***NEGATIVE***

Drones

Drones Funding DA: CBP

Shell
Drones are a funding bonanza for the CBP
Barry 1/16 12 http://www.ciponline.org/research/entry/numbers-game-governmentagencies-falsely-report-meaningless-deportationom Barry, senior analyst at the Center for
International Policy in Washington, DC, directs the institute's TransBorder Project. Barry
cofounded the International Relations Center1979-2007where he helped establish its
Foreign Policy in Focus, Americas Policy, Global Good Neighbor, and Right Web programs.
DHS is building its drone fleet at a rapid pace despite its continuing inability to
demonstrate their purported cost-effectiveness. The unarmed Predator and Guardians (the
maritime variant) cost about $20 million each. Yet DHS has little to show for its UAV
spending spree other than stacks of seized marijuana and several thousand immigrants who
crossed the border without visas.
Aside from a continuing funding bonanza for border security, to pursue its
drone strategy DHS is also counting on the Federal Aviation Administration to continue
authorizing the use of more domestic airspace by the unarmed drones. And FAA seems set
to comply, having approved 35 of the 36 requests by the departments Customs and
Protection agency from 2005 to mid-2010. In congressional testimony in July 2010, the FAA
said it was streamlining its authorization process for drones, including the hiring of 12
additional staff to process drone airspace requests.

CBP funding crunch kills border streamlining

Mascaro and Bennett 14 http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-border-budgettradeoffs-20140731-story.html LA Times Staff writer 14
On Wednesday, officials at the Office of Management and Budget were putting together
plans to scrounge up funds. But without congressional approval, President Obama is limited
to moving around money only in small amounts. That probably means the redistribution will
touch many different programs a distressing prospect for officials in vulnerable agencies.
There's not a mood of urgency. - Rep. Steve King (R-Iowa), who recently returned from a
weekend visit to the border
Homeland Security Secretary Jeh Johnson has already diverted funds from immigration
enforcement, and is now reviewing other programs in what he has described as a "dramatic"
effort to locate money. Another casualty of the budget crunch might be new X-

ray screening equipment to speed up truck cargo traffic at the border, Customs
and Border Protection Commissioner Gil Kerlikowske said in a recent interview.
"We have huge investments in technology to speed up people traveling lawfully

into the U.S. and [for] cargo advancement," Kerlikowske said. "There is money in those
programs, but we would have to reprogram to keep up with the money that is now
being spent on the Southwest border."

Without help from Congress, Johnson said last week at the Aspen Security Forum in
Colorado, "we will run out of money to deal with this. " Earlier this month, he warned
lawmakers of a "harsh" diversion of resources "that will take money away from
some vital homeland security programs I am sure members of this committee care a lot
about."

That wrecks the US economy

Kerkilowske 2/12/15 http://www.dhs.gov/blog/2015/02/12/budget-impacts-bordersecurity Commissioner R. Gil Kerlikowske
Budget Impacts on Border Security

CBP has made great strides in making it easier and safer for lawful travelers and
cargo to cross our borders. Weve invested in paperless technologies and partnered with
private industry to roll out improvements like automated passport control, and weve
implemented trusted traveler programs to help ease wait times at our ports of entry. Weve
given our Border Patrol agents and our Air and Marine personnel better equipment and
resources to ensure that our borders are secure.
We have committed to do more. But we cant because of the uncertain budget

climate. For example:

Improving our increasingly obsolete nonintrusive inspection and detection
technology is on hold. This technology detects illegal goods and materials and reduces
the time it takes to conduct to these inspections, moving trade and travel faster.
This is vital to the U.S. economy.
Upgrading and replacing remote and mobile video surveillance systems in the Rio Grande
Valley in Texas is on hold. These technologies are vital to improving CBPs situational
awareness, officer and agent safety, and detection capabilities.
Improving the operational systems and analytic tools that support our National Targeting
Center is on hold. The NTC supports DHS efforts to identify and deter transnational criminal
organizations and these operational systems help identify terrorists and criminals
attempting to cross our borders.
Enhancing CBPs ability to analyze geospatial intelligence is on hold. This capability is
essential for identifying traffic patterns along the border as well as for prioritizing Border
Patrol and Air and Marine deployments.
Beginning the procurement process to fix outdated and inefficient Border Patrol facilities is
on hold. This would allow CBP to address a portion of its deferred maintenance backlog,
ensuring the safety and well-being of CBP staff and supporting operations in the field.
I have 40 years of experience in career law enforcement. A shutdown would be a needless
hardship for our nearly 60,000 dedicated and professional CBP employees, their families,
and for the nation. Nearly all of them more than 53,000 would come to work but would
not take home a paycheck. CBP, meanwhile, would have to shut down or scale back many of
its most important training functions and processing the paperwork to move trade, a risk to
the national economy.
Time is running out. Congress should pass a clean, full-year appropriations bill.

The stakes are simply too high when it comes to ensuring secure and efficient
border operations

[INSERT ECONOMY IMPACT]

Uniqueness High now

CBP well-funded now
Graff November/December 14 Garrett M. Graff is a senior staff writer for Politico
Magazine. He was the editor of Washingtonian magazine for five years and is author of The
Threat Matrix: The FBI at War. Read more:
http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/10/border-patrol-the-green-monster112220.html#ixzz3hCUn995I http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/10/border-patrolthe-green-monster-112220.html?ml=m_a1_1#.Vbee2fmo01o
The United States today spends more money each year on border and immigration

enforcement than the combined budgets of the FBI, ATF, DEA, Secret Service and
U.S. Marshalsplus the entire NYPD annual budget. Altogether, the country has invested
more than $100 billion in border and immigration control since 9/11.

It has paid for quite a force: Customs and Border Protection not only employs some
60,000 total personneleverything from desert agents on horseback to insect inspectors at
airportsbut also operates a fleet of some 250 planes, helicopters and unmanned aerial
vehicles like the Predator drones the military sent to Iraq and Afghanistan, making CBP both
the largest law enforcement air force in the world and equivalent roughly to the size of
Brazils entire combat air force.

The Border Patrol wing of this vast apparatus has experienced particularly dramatic
growth: By the time the Bush administration left Washington, the fiercely independent
agencypart police force, part occupying army, part frontier cavalryhad gone from being
a comparatively tiny, undermanned backwater of the Justice Department to a 21,000-person
arm of the largest federal law enforcement agency in the country.
Read more: http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/10/border-patrol-the-greenmonster-112220.html#ixzz3hCU2FFbt

Links Drones get funding for the border patrol

Drones key funding magnet for border patrol
NBC News 7/13/14 http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/immigration-border-crisis/eyessky-are-pricey-border-patrol-drones-worth-money-n153696
http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/immigration-border-crisis/eyes-sky-are-pricey-borderpatrol-drones-worth-money-n153696
High above the U.S.-Mexican border, Predator drones fly in relative quiet. They are the
Border Patrol's sentinels in the sky as thousands of immigrants flood over the invisible line
dividing the two countries and a political firestorm over what to do about the crisis rages in
Washington. The bird's eye view afforded by drones doesn't come cheap. The White House
wants an additional $3.7 billion to deal with the current crisis , with $39.4 million
committed to air surveillance including funds meant for 16 additional crews to operate
and maintain drones. The Dangerous Guatemala Town Where Illegal Journey to U.S. Begins
2:16 Border Patrol wants the money and it wants the drones, Gregory
McNeal, a law professor and drone expert at Pepperdine University, told NBC News. This is
the kind of crisis where, if you are Border Patrol, you seize the opportunity to get more

funding from Congress.

Internal Link Drones Cost effective

UAV flights are less expensive than manned aircrafts
Michael C. Heatherly, doctoral student in Public Administration at Valdosta State
University and police officer in Tulsa, Oklahoma with nine years of law enforcement
experience and former US Marine infantryman, 2014 [Drones: The American Controversy,
Journal of Strategic Security, http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=1387&context=jss] ml

There are also cost considerations that make the use of UAVs desirable to law
enforcement officials. According to a study conducted by the Government Accounting Office of the cost
comparison of operating both manned and unmanned aircraft in support of Customs and
Border Protection operations, there was a significant cost savings .14 The study shows that the
average cost per flight hour for the Blackhawk helicopter, a manned aircraft, was
approximately $5,233.15 This includes fuel, maintenance, and other costs associated
with both flying and maintaining the aircraft. According to the same study, the cost per flight hour for the
Predator B, an unmanned aircraft, was $3,234. This also included fuel, maintenance, and other costs
associated with both flying and maintaining the aircraft. This is a nearly $2,000 savings per flight
hour. The Border Patrol uses both platforms for similar missions, including aerial surveillance and coordinating
with ground units to apprehend suspected aliens and smugglers.16 One considerable difference is that the
Blackhawk is capable of delivering personnel while the Predator is not.

Drones are more cost effective than traditional helicopters

Jay Stanley, Policy Analyst, ACLU Speech, Privacy & Technology Project, 3-8- 13 [The Plan
to Make Drones 'A Tool the FBI Cannot Do Without', ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/blog/wealready-have-police-helicopters-so-whats-big-deal-over-drones] ml
As drone regulation legislation works its way through Congress and the 30 (so far) state legislatures where it has
been introduced, one question that we hear a lot these days is, weve

had police helicopters for a

long time, whats so different about drones ? For one thing, police helicopters do raise privacy

issues. Because of the expense of using manned police aircraft, privacy invasions have not risen to the level that
legislators have felt compelled to address them, but incidents do happen. In 2005, for example, a police helicopter
supposedly monitoring a street protest in New York City instead trained its infrared camera for a prolonged period
on a couple making love on a pitch-black rooftop patio. Any police helicopter that followed a citizen around town for
no reason, or hovered over the backyard of innocent homeowners whose daughter was sunbathing with her friends,
would probably draw complaints. With drones, scenarios like those are bound to happen much more frequently. And
thats because there are some critical distinctions between manned and unmanned aircraft. 1. Drones erase

Manned helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft are expensive

to acquire, staff, and maintain. A police helicopter costs from $500,000 to $3 million
to acquire, and $200-$400 an hour to fly. Manned aircraft are large, complex machines
requiring expert ground crews, multiple shifts of pilots and co-pilots, and (unlike drones
which can often be hand-launched) runways or helipads. Such expenses mean there are inevitably going to
natural limits on aerial surveillance

be far fewer of themwhich in turn means the police are likely to use them only where they are most needed.

With drones, on the other hand, its easy to foresee a day when even a professional police
drone could be acquired for less than a hundred dollars, including maintenance
costs. And if technology and laws eventually reach the point where drones can fly
autonomously, they would become even cheaper because police departments
wouldnt even have to pay staff to control or monitor them.

Drones save Money for the CBp

Drones produce substantial comparative cost savings for CBP
Heatherly 14 Heatherly, Michael C.. "Drones: The American Controversy." Journal of
Strategic Security 7, no. 4 (2014): 25-37 http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=1387&context=jss Michael C. Heatherly is a doctoral student in Public
Administration at Valdosta State University. He is a police officer in Tulsa, Oklahoma with
nine years of law
There are also cost considerations that make the us e of UAVs desirable to law

enforcement officials . According to a study conduct ed by the Government Accounting

Office of the cost comparison of operati ng both manned and unmanned aircraft in support
of Customs and Border Protection operations, there was a significant cost
savings . 14 The study shows that the average cost per flight hour for the Blackhawk
helicopter, a manned aircraft, was approximately $5,233. 15 This includes fuel,
maintenance, and other costs a ssociated with both flying and maintaining the aircraft.
According to t he same study, the cost per flight hour for the Predator B, an unmanned
aircraf t, was $3,234. This also included fuel, maintenance, and other costs associa ted with
both flying and maintaining the aircraft. This is a nearly $2,000 s avings per flight hour.
The Border Patrol uses both platforms for similar missi ons , including aerial
surveillance and coordinating with ground units to apprehend suspected aliens and
smugglers. 16

Drones save money

Kimery 7/28/13 http://www.hstoday.us/columns/the-kimery-report/blog/drones-forcemultipliers-for-law-enforcement-other-firstresponders/06bfa4d1a8afea68ce724424cb7679f6.html Anthony L. Kimery, Editor-in-Chief,
draws on more than 30 years of experience and extensive contacts as he investigates and
analyzes homeland security, counterterrorism and border security. "The Kimery Report" was
awarded a 2008 National ASBPE Award for Original Web News Section. He most recently won
a 2014 regional gold ASBPE award for impact/investigative journalism. His report, "Savage
Struggle on the Border," was the lead report in the series of the same title that won the
2010 National ASBPE Gold Award for best magazine series
Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems (SUAS) may be a mature technology, but theyre still in
their infancy proving themselves through the rigorous testing done privately, commercially
and by state and federal government agencies, including the US Department of Homeland
Security (DHS). Nevertheless, despite fears by segments of the public and civil rights
opponents that broad use of drones heralds a domestic surveillance state, many more
believe unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) provide tremendous benefits and dividends for
public safety. This includes everything from traffic accident investigation; forensics; search
and rescue; tactical operations; emergency and disaster response; crowd control;
HAZMAT/CBRNE management; fire investigation and damage assessment and fire
management. These are all vital public safety matters that drones made for the domestic
civilian market are well suited to handle. Cities, towns and municipalities facing strained
budgets and dwindling resources may more easily be able to afford than traditional big ticket
first response equipment and personnel. Consequently, for some local governments, it will
give them a bigger bang for their buck as important force multipliers. Ben Gielow,
general counsel of the Association for Unmanned Vehicle Systems International (AUVSI),
noted that unmanned aircraft help save time [and] save money, not to mention

saving lives."

Drones save money and aff just shifts to expensive tech

Pando 1/31/14 https://pando.com/2014/01/31/could-spy-drones-be-the-future-of-crimefighting/ News Site and Portal
While law enforcement agencies are excited by the possibilities of UAS deployment in
fighting and preventing crime, unmanned aerial vehicles call into question the limits of
surveillance. Police officers like McDaniel argue that UAS are an extension of the aerial
technology already being used by law enforcement. Fixed cameras and helicopters allow
police to monitor citizens without a search warrant why would drones be any different?

"This is merely a more cost-effective manner of using air resources. It's nothing
more than what's already available," said Randy McDaniel, Chief Deputy in Montgomery
County, TX.

Streamling Key to Economy

CBP funding crucial to keep the US economy running
NTEU 15 http://www.nteu.org/UnionOffice/legconference/2015/CBPFunding.pdf NAtional
Treasury Employees Union, NTEU is widely known as a smart, tough organization, wellrespected for its knowledge of federal employee issues. And for its determination to work
with federal agencies, with Congress, and in the courts to protect, promote and expand the
rights of those it represents. Since 1938, NTEU has been driven by the principle that every
federal employee should be treated with dignity and respect. In that time, NTEU has grown
to represent some 150,000 bargaining unit employees in 31 federal agencies and
departments.
Sufficient Customs and Border Protection (CBP) staffing must be provided to ensure

security and mitigate long wait times at our nations air, sea and land ports of entry.
There is perhaps no greater roadblock to legitimate trade and travel efficiency than the
shortage of staff at the ports. Understaffed ports lead to long delays, especially in

commercial lanes, as cargo waits to enter U.S. commerce. Those delays result in
real losses to the U.S. economy. According to the U.S. Department of Treasury, more
than 50 million Americans work for companies that engage in international trade
and travel. Trade and travel related job creation, border security and mitigating wait
times at the ports of entry require stable funding of CBP. Late last year, Congress
approved funding for the rest of the federal government through Fiscal Year (FY) 2015, but
funded the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) at its FY 2014 level only through
February 27, 2015. Congress must pass a new spending bill for DHS by February 28 or
the Department could shut down. Last month, the House approved H.R. 240, a bill that
provides funding for DHS for the remainder of FY 2015. The House bill includes $10.7
billion for CBP, an increase of $118.7 million above the FY 2014 enacted level. This
funding level supports a CBP Officer staffing level of 23,775. The bill, however, does not
include additional funds for other CBP inspection and enforcement positions that are
experiencing staffing shortages such as CBP Agriculture and Import Specialists. In addition to
understaffing at the ports, retention of existing CBP employees, particularly those not
covered by recent pay and retirement enhancements, such as CBP trade operations
specialists, CBP Seized Property Specialists and CBP Technicians, needs to be addressed

CBP key to managing trade for econ

U.S. Customs and Border Protection | Office of Congressional Affairs
August 14
http://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/documents/401784%20CBPs%20Role%20in
%20Strengthening%20the%20Economy.pdf
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Field Operations is the law enforcement entity

responsible for managing the Nations 328 air, land, and sea ports of entry. CBPs
mission includes border security and anti-terrorism. We also help drive our Nations
economic engine by facilitating lawful international trade and travel through the
enforcement of hundreds of U.S. laws and regulations ranging from agriculture to
intellectual property rights. Nearly 225 years ago, the Fifth Act of Congress was passed,
establishing the U.S. Customs Service in 1789. Since then, we have played a critical role
in collecting revenue for the Nations treasury.

Drone Loan DA

Shell
CBP drones loaned out to multiple agencies
Cushing 10/3/13 Tim, staff writer for Tech Dirt
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20131003/06560224740/eff-lawsuit-uncovers-abusesurveillance-drones-dhs-files-motion-to-suppress-further-transparency.shtml
About a week ago, the EFF obtained documents (via a FOIA lawsuit) detailing usage of
CBP's (Customs and Border Protection) fleet of Predator drones. Nothing much has
changed since the last time this subject was visited (back in July): the CBP is still

acting like a drone lending library, loaning out its drones to everyone, from the FBI
and DEA to DPS offices, the Bureau of Indian Affairs and various military entities.
What has changed is just how many agencies have been recipients of the CBP's
largesse.

Includes overfishing busts

Lynch 7/3/13 Jennifer Lynch is a Senior Staff Attorney with the Electronic Frontier
Foundation and works on open government, transparency and privacy issues in new
technologies as part of EFFs Transparency Project. In addition to government transparency,
Jennifer writes and speaks frequently on government surveillance programs, domestic
drones, location data, and biometrics. https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/07/customsborder-protection-significantly-increases-drone-surveillance-other
As the Concept of Operations report notes, CBPs goal is that its drone data will be
persistently available (p. 21) and interoperable (p. 29) not just within CBP, but to
other agencies, and also possibly to other countries. CBP plans that its UAS will provide
assured monitoring of entities along land borders, inland seas, littorals and high seas
with sufficient frequency, continuity, accuracy, spectral diversity, and data content to
produce actionable information. (p. 29)
Daily Predator Flight Logs Detail Scope of CBP Drone Flights for Other Agencies
CBPs three years of daily flight logs detail when, where and how the agency flew its
Predator drones on behalf of other agencies. These logs show a marked increase in drone
flights over the years. In 2010, CBP appears to have flown its Predators about 30 times on
behalf of other agencies, but this number increased to more than 160 times in 2011 and
more than 250 times in 2012.
While CBP blacked out important information about dates, geographic location of flights,
and, in most cases, agency names, these logs do provide some insights into the agencys
drone program. For example, weve learned that CBP conducted drone surveillance for law
enforcement agencies ranging from the FBI, ICE, the US Marshals, and the Coast Guard to
the Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Investigation, the North Dakota Bureau of Criminal
Investigation, the North Dakota Army National Guard, and the Texas Department of Public
Safety. These missions ranged from specific drug-related investigations, searches for missing
persons, border crossings and fishing violations to general surveillance imagery and
aerial reconnaissance of a given location.

CBP also flew its drones for non-law enforcement agencies and missions . The logs
show that CBP conducted extensive electro-optical, thermal infrared imagery and Synthetic
Aperture Radar surveillance of levees along the Mississippi River and river valleys across
several states, along with surveillance of the massive Deep Water Horizon oil spill and

other natural resources for the US Geological Survey, FEMA, the Bureau of Land
Management, the US Forest Service, the Department of Natural Resources, and the

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.

Thats key to maintain oceans

Selbe 3/19/14 http://voices.nationalgeographic.com/2014/03/19/robot-eyes-protectingfrom-above-drones-and-ocean-conservation/ Shah Selbe is a National Geographic Emerging
Explorer, engineer, and conservation technologist focused on bringing new technologies into
ocean conservation, namely to help stop illegal fishing and overfishing. Much of his efforts
focus on open source technologies and the development of low cost hardware to help
empower coastal communities. He is the principal investigator for SoarOcean, as well as a
number of other projects, and works as a Spacecraft Propulsion Engineer as his day job
A robust and healthy ocean is the lifeblood for our planet, sustaining life through
interconnected ecosystems worldwide. Unfortunately, as a result of global industrial

overfishing pressure, many of these ecosystems have shown signs of rapid

deterioration. This is particularly bad in the high seas, the part of the oceans that lie
beyond 200-miles off the coast, where we are facing a tragedy of the commons. Nearly twothirds of the fish stocks in those areas are over-exploited, with the situation in many coastal
areas much worse.
Fortunately, there is a solution that has shown promise. Through establishing marine
protected areas, we can create sanctuaries that protect the ecosystem from destructive
fishing practices. Much like the national parks we see on terrestrial land, these can provide
legal protection that will allow the fish stocks to rebound. Explorer-in-Residence Enric Sala
has demonstrated through the Pristine Seas Expedition the importance of setting up these
marine reserves to help protect these habitats, safeguard biodiversity, and restore fisheries.
Currently less than one percent of the high seas have any sort of protection, but there are
efforts underway to increase this substantially.
However, just establishing these marine reserves on a map or in our laws and treaties is not
enough. The benefits of these areas can only be realized through effective monitoring and
enforcement. Without the ability to ensure that these regions are protected, they risk falling
to the same fate as the unprotected areas that surround them. This recent expansion of the
creation of these reserves has started to expose the limitations in our traditional approaches
to protection. So, in order to supplement our monitoring capacity, we need to look to
the incorporation of new technologies. This area where new technologies meet these
ocean conservation challenges is the focus of my work (and a series of future blog posts on
Ocean Views).
Traditionally, one of the most important tools in monitoring and protection of the oceans is
aerial surveillance . When used for our ocean, current approaches involve rental of flight
time on private aircraft or the use of military aircraft as a secondary mission. Unfortunately,
this method typically results in less desirable coverage or lower frequency of flights due to
the high costs involved and pilot limitations. Large governments or resource-rich
organizations typically operate these flights in order to absorb the capital costs of the
equipment, fueling, and flight operations. But for coastal areas outside of wealthy countries,
this approach just seems too out of reach to regularly help them watch over their seas.
Thankfully, there now exists a technology that can change this approach forever. The
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (commonly called a UAV, UAS, or drone) is a reusable robotic
aircraft that can fly without a human pilot or crew on-board and, as a result, does not suffer
the same issues associated with pilot fatigue or high operational costs. In recent years, this
technology has been all over the news. Unfortunately, much of that public consciousness
has been wrought with criticism as a result of its military uses.

Much of that controversy fails to realize that drones are a general-purpose

technology, much like the computer, and can be used for both good and bad uses.
Through the military uses and a large hobbyist following (websites like DIY Drones and the
Drone User Group Network), the technology has benefited from an impressive rate of
innovation and development (both commercially and open source). These systems have
been growing at such a pace that the hobby market and toy industry are building UAVs that
rival the options provided by the military-industrial complex. The miniaturization of cameras,
sensors, batteries, and other hardware as a result of the popularity of smartphones has
further increased these capabilities.
So now there exists a great opportunity for environmental and humanitarian causes to
take full advantage of the technology growth seen here. Through the democratization and
demilitarization of drone technology, there are a number of issues that can be solved more
cheaply and effectively than our current methods. As Patrick Egan of sUAS News says,
theres a lot of good that can be done with this technology. Feeding a hungry world, privatepublic asset management, erosion studies, anti-poaching efforts, anti-deforestation the
list goes on and on.
There have been demonstrations of drone usefulness in things from scientific missions, to
orangutan protection, to search and rescue, to firefighting, to rhino poaching surveillance,
and much more. There also exists a Wildlife Conservation UAV Challenge, where over 120
teams have competed to design, build, and fly drones to help stop rhino poaching. They
have even began to be used to create art. So there is plenty of opportunity here beyond just
aerial photography and military uses that we all have heard so much
I believe that there is one area where drones will really soar: for use in ocean

conservation . As I mentioned above, plane-based aerial monitoring of our oceans is

already a practice that is prevalent globally. Manned flights at sea can be dangerous, where
low cost UAVs would easily fill that use without the risk to human life. Through controlling
the drone with a ground station far away, the same concerns with pilot fatigue and flight
time disappear (with the only practical limitation being the amount of battery power or fuel
on board).
Having these robots in the sky can also act as a deterrence, as Thomas Snitch,
Executive officer of the UN Wildlife Enforcement Monitoring System, said of his experience in
Balule, the poachers are terrified to go into Balule because the word on the street is that
there are machines in the sky that can see at night, and the rangers know where they will
walk. This type of deterrence is just what we need for our ocean, which
currently resembles the Wild West in some areas. Through documenting what is
happening out there, evidence can be collected for use in legal prosecution and provide a
more effective patrol for the enforcement vessels already out on the water.

Extinction and structural violence through starvation

Schofield, 14 --- Director of Research at the Australian Centre for Ocean Resource and
Security University of Wollongong (3/10/2014, Clive, Why our precious oceans are under
threat, http://uowblogs.com/globalchallenges/2014/03/10/the-threats-facing-our-preciousoceans/, JMP)
Science fiction author Arthur C Clarke once observed, How inappropriate to call this planet
Earth when it is quite clearly Ocean. Good point, well made.

The oceans clearly dominate the world spatially, encompassing around 72 per cent of the
surface of the planet.
The vast extent of the oceans only tells part of the story, however.

The oceans are critical to the global environment and human survival in
numerous ways they are vital to the global nutrient cycling, represent a key
repository and supporter of biological diversity on a world scale and play a fundamental
role in driving the global atmospheric system.
Coastal and marine environments support and sustain key habitats and living
resources, notably fisheries and aquaculture. These resources continue to provide a
critical source of food for hundreds of millions of people.
The fishing industry supports the livelihoods of an estimated 540 million people
worldwide and fisheries supply more than 15 per cent of the animal protein consumed by 4.2
billion people globally.
Moreover, the oceans are an increasing source of energy resources and underpin the
global economy through sea borne trade.
Overall, it has been estimated that 61 per cent of global GNP is sourced from the oceans and
coastal areas within 100km of the sea.
Coasts and marine zones also provide essential, but often not fully acknowledged,
ecosystem services.

Coasts and marine zones are therefore of critical importance across scale s, from the
global to the regional, national and sub-national coastal community levels. At the same time
the oceans also remain largely (95 per cent) unexplored.

Drones Loaned Out

CBP drones loaned out
Wolverton 11/21/12 Joe A. Wolverton, II, J.D. is a correspondent for The New
American and travels frequently nationwide speaking on topics of nullification, the NDAA,
and the surveillance state. He can be reached at jwolverton@thenewamerican.com. Joe A.
Wolverton, II, J.D. is a correspondent for The New American and travels frequently
nationwide speaking on topics of nullification, the NDAA, and the surveillance state.
http://www.thenewamerican.com/usnews/item/13714-dhs-inks-$443-million-deal-to-buymore-drones
These other purposes are even hinted at in the DHS report. The tasks being performed by

the CBP drones extend well beyond the patrolling of the border and into many other
areas, a situation described by one reporter as mission creep. Here is a brief catalog of
some of the ways CBP is farming out its drone fleet.

CBP Predators have been used to conduct missions fo r the following federal and state
government agencies: U.S. Secret Service, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA),
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE); Bureau of Land Management; Federal
Bureau of Investigation; Department of Defense; Texas Rangers; U.S. Forest Service; and
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA).

Drones are lent out for overfishing busts

Cushing 7/9/13 https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20130705/17154023725/borderpatrol-drone-fleet-straying-far-from-borders-when-not-being-loaned-out-to-whatever-agencycomes-asking.shtml Tim Cushing, TechDirt writer
his wouldn't seem to be much of an issue if these drones were used as intended. Instead,

the CBP has been acting as a drone lending library, loaning out its drones to other
government agencies.
As Congress considers a new immigration law that would expand the fleet of unmanned
drones along the border, the agency in charge of border protection is increasingly
offering the military-grade drones it already owns to domestic law enforcement
agencies and has considered equipping them with nonlethal weapons, according to
documents recently made public...
The flight logs provided by the agency show that it has become increasingly generous
with its unmanned aerial vehicles. They have been used by the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, the North Dakota Army National Guard, Texas Department of Public Safety and
the United States Forest Service, among others.
Agencies that have used the 10 Predator drones owned by the Customs and Border
Protection Agency have deployed them to investigate fishing violations, search for
missing persons and inspect levees along the Mississippi River, among other things.
The uses listed here are acceptable, with the drones acting in an investigative fashion
targeting specific areas or activities. T

Drones k2 ocean monitoring

Drones crucial for ocean monitoring
BackCountry Voices 11/21/13 opinion and commentary blog
https://backcountryvoices.wordpress.com/2013/11/21/drone-development-has-exceededthe-pace-of-the-law/
While UAVs can play a clear role in law enforcement and public safety, they also can provide
assistance in any number of industries, including entertainment, transportation, oil and gas,
and cargo hauling, if allowed to operate in the public airspace.
In fact, some environmental groups and federal agencies are already using drones to
revolutionize the process of monitoring the health of oceans, forests, wetlands, and
wildlife. Were looking at UAS technology as just another observing system to come into the
other larger observing systems were already using, said Robbie Hood, director of the
Unmanned Aerial Systems Program at the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA), at the New America Foundationsponsored forum. We want to take these
technologies and rapidly deploy them for scientific purposes, Hood added.

Along with satellites, ocean buoys, and rain gages, NOAA would use drones to track
everything from high-impact weather to marine wildlife to illegal fishing in U.S.
waters.

Aff restricts fishing drones

Privacy concerns stymie fishing violation investigation
Romans 7/9/13 http://www.fieldandstream.com/blogs/field-notes/2013/07/us-borderagency-says-drones-provide-unmatched-level-surveillance Angling Trade contributing editor
Ben Romans will be assuming the editor position at The Flyfish Journal,
Despite controversy surrounding the use of drones over U.S. territory, the U.S. Customs

and Border Protection Agency has increasingly loaned drones over the last three
years for tasks like spotting fishing violations, missing person searches, and
inspecting levees on the Mississippi River, according to The New York Times.
Proponents of drones say the units are a valuable resource that provides an unmatched level
of surveillance. But critics point out that monitoring individuals without probable cause or a
warrant amounts to an invasion of privacy.

Misc

K2 immigration reform
Drones crucial to pass immigration reform
Trevizo 6/16/13 Perla Trevizo Arizona Daily Star 0http://tucson.com/business/droneskey-tool-to-border-security/article_9291e57b-bab5-5d78-b79b-dc7f01aacff5.html
Among the limitations, the internal reports revealed that Border Patrol agents often are not
available to respond because of rugged terrain or other assignments, the Center for
Investigative Reporting found.
Alles said the internal report was misused and doesn't reflect apprehensions in the zone
where the radar was used. CBP is getting two of the $5 million VADER systems and
plans to deploy at least one in Arizona in about a year. At the recent Congressional
hearing he told McCain the goal was to have six radars.

Whatever shape comprehensive immigration reform takes in the end , Isacson said,
it's not likely to pass without requiring the use of more drones.
"Putting more drones and technology on the border is an easy way to convince
more conservative members of Congress to vote for this, " he said. "It feels it's
inevitable."

Intel Good

NSA Good DA

1NC Shell
Recruitment stable, but on the brink dip crushes NSA capabilities
Brumfiel 3/31/15 http://www.npr.org/2015/03/31/395829446/after-snowden-the-nsafaces-recruitment-challenge Science correspondent Geoff Brumfiel's reports on physics,
space, and all things nuclear can be heard across NPR News programs and on NPR.org.
Brumfiel has carried his microphone into ghost villages created by the Fukushima nuclear
accident in Japan. He's tracked the journey of highly enriched uranium as it was shipped out
of Poland. For a story on how animals drink, he crouched for over an hour and tried to
convince his neighbor's cat to lap a bowl of milk. He became a full-time correspondent in
March of 2013. Prior to NPR, Geoff was based in London as a senior reporter for Nature
Magazine from 2007-2013. There he covered energy, space, climate, and the physical
sciences. In addition to reporting, he was a member of the award-winning Nature podcast
team.
Daniel Swann is exactly the type of person the National Security Agency would love
to have working for it. The 22-year-old is a fourth-year concurrent bachelor's-master's
student at Johns Hopkins University with a bright future in cybersecurity. And growing up in
Annapolis, Md., not far from the NSA's headquarters, Swann thought he might work at

the agency, which intercepts phone calls, emails and other so-called "signals
intelligence" from U.S. adversaries. "When I was a senior in high school I thought I would
end up working for a defense contractor or the NSA itself," Swann says. Then, in 2013, NSA
contractor Edward Snowden leaked a treasure-trove of top-secret documents. They

showed that the agency's programs to collect intelligence were far more sweeping
than Americans realized. After Snowden's revelations, Swann's thinking changed. The
NSA's tactics, which include retaining data from American citizens, raise too many
questions in his mind: "I can't see myself working there," he says, "partially because
of these moral reasons." This year, the NSA needs to find 1,600 recruits. Hundreds of
them must come from highly specialized fields like computer science and mathematics. So
far, it says, the agency has been successful. But with its popularity down, and pay
from wealthy Silicon Valley companies way up, agency officials concede that
recruitment is a worry. If enough students follow Daniel Swann, then one of the world's
most powerful spy agencies could lose its edge. People Power Makes The Difference
Contrary to popular belief, the NSA's black buildings aren't simply filled with codecracking supercomputers. "There's no such thing as a computer that can break any
code," says Neal Ziring, a technical lead in the agency's information assurance directorate.
"People like to think there's some magic bullet here, and there isn't. It's all hard work." "I
was at a Dartmouth career fair a few months ago, and our table was right across from
Facebook. And we are looking for some of the same things that they are." Hard work done
by a lot of people. Nationwide, the NSA employs roughly 35,000. And each year it must
find recruits to keep it at the cutting edge of code-making and code-breaking . It gets
those recruits from hundreds of colleges and universities nationwide, including Johns
Hopkins University. Matthew Green, a professor of computer science at Hopkins, says the
number of such students the school turns out each year can vary. "Sometimes it's a half-adozen," he says. "Sometimes it's just one or two."

Calls for restraint tank NSA morale

Reed 12/9/13 http://bgr.com/2013/12/09/nsa-employees-snowden-leaks/ Prior to joining
BGR as News Editor, Brad Reed spent five years covering the wireless industry for Network
World.
Employees at the National Security Agency arent happy that we now know to look out for
their trash-talking elves that theyve created in World of Warcraft. The Washington Post
reports that officials at the NSA are feeling depressed and demoralized by the

constant stream of revelations being leaked by former contractor Edward Snowden

and are also feeling hung out to dry by a White House that has spent most of its
time trying to contain political damage caused by the Snowden leaks. Essentially, the
Posts sources say that the NSA thinks that its providing some of the most valuable
intelligence in the United States battle against terrorism and that it deserves
recognition for its efforts instead of calls for more restraint .

Morale crashes kill recruiting

Medici 5/6/14
http://archive.federaltimes.com/article/20140506/MGMT02/305060013/Agencies-continuestruggle-low-morale staff, federal times

The morale of Defense Department employees was improving until the workforce
was hit by furloughs last year, according to Paige Hinkle-Bowles, deputy assistant
secretary of defense for civilian personnel policy at DoD. She said the past few years have
been a challenging time and that employee satisfaction on pay and opportunities for
advancement have declined but that the agency is working to improve morale
through greater engagement and by reshaping its workforce to meet future needs .
Katherine Archuleta, the director of the Office of Personnel Management, said at the hearing
that the decline in morale has a negative impact on agency recruiting

efforts . Despite that, she said, there is still a strong interest in public service among
federal job seekers. She said OPM is looking at how to maintain the current number of
about 2 million federal workers while adding more in critical areas. OPM is working with
agencies on a number of ways to boost morale and improve employee hiring and retention,
including enhanced training for management and greater engagement between agency
leaders and employees.

Personnel quality in intel crucial to address all global threats this

outweighs specific scenarios
Ellison 13 To introduce our speaker today is Admiral David Ellison. Hes a 34 - year career
Navy officer, then went on the become president of New Mexico Military Institute u ntil he
came to what is now NIU and what was then the Defense Intelligence University in 2009.
Hes a graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy at Annapolis and has a Ph.D. from Pennsylvania
State University.
ADMIRAL ELLISON: Good afternoon, ladies and gentle men. One need only span the globe

to readily observe the complexity and instability , and the uncertainty , that
characterizes todays global security environment. The challenge of preventing the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the challenge of defining and combating the
cyber threat and the challenge of defending against the danger posed by ever present terrorists combine to characterize an immensely complex national security
environment. Instability is evidenced by events such as those sur rounding the Arab Spring
and the recent turmoil in the countries of Syria and Egypt. Together this complexity, this

boundless regional instability , define a future of extreme uncertainty. This is a

national security environment that demands an intelligen ce professional with
unique characteristics. Protecting and defending our national security interests
requires intelligence professionals who are adaptive, agile, and forward thinking ,
ever endeavoring to anticipate the future, anticipating the future rat her than
reacting to the future. It is no longer enough to focus attention on one area to the
exclusion of others. Intelligence professionals no longer have the luxury of slowly
and deliberately refocusing their attentions, and no longer can they succeed as an
intelligence professional with just understanding the past and the present. Todays
intelligence professional must be able to anticipate future events. Preparing intelligence
professionals capable of meeting such an enormous challenge demands tha t we place them
in an environment that fosters creativity and innovation and one in which exploration,
collaboration, and integration are commonplace.

Intelligence capacity key to stop cyberterrorism only proactive

approach solves
Rudner 13
Martin Rudner (2013) Cyber-Threats to Critical National Infrastructure: An
Intelligence Challenge, International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 26:3,
453-481, DOI: 10.1080/08850607.2013.78055 Martin Rudner is Distinguished Resea rch
Professor Emeritus at Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada. This study formed part of a
larger research project he undertook with Angela Gendron on Assessing Cyber Threats to
Canadian Infrastructure for the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) and completed
in March 2012.
COUNTERING CYBER-THREATS THROUGH INTELLIGENCE Cyber-security is typically
perceived as an essentially defensive means of protecting digital assets, with the emphasis
placed on technical solutions. A defensive posture, being procedurally passive and reactive,
will always trail behind emergent threats. The initiative remains with the adversaries. Yet,
the protection of critical infrastructures and information systems against cyber-threats
is now rapidly being re-conceptualized as constituting the defense of an informationbased society as a wholea national security consideration. And, in national security as in
war, the best defense is predicated on a robust offense . In going beyond merely
defensive technical solutions, a proactive approach to the protection of critical
infrastructure against cyber-threats m ust utilize intelligence capabilities and assets
to prevent attacks by identifying and forestalling prospective threats. A major
consideration for owners and operators of critical infrastructures is the financial cost of
ensuring the security of their critical infrastructure assets against cyber-threats. This fi
nancial burden can include expenses incurred for built-in redundancies, hardware and
software solutions, specialist staffing, and professional training, as well as contingency
planning. Corporate management, for the most part, tends to treat security as a
troublesome and unwelcome cost of doing business. According to an international survey,
complacency, if not apathy, typically prevails in many executive suites, especially as regards
cyber- and terrorist threats. 83 While the onus for protection against criminal threats falls
clearly on the owners = operators themselves, cyber-threats can have ramifications beyond
the private domain that may impact adversely on the broader public well-being, especially
when critical infrastructures are affected. Cyber-security then becomes a national security
matter. Closing the Gaps Stakeholders in these key sectors widely acknowledged that
weaknesses and gaps exist in their cyber defenses against current threats. A more holistic,
finely-tuned partners hip approach between the private sector and the security and
intelligence communities is warranted to help stakeholders, as well as local authorities. It
could help to offset these vulnerabilities, mitigate any potential damage, and pr e-plan

resilience. The information sharing that already takes place with and among critical
infrastructure stakeholders, as and when appropriate, can be reinforced by promoting
effective public = private partnership and colla boration in cyber-security. Intelligence
services could provide significant support for such initiatives by virtue of their access to
threat information, technical and analytic expertise, and investigative experience .
The challenges confronting cyber-security cannot be dealt with solely at a technicaloperational level but requ ire a more inclusive approach at the national level. The
essential need is to protect an information-based society as a whole rather than merely the
protection of cyber-based infrastructures. Apart from stimulating investment in defensive
technologies, this approach would entail a proactive cyber-security initiative on the part of
intelligence services to prevent attacks rather than merely react to them. 84 Greater
emphasis must also be directed at combating cyber exploitations which target government
and business secrets . Forestalling cyber-espionage and the theft of intellectual property
and sensitive information is becoming a key objective of U.S. cyber strategy, and is
likewise emerging as a core responsibility of the security and int elligence communities of
most other countries as well. Retired Admiral Mike McConnell, the former Director of U.S.
National Intelligence, has discussed the uniqu e capabilities of U.S. intelligence

agencies which could be enlisted to help protect American companies from cyberespionage and attack. 85 The key question is how that capability can be harnessed and
made available to the private sector so that critical infrastructure can be better protected.
Government Effects at Prevention Although the U.S. is developing more robust and proactive
cyber-security capabilities, the main priority, ac cording to McConnell, should be to protect

Americas critical infrastructure, such as the financial sector, the electric power grid,
and transportat ion from cyber-attack, and to stop the theft of intellectual property through
cyber-espionage The United Statess Cyberspace Strategic Plan aims to improve cyber
security resiliency with technology that enables secure software development; to introduce
economic incentives like market-based , legal, regulatory, or institutional
interventions,aswellasstrategie s to help security professionals make infringements more
costly and difficult for attackers. 86 Efforts by the American government to enact legislation
authorizing a more robust and proactive cyber-security plan involving the Intelligence
Community and private sector stakeholders failed to gain Senate approval and lapsed by
mid-2012. But, shortly before the November 2012 presidential election, President Barack
Obama issued the classified Presidential Policy Directive 20 setting out guidelines
authorizing proactive measures to thwart cyber attacks on the U.S. government and
private computer networks. 87

Backdoors in military communications are prime targets for cyber

terrorism which can trigger nuclear conflict.

Fritz 9, Former Captain of the U.S. Army, Jason, July, Hacking Nuclear Command and
Control, www.icnnd.org/Documents/Jason_Fritz_Hacking_NC2.doc
The US uses the two-man rule to achieve a higher level of security in nuclear affairs. Under
this rule two authorized personnel must be present and in agreement during critical stages
of nuclear command and control. The President must jointly issue a launch order with the
Secretary of Defense; Minuteman missile operators must agree that the launch order is
valid; and on a submarine, both the commanding officer and executive officer must agree
that the order to launch is valid. In the US, in order to execute a nuclear launch, an
Emergency Action Message (EAM) is needed. This is a preformatted message that directs
nuclear forces to execute a specific attack. The contents of an EAM change daily and consist
of a complex code read by a human voice. Regular monitoring by shortwave listeners and
videos posted to YouTube provide insight into how these work. These are issued from the
NMCC, or in the event of destruction, from the designated hierarchy of command and control

centres. Once a command centre has confirmed the EAM, using the two-man rule, the
Permissive Action Link (PAL) codes are entered to arm the weapons and the message is sent
out. These messages are sent in digital format via the secure Automatic Digital Network and
then relayed to aircraft via single-sideband radio transmitters of the High Frequency Global
Communications System, and, at least in the past, sent to nuclear capable submarines via
Very Low Frequency (Greenemeier 2008, Hardisty 1985). The technical details of VLF
submarine communication methods can be found online, including PC-based VLF reception.
Some reports have noted a Pentagon review, which showed a potential electronic back
door into the US Navys system for broadcasting nuclear launch orders to Trident
submarines (Peterson 2004). The investigation showed that cyber terrorists could
potentially infiltrate this network and insert false orders for launch. The investigation
led to elaborate new instructions for validating launch orders (Blair 2003). Adding further
to the concern of cyber terrorists seizing control over submarine launched nuclear missiles;

The Royal Navy announced in 2008 that it would be installing a Microsoft Windows
operating system on its nuclear submarines (Page 2008). The choice of operating
system, apparently based on Windows XP, is not as alarming as the advertising of such a
system is. This may attract hackers and narrow the necessary reconnaissance to
learning its details and potential exploits. It is unlikely that the operating system would
play a direct role in the signal to launch, although this is far from certain. Knowledge of the

operating system may lead to the insertion of malicious code, which could be used
to gain accelerating privileges, tracking, valuable information, and deception that
could subsequently be used to initiate a launch . Remember from Chapter 2 that the
UKs nuclear submarines have the authority to launch if they believe the central command
has been destroyed. Attempts by cyber terrorists to create the illusion of a decapitating
strike could also be used to engage fail-deadly systems . Open source knowledge is
scarce as to whether Russia continues to operate such a system. However evidence
suggests that they have in the past. Perimetr, also known as Dead Hand, was an automated
system set to launch a mass scale nuclear attack in the event of a decapitation strike
against Soviet leadership and military. In a crisis, military officials would send a coded
message to the bunkers, switching on the dead hand. If nearby ground-level sensors
detected a nuclear attack on Moscow, and if a break was detected in communications links
with top military commanders, the system would send low-frequency signals over
underground antennas to special rockets. Flying high over missile fields and other military
sites, these rockets in turn would broadcast attack orders to missiles, bombers and, via radio
relays, submarines at sea. Contrary to some Western beliefs, Dr. Blair says, many of Russia's
nuclear-armed missiles in underground silos and on mobile launchers can be fired
automatically. (Broad 1993) Assuming such a system is still active, cyber terrorists would
need to create a crisis situation in order to activate Perimetr, and then fool it into believing a
decapitating strike had taken place. While this is not an easy task, the information age
makes it easier. Cyber reconnaissance could help locate the machine and learn its inner
workings. This could be done by targeting the computers high of level officialsanyone who
has reportedly worked on such a project, or individuals involved in military operations at
underground facilities, such as those reported to be located at Yamantau and Kosvinksy
mountains in the central southern Urals (Rosenbaum 2007, Blair 2008) Indirect Control of
Launch Cyber terrorists could cause incorrect information to be transmitted, received, or
displayed at nuclear command and control centres, or shut down these centres computer
networks completely. In 1995, a Norwegian scientific sounding rocket was mistaken by
Russian early warning systems as a nuclear missile launched from a US submarine. A radar
operator used Krokus to notify a general on duty who decided to alert the highest levels.
Kavkaz was implemented, all three chegets activated, and the countdown for a nuclear
decision began. It took eight minutes before the missile was properly identifieda
considerable amount of time considering the speed with which a nuclear response must be
decided upon (Aftergood 2000). Creating a false signal in these early warning systems would
be relatively easy using computer network operations. The real difficulty would be gaining

access to these systems as they are most likely on a closed network. However, if they are
transmitting wirelessly, that may provide an entry point, and information gained through the
internet may reveal the details, such as passwords and software, for gaining entrance

to the closed network. If access was obtained, a false alarm could be followed by
something like a DDoS attack, so the operators believe an attack may be imminent,
yet they can no longer verify it. This could add pressure to the decision making
process, and if coordinated precisely, could appear as a first round EMP burst.
Terrorist groups could also attempt to launch a non-nuclear missile, such as the one
used by Norway, in an attempt to fool the system. The number of states who possess
such technology is far greater than the number of states who possess nuclear weapons.

Obtaining them would be considerably easier, especially when enhancing

operations through computer network operations. Combining traditional terrorist
methods with cyber techniques opens opportunities neither could accomplish on
their own. For example, radar stations might be more vulnerable to a computer attack,
while satellites are more vulnerable to jamming from a laser beam, thus together they deny
dual phenomenology. Mapping communications networks through cyber

reconnaissance may expose weaknesses, and automated scanning devices created

by more experienced hackers can be readily found on the internet. Intercepting or
spoofing communications is a highly complex science. These systems are designed to
protect against the worlds most powerful and well funded militaries. Yet, there are
recurring gaffes, and the very nature of asymmetric warfare is to bypass
complexities by finding simple loopholes . For example, commercially available software
for voice-morphing could be used to capture voice commands within the command and
control structure, cut these sound bytes into phonemes, and splice it back together in order
to issue false voice commands (Andersen 2001, Chapter 16). Spoofing could also be used
to escalate a volatile situation in the hopes of starting a nuclear war. In June 1998, a
group of international hackers calling themselves Milw0rm hacked the web site of Indias
Bhabha Atomic Research Center (BARC) and put up a spoofed web page showing a
mushroom cloud and the text If a nuclear war does start, you will be the first to scream
(Denning 1999). Hacker web-page defacements like these are often derided by critics of
cyber terrorism as simply being a nuisance which causes no significant harm. However, webpage defacements are becoming more common, and they point towards alarming
possibilities in subversion. During the 2007 cyber attacks against Estonia, a counterfeit
letter of apology from Prime Minister Andrus Ansip was planted on his political party website
(Grant 2007). This took place amid the confusion of mass DDoS attacks, real world protests,
and accusations between governments.

Turns all impactscurrent capabilities are key to foreign policy

decisions
Kupcikas 13(Karolis, Assistant Professor at Loughborough University for International
Relations, The Importance of Intelligence to International Security, NOV 8 2013,
http://www.eir.info/2013/11/08/importance-of-intelligence-to-international-security)

If knowledge is power it can also be deduced that intelligence is a form of power

itself. Information can support the exercise of other forms of power for example material
or coercive. Intelligence provides the basis for policy or decisions people,
organizations and states, if they are to act rationally, will do so after canvassing fully
the alternative courses of action open to them and their costs and benefits (Gill &
Phythian, 2006, p. 33). Therefore, tensions can arise between intelligence conclusions and
politicians desire for particular answers. Policy is usually formulated based on principles

or grounded in ideology, while intelligence is produced by evaluating dry

information. When they meet, the contest is uneven: When intelligence clashes
with policy preference, intelligence loses; when information runs up
against power, information is the casualty. Indeed, when information is countered
by perception or, more accurately, conception, evidence is discounted (Fry & Hochstein,
1994, p. 20). Thus, in practice intelligence information will be judged upon its ability

to support a chosen course of action which has been formed even before the search
for information, in this way creating a reversed knowledge/power relationship. An
additional variable at the centre of security intelligence is secrecy, since: Without secrets it
is not intelligence (Warner, 2009, p. 9). Secrecy is important not just as barrier to
surveillance it permeates aspects of the process itself. Some actions make no sense unless
carried out with an element of surprise, such as arrests (Herman, 2001, p. 5). However,
secrecy also raises key issues of legality, morality and accountability.

Furthermore, intelligence is not only a foundation for state policies it has always
had a significant role in informing and exercising actions that are not
widely appreciated and, indeed, may actually breach domestic or
international law. Mostly debated is covert action or special political action as
practised by the CIA. Intelligence agencies not only engage in rather passive activity of
gathering intelligence on world affairs, but also try to intervene covertly to influence events.
Some authors see covert action as essential to intelligence (Russel, 2007, p. 281), while
some characterized it as an additional activity, somewhat separate from the main business
of intelligence. Intelligence is information and information gathering, not
doing things to people; no-one gets hurt by it, at least not directly. Some
agencies do indeed carry out covert action, which confuses the ethical
issues, but this a separable and subsidiary function (Herman, 2004, p. 180).
Also, intelligence methods have been applied in order to disrupt the

activities of criminal organizations that are involved in drugs, arms or

people trafficking . Since 9/11, due to perceived terrorist threats, even more
attention has been given to this development by the convergence of security, police
and military intelligence. However, could it be said that the modern transformation of
intelligence by the application of highly sophisticated surveillance and information
technology has overshadowed the fact that, at its core, it remains an intellectual process?
Most intelligence effort since 9/11 has been put into the investigation and prevention of
terrorist attacks. Many analytical techniques deploy sophisticated software facilitating the
analysis of relational data. However, the cleverness of the software cannot provide a

technological fix: analysis remains at heart an intellectual exercise based on

reasoning (Russel, 2007, p. 213).

2NC MUST READ

The overall resilience of intelligence analysis trumps specific event
prediction
Wirtz 13 Dr. James J. Wirtz is Dean of the School of International Graduate Studies and former Chairman of the
Department of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. A former Chairman
of the Intelligence Studies Section of the International Studies Association, he was President of the International
Security and Arms Control Section of the American Political Science Association. A graduate of the University of
Delaware, with a Ph.D. from Columb ia University, New York City, Dr. Wirtz is the author and co-edito r of several
books on intelligence and arms control James J. Wirtz (2013) Indications and Warning in an Age of Uncertainty,
International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 26:3, 550-562, DOI: 10.1080/08850607.2013.780558

Indications and warning intelligence is an important and time-tested methodology employed

by intelligenc e analysts to warn military officers and policymakers about changes in an
opponents operational posture which indicate that the likelihood of dangerous or
aggressive activity is increasing. In recent times, it has fallen out of fashion because
policymakers and the public alike have come to expect that the Intelligence
Community will be able to provide specific event predictions of an opponents
future actions. In other words, people tend to believe that intelligence analysts should be
able to state who is about to undertake some unwanted activity, as well as where, how,
when and why the action will unfold. Another expectation is that these specific event
predictions will be offered early enough so that policymakers and operators can
take effective action to prevent the occurrence of some nefarious act or attack. Specific
event prediction is indeed the holy grail of intelligence analysis, and analysts
sometimes do manage to warn of specific events before they unfold. In 1942 naval
intelligence analysts predicted the Japanese attack on Midway The Intelligence Community
detected Soviet efforts to place medium range missiles in Cuba before these actions became
a fait accompli . 1 But for theoretical, bureaucratic, and cognitive reasons, specific
event prediction is extraordinarily difficult to achieve in practice. Success tends to
be the exception, not the norm. Indications and warning intelligence offers a
powerful and important alternative to a focus on specific eve nt prediction that
might in fact be better suited to contemporary threat s posed by non-state actors or rogue
regimes.

Uniqueness Morale
New leadership and Obama allow new confidence in NSA
Stroebel 5/19/14 Reuters staff http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/05/19/us-usasecurity-rogers-idUSBREA4I02J20140519
Rogers faces big challenges. Morale among the NSA's tens of thousands of employees has
taken a hit, and Rogers said many people in the agency found it both uncomfortable
and perplexing to be under public scrutiny . Retired Air Force General Michael Hayden, a
former director of both the NSA and CIA, said it was instructive that Obama chose Rogers,

and veteran NSA civilian Richard Ledgett to be his deputy, at a time when the
president was under enormous pressure to conduct a house cleaning of the agency .
It was, Hayden said, a "vote of confidence" in the NSA and its staff , and a sign that,
despite some reforms, Obama plans no sharp cutback in the agency's aggressive
global surveillance. "They were the obvious choices before Snowden, and they were the
choices after Snowden. This is a powerful message to send to the workforce, "
Hayden said. A second former senior U.S. intelligence official who knows Rogers
predicted he would be a "much more inclusive" leader than his predecessor , the
sometimes-combative Army General Keith Alexander, who led the agency for more than
eight years.

Betrayal by Congress and the President crushes MSA morale, which

impact capaiblities
Hayden 14 Michael V. Hayden was director of the CIA from 2006 to 2009.
http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/beyond-snowden-nsa-reality-check
In the most iconic scene in one of Americas most iconic movies, High Noon, Marshal Will
Kane, played by Gary Cooper, throws his badge into the dust as he prepares to abandon the
ungrateful town he has defended for years. Kane had sought the support of the townsfolk as
murderous Frank Miller and his gang descended on them. He got no such support; they even
objected to his standing up against the gang on his own, as it might endanger them. Still
Kane went into harms way, refusing to flee, finally killing Miller and his henchmen. In the
last scene, the townsfolk are almost tripping over themselves to congratulate and praise
Kane for his heroism. He stares them down, removes his badge, and climbs aboard a
buckboard driven by his new wife (Grace Kelly) and heads out of town. The folks at Fort
Meade today have to feel a little bit like Will Kane. They dont seem to be getting much
help against the current threats to them. House Intelligence Chairman Mike Rogers
summed it up pretty well at a recent panel, noting that the United States had the only

intelligence services on the planet that are under siege from its adversaries and
from its internal support system, the citizens of the United States . It should trouble
all Americans when the NSA director and his deputy feel it necessary to send a
letter to the families of all NSA officers to assure them that their loved ones are
heroes, not criminals. There is no doubt that these are difficult issues, and the
fundamental questions brought on by new technologies and new enemies remain to be
resolved. But the NSA played by the rules. Its actions were anchored in statute (the
2006 renewal of the Patriot Act and the 2008 FISA Amendment Act), briefed to all members
of the congressional committees, and overseen by an unprecedented level of court
supervision. And yet a New York Times op-ed casually leads with the headline The Criminal
NSA. Even President Obamas efforts to defend the agency have had a pointed

edge at times. At an August press conference, the president praised the men and women
of the intelligence community as patriots and then, understandably and correctly,
characterized those who have raised their voices against various NSA programs as patriots,
too. Fair enough, in some general rhetorical sense. But to the people at Fort Meade, the

presidents words just equated his own workforce with those who routinely accuse
that same workforce of felonies. That doesnt go down easily. Perhaps what is
missing here is a personal touch. When President Obama released CIA interrogation
memos in 2009, an event that David Ignatius equated to a car bomb going off in the
driveway, the president visited Langley. A visit to Fort Meade today, to thank and

support an embattled and routinely traduced workforce, would be almost

sacramental in its character, delivering both sign and substance of the presidents
commitment. It would also set a precedent. In the sixty-one-year history of the NSA, no
Democratic president has ever visited the agency. There are a lot of risks involved in the
controversy that Edward Snowden started. The greatest of all, perhaps, is the impact

of an uninformed blizzard of accusations on the morale of our intelligence

workers . The last thing the nation needs is for this community to ride out of town with the
Frank Millers of today still standing.

Uniqueness Recruiting
Recruitment stable, but on the brink dip crushes NSA capabilities
Brumfiel 3/31/15 http://www.npr.org/2015/03/31/395829446/after-snowden-the-nsafaces-recruitment-challenge Science correspondent Geoff Brumfiel's reports on physics,
space, and all things nuclear can be heard across NPR News programs and on NPR.org.
Brumfiel has carried his microphone into ghost villages created by the Fukushima nuclear
accident in Japan. He's tracked the journey of highly enriched uranium as it was shipped out
of Poland. For a story on how animals drink, he crouched for over an hour and tried to
convince his neighbor's cat to lap a bowl of milk. He became a full-time correspondent in
March of 2013. Prior to NPR, Geoff was based in London as a senior reporter for Nature
Magazine from 2007-2013. There he covered energy, space, climate, and the physical
sciences. In addition to reporting, he was a member of the award-winning Nature podcast
team.
Daniel Swann is exactly the type of person the National Security Agency would love
to have working for it. The 22-year-old is a fourth-year concurrent bachelor's-master's
student at Johns Hopkins University with a bright future in cybersecurity. And growing up in
Annapolis, Md., not far from the NSA's headquarters, Swann thought he might work at

the agency, which intercepts phone calls, emails and other so-called "signals
intelligence" from U.S. adversaries. "When I was a senior in high school I thought I would
end up working for a defense contractor or the NSA itself," Swann says. Then, in 2013, NSA
contractor Edward Snowden leaked a treasure-trove of top-secret documents. They

showed that the agency's programs to collect intelligence were far more sweeping
than Americans realized. After Snowden's revelations, Swann's thinking changed. The
NSA's tactics, which include retaining data from American citizens, raise too many
questions in his mind: "I can't see myself working there," he says, "partially because
of these moral reasons." This year, the NSA needs to find 1,600 recruits. Hundreds of
them must come from highly specialized fields like computer science and mathematics. So
far, it says, the agency has been successful. But with its popularity down, and pay
from wealthy Silicon Valley companies way up, agency officials concede that
recruitment is a worry. If enough students follow Daniel Swann, then one of the world's
most powerful spy agencies could lose its edge. People Power Makes The Difference
Contrary to popular belief, the NSA's black buildings aren't simply filled with codecracking supercomputers. "There's no such thing as a computer that can break any
code," says Neal Ziring, a technical lead in the agency's information assurance directorate.
"People like to think there's some magic bullet here, and there isn't. It's all hard work." "I
was at a Dartmouth career fair a few months ago, and our table was right across from
Facebook. And we are looking for some of the same things that they are." Hard work done
by a lot of people. Nationwide, the NSA employs roughly 35,000. And each year it must
find recruits to keep it at the cutting edge of code-making and code-breaking . It gets
those recruits from hundreds of colleges and universities nationwide, including Johns
Hopkins University. Matthew Green, a professor of computer science at Hopkins, says the
number of such students the school turns out each year can vary. "Sometimes it's a half-adozen," he says. "Sometimes it's just one or two."

NSA recruitment and retention is steadylimited vacancy

Gold 5/1/15 (Hannah Gold, writer and editor for The Guardian, "The NSA's greatest hiring
strength is students, but resistance is growing," www.theguardian.com/usnews/2015/may/01/nsa-recruitment-college-campuses-student-privacy)

Since the late 1990s, the NSA has been running recruiting programs out of

universities across the country, with minimal pushback from students or

administrations. This success is unparalleled, and its mostly due to the steady,
reliable stream of talent that flows from universities into the agency. Unlike the
Department of Defense, the NSA has hardly any vacancies about 1% of its positions
at any given time. Thats because the agency puts a premium on recruiting: it has
1,500 employees involved, at least part time, with the employment process. Most of
these recruiting efforts take place on university campuses, and 80% of the NSAs
hires are for entry-level positions. But students at dozens of schools are currently making
the connections needed to begin a discussion about the NSAs hiring practices. These
recruitment programs are now viewed by some as controversial, given recent revelations
about the NSA, including but not limited to their awesome capacities for spying on students.
There are two main ways to recruit on campuses: through the Centers of Academic
Excellence designation (CEA), and the CyperCorps: Scholarship for Service.

NSA recruiting is fine

Messmer 7/18/14 http://www.networkworld.com/article/2364271/security0/h4ckerswanted-report-nsa-not-having-trouble-filing-cybersecurity-jobs.html Ellen Messmer is a
senior editor at Network World. She covers news and technology trends related to
information security.

In spite of the headlines about NSA secrets leaked by former NSA contractor Edward
Snowden, the NSA seems to find no shortage of people wanting to work
there. RAND says NSA, the countrys largest and leading employer of cybersecurity
professionals, is doing well in hiring, with fewer than 1% of their positions going
vacant for any length of time. A mention is made in the RAND report that some federal
agencies think they are being outbid for cybersecurity personnel by the NSA, FBI and
Department of Homeland Security. NSA also has a very low turnover rate (losing no
more to voluntary quits than to retirements), the RAND report states. One reason is
that it pays attention to senior technical development programs to ensure that employees
stay current and engaged. RAND says NSA does devote a lot of time and energy to the
task of finding the cybersecurity professionals it needs, having a total of 1,500 involving
in the recruiting and employment process, with outreach into many universities, especially
those with a reputation for educating people who go into the military. Eighty percent of

NSA cybersecurity hires are entry level, with most having bachelors degrees. NSA
also has a very intensive schooling system, lasting as long as three years for
some, the report notes, adding, For the most part, our interview suggests that the NSA
makes rather than buys cybersecurity professionals . The NSA today absorbs a third of
all Scholarship for Service graduates, the report says, partly because it has the most job
openings and also because it has a reputation for hiring the best hackers.

