor vehicle.
20-288. Application for license; license requirements; expiration of license; bond.
(a) A new motor vehicle dealer, motor vehicle sales representative, manufacturer,
factory branch, factory representative, distributor, distributor branch, distributor
representative, or wholesaler may obtain a license by filing an application with the
Division. An application must be on a form provided by the Division and contain the

information required by the Division. An application for a license must be accompanied


by the required fee and by an application for a dealer license plate.
(a1) A used motor vehicle dealer may obtain a license by filing an application, as
prescribed in subsection (a) of this section, and providing the following:
(1) The required fee.
(2) Proof that the applicant, within the last 12 months, has completed a 12hour licensing course approved by the Division if the applicant is
seeking an initial license and a six-hour course approved by the
Division if the applicant is seeking a renewal license. The
requirements of this subdivision do not apply to a used motor vehicle
dealer the primary business of which is the sale of salvage vehicles on
behalf of insurers or to a manufactured home dealer licensed under
G.S. 143-143.11 who complies with the continuing education
requirements of G.S. 143-143.11B. The requirement of this
subdivision does not apply to persons age 62 or older as of July 1,
2002, who are seeking a renewal license. This subdivision also does
not apply to an applicant who holds a license as a new motor vehicle
dealer as defined in G.S. 20-286(13) and operates from an established
showroom 20 miles or less from the established showroom for which
the applicant seeks a used motor vehicle dealer license. An applicant
who also holds a license as a new motor vehicle dealer may designate
a representative to complete the licensing course required by this
subdivision.
(3) If the applicant is an individual, proof that the applicant is at least 18 years
of age and proof that all salespersons employed by the dealer are at
least 18 years of age.
(4) The application for a dealer license plate.
(b) The Division shall require in such application, or otherwise, information relating
to matters set forth in G.S. 20-294 as grounds for the refusing of licenses, and to other
pertinent matters commensurate with the safeguarding of the public interest, all of which
shall be considered by the Division in determining the fitness of the applicant to engage
in the business for which he seeks a license.
(b1) The Division shall require in such license application and each application for
renewal of license a certification that the applicant is familiar with the North Carolina
Motor Vehicle Dealers and Manufacturers Licensing Law and with other North Carolina
laws governing the conduct and operation of the business for which the license or license
renewal is sought and that the applicant shall comply with the provisions of these laws,
with the provisions of Article 12 of Chapter 20 of the General Statutes, and with other
lawful regulations of the Division.
(c) All licenses that are granted shall be for a period of one year unless sooner
revoked or suspended. The Division shall vary the expiration dates of all licenses that are
granted so that an equal number of licenses expire at the end of each month, quarter, or
other period consisting of one or more months to coincide with G.S. 20-79(c).
(d) To obtain a license as a wholesaler, an applicant who intends to sell or distribute
self-propelled vehicles must have an established office in this State, and an applicant who
intends to sell or distribute only trailers or semitrailers of more than 2,500 pounds

unloaded weight must have a place of business in this State where the records required
under this Article are kept.
To obtain a license as a motor vehicle dealer, an applicant who intends to deal in selfpropelled vehicles must have an established salesroom in this State, and an applicant who
intends to deal in only trailers or semitrailers of more than 2,500 pounds unloaded weight
must have a place of business in this State where the records required under this Article
are kept.
An applicant for a license as a manufacturer, a factory branch, a distributor, a
distributor branch, a wholesaler, or a motor vehicle dealer must have a separate license
for each established office, established salesroom, or other place of business in this State.
An application for any of these licenses shall include a list of the applicant's places of
business in this State.
(e) Each applicant approved by the Division for license as a motor vehicle dealer,
manufacturer, factory branch, distributor, distributor branch, or wholesaler shall furnish a
corporate surety bond or cash bond or fixed value equivalent of the bond. The amount of
the bond for an applicant for a motor vehicle dealer's license is fifty thousand dollars
($50,000) for one established salesroom of the applicant and twenty-five thousand dollars
($25,000) for each of the applicant's additional established salesrooms. The amount of the
bond for other applicants required to furnish a bond is fifty thousand dollars ($50,000) for
one place of business of the applicant and twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000) for
each of the applicant's additional places of business.
A corporate surety bond shall be approved by the Commissioner as to form and shall
be conditioned that the obligor will faithfully conform to and abide by the provisions of
this Article and Article 15. A cash bond or fixed value equivalent thereof shall be
approved by the Commissioner as to form and terms of deposits as will secure the
ultimate beneficiaries of the bond; and such bond shall not be available for delivery to
any person contrary to the rules of the Commissioner. Any purchaser of a motor vehicle,
including a motor vehicle dealer, who shall have suffered any loss or damage by the
failure of any license holder subject to this subsection to deliver free and clear title to any
vehicle purchased from a license holder or any other act of a license holder subject to this
subsection that constitutes a violation of this Article or Article 15 of this Chapter shall
have the right to institute an action to recover against the license holder and the surety.
Every license holder against whom an action is instituted shall notify the Commissioner
of the action within 10 days after served with process. Except as provided by G.S. 20288(f) and (g), a corporate surety bond shall remain in force and effect and may not be
canceled by the surety unless the bonded person stops engaging in business or the
person's license is denied, suspended, or revoked under G.S. 20-294. That cancellation
may be had only upon 30 days' written notice to the Commissioner and shall not affect
any liability incurred or accrued prior to the termination of such 30-day period. This
subsection does not apply to a license holder who deals only in trailers having an empty
weight of 4,000 pounds or less. This subsection does not apply to manufacturers of, or
dealers in, mobile or manufactured homes who furnish a corporate surety bond, cash
bond, or fixed value equivalent thereof, pursuant to G.S. 143-143.12.
(f) A corporate surety bond furnished pursuant to this section or renewal thereof may
also be canceled by the surety prior to the next premium anniversary date without the
prior written consent of the license holder for the following reasons:

(1) Nonpayment of premium in accordance with the terms for issuance of the
surety bond; or
(2) An act or omission by the license holder or his representative that
constitutes substantial and material misrepresentation or nondisclosure
of a material fact in obtaining the surety bond or renewing the bond.
Any cancellation permitted by this subsection is not effective unless written notice of
cancellation has been delivered or mailed to the license holder and to the Commissioner
not less than 30 days before the proposed effective date of cancellation. The notice must
be given or mailed by certified mail to the license holder at its last known address. The
notice must state the reason for cancellation. Cancellation for nonpayment of premium is
not effective if the amount due is paid before the effective date set forth in the notice of
cancellation. Cancellation of the surety shall not affect any liability incurred or accrued
prior to the termination of the 30-day notice period.
(g) A corporate surety may refuse to renew a surety bond furnished pursuant to this
section by giving or mailing written notice of nonrenewal to the license holder and to the
Commissioner not less than 30 days prior to the premium anniversary date of the surety
bond. The notice must be given or mailed by certified mail to the license holder at its last
known address. Nonrenewal of the surety bond shall not affect any liability incurred or
accrued prior to the premium anniversary date of the surety bond. (1955, c. 1243, s. 4;
1975, c. 716, s. 5; 1977, c. 560, s. 2; 1979, c. 254; 1981, c. 952, s. 3; 1985, c. 262; 1991,
c. 495, s. 1; c. 662, s. 3; 1993, c. 440, s. 3; 1997-429, s. 1; 2001-345, s. 2; 2001-492, s. 4;
2003-254, s. 2; 2004-167, s. 9; 2004-199, s. 59; 2005-99, s. 2; 2006-105, s. 2.3; 2006191, s. 1; 2006-259, s. 12; 2011-290, ss. 1, 2.)

10

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

IN THE GENERAL COURT OF


JUSTICE
SUPERIOR COURT DIVISION
File No. 12

COUNTY OF GUILFORD

MARTHA A. WILLIAMS,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff,
vs.
WALTER L. BROWER, d/b/a RMG
MOTORSPORTS, and PLATTE RIVER
INSURANCE COMPANY, INC.

COMPLAINT
(Jury Trial Demanded)

)
)

Defendants.

Now comes Plaintiff Martha A. Williams, by and through her attorney, who
complains of Defendants Walter L. Brower d/b/a RMG Motorsports (Defendant RMG)
and Platte River Insurance Company, Inc. (hereinafter, Defendant Platte River) as
follows:
Parties
1. Plaintiff Martha A. Williams, formerly known as Martha A. Zelada
(hereinafter, "Plaintiff"), is a natural person and is a resident of Greensboro, Guilford
County, North Carolina.
2. Upon information and belief, defendant Walter L. Brower is a citizen and
resident of the State of North Carolina, and does business in Greensboro, Guilford
County, North Carolina under the business name RMG Motorsports (hereinafter,
"RMG").

11

3. At all times relevant to this action, RMG, acted in the ordinary course of
business in selling used vehicles, engaged in acts or practices affecting commerce within
the meaning of N.C.G.S. 75-1.1.
4. RMG sells, imports, and distributes used motor vehicles that are sold in the
State of North Carolina, including the vehicle that is the subject of this action, a 2007
Honda Accord vehicle which is further described in paragraph 10 below.
5. RMG is a "Seller" as defined in North Carolina General Statute 25-2-103.
6. Upon information and belief, Defendant Platte River Insurance Company,
Inc. (Platte River) is a foreign corporation registered to do business and doing business
in North Carolina.
7. Upon information and belief, in the regular course of its business Platte River
extends surety bonds to North Carolina automobile dealers and manufacturers pursuant to
N.C. Gen. Stat. 20-288(e).
8. Defendant Platte River extended a surety bond to RMG in the amount of
$50,000.00, pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. 20-288(e).
9. Jurisdiction over Platte River is proper pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. 175.4(1)(d), 1-75.4(5), and 20-288(e).
Facts
10. On or about June 30, 2009, Plaintiff purchased, for a cash price including all
taxes, tag/title fees, and other fees, of $15,518.00, a 2007 Honda Accord vehicle with a
VIN of JHMCN36557C001879 (hereinafter the vehicle) from RMG. This purchase
was documented via a Bill of Sale executed on June 30, 2009 which is attached to this

12

Complaint as Exhibit A. Plaintiff purchased the Vehicle for her personal, family or
household use.
11. Plaintiffs agreement with RMG was for Plaintiff to make a $4,000.00 cash
down payment on the Vehicle, which she did, leaving a remaining balance in the amount
of $11,518.00. Plaintiff agreed to pay this balance via monthly payments of $400.00 for
36 consecutive months commencing on July 30, 2009. Monthly payments would be due
on the last date of each month and there would be a five-day grace period for each
monthly payment after which Plaintiff would be responsible for paying a late fee. Upon
Plaintiffs payment in full of the $14,400.00 Defendant RMG would be required to
execute all documents necessary to remove its lien from the vehicles Certificate of Title
and title would reside wholly with Plaintiff.
12. The terms recited in paragraphs 10 and 11 of the Complaint comprise the
terms of Plaintiffs agreement with RMG to purchase the vehicle and are hereinafter
referred to collectively as, the sales agreement", Plaintiffs agreement with RMG, or
the like unless otherwise stated.
13. The Bill of Sale did not reserve to RMG the right to assess finance charges on
the remaining balance of $11,518.00.
14. The Bill of Sale did not require Plaintiff to pay any finance charges on the
remaining balance of $11,518.00.
15. The Bill of Sale did not reserve to RMG the right to charge late fees or
penalty on any past due payments.
16. The Bill of Sale did not require Plaintiff to pay any late fees or penalty on any
past due payments.

