CHAPTE 1

MODELING
A mathematical model uses mathematical language to describe a system. The
process of developing a mathematical model is termed mathematical modeling
(also modeling). Mathematical models are used not only in the natural sciences
(such as physics, biology, earth science, meteorology) and engineering disciplines,
but also in the social sciences (such as economics, psychology, sociology and
political science); physicists, engineers, computer scientists, and economists use
mathematical models most extensively.

Eykhoff (1974) defined a mathematical model as 'a representation of the essential

aspects of an existing system (or a system to be constructed) which presents
knowledge of that system in usable form'.

Mathematical models can take many forms, including but not limited to dynamical
systems, statistical models, differential equations, or game theoretic models. These
and other types of models can overlap, with a given model involving a variety of
abstract structures.

Classifying mathematical models

Many mathematical models can be classified in some of the following ways:

1. Linear vs. nonlinear: Mathematical models are usually composed by

variables, which are abstractions of quantities of interest in the described
systems, and operators that act on these variables, which can be algebraic
operators, functions, differential operators, etc. If all the operators in a
mathematical model exhibit linearity, the resulting mathematical model is
defined as linear. A model is considered to be nonlinear otherwise.
The question of linearity and nonlinearity is dependent on context, and linear
models may have nonlinear expressions in them. For example, in a
statistical linear model, it is assumed that a relationship is linear in the
parameters, but it may be nonlinear in the predictor variables. Similarly, a
differential equation is said to be linear if it can be written with linear
differential operators, but it can still have nonlinear expressions in it. In a
mathematical programming model, if the objective functions and constraints
are represented entirely by linear equations, then the model is regarded as
a linear model. If one or more of the objective functions or constraints are
represented with a nonlinear equation, then the model is known as a
nonlinear model.
Nonlinearity, even in fairly simple systems, is often associated with
phenomena such as chaos and irreversibility. Although there are
 exceptions, nonlinear systems and models tend to be more difficult to study
than linear ones. A common approach to nonlinear problems is linearization,
but this can be problematic if one is trying to study aspects such as
irreversibility, which are strongly tied to nonlinearity.
2. Deterministic vs. probabilistic (stochastic): A deterministic model is one
in which every set of variable states is uniquely determined by parameters in
the model and by sets of previous states of these variables. Therefore,
deterministic models perform the same way for a given set of initial
conditions. Conversely, in a stochastic model, randomness is present, and
variable states are not described by unique values, but rather by probability
distributions.
3. Static vs. dynamic: A static model does not account for the element of
time, while a dynamic model does. Dynamic models typically are
represented with difference equations or differential equations.
4. Lumped vs. distributed parameters: If the model is heterogeneous
(varying state within the system) the parameters are distributed. If the model
is homogeneous (consistent state throughout the entire system), then the
parameters are lumped. Distributed parameters are typically represented
with partial differential equations.

Representational models I: models of phenomena

Many scientific models represent a phenomenon, where ‘phenomenon’ is used as

an umbrella term covering all relatively stable and general features of the world
that are interesting from a scientific point of view. Empiricists like van Fraassen
(1980) only allow for observables to qualify as such, while realists like Bogen and
Woodward (1988) do not impose any such restrictions. The billiard ball model of a
gas, the Bohr model of the atom, the double helix model of DNA, the scale model
of a bridge, the Mundell-Fleming model of an open economy, or the Lorenz model
of the atmosphere are well-known examples for models of this kind.

A first step towards a discussion of the issue of scientific representation is to

realize that there is no such thing as the problem of scientific representation.
Rather, there are different but related problems. It is not yet clear what specific set
of questions a theory of representation has to come to terms with, but whatever list
of questions one might put on the agenda of a theory of scientific representation,
there are two problems that will occupy center stage in the discussion (Frigg 2006).
The first problem is to explain in virtue of what a model is a representation of
something else. To appreciate the thrust of this question we have to anticipate a
position as regards the ontology of models (which we discuss in the next section).
It is now common to construe models as non-linguistic entities rather than as
descriptions. This approach has wide-ranging consequences. If we understand
models as descriptions, the above question would be reduced to the time-honored
problem of how language relates to reality and there would not be any problems
over and above those already discussed in the philosophy of language. However, if
we understand models as non-linguistic entities, we are faced with the new
question of what it is for an object (that is not a word or a sentence) to scientifically
represent a phenomenon.