NSA role model in recruiting tech talent

Kopp 4/14/15 http://federalnewsradio.com/technology/2015/04/want-to-grab-cybertalent-look-to-better-pay/ Reporter / Anchor http://www.federalnewsradio.com and 1500AM
in Washington.
Agencies look to NSA Some agencies are wrestling with the handcuffs and making

progress, despite some bruises. The National Security Agency has had an easier

time than some others in attracting new cybersecurity graduates. Unlike other civilian
agencies, students are more likely to know what theyll be doing in cyber at the NSA
and theyre more likely to build street credibility , as Barg Bulman puts it, which can
help them later in their careers. The NSA also is among a growing number of agencies
that can offer higher salaries to junior cybersecurity professionals , thanks to
Congress. Starting salaries are around $65,000

NSA is crushing it at recruiting

Libicki Senty Pollak 14
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR400/RR430/RAND_RR430.pd
f Martin C. Libicki is an American scholar and Professor at the Frederick S. Pardee RAND
Graduate School in Santa Monica, California. David Senty is a RAND senior fellow who
previously served as chief of staff at the U.S. Cyber Command, Julia Pollak, Assistant Policy
Analyst at the RAND Corporation.
Findings from Interviews and Statistics 31 2010). This allows them to develop an approach
that works against each or all of the six as a way of reducing to negligible levels the odds
that an attacker will succeed. This, in turn, creates a counter-attacking task list, which then
informs the corporation what skills are needed to execute the task list, which in turn, guides
the conversion of technical employees into cybersecurity employees. As with NSA (see
below), this company argues that it has found ways to keep its best cybersecurity people
on board by giving them interesting missions, reinforced by the notion that big companies
can do big things. NSA The NSA is the countrys largest and leading employer of
cybersecurity professionals. In the face of the current stresses in the market for such
professionals, officials there believe they are doing quite wellfewer than 1 percent of their
positions are vacant for any significant length of time, and supervisors, queried after their
new hires have been working for six months, report being very happy with the personnel
they get. NSA also has a very low turnover rate (losing no more to voluntary quits

than to retirements). One reason is that it pays attention to senior technical

development programs to ensure that employees stay current and engaged. Yet, to
get to that point, our interview indicates that NSA must and does pay a great deal
of attention to workforce issues. If not its primary focus, then it is still very high up on
the list. Although only 80 people have recruitment as their full-time occupation,
another 300 have recruitment as an additional duty, and another 1,500 beyond
that are involved in the whole recruitment and employment process . All told, that
is a great deal of effortsuggesting, from our perspective, that the difficulties of
finding enough cybersecurity professionals can be largely met if sufficient energy
is devoted to the task. NSA has out - reach into many universities, not simply those
designated its Centers of Academic Excellence (CAE), 2 although it pays attention to
support - ing cybersecurity curricula development in the CAE schools, as noted. In some
cases it has people teaching in schools to encourage potential cybersecurity professionals
at the pre-college levels, particularly, for obvious reasons, in the state of Maryland.

Uniqueness Recruiting Morale

Morale high enough to maintain recruiting
Cheung 14 writer, associated press
http://www.nextgov.com/cybersecurity/2014/08/snowden-effect/91577/
Nonetheless, job seekers appear undeterred. CIA spokesman Christopher White says
more than 80,000 people applied for jobs with the agency in 2013 , an increase over
the previous year although he would not disclose how many people applied in 2012. What

I can tell you is that recent leaks have not impacted our recruiting efforts in any
significant way, he says. Within the office of the Director of National Intelligence, hiring
managers have seen no notable impact to our recruitment efforts or to the number
of individuals submitting applications in response to the Snowden media leaks, DNI
spokeswoman Kasey Butler says. Officials at the FBI and the Homeland Security
Department declined to comment. At the Pentagon, the opportunity to join a unique

cyberspace mission, which involves hacking adversaries, protecting military

systems and cyber spying, continues to attract candidates , Defense spokeswoman Lt.
Col. Valerie Henderson says. Recent media attention to the work cyber professionals
perform provides an opportunity to correct distortions and present the facts on the critical
value of this work, she adds. As for the elephant in the room, NSA Director Adm. Mike
Rogers said recently at a Reuters cybersecurity summit that the agency had seen some
impact on recruiting and retention, in certain areas: In general I would say not to the
point where its really impacted our ability to recruit the right people , Rogers said.
Regarding retention, he pays particular attention to younger staff with three to five years
training, who have a skill set that is readily transferable to the outside world, he said. I

have not seen significant loss that I would attribute to the current environment.
Now, does that mean Im going to sit here and tell you we havent seen any loss?
No . . . I think it just goes to the workforce believes in what theyre doing.

Uniqueness Recruiting AT Snowden

NSA has maintained recruiting despite Snowden crisis
Reuters 12/14/13 http://www.cnbc.com/2013/12/14/after-cataclysmic-snowden-affairnsa-faces-winds-of-change.html

The U.S. National Security Agency has made dozens of changes in its operations
and computer networks to prevent the emergence of another Edward Snowden,
including potential disciplinary action, a top NSA official said on Friday, as a White House
review panel recommended restraints on NSA spying. Former NSA contractor Snowden's
disclosures have been "cataclysmic" for the eavesdropping agency, Richard Ledgett, who
leads a task force responding to the leaks, said in a rare interview at NSA's heavily guarded
Fort Meade headquarters. In the more than hour-long interview, Ledgett acknowledged

the agency had done a poor job in its initial public response to revelations of vast
NSA monitoring of phone and Internet data; pledged more transparency; and said
he was deeply worried about highly classified documents not yet public that are
among the 1.7 million Snowden is believed to have accessed. He also stoutly defended
the NSA's mission of tracking terrorist plots and other threats, and said its recruiting
of young codebreakers, linguists and computer geeks has not been affected by the
Snowden affair - even as internal morale has been. "Any time you trust people, there is
always a chance that someone will betray you," he said.

Snowden scandals only boosted recruiting

Cheung 14 writer, associated press
http://www.nextgov.com/cybersecurity/2014/08/snowden-effect/91577/

Revelations last year that the National Security Agency is collecting Americans
telephone metadata soured some peoples opinions about the U.S. intelligence
community, but they apparently havent affected the views of many computer
security professionals. Anecdotal evidence suggests that leaks by Edward Snowden,
the former systems administrator and contractor with the National Security Agency, have
not hindered efforts to recruit or retain cyber staff at the three-letter agencies.
Instead, the disclosures actually might have helped intelligence agencies attract
computer aficionados by spotlighting the agencies bleeding edge technology . We
have had no indication that cyber pros have any reticence about working for the
government, says Mark Aiello, president of Massachusetts-based Cyber 360 Solutions, a
staffing firm. It is probably the opposite, and mostly for the opportunity to work with
some advanced tools or techniques. The Big Brother aspect is appealing if you are
the watcher, not the watched. Justice Department Chief Information Security Officer
Melinda Rogers says the attention to agencies cyber activities may pique the interest
of potential recruits. And thats our responsibility as hiring managers to make sure
that they understand the importance of the mission. Multiple East Coast cyber
recruiters say none of their prospective hires has mentioned Snowden as a factor in
their career considerations. Nor have cyber headhunters , who place departing
government pros in industry positions, seen any increase in federal personnel heading for
the exits. I normally hear regularly from people who want to leave. I havent seen an uptick
at all, says Kathy Lavinder, founder of Maryland-based Security and Investigative
Placement Consultants. I think theres just always a steady stream of people who want to
leave after X amount of years. And I think for the NSA, there are people who go there to get

the experience to have that on their resume. Deborah Page, a Virginia-based executive
search consultant with the McCormick Group who specializes in information security job
searches, says, We arent seeing any challenges at the moment with recruiting
talent in the wake of Snowden, or at least Im not.

Snowden didnt impact recruiting

McGarry 10/14/13 Brendan McGarry is an award-winning reporter and editor for
Military.com. He writes breaking news and feature stories on a range of topics, from the
Pentago http://defensetech.org/2013/10/14/nsa-chief-what-cyberwarrior-shortage/

The head of the National Security Agency said recruiting so-called cyberwarriors
hasnt been difficult despite the recent disclosures of classified surveillance
programs by a former government contractor. The agency has received tens of
thousands of applications for just a couple of thousand job openings, according to Army Gen.
Keith Alexander, who oversees both the agency and U.S. Cyber Command at Fort Meade,
Md. He didnt specify a time period. Actually, on the NSA side, which can influence
onto the Cyber Command side, weve had a lot of applicants around 20,000 to
40,000 for 2,000 jobs, he said last week during a cybersecurity conference in Washington,
D.C. Its amazing. His comments seemed to undercut those made by other panelists who
suggested the political gridlock on Capitol Hill, D.C., is discouraging potential candidates
from seeking the highly technical government jobs. The government shutdown, now in its
14th day, began Oct. 1 after Congress failed to pass a budget or short-term funding
resolution for fiscal 2014. While Alexander said the shutdown is making it hard for

some employees to continue working in government, he also described

cybersecurity work as a tremendous opportunity for young people entering the
military services. This generation is coming up cyber savvy, he said, after explaining
how his almost 2-year-old granddaughter knows how to use an iPad to watch movies on
Netflix. We can train them. We can educate them. The Defense Department wants to
boost spending on cyberspace operations 21 percent to $4.7 billion in fiscal 2014. U.S.
Cyber Command alone plans to dramatically increase the number of personnel to 4,900 by
2015 from 900 today. In coming years, it expects to build a new joint operations center at
Fort Meade and boost the ranks of military and civilian personnel assigned to cyberwarfare
teams in Maryland, Texas, Georgia and Hawaii. At the National Security Agency, both
technical and non-technical jobs are in demand, Alexander said. An opening for a civil
liberties and privacy officer drew several dozen resumes, he said. We have the

technical foundation and the academic acumen at NSA to help build the knowledge
set for these people, Alexander said. I dont see an issue there and Im not getting
it from the services that thats yet an issue in hiring.

Uniqueness Recruiting Reputation

NSA makes hackers if they keep up recruiting
Libicki Senty Pollak 14

http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR400/RR430/RAND_RR430.pd
f Martin C. Libicki is an American scholar and Professor at the Frederick S. Pardee RAND
Graduate School in Santa Monica, California. David Senty is a RAND senior fellow who
previously served as chief of staff at the U.S. Cyber Command, Julia Pollak, Assistant Policy
Analyst at the RAND Corporation.
For the most part, our interview suggests that the NSA makes rather than buys

cybersecurity professionals, although its recruitment process is very sensitive to the

importance of determining those quali - ties that predispose people to make good
employees. Recruiters also look hard at schools that have a reputation for educating
people that go into the military. Fully 80 percent of their hires are entry level, the
vast majority of whom have bachelors degree s. They could conceivably draw deeper by
finding particularly talented junior college graduates, but the latter would have to undergo a
much longer training program as a result. Furthermore, they are not inclined to look for the
brilliant nondegreed hacker. 3 NSA has a very intensive internal schooling system,
lasting as long as three years for some. This too, would be difficult for other institu -

tions to duplicate. NSA can take advantage not only of its size, but also of its low
turnover rate. The latter means that it reaps the benefits of its investments in
people rather than seeing the benefits accrue to other organizations after NSA has
paid the costs of the training (not least of which is the time that such students spend off
the job to be trained). Employers with more turnover may logically deem it not worthwhile
investing that much to educate their employees.

NSA rep is great

Libicki Senty Pollak 14
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR400/RR430/RAND_RR430.pd
f Martin C. Libicki is an American scholar and Professor at the Frederick S. Pardee RAND
Graduate School in Santa Monica, California. David Senty is a RAND senior fellow who
previously served as chief of staff at the U.S. Cyber Command, Julia Pollak, Assistant Policy
Analyst at the RAND Corporation.
In all fairness, only one organization can be the most prestigious place to work, and
for this line of work (and for this size of organiza - tion), NSA is hard to beat. It
consistently absorbs a third of all Schol - arship for Service graduates , as shown in
Figure 3.1, 4 in part because Findings from Interviews and Statistics 33 it has the most job

openings but also because it has a reputation for hiring the best hackers.

NSA able to raise salaries at will to compete

Hamilton 4/16/14 http://news.clearancejobs.com/2014/04/16/streamliningcybersecurity-hiring-process/ Jillian Hamilton has worked in a variety of Program
Management roles for multiple Federal Government contractors. She has helped manage
projects in training and IT. She received her Bachelors degree in Business with an emphasis
in Marketing from Penn State University and her MBA from the University of Phoenix.

The Department of Homeland Security is asking for Congressional help in leveling

the cybersecurity recruiting playing field. DHS feels unable to compete within the

current government recruiting restrictions. Keep in mind many can attest that the
federal governments hiring process is less than streamlined. It isnt easy to find the right
candidate who is willing to take a lower salary, has the necessary certifications, can get a
clearance, and is willing to jump through any federal government hiring hoops.

DHS is asking Congress to relax federal salary requirements for cybersecurity hires,
a move the National Security Agency (NSA) has done that has increased its
attractiveness to cyber talent. A bump in salary could go a long way in helping
qualified candidates feel the value of public service.

NSA REPUTATION sustains it

Verton 6/8/14 Dan Verton is FedScoop's Editorial Director. A veteran technology
journalist with 20 years of experience covering the federal government
http://fedscoop.com/real-cybersecurity-workforce-challenge-hiring-best-best-hackers

Less than 1 percent of NSA's positions are vacant at any given time, according to the
Rand study. And very few cybersecurity professionals quit their jobs at NSA. According
to the Rand researchers, NSA's success is partly the result of the amount of effort it
puts into employee development and training . "Our interview suggests that the NSA
makes rather than buys cybersecurity professionals ," the report states. And
while 80 percent of NSA's new hires are entry-level employees with bachelor's
degrees, the agency has one of the most intensive training programs in the world.
For some, that training lasts for up to three years. Where Scholarship For Service
graduates go to work. Where Scholarship For Service graduates go to work. "Only one
organization can be the most prestigious place to work, and for this line of
work...NSA is hard to beat," the report states. The agency, according to the Rand study,
consistently absorbs one-third of all Scholarship for Service Graduates because of its
reputation for hiring the best hackers. NSA also has 80 people dedicated to recruitment,
with another 300 who have recruitment as a secondary duty. Another 1,500 employees

are involved in some way in the entire recruitment and employment process,
according to Rand. "All told, that is a great deal of effortsuggesting, from our perspective,
that the difficulties of finding enough cybersecurity professionals can be largely met if
sufficient energy is devoted to the task," the report states.

NSA hires the best strong recruiting

Gold 5/1/15 staff, The Guardian http://www.theguardian.com/us-

news/2015/may/01/nsa-recruitment-college-campuses-student-privacy
Since the late 1990s, the NSA has been running recruiting programs out of

universities across the country, with minimal pushback from students or

administrations. This success is unparalleled, and its mostly due to the steady,
reliable stream of talent that flows from universities into the agency. Unlike the
Department of Defense, the NSA has hardly any vacancies about 1% of its positions
at any given time. Thats because the agency puts a premium on recruiting: it has 1,500
employees involved, at least part time, with the employment process. Most of these
recruiting efforts take place on university campuses, and 80% of the NSAs hires are for
entry-level positions.

Uniqueness Recruiting Tech Key

Shiny tech key to NSA recruiting

Hamilton 4/16/14 http://news.clearancejobs.com/2014/04/16/streamliningcybersecurity-hiring-process/ Jillian Hamilton has worked in a variety of Program
Management roles for multiple Federal Government contractors. She has helped manage
projects in training and IT. She received her Bachelors degree in Business with an emphasis
in Marketing from Penn State University and her MBA from the University of Phoenix.

Whats the best way to attract cyber talent? Money and mission. When you lack in
one, make sure youre adequately selling the other .
Its time to get real with the cybersecurity recruits in the defense industry .
Acknowledge the pay gap. Work to close the gap, but dont pretend that it doesnt exist.
Help potential candidates understand their value to the mission of the organization and let
them know they are appreciated. Speaking of the mission tell them about it as much

as is appropriately possible. Supporting national security is a big deal. The key

recruiting strategy for the NSA is letting recruits know theyll be working on the
cutting edge of technology with opportunities that are literally
impossible in the commercial sector .
Recruiters can also go a long way in keeping top talent interested by streamlining
the hiring process. Consider how your hiring practices could be scaring off the best talent.
How crucial are your questionnaires? What is your application process? Make things as easy
as possible for your most in-demand fields. When it comes to in-demand positions, like
cybersecurity, it is time to scrutinize all the elements of the procedure. One way to compete
is to be smarter and more efficient in the hiring process.

Technical cutting edge key to keep up NSA recruiting

ITWorld 8/2/11 http://www.itworld.com/article/2740232/security/r-u-h4x0r--n33d---jo8-nsa-wants-you--locked-up-in-a-cubicle--not-a-cell-.html
It's not likely the feds will go unspotted or unhacked, but they will probably not be snubbed
either. Hackers need jobs just like the rest of us, and the intelligence agencies do
offer the chance to spend all your time right up on the cutting edge technically ,
though often far over its far side ethically. That's the price you pay in cyberwar. The

NSA needs people who can harden a firewall, keep up software patches and updates
up to date, do penetration testing to make sure NSA knows where its knownunknowns are and suspects where it unknown-unknowns may be (follow the sound of
Mandarin and smell of borscht; you'll find them). The agencies want to hire "cyber
warriors... not rocket scientists," according to Richard George, technical director for the
NSA's cyber-defense branch. NSA expects to hire 1,500 people during the next fiscal
year and to work in an atmosphere that has already adapted to be more friendly
toward attitudes toward conventional dress and behavior that would leave them
ostracized in many federal agencies especially intelligence or law-enforcement
agencies whose unassailable expectation of conservative dress and deportment means the
straits are laced, the collars are buttoned down and the tips are buck.

Uniqueness Retention
NSA retaining top talent at high rates
Otto 4/2/15 Greg Otto (@gregotto). Tech reporter @fedscoop. Covering the intersection
of technology and government. http://fedscoop.com/nsa-mike-rogers-workforce-challenges

Retaining the NSA's workforce have been a challenge that Rogers said he has thought
a lot about since becoming NSA director and head of U.S. Cyber Command one year ago.
While the NSA competes for top talent, he has spent time studying the differences between
the public and private sector workforce. In talking with people in Silicon Valley, Rogers
learned that people generally bounce from company to company , staying for two to
five years. Rogers said his model is completely different: NSA has a 96.7 percent
workforce retention rate for the past year. "That is a great testament to the culture
and the mission," Rogers said. "We are motivated to no end, we have great respect for
each other and we are dedicated to the idea of how we defend the nation in a lawful,
accountable framework."

Uniqueness Obama Defended NSA

Obama sticking with the NSA
Nakashima 12/13/13 https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/whitehouse-to-preserve-controversial-policy-on-nsa-cyber-commandleadership/2013/12/13/4bb56a48-6403-11e3-a373-0f9f2d1c2b61_story.html Washington
Post

The Obama administration has decided to preserve a controversial arrangement

under which a single military official is permitted to direct both the National Security
Agency and the militarys cyberwarfare command despite an external review panels
recommendation against doing so, according to U.S. officials. The decision by President
Obama comes amid signs that the White House is not inclined to place significant new
restraints on the NSAs activities and favors maintaining an agency program that collects
data on virtually all phone calls of Americans, although it is likely to impose additional
privacy-protection measures. Some officials, including top U.S. intelligence officials, had

argued that the NSA and Cyber Command should be placed under separate
leadership to ensure greater accountability and avoid an undue concentration of power.
Following a thorough interagency review, the administration has decided that keeping
the positions of NSA Director and Cyber Command commander together as one, dualhatted position is the most effective approach to accomplishing both agencies missions,
White House spokeswoman Caitlin Hayden said in an e-mail to The Washington Post. The
announcement comes as an external panel appointed by Obama to review U.S. surveillance
policies submitted its report on Friday. According to some U.S. officials, the panel was
expected to recommend that the NSA-Cyber Command leadership be split and that the
agencys phone program be modified by having the phone companies or a third party hold
the records, not the NSA. The five-member panel made more than 40 recommendations,
which the White House is free to reject or modify as it conducts its own review of NSA
surveillance. That review is expected to be completed in January. The big picture is
theres not going to be that much [additional] constraint by the White House, said a
U.S. official, speaking on the condition of anonymity to discuss internal deliberations.
Theyre really not hurting [the NSA] that much.

Obama successfully defended the NSA

Wittes 1/21/14 http://www.newrepublic.com/article/116284/obamas-nsa-speech-wasntapology-it-was-clever-defense This story was cross-posted at Lawfare. Benjamin Wittes is
editor in chief of Lawfare and a Senior Fellow in Governance Studies at the Brookings
Institution.
President Obamas speech on Friday and its accompanying Presidential Policy Directive
(PDD-28) cover a lot of ground, announce a bunch of reforms, announce plans and
direction for more, and kick still others over to Congress. The speech contained a

surprisingly fierce defense of NSA, one that some of the agencys critics appear not
to have noticed. Reactions to the speech have been curiously favorable from
diverse quarters. I described the speech as a big win for the intelligence
community , as did colleagues at this Brookings event and in this Lawfare Podcast. The
New York Times opened its editorial on the speech by declaring: In the days after Edward
Snowden revealed that the United States government was collecting vast amounts of
Americans dataphone records and other personal informationin the name of national
security, President Obama defended the data sweep and said the American people
should feel comfortable with its collection . On Friday, after seven months of increasingly
uncomfortable revelations and growing public outcry, Mr. Obama gave a speech that was
in large part an admission that he had been wrong.

Uniqueness AT metadata restrictions

Current restrictions too small to impact morale
Baker and Sanger 5/1/15 http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/02/us/politics/giving-in-alittle-on-national-security-agency-data-collection.html?_r=0 New York Times
For years after the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, even as the National Security Agency

fiercely defended its secret efforts to sweep up domestic telephone data, there were
doubters inside the agency who considered the program wildly expensive with few
successes to show for it. So as Congress moves to take the government out of the
business of indiscriminate bulk collection of domestic calling data, the agency is
hardly resisting. Former intelligence officials, in fact, said Friday that the idea to store the
data with telecommunications companies rather than the government was suggested to
President Obama in 2013 by Gen. Keith B. Alexander, then the N.S.A. director, who saw the

change as a way for the president to respond to criticism without losing programs
the N.S.A. deemed more vital. The limits on bulk collection are the centerpiece of
legislation now advancing in the House that would be the first significant response
to the spying revelations by Edward J. Snowden, a former N.S.A. contractor. In addition to
new restrictions on domestic data sweeps, the plan would require more
transparency and introduce ostensibly independent voices into secret intelligence
court proceedings. But as one recently departed senior intelligence official put it on Friday,
This is hardly major change. The legislation would still leave an expansive
surveillance apparatus capable of tracking vast quantities of data. Some of the most
sweeping programs disclosed by Mr. Snowden, particularly those focused on international
communications, would remain unaffected. The N.S.A. could continue efforts to break
private encryption systems, and information about Americans could still be swept up if
originating overseas.

Uniqueness AT Obama Visit NU

NSA doesnt care abut Obama visits
Friedersdorf 12/10/13 (Conor Friedersdorf is a staff writer at The Atlantic, where he
focuses on politics and national affairs. He lives in Venice, California, and is the founding
editor of The Best of Journalism, a newsletter devoted to exceptional nonfiction. Do You
Trust The Washington Post's Sources on Morale at the NSA?,
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/12/do-you-trust-em-the-washington-postem-s-sources-on-morale-at-the-nsa/282184/)
Skipping all the way to the end of the Post story, there is a bit of supporting evidence for
that thesis: Morale is bad overall, a third former official said. The newsthe Snowden
disclosuresit questions the integrity of the NSA workforce , he said. Its become
very public and very personal. Literally, neighbors are asking people, Why are you spying
on Grandma? And we arent. People are feeling bad, beaten down. Set beside one

another, "discomfort with what the NSA is doing" and "hearing their employer
criticized" both seem like a lot better explanations for low morale than an inchoate,
unfulfilled yearning for that cruelly withheld visit from the president. His charm and
charisma may make him adept at obscuring what the NSA is doing when he speaks to a
general audience. NSA employees aren't so easily fooled. In fact, they are perfectly
positioned to see the full extent of any mendacity.

Uniqueness AT Moonlighting

Moonlighting improves the NSA through corporate partnerships

Rogers 10/28/14 NSA Chief
https://www.nsa.gov/public_info/speeches_testimonies/28oct14_dirnsa.shtml
Q: Yes. There have been some reports recently about employees of the NSA working

part time in the private sector, some former employees going on to the private
sector. How is that affecting morale within the NSA and is there any concern about, you
know, that particular relationship with the private sector and classified information sort of
jumping from within the borders of the NSA? MR. ROGERS: First, we have a formal set of

processes that must be applied when individuals are going to do something in

addition to their NSA duties. We review that consistently over time and when
circumstances change. What was acceptable at one point, well say, hey, that -- thats not
acceptable anymore, the circumstances have changed the nature of the relationship
between the outside entity and us is different. So we do that on a recurring basis. For some,
its as simple, for example, as someone with a language background says, hey, look, I want
to use my language outside NSA in a contractor basis because I think itll increase my skills.
And so sometimes well say, yes, that makes sense. Sometimes we wont. In terms of, you
know, the flow of partnerships and information back and forth, I have been very public about
saying, for the National Security Agency, I would like us to create a model where

members of our workforce dont necessarily spend 30 or 35 years working directly

for us, which right now is has been a historic norm. It is amazing the employees that I will
talk to, when I say tell me how long youve been with NSA, 30, 35 years, 38 years. I just said
goodbye to an employee after 50 years. What Ive talked about is, particularly given the

state of technology, we have got to create a world where people from NSA can
leave us for a while and go work in the private sector. And I would also like to create
a world where the private sector can come spend a little time with us , because one of
the challenges, I think, as a nation that were dealing with and youve seen this play out
over the last, you know, year or so in particular we talk past each other a lot because we
dont understand each other. The NSA culture and experience is necessarily optimized
to understand, you know, concerns that many of which are very valid from our IT
corporate partners. Likewise, are many of the individuals well work with in the

corporate world dont really have an understanding of us. And Id like to see what
we can do to try to change that because I think itll produce better outcomes for
both of us and itll serve us better as a nation.

Link Restrictions kill morale

Calls for restraint tank NSA morale
Reed 12/9/13 http://bgr.com/2013/12/09/nsa-employees-snowden-leaks/ Prior to joining
BGR as News Editor, Brad Reed spent five years covering the wireless industry for Network
World.
Employees at the National Security Agency arent happy that we now know to look out for
their trash-talking elves that theyve created in World of Warcraft. The Washington Post
reports that officials at the NSA are feeling depressed and demoralized by the

constant stream of revelations being leaked by former contractor Edward Snowden

and are also feeling hung out to dry by a White House that has spent most of its
time trying to contain political damage caused by the Snowden leaks. Essentially, the
Posts sources say that the NSA thinks that its providing some of the most valuable
intelligence in the United States battle against terrorism and that it deserves
recognition for its efforts instead of calls for more restraint .

Attacks on the NSA crash agency morale

DIlanian 8/24/13 http://articles.latimes.com/2013/aug/24/nation/la-na-nsa-spying20130824 LA Times Staff Writer

The National Security Agency is facing its worst crisis since the domestic spying
scandals four decades ago led to the first formal oversight and overhaul of U.S.
intelligence operations. Since former NSA systems analyst Edward Snowden's flood of
leaks to the media, and the Obama administration's uneven response to them, morale at
the spy agency responsible for intercepting communications of terrorists and foreign
adversaries has plummeted, former officials say. Even sympathetic lawmakers are calling
for new curbs on the NSA's powers. "This is a secret intelligence agency that's now in the
news every day," said Michael Hayden, who headed the NSA from 1999 to 2005 and later
led the CIA. "Each day, the workforce wakes up and reads the daily indictment."
President Obama acknowledged Friday that many Americans had lost trust in the nation's
largest intelligence agency. "There's no doubt that, for all the work that's been done to

protect the American people's privacy, the capabilities of the NSA are scary to
people," he said in a CNN interview. He added, "Between all the safeguards and checks
that we put in place within the executive branch, and the federal court oversight
that takes place on the program, and congressional oversight, people are still
concerned as to whether their emails are being read or their phone calls are being
listened to." Intelligence officials say those concerns are unwarranted. They say the latest
revelations involve largely technical glitches that the NSA, the director of national
intelligence and the Justice Department discovered and reported on their own to Congress
and the secret court that oversees NSA surveillance. And none, they say, involve illegal
operations. As a result, they argue, the problems are fundamentally different than the

deliberate spying on Americans that congressional committees uncovered in the

wake of the Watergate scandal.

Congressional backlash tanks agency worker morale

Medici 5/6/14 staff writer, Andy
http://archive.federaltimes.com/article/20140506/MGMT02/305060013/Agencies-continuestruggle-low-morale

Sen. Jon Tester, D-Mont., said at a May 6 hearing of the Senate subcommittee on the
Efficiency and Effectiveness of Federal Programs and the Federal Workforce that many

politicians are using federal workers as a punching bag during budget negotiations .
Federal workers didnt cause our budget problems and they should not be a
scapegoat to score political points, Tester said. J. David Cox, president of the American
Federation of Government Employees, said federal employees have been the target of
attacks for more than four years that have required them to contribute more to their
pensions and endure furloughs. They are sick and tired of simultaneously being
Congress and the administrations punching bag and ATM , he said. The morale of

Defense Department employees was improving until the workforce was hit by
furloughs last year, according to Paige Hinkle-Bowles, deputy assistant secretary of
defense for civilian personnel policy at DoD.

Link Restrictions kill recruiting

Curtailing programs depresses NSA recruitment
Farr 2014 (Christina, Staff writer of venturebeat, Technology and health correspondent Thomson Reuters
2014 2015, NSA, struggling to recruit top talent, turns to Silicon Valley,

Neuberger, special
said this week she feared the agency would no longer be
able to recruit top technologists, since former contractor Edward Snowden blew the lid off
the extent of its spying activities. At a seminar organized by the non-profit LongNow Foundation in San
Francisco, she extended a plea to an audience replete with tech workers to consider a
career in government, or at least apply for a fellowship. Silicon Valley has a reputation for
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/08/07/tech-nsa-idUSL2N0QD1YC20140807)Anne
assistant to NSA Director Michael Rogers,

disdain of government regulation, and many of its largest players from Google to Twitter have been outspoken in

Senior NSA officials have

downplayed the repercussions of the revelations previously . But Neuberger said that, in
the long run, the agency might struggle to keep pace with technology . Describing her
role as an intermediary between the public and technology sectors, Neuberger promised to "rebuild
trust" in the wake of what she called "media leaks. " The NSA spent months "soul-searching" and
their criticism of the spy agency in the wake of Snowden's revelations.

now plans to engage with the media. It is already in talks to extend privacy protections abroad and has started
taking meetings, she added.

The NSA is eager to make versions of previously classified

documents available to the public. With distrust, our own workforce becomes
demoralized. Our programs are curtailed, she said. "We need to find a balance of
experience and new ideas.

Link Oversight kills morale

Oversight kills agency morale
Brennan 1/15/15 https://www.brennancenter.org/blog/how-fix-congressional-oversight
Victoria Bassetti Brennan Center Contributor Victoria Bassetti is a Brennan Center
contributor. She is the author of Electoral Dysfunction: A Survival Manual for American
Voters, published by The New Press in 2012.
Welcome to 21st century congressional oversight, an unpredictable blend of partisan
hackery, prosaic toil, and rare but extraordinary work (the Senate Intelligence Committees
torture report). As a new Congress dawns, its time to gear up for two years of
investigatory-pallooza, as one former agency head appointed by President Obama called
it. Its inevitable, as we near a presidential election with a partisan split between the
legislative and executive branches. Its also highly doubtful that much of this
forthcoming congressional oversight will be productive . Congress far too often
engages in oversight that is lackadaisical and caught up in the gotcha cycle , the
former agency head added. "Some hearings are worthwhile and uncover useful information,
but others amount to an all-day exercise in congressional preening," said Ron Weich, a
former DOJ official and now dean of the University of Baltimore School of Law. Worse, a fair
amount of it is "mere harassment," he noted. So much so that another agency chief once
turned to one of his aides during an oversight hearing and asked, Why would anyone take
this job again? One former high-ranking Department of Justice official said that during his
time at the agency 20 percent of the oversight was effective; 40 percent was a wash; and 40
percent was political nonsense. The failure of Congress to conduct comprehensive and
effective oversight is shameful. With federal government spending at more than 23
percent of the gross domestic product and employing more than 2.5 million people, who
doesnt think that someone needs to mind the store? Independent review is always
valuable, said Weich, who guided DOJ through the Fast and Furious hearings. Worse, the
type of oversight Congress conducts today is often counterproductive. It wastes valuable
time, leads to minimal improvements, and inhibits good government. A former
Department of Energy official told me that the agencys staff was amazed at the intensity
of all the investigations in the first four years of the Obama Administration. They felt
beleaguered, even as they continued to do their jobs . But it hurt morale and

made people excessively sensitive about internal communications .

Link Backdoors
Backdoor programs key for the NSA
Levy 1/13/14 http://www.wired.com/2014/01/nsa-surveillance/ In 2006, my Wired profile
of publisher and Internet guru Tim OReilly was included in Best of Technology Writing
2006, an anthology of tech writing. I accepted the assignment to edit the next collection
and in Fall 2007, the digitalculture imprint of the University of Michigan published The Best
of Technology Writing 2007. I grew up in Philadelphia, where my heart was broken by the
Phillies (now Im kind of stunned at their recent success, which borders on dynastic and is
surely a sign of the apocalypse), and went to Central High School and Temple University
there. Then I got an M.A. in literature at Penn State. (I was chosen to receive the first
Distinguished Alumni Award from the English Department there, something no one in Happy
Valley would have predicted during my time there.) Now I live in New York City and western
Massachusetts with my wife, Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist and author Teresa Carpenter
whose recent book is New York Diaries 1609-2009 and our college-age son.

The dual mission of the NSA generates cognitive dissonance . Right on its home page,
the NSA says its core missions are to protect U.S. national security systems and to produce
foreign signals intelligence information. The officials repeatedly claimed they pursue both
responsibilities with equal vigor. Theres a built-in conflict here: If U.S. industries distribute

strong encryption throughout the world, it should make the NSAs signals-gathering
job much harder. Yet the NSA says it welcomes encryption. (The officials even implied
that the tension between the two missions winds up making both efforts more robust.)
Nonetheless, the Snowden leaks indicate that the NSA has engaged in numerous efforts
that tamper with the security of American products . The officials resisted this
characterization. Why, they asked, would they compromise security of products they use
themselves, like Windows, Cisco routers, or the encryption standards they allegedly
compromised? They believe their intelligence gathering is palatable because its
controlled by laws, regulations, and internal oversight . Looking at the world through
their eyes, there is no privacy threat in collecting massive amounts of information if
access to that information is rigidly controlled and minimalized. This includes efforts to
excise data (about Americans, mainly) that should have not been collected in the first

place. The NSA feels that if people knew about these controls, theyd be OK with the
collection. This argument reminded me of something I learned from my approved NSA
source in the 1990s. The official who concocted the Clipper Chip scheme had a vision where
private citizens could use encryption. But the NSA, though its built-in backdoor chip,

would be able to access the information when it needed to. The official called his
vision Nirvana. The NSA is still envisioning Nirvana, this time a system with huge
haystacks accessed only when national security is at stake. But many people believe the
very creation of those government-owned haystacks is a privacy violation, and possibly
unconstitutional.

Backdoors key to signit capabilities

Mcarthy 15 (Tom, is national affairs correspondent for Guardian US, 2/23/15, NSA
director defends plan to maintain 'backdoors' into technology companies,
http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/feb/23/nsa-director-defends-backdoors-intotechnology-companies)

The National Security Agency director, Mike Rogers , on Monday sought to calm a chorus of
doubts about the governments plans to maintain built-in access to data held by US technology companies ,

saying such backdoors would not be harmful to privacy, would not fatally
compromise encryption and would not ruin international markets for US technology
products. Rogers mounted an elaborate defense of Barack Obamas evolving
cybersecurity strategy in an appearance before an audience of cryptographers, tech
company security officers and national security reporters at the New America
Foundation in Washington. In an hour-long question-and-answer session, Rogers said
a cyber-attack against Sony pictures by North Korea last year showed the urgency
and difficulty of defending against potential cyber threats. FBI doubles down on North Korea
accusation for Sony Pictures hack Read more If you look at the topology of that attack from North Korea against
Sony Pictures Entertainment, it literally bounced all over the world before it got to California, Rogers said.

For most of the

appearance, however, Rogers was on the defensive, at pains to explain how legal or
technological protections could be put in place to ensure that government access to
the data of US technology companies would not result in abuse by intelligence
agencies. The White House is trying to broker a deal with companies such as Apple,
Yahoo and Google, to ensure holes in encryption for the government to access
mobile data, cloud computing and other data. Backdoor is not the context I would
use, because when I hear the phrase backdoor I think: Well this is kind of shady,
why wouldnt you want to go in the front door, be very public? Rogers said. We
can create a legal framework for how we do this. Advertisement Rogers, who is also commander
of US Cyber Command, said the government was playing catch-up not only in establishing
defenses against cyber attacks but in laying out its own rules of cyber warfare,
including when retaliation was appropriate. Were not mature and were clearly not
where we need to be, Rogers said. Take the nuclear example. If you go back in the
first 10, 20 years, we were still debating about, Well, what are the fundamental
concepts of deterrence? This whole idea of mutually assured destruction that
didnt develop in five years, for example. All of that has taken time. Cyber is no
different. Rogers admitted that concerns about US government infiltration of US
companies data represented a business risk for US companies, but he suggested
that the greater threat was from cyber-attacks . I think its a very valid concern to say Look, are
we losing US market segment here? Rogers said. Whats the economic impact of this? I just
think, between a combination of technology, legality and policy, we can get to a
better place than we are now. US technology companies have bridled at
government pressure to introduce weaknesses in encryption systems in order to
ensure government access to data streams, and technical experts have warned that
there is no way to create a backdoor in an encryption system without summarily
compromising it. An appearance by Obama at a cybersecurity conference at Stanford University last week to
Infrastructure located on multiple continents, in multiple different geographic regions.

tout cooperation between the government and US tech companies was upstaged by an impassioned speech by
Apple;s chief executive, Tim Cook, who warned of the dire consequences of sacrificing the right to online privacy.
Advertisement The basic discomfort of the new partnership the government would like to see with technology
companies once again burst into full view on Monday when Alex Stamos, the chief information security officer at
Yahoo, challenged Rogers on his recommendation for built-in defects-slash-backdoors, or golden master keys to

Stamos asked Rogers how companies such as Yahoo, with 1.3

billion users worldwide, would be expected to reply to parallel requests for
backdoors from foreign governments, and told Rogers such backdoors would be like
drilling a hole through a windshield. Ive got a lot of world-class cryptographers
at the National Security Agency, replied Rogers, skipping over the question of
foreign government requests. I think that this is technically feasible. Now it needs
to done within a framework.
serve government purposes.

Link Biometrics
NSA biometrics key to broader intel capabilities
Homeland Security News Wire 14(Security and Government news source, NSA,
other agencies, collect millions of images for large facial recognition databases, security
section, June 15th of 2014 edition, http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20140605nsa-other-agencies-collect-millions-of-images-for-large-facial-recognition-databases)
The NSA, through its global surveillance operations, has been accumulating millions of

images from communication interceptions for use in high-level facial recognition

programs, according to classified 2011 documents leaked by Edward Snowden. The
documents do not reveal how many people have been targeted with facial recognition
programs, but given theNSAs foreign intelligence mission, a bulk of the imagery

collected would involve foreign nationals.

The NSA, through its global surveillance operations, has been accumulating millions of
images from communication interceptions for use in high-level facial recognition programs,
according to classified 2011 documents leaked by Edward Snowden.

The agencys reliance on facial recognition technology has evolved significantly

over the last four years. The technology continues to advance to exploit the
numerous images included in e-mails, text messages, social media, video
conferences, and other forms of digital communications. Already, facial
recognition has revolutionized the way intelligence targets are found and
tracked, complementing voice and written communications.
The Boston Globe reports that the NSA intercepts millions of images per day,
including roughly 55,000 facial recognition quality images , which translates into
tremendous untapped potential. Its not just the traditional
communications were after: Its taking a full-arsenal approach that
digitally exploits the clues a target leaves behind in their regular
activities on the net to compile biographic and biometric information that
can help implement precision targeting, noted a 2010 document.

Biometrics key to NSA flexibility

Risen and Poitras 14( James, a journalist who works at the New York Times, Laura, is an Academy
Award-winning documentary film director and producer, N.S.A. Collecting Millions of Faces From Web Images,
5/31/14, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/01/us/nsa-collecting-millions-of-faces-from-webimages.html?_r=2) NG

The National Security Agency is harvesting huge numbers of images of people from
communications that it intercepts through its global surveillance operations for use in
sophisticated facial recognition programs, according to top-secret documents. The spy

agencys reliance on facial recognition technology has grown significantly over the
last four years as the agency has turned to new software to exploit the flood of images
included in emails, text messages, social media, videoconferences and other
communications, the N.S.A. documents reveal. Agency officials believe that technological
advances could revolutionize the way that the N.S.A. finds intelligence targets around the
world, the documents show. The agencys ambitions for this highly sensitive ability and

the scale of its effort have not previously been disclosed. The agency intercepts
millions of images per day including about 55,000 facial recognition quality
images which translate into tremendous untapped potential , according to 2011

documents obtained from the former agency contractor Edward J. Snowden. While once
focused on written and oral communications, the N.S.A. now considers facial images,

fingerprints and other identifiers just as important to its mission of tracking

suspected terrorists and other intelligence targets, the documents show. Its not just
the traditional communications were after: Its taking a full-arsenal approach that digitally
exploits the clues a target leaves behind in their regular activities on the net to compile

biographic and biometric information that can help implement precision

targeting, noted a 2010 document. One N.S.A. PowerPoint presentation from 2011, for
example, displays several photographs of an unidentified man sometimes bearded,
other times clean-shaven in different settings, along with more than two dozen data
points about him. These include whether he was on the Transportation Security
Administration no-fly list, his passport and visa status, known associates or suspected
terrorist ties, and comments made about him by informants to American intelligence
agencies. It is not clear how many people around the world, and how many Americans,
might have been caught up in the effort. Neither federal privacy laws nor the nations
surveillance laws provide specific protections for facial images. Given the N.S.A.s foreign
intelligence mission, much of the imagery would involve people overseas whose data was
scooped up through cable taps, Internet hubs and satellite transmissions. Because the

agency considers images a form of communications content, the N.S.A. would be

required to get court approval for imagery of Americans collected through its
surveillance programs, just as it must to read their emails or eavesdrop on their phone
conversations, according to an N.S.A. spokeswoman. Cross-border communications in
which an American might be emailing or texting an image to someone targeted by
the agency overseas could be excepted. Civil-liberties advocates and other critics are
concerned that the power of the improving technology, used by government and industry,
could erode privacy. Facial recognition can be very invasive, said Alessandro Acquisti, a
researcher on facial recognition technology at Carnegie Mellon University . There are still

technical limitations on it, but the computational power keeps growing, and the
databases keep growing, and the algorithms keep improving. State and local law
enforcement agencies are relying on a wide range of databases of facial imagery,
including drivers licenses and Facebook, to identify suspects. The F.B.I. is
developing what it calls its next generation identification project to combine its
automated fingerprint identification system with facial imagery and other biometric
data. The State Department has what several outside experts say could be the
largest facial imagery database in the federal government, storing hundreds of
millions of photographs of American passport holders and foreign visa applicants.
And the Department of Homeland Security is funding pilot projects at police
departments around the country to match suspects against faces in a crowd. The
N.S.A., though, is unique in its ability to match images with huge troves of private
communications. We would not be doing our job if we didnt seek ways to continuously
improve the precision of signals intelligence activities aiming to counteract the efforts of
valid foreign intelligence targets to disguise themselves or conceal plans to harm the United
States and its allies, said Vanee M. Vines, the agency spokeswoman. She added that the
N.S.A. did not have access to photographs in state databases of drivers licenses or to
passport photos of Americans, while declining to say whether the agency had access to the
State Department database of photos of foreign visa applicants. She also declined to say
whether the N.S.A. collected facial imagery of Americans from Facebook and other social
media through means other than communications intercepts. The government and the

private sector are both investing billions of dollars into face recognition research
and development, said Jennifer Lynch, a lawyer and expert on facial recognition and
privacy at the Electronic Frontier Foundation in San Francisco. The government leads the

way in developing huge face recognition databases , while the private sector leads in
accurately identifying people under challenging conditions. Ms. Lynch said a handful of
recent court decisions could lead to new constitutional protections for the privacy of
sensitive face recognition data. But she added that the law was still unclear and that
Washington was operating largely in a legal vacuum. Laura Donohue, the director of the
Center on National Security and the Law at Georgetown Law School, agreed. There are very
few limits on this, she said. Congress has largely ignored the issue. Unfortunately, our
privacy laws provide no express protections for facial recognition data, said Senator Al
Franken, Democrat of Minnesota, in a letter in December to the head of the National
Telecommunications and Information Administration, which is now studying possible
standards for commercial, but not governmental, use. Facial recognition technology can still
be a clumsy tool. It has difficulty matching low-resolution images, and photographs of
peoples faces taken from the side or angles can be impossible to match against mug shots
or other head-on photographs. Dalila B. Megherbi, an expert on facial recognition technology
at the University of Massachusetts at Lowell, explained that when pictures come in different
angles, different resolutions, that all affects the facial recognition algorithms in the
software. That can lead to errors, the documents show. A 2011 PowerPoint showed one
example when Tundra Freeze, the N.S.A.s main in-house facial recognition program, was
asked to identify photos matching the image of a bearded young man with dark hair. The
document says the program returned 42 results, and displays several that were obviously
false hits, including one of a middle-age man. Similarly, another 2011 N.S.A. document
reported that a facial recognition system was queried with a photograph of Osama bin
Laden. Among the search results were photos of four other bearded men with only slight
resemblances to Bin Laden. But the technology is powerful. One 2011 PowerPoint showed
how the software matched a bald young man, shown posing with another man in front of a
water park, with another photo where he has a full head of hair, wears different clothes and
is at a different location. It is not clear how many images the agency has acquired. The

N.S.A. does not collect facial imagery through its bulk metadata collection
programs, including that involving Americans domestic phone records, authorized under
Section 215 of the Patriot Act, according to Ms. Vines. The N.S.A. has accelerated its
use of facial recognition technology under the Obama administration , the documents
show, intensifying its efforts after two intended attacks on Americans that jarred the White
House. The first was the case of the so-called underwear bomber, in which Umar Farouk
Abdulmutallab, a Nigerian, tried to trigger a bomb hidden in his underwear while flying to
Detroit on Christmas in 2009. Just a few months later, in May 2010, Faisal Shahzad, a
Pakistani-American, attempted a car bombing in Times Square. The agencys use of facial
recognition technology goes far beyond one program previously reported by The Guardian,
which disclosed that the N.S.A. and its British counterpart, General Communications
Headquarters, have jointly intercepted webcam images, including sexually explicit material,
from Yahoo users. The N.S.A. achieved a technical breakthrough in 2010 when analysts first
matched images collected separately in two databases one in a huge N.S.A. database
code-named Pinwale, and another in the governments main terrorist watch list database,
known as Tide according to N.S.A. documents. That ability to cross-reference images has
led to an explosion of analytical uses inside the agency. The agency has created teams of
identity intelligence analysts who work to combine the facial images with other records
about individuals to develop comprehensive portraits of intelligence targets. The agency has
developed sophisticated ways to integrate facial recognition programs with a wide range of
other databases. It intercepts video teleconferences to obtain facial imagery, gathers airline
passenger data and collects photographs from national identity card databases created by
foreign countries, the documents show. They also note that the N.S.A. was attempting to
gain access to such databases in Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Iran. The documents suggest
that the agency has considered getting access to iris scans through its phone and
email surveillance programs. But asked whether the agency is now doing so, officials
declined to comment. The documents also indicate that the N.S.A. collects iris scans of

foreigners through other means. In addition, the agency was working with the C.I.A. and the
State Department on a program called Pisces, collecting biometric data on border crossings
from a wide range of countries. One of the N.S.A.s broadest efforts to obtain facial images is
a program called Wellspring, which strips out images from emails and other
communications, and displays those that might contain passport images. In addition to inhouse programs, the N.S.A. relies in part on commercially available facial recognition
technology, including from PittPatt, a small company owned by Google, the documents
show. The N.S.A. can now compare spy satellite photographs with intercepted

personal photographs taken outdoors to determine the location. One document

shows what appear to be vacation photographs of several men standing near a
small waterfront dock in 2011. It matches their surroundings to a spy satellite image
of the same dock taken about the same time, located at what the document
describes as a militant training facility in Pakistan.

Link Pres Restraint

Allowing restrictions on the NSA crushes trust between Pres and
NSA crushes intel capacity
Harris 10/11/13 http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/10/11/nsa-veterans-the-white-house-ishanging-us-out-to-dry/ Shane Harris is a senior staff writer at Foreign Policy, covering
intelligence and cyber security. He is the author of The Watchers: The Rise of America's
Surveillance State, which chronicles the creation of a vast national security apparatus and
the rise of surveillance in America. The Watchers won the New York Public Librarys Helen
Bernstein Book Award for Excellence in Journalism, and the Economist named it one of the
best books of 2010. Shane is the winner of the Gerald R. Ford Prize for Distinguished
Reporting on National Defense. He has four times been named a finalist for the Livingston
Awards for Young Journalists, which honor the best journalists in America under the age of
35. Prior to joining Foreign Policy, he was the senior writer for The Washingtonian and a staff
correspondent at National Journal.
Gen. Keith Alexander and his senior leadership team at the National Security Agency

are angry and dispirited by what they see as the White Houses failure to defend the
spy agency against criticism of its surveillance programs, according to four people
familiar with the NSA chiefs thinking. The top brass of the countrys biggest spy agency
feels theyve been left twisting in the wind, abandoned by the White House and left
largely to defend themselves in public and in Congress against allegations of
unconstitutional spying on Americans. Former intelligence officials closely aligned
with the NSA criticized President Obama for saying little publicly to defend the
agency, and for not emphasizing that some leaked or officially disclosed documents
arguably show the NSA operating within its legal authorities. "There has been no support for
the agency from the President or his staff or senior administration officials, and this has not
gone unnoticed by both senior officials and the rank and file at the Fort," said Joel Brenner,
the NSAs one-time inspector general, referring to the agencys headquarters at Ft. Meade,
Maryland. The weak backing from top administration officials has aggravated the
relationship between Alexander and the White House, where he has never been warmly
embraced. The NSA now finds itself without the strong, visible support of the

President at a time of extraordinary political vulnerability, with the agencys secrets

laid bare and its future in doubt. The Obama administration has long relied on Americas
intelligence agencies to carry out its most important foreign policy objectives, from killing
Osama bin Laden to undermining Bashar al-Assad. The White Houses embrace of the dark
world of spycraft has been near-absolute. A rift between Americas intelligence and political
leaders could be more than fodder for Beltway cocktail parties. If left unchecked, it could

start to erode the trusted relationships that have been at the heart of how the U.S.
government handles global threats since 9/11.

Link Courts
Court action against the NSA uniquely crushes morale
Savage 14 (Charlie, New York Times, 1/23/14, Watchdog Report Says N.S.A. Program Is
Illegal and Should End, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/23/us/politics/watchdog-reportsays-nsa-program-is-illegal-and-should-end.html)
While a majority of the five-member board embraced that conclusion, two members
dissented from the view that the program was illegal. But the panel was united in 10 other
recommendations, including deleting raw phone records after three years instead of five and
tightening access to search results. The report also sheds light on the history of the

once-secret bulk collection program. It contains the first official acknowledgment

that the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court produced no judicial opinion
detailing its legal rationale for the program until last August, even though it had
been issuing orders to phone companies for the records and to the N.S.A. for how it
could handle them since May 2006. The privacy boards legal critique of the program was
approved by David Medine, the boards chairman and a former Federal Trade Commission
official in the Clinton administration; Patricia M. Wald, a retired federal appeals court judge
named to the bench by President Jimmy Carter; and James X. Dempsey, a civil liberties
advocate who specializes in technology issues. But the other two members Rachel L.
Brand and Elisebeth Collins Cook, both of whom were Justice Department lawyers in the
George W. Bush administration rejected the finding that the program was illegal.

They wrote in separate dissents that the board should have focused exclusively on
policy and left legal analysis to the courts. Last month, two Federal District Court judges
reached opposite legal conclusions in separate lawsuits challenging the program. Ms. Brand
wrote that while the legal question was difficult, the governments legal theory was at
least a reasonable reading, made in good faith by numerous officials in two administrations
of different parties. She also worried that declaring that counterterrorism officials

have been operating this program unlawfully for years could damage morale
and make agencies overly cautious in taking steps to protect the country .

Link Section 702

Vindication on 702 crucial to NSA morale boostthe plan flips that
DIlanain 7/2/14 http://news.yahoo.com/thumbs-nsa-internet-spying-foreigners210324160--finance.html Associated Press staff writer

Endorsement of the NSA's Internet surveillance programs by a bipartisan privacy

board deeply disappointed civil liberties activists Wednesday while providing a measure
of vindication for beleaguered U.S. intelligence officials. James Clapper, director of national
intelligence, welcomed the conclusion by the independent Privacy and Civil Liberties
Oversight Board that the National Security Agency's Internet spying on foreign
targets in the U.S. has been legal, effective and subject to rigorous oversight to
protect the rights of Americans. Activist groups panned the report as a dud. It was a
dizzying turnabout for a privacy board that in January drew criticism in the other direction for
branding the NSA's collection of domestic calling records unconstitutional. As they
unanimously adopted their 190-page report on Wednesday, the five board members all
appointed by President Barack Obama sought to explain their largely favorable
conclusions about surveillance programs that have provoked worldwide outrage since former
NSA systems administrator Edward Snowden revealed them last year. At issue is a spying
regime, first definitively disclosed in Snowden documents last year, under which the NSA is
using court orders to obtain foreign customers' emails, chats, videos and texts from Google,
Facebook and other U.S. tech companies under a program known as PRISM. The documents
also showed that the agency is intercepting foreign data as it transits fiber optic lines in the
U.S. Yahoo, Apple, Microsoft, Twitter and Facebook did not immediately respond to requests
for comment. Google and LinkedIn declined to comment. The reputations of American
technology companies have suffered abroad over the perception that they cannot protect
customer data from U.S. spy agencies. Last week, the German government said it would end
a contract with Verizon over concerns about network security. European and other foreign
intelligence agencies routinely demand cooperation from their national companies, U.S.
officials say, but those operations have not been leaked to the news media. The targets of
the surveillance the U.S. privacy board was looking at this time must be foreigners living
abroad, but the NSA also collects some American communications either by mistake, or
because the Americans were talking to or about foreign targets. The programs come
under Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act of 2008, which legalized programs
launched after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks. Last week, the Obama administration
disclosed for the first time that it targeted nearly 90,000 people or groups under the
programs last year. There are 2.4 billion Internet users worldwide. In January, the privacy
board criticized a different program authorized under Section 215 of the Patriot Act, through
which the NSA had been collecting billions of American telephone records and searching
through them in terrorism investigations. Obama has since called for ending NSA's collection
of those records. For the Section 702 probe, board members noted that they spent
hours in classified briefings with intelligence officials, learning the details of how the NSA
programs operate. And they came away convinced that the public debate about the
programs had been rife with misconceptions. For example, said board chairman David
Medine, a former government privacy lawyer, the Internet surveillance "is not a bulk
collection program" but instead targets specific foreigners living abroad for terrorism or
intelligence purposes. And, he said, contrary to media reports, it is not true that the NSA

will monitor a person if the evidence shows just a 51 percent probability that he or
she is a foreigner living abroad. The agency is barred from targeting an American without
a warrant. "We had the benefit of going into the CIA and the NSA and the FBI and the Justice
Department and meeting with the key people who run the program and seeing
demonstrations of how it works," Medine said. "We concluded that the program is legal,

valuable and subject to intense oversight, " said board member Elisebeth Collins Cook, a
former Republican staff member of the Senate Judiciary Committee. Some activists strongly
disagreed. "The board's recommendations would leave in place the government's ability to
spy on its citizens along with their friends, family members and business partners
overseas without any suspicion of wrongdoing," complained Elizabeth Goitein of the
Brennan Center for Justice in New York. The report appears to lengthen the already-

long odds against lawmakers who want to put restrictions of the Section 702
programs. The House recently passed legislation seeking to cut off funding for searching
702 data connected to Americans, but key senators oppose any changes to the program.

Link Privacy
More Privacy is bad for NSA to do its job, good now
Sales 13 (Nathan, law professor at George Mason University. He served in the George W. Bush administration
at the Justice Department and as deputy assistant secretary of homeland security for policy, NSA Privacy Breaches:
The Bad and the Good, http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/356024/nsa-privacy-breaches-badand-good-nathan-sales) NG

Last nights Washington Post story about NSA privacy breaches contains news thats
both bad and, perhaps unexpectedly, good. The bad news is that NSA analysts are sometimes gathering and accessing
information in violation of statutes and executive orders . The good news is that the government has
meaningful oversight mechanisms to find and fix these problems. For a number of
years, the NSA has been collecting large troves of data in an effort to track down
terrorists whose identities are unknown. Bulk data collection can be a powerful
national-security tool. A 2002 study found that such a program could have identified
the links among all 19 of the 9/11 hijackers. But bulk collection also raises very real concerns about privacy
and civil liberties. The key therefore is to establish and enforce strict limits on what the government can do with the data it
compiles. We want officials to be able to find the next Mohamed Atta but not, for example, to look
up long-lost high-school sweethearts. That brings us to the Post story. An internal NSA audit from last spring reportedly counted
2,776 incidents in the preceding 12 months of unauthorized collection, storage, access to or distribution of legally protected
communications. Most of the breaches were unintentional, and many were fairly minor.
Some analysts accessed information they shouldnt have because of typos, and others did so because they failed to follow the NSAs
standard operating procedures. Other violations were more problematic e.g., the unauthorized sharing of protected content.

Nearly as important as the fact that these breaches occurred is the fact that they
were caught and, one hopes, rectified. The government increasingly is using
computer systems with technological safeguards that monitor who accesses what
information when and for what purposes . Back in 2008, officials were able to immediately identify - and
punish a group of State Department contractors who snooped around in various presidential candidates passport files. These
tools arent just good for security. Theyre also good for privacy. They can help
ensure that government officials are faithfully using the new surveillance powers
theyve gained since 9/11. Internal oversight is a good start, but it isnt enough on its own. The NSA should be
reporting any breaches, and what its doing to fix them, to outside watchdogs especially Congress and the FISA court. Thats why
its troubling to read that the NSA might be sanitizing what its overseers see when composing reports for outside consumption.
According to the Post, agency personnel are instructed to remove details and substitute more generic language in reports to the

Human beings inevitably make

mistakes, and spies are not exempt from this law of nature. The critical question is
whether there are mechanisms to detect the mistakes and correct them. The NSA
audit gives some reason for optimism that such safeguards are in place at the
agency. But we could all breathe a bit easier if the NSA kept Congress and other overseers more fully in the loop.
Justice Department and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.

Link Backlash
NSA backlashes against Obama throwing them under the bus
Allen 10/29/13 Bob Allen is a veteran of more than 30 years in media, and has been
spreading trouble across State lines since 1986. Most of his career involves producing,
writing, and co-hosting syndicated talk and information radio programs, and he is currently
Director of Programming for a national television network. Read more at
http://politicaloutcast.com/author/boballen/#suSowj7k6dC217PY.99
http://politicaloutcast.com/2013/10/spying-obamas-specialty-throwing-bus/

President Obama specializes in throwing other people under the bus to avoid taking
blame, but at some point you simply attack too many of the wrong people . I
sincerely hope his assaults on the Media are creating a critical-mass that is finally
leading them to do their job, and to expose him and his Administration. Here is the L.A.
Times hitting him, and the N.Y. Times also has a piece on the same issue today.
"Professional staff members at the National Security Agency and other U.S.
intelligence agencies are angry, these officials say, believing the president has cast
them adrift as he tries to distance himself from the disclosures by former NSA
contractor Edward Snowden that have strained ties with close allies."

Link PRISM
PRISM is key to NSA flexibility
Worstall 13 (Tim, 6/7/13, British-born writer and Senior Fellow of the Adam Smith Institute, NSA's PRISM Sounds Like A Darn Good
Idea To Me: This Is What Governments Are For,

http://www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/2013/06/07/nsas-prism-sounds-like-a-darn-good-idea-to-me-thisis-what-governments-are-for/) NG
Theres been a joint investigation by the Washington Post and The Guardian into an NSA program called PRISM.