13

17. The Bill of Sale did not reserve to RMG the right to charge any repossession
fees.
18. The Bill of Sale did not require Plaintiff to pay any repossession fees.
19. The right to receive all vehicle payments was retained by RMG. RMG did
not assign its rights to vehicle payments.
20. The only document RMG gave to Plaintiff on June 30, 2009 was the Bill of
Sale.
21. Plaintiff does not recall signing any Retail Installment Sales Contract.
Plaintiff has never received a copy of any Retail Installment Sales Contract.
22. Plaintiff does not recall signing any document which purports to create a
security interest in the Vehicle in favor RMG.
23. Plaintiff did not receive a copy of any document bearing her genuine
signature which purports to create a security interest in the Vehicle in favor of RMG.
24. Upon her belief and recollection, Plaintiff avers that she did not sign
documents which, independently or combined, create a valid security interest in the
vehicle in favor of RMG.
25. Upon her belief and recollection, Plaintiff avers that she did not receive a
copy of documents which create a valid security interest in the vehicle in favor of RMG.
26. At the time of the purchase Plaintiff was aware the vehicle had some physical
damage. However, Plaintiff had no actual or constructive knowledge that the vehicle was
a salvage vehicle or had a Certificate of Title with a salvage brand.
27. Plaintiff has never signed a Damage Disclosure Statement in which RMG
disclosed damage to the vehicle.

14

28. Plaintiff has never signed a Damage Disclosure Statement in which RMG
disclosed the vehicle was a salvage vehicle.
29. Plaintiff has never signed a Damage Disclosure Statement in which RMG
disclosed the vehicle had a Certificate of Title with a salvage brand.
30. Plaintiff never signed any agreement allowing RMG the right to repossess the
vehicle.
31. Before Plaintiffs May 2011 payment was due or to be considered late,
Plaintiff tendered the sum of $400.00 which represented her May 2011 payment. At the
time of this tender Plaintiff was current on her loan obligation.
32. RMG refused to accept Plaintiffs tender of the $400.00 and demanded
Plaintiff pay a $50.00 late fee or else RMG would repossess the vehicle. On May 2,
2011, in the face of pressure and threat of repossession by RMG, Plaintiff reluctantly paid
the $400.00 payment for May 2011 plus the $50.00 late fee demanded by RMG despite
the fact that she was not late.
33. Plaintiffs May 2, 2011 payment to RMG pursuant to RMGs demand did not
serve as a waiver of her rights as the holder of a vehicle without a security interest.
34. Plaintiffs May 2, 2011 payment to RMG pursuant to RMGs demand did not
serve as an affirmation of any presumed right by RMG to repossess the vehicle.
35. In March 2012, RMG repossessed the vehicle from Plaintiff. RMG failed to
provide Plaintiff any correspondence or written prior notice of intent to repossess the
vehicle.
36. Upon RMGs March 2012 repossession of the vehicle Plaintiff complied with
RMGs demand that she pay a repossession fee of $350.00 and Plaintiff made said

15

payment. RMG failed to provide Plaintiff with any written itemization or invoice of
RMG having incurred any expenses related to the repossession.
37. In addition to paying the $350.00 repossession fee assessed by RMG, Plaintiff
paid to RMG a late fee of $6.00 and a vehicle payment of $400.00.
38. On several occasions in 2012 Plaintiff requested RMG provide her with a
copy of any retail installment sales agreement, finance agreement, or other document
purported to create a security interest in the vehicle. RMG failed to provide any
documents whatsoever responsive to Plaintiffs requests.
39. On or about May 4, 2012, RMG provided Plaintiff with a Sales Recap
Sheet purporting to represent the unpaid balance on the vehicle. This Sales Recap
Sheet cited a finance charge of 28.00% resulting in total finance charges of $7.808.78.
A copy of the Sales Recap Sheet is attached to this Complaint as Exhibit B.
40. The balance due of $7,808.78 stated in this May 4, 2012 Sales Recap Sheet
did not comport with the terms of Plaintiffs sales agreement of June 30, 2009 when she
purchased the vehicle.
41. Plaintiff has been informed by RMG that the finance charge assessed by
RMG for her vehicle transaction is 28.00%.
42. Upon information and belief, Iris Fewell (Fewell) is an operator or manager
of Defendant RMG. Her actions and omissions alleged in this Complaint were within the
scope of her duties for RMG.
43. In June 2012, Fewell offered to settle the vehicle transaction in full if
Plaintiff paid RMG the amount of $3,000.00. Fewell failed to itemize or otherwise the

16

explain RMGs purported contractual right to receive the payment of $3,000.00. Plaintiff
refused Fewells offer and did not pay the $3,000.00.
44. As of August 1, 2012, Plaintiff had paid a total sum of $14,406.00 in monthly
payments and late fees to RMG for the vehicle. This $14,406.00 paid by Plaintiff is in
excess of the $11,518.00 balance noted on the Bill of Sale. This $14,406.00 paid by
Plaintiff is in excess of $14,400.00 which represents the amount which is comprised of
$400.00 per month multiplied by 36 months of payments.
45. As of August 1, 2012, Plaintiff was current on her vehicle loan obligation and
was not in default.
46. As of August 1, 2012, Plaintiff had paid all monies which she was
contractually obligated to pay to RMG to purchase the vehicle.
47. As of August 1, 2012, RMG was contractually obligated to take all
appropriate steps and execute all documents necessary to remove its lien from the
vehicles Certificate of Title so that Plaintiff would be the lone titled owner of the
vehicle.
48. As of August 8, 2012, RMG had not provided Plaintiff with a copy of any
retail installment sales agreement or finance agreement for the vehicle.
49. As of August 8, 2012, RMG did not possess a copy of any retail installment
sales agreement or finance agreement signed by Plaintiff.
50. On August 8, 2012, RMG repossessed the vehicle. At the time of the
repossession Plaintiff had made all payments required under the terms of her sales
agreement with RMG. Additionally, Plaintiff had paid extra-contractual sums and fees as
further demanded by RMG.

17

51. To the extent RMG completed a NCDMV MVR-3 form, Certificate of


Repossession, said form was necessarily invalid as RMG lacked the legal right to
repossess Plaintiffs vehicle as of August 8, 2012.
52. Prior to the filing of this civil action Plaintiff requested that RMG return the
vehicle to her possession. As of the date of the filing of this civil action, RMG has failed
to return possession of the vehicle to Plaintiff. Further, RMG has neither offered to
refund or actually refunded any fees or monies illegally collected from Plaintiff. Finally,
RMG has failed to remove its lien from the vehicles Certificate of Title so that Plaintiff
would be the lone titled owner of the vehicle.
53. As a result of RMGs repossession of the vehicle Plaintiff has no reliable
primary means of transportation.
54. As of August 8, 2012 and continuing through the date of this Complaint
Plaintiff is still in need of replacement transportation due to RMGs repossession of the
vehicle.
55. Since RMGs repossession of the vehicle Plaintiff has incurred damages
including but not limited to having to refuse an offer of full-time employment due to lack
of ownership of reliable transportation.
56. Fewell has been charged with a violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. 20-297 for
failing to maintain certain dealer records relating to Plaintiffs purchase of the vehicle
from RMG. The criminal charge is stated as Guilford County court file number 2012 CR
723649.
57. Guilford County court file number 2012 CR 723649 is based upon Fewells
inability and failure, in response to a request by Inspector Layton of the North Carolina

18

Division of Motor Vehicles, to produce a copy of a valid finance agreement or retail


installment sales agreement or security agreement between the Plaintiff and RMG as
relates to the vehicle. Inspector Laytons request that Fewell and RMG produce said
documentation was made on a date in August 2012 after RMG had repossessed the
vehicle from Plaintiff.
FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF
March 2012 Conversion

58. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the facts and allegations contained in all
preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein.
59. The Bill of Sale is insufficient to create a valid security interest in favor of
Defendant RMG in the vehicle.
60. Defendant RMG has not met the requisites of N.C.G.S. 25-9-203 and thus
possesses no valid, enforceable security interest in the vehicle.
61. By repossessing the vehicle in March 2012 in the absence of any security
interest in the vehicle, RMG engaged in an unauthorized assumption and exercise of the
right of ownership over the vehicle, which rightfully belonged to Plaintiff.
62. By repossessing the vehicle in March 2012 in the absence of any default by
Plaintiff, RMG engaged in an unauthorized assumption and exercise of the right of
ownership over the vehicle, which rightfully belonged to Plaintiff.
63. RMG's repossession of the vehicle in March 2012 interfered with Plaintiff's
right to possession of the vehicle by depriving her of the use of the vehicle.
64. RMG's wrongful repossession of the vehicle in March 2012, which was
willful and/or wanton, constitutes an unlawful conversion of Plaintiff's personal property.

19

65. Plaintiff is entitled to recover actual damages from RMG for the loss of use of
the vehicle, the loss of value of the vehicle, the loss of use of her personal property, and
the loss of use of her personal property.
66. Defendant Platte River is jointly and severally liable for Defendant RMG's
actions and omissions pursuant to the terms of RMG's Motor Vehicle Dealer Surety
Bond.
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF
August 2012 Conversion and Notice of Demand to Retain Possession of Vehicle with
Directive Not to Sell or Dispose
67. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the facts and allegations contained in all
preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein.
68. The Bill of Sale is insufficient to create a valid security interest in favor of
Defendant RMG in the vehicle.
69. Defendant RMG has not met the requisites of N.C.G.S. 25-9-203 and thus
possesses no valid, enforceable security interest in the vehicle.
70. By repossessing the vehicle on August 8, 2012 in the absence of any security
interest in the vehicle, RMG engaged in an unauthorized assumption and exercise of the
right of ownership over the vehicle, which rightfully belonged to Plaintiff.
71. By repossessing the vehicle on August 8, 2012 in the absence of any default
by Plaintiff, RMG engaged in an unauthorized assumption and exercise of the right of
ownership over the vehicle, which rightfully belonged to Plaintiff.
72. RMG's repossession of the vehicle on August 8, 2012 interfered with
Plaintiff's right to possession of the vehicle by depriving her of the use of the vehicle.

20

73. RMG's wrongful repossession of the vehicle on August 8, 2012, which was
willful and/or wanton, constitutes an unlawful conversion of Plaintiff's personal property.
74. RMG has refused to return to Plaintiff various items of her personal property
that were in the Vehicle at the time of the August 8, 2012 wrongful repossession. These
possessions include but are not limited to the North Carolina license plate/tag assigned to
the vehicle.
75. Plaintiff is entitled to recover actual damages from RMG for the loss of use of
the vehicle, the loss of value of the vehicle, the loss of use of her personal property, and
the loss of use of her personal property.
76. Defendant Platte River is jointly and severally liable for Defendant RMG's
actions and omissions pursuant to the terms of RMG's Motor Vehicle Dealer Surety
Bond.
77. Defendants are directed to retain possession of the vehicle for the entirety of
the litigation commenced by this Complaint. Defendants are directed not to dispose of
the vehicle.
78. Plaintiff formally notifies Defendant of the request for an Order requiring the
return of the vehicle to Plaintiffs possession pursuant to N.C.G.S. 25-9-625(a).
79. Pursuant to N.C.G.S. 20-58.4, Plaintiff hereby makes formal demand that
Defendant RMG release its purported security interest upon the vehicles Certificate of
Title and procure all neccesary paperwork for a Certificate of Title to issue solely in
Plaintiffs name.
80. Pursuant to N.C.G.S. 20-59, Plaintiff hereby makes formal demand that
Defendant RMG deliver the vehicles Certificate of Title to Plaintiff.