Somewhat surprisingly, until recently this question has not attracted much attention
in twentieth century philosophy of science, despite the fact that the corresponding
problems in the philosophy of mind and in aesthetics have been discussed
extensively for decades (there is a substantial body of literature dealing with the
question of what it means for a mental state to represent a certain state of affairs;
and the question of how a configuration of flat marks on a canvass can depict
something beyond this canvass has puzzled aestheticians for a long time).
However, some recent publications address this and other closely related problems
(Bailer-Jones 2003, Frigg 2006, Giere 2004, Suárez 2004, van Fraassen 2004),
while others dismiss it as a non-issue (Callender and Cohen 2006, Teller 2001).

The second problem is concerned with representational styles. It is a

commonplace that one can represent the same subject matter in different ways.
This pluralism does not seem to be a prerogative of the fine arts as the
representations used in the sciences are not all of one kind either. Weizsäcker's
liquid drop model represents the nucleus of an atom in a manner very different
from the shell model, and a scale model of the wing of an air plane represents the
wing in a way that is different from how a mathematical model of its shape does.
What representational styles are there in the sciences?

Although this question is not explicitly addressed in the literature on the so-called
semantic view of theories, some answers seem to emerge from its understanding
of models. One version of the semantic view, one that builds on a mathematical
notion of models (see Sec. 2), posits that a model and its target have to be
isomorphic (van Fraassen 1980; Suppes 2002) or partially isomorphic (Da Costa
and French 2003) to each other. Formal requirements weaker than these have
been discussed by Mundy (1986) and Swoyer (1991). Another version of the
semantic view drops formal requirements in favor of similarity (Giere 1988 and
2004, Teller 2001). This approach enjoys the advantage over the isomorphism
view that it is less restrictive and also can account for cases of inexact and
simplifying models. However, as Giere points out, this account remains empty as
long as no relevant respects and degrees of similarity are specified. The
specification of such respects and degrees depends on the problem at hand and
the larger scientific context and cannot be made on the basis of purely
philosophical considerations (Teller 2001).
 Models and Theory
One of the most perplexing questions in connection with models is how they relate
to theories. The separation between models and theory is a very hazy one and in
the jargon of many scientists it is often difficult, if not impossible, to draw a line. So
the question is: is there a distinction between models and theories and if so how do
they relate to one another?

In common parlance, the terms ‘model’ and ‘theory’ are sometimes used to
express someone's attitude towards a particular piece of science. The phrase ‘it's
just a model’ indicates that the hypothesis at stake is asserted only tentatively or is
even known to be false, while something is awarded the label ‘theory’ if it has
acquired some degree of general acceptance. However, this way of drawing a line
between models and theories is of no use to a systematic understanding of
models.

1 The two extremes: the syntactic and the semantic view of theories

The syntactic view of theories, which is an integral part of the logical positivist
picture of science, construes a theory as a set of sentences in an axiomatized
system of first order logic. Within this approach, the term model is used in a wider
and in a narrower sense. In the wider sense, a model is just a system of semantic
rules that interpret the abstract calculus and the study of a model amounts to
scrutinizing the semantics of a scientific language. In the narrower sense, a model
is an alternative interpretation of a certain calculus (Braithwaite 1953, Campbell
1920, Nagel 1961, Spector 1965). If, for instance, we take the mathematics used in
the kinetic theory of gases and reinterpret the terms of this calculus in a way that
they refer to billiard balls, the billiard balls are a model of the kinetic theory of
gases. Proponents of the syntactic view believe such models to be irrelevant to
science. Models, they hold, are superfluous additions that are at best of
pedagogical, aesthetical or psychological value (Carnap 1938, Hempel 1965; see
also Bailer-Jones 1999).

The semantic view of theories (see e.g. van Fraassen 1980, Giere 1988, Suppe
1989, and Suppes 2002) reverses this standpoint and declares that we should
dispense with a formal calculus altogether and view a theory as a family of models.
Although different version of the semantic view assume a different notion of model
(see above) they all agree that models are the central unit of scientific theorizing.