The allegation is that the National Security Agency (NSA) has backdoor access to
the systems and data of the major internet firms, Microsoft MSFT -1.27%, Google GOOG +0.64%,
Apple AAPL -1.64%, Facebook FB -2.13% and so on, and they routinely use this to monitor what
people are saying and doing. With one caveat this is in fact what governments are
supposed to do so Im at something of a loss in understanding why people seem to be getting so outraged about
it. The WaPo piece is here, a couple from The Guardian here and here. Its worth pointing out that the companies
themselves are vehemently denying that the NSA has such backdoor access to the data. However, senior
executives from the internet companies expressed surprise and shock and insisted that no direct access to servers

the
PRISM program, which it said granted access to records such as emails, chat
conversations, voice calls, documents and more. The presentation the listed dates when
had been offered to any government agency. The top-secret NSA briefing presentation set out details of

document collection began for each company, and said PRISM enabled direct access from the servers of these US
service providers: Microsoft, Yahoo YHOO -2.70%, Google, Facebook, Paltalk, AOL AOL +%, Skype, YouTube, Apple.
Senior officials with knowledge of the situation within the tech giants admitted to being confused by the NSA
revelations, and said if such data collection was taking place, it was without companies knowledge. An Apple
spokesman said: We have never heard of PRISM. We do not provide any government agency with direct access to
our servers and any agency requesting customer data must get a court order, he said. Whether the claim of direct

But the much larger point is that this sort of behaviour is

not something that we should be shouting about government doing. Its something
that we should be shouting about government not doing. The crucial point is here, from the
DNI: Section 702 is a provision of FISA that is designed to facilitate the acquisition of
foreign intelligence information concerning non-U.S. persons located outside the
United States. It cannot be used to intentionally target any U.S. citizen, any other
U.S. person, or anyone located within the United States. As I say thats the
important part of it all. The information, the data, may be in the US as a result of the
global spread of the internet and the physical location of servers. But the
information cannot be about either a US citizen or someone who is in the US. And, if
were prepared to be honest about matters, we do actually want the government to
be keeping an eye on foreigners in foreign lands. Which is what theyre doing. Take a
step back for a moment. The purpose of the State, the first job it is tasked with, is the
protection of that State from external enemies. This is the first principle of even
having a State in the first place: to make sure that the populace is protected from
the depredations of the foreigners who would do them harm. So the idea that the
spies would be attempting to look at the telecoms data of said foreigners shouldnt
really surprise us. Indeed, this is something we actually want said State to be doing:
this is rather the purpose of having both it and the spies it employs. The matter is
entirely different when such a State uses the same methods to look at its own
citizens: this is a gross abuse of power and a serious threat to any form of liberty or
freedom. Which is why there are legal protections against it in most free and liberal
states. And as we can see with PRISM those safeguards are in place. Data on US citizens
access is true or not is one thing.

or residents might be collected but only as a by-product of collecting it on those foreigners. Who do not have any of

It should also be noted that many governments are

trying the same thing. Im sure that the UKs spies at GCHQ are keeping an eye on
the Old Enemy across the Channel in France. China certainly seems to be running
those legal or constitutional protections.

around the internet looking to see what it can find. And Russian state backed (if
even by a blind eye if not actual encouragement) attempts to rootle through the
data are well known. In my native UK theres also an attempt (known as the
Snoopers Charter colloquially) to push through government having the powers to
do this sort of monitoring on UK citizens and residents. Something to which Im
vehemently opposed as should we all be. But while Im opposed to my government spying on me I
rather assume that foreign governments are going to spy on me*. Just as my own government spies upon

That the NSA is looking at as

much information and data it can get on what those nefarious foreigners are up to
outside the US doesnt seem objectionable to me in the slightest. Indeed, I rather
think that thats the purpose of government, to protect us, and its the reason we
hire the spies in the first place. Theyre doing exactly what they should be: looking
for those who would do us, the citizenry, harm and then attempting to prevent them
doing so. Sure, the foreigners arent going to be very happy about it all: but their own governments (or perhaps I
foreigners. Thats rather the point of having a government in the first place.

should say ours) are doing as much of it to US citizens as they can. The dividing line, the where it moves from
being entirely reasonable and sensible to being an outrage that must be prevented, is when governments do this
sort of thing to their own citizens.

Internal Link Morale k2 recruiting

Morale crash kills federal employye recruitment and retention
Fierce Government 5/6/14 http://www.fiercegovernment.com/story/low-employeemorale-hindering-recruitment-and-retention/2014-05-06 FierceGovernment tracks the latest
developments in the U.S. government. Federal managers rely on our free, four-times-perweek email newsletter for news on: Collaboration Transparency & Open Government
COOP/Telework Social Media and Gov 2.0 Federal Budget Agency News

The declining morale of federal employees is making it difficult to retain

experienced talent and recruit young candidates into public services , top
agency officials told a Senate panel May 6. Varying factors such as furloughs, a threeyear pay freeze, hiring freezes and ongoing budget uncertainties have and will
continue to factor heavily into employees' decisions about when to depart , said Paige
Hinkle-Bowles, deputy assistant secretary of defense for civilian personnel policy. About 13
percent of the Defense Department's civilian employees are currently eligible to retire and
that number is expected to rise to 30 within the next five years, she said at a Senate
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs subcommittee hearing.

Morale crashes kill recruiting

Medici 5/6/14
http://archive.federaltimes.com/article/20140506/MGMT02/305060013/Agencies-continuestruggle-low-morale staff, federal times

The morale of Defense Department employees was improving until the workforce
was hit by furloughs last year, according to Paige Hinkle-Bowles, deputy assistant
secretary of defense for civilian personnel policy at DoD. She said the past few years have
been a challenging time and that employee satisfaction on pay and opportunities for
advancement have declined but that the agency is working to improve morale
through greater engagement and by reshaping its workforce to meet future needs .
Katherine Archuleta, the director of the Office of Personnel Management, said at the hearing
that the decline in morale has a negative impact on agency recruiting

efforts . Despite that, she said, there is still a strong interest in public service among
federal job seekers. She said OPM is looking at how to maintain the current number of
about 2 million federal workers while adding more in critical areas. OPM is working with
agencies on a number of ways to boost morale and improve employee hiring and retention,
including enhanced training for management and greater engagement between agency
leaders and employees.

Morale drop kills recruitment and retention

Lawrence 5/24.14 http://publicsectorview.com/federal/dropping-hammer-droppingmorale-federal-workforce/Meredith Lawrence

With all of the negative trends impacting federal workers , its no shock that the
Partnership for Public Services 2013 Best Places to Work in the Federal Government

rankings showed that, employee satisfaction and commitment were at an all-time

low. This low morale is impacting all levels of federal employees. A recent survey by
the Senior Executive Association found that, A majority (51%) of survey respondents rated

overall morale among Senior Executives and Senior Professionals at their agencies as low
or very low. This is a problem that is bleeding into the governments ability to

recruit top talent, retain their existing employees and keep employees working
towards their agencys mission. However, there may be ways to help improve
morale and make the federal workforce more happy and productive in their jobs.

Internal Link Morale k2 personnel

Morale kills staff quality
Barrett Rose and Lee 15 Barrett Rose & Lee recruits senior and mid-level executives,
as well as professional staff, in: pre-sales and service delivery professionals for information
technology vendors sales and marketing technical and engineering for manufacturing
finance, human resources, and administration http://www.barrettrose.com/the-high-cost-oflow-morale-and-what-to-do-about-it/

A costly indicator of low morale is high turnover; when employees leave

because they are not happy with their jobs and have few external reasons to stay.
The negative impact of employee turnover is disconcerting because of its tremendous
impact both financially and on productivity levels . More importantly, when employees
leave, they take with them the knowledge, skills and ability that helped contribute
to the goals, profit and performance of the organization .[6] The Saratoga Institute
suggests that the average internal cost of turnover ranges from a minimum of one years
pay and benefits to a maximum of two years salary. Other research indicates that total
turnover costs can reach as high as 150% of an employees base salary.[7] High turnover
also means that significant recruitment and replacement costs will be incurred. Another

cost of low morale is increased absenteeism. A workforce that is present and

healthy accomplishes more. According to an article in The Leading Edge, dissatisfied
workers crave an escape from their offices, even if those escapes are only
temporary.[8] Sick days cost the organization money and production, as well as increased
health and insurance costs. When employees feel dissatisfied, are not as invested in
the work they produce or discontented with managers, the level of absenteeism
increases,[9] leading to less productivity. Unscheduled employee absenteeism costs an
average of 9% of payroll.[10] However, absenteeism does not necessarily mean that
employees hate their jobs. It can also stem from not feeling empowered or well-trained to
perform.[11]

Internal Link Morale Loss Leaks

Morale crash = leaks
Hayden 13 http://strategicstudyindia.blogspot.com/2013/11/11
http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/state-craft-intelligence-reform-working Michael V.
Hayden was director of the CIA from 2006 to 2009.
To make matters worse, a whole series of damaging leaks in recent years, ranging

from WikiLeaks to include some from the highest levels of the US government, have
called into question Americas reliability as an intelligence partner . For friendly
intelligence services, trusting the Americans to keep secrets secret has become a far riskier
proposition. In fact, our stock as an intelligence partner has never been lower, which

is exceedingly worrisome in an era when we rely so heavily on liaison services for

essential intelligence about terrorist targets. For American intelligence personnel,
doing their jobs has become that much more difficult and that much more
thankless. You can be sure that the Russians, the Chinese, and others, knowing about
the demoralizing effects of the Snowden leaks, are working overtime pursuing new
recruitment prospects within US intelligence ranks . They know from long experience
that low morale is a key factor in persuading Americans to spy on their
own country .

Leaks undermine intelligence efforts

James B. Bruce, Vice Chairman of the DCI Foreign Denial and Deception Committee, 4-1407 [The Consequences of Permissive Neglect, CIA, https://www.cia.gov/library/center-forthe-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol47no1/article04.html] ml

Intelligence requires secrets. And secrecy is under assault. The future of US

intelligence effectiveness depends to a very significant degree on keeping its
secrets about collection sources and methods and analytical techniques. When secrecy is breached,
foreign targets of US intelligencesuch as adversary countries and terrorists learn about, and then
often develop countermeasures to, US intelligence techniques and operations. As a result, the
effectiveness of intelligence declines, to the detriment of the national security
policymakers and warfighters, and the citizenry that it is meant to serve. The US press is an open vault
of classified information on US intelligence collection sources and methods. This has been true for years. But the
problem is worse now than ever before, given the scope and seriousness of leaks
coupled with the power of electronic dissemination and search engines. The principal
sources of intelligence information for US newspapers, magazines, television, books, and the Internet are
unauthorized disclosures of classified information.

Press leaks reveal, individually and cumulatively, much

about how secret intelligence works. And, by implication, how to defeat it. This significant issue
the unauthorized disclosure of classified intelligencehas been extraordinarily resistant to correctives. It will
never be solved without a frontal assault on many levels, and an essential one is US law. This article addresses key
legal issues in gaining better control over unauthorized disclosures that appear in the press. It advocates a range of
legal solutions that have not been tried before, some of which are controversial. The views expressed here are my
own.1 Importantly, I would not hold these views had I not come to them from the vantage point of 20 years in the
intelligence business, and particularly my last seven with the Foreign Denial and Deception Committee. This
committee represents an interagency effort to understand how foreign adversaries learn about, then try to defeat,
our secret intelligence collection activities. I have come to appreciate that unauthorized disclosures of classified
intelligence pose a serious, seemingly intractable, problem for US national security. The Director of Central

unauthorized disclosures have

become one of the biggest threats to the survival of US Intelligence .2 A skeptical public
Intelligence, George Tenet, made the point during an interview, that

can rightly question whether the DCI might not be exaggerating the seriousness of the problem. Unfortunately, he

no intelligence specialist who is knowledgeable about the damage caused

by leaks would disagree. This presents an important anomaly in public discourse: Nearly all of the
is not, and

compelling evidence in support of the argument that leaks are causing serious damage is available only in the
classified domain. It thus seems daunting to make a persuasive public case for legal correctives to address
unauthorized disclosures when so little of the evidence for it can be discussed publicly. Proponents for better laws
it will soon become clear why I am one of these sometimes feel that this is not a fair fight. Freedom-of-the-press
advocates and professional journalists exert disproportionate influence on this debate, at least when compared to
advocates of criminal penalties for the leaking and publishing of sensitive classified intelligence. But I have come to
believe that First Amendment objections to criminal penalties for disclosing classified intelligence now demand a
more critical reconsideration than we have given them to date.3 Once we get over this hurdle, it will be more of a
fair fight, a more reasoned debate. The Seriousness of Unauthorized Disclosures Any sources and methods of
intelligence will remain guarded in secret. My administration will not talk about how we gather intelligence, if we
gather intelligence, and what the intelligence says. Thats for the protection of the American people. President
George W. Bush, following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.4

It

is a myth, too commonly held outside the Intelligence Community (IC), that leaks really do not do
much harm. The genealogy of this erroneous view traces to the publication of The
Pentagon Papers in 1971. After much government carping about all the damage that those Top Secret

revelations in the press would do to US national security, few today would claim that any damage was done at all.

The view
that leaks are harmless is further nourished by other popular myths that the government overclassifies everything including intelligence and classifies way too much. This seduction has
And I am unaware of any that was done to intelligence. The Pentagon Papers flap took us off the scent.

become a creed among uncleared, anti-secrecy proponents. But this, too, at least in regard to intelligence, I would

leaks do cause a
great deal of harm to intelligence effectiveness against priority national security
issues, including terrorism. This is principally because the press has become a major
source for sensitive information for our adversaries about US intelligenc ewhat it knows,
what it does, and how it does it. Unfortunately, serious leaks of US intelligence cumulatively
provide substantial information to foreign adversaries . At CIA alone, since 1995 there have been
argue, is wrong. A recent classified study of media leaks has convincingly shown that

hundreds of investigations of potential media leaks of Agency information, and a significant number of these have

Leaks that have damaged the

National Security Agencys (NSA) signals intelligence sources and methods also
number in the hundreds in recent years; dozens of these cases have also been referred to Justice.
been referred to the Department of Justice for follow-up action.

The National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) has experienced roughly a hundred leaks just since 2000 that

Many dozens of leaks on the activities and programs

have also helped foreign adversaries develop
countermeasures to spaceborne collection operations. DIA and the military services,
too, have suffered collection losses as a result of media leaks. It is impossible to measure
the damage done to US intelligence through these leaks, but knowledgeable specialists assess the
cumulative impact as truly significant. Some losses are permanent and irreversible ;
have damaged US imagery collection effectiveness.
of the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO)

others can be recovered, though sometimes only partially, and with the expenditure of substantial resources that
could well be spent elsewhere. While leaks of classified information are often intended to influence or inform US

foreign intelligence services and terrorists are close and voracious readers
of the US press. They are keenly alert to revelations of US classified information . For
audiences,

example, a former Russian military intelligence officer wrote: I was amazedand Moscow was very appreciativeat
how many times I found very sensitive information in American newspapers. In my view, Americans tend to care
more about scooping their competition than about national security, which made my job easier.5 I call this the

Classified intelligence disclosed in the press is the effective equivalent of

intelligence gathered through foreign espionage . Importantly, more than just Russian intelligence
Lunev Axiom:

officers understand this. Key adversaries of the United States, such as China and al-Qaida, derive a significant
amount of their information on the United States and US intelligence from the media, including the Internet. What
we need to understand are the legal implications of this key principle. Reported Examples of Intelligence Losses due
to Press Leaks Soviet ICBM testing, 1958. A New York Times story on 31 January 1958 reported that the United
States was able to monitor the eight-hour countdown broadcasts for Soviet missile launches from Tyuratam (now
Baykonur), Kazakhstan, which provided enough lead time to dispatch US aircraft to observe the splashdowns and,
thus, collect data used to estimate the accuracy of the intercontinental ballistic missiles. Following publication of
the article, Moscow cut the countdown broadcasts to four hours, too little time for US aircraft to reach the landing
area. Occurring in the midst of the missile-gap controversy, the publication of the press item left President
Eisenhower livid, according to Wayne Jackson in Allen Welsh Dulles, Director of Central Intelligence (July 1973,

declassified history, Volume IV, pp. 29-31, in Record Group 263, National Archives). According to the same source,
some intelligence was lost forever, and, to recoup the remainder, the US Air Force had to rebuild an Alaskan airfield
at a cost of millions of dollars. Politburo conversations, 1971. In a 16 September 1971 column in The Washington
Post, Jack Anderson wrote that US intelligence was successfully intercepting telephone conversations from
limousines used by members of the Soviet Politburo in Moscow. In his book, For the Presidents Eyes Only (New York,
NY: Harper Perennial, 1966, p. 359), British historian Christopher Andrew says that this US collection program
producing highly sensitive information ended abruptly after Andersons revelations. Soviet submarine, 1975. The
Los Angeles Times published a story on 7 February 1975 that the CIA had mounted an operation to recover a
sunken Soviet submarine from the Pacific Ocean floor. The New York Times ran with its own version the next day.
After this story broke, Jack Anderson further publicized the secret operation on national television on 18 March. In
his memoir, Honorable Men: My Life in the CIA (London: Hutchinson, 1978, pp. 413-418), former DCI William Colby
wrote: There was not a chance that we could send the Glomar [Explorer] out again on an intelligence project
without risking the lives of our crew and inciting a major international incident. . . . The Glomar project stopped
because it was exposed.

Leaks jeopardize intelligence efforts

James B. Bruce, Vice Chairman of the DCI Foreign Denial and Deception Committee, 4-1407 [The Consequences of Permissive Neglect, CIA, https://www.cia.gov/library/center-forthe-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol47no1/article04.html] ml
How Leaks Hurt The Intelligence Community faces improved foreign countermeasures as adversaries use leaks to
expand their understanding of US intelligence. In the mid-1990s, for example, dozens of press articles covered the
issue of whether Chinese M-11 missiles had been covertly transferred to Pakistan. If missiles had been acquired,
Pakistan could be found in violation of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) to which it was a signatory.
Under the National Defense Authorization Act, US law mandates sanctions against proven MTCR violators. Reports
in the Washington press claimed that US intelligence had indeed found missiles in Pakistan, but that the
information, apparently, was not solid enough to trigger sanctions. Based on numerous leaks, readers of both The
Washington Times and The Washington Post learned that intelligence had failed to convince the Department of
State of the missiles existence. Spy satellites, the press announced, were unable to confirm the presence of
such missiles. The message from the press coverage was, in effect, that any nationsuch as Pakistan or other
signatories to the MTCR who sought to circumvent its terms could avert US sanctions if they neutralized
intelligence by shielding missiles from satellite observation. These articles not only suggested to Pakistan and China
that some key denial measures were succeeding, but also spelled out specific countermeasures that other potential
violators could take to prevent US intelligence from satisfying the standards needed for sanctions. US imaging
capabilities are a favorite press topic. An example is leaked intelligence about Indias nuclear program in the mid-

Unauthorized disclosures about issues such as this have revealed to our

adversaries, directly and indirectly, unique elements that underpin our analytic
tradecraft. Thoughtful manipulation by adversaries , as well as friends, of such knowledge
exposed in the press impairs our ability to provide policymakers with timely
intelligence before they are taken by surpriseas happened when the Intelligence
Community failed to warn of the Indian nuclear tests in May 1998 .6 In addition, effective
intelligence depends on cooperative relationships with friendly governments and
individuals who trust the United States to protect their confidences. Press disclosures can
and sometimes doundermine these relationships, making both governments and
individuals reluctant to share information, thereby inhibiting intelligence support
crucial to informed policymaking, counterterrorist efforts, and, when necessary, military
operations. In 1998, for example, newspaper reports provided lengthy coverage of UNSCOM, the UN
1990s.

Special Commission charged with inspecting Iraqs weapons of mass destruction (WMD) facilities following the Gulf
war. These reports were widely cited in subsequent worldwide media coverage. Although the articles contained

information in them interfered with the US governments ability to

aggressively pursue its policy on Iraqi weapons inspections . Other serious leaks
clearly have degraded Washingtons ability to obtain intelligence on Iraq . Damaging press
many inaccuracies,

disclosures based on imagery-derived intelligence on Iraq have included the movement of missile systems, the
construction of a new command and control network, and the dispersal of WMD equipment following the 11

Terrorists feed on leaks. Through their

investigations into whether the 9/11 attacks resulted from intelligence failure,
Congress and the special Commission will learn that important intelligence collection
capabilities against Osama bin Laden and al-Qaida were lost in the several years preceding
September 2001. With the concurrence of NSA, the White House officially released just one of these. As press
September 2001 terrorist attacks in New York and Washington.

spokesman Ari Fleischer explained: And let me give you a specific example why, in our democracy and in our open

system, it is vital that certain information remain secret. In 1998, for example, as a result of an inappropriate leak of
NSA information, it was revealed about NSA being able to listen to Osama bin Laden on his satellite phone. As a
result of the disclosure, he stopped using it. As a result of the public disclosure, the United States was denied the
opportunity to monitor and gain information that could have been very valuable for protecting our country.7 What
the public cannot easily know, because the overwhelming bulk of this intelligence must necessarily remain

In recent years, all

intelligence agenciesCIA, NSA, NIMA, NRO, and the Defense Intelligence Agency, to cite just the larger
oneshave lost important collection capabilities, including against high-value terrorist
targets. These losses have impaired human operations, signals intelligence, and
imagery collection. And they have deprived analysts and policymakers of critical
information, unavailable elsewhere, that they should have had.
classified, is that the bin Laden example cited here is just the tip of the iceberg.

Leaks damage intelligence capabilities

Roseanne Sessa, judicial clerk and Seton Hall University School of Law, 2014 [The

culture of leaks has to change", but at what expense to congressional oversight of the
Executive Branch? An examination of Title V of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2013., Law School Student Scholarship, http://scholarship.shu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=1617&context=student_scholarship] ml
Most discussions about intelligence leaks revolve around the government regulating the flow
of national security information.6 This is because the government has a substantial interest
in protecting the national security of the country.7 As such, the "executive and legislative
branches of government have elaborate machinery for protecting the confidentiality of
information used in policymaking and administration?" A leak by a government employee is
considered "the release, of outside official public information channels, of previously
undisclosed information. Leaks can either be classified as authorized or unauthorized." An
authorized leak is defined as "an established part of "while an unauthorized leak is said to
"[occur] when in government policy employee makes public information that her superiors
and the government information machinery have chosen not to disclose."'2 Whether a leak
is authorized or unauthorized, those that are disseminated to the public by the media are an
important source of political news and are likewise an effective means of inuencing
government policy." This note will focus in particular on the consequences of unauthorized
leaks. In 2009, Former Director of National Intelligence, Dennis Blair, wrote a
memorandum to the directors of the sixteen United States Intelligence Community
Agencies." In this memorandum, Blair discussed the severe consequences posed by
the unauthorized disclosure of classified information ." He noted that "disclosures of

classified information, including 'leaks' to the media can compromise sensitive

sources and methods. . .and may allow our adversaries to learn about, deny,
counteract, and deceive our intelligence collection methods, leading to the loss of
critical capabilities, resources, and even lives. ""' Blair further noted that over recent
years, unauthorized disclosures have impaired the ability of the Intelligence
Community to accomplish its mission and support its national security objectives."
While these unauthorized disclosures have the potential to jeopardize national
security, Congress also utilizes the media as a way to exercise oversight of the Executive
Branch, which will be discussed in the following section.

Internal Link Recruiting k2 intel

Personnel quality in intel crucial to address all global threats this
outweighs specific scenarios
Ellkson 13 To introduce our speaker today is Admiral David Ellison. Hes a 34 - year
career Navy officer, then went on the become president of New Mexico Military Institute u
ntil he came to what is now NIU and what was then the Defense Intelligence University in
2009. Hes a graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy at Annapolis and has a Ph.D. from
Pennsylvania State University.

ADMIRAL ELLISON: Good afternoon, ladies and gentle men. One need only span the globe

to readily observe the complexity and instability , and the uncertainty , that
characterizes todays global security environment. The challenge of preventing the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the challenge of defining and combating the
cyber threat and the challenge of defending against the danger posed by ever present terrorists combine to characterize an immensely complex national security
environment. Instability is evidenced by events such as those sur rounding the Arab Spring
and the recent turmoil in the countries of Syria and Egypt. Together this complexity, this
boundless regional instability , define a future of extreme uncertainty. This is a
national security environment that demands an intelligen ce professional with
unique characteristics. Protecting and defending our national security interests
requires intelligence professionals who are adaptive, agile, and forward thinking ,
ever endeavoring to anticipate the future, anticipating the future rat her than
reacting to the future. It is no longer enough to focus attention on one area to the
exclusion of others. Intelligence professionals no longer have the luxury of slowly
and deliberately refocusing their attentions, and no longer can they succeed as an
intelligence professional with just understanding the past and the present. Todays
intelligence professional must be able to anticipate future events. Preparing intelligence
professionals capable of meeting such an enormous challenge demands tha t we place them
in an environment that fosters creativity and innovation and one in which exploration,
collaboration, and integration are commonplace.

Understaffing makes counter intel ineffective and outdated makes

intelligence programs useless
Markon and Nakashima 14 (Jerry and Ellen, Reporters for Washington Post, Toplevel turnover makes it harder for DHS to stay on top of evolving threats,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/top-level-turnover-makes-it-harder-for-dhs-to-stayon-top-of-evolving-threats/2014/09/21/ca7919a6-39d7-11e4-9c9f-ebb47272e40e_story.html)
A bipartisan Senate study in 2012 concluded that understaffing and turnover in the DHS
intelligence office were contributing to dangerous delays. The study found that

hundreds of reports being prepared by intelligence analysts working with state and
local officials on counterterrorism were being released months late, at times based
on outdated information.

Internal Link NSA k2 intel

The NSA is the core of U.S intel
McLaughlin 14 (John, a nonresident senior fellow in the Center for 21st Century Security
and Intelligence and the Center for Middle East Policy in the Foreign Policy program at
Brookings. A former deputy director for intelligence at the Central Intelligence Agency, he is
an expert in counterterrorism, intelligence policy and proliferation issues, 1/2/14, NSA
intelligence-gathering programs keep us safe,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/nsa-intelligence-gathering-programs-keep-ussafe/2014/01/02/0fd51b22-7173-11e3-8b3f-b1666705ca3b_story.html)TT

Its time we all came to our senses about the National Security Agency (NSA). If it is true, as
many allege, that the United States went a little nuts in its all-out pursuit of al-Qaeda after the Sept. 11, 2001,
attacks, it is equally true that we are going a little nuts again in our dogged pursuit of the post-Snowden NSA .

Those who advocate sharply limiting the agencys activities ought to consider that
its work is the very foundation of U.S. intelligence. I dont mean to diminish the role of other
intelligence agencies, and I say this as a 30-year veteran of the Central Intelligence Agency who is CIA through

in most cases, the NSA is the starting point for determining what holes
need to be filled through other means of intelligence-collection. Thats because its
information on foreign developments is so comprehensive and generally so reliable.
It is the core of intelligence support to U.S. troops in battle . Any efforts to rein in the agency
and through. But

must allow for the possibility that change risks serious damage to U.S. security and the countrys ability to navigate
in an increasingly uncertain world

. The presumption that the NSA spies on

Americans should also be challenged . In my experience, NSA analysts err on the

side of caution before touching any data having to do with U.S. citizens . In
2010, at the request of then-Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair, I chaired a panel investigating the
intelligence communitys failure to be aware of Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, the underwear bomber who tried to
blow up a commercial plane over Detroit on Dec. 25, 2009. The overall report remains classified, but I can say that
the government lost vital time because of the extraordinary care the NSA and others took in handling any data
involving a U.S. person. (Abdulmutallab, a Nigerian, was recruited and trained by the late Anwar al-Awlaki, a U.S.
citizen based in Yemen.)

Regarding outrage over the NSAs collection of telephone

calling records, or metadata, I dont know why anyone would have

greater confidence in this information being held by private companies .
And given the perceived threat to privacy, its astonishing how little attention has been paid to
the Senate commerce committees recent report on companies that gather personal
information on hundreds of millions of Americans and sell it to marketers, often
highlighting people with financial vulnerability . Some companies group the data into categories
including rural and barely making it, retiring on empty and credit crunched: city families. The aim is often to
sell financially risky products to transient consumers with low incomes, the report found. Thats a real scandal
and a universe away from the NSAs ethical standards and congressional oversight. The NSA, of course, is not

the independent commission appointed by

President Obama found no illegality or abuses than of the broad distrust of government that has
taken root in the United States in recent decades. Studies by Pew and others show distrust of
government around 80 percent, an all-time high. This distrust is the only logical
explanation I see for fear of data being held by the government and its not a
circumstance the NSA created. Although our society lauds, in almost Stepford Wives-like fashion, the
perfect. But it is less a victim of its actions

merits of transparency, it lacks a collective, mature understanding of how intelligence works, how it integrates
with foreign policy and how it contributes to the national welfare. Meanwhile, prurient interest in the details of
leaked intelligence skyrockets, and people devour material that is not evidence of abuse but merely fascinating
and even more fascinating to U.S. adversaries. So what makes sense going forward? Clearly, the widespread
perception that there is at least the potential for abuse when the government holds information even as limited
as telephone call metadata must be addressed. The recent presidential commission recommended adding a public
privacy advocate to the deliberation process of courts that approve warrants one proposal that would do no

harm. But as the administration contemplates reform, it must reject any ideas that add time and process between
the moment the NSA picks up a lead overseas and the time it can cross-check records to determine whether there
is a domestic dimension to overseas plotting.

As our debate continues, the terrorist threat

is not receding but transforming.

The core leadership of al-Qaeda has been degraded and

remains under pressure, but robust al-Qaeda affiliates have multiplied. With the decline of central government
authority in the Middle East and North Africa in the wake of the Arab Spring and the war in Syria, terrorists have the
largest havens and areas for operational planning in a decade.

If anything, the atomization of

the movement has made the job of intelligence more labor-intensive,

more detail-oriented and more demanding. Now is not the time to give up
any tool in the counterterrorism arsenal.

NSA intel sharing is key to all other security agencies

Eric Lichtblau and Michael Schmidt 13 (Lichtblau: Washington bureau journalist for
the New York Times, graduate of Cornell University; Schmidt: Reporter for New York Times in
Washington. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/04/us/other-agencies-clamor-for-data-nsacompiles.html)
WASHINGTON The National Security Agencys dominant role as the nations spy warehouse has spurred frequent
tensions and turf fights with other federal intelligence agencies that want to use its surveillance tools for their own

Agencies working to curb drug trafficking, cyberattacks, money

laundering, counterfeiting and even copyright infringement complain that their
attempts to exploit the security agencys vast resources have often been turned
down because their own investigations are not considered a high enough priority ,
investigations, officials say.

current and former government officials say. Intelligence officials say they have been careful to limit the use of the
security agencys troves of data and eavesdropping spyware for fear they could be misused in ways that violate
Americans privacy rights. The recent disclosures of agency activities by its former contractor Edward J. Snowden
have led to widespread criticism that its surveillance operations go too far and have prompted lawmakers in
Washington to talk of reining them in. But out of public view, the intelligence community has been agitated in
recent years for the opposite reason: frustrated officials outside the security agency say the spy tools are not used
widely enough. Its a very common complaint about N.S.A., said Timothy H. Edgar, a former senior intelligence
official at the White House and at the office of the director of national intelligence. They collect all this information,
but its difficult for the other agencies to get access to what they want. The other agencies feel they should be
bigger players, said Mr. Edgar, who heard many of the disputes before leaving government this year to become a
visiting fellow at Brown University. They view the N.S.A. incorrectly, I think as this big pot of data that they

Smaller intelligence units within the Drug

Enforcement Administration, the Secret Service, the Pentagon and the Department
of Homeland Security have sometimes been given access to the security agencys
surveillance tools for particular cases , intelligence officials say. But more often, their requests have
could go get if they were just able to pry it out of them.

been rejected because the links to terrorism or foreign intelligence, usually required by law or policy, are considered
tenuous. Officials at some agencies see another motive protecting the security agencys turf and have grown
resentful over what they see as a second-tier status that has undermined their own investigations into security

At the drug agency, for example, officials complained that they were blocked
from using the security agencys surveillance tools for several drug-trafficking cases
in Latin America, which they said might be connected to financing terrorist groups in
the Middle East and elsewhere. At the Homeland Security Department, officials have
repeatedly sought to use the security agencys Internet and telephone databases
and other resources to trace cyberattacks on American targets that are believed to
have stemmed from China, Russia and Eastern Europe , according to officials. They have often
matters.

been rebuffed. Officials at the other agencies, speaking only on the condition of anonymity because they were not
authorized to discuss the tensions, say the National Security Agencys reluctance to allow access to data has been
particularly frustrating because of post-Sept. 11 measures that were intended to encourage information-sharing

In fact, a change made in 2008 in the executive order governing

intelligence was intended to make it easier for the security agency to share
surveillance information with other agencies if it was considered relevant to their
among federal agencies.

own investigations. It has often been left to the national intelligence directors office to referee the frequent
disputes over how and when the security agencys spy tools can be used. The directors office declined to comment

agencies request that the N.S.A. target individuals or groups

for surveillance, search its databases for information about them, or share raw
intelligence, rather than edited summaries, with them . If those under scrutiny are Americans,
for this article. Typically, the

approval from the secret Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court is required. The security agency, whose mission is
to spy overseas, and the F.B.I., its main partner in surveillance operations, dominate the process as the Justice
Departments main customers in seeking warrants from the intelligence court, with nearly 1,800 approved by the
court last year. In a statement, the security agency said that it works closely with all intelligence community
partners, and embeds liaison officers and other personnel at those agencies for the express purpose of ensuring

The security agencys spy

tools are attractive to other agencies for many reasons. Unlike traditional, narrowly tailored
N.S.A. is meeting their requirements and providing support to their missions.

search warrants, those granted by the intelligence court often allow searches through records and data that are
vast in scope. The standard of evidence needed to acquire them may be lower than in other courts, and the
government may not be required to disclose for years, if ever, that someone was the focus of secret surveillance
operations. Decisions on using the security agencys powers rest on many complicated variables, including a link to
terrorism or foreign intelligence, the type of surveillance or data collection that is being conducted, the
involvement of American targets, and the priority of the issue. Every agency wants to think that their mission has
to be the highest priority, said a former senior White House intelligence official involved in recent turf issues.

Other intelligence shops usually have quick access to N.S.A. tools and data on
pressing matters of national security, like investigating a terrorism threat, planning
battlefield operations or providing security for a presidential trip , officials say. But the
conflicts arise during longer-term investigations with unclear foreign connections. In pressing for greater access, a

smaller agencies maintain that their cases involve legitimate national

security threats and could be helped significantly by the N.S.A.s ability to trace emails and Internet activity or other tools. Drug agency officials, for instance, have sought a higher
number of

place for global drug trafficking on the intelligence communitys classified list of surveillance priorities, according to
two officials. Dawn Dearden, a drug agency spokeswoman, said it was comfortable allowing the N.S.A. and the F.B.I.
to take the lead in seeking surveillance warrants. We dont have the authority, and we dont want it, and that
comes from the top down, she said. But privately, intelligence officials at the drug agency and elsewhere have
complained that they feel shut out of the process by the N.S.A. and the F.B.I. from start to finish, with little input on
what groups are targeted with surveillance and only sporadic access to the classified material that is ultimately
collected. Sometimes, security agency and bureau officials accuse the smaller agencies of exaggerating links to
national security threats in their own cases when pushing for access to the security agencys surveillance
capabilities. Officials from the other agencies say that if a link to national security is considered legitimate, the F.B.I.

In one such case, the bureau took

control of a Secret Service investigation after a hacker was linked to a foreign
government, one law enforcement official said. Similarly, the bureau became more interested in investigating
will at times simply take over the case itself and work it with the N.S.A.

smuggled cigarettes as a means of financing terrorist groups after the case was developed by the Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives. Mr. Edgar said officials in the national intelligence directors office
occasionally allow other agencies a role in identifying surveillance targets and seeing the results when it is relevant
to their own inquiries. But more often, he acknowledged, the office has come down on the side of keeping the
process held to an exclusive club at the N.S.A., the F.B.I. and the Justice Department, with help from the Central
Intelligence Agency on foreign issues. Officials in the national intelligence directors office worry about opening the
surveillance too widely beyond the security agency and the F.B.I. for fear of abuse, Mr. Edgar said. The two
intelligence giants have been burned by past wiretapping controversies and know the political consequences if
they venture too far afield, he added. I would have been very uncomfortable if we had let these other agencies get
access to the raw N.S.A. data, he said. As furious as the public criticism of the security agencys programs has
been in the two months since Mr. Snowdens disclosures, it could have been much, much worse, if we had let these
other agencies loose and we had real abuses, Mr. Edgar said. That was the nightmare scenario we were worried
about, and that hasnt happened.

Internal Link AT Outsourcing solves

Outsourcing cant solve
Libicki Senty Pollak 14
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR400/RR430/RAND_RR430.pd
f Martin C. Libicki is an American scholar and Professor at the Frederick S. Pardee RAND
Graduate School in Santa Monica, California. David Senty is a RAND senior fellow who
previously served as chief of staff at the U.S. Cyber Command, Julia Pollak, Assistant Policy
Analyst at the RAND Corporation.
Over the last 20 or more years, the government has finessed the problem of recruiting

really skilled individuals by outsourcing the work they would have done to private
contractors. The outsourcers can then pay market prices to deliver from qualified
individuals services other - wise unavailable from direct employees. But outsourcing does
not solve all problems. First, many mili - tary and some civilian tasks cannot be
performed by private contrac - tors. Some of the reasons involve the hazards of being
deployed in war zones or on warfare platforms (although these have loosened consider ably over the last quarter century). More dominant are the legal issues associated with
who can do what, many associated with the chain of military command . Second, it
takes federal employees to oversee the contracting process at very least to establish
requirements, evalu - ate proposals, and select contractors. Oversight is important. It

takes talent to write a good specification for contracted work, particularly if rapid
changes in the environment suggest a corresponding require - ment for rapid
changes in what contractors are asked to do. If federal employees lack the skills to write
such specifications (and particularly if the contractors understand as much), they are likely
to be spending federal money inefficientl y; hence, they cannot be supplanted. Third,
outsourcing creates a vicious circle. If the cool jobs are given to con - tractors
(Homeland Security Advisory Council, 2012), then extant and even prospective federal
employees will have that much less motivation to stay or to join the federal government to
work on cyber problems. This then reduces the quality of the federal labor pool, which

then reinforces the initial tendency to assign the cool jobs to contractors

Impact Turns case Bad intel

NSA morale drop makes abuses worse
Friedersdorf 12/10/13 (Conor Friedersdorf is a staff writer at The Atlantic, where he
focuses on politics and national affairs. He lives in Venice, California, and is the founding
editor of The Best of Journalism, a newsletter devoted to exceptional nonfiction. Do You
Trust The Washington Post's Sources on Morale at the NSA?,
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/12/do-you-trust-em-the-washington-postem-s-sources-on-morale-at-the-nsa/282184/)

What I wonder is what the impact on the NSA would be if morale really is falling,
something that wasn't established to my satisfaction. It would arguably be
heartening if surveillance-state employees are upset at the revelation that their
employer has been doing wrong. But if NSA employees who have some discomfort
with mass surveillance start to quit, who will replace them, and how much less
trustworthy would that agency be?

Impact Turns terror

NSA key to counter terrorism
Ressler 06(Steve, GovLoop founder and former journalist for the Huffington Post, Social

Network Analysis as an Approach to Combat Terrorism: Past, Present, and Future Research)

The importance of NSA in fighting the war on terrorism was recognized even before
the attacks of September 11, 2001. John Arquilla and David Ronfeldts work Networks
and Netwars, which was released in 2001 before the terrorist attacks, describes the
increased network principles in modern criminal organizations. 9 The premise of the book is
that war is no longer a head-to-head battle of two powers. There is no formal hierarchicalbased enemy like the U.S.S.R. during the Cold War. Modern war is netwar, a lower-

intensity battle by terrorists, criminals, and extremists with a networked

organizational structure. These networked structures are often leaderless and
able to attack more quickly. Novel, asymmetric approaches are needed to combat a
networkbased criminal organization. After the attacks of 9/11, academia, the
government, and even mainstream media began to discuss the
importance of social network analysis in fighting terrorism. Mainstream
media outlets such as the Washington Post and the Dallas Morning News ran articles
describing the potential benefits of network science.10 Authors of popular press network
books, such as Antonio-Laszlo Barabasi (Linked), were interviewed extensively, on television
and radio programs, on how we could use the knowledge of social networks to fight
terrorism. Further, when the National Security Agencys warrant-less

eavesdropping program hit the news in 2006, the importance of social network
analysis in fighting terrorism reemerged in a New York Times article discussing the
ability of network analysis to map and potentially make meaning out of the millions of
communications NSA intercepts daily between individuals.

Intel Good: General

General k2 FP
Bad intel is an impact magnifiercurrent capabilities are key to
foreign policy decisions
Kupcikas 13(Karolis, Assistant Professor at Loughborough University for International
Relations, The Importance of Intelligence to International Security, NOV 8 2013,
http://www.eir.info/2013/11/08/importance-of-intelligence-to-international-security)

If knowledge is power it can also be deduced that intelligence is a form of power

itself. Information can support the exercise of other forms of power for example material
or coercive. Intelligence provides the basis for policy or decisions people,
organizations and states, if they are to act rationally, will do so after canvassing fully
the alternative courses of action open to them and their costs and benefits (Gill &
Phythian, 2006, p. 33). Therefore, tensions can arise between intelligence conclusions and
politicians desire for particular answers. Policy is usually formulated based on principles

or grounded in ideology, while intelligence is produced by evaluating dry

information. When they meet, the contest is uneven: When intelligence clashes
with policy preference, intelligence loses; when information runs up
against power, information is the casualty. Indeed, when information is countered
by perception or, more accurately, conception, evidence is discounted (Fry & Hochstein,
1994, p. 20). Thus, in practice intelligence information will be judged upon its ability
to support a chosen course of action which has been formed even before the search
for information, in this way creating a reversed knowledge/power relationship. An
additional variable at the centre of security intelligence is secrecy, since: Without secrets it
is not intelligence (Warner, 2009, p. 9). Secrecy is important not just as barrier to
surveillance it permeates aspects of the process itself. Some actions make no sense unless
carried out with an element of surprise, such as arrests (Herman, 2001, p. 5). However,
secrecy also raises key issues of legality, morality and accountability.

Furthermore, intelligence is not only a foundation for state policies it has always
had a significant role in informing and exercising actions that are not
widely appreciated and, indeed, may actually breach domestic or
international law. Mostly debated is covert action or special political action as
practised by the CIA. Intelligence agencies not only engage in rather passive activity of
gathering intelligence on world affairs, but also try to intervene covertly to influence events.
Some authors see covert action as essential to intelligence (Russel, 2007, p. 281), while
some characterized it as an additional activity, somewhat separate from the main business
of intelligence. Intelligence is information and information gathering, not
doing things to people; no-one gets hurt by it, at least not directly. Some
agencies do indeed carry out covert action, which confuses the ethical
issues, but this a separable and subsidiary function (Herman, 2004, p. 180).
Also, intelligence methods have been applied in order to disrupt the

activities of criminal organizations that are involved in drugs, arms or

people trafficking . Since 9/11, due to perceived terrorist threats, even more
attention has been given to this development by the convergence of security, police

and military intelligence. However, could it be said that the modern transformation of
intelligence by the application of highly sophisticated surveillance and information
technology has overshadowed the fact that, at its core, it remains an intellectual process?
Most intelligence effort since 9/11 has been put into the investigation and prevention of
terrorist attacks. Many analytical techniques deploy sophisticated software facilitating the
analysis of relational data. However, the cleverness of the software cannot provide a

technological fix: analysis remains at heart an intellectual exercise based on

reasoning (Russel, 2007, p. 213).

Intelligence coordination crucial to assess and defuse complex

threats
Clapper 3/2/13
http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/130312/clapper.pdf
James Robert Clapper, Jr. (born March 14, 1941)[2][3] is a retired lieutenant general in the
United States Air Force and is currently the Director of National Intelligence. He was
previously dual-hatted as the first Director of Defense Intelligence within the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence alongside the position of Under Secretary of Defense for
Intelligence.[4] Clapper has held several key positions within the United States Intelligence
Community. He served as the director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA)
from September 2001 until June 2006. Previously, he served as director of the Defense
Intelligence Agency (DIA) from 1992 until 1995. On June 5, 2010, President Barack Obama
nominated Clapper to replace Dennis C. Blair as United States Director of National
Intelligence. Clapper was unanimously confirmed by the Senate for the position on August 5,
2010.[5][6]
This year, in both content and organization, this statement illustrates how quickly and
radically the worldand our threat environmentare changing. This environment is
demanding reevaluations of the way we do business, expanding our analytic envelope, and
altering the vocabulary of intelligence. Threats are more diverse, interconnected,
and viral than at any time in history. Attacks, which might involve cyber and financial
weapons, can be deniable and unattributable. Destruction can be invisible, latent, and
progressive. We now monitor shifts in human geography, climate, disease, and
competition for natural resources because they fuel tensions and conflicts. Local events
that might seem irrelevant are more likely to affect US national security in accelerated
time frames. In this threat environment, the importance and urgency of intelligence
integration cannot be overstated. Our progress cannot stop. The Intelligence
Community must continue to promote collaboration among experts in every field, from the
political and social sciences to natural sciences, medicine, military issues, and space.
Collectors and analysts need vision across disciplines to understand how and why
developmentsand both state and unaffiliated actorscan spark sudden changes with
international implications. The Intelligence Community is committed every day to
providing the nuanced, multidisciplinary intelligence that policymakers, diplomats,
warfighters, and international and domestic law enforcement need to protect American
lives and Americas interests anywhere in the world.

Estimative intelligence acknowledges complexity and uncertainty

but is the best way to mediate that into useful policy.
Nye 94 (1994, Joseph, PhD in political science, University Distinguished Service Professor
at Harvard University, chairman of the National Intelligence Council, Peering into the
Future, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 4, Jul/Aug 1994, pp. 82-93)

Innovations and enhancements aside, it does not matter how good the National Intelligence
Council's estimates are unless it gets them into the minds of policymakers . Most high-level policymakers
are swamped with information and have little time to read. They spend their days drinking from a fire hose of information. The basic paradox of
government is that it rests on a sea of paper, but the higher you go, the more it becomes an oral culture. The finest analytic work that is too long to read,
or that arrives when its issue is not on the front burner, is likely to be placed in a pile on the back corner of the desk that is reserved for papers too
interesting to throw away but not urgent enough to read immediately. Every few weeks or months, most ofthat pile is discarded unread.
To respond to this situation, the nic has devised two new estimative art forms. Following the example of Britain's Joint Intelligence Coun cil, which produces
three-page estimates for the cabinet, the nic has developed a short "President's Summary" designed explicitly for top policymakers. The complete version
of the estimate, with details and justifications, is a useful tool for staffs and lower levels of policy bureau cracies. Moreover, estimating must be seen as a
continuous process. When new information or developments come in, recipients of esti mates are provided with a short memorandum that updates them.

Good estimating requires constant contact with policymakers so that written products are keyed to
Policymakers are often too distracted to ask for estimates, but they will read or
listen if the timing is right. The production of some estimates must be geared to upcoming
events such as the visit of a foreign prime minister or a presidential trip abroad. When warranted, estimates or special nic memos can be produced in
their agendas.

a matter of days.

The estimative process involves contact with decisionmakers before and after publication. The purpose of estimating is not publication, but
getting ideas into policymakers' minds. Oral estimating is another important way of doing that. Listenership is
Even efficient and timely publication is not the whole answer.

sometimes more impor tant than readership.

estimation as a process requires constant interaction between national intelligence officers

and policymakers both before and after publication. Such contact raises the red flag of politicization, of
In short,

consciously or unconsciously crossing the line between objective analy sis and a statement of policy preferences. National intelligence organi zations must

Fortunately, the taboo against trespassing into policy is so deeply

ingrained in the intelligence culture that there are frequent reminders . In addition, estimators often present
constantly be alert to that danger.

unpopular information. With particularly sensitive estimates that could undermine a policy or a foreign leader if leaked to the press, the nic is prepared to
limit distribution to a narrow list of people with a need to know, but not to change the nature of the conclusions.
MAKING BETTER CHOICES

policymakers still need estimative

intelligence to help them understand the more diffuse and ambiguous threats and
opportunities they face. Ideological divisions are less likely to obstruct analysis, but greater uncertainties make analysis more difficult .
The greater the uncertainty, the greater the scope and need for estimative
intelligence. But the task is not simple prediction. Estimators are not fortune-tellers;
they are educators. Rather than trying to predict the future, estimators should deal with heightened uncertainty by pre senting alternative
Estimates focused heavily on the Soviet Union during the Cold War. In its wake,

scenarios. To be useful, estimates must describe not only the nature and probability of the most likely future paths, but they must also investigate
significant excursions off those paths and identify the signposts that would tell us we are entering such territory.

Sometimes they will be wrong;

sometimes, even when correct, they will be ignored . As in the case of the 1990 esti mate that correctly predicted the
violence in the former Yugoslavia, policymakers can draw a variety of conclusions about whether or not to intervene. Often
estimates will be unpopular when they cast doubt on preferred options or put awkward new issues on the policy agenda. But, properly
conceived and effectively presented, estimative intelligence can help policymakers
make better choices in a future that will contain a more complex mix of threats
and opportunities.
Estimates are ways of summarizing what is known and structuring the remaining uncertainties.

More ev.
Nye 94 (1994, Joseph, PhD in political science, University Distinguished Service Professor
at Harvard University, chairman of the National Intelligence Council, Peering into the
Future, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 4, Jul/Aug 1994, pp. 82-93)
The National Intelligence Council has tried to cope with this uncertainty in various ways . Most
important, it has increased its emphasis on alternative scenarios rather than single-point
predictions. The job, after all, is not so much to predict the future as to help policy makers think
about the future. No one can know the future, and it is misleading to pretend to . On
the other hand, to tell policymakers how complex things are will only echo Harry Truman's
request for a one armed analyst: "No more on the one hand and on the other hand.' " Analysts owe policymakers
a forthright appraisal of the best estimate. In lieu of predicting the future, the National Intelligence
Estimates describe the range of possible outcomes, including relatively unlikely ones that could
have major impact on American interests, and indicate which outcomes they think are most likely and why. They then predict the absolute likelihood of
each outcome, mindful of the fact that they tread on very uncertain ground.
Rather than use vague words like "possibly" or "small but significant chance," where feasible the estimates present judgments of likelihood as numerical
percentages or bettor's odds. To be sure, this is a contro versial approach; it is impossible to explain why something is one chance in two or one chance in
three. Even so, the

policymakers are better served than if the nic simply tells them something is

"possible," which is equivalent to telling them there is a 1 to 49 percent chance it will

happen not much help to someone trying to make an impor tant decision. Moreover, if the intelligence community is really uncer tain about the
likelihood of an outcome, or if agencies disagree over that likelihood, the easiest way to depict that to a busy reader is simply to present a range of
probability?saying, for example, that there is a 30 to 50 percent chance it will happen.

analysts must ask another set of questions before

the estimate is done. What would it take for this estimate to be dramatically wrong? What could
cause a radically different outcome? This task is not the same as a worst-case analysis . If the most plausible
scenarios are pessimistic, the analysts must ask what it would take to produce a favorable
result. What would such an outcome look like, and how would they know if events were heading in that direction?
Experts often resist this exercise. Since they know their country or region and have already presented all the plausible scenarios, why
waste any effort on scenarios that are by definition highly unlikely? The answer is that such
questions help to alert the policymakers to low-probability but high-impact
contingencies against which they might plan. It also informs intelligence agencies about obscure indi cators about
After the most likely scenarios have been constructed and pre sented,

which they should be collecting information.

Perhaps if estimators of Soviet strength in the 1980s had asked explicitly what it would take to greatly weaken the Soviet Union and what such a stricken

One
reason, for example, Royal Dutch Shell survived the 1973 oil crisis better than other companies is
that its planners did not merely do best estimates of future oil prices but also contemplated
scenarios of dramatic price changes that were consid ered highly unlikely at the time.
Good analysts will also explicitly identify their key assumptions and uncertainties , so that
policymakers are aware of the foundations of the estimate. Obviously it is impossible to identify all the assump tions behind the nic's
colossus would look like, analysts and policy makers would have been more attentive to offbeat indicators and less surprised by the outcome.

analyses. Everyone assumes that the future will more or less resemble the past; for instance, all expect the sun to rise in the east. Someday that might
not be true, but it will probably remain true for the time frame of today's estimates. Other assump tions might seem obvious but nonetheless be worth
highlighting. In the 1980s, for example, if one were estimating Iraq's ability to build a nuclear weapon, one could reasonably have assumed that Baghdad
would use only the most modern and efficient techniques. But U.S. intelligence missed a critical part of Iraq's program that included elec tromagnetic
isotope separation, an antiquated technique the United States abandoned in the 1940s. Had the assumption been explicit, some analyst or policymaker
might have thought to ask what Sad dam's program might look like if the assumption were relaxed.

Estimates start with a section that highlights assumptions and end, where appropriate, with a section
that highlights key uncertainties. After all is said and done, what are the biggest gaps in U.S. intelli gence? This
exercise not only helps alert policymakers to the limits of estimates, but also informs intelligence collectors of the needs for fur ther information. In fact,
one job of national intelligence officers is to serve as issue coordinators, to identify gaps in the community's knowledge and provide that information to the
director of the cia and the executive committee of the intelligence community to help them plan collection programs.
Another way to enrich national intelligence estimates is to explore the reasons agencies hold different views on specific issues. Providing alternative views
is better than suppressing them in favor of vague or ambiguous consensus; yet alternative views have often been presented without much explanation of
the basis of the disagreement. Such explanations can be illuminating. Are the facts in dispute? Are agen cies and their staffs using different conceptual
frameworks? Is it a cup-half-full versus cup-half-empty dispute? Policymakers are most helped by estimates that indicate clearly what all agencies agree is
known and not known, what they disagree about and what the evi dence is for each position. Indeed, differing interpretations do not need agency
sponsors. In the always foggy estimative arena, analysts within agencies often differ on how to interpret sparse or ambiguous material. The most
responsible course in such cases is to describe the various plausible interpretations and lay out the evidence for each.
As for the problem that there is now a greater proportion of mys teries to secrets in estimative questions, the solution lies in paying more attention to
outside and open sources of information. A high proportion of the information needed to analyze Cold War subjects involved secrets that had to be

That is still true today

clandestinely collected, while open sources often provided little help.

for closed societies such as Iraq or North Korea.
But on many key issues, clan destine sources may provide only a small, though still useful, por tion. Open sources provide context. The combination
provides a unique resource that policymakers could not obtain merely from read ing the journals, assuming they had time to do so.

intelligence analysts are like people assembling a jigsaw puzzle who have some nifty
nuggets inside a box but need to see the picture on the cover to understand how they fit .
Those pictures are drawn by outsiders in universities, think tanks, businesses, nongovernmental orga nizations and the press.
National estimates on many subjects today greatly benefit from the insights of outside
analysts. It is important for intelligence analysts to keep up with open lit erature. Managers should also look to outside training and use con sultants
In a sense,

and conferences. And in estimates, it helps to describe the range of academic views so that policymakers can calibrate where the intelligence community
stands. In some cases,

estimates.

outside experts may even answer key estimative questions or produce parallel

K2 Adaptation
Intelligence key to adapt to post-warming threats
Hughes and Stoddart 12 (2012, R. Gerald, PhD, director of the Centre for
Intelligence and International Security Studies, Lecturer in Military History, Aberystwyth
University, Scotland, and Kristan, PhD, Lecturer in International Politics and the Cyber
Dimension, Aberystwyth University, Scotland, Hope and Fear: Intelligence and the Future of
Global Security a Decade after 9/11, Intelligence and National Security Volume 27, Issue 5,
2012, taylor and francis)
New Challenges and Over the Horizon Threats
In the post 9/11 world (which has become as familiar a refrain to us as the post Cold War world was at one
time) these differing approaches are both a cause of unity and division. Thus, the common goal of reducing the
threat from transnational terrorism is matched by a failure to agree on the measures required.34This post 9/11
world did not end with the death of Osama bin Laden on 2 May 2011.35Neither did terrorism.

However the decade following the 9/11 attacks has been a fertile ground for debates
regarding intelligence failure. These have, naturally, often focused on the intelligence
establishments themselves.36Such debates have been accompanied, in the generality, by
controversies over the ethics of warfare and ethics of intelligence collection, analysis and
dissemination. As one might expect these debates have often focused on the conduct of the War on Terror' and
the reasons for the invasion of Iraq in 2003.37And intelligence is certainly in the frontline in the fight against
terrorism.38But the use and function of intelligence is nothing if not controversial. The 2010 book by the late Brian
Jones, Failing Intelligence, highlighted once again the ongoing debate regarding intelligence in the context of Iraqi
WMD and the 2003 invasion39and the complex implications regarding intelligence assessments and the producerconsumer relationship.40

One of the absolute necessities of intelligence is the flexibility to combat new or emerging
challenges (in today's world in fields as wide-ranging as environmental intelligence and cyber
warfare).41And, thanks to the rapid advances in global communications, any action, inaction or
failure on the part of the intelligence agencies can potentially be exposed instantaneously to
a global audience.42 This necessarily affects the nature of the product itself, but also the means of
procurement and analysis, and the organizations that deal with it .43Given diminishing resources
brought about by the global economic downturn, intelligence organizations are increasingly under pressure to
successfully map out priorities in advance of events. These priorities encompass both traditional security challenges
as well as increasingly complex and inter-connected non-traditional problems. As DCI Porter J. Goss told the US
Senate in 2005: We need to make tough decisions about which haystacks deserve to be scrutinized for the needles
that can hurt us most. And we know in this information age that there are endless haystacks everywhere'.44
Chad Briggs and Michael Warner demonstrate the manner in which new challenges for
intelligence agencies demand constant innovation and reappraisal by intelligence agencies .
Briggs argues that the prevalence of non-predictive factors in climate change data is now
accepted as the norm by the US government. It thus accepts with equanimity that: The future may
look nothing like the present. He goes on to say although scenario planning can help map out

future environmental changes the rules of environmental behaviour have shifted which
begins to set important boundaries regarding predictability and preventive action .45 Climate
change is no respecter of national boundaries and is one of the core transnational issues
dealt with (with limited results) at intergovernmental level through the United Nations and G-20 group of
nations. The role of intelligence in providing potential forewarning to future trends with
attendant securitization impacts will have a potentially pivotal role for national and global-level
debates and discourses in this area.

Intel improvement key to AVERT geopolitical conflicts from ecochange

Briggs 12 (2012, Chad, PhD, Minerva Chair of Energy and Environmental Security at Air
University (US Air Force), Senior Fellow at the Institute for Environmental Security in The
Hague, former Senior Advisor at the US Department of Energy, principal consultant with

GlobalInt LLC, Developing Strategic and Operational Environmental Intelligence

Capabilities, Intelligence and National Security Volume 27, Issue 5, 2012, taylor and francis)
This article examines the role of environmental change in conducting intelligence assessments,
and the important role in integrating scientific data with background assumptions behind military
and security planning. Tracing the development of environmental security concepts, recent military and
intelligence interest in climate and environmental changes are based on practical concerns
over critical vulnerabilities of infrastructure, energy supplies, and system stability . Examples
from Central Asia illustrate the cascading nature of environmental security risks , particularly
with water and energy systems. The discussion follows with how scenarios and risk assessments can be
integrated with concepts from environmental net assessments, and why traditional assumptions of probabilities,
uncertainties and secrecy may be misleading. It is essential to understand not only how extreme

future changes might be, but what capabilities we and allies posses to adapt to
environmental-related hazards.
Introduction

Intelligence services and operations have existed for centuries , becoming more professionalized in
the twentieth century in response to greater needs for technical expertise, and in recognition of severe
consequences of inaction or surprise. A combination of events during the Second World War, notably the 1941
attack on Pearl Harbor in addition to the advent of nuclear weapons, largely shaped intelligence organizations in the
United States.1 Despite the historical importance of environmental and energy issues in

operational conduct of conflicts, intelligence analysis has been overwhelmingly concerned

with actions of foreign countries and risks of violent action (often military or terrorist).2 Yet
viewed from the perspective of intelligence as a general activity of analysis, the Central Intelligence
Agency's (CIA) definition can be interpreted more broadly: Reduced to its simplest terms,
intelligence is knowledge and foreknowledge of the world around us the prelude to
decision and action by US policy-makers.3
Early warning intelligence post 9/11 is often popularly understood to mean warning against
specific attacks or actions by terrorists, but its historic usefulness has been in providing a
credible background for understanding the world and what risks are possible . A fully developed

system of early warning can help provide planning capabilities for new and emerging risks or, as Sir David Omand
writes: The intention of such analysis is less to guide prediction of what will happen than to provide a rational basis
for the identification of national and international capabilities that may be needed to cope with the range of futures
thus identified.4This line of reasoning has been further expanded by Leon Fuerth, who has described the everincreasing complexity of security risks (along with the difficulties associated with anticipatory governance of longrange and emerging security challenges).5
An underlying component of such complex risks has been environmental factors , referring to
the physical environment within which potential risks and conflict take place. The majority of current security
planning takes environmental conditions as largely static, assuming either a steady-state background or the
existence of normal conditions within a historically established variation. As scientific capabilities have

grown in recent decades, background knowledge of atmospheric, oceanographic, or

geographical conditions may have been taken for granted by many intelligence analysts ,
leading to continued assumptions of static environmental conditions during
scenario planning. Increasingly, scientific research has indicated that boundary conditions are changing in
environmental systems on a global scale, meaning that the rules of behavior for climate, weather, and ecosystems
have themselves shifted, and with them the ability to predict future environmental conditions. Often, predictive

models use initial starting conditions and project linear trend lines to indicate future
conditions, but in environmental systems non-linear shifts are much more common than the
models suggest.6 Complex and chaotic systems resist easy prediction (think of weather reports
beyond three days), while at the same time underlying conditions themselves are changing . The
future may look nothing like the present.
That climate and environmental changes may pose new risks to security and intelligence
agencies has been well documented in recent years.7 The US National Intelligence Council refers to climate
change as a potential threat multiplier, and has warned of the risks to political stability posed by shifting
temperatures, precipitation, and sea levels.8 What is less clear is how security agencies and military
services translate scientific data into actionable intelligence , or how general warnings of
increased risk globally can be scaled down to specific geographical regions . This article lays out
the risk and vulnerability framework available to intelligence services, and how scenario planning can
translate complex scientific data into early warning capabilities .9 In contrast to common

assumptions of resource degradation leading directly to violent conflict, providing early

warning of environmental risks requires a new suite of approaches, based on vulnerability and risk
assessments of systems underlying security.

K2 Solve Structural Violence

Surveillance and intel support disaster relief and humanitarian
assistance.
Petijean 13 (Mirielle, Major in the United States Air Force, winter 2013, Intelligence Support to Disaster
Relief and Humanitarian Assistance,
http://www.afio.com/publications/Petitjean_ISR_Spt_to_HA_DR_WinterSpring2013_AFIOIntelligencer.pdf)

In the last few years, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities
have played an important role in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. Due to
changes in law and policies that allow for more flexibility in the use of intelligence
systems within the United States and the dissemination of intelligence products at
lower classification levels, ISR assets help identify for first responders, federal civil
agencies, and government and private aid organizations, the areas where relief
efforts should be focused and what kind of supplies and aid victims need. This article
highlights the usage of ISR for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief over the last
decade. The value of intelligence for situational awareness has been known for

decades. The National Geospatial Intelligence Agency (NGA), the US governments

imagery intelligence (IMINT) manager, has supported disaster relief operations in
the US since 1992. Hurricane Katrina in 2005, however, was the first time that
classified national capabilities, Air Force, Air National Guard, and Department of
Homeland Security ISR assets were all deployed in support of domestic national
disaster relief operations.2 Changes in law after the 2001 terrorist attacks on the US
allowed for increased flexibility in the use of ISR assets to complement and improve
major domestic emergency and disaster response operations.