21

THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF


Breach of Contract

81. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the facts and allegations contained in all
preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein.
82. By repossessing the vehicle when Plaintiff was not in default of her
obligations to RMG, RMG breached the sales agreement Plaintiff.
83. By repossessing the vehicle without having a valid security agreement with
the Plaintiff, RMG breached the sales agreement Plaintiff.
84. RMG has attributed portions of funds paid to RMG by Plaintiff for late fees,
finance charges, repossession fees, and other fees that were not agreed upon by Plaintiff
and RMG on June 30, 2009. Consequently, RMG has incorrectly calculated the balance
due from Plaintiff.
85. Plaintiff has paid all sums due to RMG under the terms of her sales
agreement and is legally entitled to possession of the vehicle and the removal of
Defendants lien upon the vehicles Certificate of Title.
86. RMG's conduct as described in the paragraphs 82 through 84, inclusive, of
this Complaint breached the sales agreement between the parties.
87. Plaintiff is entitled to recover actual damages, including consequential
damages, from RMG in an amount to be determined by this Court.
88. Defendant Platte River is jointly and severally liable for Defendant RMG's
actions and omissions pursuant to the terms of RMG's Motor Vehicle Dealer Surety
Bond.
FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
Fraud

22

89. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the facts and allegations contained in all
preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein.
90. The following were material facts in Plaintiffs decision to purchase the
vehicle: whether the vehicle had been involved in any collision or other
occurrence that substantially impaired the vehicles fair market value or
crashworthiness/safety, whether the vehicle was a salvage vehicle, the
accurate fair market value of the vehicle, the amount of equity Plaintiff
would have and retain in the vehicle.
91. Defendant RMGs representation to Plaintiff that the vehicle had not been
involved in a collision or other occurrence to the extent that the cost to repair
exceeded 25% of the vehicles value at the time of the collision was false.
Plaintiff did not know this representation was false.
92. Defendant RMGs representation to Plaintiff that the vehicle was not a
salvage vehicle was false. Plaintiff did not know this representation was
false.
93. Plaintiff had no actual or constructive knowledge that Defendant RMGs
representations were false or otherwise inaccurate.
94. Defendant RMG knew or should have known Plaintiff was relying upon its
promise to deliver to Plaintiff a vehicle that was not a salvage vehicle.
95. Defendant RMG also knew or should have known the significance and
consequences of its promise to deliver to Plaintiff a vehicle that was not a
salvage vehicle.

23

96. Defendant RMG knew or should have known Plaintiff was relying upon its
promise to deliver to Plaintiff a vehicle that had not been involved in a
collision or other occurrence to the extent that the cost to repair exceeded
25% of the vehicles value at the time of the collision.
97. Defendant RMG also knew or should have known the significance and
consequences of its promise to deliver to Plaintiff a vehicle that that had not
been involved in a collision or other occurrence to the extent that the cost to
repair exceeded 25% of the vehicles value at the time of the collision.
98. Defendant RMG intended its representations referenced in paragraphs 91 and
92 in this Complaint to induce Plaintiff to purchase the vehicle.
99. Plaintiff was induced by Defendants representations referenced in paragraphs
91 and 92 of this Complaint to purchase the vehicle.
100.

Defendant RMG intended for Plaintiff to rely on its representations

referenced in paragraphs 91 and 92 of this Complaint.


101.

Defendant RMG intended for Plaintiff to act in reliance on its

representations referenced in paragraphs 91 and 92 of this Complaint.


102.

Plaintiffs purchase of the vehicle was in reasonable reliance on Defendant

RMGs representations referenced in paragraphs 91 and 92 of this Complaint.


103.

As a direct result of Plaintiffs reliance on Defendant RMGs

representations referenced in paragraphs 91 and 92 of this Complaint,


Plaintiff acted in a manner different than she would have acted had she known
the true facts about the vehicles condition and history.

24

104.

Plaintiff has suffered damages proximately caused by the conduct of

Defendant RMG including, but not limited to, lost value of the vehicle in the
amount of at least $11,000.00, the cost of insurance premiums for the vehicle,
expenses directly related to investigation of the history of the vehicle at
$10.00, and costs relating to inconvenience caused by the defendants' conduct
at $1,000.00.

At this time the total amount of damages calculated is a

minimum of $12,010.00.
105.

Plaintiff is entitled to and hereby demands compensation for the damages

stated in the immediately preceding paragraph.


106.

Defendant Platte River is jointly and severally liable for Defendant RMG's

actions and omissions pursuant to the terms of RMG's Motor Vehicle Dealer
Surety Bond
FIFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
Charging and Receiving Unlawful Late Fees
N.C.G.S. 25A-29, 25A-44(3)
107.

Plaintiff incorporates by reference the facts and allegations contained in all

preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein.


108.

Plaintiff's purchase of the Vehicle constituted a "consumer credit sale"

within the meaning of N.C.G.S. 25A-2, because, at all times relevant to this pleading,
Defendant, in the ordinary course of its business, regularly extended or arranged for the
extension of credit; and, further, because Plaintiff purchased the vehicle for personal,
family and/or household use.
109.

RMG charged and collected, from Plaintiff, late fees when there was no

agreement for the payment of late fees under the Contract.

25

110.

RMG has collected at least $50.00 in late fees from Plaintiff.

111.

Plaintiff has paid all sums due under the terms of her sales agreement with

RMG and is legally entitled to possession of the vehicle and the removal of Defendants
lien upon the vehicles Certificate of Title.
112.

Pursuant to N.C.G.S. 25A-44(3), Plaintiff hereby gives notice that RMG

shall have ten days from its receipt of service of this Complaint to refund all late fees
unlawfully collected from her. Plaintiff gives notice that if RMG has not provided said
refund she is entitled to and thereby seeks three times the sum of all late fees unlawfully
collected from her.
113.

Defendant Platte River is jointly and severally liable for Defendant RMG's

actions and omissions pursuant to the terms of RMG's Motor Vehicle Dealer Surety
Bond.
SIXTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
Charging and Receiving Finance Charges on Contract
N.C.G.S. 25A-29, 25A-44(3)
114.

Plaintiff incorporates by reference the facts and allegations contained in all

preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein.


115.

RMG charged and collected, from Plaintiff, a finance charge when there

was no written agreement for the payment of finance charges.


116.

The 28.00% per year finance charge exceeds the maximum of 18.00% per

year allowed under N.C.G.S. 25A-15.


117.

Plaintiff does not know the true amount of finance charges she has paid to

RMG as RMG has failed to provide a comprehensible and accurate statement of how
RMG has attributed the money she has paid for the vehicle.

26

118.

Plaintiff has paid all sums due under the terms of her sales agreement with

RMG and is legally entitled to possession of the vehicle and the removal of Defendants
lien upon the vehicles Certificate of Title.
119.

Pursuant to N.C.G.S. 25A-44(3), Plaintiff hereby gives notice that RMG

shall have ten days from its receipt of service of this Complaint to refund all finance
charges unlawfully collected from her. Plaintiff gives notice that if RMG has not
provided said refund is entitled to and thereby seeks three times the sum of all finance
charges unlawfully collected from her.
120.

Defendant Platte River is jointly and severally liable for Defendant RMG's

actions and omissions pursuant to the terms of RMG's Motor Vehicle Dealer Surety
Bond.
121.

Pursuant to N.C.G.S. 25-9-404(a)(2), Plaintiff hereby demands a full and

accurate accounting of her account with RMG with said accounting to include but not be
limited to all finance charges levied by RMG and all payments made by Plaintiff with an
itemized statement as to how RMG attributed each payment. Said accounting is required
to be provided within fourteen (14) days of the date Defendant RMG is served with this
Complaint and the accompanying Civil Summons.
SEVENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
Charging and Receiving Repossession Fees
N.C.G.S. 25A-29, 25A-44(3)
122.

Plaintiff incorporates by reference the facts and allegations contained in all

preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein.


123.

RMGs March 2012 repossession of the vehicle from Plaintiff was without

contractual or legal right to do so.

27

124.

RMGs August 2012 repossession of the vehicle from Plaintiff was

without contractual or legal right to do so.


125.

RMG charged and collected, from Plaintiff, repossession fees for the

March 2012 repossession when RMG had no contractual agreement or legal right
requiring the Plaintiff to make payment of repossession fees.
126.

RMG has collected at least $350.00 in repossession fees from Plaintiff.

127.

Plaintiff has paid all sums due under the terms of her sales agreement with

RMG and is legally entitled to possession of the vehicle and the removal of RMGs lien
upon the vehicle title.
128.

Pursuant to N.C.G.S. 25A-44(3), Plaintiff hereby gives notice that RMG

shall have ten days from its receipt of service of this Complaint to refund all
repossession fees unlawfully collected from her. Plaintiff gives notice that if RMG has
not provided said refund she is entitled to and thereby seeks three times the sum of all
repossession fees unlawfully collected from her.
129.

Defendant Platte River is jointly and severally liable for Defendant RMG's

actions and omissions pursuant to the terms of RMG's Motor Vehicle Dealer
Surety Bond.
EIGHTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
Violations of Truth in Lending Act
15 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.
130.

Plaintiff incorporates by reference the facts and allegations contained in all

preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein.


131.

RMG constitutes a creditor within the meaning of 15 U.S.C. 1601(f)

as it regularly extends, in connection sales of property, consumer credit which is payable

28

by agreement in more than four installments or for which the payment of a finance charge
is or may be required.
132.

RMG constitutes a creditor within the meaning of 15 U.S.C. 1601(f)

as it is the entity to whom the debt arising from the consumer credit transaction is initially
payable by agreement and/or on the face of the evidence of indebtedness.
133.

Plaintiff's purchase of the Vehicle constituted a "credit sale" within the

meaning of 15 U.S.C. 1602(g), because RMG was the seller of the vehicle in the
ordinary course of its business, regularly extended or arranged for the extension of
credit; and, further, because Plaintiff purchased the vehicle for personal, family and/or
household use.
134.

To the extent RMG asserts and has asserted that it is due finance charges

pursuant to the Contract, RMG has failed to provide Plaintiff with a statement of method
of determining finance charges.
135.

RMGs failure to provide Plaintiff with a statement of method of

determining finance charges violates 15 U.S.C. 1602(u).


136.

RMGs provision of the Sales Recap Sheet to Plaintiff is neither timely

provided nor sufficiently detailed to satisfy the requirements of 15 U.S.C. 1602(u).


137.

RMG has failed to make the following material disclosures as required

by 15 U.S.C. 1602(u): annual percentage rate, the method of determining the finance
charge and the balance upon which a finance charge will be imposed, the amount of the
finance charge, the amount to be financed, the total of payments, the number and amount
of payments, and the due dates or periods of payments scheduled to repay the
indebtedness.

29

138.

Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. 1640(a)(3), Plaintiff is entitled to recover statutory

damages in an amount equal to twice the finance charges collected by Defendant RMG
and attorneys fees.
139.

Defendant RMG has miscalculated the amount paid by Plaintiff for the

vehicle and RMG has used the miscalculation as apparent justification for its
repossession of the vehicle.
140.

Defendant Platte River is jointly and severally liable for Defendant RMG's

actions and omissions pursuant to the terms of RMG's Motor Vehicle Dealer
Surety Bond.
141.

Plaintiff hereby demands a full and accurate accounting of her account

with RMG with said accounting to include but not be limited to all fees and charges
levied by RMG and all payments made by Plaintiff with an itemized statement as to how
RMG attributed each payment.
NINTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
Violation of N.C.G.S. 20-71.4(a) and N.C.G.S. 20-348 Failure to Disclose Salvage
Condition of Vehicle
142.