2 Models as independent of theories

One of the most perspicuous criticisms of the semantic view is that it mislocates
the place of models in the scientific edifice. Models are relatively independent from
theory, rather than being constitutive of them; or to use Morrison's (1998) slogan,
they are ‘autonomous agents’. This independence has two aspects: construction
and functioning (Morgan and Morrison 1999).
A look at how models are constructed in actual science shows that they are neither
derived entirely from data nor from theory. Theories do not provide us with
algorithms for the construction a model; they are not ‘vending machines’ into which
one can insert a problem and a models pops out (Cartwright 1999, Ch. 8). Model
building is an art and not a mechanical procedure. The London model of
superconductivity affords us with a good example of this relationship. The model's
principal equation has no theoretical justification (in the sense that it could be
derived from electromagnetic or any other fundamental theory) and is motivated
solely on the basis of phenomenological considerations (Cartwright et al. 1995).
Or, to put it another way, the model has been constructed ‘bottom up’ and not ‘top
down’ and therefore enjoys a great deal of independence from theory.

The second aspect of the independence of models is that they perform functions
which they could not perform if they were a part of, or strongly dependent on,
theories.

Models as complements of theories. A theory may be incompletely specified in the

sense that it imposes certain general constraints but remains silent about the
details of concrete situations, which are provided by a model (Redhead 1980). A
special case of this situation is when a qualitative theory is known and the model
introduces quantitative measures (Apostel 1961). Redhead's example for a theory
that is underdetermined in this way is axiomatic quantum field theory, which only
imposes certain general constraints on quantum fields but does not provide an
account of particular fields.

While Redhead and others seem to think of cases of this sort as somehow special,
Cartwright (1983) has argued that they are the rule rather than the exception. On
her view, fundamental theories such as classical mechanics and quantum
mechanics do not represent anything at all as they do not describe any real world
situation. Laws in such theories are schemata that need to be concretized and
filled with the details of a specific situation, which is a task that is accomplished by
a model.

Models stepping in when theories are too complex to handle. Theories may be too
complicated to handle. In such a case a simplified model may be employed that
allows for a solution (Apostel 1961, Redhead 1980). Quantum chromodynamics,
for instance, cannot easily be used to study the hadron structure of a nucleus,
although it is the fundamental theory for this problem. To get around this difficulty
physicists construct tractable phenomenological models (e.g. the MIT bag model)
that effectively describes the relevant degrees of freedom of the system under
consideration (Hartmann 1999). The advantage of these models is that they yield
results where theories remain silent. Their drawback is that it is often not clear how
to understand the relationship between the theory and the model as the two are,
strictly speaking, contradictory.

A more extreme case is the use of a model when there are no theories at all
available. We encounter this situation in all domains, but it is particularly rampant in
biology and economics where overarching theories are often not to be had. The
models that scientists then construct to tackle the situation are sometimes referred
to as ‘substitute models’ (Groenewold 1961).

Models as preliminary theories. The notion of models as substitutes for theories is

closely related to the notion of a developmental model. This term has been coined
by Leplin (1980), who pointed out how useful models were in the development of
early quantum theory and is now used as an umbrella notion covering cases in
which models are some sort of a preliminary exercises to theory.

A closely related notion is the one of probing models (also ‘study models’ or ‘toy
models’). These are models which do not perform a representational function and
which are not expected to instruct us about anything beyond the model itself. The
purpose of these models is to test new theoretical tools that are used later on to
build representational models. In field theory, for instance, the so-called φ4-model
has been studied extensively not because it represents anything real (it is well-
known that it doesn't) but because it serves several heuristic functions. The
simplicity of the φ4-model allows physicist to ‘get a feeling’ for what quantum field
theories are like and to extract some general features that this simple model
shares with more complicated ones. One can try complicated techniques such as
renormalization in a simple setting and it is possible to get acquainted with
mechanisms—in this case symmetry breaking—that can be used later on
(Hartmann 1995). This is true not only for physics. As Wimsatt (1987) points out,
false models in genetics can perform many useful functions, among them the
following: the false model can help to answer questions about more realistic
models, provide an arena for answering questions about properties of more
complex models, ‘factor out’ phenomena that would not otherwise be seen, serve
as a limiting case of a more general model (or two false models may define the
extreme of a continuum of cases in which the real case is supposed to lie), or it can
lead to the identification of relevant variables and the estimation of their values.

Follow this link for more information: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/models-

science/

BIBLIOGRAPHY
 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mathematical_model
 http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/models-science/