K2 Solve Dicrimination
Intel improvement key to reducing discrimination
The Economist 15(editorial article by D.K., The lessons of Baltimore, Race and Criminal

Justice section, http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2015/04/race-andcriminal-justice)

In Baltimore the murder rate has fallen by a fifth since its peak in the 1990s , but the
clearance rate for murders is still well under 50%, compared with a national average of 65%.
The Baltimore police department has too few officers3,000 or soto investigate

more than 200 murders a year while also doing everything else that modern police
departments have to do. And because they are overwhelmed, they struggle to gain
the trust they need to get people to talk to them , and thereby to reduce the number of
murders.
In 2005 a white mayor, Martin OMalley (who now seems likely to run for president),
introduced zero tolerance policing, urging cops to stop and search young men acting
suspiciously for guns or drugs. In that year, the citys police made 100,000 arrests,

among a population only six times that. Within a few years that policy was
abandoned in favour of a more targeted approachbut only after huge damage had
been done to relations between the police and black civilians.
The only long-term way to reduce violence is to know more about who is
perpetrating it . That means creating an environment where people have faith
that the law will protect themsomething that most Americans take for granted but
residents of inner cities do not. The Boston Gun Project showed that by a mix of
intelligence and aggressive targeting of people involved in shootings, the
murder rate in black inner-city neighbourhoods can be cut substantially. In
Britain, projects such as the Trident programme in London, in which specialised officers built
up close links with the friends and relatives of suspected criminals, have had a similar effect
in reducing black-on-black teenage knife and gun crime.

Intel Good: Heg

K2 heg
Intel capability crucial to resolving multiple hegemony scenarios
Vickers 2/27/13 STATEMENT OF DR. MICHAEL G. VICKERS, UNDER SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE THE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE IN
THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE,
EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES OF THE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION HEARING HELD
FEBRUARY 27, 2013
First and foremost, we seek nothing less than the strategic defeat of Al Qaeda
dismantling and defeating core Al Qaeda in the 3 Pakistan-Afghanistan region, defeating its
affiliates on the Arabian Peninsula, in Iraq and Syria, and in East and North Africa, and
preventing the group from reconstituting. Second, we must successfully transition our
mission in Afghanistan. Third, as the Arab world undergoes a historic transition, we
must posture ourselves for the new normal that brings with it increased instability and
violence, and we must accelerate the transition to a representative government in Syria.
Fourth, we must prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and
associated delivery systems, specifically, but not exclusively, with regard to Iran and North
Korea. Fifth, we must defend against cyber threats . Sixth, we must deter and, if
necessary, defeat aggression and ensure our continued access to the global commons
and to critical regions such as East Asia. To be successful in this effort, we must be able to
counter rapidly evolving anti-access/aerial denial threats. Seventh, we must ensure
that we continue to provide decisive intelligence and decision advantage to our
national policymakers, and our operators and warfighters, and that we are postured to
prevent strategic surprise. Finally, we must ensure the continued economic leadership of the
United States. This is the foundation upon which our long-term national security rests. At the
same time as our intelligence and defense budgets are declining, the challenges, as you
noted, Mr. Chairman, are increasing and becoming more complex. Intelligence is a major

source of U.S. advantage. It informs wise policy and it enables precision operations.
It is our front line of defense.

Intel Good: Counterprolif

K2 counterprolif
Intel crucial to slow prolif highest risk despite defense
Hansen and Graham 9 Preventing Catastrophe: The Use and Misuse of Intelligence in
Efforts to Halt the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (Stanford Security Studies)
Ambassador Thomas Graham Jr. is one of the world's leading experts in nuclear nonproliferation. He is a senior U.S. diplomat involved in the negotiation of every single
international arms control and non-proliferation agreement from 1970 to 1997. This includes
the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT Treaties), the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties
(START Treaties), the Anti-ballistic missile (ABM) Treaty, Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
Treaty (INF) Treaty, Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty (NPT), Treaty
on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty and Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban
Treaty (CTBT). In 1993, Ambassador Graham served as Acting Director of the Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) from January to November, 1993 and Acting Deputy
Director from November, 1993 to July, 1994. From 1994 through 1997, he was president Bill
Clinton's special representative for Arms Control, Non-Proliferation, and Disarmament.
Graham successfully led the U.S. government efforts to achieve the permanent extension of
the NPT in 1995. Graham also served for 15 years as the general counsel of ACDA.
Throughout his career, Thomas Graham has worked with six U.S. Presidents including
Presidents Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford,Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan, George H. W. Bush, and
Bill Clinton. [Book 1] Ambassador Graham worked on the negotiation of the Chemical
Weapons Convention and the Biological Weapons Convention and managed the Senate
approval of the ratification of the Geneva Protocol banning the use of chemical and
biological weapons in war, as well as the Biological Weapons Convention. [Web 1][Book 2]
Conclusion: Is It Possible
to Prevent Future Proliferation? This book has attempted to show that efforts to monitor
and limit the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapon programs pose unique
challenges not only to the United States but also to the international community. While
proliferation (and an intelligence focus on it) is not a new, twenty-first century phenomenon,
the urgency of detecting and correctly understanding clandestine weapon programs,
especially nuclear, has increased with the possibility of international terrorists
obtaining and using nuclear, chemical, or biological agents or weapons. Consequently, the
Intelligence Community and policymakers have had to adjust their thinking about the nature
of the threat, the approach that needs to be taken to deal with it, and the likelihood of
achieving positive results. As we have explained in this book, over the past fifty years the
United States and international community have had considerable success in slowing
down the proliferation of nuclear weapons by nation-states through measures such as
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, although the cases of India, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Libya,
North Korea, Pakistan, and possibly Syria demonstrate that clandestine programs are often
not easy to detect and stop. And the challenge posed in understanding the extent of the A.
Q. Khan black market nuclear proliferation network demonstrated that the supply of
technology and equipment is difficult to track, especially when in the hands of non-state
actors. The chemical and biological weapons conventions have undoubtedly contributed to
the international effort to harness the proliferation of those weapons, but as we have
discussed, the clandestine production of such agents is much less problematic for nationstates than is the clandestine production of nuclear weapons. However, past
accomplishments in identifying and preventing proliferation are no guarantee of
future success. Good intelligence, wise policymaking, good cooperation among federal
and local law enforcement and intelligence organizations, and effective international
cooperation will clearly be required to prevent weapons from reaching the hands of
international terrorists. As the Iraqi, Iranian, Libyan, and North Korean cases have
demonstrated, intelligence analysis and judgments are often less than perfect, even on the

activities of nation-states. International agreements and inspections may inhibit proliferation

but certainly do not ensure that proliferation efforts are not under way, especially with nonstate actors. Additional creative, cooperative approaches are required. Given the inaccurate
intelligence estimate prepared and disseminated by the IC on Iraqs WMD programs in
October 2002, some have asked whether the US Intelligence Community is up to the task of
monitoring and correctly reporting on the status of small, clandestine nuclear, chemical, and
biological weapons programs. The IC has tried to learn from its past mistakes and to
correct its shortcomings. As the preface to the unclassified judgments from the national
intelligence estimate on Irans nuclear weapon program, released in December 2007,
indicated, the IC has adopted changes, such as a more thorough vetting of sources, in
preparing and presenting its findingsalong with explaining more carefully the basis for
findingsto avoid repeating past mistakes and misunderstandings regarding its judgments.
However, since no two situations are exactly alike, success in discovering a clandestine
program in one country docs not guarantee success in another. Moreover, some of the
fixes to the Intelligence Community, especially those that are purely bureaucratic at upper
levels, can create as many difficulties as they are designed to solve. And as discussed, the
effort to monitor and prevent the proliferation of WMD technology, expertise, and equipment
to international terrorists is even more challenging than monitoring the activities of nationstates. It requires effective cooperation at multiple levels within and across national
boundaries. The United States adopted structural and bureaucratic changes following the
9/11 attacks that have most likely improved information sharing and policy coordination
against potential terrorist attacks, especially those that might involve nuclear, chemical, or
biological weapons. Less clear is whether these changes have improved the ICs ability to
monitor and understand clandestine proliferation efforts by nation-states. Establishing the
Department of Homeland Security has certainly improved information sharing between
federal and local intelligence and law enforcement organizations as well as the coordination
of defensive measures against future terrorist attacks. And establishing the position of
Director of National Intelligence based on recommendations from the 9/11 Commission
Report promises to improve the ICs information sharing and performance at least in certain
areas. However, measures such as restructuring at the top (sometimes referred to as
rearranging the chairs on the A deck of a cruise ship), throwing in more money, and creating
a new organization chart do not necessarily affect activities or improve performance lower
down in the bureaucracy, where actual collection and analytic activities are performed.
Some of the ICs responsibilities may have been made even more difficult, including the
monitoring and analysis of clandestine WMD programs. For example, because foreign
intelligence services are probably somewhat unsure as to who is actually running US
intelligence, they may be more hesitant to share key pieces of information. Should they
establish liaison with members of the DNIs growing staff or retain their traditional liaison
relationship with the CIA? Most are probably doing a little of both until they are sure which
address really counts!1 Moreover, making structural changes in response to one crisis (such
as the lack of tactical warning about the attacks of September 11, 2001) does not
necessarily make the Intelligence Community immune to future failures in other areas, such
as detecting and accurately understanding proliferation activities. The reorganization did not
alter any of the essential levers of power, such as Department of Defense control over most
intelligence resources. From what has been described in this book, there seems little
relationship between the problems the IC faced in assessing Iraqs WMD programs and the
restructuring of the Intelligence Community in 2004. Nevertheless, the Senate Report, WMD
Commission, and Kerr internal study (sec Chapter 5) did offer helpful observations on pitfalls
to avoid and approaches to improve intelligence collection and analysis with regard to
proliferation issues. As we have noted, the task of understanding whether a WMD program
exists, as well as determining its status, depends on the type of weapon in question. It also
depends on understanding and factoring in what we know about context, motives,
intentions, ongoing efforts, and capabilities achieved by potential state or non-state
proliferators. This knowledge in turn requires effective and thoughtful management and use
of all collection disciplines and appropriate analytical methodologies. It also requires that

collectors and analysts work together as a team, especially to ensure that reliability and
motives of human sources are vetted properly and that information is understood in the
appropriate context. Future success in collecting information for the effective monitoring
of clandestine proliferation activities in the twenty-first century is not assured, just as it
was not during Cold War efforts to monitor Soviet military forces. Effective human source
and technical collection require careful analysis of the problems the United States
faces, careful planning and execution of agent recruitment and development programs,
diligent vetting of human sources, and patience. Hiring officers with appropriate cultural
and linguistic skills must go hand in hand with training in human collection tradecraft, if the
US Intelligence Community ever hopes to recruit foreign agents with the access and
reliability required to penetrate proliferation programs. For technical collection, creativity
and ingenuity are required for breaking into the covert activities of those who will use every
means available to deny, conceal, and mislead. For analysts, success in understanding the
collected bits of information requires, as learned from the Iraqi case, the ability to think
outside the box and to apply the relevant cultural and historical lenses. Challenging
assumptions and considering alternative explanations are critical to effective analysis and to
reaching accurate judgments. The IC must train its intelligence analysts to be bold in making
informed judgments and to be diligent in explaining what they know, what they do not know,
and expressing the level of confidence in their judgments. This tradecraft of intelligence
analysis is not new, but the stakes are quite high when the IC fails to learn from the
past or fails to apply due diligence in analyzing available data, both with respect to
credibility and importance. And policymakers must work cooperatively with intelligence
officers, challenging them to be thorough but avoiding efforts to politicize judgments. Thus,
one should not assume that the post-9/11 legislation establishing the Department of
Homeland Security and the Director of National Intelligence will have fixed all problems or
will prevent intelligence failures in the future. To think so would show a lack of understanding
of the intelligence business, which deals with uncertainty, ambiguity, incomplete data, and a
dynamically evolving world. Apart from the alleged shortcomings of the Intelligence
Communitys reorganization in Washington and potential misuse of intelligence judgments
by policymakers in the future, the IC must keep in mind that one of its chief responsibilities
is to warn policymakers and help them avoid potentially tragic blind spots on what is
surfacing in the world around them. Intelligence officers must have the courage to report to
policymakers what they need to hear, whether or not they wish to hear it. On the
intelligence task of detecting and monitoring clandestine nuclear, chemical, and biological
weapons programs it appears appropriate to paraphrase former DCI Tenets concluding
remarks from his speech at Georgetown University in February 2004. The remarks are not a
rationalization for the ICs failure to assess correctly the status of Saddams WMD programs
but rather a realistic recognition of the challenges intelligence faces. In sum, he said that
intelligence deals with the unclear, the unknown, and the deliberately hidden. Uncertainties
in intelligence information are significant, and analysts must fill in the gaps with informed
judgments. Tenet ended by saying that in the intelligence business one is almost never
completely wrong nor completely right. Mistakes are disappointing and dangerous, and when
the 1C makes them it must figure out why and fix the problem .2 That certainly is the
communitys duty to the nation; in turn the American people must give the IC their full
support to maximize its effectiveness as the first line of defense against threats in the
twenty-first century, which most likely will include WMD proliferation, especially to terrorists.
The United States must recognize that terrorist use of one or more WMD is the
principal external threat that it faces as a nation and as a member of the world
community. While it is possible to make it more difficult for nation-states to acquire or
proliferate these types of weapons, it may be overly optimistic to think that such
activities can be prevented. Even benign assistance in the field of nuclear technology for
purposes sanctioned by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, such as the enrichment of
uranium for research or power reactors, can lead to the clandestine misuse of nuclear
expertise, facilities, and material by nation-states that can then be passed on to or stolen by

terrorists. As we stated earlier, the war on terror will be easier to win if terrorists have only
conventional means with which to strike; however, if more rogue states acquire WMD,
especially nuclear, the chances will increase that international terrorists wil l acquire
and use them. The consequences could be catastrophic for the world community. It is of

the greatest importance, therefore, to inhibit and, if possible, prevent the further
spread of nuclear weapons, along with other WMD, to states not committed to the
world community such as Iran and North Korea. The more widely weapons
proliferate, the more likely they will be used in warfare and the greater the risk
they will be acquired, and used, by international terrorists. The administration and
Congress must give the Intelligence Community the resources, authorities, and
support it needs to effectively monitor proliferation activities. For its part, the IC must
remain diligent, apolitical, and objective in its judgments. It must also adapt and think
outside the box to detect and understand novel efforts to proliferate, especially to non-state
actors. And for its part, the policy community must responsibly use the intelligence it is
given without trying to politicize intelligence judgments or misuse them to fit policy biases
and preferences. It must also weigh carefully intelligence provided by other countries and
information from international inspections. The world has seen what happens when
intelligence is off the mark, when the international community is unable to cooperate, and
when policymakers choose to misconstrue intelligence judgments to justify their preferred
policy. We, the authors, judge that the George YV. Bush administration has left a legacy on
US intelligence which isas often the case with administrations led by either partya mixed
bag (see Appendix K). While the administration gave the US Intelligence Community strong
support in many areas, the intelligence-policymaker relationship was put under considerable
strain. Its handling of intense political criticism for its decision to use military force to
remove Saddam Hussein led it to blame the Intelligence Community for a poorly conceived
policy; some in the administration sought analysis outside of the 1C to support its policy
decisions. We underscore the words of columnist David Ignatius quoted in Chapter 5: When
we assess the CIA, we should understand that many of its supposed failures really have
another addressthe White House. Exaggerating and misconstruing available intelligence
can lead to bad policy decisions. This does not excuse the shortcomings of the IC, however,
which as we stated in Chapter 5 should have offered a more thorough and accurate
assessment of Iraqs WMD capabilities and perhaps provided an even more forceful warning
about the risks of using military force in Iraq. To be successful in future nonproliferation
efforts, the United States will need to heal its internal bureaucratic wounds and
establish a collegiality that will fuse good intelligence collection and analysis with good
policy making. Such fusion is essential to national security, and fortunately it normally
prevails. There are ups and downs within every administration (see Appendix K), and
wounds from the Iraqi WMD crisis will also heal. But the nation has come through a
particularly difficult time. There is a real danger that the general mistrust of US intelligence
which has resulted from the criticisms and various investigations following the 9/11 and Iraqi
WMD episodes maybe spilling over into criticisms of, and constraints on, US corporations,
which have patriotically supported intelligence activities against proliferation and
international terrorists. This is particularly true of telecommunications companies that
assisted the Bush administrations terrorist surveillance programs which have come under
attack. Companies that have in the past supported intelligence efforts can rightfully fear that
they will be exposed and subject to legal consequences for aiding such efforts in the future.
If this proves to be the case, the country (and the international community) will have
suffered a significant loss of security.3 In addition, the United States must find a way to
weave together national and local intelligence more effectively as well as cooperate more
harmoniously with the international community, despite differences of perception and
national interest. In conjunction with the international community, the United States must
pressure countries to control the supply side of proliferation (transferring critical technology,
material, or actual weapons) as well as promote arms control, nonproliferation and
countcrproliferation measures to deter nations and terrorists from clandestinely acquiring

WMD. US intelligence and policymakers must take advantage of international inspections

and liaison information from like-minded countries to ensure that all channels of information
are available and shared, especially in areas of the world where the United States does not
have a presence. The increasing availability of commercial overhead photography from
satellites with ever-increasing resolution should be helpful. The public must be included,
where possible, to help Washington pursue this difficult task. Even Internet users, using
Google Earth, should be persuaded to be part of the battle against international terrorism.
We conclude that the path ahead will be difficult. We live in a far more dangerous world
than was ever imagined at the end of the Cold War. The continued efforts of an extremist
Islamic regime in Iran to achieve nuclear weapons capability and the possibility of a

future Pakistani government taking a Taliban-like course would certainly increase

the risks of nuclear proliferation among Arab states in the Middle East as well as the
provision of nuclear expertise and material to terrorist organizations such as Hamas,
Hezbollah, or al-Qaeda. Moreover, a failure to denuclearize North Korea, especially if that
state became more aggressive and bellicose as a result, would increase the chances that
Japan and South Korea would choose to go nuclear. The first line of defense is good
intelligence, and the US Intelligence Community is the finest the world has ever
seen. Mistakes have been made and will be made in the future, for that is the nature of the
uncertain and ambiguous world of intelligence. But for the most part the dedicated
professionals in the CIA and its sister organizations in the Intelligence Community have
served the United States and its citizens well. Through the ups and downs of attempting to
understand dynamic world events and trying to give insightful support to administrations,
Intelligence Community professionals must maintain their integrity, honesty, perseverance,
courage, and commitment to serve the national security needs of the United States. And the
citizens of the United States must ensure that the Intelligence Community has the best and
brightest individuals the country can offer, as well as the resources they need to give us the
security we need.

US intelligence is key to control the rate of nuclear weapons

proliferation globally empirically proven
Graham and Hansen 09 (2009, Thomas, JD, former General Counsel and Acting Director
of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, involved in negotiations for
every major arms control and nonproliferation agreement from 1970 to 1997, including
START, SALT, the CTBT, the INF Treaty, and the ABM Treaty, former member of the United
Arab Emirates International Advisory Board, helping to guide that countrys nuclear energy
program, and Keith, PREVENTING CATASTROPHE: The Use and Misuse of Intelligence in
Efforts to Halt the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Stanford Security Studies,
p. 187-94)
efforts to monitor and limit the proliferation of nuclear, chemical,
and biological weapon programs pose unique challenges not only to the United States but also to
the international community. While proliferation (and an intelligence focus on it) is not a new, twentyfirst
century phenomenon, the urgency of detecting and correctly understanding clandestine weapon
programs, especially nuclear, has increased with the possibility of international terrorists
obtaining and using nuclear, chemical, or biological agents or weapons . Consequently, the
Intelligence Community and policymakers have had to adjust their thinking about the nature of the threat,
This book has attempted to show that

the approach that needs to be taken to deal with it, and the likelihood of achieving positive results.

over the past fifty years the United States and international
community have had considerable success in slowing down the proliferation of
nuclear weapons by nation-states through measures such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, although the
cases of India, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Libya, North Korea, Pakistan, and possibly Syria demonstrate
that clandestine programs are often not easy to detect and stop. And the challenge posed in understanding the
As we have explained in this book,

extent of the A. Q. Khan black market nuclear proliferation network demonstrated that the supply of technology and equipment is
difficult to track, especially when in the hands of non-state actors. The chemical and biological weapons conventions have
undoubtedly contributed to the international effort to harness the proliferation of those weapons, but as we have discussed, the

clandestine production of such agents is much less problematic for nation-states than is the clandestine production of nuclear
weapons.

past accomplishments in identifying and preventing proliferation are no guarantee of

future success. Good intelligence, wise policymaking, good cooperation among federal and local law enforcement
and intelligence organizations, and effective international cooperation will clearly be required to
prevent weapons from reaching the hands of international terrorists. As the Iraqi, Iranian, Libyan, and
North Korean cases have demonstrated, intelligence analysis and judgments are often less than perfect ,
even on the activities of nation-states. International agreements and inspections may inhibit
proliferation but certainly do not ensure that proliferation efforts are not under
way, especially with non-state actors. Additional creative, cooperative approaches are required.
Given the inaccurate intelligence estimate prepared and disseminated by the IC on Iraqs WMD programs in
October 2002, some have asked whether the US Intelligence Community is up to the task of
monitoring and correctly reporting on the status of small, clandestine nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons programs. The IC
has tried to learn from its past mistakes and to correct its shortcomings. As the preface to the
However,

unclassified judgments from the national intelligence estimate on Irans nuclear weapon program, released in December 2007,

the IC has adopted changes, such as a more thorough vetting of sources, in preparing and
with explaining more carefully the basis for findings to avoid
repeating past mistakes and misunderstandings regarding its judgments. However, since no two
situations are exactly alike, success in discovering a clandestine program in one country does not
guarantee success in another. Moreover, some of the fixes to the Intelligence Community, especially those that are
indicated,

presenting its findingsalong

purely bureaucratic at upper levels, can create as many difficulties as they are designed to solve. And as discussed, the effort to
monitor and prevent the proliferation of WMD technology, expertise, and equipment to international terrorists is even more
challenging than monitoring the activities of nation-states. It requires effective cooperation at multiple levels within and across
national boundaries.

The United States adopted structural and bureaucratic changes following the 9/11 attacks that have
most likely improved information sharing and policy coordination against potential terrorist attacks, especially
those that might involve nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons. Less clear is whether these changes have improved the ICs
ability to monitor and understand clandestine proliferation efforts by nation-states. Establishing the Department of Homeland
Security has certainly improved information sharing between federal and local intelligence and law enforcement organizations as
well as the coordination of defensive measures against future terrorist attacks. And establishing the position of Director of National
Intelligence based on recommendations from the 9/11 Commission Report promises to improve the ICs information sharing and
performance at least in certain areas.

measures such as restructuring at the top (sometimes referred to as rearranging the chairs on the A
throwing in more money, and creating a new organization chart do not
necessarily affect activities or improve performance lower down in the
bureaucracy, where actual collection and analytic activities are performed. Some of the ICs
responsibilities may have been made even more difficult, including the monitoring and
analysis of clandestine WMD programs. For example, because foreign intelligence services are probably somewhat
However,

deck of a cruise ship),

unsure as to who is actually running US intelligence, they may be more hesitant to share key pieces of information. Should they
establish liaison with members of the DNIs growing staff or retain their traditional liaison relationship with the CIA? Most are
probably doing a little of both until they are sure which address really counts!1

making structural changes in response to one crisis (such as the lack of tactical warning about the
does not necessarily make the Intelligence Community immune to
future failures in other areas, such as detecting and accurately understanding proliferation activities. The reorganization did
Moreover,

attacks of September 11, 2001)

not alter any of the essential levers of power, such as Department of Defense control over most intelligence resources. From what
has been described in this book, there seems little relationship between the problems the IC faced in assessing Iraqs WMD
programs and the restructuring of the Intelligence Community in 2004. Nevertheless, the Senate Report, WMD Commission, and Kerr
internal study (see Chapter 5) did offer helpful observations on pitfalls to avoid and approaches to improve intelligence collection
and analysis with regard to proliferation issues.
As we have noted, the task of understanding whether a WMD program exists, as well as determining its status, depends on the type
of weapon in question. It also depends on understanding and factoring in what we know about context, motives, intentions, ongoing
efforts, and capabilities achieved by potential state or non-state proliferators. This knowledge in turn requires effective and
thoughtful management and use of all collection disciplines and appropriate analytical methodologies. It also requires that collectors
and analysts work together as a team, especially to ensure that reliability and motives of human sources are vetted properly and
that information is understood in the appropriate context.

Future success in collecting information for the effective monitoring of clandestine

proliferation activities in the twenty-first century is not assured, just as it was not during Cold War efforts
to monitor Soviet military forces. Effective human source and technical collection require careful analysis of the problems the United
States faces, careful planning and execution of agent recruitment and development programs, diligent vetting of human sources,
and patience. Hiring officers with appropriate cultural and linguistic skills must go hand in hand with training in human collection
tradecraft, if the US Intelligence Community ever hopes to recruit foreign agents with the access and reliability required to penetrate
proliferation programs. For technical collection, creativity and ingenuity are required for breaking into the covert activities of those
who will use every means available to deny, conceal, and mislead. For analysts, success in understanding the collected bits of
information requires, as learned from the Iraqi case, the ability to think outside the box and to apply the relevant cultural and
historical lenses. Challenging assumptions and considering alternative explanations are critical to effective analysis and to reaching
accurate judgments.

The IC must train its intelligence analysts to be bold in making informed

judgments and to be diligent in explaining what they know, what they do not know, and
expressing the level of confidence in their judgments . This tradecraft of intelligence
analysis is not new, but the stakes are quite high when the IC fails to learn from
the past or fails to apply due diligence in analyzing available data, both with
respect to credibility and importance . And policymakers must work cooperatively with intelligence officers,
challenging them to be thorough but avoiding efforts to politicize judgments.

one should not assume that the post9/11 legislation establishing the Department of Homeland
will have fixed all problems or will prevent intelligence failures in the
future. To think so would show a lack of understanding of the intelligence business, which deals with
Thus,

Security and the Director of National Intelligence

uncertainty, ambiguity, incomplete data, and a dynamically evolving world.

Apart from the alleged shortcomings of the Intelligence Communitys reorganization in Washington and potential misuse of

the IC must keep in mind that one of its chief

responsibilities is to warn policymakers and help them avoid potentially tragic blind
spots on what is surfacing in the world around them. Intelligence officers must have the courage to report to
intelligence judgments by policymakers in the future,

policymakers what they need to hear, whether or not they wish to hear it.
On the intelligence task of detecting and monitoring clandestine nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons programs it appears
appropriate to paraphrase former DCI Tenets concluding remarks from his speech at Georgetown University in February 2004. The
remarks are not a rationalization for the ICs failure to assess correctly the status of Saddams WMD programs but rather a realistic

intelligence deals with the unclear, the

unknown, and the deliberately hidden. Uncertainties in intelligence information are significant, and
analysts must fill in the gaps with informed judgments. Tenet ended by saying that in the intelligence business one is
almost never completely wrong nor completely right. Mistakes are disappointing and dangerous , and when the IC
recognition of the challenges intelligence faces. In sum, he said that

makes them it must figure out why and fix the problem.2 That certainly is the communitys duty to the nation; in turn the

American people must give the IC their full support to maximize its effectiveness as the first
line of defense against threats in the twenty-first century, which most likely will include WMD
proliferation , especially to terrorists.
The United States must recognize that terrorist use of one or more WMD is the principal external threat
that it faces as a nation and as a member of the world community . While it is possible to
make it more difficult for nationstates to acquire or proliferate these types of weapons, it may
be overly optimistic to think that such activities can be prevented. Even benign assistance in the field of
nuclear technology for purposes sanctioned by the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty, such as the enrichment of uranium for research
or power reactors, can lead to the clandestine misuse of nuclear expertise, facilities, and material by nation-states that can then be
passed on to or stolen by terrorists. As we stated earlier, the war on terror will be easier to win if terrorists have only conventional

if more rogue states acquire WMD, especially nuclear, the chances

will increase that international terrorists will acquire and use them. The consequences
could be catastrophic for the world community .
It is of the greatest importance, therefore, to inhibit and, if possible, prevent the further spread of
nuclear weapons, along with other WMD, to states not committed to the world community such as Iran
and North Korea. The more widely weapons proliferate, the more likely they will be used in
warfare and the greater the risk they will be acquired, and used, by international terrorists .
The administration and Congress must give the Intelligence Community the resources,
authorities, and support it needs to effectively monitor proliferation activities. For its part, the IC must
remain diligent, apolitical, and objective in its judgments. It must also adapt and think outside
the box to detect and understand novel efforts to proliferate , especially to non-state actors. And for its
means with which to strike; however,

part, the policy community must responsibly use the intelligence it is given without trying to politicize intelligence judgments or
misuse them to fit policy biases and preferences. It must also weigh carefully intelligence provided by other countries and
information from international inspections.

The world has seen what happens when intelligence is off the mark , when the international
community is unable to cooperate, and when policymakers choose to misconstrue intelligence judgments to justify their preferred

We, the authors, judge that the George W. Bush administration has left a legacy on US
intelligence which isas often the case with administrations led by either partya mixed bag (see Appendix K). While
policy.

the administration gave the US Intelligence Community strong support in many areas, the intelligencepolicymaker relationship was
put under considerable strain. Its handling of intense political criticism for its decision to use military force to remove Saddam
Hussein led it to blame the Intelligence Community for a poorly conceived policy; some in the administration sought analysis outside
of the IC to support its policy decisions. We underscore the words of columnist David Ignatius quoted in Chapter 5: When we assess
the CIA, we should understand that many of its supposed failures really have another addressthe White House. Exaggerating and
misconstruing available intelligence can lead to bad policy decisions. This does not excuse the shortcomings of the IC, however,
which as we stated in Chapter 5 should have offered a more thorough and accurate assessment of Iraqs WMD capabilities and
perhaps provided an even more forceful warning about the risks of using military force in Iraq.

US intel key to counterprolif measures key to slow the rate of

spread.
CPRC 97 (1997, Counterproliferation Program Review Committee, Policy and Strategy
Perspectives for Countering Proliferation and NBC Terrorism, CPRC Annual Report To
Congress, http://www.fas.org/spp//starwars/program/cprc97/cprc9704.htm)
4.4 U. S. Intelligence Perspectives

U. S. Intelligence actively contributes to national efforts to stem proliferation by supporting

policy makers in identifying, stopping, and rolling back NBC/ M proliferation where it has
occurred. U. S. Intelligence assists in operations to slow proliferation activities and
in developing countermeasures against NBC/ M threats. Most importantly, it collects information
useful in stopping NBC/ M programs before they reach fruition or in rolling back existing
programs. U. S. Intelligence assists DoD in adapting U. S. military forces and emergency
assets to deal with these threats by: identifying capabilities, vulnerabilities, and performance
characteristics of NBC/ M threats; establishing adversary use doctrine and operational strategy ;
and providing indications and warning of potential NBC/ M use . In supporting efforts to roll back
NBC/ M proliferation, U. S. Intelligence continuously updates the status of foreign NBC/ M programs and identifies
NBC/ M program incentives, disincentives, and vulnerabilities.

Key to accurate monitoring and preventive measures all types of

WMD prolif (and bioweapons)
Schreier 09 (2009, Fred, Consultant, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of
Armed Forces, former colonel and general staff member, Swiss Ministry of Defense, Master
of Arts in Law and Diplomacy, Fletcher School, Tufts, Fighting the Pre-eminent Threats with
Intelligence-led Operations, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces
(DCAF) Occasional Paper 16)
an intelligence-led
approach is equally needed in all agencies and inspectorates that have a mission in the
prevention of the proliferation of WMD. This in the work processes of the export-import
control and licensing office; the offices that have to survey academic institutions and companies
that have stocks of pathogens, high-level microbiological containment facilities and bioreactors; the
pharmaceutical sector and biotechnology companies that have expertise in genetics and molecular
biology, and the inspectorates that have to monitor bioengineering firms as well as
consultants that could help in the industrial microbiological process . Moreover, there are the
offices mandated with the surveillance and inspection of the chemical industry , and those in
charge of security of nuclear power plants, the nuclear-fuel cycle, nuclear waste deposits, the
control of radiation protection and measurement, and the control of radioactive materials
used in hospitals, X-rays and irradiation facilities as well as in industry and for food conservation purposes. An
intelligence-led approach is equally needed in the work processes of all offices
responsible for the prevention of proliferation of missiles, materials or relevant
dual-use items. Also the organisations responsible for homeland defence, the protection of critical national
An intelligence-led approach is needed foremost in the fight against terrorism. But

infrastructures, defence against electronic and cyberattacks, and those for the mitigation of terrorist acts and for
the engagement of emergency responders should switch to intelligence-led operations.

The raison dtre of intelligence is knowledge of intentions, capabilities, methods and

means. Its essence is information plus insights derived from subject-matter knowledge. Intelligence provides
a sound basis from which inferences can be drawn to guide strategic, operational and tactical activity.
Intelligence analyses and assessments inform decision-making and preventive, preemptive and disruptive actions in ways that can make a positive difference in mission
accomplishment. Timely intelligence warns of surprises and looming crises; identifies
threats, dangers, risks and chances; monitors fast-breaking situations; illuminates issues and
detects trends. And intelligence helps decision- and policymakers consider alternative options
and outcomes. All this is also needed in other agencies and organisations of the security sector that are
mandated with combating the pre-eminent threats.

Intelligence key to stopping prolif failures and stopping terrorism

Shelton 11 Christina Shelton spent the major part of her thirty-two-year career as a
Soviet analyst and counterintelligence branch chief at the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency
(DIA). In these assignments, she authored assessments on foreign intelligence activities
impacting natio nal security issues in support of senior policymakers in the Office of the
Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. She was the DIAs representative on
Interagency Damage Assessment Teams and on a National Intelligence Estimate on Foreign
Denial and Deception. Ms. Shelton also had tours of duty in the Office of the Deputy Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy Support, and as a special assistant to the National
Counterintelligence Executive. Her book Alger Hiss: Why He Chose Treason will be published
in early 2012 by Threshold = Simon & Schuster Christina Shelton (2011) The Roots of
Analytic Failures in the U.S. Intelligence Community, International Journal of Intelligence and
CounterIntelligence, 24:4, 637-655, DOI: 10.1080/08850607.2011.598779
The record of U.S. intelligence analyses over the past half-century is not good; the political
and military leadership could have been better served. Poor judgments and inaccurate
assessments could have been prevented in many instances had analysts and management
been intellectually honest, or able to overcome their scotomas and po litical biases. Since

intelligence is decisive in the war on terrorism and in defeating the proliferation of

weapons of mass destruction (WMD) technology both of which thrive on secrecy,
deception, and covert activitydetailed, timely, objective, and reliable intelligence is
critical more than ever for early and effective action in the defense of the countrys
national security interests.

Intelligence crucial to stop WMD prolif and use

Hansen and Graham 9
Preventing Catastrophe: The Use and Misuse of Intelligence in Efforts to Halt the Proliferation
of Weapons of Mass Destruction (Stanford Security Studies)
Ambassador Thomas Graham Jr. is one of the world's leading experts in nuclear nonproliferation. He is a senior U.S. diplomat involved in the negotiation of every single
international arms control and non-proliferation agreement from 1970 to 1997. This includes
the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT Treaties), the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties
(START Treaties), the Anti-ballistic missile (ABM) Treaty, Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
Treaty (INF) Treaty, Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty (NPT), Treaty
on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty and Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban
Treaty (CTBT). In 1993, Ambassador Graham served as Acting Director of the Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) from January to November, 1993 and Acting Deputy
Director from November, 1993 to July, 1994. From 1994 through 1997, he was president Bill
Clinton's special representative for Arms Control, Non-Proliferation, and Disarmament.
Graham successfully led the U.S. government efforts to achieve the permanent extension of
the NPT in 1995. Graham also served for 15 years as the general counsel of ACDA.
Throughout his career, Thomas Graham has worked with six U.S. Presidents including
Presidents Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford,Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan, George H. W. Bush, and
Bill Clinton. [Book 1] Ambassador Graham worked on the negotiation of the Chemical
Weapons Convention and the Biological Weapons Convention and managed the Senate
approval of the ratification of the Geneva Protocol banning the use of chemical and
biological weapons in war, as well as the Biological Weapons Convention. [Web 1][Book 2]
As can be seen from these reports, the threat of nuclear or nuclear-related programs in
dangerous states continues. It was reported that the Obama administration planned to
appoint a new White House official to coordinate efforts to prevent terrorists from obtaining

nuclear or biological weapons (see Bryan Bender, New Leadership Planned to Fight WMD
Terrorism, Boston Globe, December 3, 2008, p. 1). This White House appointment was
apparently in response to the Report of the Commission on the Prevention of WMD
Proliferation and Terrorism, WORLD AT RISK, released in early December 2008, which had
been ordered by Congress in accordance with implementing recommendations of the 9/11
Commission Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-53). This sobering report concluded that unless the world
community acts decisively and with great urgency, it is more likely than not that a weapon
of mass destruction will be used in a terrorist attack somewhere in the world by the end of
2013. The Commission believed that terrorists arc more likely to obtain and use a
biological weapon than a nuclear weapon and criticized the US governments approach to
bioterrorism for having placed too little emphasis on prevention. In addition to urging the
appointment of a White House principal advisor for WMD proliferation and terrorism, the
Commission issued a call for increased cooperation and international support, a halt to the
Iranian and North Korean nuclear weapon programs, implementation of a comprehensive
policy toward Pakistan including measures to secure nuclear and biological materials, more
effective congressional oversight of intelligence and other efforts to prevent WMD
proliferation and terrorism, and the adoption of a counterterrorism strategy that
effectively counters the ideology behind WMD terrorism. On April 5, 2009, President
Obama presented in a speech in Prague some details regarding his administrations arms
control/nonproliferation policy for the future. Among other things, the President said: I state
clearly and with conviction Americas commitment to seek the peace and security of a world
without nuclear weapons.... To reduce our warheads and stockpiles, we will negotiate a new
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty with the Russians this year. ... And this will set the stage for
further cuts, and we will seek to include all nuclear weapons states in this endeavor. ... my
administration will immediately and aggressively pursue U.S. ratification of the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.... the United States will seek a new treaty that vcrifiably
ends the production of fissile materials intended for use in state nuclear weapons.... we will
strengthen the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as a basis for cooperation. ... we should build
a new framework for civil nuclear cooperation Just this morning, we were reminded again of
why we need a new and more rigorous approach to address this [nuclear weapon
proliferation] threat. North Korea broke the rules once again by testing a rocket that could be
used for long range missiles Iran has yet to build a nuclear weapon We believe in dialogue.
But in that dialogue we will present a clear choice.... I rans nuclear and ballistic missile
activity poses a real threat, not just to the United States, but to Irans neighbors and our
allies Finally, we must ensure that terrorists never acquire a nuclear weapon ... . I am
announcing a new international effort to secure all vulnerable nuclear material around the
world within four years. We support these initiatives and are eager to see how the Obama
administration moves forward to implement them. We very much agree that a multifront,
multitiered approach is required, but the first line of defense of the United States
will remain an effective and capable Intelligence Community supported by the
Obama administration, Congress, and the American people.

Intel to slow prolif key to national survival

Hansen and Graham 9
Preventing Catastrophe: The Use and Misuse of Intelligence in Efforts to Halt the Proliferation
of Weapons of Mass Destruction (Stanford Security Studies)
Ambassador Thomas Graham Jr. is one of the world's leading experts in nuclear nonproliferation. He is a senior U.S. diplomat involved in the negotiation of every single
international arms control and non-proliferation agreement from 1970 to 1997. This includes
the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT Treaties), the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties
(START Treaties), the Anti-ballistic missile (ABM) Treaty, Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
Treaty (INF) Treaty, Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty (NPT), Treaty
on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty and Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban
Treaty (CTBT). In 1993, Ambassador Graham served as Acting Director of the Arms Control

and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) from January to November, 1993 and Acting Deputy
Director from November, 1993 to July, 1994. From 1994 through 1997, he was president Bill
Clinton's special representative for Arms Control, Non-Proliferation, and Disarmament.
Graham successfully led the U.S. government efforts to achieve the permanent extension of
the NPT in 1995. Graham also served for 15 years as the general counsel of ACDA.
Throughout his career, Thomas Graham has worked with six U.S. Presidents including
Presidents Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford,Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan, George H. W. Bush, and
Bill Clinton. [Book 1] Ambassador Graham worked on the negotiation of the Chemical
Weapons Convention and the Biological Weapons Convention and managed the Senate
approval of the ratification of the Geneva Protocol banning the use of chemical and
biological weapons in war, as well as the Biological Weapons Convention. [Web 1][Book 2]

Limiting the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction
and preventing their use is a top priority for the United States and the world community
in the twenty-first century. With respect to nuclear weapons, this priority involves our
national survival as surely as containing the Soviet nuclear threat did during the Cold War.
The urgency is apparent in the amount of US and international effort in dealing with India,
Pakistan, Libya, North Korea, Iraq, and Iran in the post-Cold War world. However, the
discussion of policy and intelligence interaction concerning WMD proliferation and of
understanding the weapons themselves is often confusing and misleading. First, criticisms

of the Intelligence Community often fail to take into account either the complex
bureaucratic processes within the Intelligence Community that are designed to produce
accurate and objective assessments or the interactions between the Intelligence
Community and policymakers, who are responsible for formulating appropriate actions. The
dynamics of these interactions are critical to successful policy-making, and the distinction
between policy and intelligence must be understood (see Chapter 4). The best summary of
how this bureaucratic process should work is contained in Intelligence: From Secrets to
Policy by Mark Lowenthal. We add our perspective in the present book on how the
intelligence-policymaker relationship generally unfolds to clarify the important distinctions
between the roles and responsibilities of intelligence and policy. Using the Iraqi WMD
episode as a case study (Chapter 5), we explain what can happen when the lines become
blurred and the bureaucratic processes are corrupted. Second, given the various types of
weapons of mass destruction, important distinctions pertain to what is required for potential
proliferators to develop, produce, acquire, and use them (for a discussion of the technical
differences among WMD, see Appendix B). These distinctions complicate the challenges the
United States and the international community face in monitoring and limiting proliferation.
We hope to make clear the implications of these distinctions and describe the complexities
in monitoring such weapons and limiting their proliferation, including within terrorist
organizations. Suffice it to say here that it is the threat from nuclear weapons which
rightly instills the greatest concern, as was evidenced in how US policymakers portrayed
the potential threat of Iraqi WMD programs prior to March 2003 (see Chapter 5). At least
seven factors play into an analysis of clandestine efforts to obtain weapons of mass
destruction, especially nuclear weapons. First, historical context is important for
understanding the aspirations and motives of a country (or a terrorist group) seeking such
weapons. Has a country been the user, or victim, of such weapons in the past, or is there a
prevailing desire to achieve a particular status within a region or in the world community,
which the possession of the weapons will make possible? That India, Pakistan, Israel and, at
least initially, South Africa refused to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty raised
suspicions that each wanted to preserve the option to have nuclear weapons. All four
eventually exercised that option. Second, what are the intentions of the leaders The US
Intelligence Community was thus eventually able to establish a relatively accurate baseline
understanding of Soviet military force capabilities. It is important to say relatively because
the intelligence record during the Cold War was certainly not perfect. At times the
Intelligence Community cither overestimated or underestimated the capabilities (the

number of weapons or their technical qualities, such as ranges, accuracies, or lethality) of

Soviet weapon systems, especially those of strategic bombers and intercontinental-range
ballistic missiles. These episodes often resulted in, or fed, ongoing debates within the policy
community or led to strife between parts of the policy community and the Intelligence
Community. It was, of course, just as important to understand Moscows strategic intentions,
and the difficulty of doing this often led to interagency battles among intelligence analysts
and among policymakers regarding how to interpret Soviet behavior, statements, and at
times their actual military capabilities. There were no crystal balls and, without good human
source information, Soviet intentions could only be inferred. The resulting ambiguities and
uncertainties, along with Soviet efforts to deceive and hide their intentions, actions, and
capabilities, made accurate judgments a real challenge. The limitations of intelligence
support to policymakers continue to the present. It should not be a surprise then to anyone
when the Intelligence Communitys analyses and judgments do not always prove to be
unanimous or accurate. Monitoring WMD Proliferation Even as the Intelligence Community
was developing sophisticated and comprehensive capabilities to monitor increasingly
capable Soviet military forces, some resources were also focused on proliferation issues.
Proliferation, it turns out, posed a challenge of a different kind, for the clandestine nuclear
weapon programs of smaller countries lacked the large infrastructure and signatures
associated with the Soviet (and to some extent the Chinese) industrial enterprises and
military forces. Thus, some of the capabilities developed to monitor Soviet forces were less
capable of monitoring small, clandestine nuclear weapon programs as well as other WMD
programs. The fundamental difference was due to the factors described in Chapter 1: small,
clandestine programs, especially those involving chemical or biological agents, are often
hidden in dual-purpose facilities using dual-purpose equipment, and nuclear weapon
programs can be masked by legitimate civilian nuclear programs and facilities. Further,
proliferating countries generally do not deploy large WMD stockpiles requiring large
infrastructures, which reduces the tip-offs of suspicious activity that technical collection
systems, particularly imagery satellites, can normally provide. This challenge is compounded
by the international sale and transfer of knowledge, technology, and equipment, much of
which is legitimate but which can be rechanneled into clandestine activities (see Appendix
F). Moreover, monitoring the technical and financial activities of some relatively developed
countries, such as China, as well as countries such as North Korea, is no small task. And
when clandestine transfers and activities involve non-state actors, such as the A. Q. Khan
black-market nuclear proliferation network or international terrorists, the small signature and
diffuse nature of the transactions increase the complexity of the monitoring task (for details
on the A. Q. Khan network, see Chapter 3). The United States and other like-minded
countries have had to devise unique methods of collecting intelligence against would-be
proliferators. One means that has become increasingly available is commercial satellite
imagery, such as from Google Earth. The US National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA),
which is charged with analyzing imagery on behalf of the entire Intelligence Community, is
using commercially available, high-definition satellite photos to supplement what can be
collected by the more capable US government reconnaissance satellites. One report in 2008
indicated that NGA was helping to fund an advanced commercial satellite being launched by
GeoEye. However, there is a downside to this new tool: countries have stepped up efforts to
conceal sensitive facilities, and terrorists also can make good use of such imagery. For
example, in August 2006, the Islamic Army in Iraq reportedly circulated an instructional
video on how to aim rockets at US military sites using Google Earth. And images from Google
Earth and other commercial sources have been found in safe houses used by al-Qaeda and
other terrorist groups.2 Unfortunately, every disclosure, whether official or unofficial, of US
monitoring capabilities gives proliferators new advantages in their efforts to deny
information on their clandestine activities. This appears to have been the case with Indias
nuclear test preparations in 1998 (see Chapter 3), and it certainly muddied the waters as
intelligence organizations in the United States and other countries tried to sort out the
status of Saddam Husseins WMD programs after 1998, when UN inspectors were denied
further access (see Chapter 5). The Iraqis under the Saddam regime became experts in

concealing their clandestine activities from both inspectors and remote technical collection
systems. Clandestine Human Sources. Because of the intrinsic limits on traditional
technical collection systems, the focus in targeting and collecting against small,
clandestine programs often comes back to human sources . In many proliferation
situations, there are no external observables; only human sources can gain access to

people or facilities. Thus, an emphasis on clandestine human collection has

recmergcd against countriesand their suppliersseeking nuclear weapons or other
WMD capabilities.

Timely intelligence key to prevent proliferation

Zarate 2013 (Robert Zarate is a Research Fellow at the Nonproliferation Policy Education
Center; The Non-Use and Abuse of Nuclear Proliferation Intelligence in the Cases of North
Korea and Iran; April 8; http://www.npolicy.org/article.php?aid=1195&rtid=2)

U.S. policymakers tried to use a mixture of policies short of

military actionincluding diplomatic negotiations, economic sanctions, interdictions, and covert actions to
deal with North Korean and Iranian efforts to develop nuclear weapons-making
capabilities. However, U.S. policies ultimately did not stop the DPRK from building its
first nuclear explosive device, and detonating it in October 2006. Observers today rightly worry whether
Over the last few decades,

Iran can be persuaded or prevented from following North Koreas nuclear precedent. As this papers examination of
the non-use and abuse of proliferation intelligence in the cases of Iran and North Korea suggests, despite a long

nuclear proliferation poses the gravest danger to the

United States and its allies, U.S. policymakers in both Democratic and Republican presidential
tradition of official statements about how

administrations sometimes have tended to subordinate nuclear nonproliferation policy to other international or
domestic concernseven in the face of proliferation intelligence that counseled otherwise. In turn, this tendency
has served at times to frustrate, if not also undermine, the very aims of nuclear nonproliferation policy. Whats
worrisome is that it was often when proliferation problems metastasized and became far less manageable that risks

The failures of
intelligence demand in the North Korean and Iranian nuclear proliferation cases
raise a significant and thorny issuenamely, if policymakers will not be more hardnosed and
act on timely intelligence early on, when a proliferation case is still manageable and
easier to respond to, then might they be even less likely to take meaningful yet
more difficult actions later, when the case becomes much less manageable and much more dangerous?
of subordinating nuclear nonproliferation policy came to be more fully appreciated.

The answer appears to a tentative and regrettable yes. However, there is ground for modest hope. Indeed, if
policymakers in the Executive Branch, as well as lawmakers in Congress who oversee them and other interested

attempt to apply the lessons learned of these and other past

of proliferation intelligence negatively affected U.S.
policymaking, then they potentially can put themselves in a better a position to deal more
effectively with current and future proliferation cases.
parties, soberly examine and

instances when the demand-side problem

Weakness in Intelligence Bad- Hard to find weapon facilities

Levi 2003 (Michael; Michael Levi was a Science and Technology Fellow in Foreign Policy
Studies at the Brookings Institution; Fallout; February 17;
http://web.a.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=4699f390-c92a-4455-92e2ec46e203eced%40sessionmgr4005&vid=14&hid=4104)
Biological and chemical targets present a different challenge since a U.S. attack could spread deadly agents across
the countryside. Indeed, a typical bomb detonated against a facility holding a substantial amount of anthrax could,
depending on the conditions, kill as many people as a small nuclear weapon. But again, the apparent choices-incinerate the anthrax with a nuclear bomb but spread radioactive fallout, or spread live anthrax but avoid nuclear
fallout--are not the only ones. The United States has developed thermobaric bombs that generate high
temperatures in closed spaces, neutralizing exposed spores. Air Force laboratories are also developing potent
payloads that chemically neutralize agents on contact. And, if chemical or biological agents are accidentally
dispersed, American troops can defend themselves with protective gear. In contrast, special clothing cannot provide

America's greatest
weakness is in intelligence, not explosive power . Osama bin Laden survived in
complete protection against the radioactive fallout from friendly nuclear fire.

Afghanistan not because our bombs were too small but because we could not find him. Most of
Saddam's bioweapons survived the Gulf war unscathed not because we feared collateral damage
but because we did not yet know Saddam's stockpiles existed ; even today, inspectors are
unable to find Saddam's biological weapons. And, even if we choose to attack North Korea's nuclear
program, we will be unable to destroy its uranium-enrichment facilities, not for lack
of weaponry but because we do not know where these sites are . Political fallout from the
use, or even threat, of nuclear weapons elevates this discussion beyond mere technical quibbling. The Bush
administration seems oblivious to the irony in using nuclear weapons to fight a war against nuclear proliferation.
Certainly, the nuclear taboo is not a panacea--Kim Jong Il and Saddam care little about international norms--but it is

By needlessly claiming that we need nuclear weapons to fill military holes,

we confirm all the worst international stereotypes about a trigger-happy Bush
administration, undermine our argument that others should forego them, and weaken our coalitions. We
weaken our coalitions by undermining global regimes, such as the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty, that our allies strongly support.
still valuable.

Better intelligence analysis key to fight proliferation

Sokolski 1996 (Henry D. Sokolski is the executive director of the Nonproliferation Policy
Education Center and teaches graduate courses on proliferation at Boston University
Institute of World Politics; Fighting Proliferation with Intelligence; January
1996;http://fas.org/irp/threat/fp/b19ch16.htm)

The effort to fight proliferation will require more than just new targets for collection;
intelligence analysis will also have to change . In particular, to support policymakers
looking for opportunities to disrupt, slow, or stop a proliferation program of another
country, an increased need will exist for analysis that lays out the uncertainties and
variables connected with a particular program. That is true not only in the technical arena (for

example, what engineering bottlenecks remain for country X to complete project Y; and what are the range of
possibilities for country X to master them?) but in political and economic affairs as well. Recently, we have seen
how nuclear and missile programs in countries such as Argentina, South Africa, Taiwan, and Brazil have been either
terminated or suspended because of political considerations or economic factors. The United States and its friends
could have done more to reinforce some of these forces earlier, had more collection and analysis existed on what
the various domestic constituencies for and against these programs were. Taiwans decision in 1991 not to develop
a space-launch vehicle is a case in point. After considerable internal debate, Taiwan decided to focus its
development efforts in the area of satellite technology rather than rocketry. Knowing who supported what, for what
reasons, and what political and economic costs they were willing to pay to pursue their aims was critical for
policymakers who wanted to move Taiwan along a more benign path of satellite development. Beyond this, it would
also be helpful to have analyses of how each of these countries could better meet the peaceful goals they claimed
they were pursuing by investing in these projects (for example, civilian nuclear and space-launch vehicles, large

This analysis is especially useful if one is to mount

effective public diplomacy efforts against proliferation developments. Also, one
must do counterintelligence analysis on how incipient nuclear states are likely to
hide their activities or how they plan to get around weaknesses in existing
safeguard and inspection regimes and how they plan to avoid intelligence-collection
efforts. Such analysis goes beyond uncertainty analysis into the realm of excursions. This work need not be done
by intelligence analysts alone; it can be contracted out. In any case , it is work that should be jointly
managed by intelligence and policy officials who have a clear grasp of the facts and
know what kind of analysis is needed. This requirement for gaming, economic analysis, and
operations research is even clearer in the case of developing military threat analyses . Here, the
involvement of the intelligence agencies, particularly those of the military services, is imperative. Without their
involvement, no threat assessment no matter how correct is likely to alter defense
requirements in the areas of weapons acquisition and development or service
training or doctrine. Again, such involvement does not come naturally. As one Defense Intelligence Agency
mainframe supercomputers, and so forth).

analyst explained to me, We dont do excursions; they are too hypothetical. When analysts in the defense
intelligence services attempt to do such work, moreover, it is often heavily edited and reduced to banality out of
concern that it might upset the military services, who have a large stake invested in their five-year spending plans.
They do not need or want any second-guessing implicit or otherwise generated by intelligence officials.
Unfortunately, such a perspective can be literally self-defeating. One way to change that is to sponsor threat

assessments by analysts from outside the government and arrange for the military commands or service staffs to
participate in their production. The money is likely to be there: for fiscal year 1996 alone, the policy arm of the
Department of Defense spent several million dollars on proliferation studies, and the Energy Department and the
Central Intelligence Agency together spent orders of magnitude more on this same set of issues. Given this
spending, it is important that a concerted effort be made to focus and manage the governments study efforts. The
National Intelligence Council or the Intelligence Community Management Staff might play a useful role in seeing
that this money is used to develop the right kind of analyses. They have a solid bureaucratic interest in doing so,
since these studies should have a direct impact on intelligence-collection requirements. At a minimum, some effort

Without such monitoring,

matching analysis on proliferation to the governments nonproliferation strategy will
be nearly impossible.
is needed to keep track of what is being done by the government as a whole.

prolif impact
Proliferation causes extinction
Utgoff 2 (Victor A, Deputy Director of Strategy, Forces, and Resources Division of Institute for Defense
Analysis, Summer 2002, Survival, p.87-90)

proliferation is likely to lead to an occasional shoot-out with

nuclear weapons, and that such shoot outs will have a substantial probability of
escalating to the maximum destruction possible with the weapons at hand. Unless nuclear
proliferation is stopped, we are headed towards a world that will mirror the
American Wild West of the late 1800s. With most, if not all, nations wearing nuclear six
shooters on their hips, the world may even be a more polite place than it is today, but every once in a while
we will all gather together on a hill to bury the bodies of dead cities or even
whole nations.
In sum, widespread

at iraq proves this is stupid

Iraq proves bad policy not bad intel
Pillar 9
Preventing Catastrophe: The Use and Misuse of Intelligence in Efforts to Halt the Proliferation
of Weapons of Mass Destruction (Stanford Security Studies)
Paul R. Pillar is an academic and 28-year veteran of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA),
serving from 1977 to 2005.[1] He is now a non-resident senior fellow at Georgetown
University's Center for Security Studies,[2] as well as a nonresident senior fellow in the
Brookings Institution's Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence.[1] He was a visiting
professor at Georgetown University from 2005 to 2012.[1] He is a contributor to The National
Interest.[1][3]

The unhappy experience of the George W. Bush administrations war against Iraq and
how the issue of weapons of mass destruction played into the administrations campaign to
win support for the war unfortunately has clouded these issues. As confirmed by my own
experience in leading other work on Iraq by the Intelligence Community during this period,
the idealand widely assumedmodel of intelligence playing directly into the making of
policy often diverges greatly from the reality In the case of Iraq, weapons of mass

destruction had much more to do with selling than with motivating the US decision
to launch the war. Subsequent recriminations over the war have further obscured the
issues and too often politicized the retrospective assessment of what intelligence did
or did not do. In other cases, policies genuinely concerned with nonproliferation are driven
largely by factors other than intelligence. This is neither surprising nor inappropriate,
particularly because nonproliferation sometimes conflicts with other foreign policy objectives
a conflict that became apparent in controversy over a US-Indian nuclear cooperation
agreement that after much delay became ready for signature in 2008. The statesman must
weigh all national interests at stake, and not act solely in response to what intelligence may
say about a particular weapon program.

Iraq is misleading intel if great as long as resources arent

diverted
Hansen and Graham 9
Preventing Catastrophe: The Use and Misuse of Intelligence in Efforts to Halt the Proliferation
of Weapons of Mass Destruction (Stanford Security Studies)
Ambassador Thomas Graham Jr. is one of the world's leading experts in nuclear nonproliferation. He is a senior U.S. diplomat involved in the negotiation of every single
international arms control and non-proliferation agreement from 1970 to 1997. This includes
the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT Treaties), the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties
(START Treaties), the Anti-ballistic missile (ABM) Treaty, Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
Treaty (INF) Treaty, Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty (NPT), Treaty
on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty and Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban
Treaty (CTBT). In 1993, Ambassador Graham served as Acting Director of the Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) from January to November, 1993 and Acting Deputy
Director from November, 1993 to July, 1994. From 1994 through 1997, he was president Bill
Clinton's special representative for Arms Control, Non-Proliferation, and Disarmament.
Graham successfully led the U.S. government efforts to achieve the permanent extension of
the NPT in 1995. Graham also served for 15 years as the general counsel of ACDA.
Throughout his career, Thomas Graham has worked with six U.S. Presidents including
Presidents Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford,Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan, George H. W. Bush, and
Bill Clinton. [Book 1] Ambassador Graham worked on the negotiation of the Chemical

Weapons Convention and the Biological Weapons Convention and managed the Senate
approval of the ratification of the Geneva Protocol banning the use of chemical and
biological weapons in war, as well as the Biological Weapons Convention. [Web 1][Book
2]bOver the past six years, the public has been bombarded with articles about the

failure of the US Intelligence Community, particularly the Central Intelligence

Agency, to assess accurately the status of Saddam Husseins nuclear, chemical, and
biological weapon programs. Some of this criticism is justified. (For an explanation of how
this failure in Iraq came about, see Chapter 5.) Overall, however, the performance of the
US Intelligence Community over the decades has been on target more often than not in
assessing the status of clandestine nuclear weapon programs in individual countries. The
effort against nuclear proliferation has always had the highest priority, although special
attention has been paid to some countries efforts to develop clandestine chemical or
biological weapons programs.

int l: signit key

Signal intelligence key to counterterror
Byman 13
Daniel Byman is a professor in the Security Studies Program in the School of Foreign Service
at Georgetown University and a senior fellow at the Saban Center at Brookings.
Article: The Intelligence War on Terrorism Author: Byman, Daniel Journal: Intelligence and
national security ISSN: 0268-4527 Date: 12/2013 Page: 1 - 27 DOI:
10.1080/02684527.2013.851876

The Vital Role of SIGINT The need for HUMINT for successful counterterrorism is widely
recognized, even if the diversity of its forms is not. Signals intelligence, however, is often
ignored or neglected, but it represents particularly important component of
counterterrorism. 36 SIGINT has always played a key role in counterterrorism: in
1987, for example, SIGINTenabled the United States to identify Irans role in kidnapping an
American journalist in Lebanon, and in 1992 SIGINT implicated Hizballah and Iran in the
bombing of the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires. Against Al Qaeda, SIGINT helped US
intelligence determine Bin Ladins responsibility for the 1998 bombings of two US embassies
in Africa that killed 224 people. 37 Beyond determining responsibility for actions that have
already occurred, SIGINT can provide information on attacks that are being planned,
terrorist travel, and other vital operational information that allows for the disruption
of attacks before they happen. SIGINTwould play a vital role in the arrest of suspected
terrorists operating in Germany with support from Pakistan. 38 Press reporting indicates
SIGINT was vital for disrupting Al Qaedas mos significant plot after 9/11: its plan to bomb
seven transatlantic commercial flights from London America. SIGINTwas particularly
important in tracking down the mastermind of 9/11, Khaled Sheikh Mohammad. 39 SIGINT
on a well-placed individual can help disrupt a much broader network. If a terrorist
operational leader in Pakistan calls or emails cell leaders in, say, Yemen, Iraq, and France to
coordinate an attack, the identity of operatives in all of those countries may be revealed.
Najibullah Zazi, an Afghan immigrant convicted of planning attacks in New York in 2009, was
initially discovered when he sent an email from Colorado to terrorists in Pakistan who were
being monitored. 40 As the use of drones to kill Al Qaeda members grew in importance, so
too has the role of SIGINT. Although the drones can offer a picture of local activities,
supplementing this information with SIGINT is vital. According to terrorism expert Peter
Bergen, who cites intelligence officials, changes in the way that an Al Qaeda courier and his
brother, both linked to Bin Ladin, communicated on his cell phone suddenly opened up the
possibility of the geolocation of both their phones. Bergen goes on to report that a mix of
SIGINT and HUMINT then allowed US intelligence to track the courier to Pakistan and then
Bin Ladins base in Abbottabad. 41 SIGINT can confirm that the individuals in the drones
sights are the right ones or, conversely, guide a drone to the accurate location for an attack.
Tracking terrorist financing, which after 9/11 became an important instrument of US
counterterrorism, also is facilitated by SIGINT. 42 SIGINT can help determine volumes of
financial support and the identity of supporters, thus enabling financial
countermeasures. Monitoring of a key global banking database led to the mastermind of
the 2002 Bali nightclub bombings. 43 SIGINT often provides reach where HUMINT
cannot: getting a spy to tribal parts of Pakistan, for example, is exceptionally difficult, but
SIGINT is able to reach there. Not surprisingly, when interrogation information and DocEx
were deficient before 9/11, reports claimed that SIGINTwas far more important to
counterterrorism than HUMINT. 44

Intel key to stop CBW

Intelligence failures result in asymmetric CBW use
Treverton 01 (2001, Gregory, PhD in economics and politics, Harvard, Director, RAND
Center for Global Risk and Security, Reshaping national intelligence for an age of
information, p. 37-8)
American military predominance gives rise to a paradox: Because the United States is so
predominant in conventional war, it is not likely to fight another one. Only a fool, or a desperate
man, would repeat Saddam Husseins mistake by taking on the United States where it is strong. Future
foes will try to find where the United States is weak. They will not confront American
power symmetrically. Rather, they will reach for asymmetric strategies and tactics, in which
weapons of mass destruction , especially chemical and biological weapons, will loom large.
Future regional conflicts will be fought under the shadow of such weapons and thus must be
planned for under that shadow.21 Would-be foes will threaten to use such weapons against U.S. forces
where they mass, or against the long lines of communication over which the United States must move forces.
Foes will also pursue other asymmetric strategies. Desert Storm was the Cold Wars European
war transplanted to Arabias sands; it was, on wide-open sand, the tank war for which the United States and
NATO had prepared on the north German plain. No serious adversary would try that again. Rather,
enemies might seek to draw the United States into messy, urban fighting , where standoff
weapons are much harder to bring to bear and the chances of U.S. casualties much greater. Those foes would hope
to induce the American body politic to dismiss the conflict as far away and of little consequence.
The American mood at the new centurys beginning continues to prefer self-reliance to coalitions. At the same time,
though, there is little inclination to pay the price of unilateral military endeavors in blood or treasure. When the
United States sends forces abroad, it looks to others for company, for help, as in former Yugoslavia,
or for both help and money, as in Desert Storm. Little by little, defense planning will catch up with the facts of
coalition warfare. However, because U.S. reliance on coalition partners will be apparent to wouldbe foes, those foes will also target the coalitions. They will probe for weak links, seeking to deny
the United States bases and ports of entry for its forces if they can, or they will try to deny the United States the
moral high ground, for instance by forcing it to kill many civilians in order to attack military targets.
Or, those foes will pursue several kinds of asymmetric strategies at once. Not much more than
intimations of a threat to use biological weapons against Saudi Arabia might be enough to
detach it from a U.S.led coalition in the Gulf. Nor might it take much to detach Japan from a
coalition in northeast Asia, especially if the Korean contingency that gave rise to the coalition were
ambiguous, perhaps internal disarray in North Korea more than a determined intent to attack the South. If allied
governments held firm, their populations might not. The United States depends on local laborers to
unload ships and planes at ports; it might not take much to induce them to stay home or to flee. In current
circumstances, evacuating Americans and other foreign civilians from Korea is already a daunting planning task:
Imagine if the evacuation had to be done under the shadow of chemical threats.