Plaintiff incorporates by reference the facts and allegations contained in all

preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein.


143.

Defendant RMGs representation, in writing, to Plaintiff that the vehicle

was not a salvage vehicle was false. Defendant RMG knew the representation
was false or made the representation recklessly and without regard for its
truth.
144.

Defendant RMG has substantial experience in acquiring and dealing in

vehicles and had ample opportunity and resources to undertake the due

30

diligence required to provide a truthful representation as to the vehicles


condition.
145.

McCray Auto Sales provided Defendant RMG with actual notice that the

vehicle had been wrecked and/or was a salvage vehicle.


146.

Defendant RMG had reason to know the vehicle was a salvage vehicle

prior to its transfer of the vehicle to Plaintiff.


147.

Defendant RMG intentionally failed to disclose the vehicles salvage

condition to Plaintiff.
148.

Defendant RMGs failure to disclose the salvage condition of the vehicle

to Plaintiff was done with the intent to defraud Plaintiff.


149.

Defendant RMGs failure to disclose the salvage condition of the vehicle

to Plaintiff did actually defraud Plaintiff.


150.

Defendant RMGs failure to disclose the salvage condition of the vehicle

violates N.C. Gen. Stat. 20-71.4(a) and N.C. Gen. Stat. 20-348.
151.

Defendant RMGs misrepresentation that the vehicle was not a salvage

vehicle violates N.C. Gen. Stat. 20-71.4(a) and N.C. Gen. Stat. 20-348.
152.

Plaintiff has suffered damages proximately caused by the conduct of

Defendant RMG including, but not limited to, lost value of the vehicle in the
amount of at least $11,000.00, the cost of insurance premiums for the vehicle,
expenses directly related to investigation of the history of the vehicle at
$10.00, and costs relating to inconvenience caused by the defendants' conduct
at $1,000.00.

At this time the total amount of damages calculated is a

minimum of $12,010.00.

31

153.

Based on Defendant RMGs violations of N.C. Gen. Stat. 20-71.4(a) and

N.C. Gen. Stat. 20-348, Plaintiff is entitled to recover three times the
amount of actual damages sustained or a minimum of $36,030.00.
Additionally Plaintiff is entitled to recover the costs of this action together
with reasonable attorney fees.
154.

Defendant Platte River is jointly and severally liable for Defendant RMG's

actions and omissions pursuant to the terms of RMG's Motor Vehicle Dealer
Surety Bond.
TENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
Violations of Article 9 of the North Carolina Uniform Commercial Code
155.

Plaintiff incorporates by reference the facts and allegations contained in all

preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein.


156.

The 2007 Honda vehicle described in Paragraph 10 of this Complaint is

consumer goods as defined in N.C.G.S. 25-9-102(a)(23).


157.

Plaintiff is a debtor as defined in N.C.G.S. 25-9-102(a)(28).

158.

Defendant RMG purports to be a secured party as defined in N.C.G.S.

25-9-102(a)(75).
159.

Defendant RMG has never created a valid enforceable security interest in

the vehicle. Consequently, Defendant RMG lacked authority to repossess or


otherwise exercise any of the rights conferred by Article 9 of the North
Carolina Uniform Commercial Code.
160.

To the extent the Court finds Defendant RMG to be a secured party,

under N.C.G.S. 25-9-625(b), Defendant RMG is liable for damages in the

32

amount of any loss caused by noncompliance with N.C.G.S. 25-9-601, et.


seq.
161.

Defendant RMG violated the provisions of Article 9, Part 6 of North

Carolina General Statutes, Chapter 25 by actions that include, but are not
limited to, ordering the repossession of the vehicle without a valid finance
agreement, security agreement, or other documentation evidencing Plaintiffs
default, in violation of N.C.G.S. 25-9-609(b)(2).
162.

For these failures to comply with Article 9, Part 6 of North Carolina

General Statutes, Defendant RMG is liable to Plaintiff for her actual damages,
pursuant to N.C.G.S. 25-9-625(b) and (c)(1), and for statutory damages in
an amount not less than the time-price differential plus ten percent (10%) of
the cash price of the vehicle.
163.

Defendant Platte River is jointly and severally liable for Defendant RMG's

actions and omissions pursuant to the terms of RMG's Motor Vehicle Dealer
Surety Bond.
ELEVENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
Violations of N.C.G.S. 75-50 et seq. the North Carolina Debt Collection Act
164.

Plaintiff incorporates by reference the facts and allegations contained in all

preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein.


165.

Defendant RMG constitutes a debt collector under Article 2 of Chapter

75 of the North Carolina General Statutes as interpreted by the courts of


North Carolina.

33

166.

Plaintiffs sales agreement evidences an agreement to pay which

constitutes a debt under Article 2 of Chapter 75 of the North Carolina


General Statutes as interpreted by the courts of North Carolina.
167.

In violation of N.C.G.S. 75-51(6) Defendant RMG falsely represented to

Plaintiff that nonpayment of the debt could result in Defendant RMG legally
and contractually repossessing the vehicle.
168.

In violation of N.C.G.S. 75-51(8) Defendant RMG falsely represented to

Plaintiff that Defendant RMG had the right legally and contractually
repossessing the vehicle.
169.

In violation of N.C.G.S. 75-54(6) Defendant RMG falsely threatened to

Plaintiff that Defendant RMG could take each of the following actions:
repossess the vehicle, assess repossession charges, assess finance charges, and
assess late charges.
170.

In violation of N.C.G.S. 75-55(2) Defendant RMG collected and

attempted to collect from Plaintiff interest, late fees, and repossession fees
without being legally entitled to collect such fees.
171.

Defendant RMGs actions as set forth above are in violation of Article 2

of Chapter 75 of the North Carolina General Statutes and have caused the
Plaintiff actual damages in an amount to be determined at trial.
172.

Defendants actions also entitle the Plaintiff to an award of statutory civil

penalties and damages pursuant to N.C.G.S. 75-56.

34

173.

Defendant Platte River is jointly and severally liable for Defendant RMG's

actions and omissions pursuant to the terms of RMG's Motor Vehicle Dealer
Surety Bond.

TWELTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF


Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices
174.

Plaintiff incorporates by reference the facts and allegations contained in all

preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein.


175.

The North Carolina Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act (UDTPA)

provides that [u]nfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and


unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce are declared
unlawful. N.C. Gen. Stat. 75-1.1(a).
176.

Defendant RMGs representations to Plaintiff, acts, omissions, and

practices set forth herein are unfair and deceptive and thus violate the
UDTPA.
177.

Defendant RMG violated the provisions of Chapters 75 and the UDTPA

by virtue of the following statements, acts, omissions, and practices:


a.
b.
c.

d.
e.

misrepresenting to Plaintiff that the vehicle was not a


salvage vehicle;
failing to disclose to Plaintiff the fact the vehicle was a
salvage vehicle;
misrepresenting that the vehicle had not been involved in a
collision to the extent that the cost to repair exceeded 25%
of the vehicles value at the time of the collision;
violating 15 U.S.C. 1231 and 16 C.F.R. Part 455 (FTC
Used Car Rule) by failing to provide Plaintiff with a
Buyers Guide for the vehicle;
violating N.C.G.S. 25-2-201(1) by failing to have a
written security instrument or security agreement pertaining

35

f.
g.
h.
i.
j.
k.

l.
m.

n.
o.

178.

to the vehicle yet repossessing the vehicle and otherwise


representing it had the right to repossess the vehicle;
engaging in deceit, misrepresentation, and lack of good
faith and fair dealing in selling the vehicle to Plaintiff;
violating N.C.G.S. 20-59 by failing to surrender the
vehicles Certificate of Title to Plaintiff;
violating N.C.G.S. 20-58.4 by failing to release the
purported security interest on the vehicle;
violating N.C.G.S. 20-303 by failing to provide the
Plaintiff with a written instrument evidencing a retail
installment sale;
repossessing the vehicle without having either a valid,
enforceable security interest or other right to do so;
knowingly and willfully failing to identify the Bill of Sale
as a consumer credit document or otherwise clearly indicate
on its face that it arose out of a consumer credit sale;
knowingly and willfully charging and receiving late fees
from Plaintiff which constitutes an unfair trade practice
pursuant to N.C.G.S. 25A-44(4);
knowingly and willfully charging and receiving finance
charges from Plaintiff which constitutes an unfair trade
practice pursuant to N.C.G.S. 25A-44(4);
knowingly and willfully charging and receiving
repossession fees from Plaintiff which constitutes an unfair
trade practice pursuant to N.C.G.S. 25A-44(4);
Other manners to be solicited in discovery and proven at
trial.

Defendant RMG has a pattern and practice of not providing consumers

with legally required and important transaction-related documents such as


finance agreements, retail installment sales agreements, Damage Disclosure
Statements, and Buyers Guides.
179.

The conduct of the negotiation and sale of motor vehicles is a consumer

transaction within the meaning of trade or commerce.


180.

Defendant RMGs aforementioned actions and omissions, with respect to

Plaintiff, offend established public policy and are unmoral, unethical,


oppressive, or unscrupulous.

36

181.

Defendant RMGs representations to Plaintiff and its acts, omissions, and

practices set forth herein violate North Carolina law as illegal, unfair or
deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce because
they are inherently deceptive.
182.

Defendant RMGs representations to Plaintiff and its acts, omissions, and

practices set forth herein proximately caused harm to Plaintiff, proximately


caused harm to North Carolina consumers, were deceptive in their effect upon
an average consumer, and caused damage to the Plaintiff.
183.

Defendant RMGs representations to Plaintiff and its acts, omissions, and

practices set forth herein had the capacity or tendency to deceive.


184.

Plaintiff has suffered damages proximately caused by the conduct of

Defendant RMG including, but not limited to, lost value of the vehicle in the
amount of at least $11,000.00, the cost of insurance premiums for the vehicle,
expenses directly related to investigation of the history of the vehicle at
$10.00, and costs relating to inconvenience caused by the defendants' conduct
at $1,000.00.

At this time the total amount of damages calculated is a

minimum of $12,010.00.
185.

Based on Defendant RMGs violations of N.C. Gen. Stat. 20-71.4(a) and

N.C. Gen. Stat. 20-348, Plaintiff is entitled to recover three times the
amount of actual damages sustained or a minimum of $36,030.00.
Additionally Plaintiff is entitled to recover the costs of this action together
with reasonable attorney fees.

37

186.