The case for an intelligence role will be strongest for those states that are most
secretive and whose future orientation toward the United States is most in doubt. Some of
those will be rogues, such as North Korea or Iraq, third-rate powers but secretive ones with the capacity to
do the United States and its allies harm. The world beyond 2010 will also contain rogue pieces of
stronger states, such as Indias nuclear program, or rogue behaviors by states that are
not otherwise hostile. The key question about Russias rump biological weapons
program, for instance, was whether it was a rogue piece or a rogue behavior , the answer turning
on how much Moscows leaders were willing or able to control that program.

For these threats, intelligences secrets will continue to matter, as will the patient puzzle
solving about armies and weapons that has been the hallmark of intelligence. As the United States
approaches an armed conflict, the will and vulnerabilities of possible coalition partners will be
critical questions whose answers will lie mostly, but not entirely, in the domain of information that is available
openly.

In assessing asymmetric threats from lesser military powers, the challenge will be to move beyond
bean counting. For all the talk of such threats, there has been little serious thinking about how, for
instance, Saddam Hussein might actually use threats of chemical or biological weapons. Much of what

passes for analysis has been a simple toting of capabilities, with perhaps some mirror imaging of the sort that
plagued U.S. analysis of Indias nuclear program: If we were Saddam, what would we do? A deeper
understanding will require getting inside the heads and strategies of would-be foes . For that
purpose, insights from open sources, such as military writings, can help, as can what spies might learn about
thinking inside militaries or what satellites might pick up about exercises. Intelligence can add value by

red teaming, simulating potential foes and how they might threaten U.S.
interests or respond to U.S. moves against them.

Bioweapons cause extinction

Baum and Wilson 13 (6/28, Seth, PhD, Geography, Pennsylvania State University,
Executive Director, Global Catastrophic Risk Institute, Research Scientist at the Blue Marble
Space Institute of Science, former Visiting Scholar position at the Center for Research on
Environmental Decisions at Columbia University, and Grant, JD, Deputy Director, GCRI, The
Ethics of Global Catastrophic Risk from Dual-Use Bioengineering, Ethics in Biology,
Engineering and Medicine, forthcoming, http://sethbaum.com/ac/fc_BioengineeringGCR.pdf)
*GCR = Global Catastrophic Risk
While bioengineering has many benefits, bioengineering can also increase GCR. There are two general risks
that arise from bioengineering: first, the risk of an accident involving a dangerous bioengineered organism (a
biosafety issue), and second, the risk of the purposeful release of a dangerous bioengineered
organism (a bioweapons issue). Biosafety is a major concern across the globe. Biosafety lapses resulted
in the apparent accidental release of Foot and Mouth Disease from a leaky pipe in the UK in 2007 and several
instances of SARS infections from laboratories in 2003.32 Meanwhile, scientists are now able to use bioengineering
techniques to create incredibly deadly organisms, such as a genetically modified H5N1 virus (bird flu), which
scientists engineered to be airborne. The natural H5N1 virus killed an alarming 60 percent of reported infected
individuals,33 which is a higher fatality rate than the 1918 influenza pandemic (Spanish flu).34 Although the
airborne H5N1 virus never escaped from the lab, its accidental release, or the accidental release of a similarly
dangerous virus, could cause a loss of life significant enough to qualify as a global catastrophe by its normal
definition.
Bioweapons are also a growing threat. The technology to create dangerous bioengineered

organisms is increasingly cheap and accessible . Custom DNA strands are available for
shipment online for several thousand dollars, and consumers can even purchase DNA
synthesis machines online, which can print customized strands of DNA .35 Individuals have also
shown a willingness to engage in attacks using biological agents, such as the postal anthrax attacks of 2001, which
killed 5 people in the United States. Furthermore, publicly available information on how to bioengineer

extremely deadly viruses can be used as an instruction manual for individuals,

organizations, or governments to create extremely deadly bioweapons.36 So with bioengineering
technologies advancing, bioterrorists or other actors could create a biological weapon that is more
deadly than anything existing in the natural world . Therefore, bioweapons that utilize
bioengineered organisms pose a GCR.

Chemical weapons use against US troops causes nuclear war.

Schneider 97 (Barry, Director of the USAF Counterproliferation Center at Air University,
Maxwell AFB, Alabama, and an Associate Professor of International Relations in the
Department of Future Conflict Studies at the U.S. Air War College., Future War and
Counterproliferation, 72-73
As a result, today, in the minds of many, the only legitimate use of U.S. nuclear weapons would be in response to a
direct nuclear attack on the United States, its forces, its allies, or its vital interests.13 A U.S. nuclear response

to much less severe attacks likely would be seen as severely disproportionate to the
provocation, even if chemical or biological attacks were launched. However, if enemy CBW
attacks were directed against important target~ in the American homeland, or if they caused horrific
numbers of U.S. and allied casualties in the field, it might well be that U.S. public opinion
then would sanction a U.S. nuclear retaliatory response. In that case, an aroused American
public might demand harsh nuclear retribution.

Intel Good: Terrorism

intel key to stop terror

Only intelligence can stop nuclear terrorist attacks
Wampler 5/21/10

https://newsline.llnl.gov/_rev02/articles/2010/may/05.21.10-olson.php
Newsline staff writer
A former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) chief of counterintelligence recently warned LLNL
employees that the United States national security is facing grave threats. James
Olson Never in my memory have we been more at peril at home than we are now, said
James Olson, an intelligence professional for more than 30 years and a senior lecturer at the
Bush School of Government at Texas A&M University. The threat, laid out in Olsons April 29
talk sponsored by the Science and Technology and Global Security principal directorates, is
two-pronged from international terrorism and from foreign espionage and covert action.
We will be hit again (by terrorists ), Olson believes. It will be inside our own borders. It
will be a weapon of mass destruction. And it will be horrible. Whether America wins
or loses the war on terrorism depends in large measure on how good the nations
intelligence turns out to be, Olson told Lab employees.

Intel most important to prevent terror attacks

Dickey 4/13/13
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/04/16/the-boston-bombing-intelligencefailure.html
Christopher Dickey is the Paris bureau chief and Middle East editor for The Daily Beast. He is
the author of six books, including Summer of Deliverance and, most recently, Securing the
City: Inside Americas Best Counterterror Forcethe NYPD.
For years a simple message has been posted, in one form or another, all over public
transport in Boston: See Something. Say Something Instincts tell you to do something?
Do something. Call this number One sees much the same slogan in New York, in
Washington, or for that matter in Paris and London. Public vigilance is an important part of
preventing terrorist attacks. And if bystanders on Boylston Street in Boston near the
marathon finish line on Monday had seen a couple of stray backpacks, or someone dumping
too-large packages into garbage cans, and said something, maybejust maybethree
people would be alive today and more than a hundred could have been saved from injury.
But the first, most important line of defense against terrorist attack is not the public,
and its not even the cops. Its not metal detectors or high-tech aerial surveillance. And
its certainly not the threat of after-the-fact jail time for the bombers in this age of suicidal
terrorism. The best and most important defense is detailed, real-time intelligence
about the fanatics and lunatics who may intend to carry out such attacks, and the means
that they may use to slaughter innocents.

Intel key to solve terrorism swamps all other factors

Byman 13
Daniel Byman is a professor in the Security Studies Program in the School of Foreign Service
at Georgetown University and a senior fellow at the Saban Center at Brookings.
Article: The Intelligence War on Terrorism Author: Byman, Daniel Journal: Intelligence and
national security ISSN: 0268-4527 Date: 12/2013 Page: 1 - 27 DOI:
10.1080/02684527.2013.851876

What is the role of intelligence for counterterrorism ? Most studies of counterterrorism

ignore the vital role of intelligence, focus only on its most controversial aspects, or fail to
recognize how counterterrorism intelligence differs from traditional intelligence issues. This
article argues that many of the common criticisms of the CIA and other agencies
misunderstand counterterrorism intelligence and what is realistic for gaining information
on terrorist groups. In particular, the important role of signals intelligence, liaison
relationships, document exploitation, and interrogation are overlooked. In addition,
intelligence analysis and the relationship with the policymaker differ fundamentally for
counterterrorism. This article emphasizes the need to recognize these differences when
evaluating counterterrorism and calls for being cautious with
intelligencereform.Inaddition,itarguesforchangingUSdetentionpolicyandmakingthe public
more aware of the inevitable gaps related to counterterrorism intelligence. Speaking to a
nation reeling from the worst terrorist attack in history, President George W. Bush famously
declared on 20 September 2001 the advent of a global war on terrorism. In the same
speech, he noted that this would involve a range of US instruments, embracing every tool of
intelligence and that the struggle may include dramatic strikes, visible on TV, and covert
operations, secret even in success. 1 Almost 10 years later, addressing the nation to
announce the killing of Usama Bin Ladin on 1 May 2011, President Barack Obama declared:
Tonight, we give thanks to the countless intelligence and counterterrorism professionals
whove worked tirelessly to achieve this outcome. The American people do not see their
work, nor know their names. But tonight, they feel the satisfaction of their work and the
result of their pursuit of justice. 2 To fight Al Qaeda, US leaders invaded Afghanistan and,
more controversially, Iraq, waged bitter counterinsurgencies in both countries, altered the
US legal system, and developed a massive and expensive homeland security architecture.
Although all of these efforts attract considerable, and deserved, attention and debate,
perhaps the most important and enduring counterterrorism instrument the use of
intelligence remains neglected. 3 Much of the work published on intelligence addresses
the issue of surprise attack and the related question of intelligence failure, while others
describe how the different aspects of intelligence influence national security issues and
theroleofoversightandintelligencereform allvitalissues,butonesthatpay less attention to the
day-to-day use of intelligence in counterterrorism. 4 Yet US government counterterrorism
intelligence efforts have grown by leaps and bounds US$80 billion according to one recent
work, with one CIA official describing the increase as a flood of money 5 but the academic
and public understanding of these changes has not kept pace. This limited attention is tragic
because, as former senior intelligence official Gregory Treverton points out, successful
counterterrorism requires identifying and stopping a threat before it materializes,
both of which demand superb intelligence. 6

Intelligence has empirically proven useful in fighting wars and is

crucial to the ever changing technological world
Hughbank and Githens 10 (Richard senior trainer with HALO Corporation and a Military Police
officer in the U.S. Army with over twenty-one years experience. He is an adjunct for the Center for Homeland
Security at the University of Colorado at Colorado Springs as a graduate course instructor in terrorism studies and
homeland defense. Richard also chairs the Terrorism Studies and Standards committee for the Anti Terrorism
Accreditation Board, is a Diplomate of the American Academy of Experts in Traumatic Stress, and a member of the
National Center for Crisis Management. His graduate studies are in security management, counseling, and terrorism
studies, and is a doctoral candidate in Strategic Security, Don Captain in the U.S. Air Force with nine years
experience as an Intelligence Officer and Analyst. He is earning a graduate certificate in Homeland Security studies
at the University of Colorado at Colorado Springs, 3/1/10, Intelligence and Its Role in Protecting Against Terrorism,
http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1020&context=jss)TT

Intelligence is both a process and a product and has played an important role in diplomacy
and warfare throughout history. In the information age, intelligence has taken on an even
greater importance. But in the popular media, the role, means, and purpose of intelligence is very often
misrepresented at best. Only a tiny fraction of intelligence officers perform clandestine intelligence gathering. They
don't assassinate people, carry weapons or even wear trench coats. The vast majority of the intelligence

community carries out its mundane tasks at a computer terminal and, while intelligence alone cannot stop the next
terrorist attack, it is the critical first step in identifying and possibly preventing one. The art and science of
gathering critical operational intelligence has been defined in many ways and is beyond our needs for this writing.

Throughout the course of history, many wars have been fought depending heavily
on various forms of intelligence. During our most recent actions in the War on
Terror, intelligence analysis has played a critical role in both offensive and
defensive operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. With such varying fact-finding techniques available
and utilized in the defense of our country, it has become an arduous task to collect, decipher,
package, prioritize, disseminate, and act upon everything that comes down the
pipe. Intelligence is even more important in homeland defense and security . Our
society is suspicious of intrusions on personal liberties. Mandated identity cards, restricted
vehicle access and random searches of airline passengers are generally not well received.
That makes it especially important to prevent terrorist attacks by interdicting the
terrorists and their resources before they can reach their targets.

Intelligence cooperation with law enforcement helps fight

terrorism
Hughbank and Githens 10 (Richard

senior trainer with HALO Corporation and a Military Police

officer in the U.S. Army with over twenty-one years experience. He is an adjunct for the Center for Homeland
Security at the University of Colorado at Colorado Springs as a graduate course instructor in terrorism studies and
homeland defense. Richard also chairs the Terrorism Studies and Standards committee for the Anti Terrorism
Accreditation Board, is a Diplomate of the American Academy of Experts in Traumatic Stress, and a member of the
National Center for Crisis Management. His graduate studies are in security management, counseling, and terrorism
studies, and is a doctoral candidate in Strategic Security, Don Captain in the U.S. Air Force with nine years
experience as an Intelligence Officer and Analyst. He is earning a graduate certificate in Homeland Security studies
at the University of Colorado at Colorado Springs, 3/1/10, Intelligence and Its Role in Protecting Against Terrorism,
http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1020&context=jss)TT
Intelligence support can be a valuable tool to assist law enforcement agencies in the
performance of their daily duties. It's especially relevant in counterterrorism investigations and

operations. Terrorist organizations rely heavily on secrecy and anonymity to carry out their
religious and politically driven agendas, and intelligence gathering and exploitation is best
suited to stripping away this critical layer of protection and making them more vulnerable to
infiltration, investigation and arrest. Intelligence work is a discipline in and of itself, just like police work,

and carries its own language, rules, and culture. At times, it can be in direct conflict with law enforcement, but the
goal of both remains the same; the protection of every American citizen and our way of life; our very culture, if you
will. As terrorism continues to plague the world through the global Salafi jihad movement , the
United States will forever serve as a critical target for various organizations who seek to spread "pure" Islam.
Through patience and vigilance, our enemies continue to further their cause through the
understanding of our society. Thus, it becomes imperative we do the same . It is imperative we
continue to learn about those who choose to attack our freedoms and way of life, and our law enforcement agencies
will have to take the lead in this ongoing war. Indeed, the law enforcement community must develop transparent
communication and intelligence links. While the days of fighting conventional crime are still at the forefront, our
modern foes have defiantly presented us with a challenge that must be met with extreme prejudice if we are to
successfully protect our nation and its citizens. The collection of intelligence will prove
invaluable in this success, but we must learn to properly use this important tool at the strategic,
operational, and tactical levels and it starts with training and utilizing every facet of our law enforcement agencies
as they continue to patrol and protect our neighborhoods.

There is no other alternative to data collection that is efficient at

stopping terrorism as it is right now.
SANGER 2015 David chief Washington correspondent of The New York Times
<http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/16/us/politics/report-finds-no-alternative-to-bulk-collection-of-phone-data.html?
_r=0>

federal study released on Thursday concluded that there was no effective

alternative to the governments bulk collection of basic information
about every telephone call made in the United States , a practice that civil rights advocates
WASHINGTON A

call overly intrusive. Last year, after the former intelligence contractor Edward J. Snowden revealed details of the governments vast
data-collection enterprise, President Obama asked intelligence agencies to assess whether there was a way to get at the
communications of terrorism suspects without sweeping up records of all calls made and received inside the United States, including
their length and other identifying information. On Thursday, the National Academy of Sciences, in a detailed report that brought
together communications and cybersecurity experts and former senior intelligence officials, said that no

softwarebased technique can fully replace the bulk collection of signals

intelligence. But it also concluded that there were ways to control the usage of collected data and to make sure that

once it is in the governments hands, there are stronger privacy protections. The findings came a year after Mr. Obama announced
modest reforms to practices of the National Security Agency that had been revealed by Mr. Snowden, including doing away with a
huge government-run database of phone records and instead relying on separate databases managed by phone companies.
Eventually, those records will be held only by providers like AT&T and Verizon. But the change has not happened yet, as officials try
to figure out how they would search, with court orders, information they do not have on their own computer systems. Government
officials have been clear that the transition will take considerable time. Mr. Obamas hope was that technology would solve the
problem that new search technologies would make it possible to target the collection of the phone data, which does not include
the conversations themselves. But the researchers could not find a way. From

a technological standpoint,
curtailing bulk data collection means analysts will be deprived of some
information, said Robert F. Sproull, the chairman of the committee that examined the problem and a former director of
Oracles Sun Labs. But, he said, that does not necessarily mean that current bulk collection must continue. Since the uproar over
Mr. Snowdens revelations and the programs effect on Americans privacy, the politics of mass data collection have shifted.

Terrorist attacks like the ones that killed 17 people in Paris last week,
along with the rise of the Islamic State, have led to calls for more vigilance
by intelligence agencies, swinging the pendulum back.

terrorism impact
Nuclear terrorism causes extinction
Hellman 8 (Martin E. Hellman, emeritus prof of engineering @ Stanford, Risk Analysis of Nuclear
Deterrence SPRING 2008 THE BENT OF TAU BETA PI, http://www.nuclearrisk.org/paper.pdf)

The threat of nuclear terrorism looms much larger in the publics mind than the threat of a full-scale nuclear war, yet this article
focuses primarily on the latter. An explanation is therefore in order before proceeding. A terrorist attack involving a nuclear
weapon would be a catastrophe of immense proportions : A 10-kiloton bomb detonated at Grand Central Station on a
typical work day would likely kill some half a million people, and inflict over a trillion dollars in direct economic damage. America and its way of life would

The likelihood of such an attack is also significant. Former Secretary of

Perry has estimated the chance of a nuclear terrorist incident within the next decade to be
roughly 50 percent [Bunn 2007, page 15]. David Albright, a former weapons inspector in Iraq, estimates those odds at less than one percent,
be changed forever. [Bunn 2003, pages viii-ix].
Defense William

but notes, We would never accept a situation where the chance of a major nuclear accident like Chernobyl would be anywhere near 1% .... A nuclear

In a
survey of 85 national security experts, Senator Richard Lugar found a median estimate of 20 percent for the
probability of an attack involving a nuclear explosion occurring somewhere in the world in the
next 10 years, with 79 percent of the respondents believing it more likely to be carried out
by terrorists than by a government [Lugar 2005, pp. 14-15]. I support increased efforts to reduce the threat of nuclear terrorism,
but that is not inconsistent with the approach of this article. Because terrorism is one of the potential trigger mechanisms for a
full-scale nuclear war, the risk analyses proposed herein will include estimating the risk of nuclear terrorism as one component of the overall
terrorism attack is a low-probability event, but we cant live in a world where its anything but extremely low-probability. [Hegland 2005].

risk. If that risk, the overall risk, or both are found to be unacceptable, then the proposed remedies would be directed to reduce which- ever risk(s) warrant
attention. Similar remarks apply to a number of other threats (e.g., nuclear war between the U.S. and China over Taiwan). his article would be incomplete
if it only dealt with the threat of nuclear terrorism and neglected the threat of full- scale nuclear war. If both risks are unacceptable, an effort to reduce

societys almost total neglect of the threat of

full-scale nuclear war makes studying that risk all the more important . The cosT of World War iii The danger
only the terrorist component would leave humanity in great peril. In fact,

associated with nuclear deterrence depends on both the cost of a failure and the failure rate.3 This section explores the cost of a failure of nuclear
deterrence, and the next section is concerned with the failure rate. While other definitions are possible, this article defines a failure of deterrence to mean
a full-scale exchange of all nuclear weapons available to the U.S. and Russia, an event that will be termed World War III. Approximately 20 million people
died as a result of the first World War. World War IIs fatalities were double or triple that numberchaos prevented a more precise deter- mination. In both
cases humanity recovered, and the world today bears few scars that attest to the horror of those two wars. Many people therefore implicitly believe that a
third World War would be horrible but survivable, an extrapola- tion of the effects of the first two global wars. In that view, World War III, while horrible, is
something that humanity may just have to face and from which it will then have to recover. In contrast, some of those most qualified to assess the
situation hold a very different view. In a 1961 speech to a joint session of the Philippine Con- gress, General Douglas MacArthur, stated, Global war has

No longer does it
possess even the chance of the winner of a duel. It contains now only the germs of double
suicide. Former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara ex- pressed a similar view: If deterrence fails and conflict develops, the present U.S. and
NATO strategy carries with it a high risk that Western civilization will be destroyed [McNamara 1986, page 6]. More recently,
become a Frankenstein to destroy both sides. If you lose, you are annihilated. If you win, you stand only to lose.

George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger, and Sam Nunn4 echoed those concerns when they quoted President Reagans belief that nuclear weapons
were totally irrational, totally inhu- mane, good for nothing but killing, possibly destructive of life on earth and civilization. [Shultz 2007] Official studies,

The resulting deaths would be

far beyond any precedent. Executive branch calculations show a range of U.S. deaths from 35 to 77 percent (i.e., 79-160 million dead)
while couched in less emotional terms, still convey the horrendous toll that World War III would exact:

a change in targeting could kill somewhere between 20 million and 30 million additional people on each side .... These calculations reflect only deaths
during the first 30 days. Additional millions would be injured, and many would eventually die from lack of adequate medical care millions of people
might starve or freeze during the follow- ing winter, but it is not possible to estimate how many. further millions might eventually die of latent
radiation effects. [OTA 1979, page 8] This OTA report also noted the possibility of serious ecological damage [OTA 1979, page 9], a concern that as-

nuclear
explosions and their resultant fire- storms could usher in a nuclear winter that might erase homo sapiens
from the face of the earth, much as many scientists now believe the K-T Extinction that wiped out the dinosaurs resulted from an impact
sumed a new potentiality when the TTAPS report [TTAPS 1983] proposed that the ash and dust from so many nearly simultaneous

winter caused by ash and dust from a large asteroid or comet striking Earth. The TTAPS report produced a heated debate, and there is still no scientific

even a limited
nuclear exchange or one between newer nuclear-weapon states, such as India and Pakistan, could have devastating longlasting climatic consequences due to the large volumes of smoke that would be generated by fires in modern megacities. While it is
consensus on whether a nuclear winter would follow a full-scale nuclear war. Recent work [Robock 2007, Toon 2007] suggests that

uncertain how destructive World War III would be, prudence dictates that we apply the same engi- neering conservatism that saved the Golden Gate
Bridge from collapsing on its 50th anniversary and assume that

preventing World War III is a necessitynot an option .

intel key to stop bioterror

Only intelligence can prevent bioterror attacks
Parker 13
http://globalsecuritystudies.com/Parker%20Bio%20Intel-AG.pdf
Campbell Univeristy, Global Security Studies, Summer 2013, Volume 4, Issue 3

Questions persist on the likelihood of producing a necessary worl dwide

preventative method or whether the United States is prepared for a biological attack.
Common knowledge among the intelligence community is the degree of hate relished by
terrorist groups , su ch as al Q a e da , towards the United States. Some extreme religious
groups encourage mass attacks towards populations opposing their viewpoints. Former
Secretary of Defense William Cohen summarized the t endency of terrorists to attack with
weapons of mass destruction stating, The question is no longer if this will happen, but
when (Intriligator , 2010 , 8 ). Terrorists will attack, either using weapons of mass

destruction or chemical and biological weapons . Scholars present multiple preven

ta tive and responsive methods towards bioterrorism on a worldwide or localized scale.
Each method stems from knowledge of the terrorists mindset with either
generalized or specific motives. It also requires extensive intelligence of available, k ey
bioweapons and their location, symptoms, damage, and vaccine s . P reparing for a
terrorist attack also involves the ethics reflected in multiple categories relating to biodefense
strategies. These ethics lead to differing appro aches to the aforementioned prevention
models and are determined at a governmental level. The President and other agenc ies
responsible for handling an international prevention of bioterrorism develop an ethic s code
initiated in times of peace and war ; this code permeates the intelligence community and is
reflect ed in foreign policy and national responses to terrorism. I ntelligence remains the
backbone of ethics, scholarly prevention models, foreign policy, and post 9/11
advancements. An in depth study of th e historical background, biological agents , and
terrorist goals reveals t he application and necessity of intelligence to prepare and
combat bioterrorism in local, national, and global efforts.

bioterror impact
Pathogen release causes extinction
Steinbrenner 97 (John Steinbrenner, Senior Fellow Brookings, Foreign Policy, 12-22-1997, Lexis)
Although human pathogens are often lumped with nuclear explosives and lethal
chemicals as potential weapons of mass destruction, there is an obvious, fundamentally important
difference: Pathogens are alive, weapons are not. Nuclear and chemical weapons do not
reproduce themselves and do not independently engage in adaptive behavior;
pathogens do both of these things. That deceptively simple observation has immense implications. The
use of a manufactured weapon is a singular event . Most of the damage occurs immediately. The
aftereffects, whatever they may be, decay rapidly over time and distance in a reasonably predictable manner.

Even before a nuclear warhead is detonated , for instance, it is possible to estimate the
extent of the subsequent damage and the likely level of radioactive fallout. Such predictability is an
essential component for tactical military planning. The use of a pathogen, by contrast, is an extended
process whose scope and timing cannot be precisely controlled . For most potential
biological agents, the predominant drawback is that they would not act swiftly or decisively enough to be an

But for a few pathogens - ones most likely to have a decisive effect
and therefore the ones most likely to be contemplated for deliberately hostile use the risk runs in the other direction. A lethal pathogen that could efficiently spread
from one victim to another would be capable of initiating an intensifying cascade of
disease that might ultimately threaten the entire world population . The 1918
influenza epidemic demonstrated the potential for a global contagion of this sort but
not necessarily its outer limit.
effective weapon.

intel key to stop cyber terror

Intelligence capacity key to stop cyberterrorism only proactive
approach solves
Rudner 13 Martin Rudner (2013) Cyber-Threats to Critical National Infrastructure: An Intelligence Challenge,
International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 26:3, 453-481, DOI: 10.1080/08850607.2013.78055
Martin Rudner is Distinguished Resea rch Professor Emeritus at Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada. This study
formed part of a larger research project he undertook with Angela Gendron on Assessing Cyber Threats to Canadian
Infrastructure for the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) and completed in March 2012.

COUNTERING CYBER-THREATS THROUGH INTELLIGENCE Cyber-security is typically perceived as an

essentially defensive means of protecting digital assets, with the emphasis placed on technical solutions. A defensive posture, being
procedurally passive and reactive, will always trail behind emergent threats. The initiative remains with the adversaries. Yet, the

protection of critical infrastructures and information systems against cyber-threats is now rapidly
being re-conceptualized as constituting the defense of an information-based society as a whole a
national security consideration. And, in national security as in war, the best defense is predicated on a
robust offense. In going beyond merely defensive technical solutions, a proactive approach to the protection of
m ust utilize intelligence capabilities and assets to
prevent attacks by identifying and forestalling prospective threats. A major consideration for owners and operators of
critical infrastructure against cyber-threats

critical infrastructures is the financial cost of ensuring the security of their critical infrastructure assets against cyber-threats. This fi
nancial burden can include expenses incurred for built-in redundancies, hardware and software solutions, specialist staffing, and
professional training, as well as contingency planning. Corporate management, for the most part, tends to treat security as a
troublesome and unwelcome cost of doing business. According to an international survey, complacency, if not apathy, typically
prevails in many executive suites, especially as regards cyber- and terrorist threats. 83 While the onus for protection against criminal
threats falls clearly on the owners = operators themselves, cyber-threats can have ramifications beyond the private domain that
may impact adversely on the broader public well-being, especially when critical infrastructures are affected. Cyber-security then
becomes a national security matter. Closing the Gaps Stakeholders in these key sectors widely acknowledged that weaknesses and
gaps exist in their cyber defenses against current threats. A more holistic, finely-tuned partners hip approach between the private
sector and the security and intelligence communities is warranted to help stakeholders, as well as local authorities. It could help to
offset these vulnerabilities, mitigate any potential damage, and pr e-plan resilience. The information sharing that already takes
place with and among critical infrastructure stakeholders, as and when appropriate, can be reinforced by promoting effective public

Intelligence services could provide significant

support for such initiatives by virtue of their access to threat information, technical and analytic
expertise, and investigative experience. The challenges confronting cyber-security
cannot be dealt with solely at a technical-operational level but requ ire a more inclusive
approach at the national level. The essential need is to protect an information-based society as a whole rather than merely
= private partnership and colla boration in cyber-security.

the protection of cyber-based infrastructures. Apart from stimulating investment in defensive technologies, this approach would
entail a proactive cyber-security initiative on the part of intelligence services to prevent attacks rather than merely react to them. 84
Greater emphasis must also be directed at combating cyber exploitations which target government and business secrets .

Forestalling cyber-espionage and the theft of intellectual property and sensitive information is becoming a
key objective of U.S. cyber strategy, and is likewise emerging as a core responsibility of the security and int
elligence communities of most other countries as well. Retired Admiral Mike McConnell, the former Director of U.S. National

the uniqu e capabilities of U.S. intelligence agencies which could

be enlisted to help protect American companies from cyber-espionage and attac k. 85
Intelligence, has discussed

The key question is how that capability can be harnessed and made available to the private sector so that critical infrastructure can
be better protected. Government Effects at Prevention Although the U.S. is developing more robust and proactive cyber-security

to protect Americas critical infrastructure,

such as the financial sector, the electric power grid, and transportat ion from cyber-attack,
capabilities, the main priority, ac cording to McConnell, should be

and to stop the theft of intellectual property through cyber-espionage The United Statess Cyberspace Strategic Plan aims to
improve cyber security resiliency with technology that enables secure software development; to introduce economic incentives like
market-based , legal, regulatory, or institutional interventions,aswellasstrategie s to help security professionals make infringements
more costly and difficult for attackers. 86 Efforts by the American government to enact legislation authorizing a more robust and
proactive cyber-security plan involving the Intelligence Community and private sector stakeholders failed to gain Senate approval

Obama issued
out guidelines authorizing proactive measures to

and lapsed by mid-2012. But, shortly before the November 2012 presidential election, President Barack
classified Presidential Policy Directive 20 setting

thwart cyber attacks on the U.S. government and private computer networks. 87

the

Intelligecne based response key to prevention

Rudner 13

Martin Rudner (2013) Cyber-Threats to Critical National Infrastructure: An

Intelligence Challenge, International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 26:3,
453-481, DOI: 10.1080/08850607.2013.78055 Martin Rudner is Distinguished Resea rch
Professor Emeritus at Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada. This study formed part of a
larger research project he undertook with Angela Gendron on Assessing Cyber Threats to
Canadian Infrastructure for the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) and completed
in March 2012.
Whether cyber-threats arise from international terrorism, state-sponsored espionage, single
interest movements, or malicious hacktivists, any targeting of critical infrastructure c an
represent a potential threat to the national security and public safety of citizens.

Intelligence capabilities should be deployed to detect and prevent the targeting of

critical infrastructure and the pursuit and prosecution of the perpetrators. A coordinated,
intelligence-based response to cyber-threats could prevent intrusions into sensitive
facilities and ICT systems, and mitigate any residual damage. A proactive, intelligence
approac h to cyber-security for critical infrastructure should demonstrate the following
attributes: . The operational objectives to detect and forestall cyber-threats to critical
national infrastructure and public safety. . Cyber-security activities geared to the
identification and systematic collection, analysis, and reporting of threats to critical
infrastructures. . Intelligence information to be availa ble on a need to share basis among
partners in the secur ity, intelligence and law-enforcement communities. Private sector
owners = operators of critical infrastru ctureassetswouldbeexpectedto share their own
assessments of vulner abilities and threats with intelligence services and security
authorities, as well as report any compromise of their networks. This information would be
protected on a classified basis. . Actionable threat intelligence on cyber-threats to critical
national infrastructure to be disseminated to security-cleared personnel in targeted private
sector facilities. . A rapid reaction capability to mitigate a ttacks, prevent escalation and
derive lessons learned in order to advance best practices Intelligence represents a key
comp onent of tactical and strategic decisionmaking . In the cyber arena, intelligence
can enhance the ability of governments and stakeholders to assess the effects of
cyber attacks, mitigate the risks, and streamline cy ber-security into an efficient and
cost-effective process based on well-informed decisions. A 2011 report issued by the Cyber
Council of the Intelligence and National Security Alliance (INSA), Cyber Intelligence: Setting
the Landscape for an Emerging Discipline, began with the proposition that While
quantifiable assessments of the net impact of cyber attacks are difficult to discern, the cost
is great enough to warrant the need for a cyber-security apparatus supported by
sophisticated cyber intelligence. 97 Intelligence support for cyber security within and
among critical infrastructures should aim to ensure that the cost to adversaries of trying to
exploit systemic vulnerabilities is high, that the prospects of success are minimal, the
probable consequential damages are mitigated, and that industry and society are

properly prepared for resilience.

NSA leads the fight against cyber terror Sony proves

Bruer 1/8/15 (Wesley Bruer, staff writer for CNN, "Official: NSA will lead fight against
future hacks," www.cnn.com/2015/01/08/politics/sony-north-korea-hacks-nsa-role/)
A top U.S. official on Thursday called the recent hack of Sony by North Korea a ground-

breaking event in cyberwarfare and outlined the role of the National Security
Agency in the investigation. The head of U.S. Cyber Command, Admiral Mike Rogers,
speaking at the International Cyber Security Conference in New York City hosted by Fordham
University, said the U.S., for the first time, was the victim of a "malicious act by a nation-

state specifically designed to achieve a coercive effect" in the cyber-arena. Rogers said in
this case the act came in the form of an effort to "stop the release of a film with a particular
viewpoint and the characterization of a leader," in reference to the recent hacking of Sony
by North Korea. He said the NSA's role in the investigation as "providing technical
assistance," which included investigating the malware used in the hack, as well as the data
generated from Sony to compare with other hacking activity. The NSA is also taking a lead

role in combating future large-scale hacks on private companies carried out by

nation-states, such as developing counter-measures to major viruses , Rogers said. "If
it's a specific malware, for example, that we saw used in the Sony scenario, we partner with
others using our technological expertise to write the programs that will counteract the
malware," he said. The other major challenge facing America in the cyber-world is

balancing privacy with security in an environment where both good and bad actors
are "using the same communication path, the same software and the same social
media," according to Rogers.

Intelligence solves cyber- Allows for information of cyber attacks

Goldsmith 2013 (Jack Goldsmith served as a Special Counsel to the Department of
Defense; We Need an Invasive NSA; October 10;
http://www.newrepublic.com/article/115002/invasive-nsa-will-protect-us-cyber-attacks)
Telecommunication networks are the channels through which malware typically travels,
often anonymized or encrypted, and buried in the billions of communications that traverse
the globe each day. The targets are the communications networks themselves as well
as the computers they connectthings like the Times servers, the computer systems
that monitor nuclear plants, classified documents on computers in the Pentagon, the Nasdaq
exchange, your local bank, and your social-network providers. To keep these computers and
networks secure, the government needs powerful intelligence capabilities abroad so
that it can learn about planned cyber-intrusions . It also needs to raise defenses at
home. An important first step is to correct the market failures that plague cybersecurity.
Through law or regulation, the government must improve incentives for individuals to

use security software, for private firms to harden their defenses and share
information with one another, and for Internet service providers to crack down on the
botnetsnetworks of compromised zombie computersthat underlie many cyber-attacks .
More, too, must be done to prevent insider threats like Edward Snowdens, and to
control the stealth introduction of vulnerabilities during the manufacture of computer
componentsvulnerabilities that can later be used as windows for cyber-attacks.

cyber terror impact

Backdoors in military communications are prime targets for cyber
terrorism which can trigger nuclear conflict.

Fritz 9, Former Captain of the U.S. Army, Jason, July, Hacking Nuclear Command and
Control, www.icnnd.org/Documents/Jason_Fritz_Hacking_NC2.doc

The US uses the two-man rule to achieve a higher level of security in nuclear affairs. Under
this rule two authorized personnel must be present and in agreement during critical stages
of nuclear command and control. The President must jointly issue a launch order with the
Secretary of Defense; Minuteman missile operators must agree that the launch order is
valid; and on a submarine, both the commanding officer and executive officer must agree
that the order to launch is valid. In the US, in order to execute a nuclear launch, an
Emergency Action Message (EAM) is needed. This is a preformatted message that directs
nuclear forces to execute a specific attack. The contents of an EAM change daily and consist
of a complex code read by a human voice. Regular monitoring by shortwave listeners and
videos posted to YouTube provide insight into how these work. These are issued from the
NMCC, or in the event of destruction, from the designated hierarchy of command and control
centres. Once a command centre has confirmed the EAM, using the two-man rule, the
Permissive Action Link (PAL) codes are entered to arm the weapons and the message is sent
out. These messages are sent in digital format via the secure Automatic Digital Network and
then relayed to aircraft via single-sideband radio transmitters of the High Frequency Global
Communications System, and, at least in the past, sent to nuclear capable submarines via
Very Low Frequency (Greenemeier 2008, Hardisty 1985). The technical details of VLF
submarine communication methods can be found online, including PC-based VLF reception.
Some reports have noted a Pentagon review, which showed a potential electronic back
door into the US Navys system for broadcasting nuclear launch orders to Trident
submarines (Peterson 2004). The investigation showed that cyber terrorists could
potentially infiltrate this network and insert false orders for launch. The investigation
led to elaborate new instructions for validating launch orders (Blair 2003). Adding further
to the concern of cyber terrorists seizing control over submarine launched nuclear missiles;

The Royal Navy announced in 2008 that it would be installing a Microsoft Windows
operating system on its nuclear submarines (Page 2008). The choice of operating

system, apparently based on Windows XP, is not as alarming as the advertising of such a
system is. This may attract hackers and narrow the necessary reconnaissance to
learning its details and potential exploits. It is unlikely that the operating system would
play a direct role in the signal to launch, although this is far from certain. Knowledge of the

operating system may lead to the insertion of malicious code, which could be used
to gain accelerating privileges, tracking, valuable information, and deception that
could subsequently be used to initiate a launch . Remember from Chapter 2 that the
UKs nuclear submarines have the authority to launch if they believe the central command
has been destroyed. Attempts by cyber terrorists to create the illusion of a decapitating
strike could also be used to engage fail-deadly systems . Open source knowledge is
scarce as to whether Russia continues to operate such a system. However evidence
suggests that they have in the past. Perimetr, also known as Dead Hand, was an automated
system set to launch a mass scale nuclear attack in the event of a decapitation strike
against Soviet leadership and military. In a crisis, military officials would send a coded
message to the bunkers, switching on the dead hand. If nearby ground-level sensors
detected a nuclear attack on Moscow, and if a break was detected in communications links
with top military commanders, the system would send low-frequency signals over
underground antennas to special rockets. Flying high over missile fields and other military

sites, these rockets in turn would broadcast attack orders to missiles, bombers and, via radio
relays, submarines at sea. Contrary to some Western beliefs, Dr. Blair says, many of Russia's
nuclear-armed missiles in underground silos and on mobile launchers can be fired
automatically. (Broad 1993) Assuming such a system is still active, cyber terrorists would
need to create a crisis situation in order to activate Perimetr, and then fool it into believing a
decapitating strike had taken place. While this is not an easy task, the information age
makes it easier. Cyber reconnaissance could help locate the machine and learn its inner
workings. This could be done by targeting the computers high of level officialsanyone who
has reportedly worked on such a project, or individuals involved in military operations at
underground facilities, such as those reported to be located at Yamantau and Kosvinksy
mountains in the central southern Urals (Rosenbaum 2007, Blair 2008) Indirect Control of
Launch Cyber terrorists could cause incorrect information to be transmitted, received, or
displayed at nuclear command and control centres, or shut down these centres computer
networks completely. In 1995, a Norwegian scientific sounding rocket was mistaken by
Russian early warning systems as a nuclear missile launched from a US submarine. A radar
operator used Krokus to notify a general on duty who decided to alert the highest levels.
Kavkaz was implemented, all three chegets activated, and the countdown for a nuclear
decision began. It took eight minutes before the missile was properly identifieda
considerable amount of time considering the speed with which a nuclear response must be
decided upon (Aftergood 2000). Creating a false signal in these early warning systems would
be relatively easy using computer network operations. The real difficulty would be gaining
access to these systems as they are most likely on a closed network. However, if they are
transmitting wirelessly, that may provide an entry point, and information gained through the
internet may reveal the details, such as passwords and software, for gaining entrance

to the closed network. If access was obtained, a false alarm could be followed by
something like a DDoS attack, so the operators believe an attack may be imminent,
yet they can no longer verify it. This could add pressure to the decision making
process, and if coordinated precisely, could appear as a first round EMP burst.
Terrorist groups could also attempt to launch a non-nuclear missile, such as the one
used by Norway, in an attempt to fool the system. The number of states who possess
such technology is far greater than the number of states who possess nuclear weapons.

Obtaining them would be considerably easier, especially when enhancing

operations through computer network operations. Combining traditional terrorist
methods with cyber techniques opens opportunities neither could accomplish on
their own. For example, radar stations might be more vulnerable to a computer attack,
while satellites are more vulnerable to jamming from a laser beam, thus together they deny
dual phenomenology. Mapping communications networks through cyber

reconnaissance may expose weaknesses, and automated scanning devices created

by more experienced hackers can be readily found on the internet. Intercepting or
spoofing communications is a highly complex science. These systems are designed to
protect against the worlds most powerful and well funded militaries. Yet, there are
recurring gaffes, and the very nature of asymmetric warfare is to bypass
complexities by finding simple loopholes . For example, commercially available software
for voice-morphing could be used to capture voice commands within the command and
control structure, cut these sound bytes into phonemes, and splice it back together in order
to issue false voice commands (Andersen 2001, Chapter 16). Spoofing could also be used
to escalate a volatile situation in the hopes of starting a nuclear war. In June 1998, a
group of international hackers calling themselves Milw0rm hacked the web site of Indias
Bhabha Atomic Research Center (BARC) and put up a spoofed web page showing a
mushroom cloud and the text If a nuclear war does start, you will be the first to scream
(Denning 1999). Hacker web-page defacements like these are often derided by critics of
cyber terrorism as simply being a nuisance which causes no significant harm. However, webpage defacements are becoming more common, and they point towards alarming

possibilities in subversion. During the 2007 cyber attacks against Estonia, a counterfeit
letter of apology from Prime Minister Andrus Ansip was planted on his political party website
(Grant 2007). This took place amid the confusion of mass DDoS attacks, real world protests,
and accusations between governments.

AT alt caus counterterror bad

Counnterterror intl good now
Byman 13

Daniel Byman is a professor in the Security Studies Program in the School of Foreign Service
at Georgetown University and a senior fellow at the Saban Center at Brookings.
Article: The Intelligence War on Terrorism Author: Byman, Daniel Journal: Intelligence and
national security ISSN: 0268-4527 Date: 12/2013 Page: 1 - 27 DOI:
10.1080/02684527.2013.851876

Counterterrorism intelligence has done well in the decade after 9/11 . There has been
no major attack on US soil, and Al Qaeda is in disarray. 101 The impressive intelligence
gathering and its integration with operations required for the success of the Bin Ladin raid
highlight how impressive US capabilities are.

Critiques of intel misguided structure is great

Byman 13
Daniel Byman is a professor in the Security Studies Program in the School of Foreign Service
at Georgetown University and a senior fellow at the Saban Center at Brookings.
Article: The Intelligence War on Terrorism Author: Byman, Daniel Journal: Intelligence and
national security ISSN: 0268-4527 Date: 12/2013 Page: 1 - 27 DOI:
10.1080/02684527.2013.851876

Dont Fix What Aint Broken

Although many challenges remain, any suggestions for changing counterterrorism
intelligence should first recognize that the current mix of liaison relationships, SIGINT,
document exploitation, and other intelligence sources has worked wel l. Perhaps
surprisingly given the US track record in the last 10 years, there are regular criticisms of the
intelligence community for being stuck in a Cold War mindset and otherwise not adapting to
the challenges of the post-9/11 world. For example, Amy Zegart contends that the US
intelligence community often fails to make necessary changes in response to the threat of
terrorism. 102 Such criticisms are common in part because the sources of the post-9/11
intelligence successes are often not properly understood. A common criticism is that
the CIA does not have enough HUMINT and that it should develop more of it a
recommendation made before 9/11 and still made today. 103 As one former CIA officer
colorfully put it, the CIA lacks a single truly qualified Arabic-speaking officer of Middle
Eastern background who can play a believable Muslim fundamentalist who would volunteer
to spend years of his life with shitty food and no women in the mountains of Afghanistan.
104 Gaining access to information through the humans who know it is vital for
counterterrorism, but the most effective, or more accurately the most realistic, form of
HUMINT is rarely the spy in the inner circle of a terrorist group. As Pillar contends: Living
where the water is bad, by itself, is apt to yield more stomach ailments than insights about
terrorism insights that are at least as likely to be gleaned in the papers being pushed at
Langley. 105 As discussed above, interrogation, document exploitation, and SIGINT

often play a far more prominent role in counterterrorism than that of the
stereotypical spy.

Intel Good: Crime

Crime Links
Intelligence led operations key to fight transnational crime
Schreier 09 (2009, Fred, Consultant, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of
Armed Forces, former colonel and general staff member, Swiss Ministry of Defense, Master
of Arts in Law and Diplomacy, Fletcher School, Tufts, Fighting the Pre-eminent Threats with
Intelligence-led Operations, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces
(DCAF) Occasional Paper 16)
The increasing sophistication of TOC makes it imperative to disrupt and demolish network
structures instead of merely arresting individual criminals. But attempts to break up criminal
networks will never be effective until all available information is developed and transformed
into intelligence for use by all government agencies involved in countering TOC. In short, intelligence-led
operations are needed for the improvement and expansion of the fight against TOC in a
more tailored and more effective way.
Although it is within the policing of organised crime that intelligence-led methods have been
developed in the first place, all law enforcement agencies have to shift their basic modus operandi
to intelligence-led policing. The same approach also redefines the intelligence functions as they exist or must
be developed in other ministries and agencies: the border guard, coast guard and customs services.
They cannot function effectively without intimate cooperation, information and intelligence
exchange with passport, consular and visa, immigration and naturalisation, migration and health services;
export-import, money laundering and financial controls; agencies of the ministries of communications and
transport, air traffic control and others, including some private sector enterprises.

Solves crime gap between norms and enforcement

Treverton 01 (2001, Gregory, PhD in economics and politics, Harvard, Director, RAND
Center for Global Risk and Security, Reshaping national intelligence for an age of
information, p. 54-6)
The plainest implication for the intelligence of the market state is that the agenda for
American policy-makers, and thus for intelligence, will be more dispersed . Nations of not much
interest will rush to the top of the agenda when humanitarian crises cannot be overlooked. Economic matters and
private groups will claim attention. Absent the Soviet Union as both focal point and overarching

threat, there is no immediate measure by which to reckon events. The meaning and import
of those events is up for grabs, and none can be immediately dismissed or downgraded
because it is isolated from the Soviet threat. Policy-makers have to deal with them all a large
number of snakes, if no big dragon, in former DCI R. James Woolseys metaphor.
In the confusing world ahead, sorting out the link between events abroad and American interests
will become more challenging. Intelligences role in that sorting will be critical, for understanding
what is going on over there is the first step in apprehending whether and why it matters to the United States. In
Somalia, for instance, the United States first thought it was feeding hungry people . Only later
did it understand that food was but a weapon in a long-standing power struggle . In Bosnia,
the United States couldnt decide whether it was containing an inevitable war, succoring
innocent victims, or punishing an evil aggressor. It did some of all of those, but the confusion of
purposes, while perhaps understandable, still bordered on the tragic.

will pose hard issues for intelligence because international concern over organized crime is
likely to grow just as international capacity to deal with it diminishes . Law enforcement is
rooted in the authority Drug trafficking and international crime of the state and
generally defined by geographic units; as a result, international institutions always have been weak.
Crime will offend the pocketbooks and values of more and more of the planets citizens, but
for a time at least, national and international institutions for dealing with it will be devalued .
For instance, there seems to be growing awareness that bribery in pursuit of international contracts is ultimately

bad even for the nations whose officials are bribed, so it is possible to imagine something like the U.S. Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act becoming a norm for international commerce. Yet acceptance of the norm is likely to run
ahead of the capacity to enforce it, which will remain in both national and international institutions that are parts of
the nation-state order.
That might change, and U.S. intelligence might, in effect, fill the gap between international
norms and the international capacity to enforce them. When the United States seeks

to level the international economic playing field, that involves secrets, for nations do not
advertise the bribes or side payments they make in trying to capture large foreign contracts for their

firms. Now, the United States looks to the world as if it is trying to enforce the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
unilaterally, but as attitudes change, what is now a pure intelligence task, based on secrets, might come to be more
accepted internationally.

Intelligence driven operations are key to solve transnational

organized crime and terrorism.
Sullivan 08 (8/22, John, Adjunct Researcher at the Vortex Foundation, Senior Research
Fellow at the Center for Advanced Studies on Terrorism, Senior Fellow at Small Wars JournalEl Centro, lieutenant with the Los Angeles Sheriffs Department, co-founder of the Los
Angeles Terrorism Early Warning (TEW) Group, co-editor of Countering Terrorism and WMD:
Creating a global counter-terrorism network, The Frontiers of Global Security Intelligence:
Analytical Tradecraft and Education as Drivers for Intelligence Reform, Small Wars Journal)
Virtually all agree that timely, accurate, reliable and actionable intelligence is
essential. To achieve that charge is often extremely complicated. Essentially, intelligence provides
understanding. Sherman Kent, the Yale-educated theoretician and practitioner of the early US
intelligence community, would have termed this knowledge, a knowledge based on an effective relationship
between intelligence and its users. As Kent (an OSS veteran who shaped the early CIA and Cold War
intelligence practices) noted, there is a need to evolve an understanding of intelligence.xvii Kent viewed
intelligence as an analytical discipline that resulted in all-source analysis. As a consequence,
collection and all source assessment led to a finished product that supports decision-makers .
In his view, intelligence production was more than raw collection, but included the collection,
evaluation, analysis, integration and interpretation of all available information to support planning and
operations. His view serves as good guidance for negotiating current and future threats. We must also
remember that classical human intelligence is a vital piece of this puzzle, one that cant
be purged in favor of technical means, however attractive and risk neutral they may
initially appear.
As we addressed the Cold War Threat, an understanding of the capabilities and intentions of our
adversaries was pursued and, largely if sometimes imperfectly, gained. Yet during the Cold War,
Soviet capabilities not intentions were decisive to Western understanding of the threat. As we
enter into what appears to be the decisive conflict of the twenty-first century , a conflict against
terrorists and networked global insurgents, we find a pressing need to understand Jihadi intentionsa
sharp contrast to the frequently predictable adversary of the past.
Combating terrorism and strategic crime is the decisive

conflict of our time. To succeed we

will need to recognize that this conflict is largely an intelligence war. Clandestine
and covert services working together with other elements of government such as the
military and police will likely be at the cutting edge of domestic and international efforts to
contain terrorism and forge domestic and foreign policy and response. To do so, many factors must be balanced.
These include balancing foreign and domestic, the push and pull of intelligence to users, the demand for an
immediate scoop vs. strategically relevant product, the tension between criminal and intelligence investigations,
the balance between sharing and security and, finally, the most important element: the balance between intrusive
protection and liberty.
We are at the frontier of this intelligence war. Like Sherman Kent at the formation of the US intelligence
community, we must start the dialog to build the craft, discipline and knowledge necessary to

evolve an understanding of intelligence for the conflict of our time. The sooner we resolve
these issues and define intelligence for combating post-modern, networked adversaries, the
sooner we can thwart the threat and preserve the liberties of Americans and other persons of good will
worldwide.

Intel Good: Counterintel

counterintel k2 heg
Counterintelligence key to all US interests
Van Cleave 9 http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2009/02/06/AR2009020603498.html Michelle Van Cleave, former
National Counterintelligence Executive; former Staff Director, Senate Judiciary
Subcommittee
But today, this vital national security mission is on life support. ad_icon Think this
isn't a big deal? Think again. Most Americans would be astonished to learn how successful
foreign intelligence services have been at stealing our national security secrets and
threatening our vital interests. The Chinese stole the design secrets to all -- repeat, all -U.S. nuclear weapons, enabling them to leapfrog generations of technology development
and put our nuclear arsenal, the country's last line of defense, at risk. To this day, we
don't know quite when or how they did it, but we do know that Chinese intelligence
operatives are still at work, systematically targeting not only America's defense secrets but
our industries' valuable proprietary information. The Soviets, of course, were especially
aggressive at spying -- a tradition that has roared back to life in Vladimir Putin's Russia. It
was bad enough that the KGB learned so much about U.S. vulnerabilities, but scores of
hostile intelligence services and terrorist groups have also been schooled in the tradecraft
that the Soviets perfected. If left unanswered, these growing foreign intelligence
threats could endanger U.S. operations, military and intelligence personnel and
even Americans at home.

Counterintelligence key to defense of US interests

Schindler 11/29/11 http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/the-counterintelligenceimperative-6195 John R. Schindler is professor of National Security Affairs at the U.S. Naval
War College in Newport, RI, and a former National Security Agency expert in
counterespionage and counterterrorism. The opinions expressed here are entirely his own
Moreover, developing a cadre of effective CI officers takes time and talent , as a good
counterintelligence officer must be a genuine expert in his or her particular region of
interest, and he or she must have a detailed, and preferably encyclopedic, knowledge of the
opposing service's operations and tactics going back years or decades. Yet the United
States must get serious about counterintelligence if it wants to protect its
interests in a dangerous world. During my time in the intelligence community, I worked
with CI officers from many agencies, including the talented staff of the CIA's
Counterintelligence Center. These people sometimes find it difficult to make CI work because
of the pervasive bias against counterintelligence at Langley. Let it be hoped that this
latest counterspy debacle will force the CIA , and all of our intelligence agencies, to
finally get serious about counterintelligence . This is the real world, not merely a thriller
spy movie.

counterintel k2 contest china

Counterintelligence key to foil Chinese espionage

Wise 12/10/11 http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/11/opinion/sunday/chinas-spies-arecatching-up.html?_r=0 David Wise is a writer and historian of intelligence and espionage. His
most recent book is Tiger Trap: Americas Secret Spy War with China. Popular Mechanics
contributing editor Simon Cooper
Later that month, an engineer who worked on the B-2 stealth bomber for Northrop Grumman
was sentenced to 32 years in prison for passing defense secrets to China. In exchange for
more than $100,000, he had helped design a stealth exhaust system for Chinas cruise
missiles to make it difficult to detect and destroy them. And in August, reports attributed to
American intelligence officials asserted that Pakistan had allowed Chinese experts to inspect
the remains of the stealth helicopter that crashed during the May mission to kill Osama bin
Laden. Although Pakistan and China denied the reports, Beijing would have a great interest
in examining the tail of the Black Hawk helicopter, the part of the aircraft that was not
destroyed by the Navy Seals team, to learn more secret details of American stealth
technology. Meanwhile, the mystery of the leaked W-88 warhead design remains unsolved.
At first, the American government suspected that Wen Ho Lee, a Los Alamos nuclear
scientist, had leaked the W-88, but it produced no evidence that he had done so. He was
held in solitary confinement for nine months, eventually pleaded guilty to one count of
mishandling classified information and won an extraordinary apology from the federal judge
who presided over the case. Misled by the Energy Department, the F.B.I. had chased the
wrong person for three years. Finally, in 1999, Robert Bryant, then the bureaus deputy
director, enlisted Stephen Dillard, a veteran counterintelligence agent, to head a major
investigation of how China had acquired the design of the W-88. The inquiry was led by the
F.B.I. and run by a task force of 300 investigators from 11 federal agencies, including the
Defense Department, the C.I.A., the National Security Agency and the Defense Intelligence
Agency. On Sept. 11, 2001, some of the investigators were killed when American Airlines
Flight 77 was flown by terrorists into the Pentagon. But the investigation went on. Mr.
Dillards task force, operating out of public view, looked at the nuclear weapons laboratories,
government agencies and defense contractors in California and several other states who had
manufactured parts of the warhead. The F.B.I. interviewed the walk-in, who was by now
living in the United States, but he could shed no light on the source of the document. Finally,
after four years, the investigation ended with American intelligence agencies no closer to
knowing how China obtained the secret design of the nuclear warhead. The answer remains
locked up in Beijing. More than a decade later, Chinas spies continue to conduct
espionage against military targets. Last year, a Pentagon official was sentenced to
prison, the last of 10 people rounded up by the F.B.I., all members of a loosely connected
Chinese spy network on the West and East Coasts that was run by Lin Hong, a spymaster in
Beijing. The data that made its way to China included information on the Navys Quiet
Electric Drive, designed to make submarines harder to detect, the B-1 bomber and projected
American arms sales to Taiwan. China has even penetrated the F.B.I. In 2003, Katrina Leung,
an F.B.I. informant for two decades, was found to be working as a double agent for Beijing.
Astonishingly, the two top F.B.I. agents in California responsible for Chinese
counterintelligence were having affairs with Ms. Leung at the same time, allowing her to
help herself to classified documents that were brought to her home by one of the agents.

Chinas success in stealing American secrets will provide a continuing challenge to

the spy catchers. And Washingtons counterintelligence agents, accustomed to the
comfortable parameters of the cold war and more recent battles against Al Qaeda, must
rethink their priorities and shift their focus, resources and energy eastward to

counter Chinas spies. If not, more secrets like the W-88 nuclear warhead will
continue to find their way to Beijing.

Counterinterlligence capabilities key to stop Chinese stealing

Mahadevan 10 Dr Prem Mahadevan is a Senior Researcher at the Center for Security
Studies in Zurich, Switzerland. He completed a BA in War Studies and an MA in Intelligence
Studies from King's College London, before completing a doctorate on Indian counterterrorism intelligence. He has written numerous journal articles on security affairs and is the
author of a short monograph on linkages between jihadist groups and the Pakistani
intelligence service ISI. His responsibilities at the CSS include the study of sub-state conflicts
and organised crime The RUSI Journal Volume 155, Issue 5, 2010
As Western intelligence agencies move into the 2010s, they face a more nebulous threat
environment.7 This article discusses three likely challenges to Western counterintelligence in the next decade: espionage from rising autocratic states, proxy warfare and
collaboration between terrorists and organised crime. Between them, these have the

potential to burden counter-intelligence resources to the point where egregious

security breaches can occur. None of these challenges are particularly new to Western
security agencies. However, their combined effect will exert strong covert pressures on the
United States and its allies. Resisting these urgently requires the upgrade of counterintelligence capabilities and the preparation of long-term forecasts of how the pressures
will interact. Western intelligence agencies need to anticipate scenarios where subversive
threats converge and create amorphous 'grey area phenomena'. Counter-terrorism should
be balanced with counterespionage, both domestically and abroad. Six countries of
particular counterintelligence interest are examined here: Russia, China, Iran, Afghanistan,
Pakistan and Mexico.* The Russian Intelligence State The June 2010 arrest of ten alleged
Russian agents in the United States demonstrates that, notwithstanding improved bilateral
relations, Cold War-style espionage continues.4 Few can be surprised at this. Ever since the
disintegration of the Soviet Union, Russia has viewed intelligence as the key to regaining its
global influence. It has also been alarmed by the eastward expansion of NATO to include
former member states of the Warsaw Pact, seeing this as encroachment within its traditional
sphere of influence, and has devoted considerable resources to monitoring it. Spy scandals
in Estonia and the Czech Republic during 2008-10 indicate that the Russian foreign
intelligence service is actively recruiting high-level Eastern European sources.s Its operations
have been aided by lower levels of vigilance on the part of host security services, compared
to their Western European counterparts.6 In addition to embassy-based networks, Russian
espionage is characterised by extensive use of unofficial operatives working under
commercial cover. The logic, which has also been used by Western intelligence agencies, is
that business contacts are likely to be less nationalistic and more willing to overlook political
differences.7 Such cover also helps in collecting economic intelligence, particularly on the
European energy sector, which is of immense importance to Russia. Under the guidance of
Vladimir Putin, Russian intelligence has adapted well to the post-Cold War international
system, remaining an instrument of national power. Moreover, not long ago, British
diplomats were embroiled in a spy scandal in Russia, suggesting that former Cold War
belligerents will continue snooping on each other, even when relations are cordial.* Chinese
Espionage Less prominent than the Russians, but equally active in the West, are the
Chinese. According to the British Security Service (MI5), the Chinese and Russians top the
list of around twenty foreign intelligence organisations that actively target British interests
Nevertheless, there is a qualitative difference between the nature of the intelligence threat
posed by Russia and China: the latter appears to define the American-led West as its
adversary in a bipolar competition for international influence .10 Its intelligence
operations are aimed less at safeguarding traditional security interests than at promoting
new ones in line with Beijing's rising power. They are thus more ambitious.

China tech stealing k2 modernization

Chinese tech stealing key to offensive military modernization and
Taiwan invasion counterintel key to check
Cooper 9 http://www.popularmechanics.com/technology/military/news/3319656 staff,
popular mechanics
Scouring the Globe
According to U.S. counterintelligence agents, Bill Moo was one player in a sprawling,
decentralized network. "They are scouring the globe on behalf of the Chinese government,
vacuuming up every shred of technology information or hardware they can get their
hands on," says former FBI officer Ed Appel. A press officer at the Chinese embassy in
Washington, D.C., calls that accusation "groundless," saying that "the Chinese government
does not have activities in espionage in the United States." However, Appel and others say
that extensive Chinese spying is indicated by a sampling of cases that have recently come
to light in the United States. South Korean arms dealer Kwonhwan Park was sentenced in
August 2005 for exporting Black Hawk helicopter engines and night vision equipment to
China. Ting-Ih Hsu, a naturalized U.S. citizen, and Hai Lin Nee, a Chinese citizen, illegally
exported 25 low-noise amplifier chips that have applications in the Hellfire air-to-ground
missiles carried by Apache and Cobra helicopters. New Jersey firms Manten Electronics and
Universal Technologies sold China millions of dollars' worth of restricted computer chips.
Eugene You-Tsai Hsu, a retiree living in Blue Springs, Mo., tried to buy a critical encryption
device tightly controlled by the National Security Agency. Additional accused Chinese
operatives have been sent to prison in cases involving Generation III night vision equipment
and computer chips used in advanced radar and navigation systems. None of the spies
acted in concert, according to U.S. counterintelligence sources. Like Moo, they were
freelancers, operating at what Appel calls a "deniable distance" from their Beijing bosses.
However, they did share much of their quarry--items on shopping lists that included some of
America's most sophisticated weaponry. Sights on Taiwan On Feb. 28, 1991, the United
States and its allies called a halt to combat operations in the Persian Gulf War, just four days
after U.S. tanks started to roll across the desert, and a few weeks after launching an air
campaign. "The Chinese watched with dismay the ease of the U.S. victory over Iraq," says
Toshi Yoshihara, visiting professor at the Air War College in Montgomery, Ala. In response, he
says, modernizing the country's vast but primitive arsenal became a top

priority for Chinese officials . According to U.S. deputy undersecretary of defense

Richard Lawless, China's sense of urgency stems partly from concern over the future of
Taiwan. In testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Lawless said that
China wants "a variety of credible military options to deter moves by Taiwan toward
permanent separation or, if required, to compel by force the integration of Taiwan "
with the mainland. Since the United States has pledged to defend Taiwan, that means

China is seeking the ability to go toe-to-toe against America's best

weaponry . Some U.S. officials argue that China's ambitions go beyond Taiwan to
encompass the global stage. Rather than trying to address all its military shortcomings at
once, Yoshihara says, the Chinese government focused on obtaining "leap ahead"
technologies already in use by the United States. Former Chinese leader Jiang Zemin called
these technologies "shashoujian," translated variously as "assassin's mace" or "silver bullet."
They ranged from advanced communications equipment to long-range missile systems. A

Credible Threat The result of China's 15-year effort has been "the largest military

buildup the world has witnessed since the end of the Cold War," says Richard Fisher, a
China specialist for the International Assessment and Strategy Center (IASC), a Virginiabased think tank. China is now termed a "credible threat to other modern militaries
operating in the region" by the Department of Defense, despite languishing perhaps 25
years behind the States in a number of areas. By next year, Chinese nuclear missiles could
have the capability to hit any target in the United States from launch sites on mainland
China. By 2008, the country is expected to possess submarine-launched nuclear missiles,
giving it global strike capabilities. The nuclear arsenal is backed by an increasingly
sophisticated navy and air force. Currently on Chinese military drawing boards are plans
for combat aircraft, the Chengdu J-10 and Xian JH-7A fighter jets; a combat helicopter, the Z10; advanced warships; and even space-based weapons designed to knock out
communications satellites. U.S. observers fear that much of this will be made possible by
espionage. In June 2005, China began sea trials of its new Luyang II guided-missile
destroyers. When the armaments were unveiled, jaws clenched in the Pentagon. The ships
were equipped with a knockoff of the latest version of the U.S. Navy's Aegis battle
management system, a critical command-and-control technology. The technology enables
U.S.--and now Chinese--forces to simultaneously attack land targets, submarines and surface
ships. It also runs fleet defense tactics to protect against hostile planes and missiles. Federal
sources insist that the only way the relatively backward Chinese military could have
developed such a system was by copying it. Into the Arms Bazaar Anthony Mangione is a
quiet-spoken man in his mid-40s whose office in Fort Lauderdale's federal courthouse is
decorated with old newspaper cuttings celebrating the D-Day landings, two fish tanks (one
full, one empty) and a door covered with dozens of curling Post-it notes. As the assistant
special agent in charge of the Fort Lauderdale department of Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE), Mangione heads a team of undercover agents who have spent years
infiltrating what he terms a global "arms bazaar." The agents are assigned to ICE's Arms and
Strategic Technology Investigations (ASTI) unit, which has operations in 43 countries as well
as in the United States. Last year, ASTI agents conducted more than 2500 investigations
worldwide, many of them involving China. The Moo case got under way after two arms
dealers, who also work as paid informants, introduced some of Mangione's undercover
agents to a French middleman, Maurice Serge Voros. During a phone call on Feb. 26, 2004,
Voros asked the agents, who were posing as arms dealers, for help obtaining engines used in
the U.S. Black Hawk combat helicopter. The engines, manufactured by General Electric, are
on the U.S. Munitions List, a catalog of restricted arms and technology administered by the
State Department's Bureau of Political-Military Affairs. It is illegal to export Munitions List
items without a special government license. Over the following year, ASTI learned that Voros
represented Moo, and that Moo in turn was working for the People's Liberation Army. In a
Dec. 4, 2004, e-mail, Moo wrote that China did not want its name on any of the contracts.
"These cases take a long time," says Mangione. "It can be frustrating. But you have to let
the game play." In March 2005, Voros told the undercover agents that Moo had now shifted
priorities. His new top goal was to buy an F-16 engine--and, said Voros, Moo had been given
"the green light" to make a deal. Lethal Shopping Lists Moo's destination last November was
Shenyang Aircraft Corp., which lies a few miles from Taoxian International Airport. It's the
site where, in cooperation with Russia, China developed its first homegrown fighter engine,
the Lyulka AL-31 turbofan engine. But the Lyulka provides a Pontiac Firebird level of
performance compared to the Formula One-worthy engine that Moo was set to deliver. U.S.
officials believe that China planned to copy the F-16 engine for its own prototype fighter.
China has managed to "reverse-engineer some of [America's] most modern rifles, cannons
and guns and produce them domestically," says Larry Wortzel, chairman of the U.S.-China
Economic and Security Review Commission, which reports to Congress. However, Chinese
expertise in engine manufacturing has lagged, according to Wortzel, who spent 25 years
working in military intelligence. "This is one of their biggest espionage targets," he says.
"There are characters out there with laundry lists of stuff like this," says Mangione. Moo's list
included nuclear missiles and jet engines, and also called for the "urgent procurement" of "2
to 4 sets" of a "Nuclear Submarine (nuclear reactor should be one unit, no noise) including

ALL nuclear weapon systems." Acquiring an entire submarine might be a long shot,
Mangione says, but "any specs, any photos, any anything they can get is more than they
had before." China's efforts amount to a worldwide "market intelligence program ,"
says former FBI analyst Paul D. Moore. "The reality is that China does not practice
intelligence the way God intended," he jokes. America's intelligence structure arose during
the Cold War to contain the Soviet Union. "In our model, professional intelligence officers go
out and do the job," Moore says. "In China's model, anyone and everyone is a potential
intelligence asset." The system is chaotic and inefficient but also highly effective. According
to Moore and others, it relies on "guanxi," a system of social networking with deep cultural
significance. "The process for finding the best restaurant in Seattle is exactly the same as
finding out what nuclear technology America has," Moore says. "You ask your friends.
Eventually, you're introduced to someone who can help." Guanxi could explain why Chi Mak,
a naturalized American citizen who spent years as a naval engineer for U.S. defense
contractors, finds himself in jail, accused of secretly working for the Chinese government.
"When someone reaches out to you," Moore says, "it can be very hard to say no." According
to a 42-page FBI affidavit, Mak was the lead engineer on a highly sensitive U.S. naval
project: the Quiet Electric Drive. The FBI says it recorded Mak copying Navy secrets, and
later found Chinese-language wish lists in his home that included propulsion and commandand-control technology. According to his lawyer, Ronald Kaye, Mak acknowledges "engaging
in a technology exchange" with China. But, Kaye says, none of the material was classified.
"It's unfortunate that so quickly people came to perceive something criminal." A trial is set
for this November. The Endgame After a series of meetings in London and Orlando, Fla., Bill
Moo, Voros and the ASTI agents agreed on a price of $3.9 million for one F-16 engine. On
Oct. 5, 2005, Moo transferred the money into a Swiss bank account he controlled. One
month later, he flew from Taipei to San Francisco and then to Miami. By now, he was being
shadowed by ASTI investigators. On Nov. 8, Moo was driven to a quiet hangar in Homestead
and shown his prize, an F-16 engine. He had already wired $140,000 from a bank account in
Singapore to an account run by an ASTI front company to cover shipping costs to China. Moo
asked to photograph the engine but was rebuffed. Nevertheless, he now authorized payment
of the $3.9 million. According to an ICE official, Moo told the undercover agents that after he
returned to China he would want to buy an entire aircraft. "Then [the] customer [will] have a
confidence on you, okay? So they will be planning [to buy] the two-seat F-16." Moo also said
he would want to purchase cruise missiles. Mangione decided it was time to bring the
operation to an end. "People like Moo don't have their lists out to one person," he says. "If
he's dealing with us he's dealing with 10 other people. We couldn't take the risk that one of
these other sellers might give him what he was after." Agents moved in and arrested Moo in
his hotel room on Nov. 9. After six months in jail--during which he tried to bribe both an
assistant U.S. attorney and a federal judge to let him go--he pleaded guilty to multiple
offenses; a sentencing hearing was set for this summer. Voros is still at large, the subject of
an international arrest warrant. Modern Smuggling Technology espionage can be difficult
to prevent. As Lockheed Martin's representative in Taiwan, Moo had successfully passed a
"rigorous" vetting procedure dictated by U.S. government rules, according to company
spokesman Jeff Adams. Yet, U.S. officials say he may have transferred restricted technology
to China before the investigation began. More typical cases are even harder to detect. ASTI
agents often navigate the murky area of dual-use technologies, where pressure sensors
could be used either for bombs or for washing machines, where computer chips with missile
applications might actually be destined for in-car navigation systems. Furthermore,
thousands of items prohibited for export can be bought over the Internet, shipped to a U.S.
address, then simply mailed to China in a padded envelope. Such materials supply the
building blocks needed for complex armaments. In other cases, technology is smuggled out
to an approved country using fake end-user certificates. For instance, Kwonhwan Park
shipped his Black Hawk engines to Malaysia before sending them on to China. And,
advanced technology such as the F-16 fighter has been sold to countries from Bahrain to
Venezuela where controls may be less stringent than in the United States. The situation
outrages U.S. Rep. Frank Wolf (R-Va.), who successfully fought recent plans by the State

Department to use Chinese-built computers for classified material. He says too little
attention is paid to China's "aggressive spying program against the U.S." The legal
deterrents to espionage are weak, says Wolf, who chairs a subcommittee overseeing
security and technology. "In the Cold War people went to jail for a long time" for spying, he
says, but today's "negligible penalties" are more appropriate to low-level embezzlement
than military spying. Park was unusual in receiving a 32-month prison term and a
deportation order; in contrast, Ting-Ih Hsu and Hai Lin Nee were each sentenced to three
years of probation. Meanwhile, says the IASC's Richard Fisher, a " battle is being

waged. The Chinese have established a vast collection system that by the end of the
decade will have helped them to become a global military power." While concern grows
among policy-makers and wonks, Mangione and his team still labor in the shadows of
the worldwide arms bazaar. They hope to prevent the day when U.S. troops

could find themselves staring down the barrel of a high-tech weapon

marked "Made in America ."
Read more: How China Steals U.S. Military Secrets - Popular Mechanics
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Chinese spying key to military modernization

Arrillaga 11 http://www.newsmax.com/Newsfront/StealingforChina/2011/05/07/id/395537
a Phoenix-based national writer for The Associated Press
For years, U.S. counterintelligence experts have cited a growing espionage threat
from China, the product of an ever-more competitive world in which technology is as vital
as political intelligence but a sign, too, of China's increasing prosperity, persistence and
patience. Recent cases reveal not only a high level of activity but also signs of changing
tactics and emboldened efforts. In one case, a convicted spy managed to convince not one
but two U.S. government officials to pass him secret information, telling them it was going to
Taiwan when he instead passed it to a Chinese official. The recruitment of more non-Chinese,
such as Shriver and Gowadia (an India-born, naturalized U.S. citizen), also represents a shift,
said Larry Wortzel, a former Army intelligence officer who serves on the U.S.-China Economic
and Security Review Commission. In the past, said Wortzel, China preferred to deal with
those "assessed as sympathetic to China or with ethnic Chinese." And then there are the socalled "espionage entrepreneurs," motivated simply by money. When asked about the recent
cases, the Chinese Foreign Ministry questioned the statistics, responding in a faxed
statement: "To speak of the Chinese side's so-called 'espionage activities' in the United
States is pure nonsense with ulterior motives." However, Joel Brenner, who served as the
U.S. National Counterintelligence Executive from 2006 to 2009, said: " The Chinese

espionage threat has been relentless recently ... we've never seen anything like it.
Some of it's public. Some of it's private. And some of it lies in that ambiguous area in
between." Today's "agents" are professors and engineers, businessmen exporting
legitimate products while also shipping restricted technology and munitions, criminal
capitalists who see only dollar signs. While some may be acting at the direction of a
government handler, others supply information to firms for either private enterprise or statesponsored research or both. Driving all of this, U.S. officials said, are China's desire
to develop a modernized military and its burgeoning wealth; last year China
surpassed Japan as the world's second-largest economy, behind only the United States.

Read Latest Breaking News from Newsmax.com

http://www.newsmax.com/Newsfront/StealingforChina/2011/05/07/id/395537#ixzz2sbqnJRSI
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Chinese espionage key to Chinese power projection

Alexander and Stewart 5/7/13 http://www.cnbc.com/id/48099539 Reuteres
corresppondants

China is using espionage to acquire technology to fuel its military modernization , the
Pentagon said on Monday, for the first time accusing the Chinese of trying to break into U.S.
defense computer networks and prompting a firm denial from Beijing. In its 83-page annual
report to Congress on Chinese military developments, the Pentagon also cited progress

in Beijing's effort to develop advanced-technology stealth aircraft and build an

aircraft carrier fleet to project power further offshore. The report said China's cyber
snooping was a "serious concern" that pointed to an even greater threat because the "skills
required for these intrusions are similar to those necessary to conduct computer network
attacks." "The U.S. government continued to be targeted for (cyber) intrusions, some of
which appear to be attributable directly to the Chinese government and military," it said,
adding the main purpose of the hacking was to gain information to benefit defense
industries, military planners and government leaders .

Espionage fuelled modernization key to Chinese regional

expansionism and destabilization
Alexander and Stewart 5/7/13 http://www.cnbc.com/id/48099539 Reuteres
corresppondants
"What concerns me is the extent to which China's military modernization occurs in the
absence of the type of openness and transparency that others are certainly asking of
China," David Helvey, deputy assistant secretary of defense for East Asia, told a Pentagon
briefing on the report. He warned of the "potential implications and

consequences of that lack of transparency on the security calculations of

others in the region." The annual China report, which Congress began requesting in
2000, comes amid ongoing tensions in the region due to China's military assertiveness and
expansive claims of sovereignty over disputed islands and shoals. Beijing has ongoing
territorial disputes with the Philippines, Japan and other neighbors. Beijing's publicly
announced defense spending has grown at an inflation-adjusted pace of nearly 10 percent
annually over the past decade, but Helvey said China's actual outlays were thought to be
higher. China announced a 10.7 percent increase in military spending to $114 billion in
March, the Pentagon report said. Publicly announced defense spending for 2012 was $106
billion, but actual spending for 2012 could range between $135 billion and $215 billion, it
said. U.S. defense spending is more than double that, at more than $500 billion. The report

highlighted China's continuing efforts to gain access to sophisticated military

technology to fuel its modernization program. It cited a laundry list of methods,
including "state-sponsored industrial and technical espionage to increase the level
of technologies and expertise available to support military research, development and
acquisition." Dean Cheng, an analyst at the conservative Heritage Foundation think tank,
said he was surprised by the number of cases of human espionage cited in the report. "This
is a PLA (People's Liberation Army) that is extensively, comprehensively modernizing,"

Cheng said. "... China is also comprehensively engaging in espionage. " China
tested its second advanced stealth fighter in as many years in October 2012, highlighting its
"continued ambition to produce advanced fifth-generation fighter aircraft," the report said.
Neither aircraft of its stealth aircraft was expected to achieve effective operational capability
before 2018, it said. Last year also saw China commission its first domestically produced
aircraft carrier. China currently has one aircraft carrier bought abroad and conducted its first
takeoff and landing from the ship in November.

modern bad (RATE)

Modernization destabilizing effects if its TOO FAST RATE is key
Bennett 8/24/11 http://thehill.com/news-by-subject/defense-homelandsecurity/178069-pentagon-china-progressing-in-quest-to-become-world-class-military-power
staff writer, The Hill
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia Michael Schiffer said Wednesday that
China this year will continue a long trend of annually increasing its military spending ,
this time by 12.7 percent over the 2010 level. U.S. officials are not concerned about any
single weapon system China is developing, Schiffer said. Rather, they are

alarmed by the scope and track of the military buildup , Schiffer told reporters
during a Pentagon briefing. The buildup could end up being a destabilizing force in

the Asia-Pacific region , he said. Beijing, over the next decade, will field a number of
combat systems that are on par with or will exceed global standards, Schiffer said. The
Pentagon report noted Chinas Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) has some gaps in some key
areas such as a large amount of antiquated hardware and an overall lack of
operational experience but said the modernization of its military is progressing. Militarily,
Chinas sustained modernization program is paying visible dividends, the report states.
During 2010, China made strides toward fielding an operational anti-ship ballistic missile,
continued work on its aircraft carrier program, and finalized the prototype of its first stealth
aircraft. Schiffer said Pentagon analysts believe Chinas goal is to build a regionally
focused military by 2020, adding the Asian behemoth is on track to achieve that.

modern = adventurism (senkaku, SCHINA sea)

Rapid modernization = Chinese regional aggression, sparking
conflict with US. Only maintaining our edge forestalls regional
conflict
Azarjw 12/13/13 http://poniforum.csis.org/blog/extension-tension-china-s-challenge-tou-s-extended-deterrence-in Research Intern at Center for Strategic and International Studies
(CSIS) Rejon metropolitalny Waszyngton, Dystrykt Kolumbii , Stany Zjednoczone
International Affairs
Chinas recent displays of power naturally raise the question of what motivated this sudden
transparency and who it is directed towards. Is China ready to show the world that it wants
more power? States often pursue vast military capabilities and a strong nuclear
deterrent in order to be considered a major power. Recent moves by China suggest it may
be seeking such recognition for itself. As China continues developing interests in other
regions, it also seeks the capacity to defend them if necessary. In tune with this goal, Beijing
adjusted its naval strategy from coastal defense to far seas defense. The PLAs
expanding military capabilities and power projection are aimed at protecting Chinese
interests and power overseas and on a global scale. Following the October 28th release of
highly unusual Chinese reports, which included maps that demonstrate the capability of
Chinas submarine-launched nuclear missiles to target and destroy U.S. cities and kill 5 to 12
million Americans, it is becoming more apparent that Chinas strategic doctrine is
transforming. Chinas evolving nuclear capabilities and doctrine will undoubtedly have
several implications for regional arms control and stability. Beijing may be
emboldened by its new capacity to challenge the United States and other countries
on several issues, including national interests in territorial disputes, as it will expect its
newly established nuclear armor to deter retaliation from the United States on a nuclear and
perhaps conventional level. While some critics, such as the Chief of Naval Operations,
Admiral Jonathan Greenert, argue Chinas nuclear missile submarine threat lacks credibility,
recent developments suggest that Chinas military modernization should be taken
more seriously. Tensions are running high after Beijings recent announcement of a new Air
Defense Identification Zone over the East China Sea, which is intended to allow the Chinese
military to take emergency defensive measures against any unidentified aircraft. The
Senkaku Islands, a focus of dispute between China and Japan, have been administered by
Japan for decades, and therefore fall under U.S.-Japan Treaty obligations. Despite Chinas
threat of military action against any aircraft which enters the zone, the United States called
Chinas bluff and sent a pair of B-52 bombers over the East China Sea. The U.S. response
was appropriate, as it immediately acted on its treaty obligations to Japan and enforced the
credibility of the U.S. security guarantee. However, the incident still increased the anxiety of
Chinas neighbors and U.S. allies in the region. Beijings current behavior in the territorial
dispute with Japan may be the prelude to a newly emboldened China on the
international stage. The dispute over the Senkaku Islands can be seen as a part of the
power struggle which has arisen between the United States and China. It is becoming a
power relationship in which China, as a rising power, conflicts with and challenges the
United States as the existing superpower. Beijing is now challenging the current global
order, testing whether the United States truly possesses the capacity to maintain its
regional presence and extended deterrence . While China sees the United States as an
important trading partner, it also has reason to perceive the United States as its potential
strategic rival. For China, strategic stability would depend on U.S. acceptance of mutual
vulnerability. The United States, however, neither accepts nor rejects such an option, which
results in U.S. ambiguity. While a U.S. declaration of mutual vulnerability would promote

stability in U.S. relations with China, it would certainly cause concern in Japan and other
countries under the U.S. nuclear umbrella. The increasing demands of U.S. allies in Asia
demonstrate that the security concerns of a rising China cannot be mollified without creating
anxiety in other Asian countries. While Chinas expanding military capabilities do not signal
the birth of another Cold War, they demonstrate that global strategic stability is being
challenged. Chinas shift in military strategy and recent behavior in the international
arena demonstrate the importance of the United States maintaining its nuclear
superiority and credible security guarantees. China is not only increasing its
capabilities, but also modernizing its arsenal at an extremely fast pace. This signifies the
need for the United States to continue to maintain the safety, security, and effectiveness of
its nuclear arsenal. Without continuing these efforts, Washington cannot expect its deterrent
to be considered credible and effective. Extended deterrence is critical for the United
States to maintain its superpower status. U.S. allies in the Pacific are essential in
continuing to balance and deter China; therefore keeping them reassured of U.S. treaty
responsibilities is crucial to upholding strategic balance in the region. Although China is
making strides in its capabilities, it has failed to show itself as a reliable actor in terms of
respecting international norms and resolving disputes in a diplomatic manner. Therefore,
while China does not view U.S. superiority as a contribution to peace in the region, its
neighbors in the Pacific rely on U.S. superiority and power. Beijings rapid military
modernization will undoubtedly inject anxiety into allies who depend on U.S. security
guarantees and put U.S. influence to the test. Chinas expanding global interests and recent
saber rattling emphasize the importance of the U.S. role as a guarantor of
security. The United States therefore needs to continue improving its capabilities
and coordination with its allies in order to demonstrate the solidity of its alliance
commitments. Washington needs to maintain a strategy of reassurance and resolve.
The way the United States reacts now may be the key to how Chinas growing power and
strategy unfolds

modern = china lashout

Chinese modernizes first strike, pushing all out war and escalation
must maintain edge to deter
Wang 2/1/14 http://nextbigfuture.com/2014/02/china-military-is-weaker-and-more.html
Director of Research nextbiguture

The Chinese military is dangerous in another way as well. Recognizing that it will never
be able to compete with the U.S. and its allies using traditional methods of war fighting, the
PLA has turned to unconventional asymmetric first-strike weapons and
capabilities to make up for its lack of conventional firepower, professionalism and
experience. These weapons include more than 1,600 offensive ballistic and cruise
missiles, whose very nature is so strategically destabilizing that the U.S. and Russia
decided to outlaw them with the INF Treaty some 25 years ago. In concert with its
strategic missile forces, China has also developed a broad array of space weapons
designed to destroy satellites used to verify arms control treaties, provide military
communications, and warn of enemy attacks. China has also built the worlds largest army
of cyber warriors, and the planets second largest fleet of drones, to exploit areas where
the U.S. and its allies are under-defended. All of these capabilities make it more likely
that China could one day be tempted to start a war, and none come with any built
in escalation control. Yet while there is ample and growing evidence to suggest China
could, through malice or mistake, start a devastating war in the Pacific, it is highly
improbable that the PLAs strategy could actually win a war. Going forward it will be
important for the U.S. and its allies to recognize that Chinas military is in many ways much
weaker than it looks. However, it is also growing more capable of inflicting destruction on its
enemies through the use of first-strike weapons. To mitigate the destabilizing effects of
the PLAs strategy, the U.S. and its allies should try harder to maintain their current
(if eroding) leads in military hardware. But more importantly, they must continue
investing in the training that makes them true professionals

modern = sino-japan war

Chinese military modernization from tech stealing sparks war with
Japan
Wall Street Journal 11/5/13
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303482504579178850122997242

The East China Sea may see the world's first war started by aerial drones . Unless
China and Japan quickly find some way to settle their territorial dispute , they are moving
toward a military clash. And with Barack Obama wounded abroad and at home by
everything from NSA spying to ObamaCare implementation, America is playing no role in
this dangerous affair. The result is an Asia more prone to conflict than at any time in recent
memory.
The Japanese-Chinese territorial dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands was botched last
year by Tokyo, led at the time by the now-discredited Democratic Party of Japan. Reacting to
China's increasingly intrusive presence in the waters around the Japanese-administered
islands, and fearing that maverick former Tokyo Governor Shintaro Ishihara would carry
through his threat to purchase the islands, then-Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda nationalized
several of the islands after buying them from their private owners in September 2012.
China responded instantly with anti-Japanese riots and a freezing of diplomatic relations.
Chinese patrol vessels and fishing boats began tense face-offs with Japan's Coast Guard.
Within months, both nations' air forces began more active aerial patrols. Two months ago,
China upped the ante by flying surveillance drones in such contested airspace. Japan
responded by saying it would shoot down any drone that refused to leave the skies above
the islands. Beijing says that any attack on its drones would be an act of war.

This conflict is accelerated partly by technology . By sending naval flotillas through

international waters that pass between Japanese islands, flying early-warning airbornecontrol planes near strategic choke points, and ramping up its use of drones, China is
flexing the military might it has developed (and stolen from the U.S.) over the past
two decades.
Japan's military is also modernizing after years of stagnation, and now it has to come up with
rules of engagement for unmanned military systems, something few other countries have
had to do. China's rise is challenging traditional military doctrine in this way and others, from
its cyber aggression to its capabilities in space (such as anti-satellite weapons). The United
States, Russia, India and others are watching the East China Sea confrontation for clues
about China's operational capabilities, military doctrine and confidence to confront advanced
nations.

The drone scare has highlighted the lack of any diplomatic relationship between
Tokyo and Beijing. Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is again subordinating necessary
economic reforms to his desire to restore Japan's standing in the world. Chinese President Xi
Jinping has shown no desire to ease tensions with Japan since taking full power earlier this
year. And with Beijing's Central Committee plenum this weekend, no Chinese leader will
want to appear to be backing down in the face of Mr. Abe's apparent nationalism.
Across Asia, the Chinese-Japanese dynamic raises concerns that regional disputes
will be settled only by might. That makes smaller countries nervousespecially those
facing their own territorial disputes with Chinaand it makes it more difficult to develop any

meaningful regional political mechanisms. China's use of drones and advanced aircraft is
also certain to drive Asia's arms spending even higher.

modern kills US pacific heg

Modernization crushes US Pacific regional heg
Colby 7/31/13 http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/dont-sweat-airsea-battle-8804?
page=show
Research Analyst Strategic Studies / Strategic Initiatives Group 703.824.2901
colbye@cna.org Expertise U.S. nuclear weapons policy Deterrence WMD proliferation Arms
control Intelligence policy and reform Elbridge Colby is a research analyst in CNAs Strategic
Initiatives Group, where he focuses on strategic deterrence, proliferation, intelligence policy,
and related issues. Recent Work Strategic stability with Russia and China; future strategy for
the U.S. Navy; Middle East contingencies; consultant to Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratorys Global Security Directorate, the U.S. Strategic Command, the National
Intelligence Council, and other government bodies. Previous Positions From 2009 to 2010
Colby served as policy advisor to the Secretary of Defenses Representative for the follow-on
to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, serving first on the delegation in Geneva and then as
a Department of Defense point man for the treaty ratification effort. He previously served as
an expert advisor to the Congressional Strategic Posture Commission, as special assistant to
the Chief of Staff in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, as a staff member on
the Presidents WMD Commission, and with the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq and the
State Department. He has also been an adjunct staff member with the RAND Corporation
and has served as a consultant to the U.S. Nuclear Command and Control System Federal
Advisory Committee. Education B.A., in History, Harvard College; J.D., Yale Law School. - See
more at: https://www.cna.org/about/staff/elbridge-colby#sthash.9oWIlDmN.dpuf
The combination of growing Chinese military power and Beijings increasing
assertiveness has refocused attention on East Asia and the possibility of conflict after
a decade of emphasis on the Middle East and stability operations. Indeed, while Chinas
economic expansion appears to be hitting some turbulence, even a China that grows more
slowlyas in 7 percent rather than 10 percent per annumwill still be able to continue to
fund its impressive array of military modernization programs, programs that, if current
trends continue, will allow it to effectively conduct serious military operations throughout
Asia.

A China that can undertake such military operations will also be a China that will be
able to mount a formidableand in some cases dauntingly formidablechallenge to the
military power of the United States and its allies in the region. This is no coincidence, as
Chinas military modernization programs are clearly designed, according to the U.S.
governments own assessment, to counter third-party [read: U.S.] intervention in
disputes it cares about. If the Chinese can achieve the military upper hand over the
United States in the Asia-Pacific, the U.S. network of alliances and partnerships
and the regional order it has underwrittenwould no longer count for much
beyond ceremony in military terms.

The Pentagon has taken note, and is vigorously pursuing a spate of initiatives in an
attempt to preserve the U.S. margin of advantage over sophisticated adversaries such as
China. The oft-discussed AirSea Battle initiative and the related Joint Operational Access
Concept, while careful to avoid explicitly mentioning China, are obviously applicable to China
(as well as other potential adversaries wielding sophisticated military systems) and senior
Defense officials regularly talk about the threat posed by Chinese antiaccess/area denial
systems (A2/AD). So you do the math.

us pacific heg k2 heg, stop war

Loss of Pacific hegemony crusehs global heg, multiple wars only
maintaining edge solves
Erickson 13 http://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS28/20131211/101579/HHRG-113AS28-Wstate-EricksonA-20131211.pdf Dr. Andrew S. Erickson is an Associate Professor in the
Strategic Research Department at the U.S. Naval War College and a core founding member
of the departments China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI). He is an Associate in Research
at Harvard Universitys John King Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies (2008-). Erickson also
serves as an expert contributor to the Wall Street Journals China Real Time Report (
), for which he has authored or coauthored 26 articles. In spring 2013, he deployed in the
Pacific as a Regional Security Education Program scholar aboard USS Nimitz (CVN68), Carrier
Strike Group 11.

Chinas military development pursues outstanding territorial and maritime claims in the
Yellow, East, and South China Seas by targeting what Ill call physics based 2 limitations
in potential opponents systems. Beijing is prioriti zing an anti Navy to deter U.S.
forces from operating there over a blue water navy to project power far away . Chinas
interests and capabilities , which decrease with distance from the mainl and, must thus be
viewed geographically. Current Chinese strategic and military priorities are unlikely to
change radically because China faces unresolved domestic and regional challenges, yet is
already increasingly experiencing an S curve shaped growth slowdown. China is thus

already beginning to pose its greatest challenge to U.S. influence and interests in
the Asia Pacific. Fundamental issues hang in the balance: If not addressed properly,
Chinas rise as a major regional maritime power could begin an era in which the U.S.
military lost unfettered access to key regions . Haunted by history, the Asia Pacific has
prospered during nearly seven decades of U.S. forces helping to preserve peace. No
other nation has the capability and lack of territorial claims necessary to play this still
vital role. More broadly, Chinese success in subordinating international norms to its
parochial interests in the region so that they do not apply fully in practice would harm U.S.,
regional, and international interests : these are the same standards that ensure the
global system operates openly and effectively, for the security and prosperity of all. It
would encourage the application of force to more of the worlds many persistent disputes.
The Asia Pacific is simply too import ant for Washington to accept a diminished
role there. As Singapores founding father Lee Kuan Yew observes, The 21 st century will
be a contest for supremacy in the Pacific, because that is where the growth will be. ... If
the U.S. does not hold its ground i n the Pacific, it cannot be a world leader. 3
Chinese leaders are acutely attuned to perceived changes in relative national power, and
periodically examine other nations stated policies for potential changes in the will to
maintain their position regardin g issues that are important to Beijing. They will create
incidents and probe relentlessly when circumstances suggest that something may have
changed, whether timing, leaders , or resources . When met with convincing capability
provided that they do not perceive gratuitous humiliation or threats to the most vital of
interests they typically retreat. When insufficiently opposed, they see how far they can
push. The Impeccable Incident of March 2009 represented an important test fro m Beijing for
newly elected President Barack Obama; he passed by maintaining U.S. policy vis vis
surveillance, reconnaissance, and observation (SRO) missions. It was made in the face of
naysayers who claimed that the United States would never tolerate an alogous activity in its
backyard, when in fact it accepted considerable Soviet SRO activity throughout the Cold
War and today tolerates Russian SRO activity. 2 This was an extremely wise decision: with
38% of the worlds oceans claimable as exclusive econ omic zones (EEZs), such an exception

could not be accommodated without compromising vital U.S. interests, or establishing an

unacceptable precedent. Now, driven by its own maritime interests and trajectory, Beijing is
already shifting on this issue, pursui ng approaches that will complicate future opposition to
such U.S. activities. Chinese maritime intelligence collection operations increased in 2012,
Commander of the U.S. Pacific Command Admiral Samuel Locklear testified to the Senate
Armed Services Comm ittee in April 2013, with historic first such missions into the Indian
Ocean and within the U.S. exclusive economic zones off of Guam and Hawaii. 4 Chinese
acknowledgement at the 2013 Shangri La Dialogue of its conducting military surveillance in
America s undisputed EEZ may presage reduced opposition to similar activities in Chinas
own EEZ as China rises as a maritime power with access interests of its own. Similarly,
dispatch of B 52s from Guam on a routine training mission following Chinas recent anno
uncement of an East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) sent the right
message: a c oastal state has no authority to alter international freedoms in international
airspace, or interfere with freedoms of others . 5 Chinas neighbors and the U.S. a re rightly
concerned about how China has (and how it has not) gone about the announcement and
explanation of its ADIZ. Thus far, Beijing has defined its new ADIZ in a categorical manner
that ignores the complexities and risks involved , and remains ambiguous in its compliance
with international legal norms . This is particularly problematic because Chinas ADIZ
overlaps so extensively with Japans ADIZ (perhaps the only such overlap over an active
sovereignty dispute) , and even to some ex tent with South Koreas ADIZ. To diffuse the
resulting tensions, China needs to exercise restraint and allay concerns by its neighbors and
other users of the international airspace in question by offering specific clarifications and
reassurances. How the U.S. responds to such tests shap es subsequent Chinese behavior.
Though Beijing dislikes it, rebalancing has already been effective. For instance, Chinese
leaders disliked Secretary of State Hillary Clintons 2010 speech in Hanoi but nevertheless at
around that time began to walk back their overly assertive posture of 2009 10. The U.S.

must be prepared for further tests, and must consistently resist counterproductive
Chinese efforts designed to elicit weakness. While conflict with China should be avoided i f
at all possible, China must also be prevented from significantly coercing its neighbors or
altering the regions status quo. Failure to emphasize this point as well risks making the U.S.
appear weak and acquiescent to Chinese assertiveness, both to Beiji ng and to regional
allies, friends, and partners. This risks miscalculation on Beijings par t. It also makes it
unclear to taxpayers and their representatives why significant U.S. military investments are
needed in a time of austerity. This should be frame d in terms of ensuring the continued
functioning of the existing international system. Washington should clarify, as necessary,
that it is not trying to contain Beijing per se , but rather to resist any Chinese actions that
would harm the existing system. 3 The U.S. has upped the ante ambitiously, particularly in
the South China Sea, while a rising and already potent China is playing a long game. The
worst possible approach would be for the U.S., having anted up, to fail to follow through
adequately, both in capability and in action. If both private and public expectations of
Americas walk matching its talk are not met across the Asia Pacific, and views of a
hollow rebalancing take hold, the results could be worse than not having tried in the first
plac e. To prevent such failure, as well as the destabilization of a vital but
vulnerable region, the U.S. must maintain the credibility of regional presence and
demonstrated capability. This is essential to renew and intensify the U.S. role in the
region. The credibility of continuous naval presence and capability is essential. As the latest
U.S. Maritime Strategy emphasizes, trust and confidence cannot be surged. That is one
reason why the U.S. would not be able to address anywhere near its present objective s if it
allowed itself to diminish to a mere offshore balancer

china tech stealing kills compet

Chinese tech stealing kills us competitiveness
NBC News 10/11/12 http://rockcenter.nbcnews.com/_news/2012/10/11/14369266officials-say-chinese-spies-have-targeted-every-sector-of-the-us-economy?lite

The Chinese are playing dirty in the international spy game, according to current and
former intelligence officials at the highest levels of government. This is stealing
American wealth. It's stealing American jobs. It's stealing American competitive
advantage, General Michael Hayden, former head of the Central Intelligence Agency and
the National Security Agency, said in an interview with NBC News. Haydens comment was
echoed by a House Intelligence Committee report released on October 8th warning that two
Chinese telecommunications companies, Huawei and ZTE, could be funneling sensitive
information back to Beijing, and cautioned American carriers to avoid doing business with
them. Intelligence Committee Chairman Mike Rogers, R-Mich., told NBC News that the
Chinese have targeted every sector of the American economy. Everything you can possibly
imagine we have seen the Chinese make a concerted effort to steal that information
and use it for their own economic advantage , he said. That includes blueprints for the
next generation of auto parts, formulas for pesticides and pharmaceuticals, and other
information that makes American companies competitive in the global marketplace. Though
the United States limits its espionage to national security interests, intelligence officials said,

China has launched a well-organized campaign to steal American corporate secrets

via the Internet. I know states steal secrets. Our states steal secrets. And we're actually
pretty good at it. But we self-limit. We steal things that are valuable and useful for your
security, for your liberty and for your safety, Hayden said.

Tech stealing strategy key to Chinese competition boost

Schlesinger 7/9/12 Jennifer Schlesinger|CNBC Production Assistant
http://www.cnbc.com/id/48099539
There is a concerted effort by the government of China to get into the business of
stealing economic secrets to put into use in China to compete against the U.S.
economy, said Rep. Mike Rogers, R-Mich., chairman of the House Intelligence Committee.
The Chinese are afraid of business gap that could hurt their economy now and in the
future, experts say. While China's economic growth has been rapid and amazing over the
last 30 years, the Chinese are afraid that they're going to get stuck in a technology trap,
said Adam Segal, a China Expert and Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. The
Chinese feel that they have to rely on the West and Japan for critical technologies. To
aid economic growth, Segal says that China has outlined which industries it feels are of
strategic importance, including green technologies, new information technologies, biology,
and high-end manufacturing. To stay economically competitive, China has a two-pronged
approach according to Segal more research and development as well as more espionage.
They are spending more on research and development and science as well as training more
engineers and scientists, Segal goes on to say. But there's also a fairly widespread
espionage plan put in place that's going after critical technologies. While China is not
alone in committing espionage to gain trade secrets, experts say it poses one of the most
serious threats. Last year, the Office of the National Counterintelligence Agency called
Chinese actors the worlds most active and persistent perpetrators of economic
espionage, in its report to Congress. The number of prosecutions by the FBI of economic
espionage cases tied back to China is on the rise. It's a very large number and so it's clearly

a nation state policy to be this aggressi ve, Rep. Rogers said. He sponsored the Cyber
Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act(CISPA) bill, which is designed to protect U.S.
companies from cyber economic espionage.

Methodology / AT Ks of DA

Methodology OW policy impacts

The overall resilience of intelligence analysis trumps specific event
prediction
Wirtz 13 Dr. James J. Wirtz is Dean of the School of International Graduate Studies and
former Chairman of the Department of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate
School, Monterey, California. A former Chairman of the Intelligence Studies Section of the
International Studies Association, he was President of the International Security and Arms
Control Section of the American Political Science Association. A graduate of the University of
Delaware, with a Ph.D. from Columb ia University, New York City, Dr. Wirtz is the author and
co-edito r of several books on intelligence and arms control James J. Wirtz (2013) Indications
and Warning in an Age of Uncertainty, International Journal of Intelligence and
CounterIntelligence, 26:3, 550-562, DOI: 10.1080/08850607.2013.780558
Indications and warning intelligence is an important and time-tested methodology employed
by intelligenc e analysts to warn military officers and policymakers about changes in an
opponents operational posture which indicate that the likelihood of dangerous or
aggressive activity is increasing. In recent times, it has fallen out of fashion because
policymakers and the public alike have come to expect that the Intelligence
Community will be able to provide specific event predictions of an opponents
future actions. In other words, people tend to believe that intelligence analysts should be
able to state who is about to undertake some unwanted activity, as well as where, how,
when and why the action will unfold. Another expectation is that these specific event
predictions will be offered early enough so that policymakers and operators can
take effective action to prevent the occurrence of some nefarious act or attack. Specific
event prediction is indeed the holy grail of intelligence analysis, and analysts
sometimes do manage to warn of specific events before they unfold. In 1942 naval
intelligence analysts predicted the Japanese attack on Midway The Intelligence Community
detected Soviet efforts to place medium range missiles in Cuba before these actions became
a fait accompli . 1 But for theoretical, bureaucratic, and cognitive reasons, specific
event prediction is extraordinarily difficult to achieve in practice. Success tends to
be the exception, not the norm. Indications and warning intelligence offers a
powerful and important alternative to a focus on specific eve nt prediction that
might in fact be better suited to contemporary threat s posed by non-state actors or rogue
regimes.

UNCERTAINTY of threats demands we prioritize intelligence

Feinstein 3/22/13 ChairwomanSELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE R E P O R T OF
THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE UNITED STATES SENATE COVERING THE PERIOD
JANUARY 5, 2011 TO JANUARY 3, 2013 http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT113srpt7/pdf/CRPT-113srpt7.pdf citing ames R. Clapper, the newly confirmed Director of
National Intelligence.
Director Clapper stated his belief that counterterrorism, counterproliferation, and
counterintelligence are at the immediate forefront of our security concerns , but
noted, It is virtually impossible to rankin terms of long-term importancethe
numerous, potential threats to U.S. national security. He asserted that [t]he United States
no longer facesas in the Cold Warone dominant threat. Rather, it is the multiplicity
and interconnectedness of potential threatsand the actors behind themthat
constitute our biggest challenge. Indeed, even the three categories noted above are

also inextricably linked, reflecting a quickly changing international environment of

rising new powers, rapid diffusion of power to non-state actors and ever greater
access by individuals and small groups to lethal technologies. Director Clapper then
explained the Intelligence Communitys role concerning the quickly changing and complex
international environment. We in the Intelligence Community believe it is our duty to
work together as an integrated team to understand and master this complexity.
By providing better strategic and tactical 8 intelligence, we can partner more effectively
with other Government officials at home and abroad to protect our vital national

interests.

Evolving nature of global threats makes intel development most

crucial to highest risks
Lahneman 10 Dr. William J. Lahneman is Assistant Professor of Political Science at
Towson University, Towson, Maryland, and Senior Research Scholar at the Center for
International and Security Studies a t the University of Maryland, College Park International
Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence Volume 23, Issue 2, 2010 The Need for a New
Intelligence Paradigm The Need for a New Intelligence Paradigm
HE PROBLEM 1 The world, and the threats within it, are becoming increasingly diffused
in nature,withnonmilitarythreatsincreasinginrelationtopurelymilitary ones. Since the end of
the Cold War, the IC has contended with the emergence of new threats to national security
from a number of quarters, including such increasingly powerful nonstate actors as
transnational terrorist groups. Many of these individuals and organizations have
capitalized on the still evolving effe cts of globalization to threaten U.S. security in
nontraditional ways. At the same time, global trends such as the population explosion,
uneven economic growth, urbanization, the AIDS pandemic , developments in
biotechnology, and ecological trends such as the increasing scarcity of fresh water in
several already volatile areas are generating new drivers of inte rnational instab ility .
These trends make the development of a clear set of priorities for collection and analysis
extremely challenging. 2 Intelligence analysts are tasked with making sense of these
developments, identifying potential t hreats to U.S. national security, and crafting
appropriate intelligence pr oducts for policymakers. They also continue to perform traditional
missions such as uncovering secrets that potential adversaries desire to withhold and
assessing foreign military capabilities. This fact has three implications. First, it means that,
besides using traditional sources of classified information, often from sensitive sources,

analysts must also extract potentially critical knowledge from vast quantities of
available open source information. Significantly, the Community must devise ways to

monitor open source information in transformed ways . Additionally, some kinds of

information currently not conside red open source must be brought into the open domain.
For example, the process of globalization, empowered by the Information Revolution, will
require a change of scale in the ICs analytical focus. In the past, the IC focused on a small
number of discrete issues that possessed the potential to cause severe destruction of known
forms. The future will involve security threats of much smalle r scale. These will be less
isolated, less the actions of military forces, and more diverse in type and more widely
dispersed throughout global society than in the past. Their aggregate effects might

produce extremely destabilizing and destructive results, but these outcomes will not
be obvious based on each event alone. Therefore, analysts must increasingly look to
discern the emergent behavioral aspects of a series of events . Second, phenomena of
global scope will increase as a result of aggregate human activities. Accordingly, analysts
will need to understand global dynamics as never before. Information is critical,
as well as an analytical understanding of the new information, in order to
understand these new dynamics. The business of organizing and collecting information is

going to have to be much more distributed than in the past, among both various U.S.
agencies and international communities. Information and knowledge sharing will be
essential to successful analysis, and most of the necessary sharing will need to be
conducted on a voluntary basis. Third, future analysts will need to focus more on the
anticipation and prevention of security threats and less on reaction after they have arisen.
For example, the medical community is highly reactive. However, anyone who deals with
infectious diseases knows that prevention is the more important reality. Preventing infectious
diseases must become the primary focus if pandemics are to be prevented. Future analysts
will need to incorporate this same emphasis on prevention to the analytic enterprise.

OW Policy transnational
Solves transnational networked threats which trump
Schreier 09 (2009, Fred, Consultant, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of
Armed Forces, former colonel and general staff member, Swiss Ministry of Defense, Master
of Arts in Law and Diplomacy, Fletcher School, Tufts, Fighting the Pre-eminent Threats with
Intelligence-led Operations, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces
(DCAF) Occasional Paper 16)
Introduction

This paper discusses the role of intelligence, intelligence services and intelligenceled operations as
crucial components of the efforts to counter the new risks, dangers and threats to states and
their population.
The end of the Cold War and globalisation has not only brought a multiplication of actors, sources
of conflict and means to fight. Indeed, globalisation, accelerating techno-logical innovation, growing
interdependence and vulnerability of modern states has dramatically enhanced the number and diversity of risks,
dangers and threats. The fact that these are increasingly transnational in nature , originate more
and more often from non-state actors and appear and mutate ever more quickly, renders the
fight against them more difficult. This is particularly true for the unholy trinity of transnational
terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and transnational organised crime
(TOC) that have become the pre-eminent security challenges confronting the world and the new
intelligence priorities. TOC is growing in volume, geographic reach and profitability, and is well
positioned for further growth because it does, in many ways, have the most to gain from globalization. Growth and
spread of TOC increase the risks of proliferation of WMD and, with it, of catastrophic transnational
terrorism as proliferants and terrorists collude ever more symbiotically with TOC groups to move money, men and
materials around the globe.
The more the international order is threatened by asymmetric warfare of Islamistic terror networks,

the more the threat perception will become multifaceted and chaotic if more actors can
acquire WMD. These developments not only diminish the predictability of risks and dangers .
The more diffuse and unpredictable the situation and the threat perception, the more difficult it will
become to clearly distinguish between external and internal, civilian and military threats to a
country, and between the strategic, operational or tactical levels of risks and dangers.
More than ever before intelligence is the pre-requisite for all measures

that aim at the

effective prevention, disruption and suppression of these threats . But countering the

pre-eminent threats from multiplying non-state actors that operate clandestinely requires more than just
intelligence services. These threats can only be effectively counteracted, disrupted, pre-empted and prevented
when the operations of all security sector organisations that are mandated to deal with them are intelligence-driven
or intelligence-led. This requires a paradigm shift in national security strategy that not only entails a whole
of government approach and multilateral engagement, but a radical new approach with more intensive
collaboration, interaction and information exchange by these organisations with the agencies
of the intelligence community.
This paper (1) sketches the main threats currently confronting all states. Part (2) elaborates what intelligence is and
explains why intelligence is key to counter the expanding array of threats more
effectively. Part (3) shows the application of intelligence and the contributions of intelligence-led operations to
the fight against the pre-eminent threats. Part (4) explores patterns and problems of intelligence cooperation. In
part (5) some of the implications which intelligence-led operations may have for democratic control, supervision,
oversight and accountability are indicated. The paper ends with a list of key recommendations.
1. The Pre-eminent Threats

The threats of yesterday were predominantly of the symmetric type: static, predictable,
homogenous, hierarchical, rigid and resistant to change. The new threats are more of the
asymmetric type: dynamic, less predictable, networked, fluid, self-organising and constantly
adapting and evolving.
These changes have far-reaching consequences for ensuring national security. The old strategic approach of
risk avoidance, which served states relatively well in terms of ensuring national security against predictable
state adversaries no longer works. Risk avoidance is no longer financially affordable ; it is also no

longer adequate against the threats posed by the growing number of less predictable, more evasive and
clandestinely operating non-state actors. Hence, budgetary constraints and the new threats force
states to move from the prevention of the known to the management of the unknown : from
risk avoidance to risk management. Thus, old concepts of threat analysis have to be supplemented by risk
analysis and vulnerability analysis. This means that resources for ensuring national security are now allocated on
the basis of threats or risks and national vulnerabilities. Threats are measured in terms of the likelihood and
severity of the consequences, while risk is accepted as equalling threat divided by vulnerability.
The activities of the unholy trinity of the pre-eminent threats are transforming the international system, upending
the rules, creating new players, and reconfiguring power in international politics and economics. The changes in

the last decade of the 20th century not only empowered terrorists, proliferants and
criminals, but at the same time weakened the agencies in charge of fighting them. The
networks of transnational terrorists, proliferants and TOC thrive on international mobility and
their ability to take advantage of the opportunities that flow from sanctuaries and separate
marketplaces into sovereign states with borders. For terrorists, proliferators and TOC, frontiers create
opportunities and convenient shields. But for the government officials chasing them, borders still too often
represent obstacles. The privileges of national sovereignty are turning into burdens and constraints on
governments. Because of this asymmetry in the global clash between governments,

transnational terrorists, proliferators and TOC, governments are systematically losing

everywhere. But ultimately, it is the fabric of society that is at stake .

at security / Ks of intel: 1st line

Threat constructions wrong in this case intel screws up by
UNDERESTIMATING and intel solves best
LilBacka13 Dr. Ralf G. V. Lillbacka is a Senior Lecturer in quantitative methodology and
statistical analysis in the Sector of Social Services and Health Care at Novia, the University
of Applied Sciences, in Vasa, Finland, where he has taught since 2004. Holder of an M.A. and
Ph.D. in Political Science from Finlands A bo Akademi University, he served as a social
science researcher at the school from 19972004. He has previously published studies
concerning intelligence matters in Northern Europe. Ralf G. V. Lillbacka (2013) Realism,
Constructivism, and Intelligence Analysis, International Journal of Intelligence and
CounterIntelligence, 26:2, 304-331, DOI: 10.1080/08850607.2013.732450

Studies in international relations experienced a constructivist turn in the late

1980s, partly because postmodernism was a scientific in thing. 53 It offered an alternative
to the pre vailing rational choice model, and emphasized dynamic and constitutive m odels
of international relations, as well as the importance of non-state actors. 54 Most proponents
in international relations represent weak constructivism, and adhere to realist
epistemology rather than radical postmodernism, but they share some common
denominators. Institutions of human association and interaction are considered products of
shared ideas rather than material circumstances, and generate the identities and interests
of various actors. Individuals adjust to rules in a na ve conventionalist manner, as a child
learns a language, and develop habits that in turn reinforce institutions. International
relations can thus be seen as social practices, and ultimately, shared mental models. 55
As with constructivism in general, (strong) constructivist research in international
relations la cks a workable methodology . 56 Constructivist research that most
directly pertains to Intelligence Studies concerns securitization, that is, political
processes by which something is defined as a threat. This is usually attributed to selfserving mechanisms by which elites expand their power, and as a need to define the self
by contrasting it to the other. 57 But, this view is often notably simplistic, ignoring
the role of the counterpart, neglecting that the mo st significant intelligence
failures throughout history have been caused by under- rather than
overestimating threats, 58 and also disregarding the fact that intelligence has often
provided a more realistic view of an opponents capabilities . 59

Anti-constructivism ingrained in intelligence any alternative will

dramatically fail
LilBacka13 Dr. Ralf G. V. Lillbacka is a Senior Lecturer in quantitative methodology and
statistical analysis in the Sector of Social Services and Health Care at Novia, the University
of Applied Sciences, in Vasa, Finland, where he has taught since 2004. Holder of an M.A. and
Ph.D. in Political Science from Finlands A bo Akademi University, he served as a social
science researcher at the school from 19972004. He has previously published studies
concerning intelligence matters in Northern Europe. Ralf G. V. Lillbacka (2013) Realism,
Constructivism, and Intelligence Analysis, International Journal of Intelligence and
CounterIntelligence, 26:2, 304-331, DOI: 10.1080/08850607.2013.732450
THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF A CONSTRUCTIVIST INTELLIGENCE
ANALYSIS
As Intelligence Studies is further advanced as an academic discipline, no reason to
abandon its realist epistemological foundation is warranted. I have developed three

arguments against any constructivist turn. First, constructivist epistemology suffers

from crippling inconsistencies. It can offer no feasible alternative to realism or even any
substantial methodology, as it is prevented from doing so by its own claim that all criteria for
adjudicating among propos itions are constructed and hence subjective. If constructivism
is viewe dinthelightofitsownpremises,itis merely another arbitrary perspective, incapable of
presenting any arguments for why its notions should be accepted. Because its presumptions
will render it either a relativist and solipsistic skepticism or a meager copy of realism it is an
epistemological dead end. Cons tructivisms concept of knowledge renders logical
contradictions equally valid which, even for the most zealous non-realist, must be indicative
of flawed thinking. As constructivism lacks a firm method by which to adjudicate
propositions, it will be inductive and prone to confirmation biases, a featur e that is
detrimental to intelligence analysis. Intelligence analysis requ ires a foundation by
which to assess alternative possibilities, and constr uctivism is poorly equipped for such an
endeavor. Second, even the weak constructivist standpoint represented in adjacent
disciplines is unlikely to provide any novel and workable points of view, and should such
research prove valuable, it is likely to be regardless of, and not because of, its self-identified
perspective. The constructivist label is even likely to be misleading, as it blurs the
boundary between realist and non-realist research. The weak constructivism found in
International Relations and Political Science is highly reminiscent of institutionalism and
agenda setting in psychology and pedagogy of cognitive psychology, and in sociology of
George Meads symbolic inte ractionism. Accordingly, the concept has been stretched to
incorporate notions that are not constructivist in astrictsense. Third, constructivism has
been demonstrated to be antithetical to intelligence analysis . From a mere
pragmatic point of view, that intelligence analysis could completely reverse its
course to shed tried and proven methods, in exchange for what even Derrida described
as nothing, seems unfeasible. As noted, the antithesis of intelligence analysis could be
related to abstract constructivist principles due only to a complete absence of anything that
would constitute a workable methodology. Intelligence analysis has adopted central
realist methodological principles, and constructivism has nothing similar to offer.
Intelligence analysts are said to harbor a healthy skepticism toward epistemological
issues, which may aid in critically considering the theoretical influx from academia. Such
influences may help to refine analytical procedures by demanding explicit assessment of
analytical performance, but may also carry certain risks. The pursuit of academic legitimacy
and credibility may not necessarily benefit the craft of intelligence or intelligence analysis in
particular. I argue that constructivism, as it is currently formulated, has very little to offer
intelligence analysis, and Intelligence Studies in general, despite its strong position within
academia. Based on the arguments presented herein, the constructivist analysis of
intelligence may in fact be impossible

Kritiks of intelligence are disastrous the demands of scholarship

uniquely skew analysis
LilBacka13 Dr. Ralf G. V. Lillbacka is a Senior Lecturer in quantitative methodology and

statistical analysis in the Sector of Social Services and Health Care at Novia, the University
of Applied Sciences, in Vasa, Finland, where he has taught since 2004. Holder of an M.A. and
Ph.D. in Political Science from Finlands A bo Akademi University, he served as a social
science researcher at the school from 19972004. He has previously published studies
concerning intelligence matters in Northern Europe. Ralf G. V. Lillbacka (2013) Realism,
Constructivism, and Intelligence Analysis, International Journal of Intelligence and
CounterIntelligence, 26:2, 304-331, DOI: 10.1080/08850607.2013.732450
ACADEMIC STUDIES INSUFFICIENT Hardly anyone would claim that academic studies
suffice to master the craft of intelligence, but they are an integrated element. Current trends
are likely to increase the influence of adjacent disciplines, for example, history, journalism,

and international relations. Pertinent to ask is whether this will be in all respects beneficial,
since they are battlegrounds in the science war between scientific realists and
constructivists. 8 Many scholars consider the debate detrimental to research, but it
has been unavoidable because of constructivisms epistemo logical emphasis. Currently a
slight lull in the struggle has occurred, due more to exhaustion than to rapprochement 9 and
to entrenched positions. But the debate may be revived when entering a new area ,
and Dr. Philip Daviess warning about theoretical perspectives far removed from
operational reality pertains: The idea that the individuals advising the chief

executives of nuclear armed states might become bogged down ... over the relative
merits of Marxism, functionalism, Lacanian psychoanalysis or whose viewpoint was false
or emancipatory consciousness, simply does not bear thinking about . 10 Intelligence
analysis, with its sc ientifically founded methodology, is particularly likely to be
exposed to su ch influences. Even if intelligence lacks an explicit theory, it does not
lack an epistemology, although it may be largely tacit. At first sight, constructivism may
seem close to the craft of intelligence where uncertainty and ambiguity are the rule rather
than the exception, and the individuals own subjective mind and social and professional
context are major sour ces of fallibility. Scholars facing the academic demand to
publish or perish may be tempted to adopt such a fashionable position to gain aca
demic legitimacy, and indeed, the pursuit of a theory of intelligence aims at securing
academic credence. 11 Hence, an analogous problem to the timeless predicament of
intelligence analysts being too subservient to the whims of the political leadership may
arise, insofar as academic success may demand adherence to a perspective that is
ill-suited for intelligence analysis and for intelligence in general.

at security/Ks of Intel: ext

Prefer our method evaluate competing epistemology through the
lens of what works for intelligence
LilBacka13 Dr. Ralf G. V. Lillbacka is a Senior Lecturer in quantitative methodology and
statistical analysis in the Sector of Social Services and Health Care at Novia, the University
of Applied Sciences, in Vasa, Finland, where he has taught since 2004. Holder of an M.A. and
Ph.D. in Political Science from Finlands A bo Akademi University, he served as a social
science researcher at the school from 19972004. He has previously published studies
concerning intelligence matters in Northern Europe. Ralf G. V. Lillbacka (2013) Realism,
Constructivism, and Intelligence Analysis, International Journal of Intelligence and
CounterIntelligence, 26:2, 304-331, DOI: 10.1080/08850607.2013.732450
I do not argue that Intelligence Studies should avoid the rest of academia or the
science war. Intelligence is a craft where key assumptions should be continuously
questioned. But openness to contradictory views does not imply acceptance of their
validity, and consequently, I argue that constructivism has hitherto been unable to
present anything that would benefit Intelligence Studies, especially concerning
intelligence analysis. Subs equently, my focus is exclusively on intelligence analysis, under
the pre sumption that it may be principally affected by academic trends since it is the
methodological manifestation of any implicit or elaborate theory of intelligence.
Obviously, any workable theory of intelligence would not be mere ly a theory about
intelligence, but also support intelligence by providing directions for how it should be
conducted, which would be most evident with regard to the methodology of intelligence
analysis. Hence, the usefulness of any theoretical or epistemological notion can be
assessed based on its impact on intelligence analysis. My central thesis is that

intelligence analysis is inherently realist, should remain so, and has nothing to gain
from contemporary constructivism. This claim is founded on three arguments: (1)
Constructivist epistemology is inconsistent and implies that any knowledge is
impossible; (2) Weak constructivism adhering to traditional epistemological assumptions
does not provide anything novel when compared to realist research; and (3) Constructivism
is antithetical to inte lligence analysis. Indeed, a reading of the 2011 volumes of the
International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence and Intelligence and National
Security reveals not a single case of constructivist writing, merely somewhat constructivist
themes treatedinarealistmanner. 12 My first two arguments are founded on a review of
previous research, whereas the third is based on my examination of three recent works on
intelligence analysis to be detailed herein.