Defendant Platte River is jointly and severally liable for Defendant RMG's

actions and omissions pursuant to the terms of RMG's Motor Vehicle Dealer
Surety Bond.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF


WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays that the Court enter judgment for Plaintiff against
Defendants, jointly and severally, for:
1. Award her actual damages based on RMG's conversion of the vehicle; and
2. Award her actual damages based on RMG's breach of contract and fraud; and
3. Pursuant to N.C.G.S. 25A-44(3), award her three times the sum of all late fees
unlawfully collected from her by RMG; and
4. Pursuant to N.C.G.S. 25A-44(3), award her three times the sum of all finance
charges unlawfully collected from her by RMG; and
5. Pursuant to N.C.G.S. 25A-44(3), award her three times the sum of all
repossession fees and other fees unlawfully collected from her by RMG; and
6. Pursuant to N.C.G.S. 75-16, award her treble damages based on RMG's
unfair and deceptive trade practices, which violated North Carolina General Statutes 751.1; OR
7. Pursuant to N.C.G.S. 25-9-625(a), issue an Order requiring the immediate
return of the vehicle to Plaintiffs possession and that RMG procure the removal of its
lien from the Certificate of Title, and provide a full refund of all extra-contractual and
illegal payments made by Plaintiff to RMG for the Vehicle; OR
8. In the alternative to Items 1 through 7, inclusive of this Prayer for Relief, that
the Court enter judgment against Defendant RMG for:

38

a.

rescission of the sales contract;

b.

refund of all funds Plaintiff has paid thus far; and

c.

incidental and consequential damages; and

d.

costs and reasonable attorney fees pursuant to N.C.G.S. 75-16.1

and 20-348; and


9. Issue an Order directing RMG to remove any and all negative credit references
regarding the vehicle and any financial agreement entered into with Plaintiff regarding
the same; and
10. Award Plaintiff the costs of suit, including any discretionary costs as may be
allowable; and
11. Award the Plaintiff pre-judgment and post-judgment interest; and
12. Award the Plaintiff attorneys fees; and
13. Award such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper under
the circumstances.
A JURY IS RESPECTFULLY DEMANDED TO TRY THESE ISSUES.
This the _____ day of August, 2012.
_________________________
John T. ONeal--ONeal Law Office
Attorney for Plaintiff
N.C. State Bar #: 23446
7 Battleground Court
Suite 212
Greensboro, North Carolina 27408
Phone: (336) 510-7904
Fax: (336) 510-7965

39

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

IN THE GENERAL COURT OF JUSTICE


SUPERIOR COURT DIVISION

COUNTY OF GUILFORD
MARTHA A. WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff,

PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF


INTERROGATORIES AND REQUESTS FOR
PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS TO
DEFENDANT RMG MOTORSPORTS

v.
WALTER L. BROWER, d/b/a RMG
MOTORSPORTS, and PLATTE RIVER
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendants.

Plaintiff herewith serves upon you the following written Interrogatories and
Requests for Production of Documents pursuant to Rule 33 and 34 of the North Carolina
Rules of Civil Procedure. You are required to have these Interrogatories and Requests
answered separately and fully in writing under oath and to serve a copy of your answers
on the undersigned within 45 days after service hereof.
These Interrogatories and Requests shall be continuing in nature until the date of
trial and you are required to serve supplemental answers as additional information may
become available to you as required by Rule 26 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
Definitions

1.

You as used herein refers to Walter L. Brower d/b/a RMG Motorsports


(hereinafter RMG) the defendant answering these Interrogatories and Requests.
Plaintiff(s) as used herein refers to Valerie J. Smith, the plaintiff(s) identified in
the Complaint.

2.

The Vehicle as used herein refers to the 2007 Honda Accord motor vehicle
identified in the Complaint and ending in vehicle identification number 1879.

3.

To identify a person, whether a natural person or a business entity, means to


state his or its full name and present or last known business and home telephone
number, present or last known business and home address, and present and last
known business affiliation.

40

4.

As used herein, the terms document and documentation mean the original or
any hard copy or electronically stored data in any medium, and any
nonidentical copy (which is different from the original or any copy because of
notations thereon or attached thereto or otherwise) or any written, recorded,
computer input or printout, printed, typewritten, or handwritten matter however
produced, reproduced or recorded, which is or was at any time in your possession
or custody or subject to your control. This includes electronic mail messages and
text messages. Without limitation, as used in this definition, a document is
deemed to be or to have been in your control if you have or had the right to
secure the document or copy thereof from another person or entity having actual
physical possession thereof.

5.

To identify a document means to state with respect thereto: (a) the nature of the
document (e.g., letter, contract, etc.); (b) its date, or if it bears no date, the date
when it was prepared or received; (c) the name and address of its author, each
signatory, or person over whose name it was issued; (d) the names and addresses
of all persons and entities (e.g., businesses, governmental agencies, etc.) to whom
the document was addressed or distributed; (e) its physical location and address,
and the name of its custodian or custodians; (f) the general subject matter of the
document with sufficient particularity to enable it to be identified; (g) if the
document was, but is no longer, in your possession or subject to your control
(e.g., because lost, destroyed, transmitted to another person, etc.), state what
disposition was made of it, the date of such disposition, and the reason for such
disposition; and (h) whether it will be voluntarily made available to Plaintiff(s) for
inspection and copying.

6.

Person includes a natural person, firm, association, organization, partnership,


business, trust, corporation or public entity.

7.

"Oral Statement means and includes any face to face communication,


conversation, meeting, conference, or any such communication by telephone,
radio, or other means of communication.

8.

In any case where you are asked to identify an oral statement or where your
answer to the interrogatory refers to the identity of an oral statement, this is a
request to give the identity of the person who made the statement and the persons
hearing the statement, and the date, time, and place of occurrence, and to briefly
describe the content of the statement.

9.

State in full detail means to set out in the fullest detail possible all knowledge or
information available to you on the subject.

10.

All references to the Transaction refer to the Plaintiffs June 30, 2009 purchase
of the vehicle that is the subject of this action.
INTERROGATORIES

41

1.

State the name, title and, if the person is no longer employed by you, home
address and telephone number of each person in your employ who, in any
manner, participated in the Transaction. This Interrogatory includes, but not
limited to, individuals who notarized any documents pertaining to the
Transaction, who assisted in the sale, purchase, or acquisition of the Vehicle that
is the subject of the Transaction, and who handled any aspect of the Transaction
at any time.
ANSWER:

2.

For each person identified in answer to Interrogatory No. 1, explain fully such
persons participation in the Transaction.
ANSWER:

3.

Identify and describe each document signed by Plaintiff(s) in connection with the
Transaction. For each such document, state:
a.

the substance of the document;

b.

the name of the person who prepared the document; and

c.

the date and location at which the document was signed.

d.

the date on which the document was first provided to Plaintiff(s).

ANSWER:

4.

Identify and describe each document signed or prepared by any of your


employees in connection with the Transaction including, but not limited to, the
"deal recap sheet", "deal summary", "accounting deal checklist", or any other
accounting document summarizing the profit or loss generated by the sale of the
Vehicle. For each such document, state:

42

a.

the substance of the document;

b.

the name of the person who prepared the document; and

c.

the date the document was prepared.

d.

the date and location at which the document was signed.

e.

the date one which the document was first provided to Plaintiff(s), if at all.

ANSWER:

5.

Was the vehicle inspected by you, your employees or agents prior to or after its
sale to Plaintiff(s)? If so:
a.

state the name of each individual who conducted the inspection(s);

b.

state the date upon which each inspection occurred; and

c.

identify each document (by date, substance and author) generated by the
inspection.

ANSWER:

6.

Identify and describe any and all repairs to the Vehicle performed by your
employees or agents, before or after its sale to Plaintiff(s). In your response,
please include following:
a.

the nature of the repair(s) performed;

b.

the date upon which such repair(s) were performed;

43

c.

the name and current work address and phone number of the individual(s)
who performed the repairs;

d.

the cost to you to have such repairs performed; and

e.

identification of each document (by date, substance and author) generated


by the repair(s).

ANSWER:

7.

Did you obtain a title history to the Vehicle (from the North Carolina Department
of Motor Vehicles or any other state motor vehicle bureau), Vinguard, CarFax,
Autocheck or similar report (from CCC Information Services, Inc. or any other
database provider of insurance claim information) relating to the Vehicle prior to
its sale to Plaintiff(s)? If yes, for each such report please state the type of report
obtained and the date on which it was obtained.
ANSWER:

8.

If you allege that you provided any disclosure relating to the condition and/or
accident and/or salvage history of the vehicle to Plaintiff(s) prior to, or upon
consummation of, the transaction, state with specificity what was disclosed. For
each such disclosure:
a.

state the substance of the disclosure;

b.

state the name of the individual who made the disclosure and the location
at which the disclosure was made; and

c.

identify each document (by date, substance and author) evidencing such
disclosure.

ANSWER:

44

9.

Identify and describe all work sheets, notes, records, memoranda and any other
document reflecting your calculations as to retail pricing of the Vehicle for sale.
For each such document, state:
a.

the substance of the document;

b.

the name of the person who prepared the document; and

c.

the date the document was prepared.

ANSWER:

10.

Identify and describe all documents not mentioned above which were included, at
one time or another, in your deal file in connection with Plaintiff(s) purchase
of the Vehicle, and which were prepared or signed by any of your employees in
connection with the sale of the Vehicle. For each such document state:
a.

the substance of the document;

b.

the name of the person who prepared the document; and

c.

the date the document was prepared.

ANSWER:

11.

Identify any experts you may call as witnesses in this case, and for each such
expert state the subject matter on which the expert is expected to testify, the
substance of the facts and opinions to which the expert is expected to testify, and
a summary of the grounds for each opinion.

45

ANSWER:

12.

State the name, title and work address of each person who assisted or participated
in preparing and/or supplying any of the information given in answer to, or relied
upon, in preparing answers to these interrogatories.
ANSWER:

13.

Identify any insurance policies which you contend may cover any of the damages
sought in the Complaint in this case, and state the date on which each relevant
insurer was notified of the claims.
ANSWER:

14.

State the date in 2012 that you obtained physical possession of the vehicle and the
person or business entity you retained to repossess the vehicle from the Plaintiff.

ANSWER:

15.

State the exact physical location of the vehicle as of the date of your answering
these interrogatories. To the extent the vehicle is not located on property owned
or rented by you, provide the full name, address and phone number of the
person(s) on whose property the vehicle is located.

ANSWER:

16.

State the full name, physical address and phone number for each person to whom
you have given possession of the vehicle since repossessing it from the Plaintiff in
August 2012. Possession here is defined to including providing another person
keys to the vehicle or otherwise providing another person permission, express or
implied, to use the vehicle. If the possession was pursuant to a lease or sale of the
vehicle, state this.

ANSWER:

46

17.

State the full name, physical address and phone number for the registered
owner(s) of the vehicle as of the date of your response to this Interrogatory.

ANSWER:

FIRST REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS


1.

All documents identified in response to Interrogatory No. 3.


RESPONSE:

2.

All documents identified in response to Interrogatory No. 4.


RESPONSE:

3.

All documents identified in response to Interrogatory No. 5.


RESPONSE:

4.

All documents identified in response to Interrogatory No. 6.


RESPONSE:

5.

All documents identified in response to Interrogatory No. 7.


RESPONSE:

6.

All documents identified in response to Interrogatory No. 8.


RESPONSE:

47

7.

All documents identified in response to Interrogatory No. 9.


RESPONSE:

8.

All documents identified in response to Interrogatory No. 10.


RESPONSE:

9.

Produce a copy of all documentation you have filed with the North Carolina
Department of Motor Vehicles related to the vehicle since June 30, 2009. This
includes but is not limited to all Certificates of Repossession and Certificates of
Title.
RESPONSE:

10.

Produce a complete certified copy of all insurance policies, surety contracts,


bonds, or other agreements that may provide coverage for you regarding any of
the causes of action/counts in the Complaint in this civil action. For each such
document provided please provide the following: Declarations Page(s), full
policy language, addenda, riders, amendments, endorsements, and conditions
thereto for insurance which covers or may cover the liability and/or damages for
the incident which is the subject of the above-captioned civil action. This request
is made pursuant to the authority under NC Civil Procedure Rules 26(b)(2) and
26(e)(3). NOTE: This request seeks information about all applicable policies
including but not limited to policies for primary coverage, supplemental coverage,
secondary coverage, excess coverage, umbrella policies, general liability, specific
liability, and re-insurance.

RESPONSE:

This the___ day of August, 2012.