Affs a DA makes impossible

LilBacka13 Dr. Ralf G. V. Lillbacka is a Senior Lecturer in quantitative methodology and
statistical analysis in the Sector of Social Services and Health Care at Novia, the University
of Applied Sciences, in Vasa, Finland, where he has taught since 2004. Holder of an M.A. and
Ph.D. in Political Science from Finlands A bo Akademi University, he served as a social
science researcher at the school from 19972004. He has previously published studies
concerning intelligence matters in Northern Europe. Ralf G. V. Lillbacka (2013) Realism,
Constructivism, and Intelligence Analysis, International Journal of Intelligence and
CounterIntelligence, 26:2, 304-331, DOI: 10.1080/08850607.2013.732450
ccordingly, nothing suggests that constructivism would in any way be an
improvement over realism. Even if presuming that realism is flawed, constructivism is

equally impotent to produce anything but local beliefs, shaped by a social context, which
are equally arbitrary as anything else. Constructivism basically implies that knowledge
in the sense commonly understood is impossible . It even la cks a strategy to assess its
central notions, which is a consequence of the premise that all criteria for adjudication are
constructs. As noted, this will either lead to serious logical inconsistencies as even
contradictions can be equally valid, or force concessions to realism. Ironically, attempts to
explain the establishment of constructs through their viability i mplies correspondence and
notions resembling primitive forms of behaviorism and positivism. Intelligence analysts
would be likely to wholeheartedly embrace any epistemology that is capable of reducing the
ambiguity inherent in current methodology. But, constructivism is unable to provide any
methodology by which to find the truth. It does not even recognize the reality of
truth. How intelligence analysis w ould serve any meaningful purpose when based

on such a premise is difficult to conceive

method: Qual anal good (AT U ARE NOT STUDIeS)

Dont reject us for not being math intelligence adheres to scientific
reasoning without unrealistic mathematical precision
Zohar 13 Eran Zohar (2013) Intelligence Analysis as a Manifestation of a Grounded
Theory, International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 26:1, 130-160, DOI:
10.1080/08850607.2012.705659 Eran Zohar, a doctoral candidate in th
eDepartmentofPoliticsatOtago University, New Zealand, is a veteran of more than two
decades in Israeli military intelligence. From 1986 to 2010, he was in the Defense Military
Intelligence section of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), specializing in the methodology of
intelligence, counterterrorism, and insurgency. From January to June 2011, he was a senior
analyst with the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Res earch at the S.
Rajaratnan School of International Studies, Nanyang Tech nological University, Singapore. He
earned his B.A. and M.A. degrees at Tel Aviv University

The often voiced criticism in academic and intelligence circles is that intelligence
analysis lacks a struct ured methodology and relies on the intuition, impressions, and
insights of analysts. In making these criticisms, the International Relations academic
discipline attempts to credit itself with intelligence analysis while ascribing the failures of the
United States Intelligence Community (IC) to the r ealm of intelligence analysis. Yet
adopting models from other disciplin es and launching a revolution in the thinking
and methodologies of intel ligence analysis is unnecessary. Intelligence analysis,
particularly t he basic kind, benefits from a rich and well-founded methodology that
has emerged from analytic ranks. IN SEARCH OF A METHODOLOGY FOR INTELLIGENCE
ANALYSIS Intelligence analysis, a cognitive and empirical activity, combines evidence
and reasoning in order to produce judgments, insights, and forecasts intended to
enhance the understanding and reduce the uncertainty of national security policymakers in
relation to an enemy. 1 Intelligence analysis fulfills a pivotal role in the intelligence
process. Relying on data gathering through a variety of means, it is designed to answer
strategic and operational n eeds in conducting diplomacy and war. Its products are a specific
array of stan dard finished intelligence products and electronic databases. Intellige nce
analysis is further divided into current analysis, dealing with routine military and political
issuessome time-critical and require the immediate attention of the analystand others
are of longer term in-depth analysis that focuses on an enemys buildup, social, economical,
and cultural issues, analysis concerning military and civilian infrastructure, and intelligence
about the enemys technological capabilities, such as missile production. 2 Intelligence
analysis is a relatively new discipline that evolved during World War II and, in particular, the
Cold War years. This is one reason for the relatively late debate concer ning the
consolidation of analysis methodologies. In the early 1950s, Sherman Kent, a scholar and
pioneering intelligence analyst, emphasized the vital importance of creating a methodology
for performing intelligen ce analysis as a basic condition for transforming it into a profession.
3 Kent depicted a circular process with int elligence assessment at its center, and identified
central characteristics of the i ntelligence analysts w ork (Intelligence is knowledge,
Intelligence is the descr iption of a situation), but he indicated neither a specific method
for pursuing this work nor exactly detail the stages of the analysis process. He postulated
that the authors of intelligence doctrine would exploit existing proven analysis methods.
Decades passed, but the methodological project conceived and advocated by Kent never
took shape, even though the need resurfaced time and again in academic and intelligence
publications and workshops, and in the conclusions of governmental investigative
committees. Donald Steury argued that intelligence analysis in the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) never achieved an explicit, broadly based, epistemological, and doctrinal
structure. 4 Concurrently, Intelligence Studies developed in the academic world as a sub-

field of International Relations . Many scholars of intelligence and officials in the Intelligence
Communit y claimed that intelligence analysis rested on relatively primitive theoretical
foundations and called for an integrated intelligence theory. The y looked with longing at the
fields of medicine, law, and even library sciences. They sought to adopt their
practicesasmodelsforintelligencea nalysis, in particular because of the reliance placed by
those disciplines upon established work processes, preserving organizational know-how, and
complying with performance standards. They claimed that inte lligence analysts, and in
particular military intelligence analysts, lacked a way and a method, operated intuitively,
and used the term craft to justify their methods of operation. An analyst in the field might
justifia bly obtain the impression that the analytical process entailed looking into some kind
of black box, the properties of which were difficult to fathom, in a manner lacking
systematic, methodological instruct ions. Some mistakenly assumed that when it came to
the study of intelligence everything was permissible, as long as the analytical process was
considered loyal to an intelligence approach. Methodological transparency, so basic to
medicine, law, economics, and other fields of analysis, appeared to some or even to many
in the Intelligence Community to be meaningless . 5 Prominent failures of the Western
Intelligence Community in the last decadesuch as the events of 11 September 2001 (9 =
11), the failure to find weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in Iraq, the results of the
elections in Iran in 1997 and 2005, and the recent uprisings in Arab statescreated doubts
about the validity of the prev ailing methodology in intelligence analysis and generated calls
for its replacement. Critics claimed that what was needed within the analytical process was
standardization and formalization in order to improve the ICs performance at the
organizational and personal level . Without a coherent doctrine or a well-organized theory
intelligence analysiswouldbeleftinaninferior position, lacking full legitimacy as a discipline or
profession. In such a state of affairs, some cautioned that the soundness of the
decisionmaking processes at the national level might be compromised and that intelligence
analysis would suffer from its numerous flaws. The outcome of these flaws would be the
under-theorization of int elligence analysis, with the result that any person might engage in
it. Critics called for transforming intelligence analysis from a series of ad hoc
activities into a highly intellectualized and disciplined profession. 6 But a meticulous
review of the reasons for many of the eras intelligence surprises and failures indicates
that, in many cases, the intelligence analysts working methods were not to blame for
the unexpected outcome. These phenomena often stemmed instead from or
ganizational politics, failures of the operational echelon, data gat hering failures, or
exaggerated expectations in supplying forecasts that neither intelligence analysis nor any
other form of analysis was able to meet. Thus, for example, Professor Philip Davies claimed
that the American academic discourse concerning the need to develop an intelligence
theory was actually an excuse for the U.S. Intelligence Communitys failure to cope with the
organizational challenges facing it (traditional obsession with jurisdictions and
boundaries). 7 Limitations of Utility of Theories Discussions on the theory of intellig ence
that were supposed to deal with intelligence analysis often drifted in to philosophical,
epistemological, political, and organizational issues far removed from the working
environment of intelligence analysis , or else degenerated into lists of working-tips for the
analysts. Instruction manuals and books that were supposed to provide guidance sank into a
quagmire of theoretical writings which served little practical purpose. Concurrently, some
have suggested upgrading intelligence analysis through the use of quantitative analysis
methods, mathematical models, and statistical analysis, under the influence of the exact
sciences. They introduced a foreign language of assumptions, correlations between
variables, regre ssion, utility curves, and the like into the field of intelligence investigation. 8
Most of these processes were little more than think-tank exercises and, a t best,
served as enriching auxiliary materials, but nothing more. In inte lligence analysis, the
environment cannot be separated into variables, as is customary in quantitative
analysis. Intelligence analysts have an interest in their analysis subjects, but they do not try
to manipulate them through the use of statistical tools. The intelligence environment can

never become a laboratory, and the analytical categories are the outcome of the pr ocess of
data gathering that must never force preconceptions on the data. The reality faced by an
intelligence analyst is much more intricate. The ca tegories of intelligence data are not part
of a technical tool designed to preserve knowledge, as some scholars assert, but are rather
the basis for creating intelligence assessments.

Our method is QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS _ falsifiability without

quantification
Zohar 13 Eran Zohar (2013) Intelligence Analysis as a Manifestation of a Grounded
Theory, International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 26:1, 130-160, DOI:
10.1080/08850607.2012.705659 Eran Zohar, a doctoral candidate in th
eDepartmentofPoliticsatOtago University, New Zealand, is a veteran of more than two
decades in Israeli military intelligence. From 1986 to 2010, he was in the Defense Military
Intelligence section of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), specializing in the methodology of
intelligence, counterterrorism, and insurgency. From January to June 2011, he was a senior
analyst with the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Res earch at the S.
Rajaratnan School of International Studies, Nanyang Tech nological University, Singapore. He
earned his B.A. and M.A. degrees at Tel Aviv University
I have chosen a different direction in exploring the world of intelligence analysts to uncover
the methodology of intelligence analysis based on the qualitative school of thought. I
present a holistic methodological approach toward conducting intelligence analy sis
that would aid in establishing a total intelligence assessment of the enemy , its
intentions and capabilities, and would serve the military and political leadership. I attempt to
show the intelligence analysts work in all its stages, identify the challenges facing them,
and the pitfalls they must learn to avoid. My basic premise is that, for many reasons,
intelligence analysis rests on qualitative analysis: it starts with a problem

belonging withi n the security sphere and collects data from a natural setting for
studying it. Similar to qualitative analysis, I employ data analysis that is inductive and
establishes patterns or themes. The final written report or presentation emanating from
such an analytical process would include a complex description and interpretation of the
problemthat is, the intelligence assessment. CHARACTERISTICS OF ANALYSIS Major
characteristics of qualitative a nalysis are dominant in intelligence analysis: use of
multiple sources of data, inductive data analysis, and an emergent analysis
process. But the intelligence analyst must maintain a focus on learning the meaning that
the participants have assigned to a problem or issue. Most important, intelligence
analysis shares the holistic approach of qualitativ e analysis because it aims to
develop a complex picture of a security problem or security issue under study.
Qualitative analysis is conducted in seeking to un derstand the contexts or settings in which
participants in a study address a problem or issue. Similarly, intelligence analysis is
conducted because of an interest in knowing how a nations enemies interpret the security
situation. 12

Intelligence is methodlogically GROUNDED THEORY that uses data

and specific examples for self-correction. Prefer this to their
abstraction
Zohar 13 Eran Zohar (2013) Intelligence Analysis as a Manifestation of a Grounded
Theory, International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 26:1, 130-160, DOI:
10.1080/08850607.2012.705659 Eran Zohar, a doctoral candidate in th
eDepartmentofPoliticsatOtago University, New Zealand, is a veteran of more than two
decades in Israeli military intelligence. From 1986 to 2010, he was in the Defense Military
Intelligence section of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), specializing in the methodology of

intelligence, counterterrorism, and insurgency. From January to June 2011, he was a senior
analyst with the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Res earch at the S.
Rajaratnan School of International Studies, Nanyang Tech nological University, Singapore. He
earned his B.A. and M.A. degrees at Tel Aviv University
Grounded theory, a central method of data analysis and theory building developed in the
1960s, was given its name because it was built of blocks that were taken from the field of
the phenomenon being researched, the same way that an intelligence assessment is built
out of the data. Its main innovation for qualitat ive analysis lies in its capacity to formulate a
theory on the basis of the analyzed data. Grounded theory strives to achieve new insights
into social processes in the natural environment. It collects information on the analyzed
subjects patterns of life and on social and organizational establishments. Its premise is that
the patterns and repetitions in human behavior cannot be described mathematically or
through calculating the links among well-defined systems of independent variables,
dependent variables, and intermediate variables. These patterns can be discovered through
initially posing a general and open analytical question, and through a structured methodical
and careful search, looking for links and structures. Only by entering into a field free of
hypotheses or existing theory regarding the manner in which reality is handled will the
accurate discovery of these patterns be facilitated. Accordingly, a research question cannot
be regarded as a stand-alone micro-analysis. A researcher taking this approach assumes
that identifying a central theme within the different behavioral patterns of various people is
possible, as is describing it in such a fashion so as to provide a complete explanation of the
phenomenon being analyzed, one that could be awarded recognition b y the scientific
community and in certain conditions used as the basis for inferring explanations. 17 The
method was developed by two sociologists, Barney Glaser and Anselm Strauss, in a seminal
1967 book titled The Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies for Qualitative Analysis . As
the title implies, their aim was to discover theoriescausal ex planationsgrounded in
empirical data, about how things work. Glaser and Strauss provided a set of flexible
strategies to guide the analysis of qualitative data. They produced the first detailed,
systematic attempt to codify qualitative analysisand, simultaneously, to develop middle-ra
nge theories through subjecting data to rigorous analytic scrutiny. When i ntelligence
analysts are dissecting a phenomenon present in an intelligen ce environment into its
trends, processes, and operational mechanisms, they codify the data in a manner similar to
that advocated by Glaser and Strauss. The methodology of grounded theory, such as that of
intelligence analysis, was intended to guide analysts to produce a compressed theory at a
conceptual level, i.e., including a variety of numerous ter minological relationships. These
relationships, manifested as postulations, just as in all qualitative analysis, are elaborately
presented. 18 And, as in the writings in intelligence analysis, they are anchored in a rich
context of descriptive and conceptual works. The grounded character of this analytical
method possesses three dimensions which can also be found in intelligence analysis: first,
the analysts closely follow the data and develop an integrated set of theoretical concepts
from their empirical materials that not only synthesize and interpret the data but also show
processional relationships; the princi ple of comparisons fulfills a central role in data
analysis. A qualitative analyst compares one set of data to another, a piece of data to a
category, and one category to another. Likewise, an intelligence analyst compares various
items of information and different concepts formed on the basis of these items, as they
relate to the enemy. 19 Second, the theoretical analysis is based directly upon the manner in
which the analyst interprets processes within this data base. The study results in an
analytical interpretation of participants worlds and of the processes leading to the
construction of those worlds. Grounded theory contains tools to study how processes are
transformed into institutionalized practices, and how they keep grounded theory and
intelligen ce analysis from dissolving into fragmented small studies. Third, analysts applying
grounded theory compare their analysis with the relevant analytical literature and ultimately
with existing theories. But this trend is less prevalent among intelligence practitioners. 20
Apparently, military intelligence a nalysts and academic personnel using grounded theory

differ significantly. In practice, however, the gap is much smaller than might first appear:
they all write to and for a certain audience, and when qualitative analysts address their
analysis to decisionmakers, they too are requi red to engage in less theoretical and more
concise, practical, and relevant writing. Although academic analysts do not serve their
government, that does not mean that they are objective: as Creswell put it: All writing is
positioned and within a stance. 21 Through the years, various streams of the grounded
theory have developed: a pronounced difference ex ists with the objectivist faction, which
advocates limiting the analys ts operational domain, and assumes the existence of an
external logical reality that analysts can discover and document. This methodology assumes
that acting according to an array of systematic analysis methods can lead to discovering a
reality upon which to assemble a theory which will be true according to the data is
possible; one that can be examined and, ultimately, verified. Intelligence analysis at the
tactical and operational levels is true to the spirit and reflective of the objectivist faction
because it deals in tangible subjects like terrorist attacks, military doctrine, and weapons
systems. In contrast, the constructivist faction is based on emergent concepts and theory
construction. Conceptual categories arise through the interpretation of data rather than
emanate from them or from methodological practices. Here, the act of writing is intuitive,
inventive, and interpret ive, not merely a reporting of acts and facts. 22 Intelligence analysis
at the stra tegic and the political levels manifests the spirit of constructivist analysis
because of its involvement in more complex and abstract aspects such as foreign policy,
stability of the regime, and revolutions

rob: deliberation on intel good

DEBATE over intelligence policy is uniquely important to ethical
DELIBERATION
Omand and Phytian 13 Sir David Omand & Mark Phythian (2013) Ethics and
Intelligence: A Debate, International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 26:1,
38-63, DOI: 10.1080/08850607.2012.705186 Sir David Omand GCB is Visiting Professor in
the Department of War Studies at Kings College London. In 2002, he was appointed the
United Kingdoms first Security and Intelligence Coordinator, responsible to the Prime
Minister for the professional health of the Intelligence Community, national counterterrorism
strategy, and homeland security. He served for seven years on the UKs Joint Intelligence
Committee. From 1997 to 2000, he was Permanent Secretary of the Home Office, and before
that was Director of the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ). Sir David is the
author of Securing the State (London: C. Hurst, 2010). Dr. Mark Phythian is Professor of Poli
tics at the University of Leicester, United Kingdom. Among the eleven books he has
authored, edited, and co-edited are: Intelligence in an Insecure World (with Peter Gill
London: Polity, 2006); PSI Handbook of Global Security and Intelligence: National
Approaches, Volumes 1 and 2 (with Stuart Farson, Peter Gill, and Shlomo ShpiroNew York:
Praeger, 2008); and Commissions of Inquiry and National Security: Comparative Approaches
(with Stuart FarsonNew York: Praeger, 2011). He has also written numerous journal articles
and book chapters
Deliberating Values The implication of this is not that nations would be better off
without intelligence, or that intelligence agencies do not perform an essential task on
behalf of the citizens in whose name they work. At times, in confronting the ethical
dilemmas generated by intelligence actions, the public is spared the ethical debates that
would have otherwise been needed had they not taken place. At the same time, though,
the last decade has shown that wider national debates about the relationship between
ethics and intelligence, and national security more generally, would be beneficial. As
Dennis Thompson has argued: Whatever its other elements, an adequate conception of
democracy should include, as a necessary condition, collective deliberation on
disputes about fundamental values. 21 Aspects of intelligence practice in the war
on terror in both the U.S. and UK, and more widely, have generated such disputes. The
collective deliberation that Thompson advocates requires a framework that moves the
debate beyond the tendency to a reductionism around crude utilitarian calculations,
inevitably rooted in subjective national contexts, and toward exploring how intelligence
can meet normative (and international legal) standards with regard to ethics while at
the same time protecting the national interest, its core business. This would have the
effect of turning the problem of dirty hands into one of democratic dirty
hands, in that once shared with, and debated by, citizens the problem of dirty
hands does not rest with just policymakers and intelligence profess ionals , but more
generally with society. This would allow policymakers and intelligence agencies to meet the
test outlined by Stansfield Turner. Overseers of intelli gence have a particular responsibility
for leading this debate. However, at the core of the problematic relationship between ethics
and intelligence is the fact that nations exist in an inherently competitive environment,
where agenc ies contribute to efforts to enhance, as well as protect, the national interest.
This may well mean that mitigation, rather than elimination, of ethical dilemmas is
the more realistic aim for any such debate.

data key

Data is key to address threats and without data we will not be able to
keep our rights
Van Cleave 2013 served as the head of US counterintelligence under President George W. Bush and is
now a principal with the Jack Kemp Foundation. Michelle What it takes: in defense of the NSA." World Affairs
Highest on the list of "lessons learned" from the September 11th terrorist attack was the need for a retooled intelligence enterprise
that could "connect the dots" and keep us safe. The intelligence apparatus in place on September 10th was not built for that
purpose. The imperatives of the Cold War were to deter conflict and maintain the peace; the overarching challenge, which US
intelligence met so brilliantly, was to collect ever more refined insights about a known antagonist. Today, the collection targets are
unknown (what are the indicators of terrorist activities that we should be watching?), and our principal objective is to take action to

Interconnected global networks of digital

data have become the single most important source of intelligence
warning of threats, enabling our defense at home and the advancement of
freedom abroad. To say "hands off," as some shortsighted privacy
advocates have been doing, will not preserve our liberties, it will endanger
them. It should be possible for an enlightened citizenry to empower
government action in that sphere without forfeiting the very rights that
our government exists to secure. That challenge is, at the very least, a
part of the continuing experiment that is our democracy.
defeat and dismantle threats in order to keep us safe.

Bulk data collection is needed to find the needle in the haystack

when you curtail data collection then there is a greater risk of the
needle not being in the data and searching for something that is not
there.
National Research Council. 2015. Bulk Collection of Signals Intelligence: Technical Options.
Washington, DC: The National Academies Press
Does bulk collection overwhelm analysts with too much data, as is sometimes argued? The needle in the haystack metaphor is
relevant here. If the needle is not found in the smaller haystack, there are two approachesnot mutually exclusivethat may result
in success. One approach is to add more hay (because that additional material may contain the needle of interest). A second
approach is to do a smarter search (because a smarter search may turn up a needle that was in the haystack all along), such as

Of course, if the needle is not in the smaller

haystack, no amount of smarter searching will help. The use case category
of alternate identifiers illuminates this problem. An analyst has
determined that a new target is of interest, where new means that this
target has not previously been explicitly targeted for collection . With luck,
previously targeted collection may provide information on alternate
identifiers that the new target has used. Adding bulk data may help,
because, by definition, bulk collection may contain alternate identifiers .
But there is still no guarantee, because the bulk data might have been
collected in the wrong location or through the wrong communications
channel, etc. The alternate identifiers might still be missed, even though
they exist. Is a smarter search more or less likely than the use of bulk data to result in identification of the needle? Without
using techniques described by Cortes et al.1

details of the specific use case in question, this question cannot be answered in the abstract. In practice, analysts do not know if the
haystack contains the needle without analyzing all the dataso they cannot know when to stop adding more hay. Thus, collecting
more data is necessary but it is not necessarily sufficient. It is true that more data may burden the analyst, while increasing the risk

if
the necessary data is not already available, collecting more is the only
possible way to find the needle. This trade-off between too much data and
finding the necessary information is inevitable. Although it can sometimes
be reduced, it cannot be eliminated.
of intruding on parties that are not of interest, and may still fail to provide the data of interest, even when such data exists. Still,

scenario planning good

Scenario planning best model for decisionmaking it TURNS their

Iraq example and gives life meaning
Ogilvy 11

Facing The Fold: Essays on scenario planning

Jay is a cofounder of GBN and dean and chief academic officer at the Presidio School
of Management in San Francisco. His own research and work have focused primarily
on the role that human values and changing motivations play in business decisionmaking and strategy, with a particular focus on health care, education, and
sustainability. He has pursued these interests in collaboration with Peter Schwartz
since 1979, when he joined SRI International, and from 1988-2008 with GBN, where
he led dozens of scenario projects for public and private sector clients in health care
and life sciences and led GBNs scenario training courses. While at SRI, Jay split his
time between developing future scenarios for strategic planning and serving as
director of research for the Values and Lifestyles (VALS) Program, a consumer
segmentation system used in market research. He also authored monographs on
social, political, and demographic trends affecting the values of American
consumers. Jay's work builds on his background as a philosopher. He taught at the
University of Texas, Williams College, and for seven years at Yale, where he received
his PhD in 1968. He is the author of Facing The Fold: Essays on Scenario Planning
(2011), Creating Better Futures: Scenario Planning as a Tool for a Better Tomorrow
(2002), Living Without a Goal (1995), Many Dimensional Man (1977); co-author of
China' Futures (2001) and Seven Tomorrows (1980); and editor of Self and World
(1971, 1980), and Revisioning Philosophy (1991). He is currently at work on a book
on emergent systems, e.g. consciousness, leadership, and wealth.
Now time itself is taking yet another turn, a fourth turning. We no longer live in the
ahistorical or circular time of the ancients. Nor do we enjoy the optimistic, progressive time
of the moderns. Nor. hopefully, the apocalyptic closing time of the postmodernists. Now we
live in the tragi-comic time of multiple scenarios. Now the future is flying at us both
faster and less predictably than ever. Surprise is its middle name. There's promise to be
sure, but risk just as surely. Our research labs are churning out discoveries at an
unprecedented rate. The life expectancy of individuals is increasing even as the lifeexpectancy of the species, according to Sir Martin Rees, is not. Neither as optimistic as
modernity nor as pessimistic as postmodernity, the sensibility' appropriate to multiple
scenarios is one of wide-eyed wonder at the nearness of Heav en and Hell both to us and to
one another. The sheer proximity of best case and worst case scenarios induces a psychic
shear factor between updrafts of hope and downdrafts of despair. Should one laugh or cry?
Or master a capacity for both each and every day? This fourth form of lived timethe first
being the traditional, the second progressive, the third apocalyptic, and the fourth tragiccomichas about it a certain intensity. The stakes are high. Choices matter . It would be
half-right but also half-wrong to call it existential: Half-right in its sense of urgency and its
call upon our sense of freedom and responsibility; but half-wrong to the extent that the
existentialists themselves were poised between the moderns and the postmoderns. and for
the most part pretty gloomy about itall that gazing into the abyss. Beingtowards-Dcath.
and European brooding. The fourth attitude toward time peeks through the gloom with
Woody Allen's wry humor asking. "What Ate Zarathustra?" Or Ken Kesev's question, "Whose

movie is this?" Or Hunter Thompson's gonzo sensibility; or R. Crumb's Zippy the Pinhead
asking. "Are we having fun yet?" Martin Amis caught a piece of this new attitude toward lime
and history in his London Fields. '"We're all coterminous," he writes, referring to the
imminent ecological apocalypse that looms over his novel. "We used to live and die without
any sense of the planet getting older, of mother earth getting older, living and dying. We
used to live outside history. But now we're all coterminous. We're inside history now all right,
on its leading edge, with the wind ripping past our ears. Hard to love, when you're bracing
yourself for impact." Facing the Fold Adopting a perspective toward our tragi-comic
future is like facing a landscape described by mathematician Rene Thom. Thom
developed a scries of mathematical models he called "catastrophes," not because they arc
bad or disastrous, but rather because he wanted to call attention to their mapping of
discontinuities. Thorn's "catastrophe theory" has a lot in common with what Nobel Prize
winner, Ilya Prigogine. called "bifurcation theory." Both were interested in the ways that
nature branches from time to time, and often in ways that a calculus of continuity has
difficulty describing. Thom theorized seven different types of catastrophe. But the force and
power of his analysis can be grasped from a brief description of just one of his seven
different types, the 'Told" catastrophe, and its application to modeling the '"bifurcation"
between fight and flight in the behavior of dogs. Imagine the behavior of a dog as following
a path on the upper behav ior surface beginning at point C and moving, on a path of
increasing rage, toward B. While launching an attack, the dog sees a man with a large stick.
The dog's behavior then moves from point B towards point A. The beauty of this
mathematical model, the beauty of Thorn's catastrophe theory, lies in the way it models, on
a continuous surface, the discontinuity in behavior we observe when we see the dog rapidly
shift from fight to flight. Moving on the behavior surface from B to A, the dog will enter the
intrinsically unstable area between the dark lines on the lower "control surface" labeled
"bifurcation set." Mapping this shift on the behavior surface, it's easy to sec where the path
from B to A will ''fair discontinuously from the "attacking" plane of the behavior surfacc to
the "retreating" plane.1 Life in the fourth era of time is like standing at point C looking at a
Utopian point B even as one sees the distinct possibility of disaster at point A. Our hopes
hide fears of disaster. Our fears eclipse the optimism of our hopes. The oscillation we
experience as we toggle back and forth between brave optimism and knowing pessimism is
enough to induce a sense of irony. Or at least a call for alternative scenarios if we need help
in handling multiple futures at once. Scenario Planning and the Scenario Stance When
considering this line sequencefrom the eclipse of Utopia to the restoration of hope by way
of the four eras of timeone can do a lot worse than pick up the tools and mental
habits of scenario planning. Facing both positive and negative scenarios at once can be
disconcerting in its complexity. Both optimism and pessimism share the advantage of
simplicity. We need some tools to handle the uncertainty and complexity of an

unpredictable future. The optimism of the entrepreneur goes a long way toward
providing clarity of vision. Nothing can stand in the way of a single-minded focus on success.
But the optimist is easily dismissed as a simpleton, or as naive, or as insensitive to the ills of
the world and therefore shallow. Pessimism is somehow deeper, more knowing. But
pessimism, too. is too simple. The pessimist gets dismissed as a Cassandra. However correct
the optimist or the pessimist proves to be ov er time, his or her optimism or pessimism by
itself was too simple when it was originally held. Still, one can hold on to the content of
both the optimistic and pessimistic visions, while avoiding the sting of their critics'
comments, by holding on to both the optimistic scenarios and the pessimistic
scenarios at the same time in the capacious space of scenario thinking. Despite its
disconcerting complexity, there are advantages to facing the fold. First, one acquires an
acute sense of freedom . Quite the opposite of living in a fatalistic rut. facing the fold

heightens the sharpness of Kierkegaard's existential imperative : Either/Or. You

cannot do both. It is yours to choose. But at least you have a choice. As opposed to this

sense of freedom, both optimism and pessimism appear as two sides of the same coin of
fatalism. Second, when one faccs the fold, one is relieved of the intellectual dishonesty
involved in holding either branch of the fold as a single-point forecast. One is relieved of
the naivete of callow optimism, even as one is spared the amoral defeatism of the allknowing cynic. You've looked at the dark side: you've seen the very real risk: and still you're
able to move ahead constructively. Third, having made a choice in full knowledge of the
alternatives and the risks involved, you'll act deliberately and resolutely, but not rashly
or foolishly. You choose the high road, but you are always well aware of the off-ramps to the
low road. You don't kid yourself that success is guaranteed, as the Bush administration
did so foolishly as they marched into Iraq. And scenarios had been written and shared. A
team in the State Department under the direction of Thomas Warrick had created scenarios
that detailed the prospect of an insurgency and the dangers of looting in the aftermath of a
purely military "victory". But Warrick was known as a prickly if brilliant fellow: second, he
was at State, traditionally at odds with both the Bush White House and the hawks under
Rumsfeld at the Pentagon; and third, those scenarios had been composed during Clinton's
tenure in the White House. So Bush. Cheney. Wolfowitz and Rumsfeld were not about to let
such lily-livered cautionary tales inhibit their march to Baghdad. They simply swept those

negative scenarios into the waste basket. The attitudinal aspect of facing the fold
retaining the ability to act resolutely even as you maintain an acute awareness of how things
could go wrongis hard to over-value. It's the kind of thing that venture capitalists look for
in lending money to people who have already suffered one or two failures. Hardly gun shy,
they are nonetheless all too aware of the ways things could go wrong. The tragi-comic
aspect of the sccnaric stance can turn abstract thoughts toward profound emotions. We're
talking about hopes and fears here. It could get scary. Or it could get hokey if only hopes and
no fears are in play. Laughter and tearsare these not direct physiological responses to
rapid reinterpretations? Do we not see a mixing of mind and body in laughter and tears? The
fairly violent physiology of laughter and its absolute irrepressibility under certain
circumstancesgood jokesis a function of a nerv ous system that has somewhere within it
a toggleswitch twitching between the planes on a fold. Your nervous system is interpreting
and rc-intcrprcting the same signals first in one way and then another, back and forth, very
rapidly. Likewise alternative scenarios give you a kind of stereoscopic vision that lends
emotional depth to your experience. In adopting the scenaric stance, facing the fold in which
multiple futures are held simultaneously and constantly in view, one achieves a kind of
emotional and intellectual maturity that is not available to cither the simple optimist or the
simple pessimist Yes, things could turn out badly. But. no, that is not in itself reason for
inaction. Yes. things could turn out very well, but. no. that is not in itself reason for foolish
bravado. By holding in mind several different futures at once, one is able to proceed
deliberately yet flexibly: resolutely yet cautiously. The scenaric stance isn't simply a tool
to solve a problem, like a calculator, or double-entry bookkeeping. It's a frame of mind.
Its framework can be measured in three dimension s: First, you find a relentless
curiosity, a willingness to learn, an eagerness to experience new frames of reference. The
scenaric stance is curious not just for facts, though certainly you want plenty of those. A
good scenario shows you a way of looking at the world that you hadn't seen before. Call this
the outside-in dimension. Second, you gain a capacity for commitment, a resoluteness
toward action, and once having acted, a clarity of follow-through. Call this the inside-out
dimension. Third, you achieve a capacity to balance these in-coming and out-going flows.
The scenaric stancc is subtle. If you emphasize the cither/or of dccisivcncss too much, you
risk cutting off the branches that constitute alternative scenarios once you have opted for
one course of action. Likewise if you emphasize too much the both/and of maintaining
multiple scenarios before the mind's eye, you risk the indecisiveness of a wavering Hamlet:
To be. or not to be, etc. So you have to climb up a level of abstraction and maintain both the
both/and and the either/or even as you learn how to assume cither the capaciousness of the
both/and or the dccisivcncss of the cither/or. But. hey. welcome to the ways of the world and
the inevitability of surprise. Further, the times demand it. He or she who sees no

opportunities is blind. He or she who senses no threats is foolish. But he or she who sees

both threats and opportunities shining forth in rich and vivid scenarios may just be
able to make the choices and implement the plans that will take us to the
high road and beyond.

Scenario planning best for prediction modeling intenral link chains

enables best future-oriented decisionmaking
Ogilvy 11

Facing The Fold: Essays on scenario planning

Jay is a cofounder of GBN and dean and chief academic officer at the Presidio School
of Management in San Francisco. His own research and work have focused primarily
on the role that human values and changing motivations play in business decisionmaking and strategy, with a particular focus on health care, education, and
sustainability. He has pursued these interests in collaboration with Peter Schwartz
since 1979, when he joined SRI International, and from 1988-2008 with GBN, where
he led dozens of scenario projects for public and private sector clients in health care
and life sciences and led GBNs scenario training courses. While at SRI, Jay split his
time between developing future scenarios for strategic planning and serving as
director of research for the Values and Lifestyles (VALS) Program, a consumer
segmentation system used in market research. He also authored monographs on
social, political, and demographic trends affecting the values of American
consumers. Jay's work builds on his background as a philosopher. He taught at the
University of Texas, Williams College, and for seven years at Yale, where he received
his PhD in 1968. He is the author of Facing The Fold: Essays on Scenario Planning
(2011), Creating Better Futures: Scenario Planning as a Tool for a Better Tomorrow
(2002), Living Without a Goal (1995), Many Dimensional Man (1977); co-author of
China' Futures (2001) and Seven Tomorrows (1980); and editor of Self and World
(1971, 1980), and Revisioning Philosophy (1991). He is currently at work on a book
on emergent systems, e.g. consciousness, leadership, and wealth.
2.1.2 Building Narratives When the basic logics of the different worlds have been
determined, then it is time for the group to weave those pieces together to form a
narrative with a beginning, a middle, and an end. How could the world get from the
present to the reality proposed by the new scenario? What events might be necessary to
make the end point of the scenario possible? One of the most frequent mistakes made by
fledgling scenario teams is falling into the temptation of settling for a single state
description of. say, the year 2020. A static description sacrifices the opportunity to see
how the "moving parts" in an industry can interact , and then interact again, sometimes
producing counter-intuitive consequences well on down the road. Narratives are also
important to capture issues of timing and path dependency . We may all agree that
twenty years from now die twisted pair telephone line and the cable TV will be largely
replaced by optical fiber. But billions will be won and lost depending on whether the Regional
Bell Operating Companies or the cable companies are the gate-keepers. Shorter term issues
of regulation, technology, economic competition, and industry consolidation will have a lot to
do with which path we take toward the final rationalization of broadband communications. A
productive exercise at this stage of the workshop is to ask the scenario team to write
newspaper headlines describing key events or trends that take place during the
course of the scenario. "Philip Morris divests cigarette business." "Dow Jones Falls to

4000." "Moore's Law Disproved" "Eighth Hurricanc in 20 Days Ravages Florida Coast." The
headlines are a quick way of defining successive stages of a narrative that includes
repetitions of the phrase, "and then... and then... and then." Good headlines might mark a
surprising beginning, perhaps a turbulent middle period, and a satisfying resolution, for
example. Imagine that you are looking out to the year 2025. What would the headlines for
your scenario read in 2015? In 2020? What social, technological, economic, environmental,
and political events or trends would be reported in the paper? For example, a scenario for an
educational products company might include such headlines as: Seattle, WA, 2015 "Bill
Gates Appointed Internet Czar," Phoenix. AZ 2020: "Chamber of Commerce Takes Over
Appointed Internet Czar,'* Phoenix. AZ 2020: "Chamber of Commerce Takes Over School
District;" Princeton. New Jersey, 2025 "ETS Reports Dramatic Rise in SAT Scores for 2 year
olds." This exercise not only hones the scenario logics but provides an intriguing source of
ideas for the narratives.

scenario planning good: at no predictions

SCENARIO PLANNING is the realization of complexity our scenario
mapping is precisely how to deal with agency and uncertainty
Ogilvy 11
Facing The Fold: Essays on scenario planning
Jay is a cofounder of GBN and dean and chief academic officer at the Presidio School
of Management in San Francisco. His own research and work have focused primarily
on the role that human values and changing motivations play in business decisionmaking and strategy, with a particular focus on health care, education, and
sustainability. He has pursued these interests in collaboration with Peter Schwartz
since 1979, when he joined SRI International, and from 1988-2008 with GBN, where
he led dozens of scenario projects for public and private sector clients in health care
and life sciences and led GBNs scenario training courses. While at SRI, Jay split his
time between developing future scenarios for strategic planning and serving as
director of research for the Values and Lifestyles (VALS) Program, a consumer
segmentation system used in market research. He also authored monographs on
social, political, and demographic trends affecting the values of American
consumers. Jay's work builds on his background as a philosopher. He taught at the
University of Texas, Williams College, and for seven years at Yale, where he received
his PhD in 1968. He is the author of Facing The Fold: Essays on Scenario Planning
(2011), Creating Better Futures: Scenario Planning as a Tool for a Better Tomorrow
(2002), Living Without a Goal (1995), Many Dimensional Man (1977); co-author of
China' Futures (2001) and Seven Tomorrows (1980); and editor of Self and World
(1971, 1980), and Revisioning Philosophy (1991). He is currently at work on a book
on emergent systems, e.g. consciousness, leadership, and wealth.
If the membership committee for the science club raises the bar to the level of a
positivistic, deterministic, predictive science, then there is no way that scenario
planning can make the grade. If it were possible to raise the bar that high, however, then
it wouldn't make sense to engage in scenario planning in the first place. There is a paradox
at best, or a contradiction at worst, in even try ing to raise scenario planning to the level of a
deterministic, predictive science: If prediction is possible, then who needs alternative
scenarios? If it were possible to marshal enough data and enough laws to achieve

certainty for a single-point forecast of the future, then why waste time on other
forecasts of what certainly won'/ happen? Given the obvious unavoidability of risk and
uncertainty in the world wc live in, it might seem absurd to entertain the prospect of
scientific predictability. Indeed, it is absurd. Nonetheless it's worth following out the
thought experiment of a scientifically predictable future for several reasons: First, the ideal
of predictabilitylies just below the surface assumptions of many who see science through the
lens of positivism. Second, the thought experiment has in fact been seriously entertained. It
is not just some fictional straw man. The mathematician. Henri LaPlace once wrote to the
effect that a sufficiently large intellect, given the positions and momenta of every particle in
the universe at a given moment of time, could then calculate state descriptions of the
universe for every subsequent moment in time. Think of the universe as a perfect,
frictionless billiards table with flawless bumpers. The LaPlacian demon can figure all the
angles. Given sufficient precision in managing his cue stick, he would never miss a shot.
Absurd as this fantasy might seem to anyone steeped in the messiness and indeterminacy of
the real world, the fact is that this fantasy has occurred\ not only to LaPlace but to many

others. This fantasy of perfect predictability also gains support from some of
science's remarkable successes. VVe are able to achieve amazing accuracy in ballistics.
We have put a man on the moon. We can predict eclipses with precision. So why can't we
achieve similar successes in the social sciences, in politics, in business? In Asimov's
Foundation trilogy, "the donkey" stands in for the positivistie dream of reducing the social
sciences and history to the determinism of Newtonian mechanics. Likewise Nietzsche's
notion of eternal recurrence also presupposes the kind of determinism necessary to ensure
that, when the train of possibilities on the cosmic billiards table has run its course once, it is
bound by iron necessity to repeat itself endlesslylike Bill Murray's replays in the movie,
Groundhog Day. This fantasy of a prc-dctcrmincd future has occurredto LaPlacc, to
Nietzsche, to Asimov. I'm not just making it up. A third reason for thinking through this
fantasy of predictability lies in the fact that it lurks among the assumptions of those who
imagine that business strategies can be based on reliable single-point forecasts of
the future. But see how fundamentally paradoxical this fantasy becomes when you think
through the thought experiment. If you can predict the future, then you can't change it. If
you. or more to the point, someone else can change the future, then you can't predict it.
Aristotle articulated this paradox over 2,000 years ago,6 but many a strategy based on a
single-point forecast falls into this paradox. How many telecom companies based their
strategies and aggressive investments in the late 1990s on predictions of market demand
that failed to greet them, in part because so many other telecom companies planned on
capturing the same market? They predicted their success based on a future in which they
captured large market share. But other companies changed that future by pursuing the
same market share. We can influence the future, and therefore we cannot predict it. If

we could predict the future, we couldn't change it. We'd have to give up planning in
favor of reading tea leav es or Tarot sticks to find our (pre-)destinv. If you believe in
fate, there's not much point in planning or acting on behalf of your shareholders' interests. If
you believe in fate, you might as well just lie back and let in unfold. This is the paradox
implicit in the fantasy of predictability. It renders intentional action superfluous. No wonder
fatalists tend toward quietism. Like Pascal, they will aver that we would all be a lot better off
if more of us learned to sit quietly in our rooms. Convinced of the power of destiny, they
become rcconcilcd to the vanity of human action . With Zen equanimity or Heideggerian
Gelassenheit. they let be what is. But the rest of us don't run our lives this way . We
engage in intentional action, both as individuals and as planners for our companies. We
do our best to mold our futures to our liking. We carve the near edge of the future so
that its farther edges will conform to our dreams and our desires. In doing so. as this thought
experiment shows, we presuppose the unpredictability of the future . But if that is so.
then we can't expect scenario planning, or any other kind of planning for that matter, to
leap over the bar of deterministic prediction. We cannot expect scenario planning to
mimic astrophysics with precise calculations of converging trajectories. Let me be clear
about the several different arguments that are parts of the preceding thought experiment: 1.
The future is not predictable. This claim can be supported by a range of arguments, from the
evidence of common sense to a combination of Hciscnbcrg's Uncertainty Principle and chaos
theory's emphasis on the importance of minor fluctuations in initial conditions (the famous
"butterfly effect"). 2. If the future were predictable, then planners would be out of business.
They would be replaced by seers or prc-cogs7 who could sec the shape of our inevitable
destiny, our ineluctable fate. 3. If the future were predictable, then alternative scenarios are
unnecessary. Only one so-called scenario could correspond to the predicted future. Its
probability would equal 1.0. All others have zero probability and are therefore useless. 4. The
high bar of deterministic predictability' is more than implicit; it has been rendered explicit by
positivists from LaPlacc to the philosophers of the Vienna Circlefigures like Rudolph
Carnap. Hans Rcichenbach. and A. J. Aver. 5. The fantasy of deterministic predictability lives
on and lurks among the assumptions of those who regard scenario planning as insufficiently
scientific. Connect these points together in any of several combinations and you will sec that

judging scenario planning against the standard of deterministic science is nonsensical. paradoxical, and ultimately absurd.
Scenario planning is complexity they just misunderstand the NATURE of our
narrative predictions
Ogilvy 11
Facing The Fold: Essays on scenario planning
Jay is a cofounder of GBN and dean and chief academic officer at the Presidio School
of Management in San Francisco. His own research and work have focused primarily
on the role that human values and changing motivations play in business decisionmaking and strategy, with a particular focus on health care, education, and
sustainability. He has pursued these interests in collaboration with Peter Schwartz
since 1979, when he joined SRI International, and from 1988-2008 with GBN, where
he led dozens of scenario projects for public and private sector clients in health care
and life sciences and led GBNs scenario training courses. While at SRI, Jay split his
time between developing future scenarios for strategic planning and serving as
director of research for the Values and Lifestyles (VALS) Program, a consumer
segmentation system used in market research. He also authored monographs on
social, political, and demographic trends affecting the values of American
consumers. Jay's work builds on his background as a philosopher. He taught at the
University of Texas, Williams College, and for seven years at Yale, where he received
his PhD in 1968. He is the author of Facing The Fold: Essays on Scenario Planning
(2011), Creating Better Futures: Scenario Planning as a Tool for a Better Tomorrow
(2002), Living Without a Goal (1995), Many Dimensional Man (1977); co-author of
China' Futures (2001) and Seven Tomorrows (1980); and editor of Self and World
(1971, 1980), and Revisioning Philosophy (1991). He is currently at work on a book
on emergent systems, e.g. consciousness, leadership, and wealth.
But what if we measure scenario planning against the standards of a different kind
of science? What kind? Consider complexity theory and the ideas of Stuart
Kauffman. In his Investigations. Kauffman reflects on the fact that in an evolving
universe where new forms of order emerge from complex concatenations of already
complex molecules, it is not only impossible to predict the future; we cannot even
anticipate the parameters of the configuration space. Not only can we not calculate
the measure of the future: we cannot even anticipate the correct measuring rods to
use. Kauffman is not shy about drawing appropriately radical conclusions about the
nature of science itself. Once again: "Our inability to prestate the configuration
space of a biosphere foretells a deepening of science, a search for story and
historical contingency, yet a place for natural laws."8 I think Kauffman is right to
deduce the need for story from our inability to prestate the configuration space of
the biosphere, but there are some premises missing from his deduction. What is it
about story that makes it essential to his new kind of science? What is it about
narrative that makes it so important to complexity theory? In order to answer this
question, we need to look elsewhere. But before we do so. it's worth recalling that
scenarios are storiesnarrativ es of alternative futures. If stories are essential to
Kauffman's new kind of science, and scenarios are stories, then scenario planning
might be far more compatible with this new kind of science than with the science of
LaPlace and the positiv ists. We seem to be getting closer to an understanding of

scenario planning as not just art. but also part of science. But before we get there,
we still need to know just what it is about story or narrative that makes it essential
to this new kind of science. Despite the rash of recent interest in narrative and the
growing fascination with story-telling in organizations,91 find it necessary to go all
the way back to Hegel to find an account of narrative sufficiently profound to serv e
Kauffman's needs. Sincc Hegel's prose is obscure to the point of being unintelligible
to those not steeped in the language of German philosophy, it will be helpful to
borrow from one of his modern interpreters. Hayden White, a formulation of his
insights more lucid than Hegel's own. White interprets Hegel as saving, "The reality
that lends itself to narrative representation is the conflict between desire and the
law."10 I think Hayden White and Hegel are on to something very important here,
something that completes Stuart Kauffman's argument in ways that not even he
may have anticipated. Put Hegel and Kauffman together (with Hayden White's help),
and you get a science that not only covers the force of necessity; you get a science
that also accommodates the power of desirenot only what must be. but also what
we want to be; not only a degree of determinism, but also some room for freedom.
We get the kind of science we need for shaping the future as well as we can without
falling into the paradox of a scientifically predictable fate defeating the efficacy of
good intentions. In short, there is reason for hope.

Demands for DETERMINIST accuracy misunderstand the point of

NORMATIVE SCENARIO PLANNING in debate SOCIAL SCIENCE can
be good without being POSITIVISM
Ogilvy 11
Facing The Fold: Essays on scenario planning
Jay is a cofounder of GBN and dean and chief academic officer at the Presidio School
of Management in San Francisco. His own research and work have focused primarily
on the role that human values and changing motivations play in business decisionmaking and strategy, with a particular focus on health care, education, and
sustainability. He has pursued these interests in collaboration with Peter Schwartz
since 1979, when he joined SRI International, and from 1988-2008 with GBN, where
he led dozens of scenario projects for public and private sector clients in health care
and life sciences and led GBNs scenario training courses. While at SRI, Jay split his
time between developing future scenarios for strategic planning and serving as
director of research for the Values and Lifestyles (VALS) Program, a consumer
segmentation system used in market research. He also authored monographs on
social, political, and demographic trends affecting the values of American
consumers. Jay's work builds on his background as a philosopher. He taught at the
University of Texas, Williams College, and for seven years at Yale, where he received
his PhD in 1968. He is the author of Facing The Fold: Essays on Scenario Planning
(2011), Creating Better Futures: Scenario Planning as a Tool for a Better Tomorrow
(2002), Living Without a Goal (1995), Many Dimensional Man (1977); co-author of
China' Futures (2001) and Seven Tomorrows (1980); and editor of Self and World
(1971, 1980), and Revisioning Philosophy (1991). He is currently at work on a book
on emergent systems, e.g. consciousness, leadership, and wealth.
Monological science is not simply wrong; it is a necessary condition for the emergence
of subjectivity from the conflict between desire and that law. Rather than staking out a
romantic opposition to the force of law; rather than restating New Age complaints

about the failure of "Western science" (whatever that might mean); rather than giving in
to Feycrabcnd's methodological anarchism, it seems wiser to define as precisely as
possible what I've called monological science, grant it its due under laboratory'
conditions, but then declare its limitations in applications outside the laboratory ,
especially where intentional agents hav e their say. The point is to appreciate the tension
between the force of law and the force of desire. Wishing something doesn't make it so. But
there is reason for hope, even in the face of harsh necessity. Once we grant the force of law,
together with its limitations somewhere short of the pre-determined, billiards table universe
of the positivists, then there 's room for entertaining the role of hope, desire and care

without falling into overly w ishful thinking or belief in some benign teleology . This
is precisely where normative scenarios come into play . As I've argued
elsewhere,11 investing our scenarios with our values is not a mistake. It is not an error to
recognize one scenario as aspirational. another as an evil to be avoided at all costs.
The effort to create scenarios that are simply different without being recognized as
good or bad derives from the mistaken belief that pure objectivity is possible . It is
not. Of course it is worth even' effort to explore and identify our biases. But it is a mistake to
maintain that we can root out all of our biases, all of our predispositions, all of our
assumptions and pre-judgments,12 to achieve some sort of context-free objectivity.

scen plan good vtl

Forecasting multiple futures crucial to invest autonomy and
experience with meaning
Ogilvy 11
Facing The Fold: Essays on scenario planning
Jay is a cofounder of GBN and dean and chief academic officer at the Presidio School
of Management in San Francisco. His own research and work have focused primarily
on the role that human values and changing motivations play in business decisionmaking and strategy, with a particular focus on health care, education, and
sustainability. He has pursued these interests in collaboration with Peter Schwartz
since 1979, when he joined SRI International, and from 1988-2008 with GBN, where
he led dozens of scenario projects for public and private sector clients in health care
and life sciences and led GBNs scenario training courses. While at SRI, Jay split his
time between developing future scenarios for strategic planning and serving as
director of research for the Values and Lifestyles (VALS) Program, a consumer
segmentation system used in market research. He also authored monographs on
social, political, and demographic trends affecting the values of American
consumers. Jay's work builds on his background as a philosopher. He taught at the
University of Texas, Williams College, and for seven years at Yale, where he received
his PhD in 1968. He is the author of Facing The Fold: Essays on Scenario Planning
(2011), Creating Better Futures: Scenario Planning as a Tool for a Better Tomorrow
(2002), Living Without a Goal (1995), Many Dimensional Man (1977); co-author of
China' Futures (2001) and Seven Tomorrows (1980); and editor of Self and World
(1971, 1980), and Revisioning Philosophy (1991). He is currently at work on a book
on emergent systems, e.g. consciousness, leadership, and wealth.
Since the interpretation of current events, and the very categories we use to interpret them,
are contingent on their outcome, what will come true; and since the outcome of current
events is genuinely in doubtuncertain, subject to the unpredictability of the future we
are therefore pressed nose to the glass against the sublime, which the romantic poets
and philosophers found to consist not in some high plateau, but in the contrast between
the heights and the depths. That's why the romantic poets, particularly Wordsworth in the
Simplon Pass passage of the Prelude. rely so heavily on the imagery of the Swiss Alps as a
favorite medium in which to express their sense of the romantic sublime. It's not just the
heights diat impressed them, but the cliffs, the steep descents from lofty peaks down into
the abyss. High mountain waterfalls do it. You could watch them for hours. Big surf docs it,
with rhythm. The collapse of the World Trade Center towers did it as tragedy. Orgasm docs it
as ecstasy. You need multiple scenarios to appreciate the sublimity of the present .
False confidence and insipid affirmations of inevitable progress point only to the
heights. Cynical contempt for hope and all-knowing declarations of imminent doom
point only to the depths. Just as Fitzgerald declared genius to lie in the ability to hold two
contrary ideas in mind at the same time.20 so it seems that access to the sublime
requires a healthy respect for both the tragic and transcendent potentials of the
human condition. My colleague and co-founder of Global Business Network, Stewart Brand,
is fond of quoting Bernal's pithy line, "Desire always misreads fate.*' For reasons stated
above (about the folly of believing in fate) I find this saying insightful but onesided. It
contains a kcrnal of wisdom shrouded in a cloak of pessimism. I would rather revise it to

read. Desire often misreads facts. Our values, our biases, our hopes and desires often lead
us to misread the evidence in front of our faces. But sometimes desire, in the form of shared
hopes articulated in normative scenarios, can lead us to create what we end up calling fate
in retrospect: So it had to be, because we cared enough to make it so. What was and is does
not reach the limits of what could be or should be. This is the gift of time and futurity
the reality and importance of possibility, the potential for new beauty and greater good.
We should not limit ourselves to the best of the past. Better futures await us if we take
the trouble to design them and make them so. In Tony Blair's powerful speech to the
Labor Party Congress at Blackpool on October L 2002, he made the point that politics is all
about the conflict between hope and pessimism . Without hope, the people perish. With
hope alone, devoid of a respect for truth or science, the people will perish just as surely.
Narrativesstories with suspense, alternative scenarios contain this perpetual

conflict between the creativ e art of articulating what we want on the one hand, and
the science of what must be on the other. Scenario planning is the medium
through which we mediate this age-old dialectic. Both the scicncc of what is and
the art of what might be conic together in sets of scenarios. These stories about the future
pit our desire for the good and the beautiful against our obedience to what is and must be.

***AFFIRMATIVE***

AT NSA Morale

Link Turn
Morale crashing because of RULEBREAKING
Friedersdorf 12/10/13 Conor Friedersdorf is a staff writer at The Atlantic, where he
focuses on politics and national affairs. He lives in Venice, California, and is the founding
editor of The Best of Journalism, a newsletter devoted to exceptional nonfiction.
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/12/do-you-trust-em-the-washington-postem-s-sources-on-morale-at-the-nsa/282184/
After reading what these former officials had to say, Marcy Wheeler points out that NSA

employees have a reason for low morale that has nothing to do with Obama's
support: Most of the NSAs employees have not been read into many of these
programs ... That raises the distinct possibility that NSA morale is low not because
the President hasnt given them a pep talk, but because theyre uncomfortable
working for an Agency that violates its own claimed rules so often . Most of the men
and women at NSA have been led to believe they dont spy on their fellow citizens. Those
claims are crumbling, now matter how often the NSA repeats the word target.

Morale Low NU
Morale low Obama ignoring
Circa News 8/7/14 http://circanews.com/news/nsa-employee-morale-drops-aftersnowden-leaks

Former NSA officials say the agency's workers are feeling low due to the fact that
Pres. Obama hasn't paid them a visit since the Snowden leaks began. Pres. Obama
hasn't visited NSA headquarters at Fort Meade since the first leaks from Edward
Snowden surfaced, causing a plunge in morale among employees , former NSA
officials tell the Washington Post. NSA workers "are feeling bad, beaten down, " an
unnamed official said. The agency, from top to bottom, leadership to rank and file, feels
that it is had no support from the White House even though it's been carrying out
publicly approved intelligence missions. They feel they've been hung out to dry, and
they're right. Joel Brenner, former NSA inspector general Former Pres. George W. Bush
visited the agency in 2006 shortly after the New York Times published revelations that the
agency has engaged in warrantless wiretapping. The visit had a "tremendous" affect on
morale, Brenner said.

Morale Low Security Breach

NSA morale killed by mass intelligence breach

Mcgough 13 (Michael, Michael McGough is the Los Angeles Times senior editorial writer,
based in Washington, D.C. He has been writing editorials for The Times since 2006. Before
that, McGough worked for 30 years for the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette as a reporter, editorial
writer, editorial page editor and Washington correspondent. He writes about law, national
security, politics, foreign policy and religion. McGough is a graduate of Allegheny College
and also attended the University of Kent at Canterbury in England and Yale Law School,
where he received a master of studies in law degree. 12/20/13, Obama throws the NSA
under the bus http://www.latimes.com/opinion/opinion-la/la-ol-obama-nsa-snowden20131220-story.html)
President Obamas end-of-the-year news conference Friday, he was given the opportunity to second-guess two
bureaucracies that report to him: the intelligence community and the Department of Justice . He threw only

the
first one under the bus by implying strongly that he was open to ending the National
Security Agencys bulk collection of telephone records. He did this in two ways. First, he said
that the metadata program in which the NSA hoovers up information about the source,
destination and duration of phone calls might not be the only way of skinning the cat.
He suggested that, given public concerns about potential abuse of metadata, maybe it
would be a good idea to follow a task force recommendation and have telephone companies
store the information, with access by investigators on a more limited basis . But equally important
was the way Obama evaded a question about whether the metadata program had actually
prevented terrorist plots. Skeptics about that proposition include both the task force and the
federal judge who this week ruled that the program was probably unconstitutional. Obama
could have responded: I disagree. I know that the metadata program was essential in the
prevention of plots. But he offered no such defense. You might read some endorsement of the programs
effectiveness into Obamas comment that the government might be able to accomplish the same goals in a
different way. But thats different from saying that the goals actually have been accomplished. Obama went easier
on the Department of Justice. Asked about the possibility of amnesty for Edward Snowden, Ob ama noted that

Ive got to be careful because Snowden was under indictment and that the disposition of
the charges against him was the province of the attorney general and a judge and a jury. But
that was more than a little misleading. As Obama seemed to acknowledge in response to a
follow-up question, the White House likely would be consulted by Justice about major
decisions in the case. And, of course, the president has the power to pardon Snowden
even before a trial. Yet it seems pretty clear there wont be a pardon in Snowdens Christmas stocking. And
why not? Because the self-styled whistle-blower, in Obamas words, had caused unnecessary
damage to U.S. intelligence capabilities and U.S. diplomacy. On that point, Obama doesn't
seem open to fresh thinking

AT NSA Recruiting

Non-unique Recruiting low

Students are skeptical of the NSA number of recruited diminishes
Brumfiel 3/31/15 (Geoff Brumfiel, science correspondent for NPR, After Snowden, "The

NSA Faces Recruitment Challenge," www.npr.org/2015/03/31/395829446/after-snowden-thensa-faces-recruitment-challenge)

Matthew Green, a professor of computer science at Hopkins, says the number of such

students the school turns out each year can vary. "Sometimes it's a half-a-dozen,"
he says. "Sometimes it's just one or two." Green says the Snowden leaks have
changed academia's views of the agency. "Before the Snowden leaks we looked at the
NSA as being a spy agency, and they did what they were supposed to do," he says. "But
we've learned that they're been collecting this incredible amount of information. And they're
not shy about doing whatever they have to do to get access to that information." Green says
he doesn't feel as friendly toward the NSA as he once did. It's important that people learn
about the Snowden documents, he says, and he teaches about them to students like
Swann. Swann says Green's class helped shape his thinking on whether to work for the NSA.
The lawsuit by Wikimedia and other plaintiffs challenges the National Security Agency's use
of upstream surveillance, which collects the content of communications, instead of just the
metadata. NATIONAL SECURITY An 'Upstream' Battle As Wikimedia Challenges NSA
Surveillance Someone like Daniel Swann is a fairly rare commodity. Hopkins is a big

university, but its Information Security Institute will produce just 31 master's this
year. Of those, only five are U.S. citizens a requirement to work at the NSA. With
similarly small numbers at other schools, how many Daniel Swanns are rejecting the
agency because of the Snowden leaks?
"Well that's kind of a tricky question," says Ziring, the NSA computer scientist. Ziring also
helps lead academic outreach for the agency. "When I've been out on campuses and talking
to students," he says, "there are some of them ... that puts them off or they have doubts."
On the other hand, Ziring says, the Snowden leaks have sparked other students' interest.
"[They say], 'I actually know some of what you do now, and that's really cool and I want to
come do that," he says.

NSA is struggling for recruits to hire and compete with other sectors
Zakaria '11 (Tabassum Zakaria, Staff writer for Washington Post, "NSA is looking for a few
good hackers," www.washingtonpost.com/politics/nsa-is-looking-for-a-few-goodhackers/2011/08/02/gIQAXZAbqI_story.html)
The NSA is hiring about 1,500 people in the fiscal year , which ends Sept. 30, and
another 1,500 next year, most of them cybersecurity experts. With a workforce of about
30,000, the Fort Meade-based NSA dwarfs other intelligence agencies, including the CIA. It
also engages in cyber-spying and other offensive operations, something it rarely, if ever,
discusses publicly. But at Defcon, the NSA and other Feds will be competing with

corporations looking for hacking talent. The NSA needs cybersecurity experts to
harden networks, defend them with updates, do penetration testing to find
security holes and watch for signs of cyberattacks. The NSA is expanding its fold of
hackers, but George said there is a shortage of those skills. We are straining to hire
the people that we need.

NSA fights an uphill battle with recruitment against other

corporations
Hatamoto 4/2/15 (Michael Hatamoto, West Coast reporter, "NSA finding it harder to

recruit specialists following Snowden leaks," www.tweaktown.com/news/44398/nsa-findingharder-recruit-specialists-following-snowden-leaks/index.html)

The NSA has around 35,000 employees across the country, and trying to compete
against tech companies to recruit employees from leading universities is proving
difficult. A lack of trust is a major issue that is making some people think-twice
before trying to land a job with a security clearance. "Before the Snowden leaks we

looked at the NSA as being a spy agency, and they did what they were supposed to do," said
Matthew Green, assistant research professor at the Johns Hopkins Information Security
Institute, in a statement to NPR. "But we've learned that they've been collecting this
incredible amount of information. And they're not shy about doing whatever they have to do
to get access to that information." Trying to compete against Facebook, Google, and

other appealing tech companies is difficult, with the private sector providing higher
salaries and better perks - but the NSA and other federal branches try to promote
work-life balance and continuing education as benefits of government positions.

Non-unique Snowden kills recruiting

Snowdens revelations still devastates recruitment and questions

much of the ethics of the NSA
Brumfiel 3/31/15 (Geoff Brumfiel, science correspondent for NPR, After Snowden, "The
NSA Faces Recruitment Challenge," www.npr.org/2015/03/31/395829446/after-snowden-thensa-faces-recruitment-challenge)
After Snowden's revelations, Swann's thinking changed. The NSA's tactics, which
include retaining data from American citizens, raise too many questions in his mind:
"I can't see myself working there," he says, "partially because of these moral reasons." This

year, the NSA needs to find 1,600 recruits. Hundreds of them must come from
highly specialized fields like computer science and mathematics . So far, it says, the
agency has been successful. But with its popularity down, and pay from wealthy Silicon
Valley companies way up, agency officials concede that recruitment is a worry . If
enough students follow Daniel Swann, then one of the world's most powerful spy

agencies could lose its edge.