_________________________
Attorney for Plaintiff
John T. ONeal
ONeal Law Office
7 Battleground Court, Suite 212
Greensboro, NC 27408
Phone: (336) 510-7904
Fax:

48

(336) 510-7965

49

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

IN THE GENERAL COURT OF JUSTICE


SUPERIOR COURT DIVISION
12 CVS 8697

COUNTY OF GUILFORD
MARTHA A. WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff,

PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF REQUESTS FOR


ADMISSIONS OF FACT TO DEFENDANT
WALTER L. BROWER d/b/a RMG
MOTORSPORTS

v.
WALTER L. BROWER, d/b/a RMG
MOTORSPORTS, and PLATTE RIVER
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendants.

TO:

Rufus Farrior, Esq.


Farrior & Associates
P.O. Box 20343
Greensboro, NC 27420
Counsel for Defendant Walter L. Brower d/b/a RMG Motorsports

These Requests for Admissions of Fact are served upon you pursuant to the
provisions of Rules 26, 33, and 36 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. You are
required to respond to these Request for Admissions of Fact in writing and to serve a copy
of your responses on the undersigned within 33 days after service hereof. Pursuant to the
requirements of Rule 36, Defendant is required to admit, deny, or set forth the reasons
why it cannot truthfully admit or deny the following matters. These Request for
Admissions of Fact shall be deemed continuing so as to require supplemental production
up to the time of trial in accordance with G.S. 1A-1, Rule 26.
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that any Request for Admissions of Fact that is not
specifically denied shall be deemed admitted. Further, if you fail to admit any of the matters
requested herein, the Plaintiff shall apply to the Court for an Order requiring you to pay all
of its reasonable expenses incurred in making the proof of matters denied, including its
reasonable attorneys fees, pursuant to the provisions of Rules 37(a)(4) and (c) of the North
Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure.
DEFINITIONS
For purposes of this request for admissions, the word and phrases listed below shall be
denied and construed as follows:

50

A.

The term "Plaintiff" shall mean Martha A. Williams, formerly known as Martha

A. Zelada, who is the Plaintiff in the above-captioned civil action.


B.
The terms "writing" or "written" are intended to include, without limitation, the
following: handwriting, typewriting, printing, photographing, computer printouts and every
other means of recording on any tangible thing or media any form of communications,
including letters, words, pictures, sounds or symbols or combinations thereof. It further
includes any oral communications, not privileged, later reduced to writing or confirmed by
letter;
C.
The terms "document" or "documents" are intended to include, without limitation,
the following:
files, notes, memoranda, correspondence or letters of any kind,
intradepartment or office communications, written statements or reports, whether signed or
unsigned, recorded or taped interviews or statements, maps, plats, photographs, moving or
still pictures, diagrams, plans, drawings, specifications, measurements, or other descriptions,
agreements, contracts, records, electronic mail messages or computer printouts;
D.
You, your, yourself or defendant as used herein refers to Defendant Walter
L. Brower d/b/a RMG Motorsports and any agents or representatives thereof including but
not limited to Ms. Iris Fewell;
E.
When a Request refers to the vehicle it is referring to the 2007 Honda Accord
motor vehicle bearing vehicle identification number JHMCN36557C001879 that you
sold to the Plaintiff on or about June 30, 2009.
F.
"Transaction", vehicle transaction, or vehicle purchase means the sales
transaction in which Plaintiff paid money and signed documents in exchange for the
Defendants delivery of the motor vehicle identified in the Complaint to this action.
G.
To the extent that you claim privilege in response to a Request, you should
specifically state the nature of the privilege or objection to the response. The privilege or
objection should be specific enough so as to be properly argued in a Motion to Compel or
subsequent discovery hearing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------MATTERS REQUESTED TO BE ADMITTED

1. You possess no document signed by the Plaintiff which allows you to assess
Plaintiff late fees on vehicle payments.
ANSWER:

2. You possess no document signed by the Plaintiff which allows you to assess
interest on vehicle payments.

51

ANSWER:

3. You possess no document signed by the Plaintiff which allows you to collect
repossession fees.
ANSWER:

4. You possess no document signed by the Plaintiff which allows you to collect late
fees on vehicle payments.
ANSWER:

5. You possess no document signed by the Plaintiff which allows you to collect
finance charges on vehicle payments.
ANSWER:

6. You possess no document signed by the Plaintiff which requires Plaintiff to pay
any penalty on any past due payments.
ANSWER:

7. You possess no document signed by the Plaintiff which allows you to assess any
penalty on any past due vehicle payments.
ANSWER:

8. You possess no document signed by the Plaintiff which allows you to collect any
penalty on any past due payments.
ANSWER:

9. You possess no document showing that on June 30, 2009 you provided the
Plaintiff written notice of the annual percentage rate assessed on her purchase of
the vehicle.
ANSWER:

52

10. You possess no document signed by Plaintiff showing that on June 30, 2009 you
provided the Plaintiff written notice of the annual percentage rate assessed on her
purchase of the vehicle.
ANSWER:

11. You possess no document showing that on June 30, 2009 you provided the
Plaintiff written notice of the finance charge assessed on her purchase of the
vehicle.
ANSWER:

12. You possess no document signed by Plaintiff showing that on June 30, 2009 you
provided the Plaintiff written notice of the finance charge assessed on her purchase
of the vehicle.
ANSWER:

13. You possess no document showing that on June 30, 2009 you provided the
Plaintiff written notice of the total number of scheduled payments to be made by
Plaintiff.
ANSWER:

14. You possess no document signed by Plaintiff showing that on June 30, 2009 you
provided the Plaintiff written notice of the scheduled payments to be made by
Plaintiff.
ANSWER:

15. You possess no document showing that on June 30, 2009 you provided the
Plaintiff written notice of the total amount of money to be paid by Plaintiff to you
for the vehicle.

53

ANSWER:

16. You possess no document signed by Plaintiff showing that on June 30, 2009 you
provided the Plaintiff written notice of total amount of money to be paid by
Plaintiff to you for the vehicle.
ANSWER:
17. You possess no document showing that on June 30, 2009 you provided the
Plaintiff written notice of the total number of scheduled payments to be made by
Plaintiff.
ANSWER:
18. You possess no document signed by Plaintiff showing that at any time after June
30, 2009 you provided the Plaintiff written notice of the annual percentage rate
assessed on her purchase of the vehicle.
ANSWER:

19. You possess no document signed by Plaintiff showing that at any time after June
30, 2009 you provided the Plaintiff written notice of the finance charge assessed
on her purchase of the vehicle.
ANSWER:

20. You possess no document signed by Plaintiff showing that at any time after June
30, 2009 you provided the Plaintiff written notice of the scheduled payments to be
made by Plaintiff.
ANSWER:

21. You possess no document signed by Plaintiff showing that at any time after June
30, 2009 you provided the Plaintiff written notice of total amount of money to be
paid by Plaintiff to you for the vehicle.
ANSWER:

54

22. You have never provided Plaintiff any written documentation informing her of a
right to rescind the agreement to purchase the vehicle.
ANSWER:

23. In early 2011 one of your employees demanded Plaintiff pay you a $50 late fee.
ANSWER:

24. Plaintiff paid you a $50.00 late fee in 2011.


ANSWER:
25. Your collection of the $50.00 late fee in early 2011 from Plaintiff violated
N.C.G.S. 25A-29.
ANSWER:
26. In March 2012 you repossessed the vehicle from Plaintiff.
ANSWER:

27. In March 2012 you demanded Plaintiff pay you a repossession fee of $350.00.
ANSWER:
28. In March 2012 Plaintiff paid you the repossession fee of $350.00 that you had
demanded.
ANSWER:
29. Your collection of the $350.00 repossession fee in March 2012 from Plaintiff
violated N.C.G.S. 25A-29.
ANSWER:

55

30. In March 2012 you would not have returned the vehicle to Plaintiff if Plaintiff
failed to the repossession fee you assessed.
ANSWER:

31. In March 2012 you demanded Plaintiff pay you a late fee of $6.00.
ANSWER:
32. In March 2012 Plaintiff paid you the late fee of $6.00 that you had demanded.
ANSWER:

33. Your collection of the late fee of $6.00 in March 2012 from Plaintiff violated
N.C.G.S. 25A-29.
ANSWER:

34. In March 2012 you would not have returned the vehicle to Plaintiff if Plaintiff
failed to pay the $6.00 late fee you assessed.
ANSWER:

35. In March 2012 you required Plaintiff to sign a Right of Repossession document.
ANSWER:

36. You told Plaintiff if she failed to sign the Right of Repossession document you
would not return her vehicle.
ANSWER:
37. Plaintiff demanded a detailed and full written accounting of her vehicle payment

56

history prior to the filing of the current lawsuit.


ANSWER:
38. You failed to provide Plaintiff with a detailed and full written accounting of her
vehicle payment history prior to the filing of the current lawsuit.
ANSWER:
39. You and the Plaintiff failed to enter into any signed agreement stating the number
of payments she was to make to you for the vehicle.
ANSWER:

40. You and the Plaintiff failed to enter into any signed agreement regarding the
monetary amount of recurring payments she was to make to you for the vehicle.
ANSWER:

41. You and the Plaintiff failed to enter into any signed agreement regarding a
method of determining finance charges to be assessed for Plaintiffs purchase of
the vehicle.
ANSWER:
42. You and the Plaintiff failed to enter into any signed agreement stating Plaintiffs
obligation to make recurring payments on a certain date of the month.
ANSWER:

43. Your taking adverse action against the Plaintiff related to failure to make
recurring payments to you for the vehicle violates 15 U.S.C. 1602(u).
ANSWER:

44. Your taking adverse action against the Plaintiff related to failure to pay finance
charges to you for the vehicle violates 15 U.S.C. 1602(u).

57

ANSWER:

45. An officer with the North Carolina Division of Motor Vehicles License and Theft
Department demanded a copy of a written finance agreement, between you and
the Plaintiff, prior to the filing of the current lawsuit.
ANSWER:

46. You failed to provide the North Carolina Division of Motor Vehicles License and
Theft Department with a copy of a written finance agreement, between you and
the Plaintiff, prior to the filing of the current lawsuit.
ANSWER:

47. As of the date of your response to this Request for Admission of Fact you have
failed to provide the North Carolina Division of Motor Vehicles License and
Theft Department with a copy of a written finance agreement, between you and
the Plaintiff.
ANSWER:

48. You do not possess a written finance agreement between you and the Plaintiff.
ANSWER:
49. Plaintiff did not execute a Finance Agreement as part of the vehicle transaction.
ANSWER:

50. The Retail Installment Contract regarding the transaction does not bear Plaintiffs
signature.
ANSWER:

51. The Retail Installment Contract for the transaction is not dated June 30, 2009.

58

ANSWER:
52. The Retail Installment Contract for the transaction was not created on June 30,
2009.
ANSWER:

53. Plaintiff did not execute a Retail Installment Sales Contract as part of the vehicle
transaction.
ANSWER:

54. The Detailed Customer Listing provided by you during the litigation of this case
purports to summarize certain details of the vehicle transaction.
ANSWER:

55. The Detailed Customer Listing provided by you during the litigation of this case
does not bear a signature by Plaintiff.
ANSWER:

56. The Detailed Customer Listing provided by you during the litigation of this case
does not bear any written endorsement by Plaintiff.
ANSWER:

57. The Detailed Customer Listing provided by you during the litigation of this case is
insufficient to meet the disclosure requirements of the Truth in Lending Act.
ANSWER:

58. You provided a warranty on the vehicle purchased by Plaintiff.


ANSWER:

59

59. The terms of the warranty on the vehicle purchased by Plaintiff are handwritten
on the As Is - Sold Without Warranty document you had Plaintiff sign.
ANSWER:
60. The Buyers Guide document you provided Plaintiff for the vehicle indicated the
vehicle was being sold As Is No Warranty.
ANSWER:

61. You failed to provide Plaintiff with a copy of the Buyers Guide document for the
vehicle.
ANSWER:

62. The window form you refer to in the Bill of Sale for the vehicle is the Buyers
Guide document for the vehicle purchased by Plaintiff.
ANSWER:

63. The Damage Disclosure Statement you contend was signed by the Plaintiff is
undated.
ANSWER:

64. The Damage Disclosure Statement you contend was signed by the Plaintiff states
the vehicle had been involved in a collision or other occurrence to the extent the
cost to repair exceeded 25% of the fair market retail value.
ANSWER:
65. The Damage Disclosure Statement you contend was signed by the Plaintiff states
the vehicle had been a salvage vehicle.

60

ANSWER:

66. You failed to provide the Plaintiff with a copy of a Damage Disclosure Statement
for the vehicle.
ANSWER:

67. You completed the MVR-2 Dealers Reassignment of Title to a Motor Vehicle
form for the vehicle in conjunction with Plaintiffs transaction.
ANSWER:

68. You signed Plaintiffs name to the MVR-2 Dealers Reassignment of Title to a
Motor Vehicle form for the vehicle in conjunction with Plaintiffs transaction.
ANSWER:

69. Plaintiff did not sign the MVR-2 Dealers Reassignment of Title to a Motor
Vehicle form for the vehicle in conjunction with Plaintiffs transaction.
ANSWER:

70. On the MVR-2 Dealers Reassignment of Title to a Motor Vehicle form for the
vehicle in conjunction with Plaintiffs transaction, you asserted the vehicle had
not been involved in a collision or other occurrence to the extent the cost to repair
exceeded 25% of the fair market retail value.
ANSWER:
71. At the time you asserted the vehicle had not been involved in a collision or other
occurrence to the extent the cost to repair exceeded 25% of the fair market retail
value, you knew the assertion was false.
ANSWER:

61

72. At the time you asserted the vehicle had not been involved in a collision or other
occurrence to the extent the cost to repair exceeded 25% of the fair market retail
value, you had reason to know the assertion was false.
ANSWER:

73. On the MVR-2 Dealers Reassignment of Title to a Motor Vehicle form for the
vehicle in conjunction with Plaintiffs transaction, you asserted the vehicle had
not been a salvage vehicle.
ANSWER:

74. At the time you asserted the vehicle sold to the Plaintiff had not been a salvage
vehicle, you knew the assertion was false.
ANSWER:

75. At the time you asserted the vehicle sold to the Plaintiff had not been a salvage
vehicle, you had reason to know the assertion was false.
ANSWER:

76. At the time you asserted the vehicle sold to the Plaintiff had not been a salvage
vehicle, you had reason to know the assertion was false.
ANSWER:
77. You first acquired the vehicle on or about May 14, 2009.
ANSWER:

78. You first acquired the vehicle from McCrays Auto Sales located in Pilot
Mountain, North Carolina.
ANSWER:

62

79. When you acquired the vehicle you had actual knowledge the vehicle possessed a
Salvage Certificate of Title.
ANSWER:

80. Walter Brower acquired the vehicle from McCrays Auto Sales.
ANSWER:

81. Your acquisition of the vehicle included Walter Brower signing a Salvage
Certificate of Title.
ANSWER:
82. You had reason to know the vehicle was a salvage vehicle prior to your
transaction with Plaintiff.
ANSWER:
83. Walter Brower acquired the vehicle from McCrays Auto Sales.
ANSWER:

84. You repossessed the Plaintiffs vehicle on or about August 7, 2012.


ANSWER:
85. At the time you repossessed the Plaintiffs vehicle on or about August 7, 2012
you did not possess a finance contract bearing Plaintiffs signature.
ANSWER:
86. At the time you repossessed the Plaintiffs vehicle on or about August 7, 2012
you did not provide your recovery agent with any finance contract bearing
Plaintiffs signature.

63

ANSWER:

87. At the time you prepared the MVR-4 form, Certificate of Repossession, dated
August 7, 2012 you did not have the legal right to repossess the vehicle.
ANSWER:

88. You have not returned the vehicle to the Plaintiff since the August 7, 2012
repossession.
ANSWER:

89. After your August 7, 2012 repossession of the vehicle you failed to provide
Plaintiff with any written notice of your intent to sell the vehicle.
ANSWER:

90. After your August 7, 2012 repossession of the vehicle you failed to provide
Plaintiff with any written notice of sale of the vehicle.
ANSWER:

91. After your August 7, 2012 repossession of the vehicle you failed to provide
Plaintiff with any notice of your intent to sell the vehicle.
ANSWER:
92. After your August 7, 2012 repossession of the vehicle you failed to provide
Plaintiff with any notice of sale of the vehicle.
ANSWER:

93. As of the date of your response to this Request for Admission of Fact you have
not made any claim against Plaintiff for monetary payment of any vehicle loan

64

deficiency.
ANSWER:
94. As of the date of your response to this Request for Admission of Fact you have
not provided Plaintiff with any written notice of any alleged vehicle loan
deficiency.
ANSWER:

95. After your August 7, 2012 repossession of the vehicle you sold the vehicle.
ANSWER:

96. After your August 7, 2012 repossession of the vehicle you sold the vehicle to a
Mr. Russell Martin.
ANSWER:

97. As of the date of your response to this Request for Admission of Fact you have
not provided Plaintiff with any written information regarding the amount of
monetary proceeds recovered by you upon your sale of the vehicle.
ANSWER:

98. As of the date of your response to this Request for Admission of Fact you have
not provided Plaintiff with any written information regarding the application of
monetary proceeds recovered by you upon your sale of the vehicle.
ANSWER:

99. As of August 1, 2012, Plaintiff had paid a total sum of $14,406.00 in monthly
payments and late fees to RMG for the vehicle.
ANSWER:

65

100. As of August 1, 2012, Plaintiff was current on her vehicle loan obligation and
was not in default.
ANSWER:

101.
As of August 1, 2012, Plaintiff had paid all monies which she was
contractually obligated to pay to RMG to purchase the vehicle.
ANSWER:

102. As of August 1, 2012, RMG was contractually obligated to take all


appropriate steps and execute all documents necessary to remove its lien from the
vehicles Certificate of Title so that Plaintiff would be the lone titled owner of the
vehicle.
ANSWER:

103.
As of August 1, 2012, RMG had not provided Plaintiff with a copy of any
retail installment sales agreement or finance agreement for the vehicle.
ANSWER:

104.

You are a "Seller" as defined in N.C.G.S. 25-2-103.

ANSWER:

105.
As of June 30, 2009, you, in the ordinary course of your business, regularly
extended or arranged for the extension of credit.
ANSWER:

106.
Plaintiffs purchase of the Vehicle constituted a "consumer credit sale"
within the meaning of N.C.G.S. 25A-2.
ANSWER:

66

107.
As of June 30, 2009, you regularly extended, in connection sales of
property, consumer credit which was payable by agreement in more than four
installments or for which the payment of a finance charge is or may be required.
ANSWER:

108.
With respect to Plaintiffs transaction you were the entity to whom the debt
arising from consumer credit transaction was initially payable by agreement.
ANSWER:

109.
The vehicle transaction constituted the sale of goods under the North
Carolina Uniform Commercial Code.
ANSWER:
110.
Act.

The vehicle constituted a vehicle under the Federal Trade Commission

ANSWER:
111.
The vehicle transaction constituted commerce under the Federal Trade
Commission Act.
ANSWER:
112.
The vehicle constituted a used vehicle under the Federal Trade
Commission Act.
ANSWER:
113.

You constitute a dealer under the Federal Trade Commission Act.

ANSWER:

67

114.
From the period of June 30, 2008 to June 30, 2009, inclusive, you offered for
sale at least five used vehicles.
ANSWER:

115.
From the period of June 30, 2008 to June 30, 2009, inclusive, you sold at
least five used vehicles.
ANSWER:

116.
As of the date of your response to this Request for Admission of Fact you
possess the license plate Plaintiff obtained for the vehicle.
ANSWER:

117.
As of the date of your response to this Request for Admission of Fact you
possess Plaintiffs personal belongings she left in the vehicle at the time you had the
vehicle repossessed.
ANSWER:
118.
You have never filed paperwork with the North Carolina Division of Motor
Vehicles to release your purported security interest against a vehicle Certificate of
Title bearing Plaintiffs name.
ANSWER:

119.
The Bill of Sale you created in conjunction with the transaction with Plaintiff
lacked any statement of potential finance charges.
ANSWER:

120.
The Bill of Sale you created in conjunction with the transaction with Plaintiff
lacked any statement of potential late fees.
ANSWER:

121.
The Bill of Sale you created in conjunction with the transaction with Plaintiff
lacked any statement of potential repossession fees.

68

ANSWER:

122.
The Bill of Sale you created in conjunction with the transaction with Plaintiff
is insufficient to create a security interest in your favor in the vehicle.
ANSWER:

123.
The Motor Vehicle Dealers Surety Bond you had with Defendant Platte
River Insurance Company at the time of the transaction with Plaintiff was cancelled
by Platte River Insurance Company, effective April 2, 2010.
ANSWER:

124.
After Defendant Platte River Insurance Company cancelled its Motor
Vehicle Dealers Surety Bond with you, effective April 2, 2010, you secured a bond
with another entity.
ANSWER:

125.
Admit that in March 2012 when you repossessed the vehicle from Plaintiff
you did not have a corporate surety bond as required by N.C.G.S. 20-288(e).
ANSWER:
126.
Admit that on May 2, 2011 you did not have a corporate surety bond as
required by N.C.G.S. 20-288(e).
ANSWER:

127.
Admit that on August 7, 2012 you did not have a corporate surety bond as
required by N.C.G.S. 20-288(e).
ANSWER:

69

128.
Admit that on the date you sold the vehicle to Mr. Russell Martin you did not
have a corporate surety bond as required by N.C.G.S. 20-288(e).
ANSWER:

129.
As of the date of your response to this Request for Admission of Fact, you
have failed to provide Plaintiffs counsel with any information regarding the
existence of any Motor Vehicle Dealers Surety Bond held by you after April 2,
2010.
ANSWER:

130.
As of the date of your response to this Request for Admission of Fact, you
have failed to provide Plaintiffs counsel with the document you purport is the sales
agreement between you and Plaintiff.
ANSWER:
This the _______ day of December, 2012.

_____________________________
John T. ONeal-Attorney for Plaintiff
ONeal Law Office
7 Battleground Court, Suite 212
Greensboro, NC 27408
Phone: (336) 510-7904
Fax: (336) 510-7965

70

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

IN THE GENERAL COURT OF JUSTICE


SUPERIOR COURT DIVISION
12 CvS 8697

COUNTY OF GUILFORD
MARTHA A. WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff,
v.

PLAINTIFFS REQUEST FOR JURY


INSTRUCTIONS

WALTER L. BROWER, d/b/a RMG


MOTORSPORTS,
Defendant.

PLAINTIFF requests the Court, pursuant to Rule 51(b) of the North Carolina Rules
of Civil Procedure, to instruct the jury as follows from the North Carolina Pattern Jury
Instructions for Civil Cases (N.C.P.I. Civil):
101.30---Testimony of Interested Witness
101.35---Impeachment of Witness by Prior Inconsistent Statement
101.40---Illustrative and Substantive Evidence
101.41---Stipulations
101.42---Requests for Admission
101.45---Circumstantial Evidence
101.62---Presumptions
800.00---Fraud
800.07---Fraud--Damages
806.00---Conversion
806.05---Conversion--Damages
813.05--Model Unfair or Deceptive Trade Practice Charge (see Plaintiffs
contentions of violations by Defendant)
813.21--Trade Regulation - Violation - Issue of Unfair Methods of Competition
and Unfair or Deceptive Acts or Practices
813.62--Trade Regulation - Commerce - Unfair and Deceptive Methods of
Competition and Unfair or Deceptive Acts or Practices
813.70--Trade Regulation - Proximate Cause - Issue of Proximate Cause
813.80--Trade Regulation-Damages-Issue of Damages.
Additionally Plaintiff seeks the following specially-requested instructions be
provided to the jury:
1.

North Carolina Debt Collection Act.

71

2.
3.
4.

North Carolina Retail Installment Sales Act.


Duty to disclose salvage condition or brand.
Explanation of salvage, total loss, and branding of vehicle Certificate of Title

The proposed language of the specially-requested instruction is attached to this Request for
Jury Instructions.
This the 10th day of June, 2013.
.
_________________________
Attorney for Plaintiff
John T. ONeal--ONeal Law Office
7 Battleground Court, Suite 212
Greensboro, NC 27408
Phone: (336) 510-7904
Fax:
(336) 510-7965

72

N.C.P.I. Civil 813.05. Model Unfair or Deceptive Trade Practice Charge


Did the defendant do at least one of the following:
(1) conceal the salvage brand on the vehicles Certificate of Title from Plaintiff;
(2) fail to inform the plaintiff that the automobile was a salvage vehicle;
(3) fail to disclose to Plaintiff the fact the vehicle had been involved in a collision to the
extent that the cost to repair exceeded 25% of the vehicles value at the time of the
collision;
(4) engage in deceit, misrepresentation, and lack of good faith and fair dealing in selling
the vehicle to Plaintiff;
(5) violate N.C.G.S. 20-303 by failing to provide the Plaintiff with a written instrument
evidencing a retail installment sale;
(6) at the time of the June 30, 2009 vehicle transaction fail to deliver to the Plaintiff a
written statement describing clearly the cash sale price;
(7) at the time of the June 30, 2009 vehicle transaction fail to deliver to the Plaintiff a
written statement describing the amount of the finance charge;
(8) at the time of the June 30, 2009 vehicle transaction fail to deliver to the Plaintiff a
written statement describing clearly the purpose of any non-finance charges;
(9) at the time of the June 30, 2009 vehicle transaction fail to deliver to the Plaintiff a
written statement describing clearly the terms of the payment of the net balance due from
Plaintiff;
(10) at the time of the June 30, 2009 vehicle transaction between the parties did the
Defendant fail to procure Plaintiffs signature on a written statement containing the
agreements of the parties regarding the payment and finance terms;
(11) repossess the vehicle from Plaintiff on August 8, 2012 without having a valid
finance agreement pertaining to the vehicle.

73

North Carolina Debt Collection Act


The (state number) issue reads:
"Did the Defendant violate the North Carolina Debt Collection Act?"
On this issue the burden of proof is on the Plaintiff. This means that the Plaintiff must
prove, by the greater weight of the evidence, six things:
First, the obligation owed must be a "debt". Plaintiff contends the debt in question was
past due vehicle loan payment(s) Defendant claimed Plaintiff owed and was obligated to
pay.
Second, the one owing the obligation must be a "consumer."
Third, the one trying to collect the obligation must be a "debt collector."
Fourth, Defendant engaged in an unfair act. Plaintiff contends Defendant engaged in
unfair acts when Defendant repossessed Plaintiffs vehicle in August 2012 without having a
valid finance contract or other evidence that Plaintiff was in default.
Fifth, the unfair act(s) by Defendant were in the course of commerce or affected
commerce.
Sixth, the unfair act(s) by Defendant proximately caused injury to Plaintiff.
Finally, as to this issue on which the Plaintiff has the burden of proof, if you find, by the
greater weight of the evidence, that the Defendant failed to comply with the requirements
of law for debt collection, then it would be your duty to answer this issue "Yes" in favor
of the Plaintiff. For each issue you answer Yes in favor of the Plaintiff you are to
award damages of a minimum of $500.00 to a maximum of $4,000.00.
If, on the other hand, you fail to so find, then it would be your duty to answer this issue
"No" in favor of the Defendant.

74

N.C.G.S. 20-303.

Installment sales to be evidenced by written instrument;


statement to be delivered to buyer.

(a) Every retail installment sale shall be evidenced by one or more instruments in
writing, which shall contain all the agreements of the parties and shall be signed by the
buyer.
(b)

For every retail installment sale, prior to or about the time of the delivery
of the motor vehicle, the seller shall deliver to the buyer a written
statement describing clearly the motor vehicle sold to the buyer, the cash
sale price thereof, the cash paid down by the buyer, the amount credited
the buyer for any trade-in and a description of the motor vehicle traded,
the amount of the finance charge, the amount of any other charge
specifying its purpose, the net balance due from the buyer, the terms of the
payment of such net balance and a summary of any insurance protection to
be effected. The written statement shall be signed by the buyer.

75

Duty to disclose salvage condition or brand (based on N.C.G.S. 20-71.4 Failure to disclose
damage to a vehicle shall be a misdemeanor)

(a)
It shall be unlawful for any transferor of a motor vehicle to do any of the
following:
(1)
Transfer a motor vehicle up to and including five model years old
when the transferor has knowledge that the vehicle has been involved
in a collision or other occurrence to the extent that the cost of repairing
that vehicle, excluding the cost to replace the air bag restraint system,
exceeds twenty-five percent (25%) of its fair market retail value at the
time of the collision or other occurrence, without disclosing that fact in
writing to the transferee prior to the transfer of the vehicle.
(2)
Transfer a motor vehicle when the transferor has knowledge that the
vehicle is, or was, a flood vehicle, a reconstructed vehicle, or a salvage
motor vehicle, without disclosing that fact in writing to the transferee
prior to the transfer of the vehicle.
(a1)
For purposes of this section, the term "five model years" shall be calculated
by counting the model year of the vehicle's manufacture as the first model year and the
current calendar year as the final model year.

76

Explanation of salvage, total loss, and branding of vehicle Certificate of Title (based
on N.C.G.S. 20-71.3. Salvage and other vehicles titles and registration cards to be
branded).
(a1)
Any motor vehicle that is declared a total loss by an insurance company
licensed and approved to conduct business in North Carolina, in addition to the
designations noted in subsection (a) of this section, shall:
(1)
Have the title and registration card marked "TOTAL LOSS CLAIM".
(h)
A branded title for a salvage motor vehicle damaged by collision or other
occurrence shall be issued as follows:
(1)
For motor vehicles up to and including six model years old, a branded
title shall be issued if the cost of repairs, including parts and labor,
exceeds seventy-five percent (75%) of its fair market value at the time
of the collision or other occurrence.

77

IN THE GENERAL COURT OF JUSTICE


SUPERIOR COURT DIVISION
12 CVS 8697

NORTH CAROLINA
GUILFORD COUNTY
MARTHA A. WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff,
vs.
WALTER L. BROWER d/b/a RMG
MOTORSPORTS,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

JURY ISSUE SHEET

NORTH CAROLINA RETAIL INSTALLMENT SALES ACT


1. Was the retail installment sale that occurred on June 30, 2009 between the parties
evidenced by one or more instruments in writing which contained all the agreements of
the parties and were signed by the Plaintiff?
ANSWER: _________________
2. At the time of the between the parties did the Defendant fail to deliver to the Plaintiff a
written statement describing clearly the cash sale price?
ANSWER: _________________
3. At the time of the June 30, 2009 vehicle transaction between the parties did the Defendant
fail to deliver to the Plaintiff a written statement describing the amount of the finance
charge?
ANSWER: _________________
4. At the time of the June 30, 2009 vehicle transaction between the parties did the Defendant
fail to deliver to the Plaintiff a written statement describing clearly the amount and
purpose of any non-finance charges?
ANSWER: _________________

78

5. At the time of the June 30, 2009 vehicle transaction between the parties did the Defendant
fail to deliver to the Plaintiff a written statement describing clearly the net balance due
from the Plaintiff?
ANSWER: _________________
6. At the time of the June 30, 2009 vehicle transaction between the parties did the Defendant
fail to deliver to the Plaintiff a written statement describing clearly the terms of the
payment of the net balance due from Plaintiff?
ANSWER: _________________
7. At the time of the June 30, 2009 vehicle transaction between the parties did the Defendant
fail to procure Plaintiffs signature on a written statement containing the agreements of the
parties regarding the payment and finance terms?
ANSWER: _________________
FRAUD
8. Did the Defendant conceal the salvage brand on the vehicles Certificate of Title from
Plaintiff?
ANSWER: _________________
9. Was Defendants concealment of the salvage brand on the vehicles Certificate of
Title reasonably calculated to deceive the Plaintiff?
ANSWER: _________________
11.
Was Defendants concealment of the salvage brand on the vehicles Certificate of
Title done with the intent to deceive the Plaintiff and with the intent that it be acted upon
by the Plaintiff?
ANSWER: _________________

12.
Was the Plaintiff was, in fact, deceived by the Defendants concealment of the
salvage brand on the vehicles Certificate of Title and did the Plaintiff rely upon it?
ANSWER: _________________

79

13.
Did the Plaintiff rely upon the Defendants concealment of the salvage brand on
the vehicles Certificate of Title?
ANSWER: _________________
14.
Was the plaintiff's reliance upon Defendants concealment of the salvage brand on
the vehicles Certificate of Title reasonable?
ANSWER: _________________
15. If you answered Yes to each of Issues 8 through 14 what amount is the Plaintiff
entitled to recover as damages?
ANSWER: _________________
FAILURE TO DISCLOSE SALVAGE CONDITION OF VEHICLE
16. Did the Defendant fail to disclose to Plaintiff the existence of a salvage brand on the
vehicles Certificate of Title?
ANSWER: _________________

17. If you answered Yes to Issue 16, above, what amount is the Plaintiff entitled to
recover as damages?
ANSWER: _________________
18 Did the Defendant fail to disclose to Plaintiff the fact the vehicle had been involved in
a collision to the extent that the cost to repair exceeded 25% of the vehicles value at the
time of the collision?
ANSWER: _________________
19 If you answered Yes to Issue 18 above, what amount is the Plaintiff entitled to recover
as damages?
ANSWER: _________________

80

NORTH CAROLINA DEBT COLLECTION ACT

20. As of August 8, 2012 was the Plaintiff delinquent on vehicle payments thereby
allowing the Defendant the right to repossess Plaintiffs vehicle?
ANSWER: _________________
21. If you answered Yes to Issue 20 what amount is the Plaintiff entitled to recover as
damages?
ANSWER: _________________
CONVERSION
22. As of August 8, 2012, did the Defendant repossess the vehicle from Plaintiff on August
8, 2012 without having a valid finance agreement pertaining to the vehicle?
ANSWER: _________________
23. As of August 8, 2012, was the Plaintiff in default on her payments under a valid finance
agreement regarding the vehicle?
ANSWER: _________________
24. If you answered Yes to Issue 22 and No to Issue 23 what amount is the Plaintiff
entitled to recover as damages?
ANSWER: _________________
UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE ACTS AND PRACTICES
25. Did the defendant engage in deceit, misrepresentation, and lack of good faith and fair
dealing in selling the vehicle to Plaintiff?

ANSWER: _________________

81

26. Was the defendant's conduct regarding the vehicle transaction with Plaintiff in
commerce or did it affect commerce?

ANSWER: _________________
This the _____ day of June, 2013.

______________________________________
Signature of Jury Foreperson

82

You might also like