AT NSA Retention

Non-unique privatization
Attacking the NSA only leads to privatization
Markon and Nakashima 14 (Jerry and Ellen, Reporters for Washington Post, Toplevel turnover makes it harder for DHS to stay on top of evolving threats,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/top-level-turnover-makes-it-harder-for-dhs-to-stayon-top-of-evolving-threats/2014/09/21/ca7919a6-39d7-11e4-9c9f-ebb47272e40e_story.html)
In one nine-month period between June 2011 and March 2012, for example, four senior

DHS cybersecurity officials quit and one retired all headed to the private sector.
The departures came as the department battled the Pentagon and the National
Security Agency over who should have responsibility for protecting critical privatesector networks and for responding to industry requests for assistance. DHS was
pressing to enshrine its authority in law. It became so hard to advocate for DHS to be
placed in charge and given more responsibility because people were constantly leaving,
recalled Jacob Olcott, a former House Homeland Security Committee aide. The cybersecurity
bill died, a victim of strong opposition from industry and its backers on the Hill. The

continuing stream of departures has at times hampered the departments ability to

combat cyberattacks aimed at civilian federal networks and to serve as the federal
point of contact for critical industries, such as energy and transportation, and for state
and local governments. The high turnover has meant that at times the National
Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center struggles to carry out its
mission of analyzing attacks on federal and private computer systems and
responding to them.

Not even government aid can keep NSA employees from staying
Moore 4/14/15 (Jack Moore, staff writer for NextGov, "IN FIERCE BATTLE FOR CYBER
TALENT, EVEN NSA STRUGGLES TO KEEP ELITES ON STAFF,"
www.nextgov.com/cybersecurity/2015/04/fierce-battle-cyber-talent-even-nsa-struggles-keepelites-staff/110158/)

The National Security Agency is probably among the best-equipped parts of the
federal government at recruiting, training and staffing an elite team of
cybersecurity professionals. Thanks to Congress, the agency has been granted
significant leeway in bypassing the sluggish federal hiring process to onboard staff
quicker and greater latitude to pay new recruits retention bonuses and provide
other perks. But even thats not enough to stop some top-level technical talent from
jumping ship. We're throwing the kitchen sink at them from our standpoint, said NSAs
human resources technical director, John Yelnosky. And they're writing in to us, as they
leave NSA, in their exit interviews, 'I'm leaving to double my salary. Yelnosky spoke
Tuesday during a panel discussion hosted by the Partnership for Public Service on the
shortage of skilled cybersecurity professionals in government. A recent report from the
partnership and consultancy Booz Allen Hamilton called attention to the most pressing
challenges the government faces in hiring cyber talent: the arcane federal hiring process, a
rigid pay scale not keeping pace with the private sector and the lack of a governmentwide
master strategy for boosting the cyber workforce. NSA, along with other parts of the
intelligence community and the Defense Department, has been granted flexibility to bypass
traditional hurdles in the hiring process and adjust salary rates to be more competitive. The
report called on the Obama administration to allow all agencies to fast-track cyber hiring, as
well as stand up a governmentwide cyber training center and create a version of the military
ROTC program for cyber recruits. "NSA is really the poster child for many of the reforms
we've advocated here," said Ron Sanders, former chief human capital officer for the

intelligence community and a vice president at Booz Allen Hamilton, who co-authored the
report. But NSAs experiences point to the lack of a silver bullet. We lose more

technical people at much higher rates to resignations early on in their careers than
we do people in other skill sets , Yelnosky said of the churn in NSAs cyber personnel. It
stings all the more as most depart after theyve undergone extensive, specialized NSA
training. "The competition out there is really fierce and particularly for these folks
that we make a big investment in, and we feel those losses very keenly , Yelnosky
said. According to the report, 2014 marked the second year in a row in which the

number of civilian federal cyber employees streaming for the exits outpaced the
number of new hires. (That figure, which excludes military members and intelligence
community employees followed a three-year period between 2009-2012, when the number
of new hires outpaced separations by much larger margins, however.) The overall attrition

rate isnt necessarily raising eyebrows.

Intel Impact Answers

AT K2 Foreign Policy
Intelligence is irrelevant to FP
Pilar 1/3/12
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/01/03/intelligence
Paul R. Pillar is an academic and 28-year veteran of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA),
serving from 1977 to 2005.[1] He is now a non-resident senior fellow at Georgetown
University's Center for Security Studies,[2] as well as a nonresident senior fellow in the
Brookings Institution's Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence.[1] He was a visiting
professor at Georgetown University from 2005 to 2012.[1] He is a contributor to The National
Interest.[1][3]
"Presidents Make Decisions Based on Intelligence."
Not the big ones. From George W. Bush trumpeting WMD reports about Iraq to this

year's Republican presidential candidates vowing to set policy in Afghanistan based

on the dictates of the intelligence community, Americans often get the sense that
their leaders' hands are guided abroad by their all-knowing spying apparatus . After
all, the United States spends about $80 billion on intelligence each year, which provides a
flood of important guidance every week on matters ranging from hunting terrorists to
countering China's growing military capabilities. This analysis informs policymakers' dayto-day decision-making and sometimes gets them to look more closely at problems, such
as the rising threat from al Qaeda in the late 1990s, than they otherwise would. On major

foreign-policy decisions, however, whether going to war or broadly rethinking U.S.

strategy in the Arab world (as President Barack Obama is likely doing now),
intelligence is not the decisive factor. The influences that really matter are the
ones that leaders bring with them into office: their own strategic sense, the lessons
they have drawn from history or personal experience, the imperatives of domestic
politics, and their own neuroses. A memo or briefing emanating from some unfamiliar
corner of the bureaucracy hardly stands a chance. Besides, one should never underestimate
the influence of conventional wisdom. President Lyndon B. Johnson and his inner circle
received the intelligence community's gloomy assessments of South Vietnam's ability to
stand on its own feet, as well as comparably pessimistic reports from U.S. military leaders on
the likely cost and time commitment of a U.S. military effort there. But they lost out to the
domino theory -- the idea that if South Vietnam fell to communism, a succession of other
countries in the developing world would as well. President Harry Truman decided to
intervene in Korea based on the lessons of the past: the Allies' failure to stand up to the Axis
powers before World War II and the West's postwar success in firmly responding to
communist aggression in Greece and Berlin. President Richard Nixon's historic opening to
China was shaped by his brooding in the political wilderness about great-power strategy and
his place in it. The Obama administration's recent drumbeating about Iran is largely a
function of domestic politics. Advice from Langley, for better or worse, had little to do
with any of this. No, bad leadership did. Intelligence may have figured prominently in
Bush's selling of the invasion of Iraq, but it played almost no role in the decision itself. If the
intelligence community's assessments pointed to any course of action, it was avoiding a
war, not launching one.

Iraq proves intel doesnt impact policymaking

Pilar 1/3/12 http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/01/03/intelligence Paul R. Pillar is
an academic and 28-year veteran of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), serving from

1977 to 2005.[1] He is now a non-resident senior fellow at Georgetown University's Center

for Security Studies,[2] as well as a nonresident senior fellow in the Brookings Institution's
Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence.[1] He was a visiting professor at
Georgetown University from 2005 to 2012.[1] He is a contributor to The National Interest.[1]
[3]
When U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell went before the United Nations in February 2003

to make the case for an invasion of Iraq, he argued, "Saddam Hussein and his
regime are concealing their efforts to produce more weapons of mass destruction,"
an observation he said was "based on solid intelligence." But in a candid interview four
months later, Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz acknowledged that weapons of
mass destruction were simply "the one issue that everyone could agree on." The
intelligence community was raising no alarms about the subject when the Bush
administration came into office; indeed, the 2001 edition of the community's
comprehensive statement on worldwide threats did not even mention the possibility of Iraqi
nuclear weapons or any stockpiles of chemical or biological weapons. The administration
did not request the (ultimately flawed) October 2002 intelligence estimate on Iraqi

unconventional weapons programs that was central to the official case for invasion
-- Democrats in Congress did, and only six senators and a handful of representatives
bothered to look at it before voting on the war, according to staff members who kept
custody of the copies. Neither Bush nor Condoleezza Rice, then his national security advisor,
read the entire estimate at the time, and in any case the public relations rollout of the war
was already under way before the document was written. Had Bush read the intelligence

community's report, he would have seen his administration's case for invasion stood
on its head. The intelligence officials concluded that Saddam was unlikely to use
any weapons of mass destruction against the United States or give them to
terrorists -- unless the United States invaded Iraq and tried to overthrow his regime.
The intelligence community did not believe, as the president claimed, that the Iraqi regime
was an ally of al Qaeda, and it correctly foresaw any attempt to establish democracy in a
post-Saddam Iraq as a hard, messy slog. In a separate prewar assessment, the intelligence

community judged that trying to build a new political system in Iraq would be "long,
difficult and probably turbulent," adding that any post-Saddam authority would face
a "deeply divided society with a significant chance that domestic groups would
engage in violent conflict with each other unless an occupying force prevented
them from doing so." Mentions of Iraqis welcoming U.S. soldiers with flowers, or the war
paying for itself, were notably absent. Needless to say, none of that made any difference to
the White House.

No foreign policy connection to intel

Pilar 1/3/12
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/01/03/intelligence
Paul R. Pillar is an academic and 28-year veteran of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA),
serving from 1977 to 2005.[1] He is now a non-resident senior fellow at Georgetown
University's Center for Security Studies,[2] as well as a nonresident senior fellow in the
Brookings Institution's Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence.[1] He was a visiting
professor at Georgetown University from 2005 to 2012.[1] He is a contributor to The National
Interest.[1][3]

"Intelligence Failures Have Screwed Up U.S. Foreign Policy." Hardly. The record of
20th-century U.S. intelligence failures is a familiar one, and mostly indisputable. But
whether these failures -- or the successes -- mattered in the big picture is another

question. The CIA predicted both the outbreak and the outcome of the 1967 Six-Day War
between Israel and neighboring Arab states, a feat impressive enough that it reportedly won
intelligence chief Richard Helms a seat at President Johnson's Tuesday lunch table. Still, topnotch intelligence couldn't help Johnson prevent the war, which produced the basic contours
of today's intractable Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and U.S. intelligence completely failed to
predict Egypt's surprise attack on Israel six years later. Yet Egypt's nasty surprise in 1973
didn't stop Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger from then achieving a diplomatic
triumph, exploiting the conflict to cement relations with Israel while expanding them with
Egypt and the other Arab states -- all at the Soviets' expense. U.S. intelligence also
famously failed to foresee the 1979 Iranian revolution. But it was policymakers'

inattention to Iran and sharp disagreements within President Jimmy Carter's

administration, not bad intelligence, that kept the United States from making tough
decisions before the shah's regime was at death's door . Even after months of
disturbances in Iranian cities, the Carter administration -- preoccupied as it was with the
Egypt-Israel peace negotiations and the Sandinistas' revolution in Nicaragua -- still had not
convened any high-level policy meetings on Iran. "Our decision-making circuits were heavily
overloaded," Zbigniew Brzezinski, Carter's national security advisor, later recalled.
Imperfect intelligence analysis about another coming political upheaval -- the
collapse of the Soviet Union -- did not matter; the overriding influence on U.S. policy
toward the USSR in the 1980s was Ronald Reagan's instincts . From the earliest days of
his presidency, the notion that the Soviet Union was doomed to fail -- and soon -- was an
article of faith for the 40th president. "The Russians could never win the arms race," he later
wrote. "We could outspend them forever."

Aff overestimates predictive capacity

Pilar 1/3/12
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/01/03/intelligence
Paul R. Pillar is an academic and 28-year veteran of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA),
serving from 1977 to 2005.[1] He is now a non-resident senior fellow at Georgetown
University's Center for Security Studies,[2] as well as a nonresident senior fellow in the
Brookings Institution's Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence.[1] He was a visiting
professor at Georgetown University from 2005 to 2012.[1] He is a contributor to The National
Interest.[1][3]

"Good Intelligence Can Save Us From Bad Surprises." We wish. Early last February,
barely a week before the Arab Spring ended the three-decade presidency of Egypt's Hosni
Mubarak, Sen. Dianne Feinstein, chair of the Senate Intelligence Committee, grilled a CIA
official in a Capitol Hill hearing room. "The president, the secretary of state, and the

Congress are making policy decisions on Egypt, and those policymakers deserve
timely intelligence analysis," Feinstein told Stephanie O'Sullivan, then the CIA's associate
deputy director. "I have doubts whether the intelligence community lived up to its
obligations in this area." Feinstein was hardly the only one to criticize U.S.
intelligence agencies' inability to predict the speed at which the fire lit by Tunisian fruit
vendor Mohamed Bouazizi, who immolated himself on Dec. 17, 2010, would spread
throughout the Arab world. But all the bureaucratic overhauls and investigative commissions
in the world can't change one incontrovertible fact: Many things we would like our

intelligence services to know are too complex to model or predict. What the
community should be expected to provide -- and, based on the limited publicly
available evidence, apparently did provide -- is a strategic understanding of
conditions and attitudes that, given the right spark, could ignite into a full-blown
revolution. The most recent recriminations and inquiries are only the latest in a long line
dating back to the 1941 surprise attack on Pearl Harbor. The resources devoted to

intelligence have increased substantially over the past seven decades, and intelligence
agencies are continually looking for ways to improve how they do their business. But no
amount of moving around boxes on a flowchart can eliminate unpleasant surprises, and
there will always be new challenges -- especially in an age of endlessly proliferating
information. Intelligence can help manage uncertainty, defining its scope and

specifying what is known and what is likely to stay unknown. It can distinguish true
uncertainty from simple ignorance by systematically assembling all available
information, but it cannot eliminate uncertainty and it cannot prevent all surprises,
including some big ones. Leaders must accept this reality; they must expect -- and
prepare -- to be surprised. With due acknowledgment to Donald Rumsfeld, it also means
expecting unknown unknowns. Not only will we not know all the right answers -- we will not
even be asking all the right questions.

AT Terrorism
NSA doesnt solve terrorismtheir statistics are overblown
Cahall et al. 14 (Bailey, David Sterman, Emily Schneider, Peter Bergen, Cahall is a Policy Analyst at New
America Foundation. Sterman is a program associate at New America and holds a master's degree from
Georgetowns Center for Security Studies. His work focuses on homegrown extremism and the maintenance of New
America's datasets on terrorism inside the United States and the relative roles of NSA surveillance and traditional
investigative tools in preventing such terrorism, Schneider is a senior program associate for the International
Security Program at New America. Her research focuses on the use of drones for military and civilian purposes,
comparative cyber security issues, and national security law and policy, Bergen is a print, television and web
journalist, documentary producer and the author or editor of five books, three of which were New York Times
bestsellers and three of which were named among the best non-fiction books of the year by The Washington Post,
1/13/14, Do NSAs Bulk Surveillance Programs Stop Terrorists?, https://www.newamerica.org/internationalsecurity/do-nsas-bulk-surveillance-programs-stop-terrorists/) DHH

However, our review of the governments claims about the role that NSA bulk surveillance
of phone and email communications records has had in keeping the United States safe from
terrorism shows that these claims are overblown and even misleading. An in-depth analysis
of 225 individuals recruited by al-Qaeda or a like-minded group or inspired by al-Qaedas
ideology, and charged in the United States with an act of terrorism since 9/11, demonstrates
that traditional investigative methods, such as the use of informants, tips from local
communities, and targeted intelligence operations, provided the initial impetus for
investigations in the majority of cases, while the contribution of NSAs bulk surveillance
programs to these cases was minimal. Indeed, the controversial bulk collection of American
telephone metadata, which includes the telephone numbers that originate and receive calls,
as well as the time and date of those calls but not their content, under Section 215 of the
USA PATRIOT Act, appears to have played an identifiable role in initiating, at most, 1.8
percent of these cases. NSA programs involving the surveillance of non-U.S. persons outside
of the United States under Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act played a role in 4.4
percent of the terrorism cases we examined, and NSA surveillance under an unidentified
authority played a role in 1.3 percent of the cases we examined.

No impact to metadata
NSA metadata is not necessary for useful intelligence Claims that
this method has prevented over 50 attacks is discredited and likely
false
Rory Carroll 4/22/15 (US West Coast Correspondent for the Guardian in Los Angeles.
http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/apr/22/mass-surveillance-needed-isis-attackmike-rogers)
Mass surveillance should be retained because of the prospect of Islamic State attacks within the United States, a
key Republican ally of the National Security Agency has claimed. Mike Rogers, the former chairman of the House
intelligence committee, said the NSA needed to preserve its wide powers in case Isis used its bases in Syria and
Iraq to unleash atrocities on the US homeland. Now you have a very real face on what the threat is, Rogers told
the Guardian on Tuesday. Somebody calling back from Syria to Minnesota, either recruiting somebody or giving the
operational OK to do something. Thats real and its serious. Before it seemed all hypothetical. Now you can see it.
He added: Think about how many people are in Syria with western passports or even American passports. I want to
know if they pick up the phone. If theyre calling back to the States, I dont know about you, but I want to know who
theyre talking to and what theyre talking about. Rogers gave the warning as negotiators in the House of
Representatives wrangled over a revamp of the USA Freedom Act, a bill that aimed to stop the NSA from its daily
collection of US phone records in bulk which failed in the Senate in 2014, and is now returning to Congress.

coalition of civil libertarian groups on the left and right wants a landmark
law to reform the intelligence services

in the wake of revelations to the Guardian by Edward

Snowden, the NSA whistleblower. Part of the Patriot Act known as section 215, which the NSA uses to justify
domestic mass surveillance, expires on 1 June. Reformers hope that deadline will give them the leverage to make
sure the Freedom Act only reauthorises those provisions on condition of much greater privacy protections.
Republicans, however, are signalling possible resistance. Senator Charles Grassley, the powerful chair of the Senate
judiciary committee, whose support is crucial, told reporters on Tuesday he had concerns about finding a balance
between national security and privacy in the bill. The National Journal reported that the Senate majority leader,
Mitch McConnell, may try to thwart reformers by introducing a bill that would reauthorise section 215 until 2020.
Rogers, speaking in a brief interview after addressing the Rand Corporation thinktank in Los Angeles, sought to
persuade Democrats and his fellow Republicans of the need to keep extensive surveillance, and expressed hope
that cooler heads in Congress will renew section 215 without ceding big concessions to reformers.

Nadia

Kayyali, an activist with the digital rights group Electronic Frontier

Foundation, said reauthorising the provision without comprehensive
reform would be against the constitution. Ending the bulk collection of
phone records under section 215 is the first step in reforming the NSA.
The time for Congress to take that step is now.

She said

NSA defenders

would falsely claim that it was necessary to keep the mass surveillance .
But the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, the Presidents Review Group, and senators who are familiar
with how bulk phone records collection works have all said we dont need the program.

Kayyali accused

reform opponents of peddling fear and discredited claims, such as mass

surveillance having stopped 54 terrorist attacks.

We hope at least Congress has some

frank, truthful discussion about NSA spying as we head towards the 1 June deadline. In his address to the Rand
Corporation audience Rogers, a former FBI agent, painted a dark picture of terrorists and other enemies exploiting
the naivety and complacency of certain Americans including Barack Obama who did not grasp the urgency of
nurturing and projecting US power. He lamented that the uproar over Snowdens leaks gave the public a
completely wrong impression about NSA collection of metadata, which he compared to a postman noting an
envelopes addressee and sender. It got so distorted, as if the government was collecting everything and hoarding
it in the basement and couldnt wait to find out about Aunt Mays bunions. The political narrative got ahead of the
facts. It was very frustrating. Rogers, a close ally of John Boehner, the House majority leader, expressed confidence
Congress would strike an acceptable balance. Im hoping cooler heads will prevail knowing what we have now. I
mean, Isis is a mess. And this interconnected world we live in, with these folks having the ability to get back to the

United States, is really troubling. We better have some mechanism to protect ourselves and still protect our civil
rights.

Drones
Too much money makes CBP violent and corrupt
McMahon 10/31/14 http://reason.com/blog/2014/10/31/unsafe-at-any-border-usborder-patrol-co Lucian McMahon is the fall 2014 Burton C. Gray Memorial Intern at Reason.
Politico Magazine has a lengthy expose by Garrett M. Graff of the financially bloated,
systemically corrupt, often violent U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP). Earlier
manifestations of the CBP, such as the Immigration and Naturalization service, have
historically been understaffed, underfunded, and largely ignored. But the post-9/11

hysteria heightened fears about border security, leading to the creation of the CBP
under the Department of Homeland Security. It also ensured that the new border
protection agency would get a generous share of the national security cash pie. The CBP
during the Bush years morphed into a goliath lumbering along America's borders. Tom
Ridge, Bush's post-9/11 homeland security czar, recalled that "people just wanted to give
me unlimited amounts of money." The agency would eventually grow into "the nation's
largest law enforcement agency, with its 46,000 gun-carrying customs officers and border
patrol agents and massive $12.4 billion annual budget": Customs and Border Protection not
only employs some 60,000 total personneleverything from desert agents on horseback to
insect inspectors at airportsbut also operates a fleet of some 250 planes, helicopters and
unmanned aerial vehicles like the Predator drones the military sent to Iraq and Afghanistan,
making CBP both the largest law enforcement air force in the world and equivalent roughly
to the size of Brazil's entire combat air force. The Border Patrol wing of this vast

apparatus has experienced particularly dramatic growth: By the time the Bush
administration left Washington, the fiercely independent agencypart police force,
part occupying army, part frontier cavalryhad gone from being a comparatively
tiny, undermanned backwater of the Justice Department to a 21,000-person arm of the
largest federal law enforcement agency in the country. The Bush administration had been
keen on increasing the capabilities of the agency as quickly as possible. This urgency

came with its own human price tagone the Obama administration has been
unwilling to address: Corruption and excessive force have also skyrocketed along
with the massive hiring surge. In fact, between 2005 and 2012, nearly one CBP officer
was arrested for misconduct every single daypart of a pattern that Ronald Hosko, former
assistant director of the FBI's criminal investigation division, calls "shocking." During
Obama's first term, the sheer number of allegations was so glaring that, according to two
CBP officials, DHS under Secretary Janet Napolitano ordered Customs and Border Protection

to change its definition of corruption to downplay to Congress the breadth of the

problem. That redefinition differentiated between two supposedly distinct types of
corruption: The agency began to differentiate between "mission-compromising
corruption"bribery, narcotics-smuggling or human-smuggling allegationsand
"non-mission-compromising corruption," a "lesser" category of cases that included
things like employees' sexually assaulting detainees or workplace theft . Only the
"mission-compromising" problems, the agency now decreed, would be reported to
CongressThe distinction helped them wipe nearly a third of the corruption cases out of
statistics. Graff lists some examples: There was the Miami CBP officer who used his law
enforcement status to bypass airport security and personally smuggle cocaine and heroin
into Miami. There was the green-uniformed agent in Yuma, Arizona, who was caught
smuggling 700 pounds of marijuana across the border in his green-and-white Border Patrol
truck; the brand-new 26-year-old Border Patrol agent who joined a drug-smuggling operation

to distribute more than 1,000 kilograms of marijuana in Del Rio, Texas. Not to mention

the excessive force complaints, the victims of CBP assault, and those killed by
trigger-happy border agents. The expansion of the CBP into one of the most
dangerous government agencies in America should be deeply unsettling to
everyoneparticularly now, when roughly two-thirds of Americans live in a "border"
zone where the government claims the right to conduct stops and searches without
warrant or cause.

Drones waste money

Winston 1/12/15 https://www.revealnews.org/article-legacy/scathing-audit-on-borderagency-drones-comes-as-police-interest-rises/ Ali Winston can be reached at
awinston@cironline.org. Follow him on Twitter: @awinston.

Funding for drone purchases has come through state and federal homeland security
grants, continuing a pattern of military-grade equipment getting into the hands of
local law enforcement. The Center for Investigative Reporting first reported on the federal
governments role in facilitating the flow of such technology to police departments in 2012.
One argument law enforcement agencies have made for using drones is that the

unmanned vehicles will improve their operational ability and save money that would
instead be spent on costly helicopters. But Customs and Border Protections experience
over the past eight years presents a cautionary tale: The inspector generals audit found
that the Predator B flights had minimal impact on migrant apprehensions and drug
interdictions. Furthermore, the drones did not respond to ground sensors triggered by

passing people or vehicles in heavy crossing areas, and the advanced radar system
mounted on the drones was not used efficiently, nor did the border agency have
adequate metrics to evaluate the use of such technology .

No internal link - cybersecurity will be a good funding magnet for

CBP
Magnuson 12
http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/archive/2012/september/Pages/FirmsThatHelpDHS
SaveMoneyWillMakeMoney,AnalystsSay.aspxSTEW MAGNUSON, AWARD-WINNING AUTHOR,
JOURNALIST. Welcome to my website! I'm a Washington, D.C.-based writer and the author of
several books,
John Hernandez, senior aerospace and defense analyst at Frost & Sullivan, said, Most talk

about sequestration has been about DoD, but DHS is not immune. Its also an
election year, which always seems to slow down government spending, and
companies are somewhat apprehensive about the future. But there are ongoing
initiatives in the information technology realm within the department, insiders said.
Its not glamorous, but there will be business opportunities, especially for firms that
can show the department how to save money. Its a little bit boring. Its not as cool
as drones over the border, but on the flipside this is not risky business. We know
we can save money. We know we can help , said Paul Christman, president and CEO of
Quest Softwares public sector subsidiary. The department has embarked on behind-thescenes projects to put its cybersecurity, interoperability and computing houses in order.
Seamlessly integrating its workforce so a Coast Guard officer, for example , can

communicate effortlessly with a CBP agent, and have access to his or her data when
needed is one of the goals. It also wants an identity management system in place
so these personnel, along with outsiders in the public safety sector, can access

public or classified data wherever they are and when they need it but only if they
are authorized.

Other Card Categories

AT Politics for NSA restrictions

Public hates NSA the anti-terrorism concerns declined
Drezner 12/16/13 http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/12/16/tone-deaf-at-the-listening-post/ Daniel W. Drezner
is professor of international politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University.

NSA officials continue to talk about the threat

environment as if theyve been frozen in amber since 2002. To them, the world
looks increasingly unsafe. Syria is the next Pakistan, China is augmenting its
capabilities to launch a financial war on the United States, and the next terrorist
attack on American soil is right around the corner. They could very well be correct
except that the American public has become inured to such warnings over the past
decade, and their response has been to tell politicians to focus on things at home
and leave the rest of the world alone. A strategy of "trust us, the world is an unsafe
place" wont resonate now the way it did in the immediate wake of the Sept. 11
attacks.
It might be an occupational hazard, but

***MISCELLANEOUS***

FBI

Uniqueness Morale High

FBI suffers budget cuts but Morale is still high
Omaye 2013 (Jayna, Multimedia/ Investgaive Reporter for Medill National Security Zone,
Sequester cuts hinder FBIs operations, but agency morale still high, experts say, December
6, 2013, sequester-cuts-hinder-fbis-operations-but-agency-morale-still-high-experts-say)

The FBIs sequester budget cut of about $800 million next year will force the agency
to impose more furloughs, hiring freezes and cut resources for ongoing and new
investigations, a group of current and former agents say .FBI Agents Association President
Reynaldo Tariche discusses the organizations latest report on how sequester cuts affect the bureaus investigations
and operations. FBI Agents Association President Reynaldo Tariche discusses the organizations latest report on how
sequester cuts affect the bureaus investigations and operations. We believe that terrorists dont get furloughed;
cyber hackers dont get furloughed; gang leaders are not on furlough, said FBI Agents Association President

Its an unacceptable thing to furlough active

FBI agents because of the risks imposed both from terrorists and criminal threats.
Reynaldo Tariche at a Wednesday news conference.

The association, which represents more than 12,000 active and former special agents, released a report in
September that is continually updated of first-hand accounts from special agents on how the sequester cuts have
affected daily investigations. The cuts, the association found, led to frozen pay levels, hiring freezes and a lack of
funding for more training. Agents may be furloughed 10 to 15 days next year, the association projected. This
situation will worsen, experts say, if Congress continues to cut the bureaus funding. FBI Director James Comey,
while visiting numerous FBI offices this year, said he would work with Congress to ease the bureaus budget cuts. At
this time, the bureau does not have any additional comments about the sequestration cuts and defers to what

In 2013, the bureau received about $1

billion less funding than the previous year, the association found, which was
described as equivalent in size to closing the bureaus offices in Chicago, Miami
and Baltimore. Tariche, who is an agent in New York City, said he had to use his own money to pay for
Comey has said in the past, said spokeswoman Allison Mahan.

photocopies at a county clerks office. Others expressed concern about the furloughs and the effect an empty office
and no available field agents could have when a tragedy equivalent to the Boston Marathon or the Navy Yard
shooting in Washington occurs unexpectedly. If on the 16th of September [when the Navy Yard shooting occurred],
half of our office was furloughed, it would have been much more difficult to get those resources to the scene, said
the Association Vice President Thomas OConnor, a Washington-based agent. The SWAT team would have not
been in a position to respond as quickly. If everybodys home its going to be the phone tree to get people in. Its
going to be much more difficult. Others speaking at the conference said

morale is still fairly high

among special agents because they are dedicated to protecting the American
people. Were used to dealing with obstacles on a daily basis, and we look at it as
this is just another obstacle, said FBI Agent John Fagan , who is based in Maryland. It
definitely doesnt make it any easier for us but were going to be here no matter what. However,
panelists said because of budget cuts, the workload for special agents will continue
to increase regardless of hiring freezes. President Barack Obama has said he is dedicated to working
with Congress to fight the bureaus budget cuts. Unfortunately, the resources allotted to that [FBIs] mission has
been reduced by sequestration, President Obama said at Comeys welcoming ceremony in October. Ill keep
fighting for those resources and we should make sure youve got the resources you need to do the job. Especially
when many of your colleagues put their lives on the line on a daily basis, all to serve and protect our fellow
citizens. For fiscal year 2014, the bureau requested a nearly $8.3 billion budget, which includes funding for special
agents, intelligence analysts and professional staff positions, an expansion of the criminal background check
system, and more cyber security initiatives. Thats [next years sequester cuts] not the end of it, OConnor said.
So at the end of this year, we have next year. And then we have the next year, and it goes on and on. Thats very
worrisome to people in the field.

Uniqueness Recruitment
FBI recruitment is a high priority
FBI 14, ( Federal Bureau of Investigations, Most Wanted Talent FBI Seeking Tech Experts to
Become Cyber Special Agents, 12/29/14,
https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2014/december/fbi-seeking-tech-experts-to-become-cyberspecial-agents/fbi-seeking-tech-experts-to-become-cyber-special-agents)

Since its earliest days, the FBI has looked for recruits with specialized skills to fill its
special agent ranks: lawyers, accountants, scientists, and engineers, to name a few. Today, however,
the most sought-after candidates possess a uniquely 21st century quality: cyber
expertise. Investigating cyber crimessuch as website hacks, intrusions, data theft,
botnets, and denial of service attacksis a top priority for the FBI. To keep pace with the
evolving threat, the Bureau is appealing to experienced and certified cyber experts to consider joining the FBI to
apply their well-honed tradecraft as cyber special agents. The

FBI seeks highly talented, technically

trained individuals who are motivated by the FBIs mission to protect our nation and
the American people from the rapidly evolving cyber threat, said Robert Anderson,
Jr., executive assistant director for the Bureaus Criminal, Cyber, Response, and Services Branch. What we want
are people who are going to come and be part of a team that is working different, very complex types of

The Bureau recently launched a

campaign to bring aboard more technical talent, including computer scientists, IT
specialists, and engineers. In a job postingopen until January 20the FBI says no
other organization will apply the expertise of successful candidates like the FBI. One
investigations and to utilize their skillsets in that team environment.

thing that no one else can offer is the mission and the camaraderie and the teamwork the FBI brings to the table,
Anderson said. Cyber agents will be integrated into all the different violations that we work. So whether its a
counterterrorism or counterintelligence investigation, they could be the lead agent in the case. Key requirements
to be a special agent include passing a rigorous background check and fitness test. Agents must be at least 23 and
no older than 37. Prospective cyber special agents are expected to meet the same threshold as special agents, but
also have a wealth of experience in computers and technology. Preferred backgrounds include computer
programming and security, database administration, malware analysis, digital forensics, and even ethical hacking.
An extensive list of sought-after backgrounds and certifications can be seen on the job posting. Cyber permeates
every aspect of what we do, whether its counterterrorism, criminal investigations, or traditional cyber attacks, as
weve seen in the recent past, Anderson said. Thats why these types of people are so important to get into the
pipeline and come into our organization. Bank robberies help illustrate how the landscape has shifted. Traditionally,
a team of agents responding to an armed bank robbery would cordon off a crime scene, interview witnesses, and
collect evidence, such as fingerprints and security video. However, if the money was stolen through a cyber
intrusion into the banks holdings, the approach would be very different: a cyber agent would request firewall logs
and forensic copies of hard drives, in addition to interviews. The FBI already has a lengthy track record fighting
cyber crimes. In June, the FBI announced its role in the multinational effort to disrupt the GameOver Zeus botnet,
believed to be responsible for the theft of millions of dollars from businesses and around the world. A month earlier,
the FBI announced charges against distributors of malicious software that infected millions of computers. Forty FBI
field offices executed more than 100 search warrants and seized more than 1,900 domains used by Blackshades

the FBI wants to grow to meet tomorrows challenges.

Were looking to hire a lot of cyber agents now, Anderson said. Its an area where
the FBI and the whole U.S. government will be looking for this talent for years to
come. Cyber agents can expect continued specialized training once onboard and to work on some of the
users to control victims computers. But

Bureaus most complex cases. Given the broad scope of the FBIs work, Anderson says there is no other place like it.
I do think the biggest thing you can offer to anyone that comes to work at the FBI is the mission and the scale of
investigations, Anderson said. It doesnt matter where you go, it doesnt matter who you work for, you cant get
that anywhere else but the FBI.

Link Backdoor
Backdoor access is key to FBI intel and investigation
Sparapani 5-15 (Tim, led the ACLUs privacy efforts and built and directed Facebooks policy and government relations
team, currently a writer for Forbes http://www.forbes.com/sites/timsparapani/2015/05/21/encryption-but-with-backdoors-the-fbi-hasbusiness-running-in-circles/)

the FBI is running in circles about whether businesses should employ encryption.
slogan seems to be Encrypt! But leave a key for us! Thats bad news for businesses
deciding whether to employ encryption as a part of their computer, app or website security protocol. The FBI
appears to be of two minds on the merits of encryption . For several years the FBI
deemed encryption by businesses a best practice to protect consumers from
cyberthieves. Noting the daily cyber attacks and the damage to American
businesses and their customers, the FBI urged companies to prevent fraud by using
encryption. Just this spring, the FBI decided it too would turn on encryption-bydefault to protect communications with its websites . What was good for the goose, however,
was not necessarily good for the gander. Recently, without justifying a policy switch, the FBI buried their
pro-encryption guidance over concerns regarding encryption systems that only
customers, not the businesses offering the encryption, could decrypt. Businesses had
Like a tiger chasing its tail,
Their

heeded the FBIs and consumers calls too well it seems. They were employing encryption that the businesses
themselves could not decrypt because only customers held the decryption keys. Raising hypothetical concerns
about negative effects on potential investigations, FBI Director James Comey attempted to bludgeon businesses
using encryption into ensuring there was always a backdoor. He pushed Congress to mandate that every business
implement a technologically feasible means of accessing encrypted information should the government ever need
access for an investigation. The FBI raised the prospect of their surveillance going dark due to widespread

The FBIs concerns run counter to the

motivations of concerned consumers and businesses that, feeling under siege by
hackers and identity thieves, are seeking out technologies to protect their data .
implementation of encryption without backdoors.

Others, including journalists, human rights activists and political dissidents, seek encryption to protect their civil
liberties in response to reports of untargeted, bulk government surveillance by the NSA and foreign spy agencies.
Businesses responded to these market demands by supplying encryption techniques that only the customer has the
key to unlock. Federal, state and local law enforcement and national security agency calls for holes in encryption
regimes are, therefore, bad for business. These calls increase customers doubts regarding the privacy and
confidentiality of their documents and communications held or transmitted by businesses required to be able to
reveal them on command to government agencies.[/entity] Moreover, virtually every business wants to sell its
services to customers around the world, yet mandated encryption backdoors will facilitate de facto trade barriers.
Foreign governments are sure to use encryption, or government-mandated weaknesses in that encryption, as a
means of favoring home grown technologies that comply with that countrys privacy or security preferences at the
expense of foreign-made technologies. In continental Europe and throughout South America, where privacy
concerns run white hot and governments and citizens are still palpably frustrated by revelations of US surveillance
of businesses and consumers, there are calls for encryption everywhere. European politicians, eager to see
European tech companies grow in market share and prominence, may use any perception of US companies privacy
weaknesses as a de facto trade barrier. In short, if the FBI forces American companies to build in encryption
backdoors those companies might lose business in Europe and South America to local companies that do not have
encryption backdoors. Viewed through one lens this pushes companies to encrypt customers information by default
and to offer encryption that only customers can decrypt. Viewed another way, this could be naked trade
protectionism masked in concerns over privacy and consumer protection. Alternatively, if US companies refuse
some nations mandates for reciprocal surveillance backdoors those companies might be frozen out of specific
markets. In short, the debate over encryption backdoors could become a sharp weapon for trade protectionism. The
security experts are unanimous: technology back doors make any IT infrastructure, app or website insecure. Dozens
of the best security and cryptography experts joined a letter with leading privacy advocates and businesses
opposing government-mandated backdoors recently. Computer science and engineering does not allow for a door to
be created that only law enforcement and national security agencies can unlock. Each opening creates
vulnerabilities that hackers, thieves, and foreign governments can and will exploit. Due to that technology reality,
businesses are likely to resist US government pressure to build costly backdoors into their systems. Unlike previous

the FBI due to its own rhetoric regarding combatting

cyber security and identity theft can no longer credibly claim that businesses
using encryption without backdoors are placing civil liberties and privacy over law
enforcement and national security. This debate turns on whether business should
iterations of the debates over encryption,

stop an enormous amount of identity theft and cyber crime the . number one
complaint by consumers to the Federal Trade Commission for the last fifteen years
by sophisticated criminal syndicates through encryption free of backdoors or
whether law enforcement should be technologically able to investigate a very few
crimes on demand. Moreover, as more of our lives and business are now conducted digitally think mobile
payments, banking, commerce, infrastructure management, and electronic health records, for example threats to
businesses ability to secure this data are themselves threats to the economic national security. Mass
implementation of strong encryption may prevent attacks by terror rings seeking to fund attacks through stealing
passwords that allow them to steal customers funds.

Link court
Court decisions kill FBI intel gathering
Volz 14 (Dustin, is a staff correspondent for National Journal covering tech policy. His work has previously
appeared in The Washington Post, The Center for Public Integrity, and The Arizona Republic. Dustin is a graduate of
Arizona State University and a publisher of Downtown Devil , http://www.nationaljournal.com/tech/privacy-groupwins-court-ruling-against-fbi-s-facial-recognition-technology-20141106)

A federal judge has ruled that the FBI's futuristic facial-recognition database is
deserving of scrutiny from open-government advocates because of the size and
scope of the surveillance technology. U.S. District Judge Tanya Chutkan said the
bureau's Next Generation Identification program represents a "significant public
interest" due to concerns regarding its potential impact on privacy rights and should
be subject to rigorous transparency oversight. "There can be little dispute that the
general public has a genuine, tangible interest in a system designed to store and
manipulate significant quantities of its own biometric data, particularly given the
great numbers of people from whom such data will be gathered," Chutkan wrote in an
opinion released late Wednesday. Her ruling validated a Freedom of Information Act lawsuit filed by the Electronic
Privacy Information Center that last year made a 2010 government report on the database public and awarded the
group nearly $20,000 in attorneys' fees. That government report revealed the FBI's facial-recognition technology
could fail up to 20 percent of the time. Privacy groups believe that failure rate may be even higher, as a search can

"The opinion strongly

supports the work of open-government organizations and validates their focus on
trying to inform the public about government surveillance programs ," said Jeramie Scott,
be considered successful if the correct suspect is listed within the top 50 candidates.

national security counsel with EPIC. Privacy groups, including EPIC, have long assailed Next Generation
Identification, which they argue could be used as an invasive means of tracking that collects images of people

The programa biometric database that includes iris scans

and palm prints along with facial recognitionbecame "fully operational" this
summer, despite not undergoing an internal review, known as a Privacy Impact
Assessment, since 2008. Government officials have repeatedly pledged they would
complete a new privacy audit. FBI Director James Comey has told Congress that the
database would not collect or store photos of ordinary citizens, and instead is
designed to "find bad guys by matching pictures to mug shots." But privacy groups
contend that the images could be shared among the FBI and other agencies,
including the National Security Agency, and even with state motor-vehicle
departments. In his testimony, given in June, Comey did not completely refute that database information could
suspected of no wrongdoing.

potentially be shared with states, however. Government use of facial-recognition technology has undergone
increasing scrutiny in recent years, as systems once thought to exist only in science fiction movies have become
reality. The New York Times reported on leaks from Edward Snowden revealing that the NSA intercepts "millions of
images per day" across the Internet as part of an intelligence-gathering program that includes a daily cache of
some 55,000 "facial-recognition quality images." The Justice Department did not immediately return a request for
comment regarding whether it will appeal Chutkan's decision.

Link funding
FBI funding key to continue valuable counterterrorist efforts
Comey 15 [James B., Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, University of Chicago Law School
Graduate, was U.S. Deputy Attorney General under Geroge W. Bush, and former Vice President of Lockheed Martin,
FY Budget Request Overview Statement Before the Senate Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on
Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies, The Federal Bureau of Investigations,
https://www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/fbi-budget-request-for-fiscal-year-2016-1]
Good morning Chairman Culberson, Ranking Member Fattah, and members of the subcommittee. As you know, the
FBI is asked to deal with a wide range of threats, crime problems, and operational challenges across the national
security and law enforcement spectrum. Today, I appear before you on behalf of the men and women of the FBI who
step up to these threats and challenges. I am here to express my appreciation for the support you have given them
in the past and to ask your continued support in the future. I would like to begin by providing a brief overview of
the FBIs fiscal year (FY) 2016 budget request, and then follow with a short discussion of key threats and
challenges that we face, both as a nation and an organization. FY 2016 Budget Request Overview The FY 2016
budget request proposes a total of $8.48 billion in direct budget authority to address the FBIs highest
priorities. The request includes a total of $8.4 billion for salaries and expenses, supporting

35,037 permanent positions (13,074 special agents, 3,083 intelligence analysts, and 18,880
professional staff), and $68.9 million for construction. Two program enhancements totaling $20 million
are proposed: $10.3 million to increase cyber investigative capabilities, and $9.7 million to leverage
Intelligence Community Information Technology Enterprise (IC ITE) components and services within
the FBI. The FY 2016 request includes the cancellation of $120 million from Criminal Justice Information Services
(CJIS) excess surcharge balances and $91.4 million in non-recurred spending ($50.4 million in the salaries and
expenses account and $41 million in the construction account). Overall, the FY 2016 request represents a net
increase of $47 million over the FY 2015 enacted levels, representing an increase of $88 million for salaries and
expenses and a decrease of $41 million for construction. Key Threats and Challenges As a nation and as an
organization, we face a multitude of ever-evolving threats from homegrown violent extremists to
hostile foreign intelligence services and agents; from sophisticated cyber-based attacks to Internet
facilitated sexual exploitation of children; from violent gangs and criminal organizations to public
corruption and corporate fraud. Within these threats, we face growing challenges, from keeping pace with
constantly changing and new technologies that make our jobs both easier and harder; to the use of the Internet and
social media to facilitate illegal activities, recruit followers and encourage terrorist attacks, and to disperse
information on building improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and other means to attack the U.S. The breadth of
these threats and challenges are as complex as any time in our history. And the consequences of not
responding to and countering threats and challenges have never been greater. The support of this
committee in helping the FBI to do its part in facing these threats and challenges is greatly appreciated. That
support has allowed us to establish strong capabilities and capacities for assessing threats, sharing
intelligence, leveraging key technologies, andin some respects, most importantlyto hiring some of the best to
serve as special agents, intelligence analysts, and professional staff. We are building a workforce that

possesses the skills and knowledge to deal with the complex threats and challenges we face
todayand tomorrow. We are building a leadership cadre that views change and transformation as a positive tool
for keeping the FBI focused on the key threats facing our nation. We remain focused on defending the United States
against terrorism, foreign intelligence, and cyber threats; upholding and enforcing the criminal laws of the United
States; protecting civil rights and civil liberties; and providing leadership and criminal justice services to federal,
state, municipal, and international agencies and partners. Our ability to carry out this demanding mission
reflects the continued support and oversight provided by this committee. Countering Terrorism
Preventing terrorist attacks remains the FBIs top priority. The terrorist threat against the United States
remains persistent and acute. The threats posed by foreign fighters, including those recruited from the U.S.,
traveling to join the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and from homegrown violent extremists are
extremely dynamic. These threats remain the biggest priorities and challenges for the FBI , the U.S.
Intelligence Community, and our foreign, state, and local partners. ISIL is relentless and ruthless in its pursuits to

terrorize individuals in Syria and Iraq, including Westerners. We are concerned about the possibility of individuals in
the U.S. being radicalized and recruited via the Internet and social media to join ISIL in Syria and Iraq and then
return to the U.S. to commit terrorist acts. ISILs widespread reach through the Internet and social media
is most concerning as the group has proven dangerously competent at employing such tools for its nefarious
strategy. ISIL uses high-quality, traditional media platforms, as well as widespread social media campaigns
to propagate its extremist ideology. Recently released propaganda has included various English language
publications circulated via social media. We are equally concerned over the execution of U.S. citizens taken as
hostages by ISIL. As a communications tool, the Internet remains a critical node for terror groups to
exploit. Recently, a group of five individuals was arrested for knowingly and willingly conspiring and attempting to
provide material support and resources to designated foreign terrorist organizations active in Syria and Iraq. Much
of their conspiracy was played out via the Internet. We remain concerned about recent calls to action by ISIL and its

supporters on violent extremist web forums that could potentially motivate homegrown
extremists to conduct attacks here at home. Online supporters of ISIL have used various social media
platforms to call for retaliation against the U.S. In one case, an Ohio-based man was arrested in January after he
stated his intent to conduct an attack on the U.S. Capitol building. The individual is alleged to have used a Twitter
account to post statements, videos, and other content indicating support for ISIL. Echoing other terrorist groups,
ISIL has advocated for lone wolf attacks in Western countries. A recent ISIL video specifically advocated for attacks
against soldiers, law enforcement, and intelligence community personnel. Several incidents have occurred

in the United States, Canada, and Europe over the last few months that indicate this call to
arms has resonated among ISIL supporters and sympathizers. Al Qaeda and its affiliatesespecially al
Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)continue to represent a top terrorist threat to the nation and our
interests overseas. AQAPs online English magazine advocates for lone wolves to conduct attacks against the U.S.
homeland and Western targets. The magazine regularly encourages homegrown violent extremists to carry out
small arms attacks and provides detailed how-to instructions for constructing and deploying a successful
improvised explosive device. With our domestic and foreign partners, we are rigorously collecting and analyzing
intelligence information as it pertains to the ongoing threat posed by ISIL, AQAP, and other foreign
terrorist organizations. Given the global impact of the Syria and Iraq conflicts, regular engagement with our
domestic and foreign partners concerning foreign fighters is critical. These partnerships are critical to performing
our counterterrorism mission and ensuring a coordinated approach towards national security threats. The FBI, along
with our local, state, tribal, and federal partners, is utilizing all investigative techniques and methods to combat the
threat these terrorists may pose to the U.S. We must maintain robust information sharing and close collaboration
with our state, local, tribal, and federal partners. Individuals who are affiliated with a foreign terrorist organization,
inspired by a foreign terrorist organization, or who are self-radicalized are living in their communities. We recognize
it is our responsibility to share information pertaining to ongoing or emerging threats immediately. Our local and

state partners rely on this intelligence to conduct their investigations and maintain the
safety of their communities. It is our responsibility to provide them with the information and resources to
keep their communities out of harms way. In each of the FBIs 56 field offices, Joint Terrorism Task Forces serve as a
vital mechanism for information sharing among our partners. These task forces consist of more than 4,100
membersincluding more than 1,500 interagency personnel from more than 600 federal, state, territorial, and
tribal partner agencies. Together with our local, state, tribal, and federal partners, we are committed to combating
the threat from homegrown violent extremists and ensuring the safety of the American public. Among the FBIs
counterterrorism capabilities is the Terrorist Explosive Device Analytical Center (TEDAC). TEDAC is a
whole of government resource for the exploitation of IEDs and combating the terrorist use of explosives. TEDAC is
proving to be a valuable tool supporting the military, homeland security, international partners,

intelligence, and law enforcement communities by developing and sharing intelligence about
terrorist explosive devices. Prior to TEDAC, no single part of our government was responsible for analyzing
and exploiting intelligence related to terrorist IEDs. TEDAC will begin occupying the first phase of its new facilities
this spring. The second phase of construction, which will include a joint partnership with the Department of
Homeland Security, is expected to be completed in FY 2016. The third phase of construction will provide a
collaboration center that is expected to be completed in FY 2017. Also, consistent with funding provided by
the committee this fiscal year, the FBI is expanding facilities and training at the Hazardous Devices School
(HDS). This effort is just getting underway. Cyber-Based Threats An element of virtually every national security
threat and crime problem the FBI faces is cyber-based or facilitated. We face sophisticated cyber threats from statesponsored hackers, hackers for hire, organized cyber syndicates, and terrorists. On a daily basis, cyber-

based

actors seek our state secrets, our trade secrets, our technology, and our ideasthings of incredible value to
all of us and of great importance to the conduct of our government business and our national security. They seek
to strike our critical infrastructure and to harm our economy. Given the scope of the cyber threat, the
FBI and other intelligence, military, homeland security, and law enforcement agencies across the government view
cyber security and cyber attacks as a top priority. Within the FBI, we are targeting high-level intrusionsthe biggest
and most dangerous botnets, state-sponsored hackers, and global cyber syndicates. We want to predict and prevent
attacks, rather than reacting after the fact. As the committee is well aware, the frequency and impact

of cyber attacks on our nations private sector and government networks have increased
dramatically in the past decade and are expected to continue to grow. Since FY 2002, the FBI
has seen an 80 percent increase in its number of computer intrusion investigations. FBI agents,
analysts, and computer scientists are using technical capabilities and traditional investigative techniquessuch as
sources, court-authorized electronic surveillance, physical surveillance, and forensicsto fight cyber threats. We are
working side-by-side with our federal, state, and local partners on Cyber Task Forces in each of our 56 field offices
and through the National Cyber Investigative Joint Task Force (NCIJTF), which serves as a coordination, integration,
and information sharing center for 19 U.S. agencies and several key international allies for cyber threat
investigations. Through CyWatch, our 24-hour cyber command center, we combine the resources of the FBI and
NCIJTF, allowing us to provide connectivity to federal cyber centers, government agencies, FBI field offices and legal
attaches, and the private sector in the event of a cyber intrusion. We have recently co-located our cyber efforts into
a new FBI facility. The FBI is engaged in a myriad of efforts to combat cyber threats, from efforts focused on threat
identification and sharing inside and outside of government, to our internal emphasis on developing and retaining
new talent and changing the way we operate to evolve with the cyber threat. The FY 2016 budget request
includes an enhancement of $10.3 million to support these efforts. In addition to key national security
threats, the FBI and the nation faces significant criminal threats ranging from complex white-collar fraud in the
financial, health care, and housing sectors to transnational and regional organized criminal enterprises to violent
crime and public corruption. Criminal organizationsdomestic and internationaland individual criminal activity
represent a significant threat to our security and safety in communities across the nation. Public Corruption Public
corruption is the FBIs top criminal priority. The threatwhich involves the corruption of local, state,
and federally elected, appointed, or contracted officialsstrikes at the heart of government, eroding
public confidence and undermining the strength of our democracy. It impacts how well U.S. borders are

secured and neighborhoods are protected, how verdicts are handed down in court, and how
well public infrastructure such as schools and roads are built. The FBI is uniquely situated to address
this threat, with our ability to conduct undercover operations, perform court-authorized electronic surveillance, and
run complex, long-term investigations and operations. However, partnerships are critical, and we work closely with
federal, state, local, and tribal, authorities in pursuing these cases. One key focus for us is border corruption. The
U.S. government oversees 7,000 miles of U.S. land border and 95,000 miles of shoreline. Every day, more than a
million visitors enter the country through one of 327 official ports of entry along the Mexican and Canadian borders,
as well as through seaports and international airports. Any corruption at the border enables a wide range of illegal
activities, potentially placing the entire nation at risk by letting drugs, arms, money, and weapons of mass
destruction slip into the country, along with criminals, terrorists, and spies. Another focus concerns election crime.
Although individual states have primary responsibility for conducting fair and impartial elections, the FBI becomes
involved when paramount federal interests are affected or electoral abuse occurs. Gangs/Violent Crime Violent
crimes and gang activities exact a high toll on individuals and communities. Todays gangs are sophisticated

and well organized; many use violence to control neighborhoods and boost their illegal
money-making activities, which include robbery, drug and gun trafficking, fraud, extortion, and prostitution
rings. Gangs do not limit their illegal activities to single jurisdictions or communities. The FBIs ability to work
across jurisdictional boundaries is vital to the fight against violent crime in big cities and
small towns across the nation. Every day, FBI special agents work in partnership with state, local, and tribal
officers and deputies on joint task forces and individual investigations. FBI joint task forcesViolent Crime Safe
Streets, Violent Gang Safe Streets, and Safe Trails Task Forcesfocus on identifying and targeting major groups
operating as criminal enterprises. Much of the Bureaus criminal intelligence is derived from partnerships with our
state, local, and tribal law enforcement partners, who know their communities inside and out. Joint task forces
benefit from FBI surveillance assets and our sources track these gangs to identify emerging trends. Through
these multi-subject and multi-jurisdictional investigations, the FBI concentrates its efforts on high-level groups
engaged in patterns of racketeering. This investigative model enables us to target senior gang

leadership and to develop enterprise-based prosecutions. Transnational Organized Crime More than a
decade ago, the image of organized crime was of hierarchical organizations, or families, that exerted influence over
criminal activities in neighborhoods, cities, or states. But organized crime has changed dramatically. Today,
international criminal enterprises run multi- national, multi-billion-dollar schemes from start to finish. These criminal
enterprises are flat, fluid networks with global reach. While still engaged in many of the traditional organized
crime activities of loan-sharking, extortion, and murder, new criminal enterprises are targeting stock market fraud
and manipulation, cyber-facilitated bank fraud and embezzlement, identity theft, trafficking of women and children,
and other illegal activities. Preventing and combating transnational organized crime demands a
concentrated effort by the FBI and federal, state, local, tribal, and international partners. The FBI continues
to share intelligence about criminal groups with our partners and to combine resources and expertise to gain a full
understanding of each group. Operational and Information Technology As criminal and terrorist threats become
more diverse and dangerous, the role of technology becomes increasingly important to our efforts. We are using
technology to improve the way we collect, analyze, and share information. We have seen significant improvement
in capabilities and capacities over the past decade; but technology remains a key concern for the future. For
example, we recently deployed new technology for the FBIs Next Generation Identification System. This technology
enables us to process fingerprint transactions much faster and with more accuracy. This year, the Biometrics
Technology Center will come online. This shared facility will enhance collaboration between the FBIs Biometrics
Center of Excellence and the Department of Defenses (DOD) Biometrics Fusion Center. Together, these centers will
advance centralized biometric storage, analysis, and sharing with state and local law enforcement, DOD, and
others. In addition, we are also integrating isolated stand-alone investigative data sets so that we can search
multiple databases more efficiently, and, in turn, pass along relevant information to our partners. The rapid pace of
advances in mobile and other communication technologies continue to present a significant challenge to conducting
court-ordered electronic surveillance of criminals and terrorists. These court-ordered surveillances are often critical
in cyber cases where we are trying to identify those individuals responsible for attacks on networks, denial of
services, and attempts to compromise protected information. However , there is a growing and dangerous gap
between law enforcements legal authority to conduct electronic surveillance , and its actual
ability to conduct such surveillance. Because of this gap, law enforcement is increasingly unable to gain timely
access to the information it needs to protect public safety and bring these criminals to justice. We are grateful for
this subcommittees support in funding the National Domestic Communications Assistance Center .
The center enables law enforcement to share tools, train one another in modern intercept
solutions, and reach out to the communications industry with one voice. It is only by working together
within the law enforcement and intelligence communities, and with our private sector partnersthat we will
develop effective strategies enabling long-term solution to address this growing problem. The FY 2016 budget
request includes $9.7 million for the initial installment of a multi-year information technology strategy to enhance
the FBIs ability to share information with partners in the Intelligence Community using cloud computing and
common desktop environments. Conclusion Being asked to respond to complex and ever-changing threats and
crime problems is not new to the FBI. Our success in meeting these challenges is directly tied to the resources
provided to the FBI. The resources this subcommittee provides each year are critical for the FBIs
ability to address existing and emerging national security and criminal threats. Chairman
Culberson, Ranking Member Fattah, and members of the subcommittee, I would like to close by thanking you for
this opportunity to discuss the FBIs budget request for FY 2016 and the key threats and challenges that we are
facing, both as a nation and as an organization. We are grateful for the leadership that you and this subcommittee
have provided to the FBI. We would not possess the capabilities and capacities to deal with these

threats and challenges today without your support. Your willingness to invest in and support
our workforce and our physical and technical infrastructure allow the men and women of the
FBI to make a difference every day in communities large and small throughout our nation
and in locations around the world. We thank you for that support. I look forward to answering any
questions you may have.

Link 215
Upcoming repeal of Section 215 worries FBI assets about field
efficiency and capability.
Barrett 15 (Delvin, is a staff reporter based in Washington. He covers federal law
enforcement and security, including terrorism, cybercrime, drugs, and public corruption
graduated from McGill University in Montreal, Quebec. 4/15/15,
http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/apr/15/nsa-fbi-surveillance-patriot-action-section215-expiration)

WASHINGTONU.S. officials and some lawmakers are worried that key tools used to
hunt down terrorists and spies could fall victim to the fight over the governments
controversial phone-surveillance program.The Federal Bureau of Investigation, using authority
conveyed by a soon-to-expire section of the 2001 Patriot Act, is currently allowed to
seek tangible things to aid in terrorism or intelligence probes, such as hotel bills,
credit-card slips and other documents . Section 215 of the Patriot Act allows the FBI, with
a court order, to take books, records, papers, documents, and other items . The
authority is often used as a way to secretly collect evidence on suspected foreign spies operating in the U.S.,
according to current and former officials. Unlike a grand-jury subpoena, a person or company receiving a Section
215 order to provide documents is barred from revealing to anyone that they received such a request, these people

Section 215, which is set to expire in June, also provides the legal basis for the National
That program has come under intense
scrutiny from lawmakers, civil-liberties groups and others following 2013 revelations
by former NSA contractor Edward Snowden that the U.S. built a vast database of
millions of Americans phone records. The database includes the time, duration and number of each
said.But

Security Agencys controversial collection of phone records.

call, and investigators can use it to try to find terror suspects associates.It is unclear whether Congress, where
some lawmakers have long criticized the Patriot Act, will have the votes to pass an extension before Section 215
expires. It has been extended before, but this is the first time that Section 215 has come up for renewal since Mr.
Snowdens revelations.Senior lawmakers are aware that if public opposition sinks the phone-surveillance program,
the other intelligence work could become an accidental casualty of that decision, aides said. Sen. Charles Grassley

Theres no question that

Section 215 is a valuable tool that helps law-enforcement officials obtain necessary
individual business records, such as hotel records, in connection with nationalsecurity investigations.NSAs critics in Congress want to overhaul the existing surveillance system and
(R., Iowa), the chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, said in a statement,

end the phone-database program.There is a huge difference between targeting suspected spies and terrorists, and
sweeping up phone records from millions of law-abiding Americans, said Sen. Ron Wyden (D., Ore.). This is
exactly why surveillance reform is so urgently neededto preserve the authorities that law-enforcement agencies
actually need, while ending dragnet surveillance that violates Americans privacy without making our country any
safer.Long before the Snowden revelations, Section 215 of the Patriot Act was controversial. Critics contended it
was so broadly written it was ripe for abuse, and authorized almost any kind of intelligence-gathering, up to and
including the books people read at libraries.Critics contend many of those fears have now become reality as the

Among those
resisting government-surveillance efforts are businesses, which have grown more
vocal in advocating greater oversight, and have worked to secure their systems
against government encroachment. There are also several continuing lawsuits in
federal courts seeking to end the phone surveillance .The possibility of losing its spy and terror
government collects phone records and other information, often from law-abiding citizens.

hunting tools is of great concern to FBI officials, who view the NSA phone program as providing far less value than

the
FBI can use the law now to search hotel records if they get a tip that a suspected
foreign spy stayed at a hotel on a specific date, the current and former officials said.
If an FBI agent spots a suspected spy using a credit card at a coffee shop, they can
use a Section 215 order to get a record of that transaction, trace the credit card
used for the purchase, and then search all the purchases made by that credit card,
according to a person familiar with the work.The current and former officials said
the other intelligence-gathering work the section allows, according to current and former officials.For example,

the FBI doesnt use the law to conduct other bulk intelligence-gathering similar to
the NSAs phone program, but uses it more specifically to chase down evidence that
they would rather not collect through other investigative means, such as a
subpoena from a grand jury or a national-security letter issued by the FBI. FBI
officials are concerned that it would be much more difficult to get that
kind of information without the current authority , these people said. The FBI
could fall back to using an older surveillance law that allows for the
collection of a more limited range of records , and use grand-jury subpoenas
more often, but officials view both of those options as significantly more risky and
less effective, because professional spies or well-trained terrorists are more likely to get wind of investigators
on their trail.Two other sections of the Patriot Act are also due to expire this yeara
provision to allow roving wiretaps on a number of devices at once, even if
authorities are unsure of the identity of the person using those devices; and a
provision that allows surveillance on lone wolf terror suspects with no known links
to terrorist organizations. Those provisions are not as controversial as Section 215.

FBI k2 Intel
FBI K2 to domestic Intelligence New jurisdiction
DOI 11 (The Directorate of Intelligence, established in 2005, is a key component of the
FBIs National Security Branch and manages all Bureau intelligence activities. 8/18/11 "Part
1: Central to the Mission."
https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2011/august/intelligence_081811, Accessed 7/27/15)
In the 10 years since 9/11, the Bureau has transformed itself from an organization that
uses intelligence to one that is defined by it. Nowhere is that more apparent than in our
intelligence analyst program. Prior to 9/11, there were approximately 1,000 intelligence
analysts (IAs) in the FBI. Today, there are triple that number. Now, instead of just agents
working cases, there are intelligence analysts working right alongside them, said Amy
Pepper, a senior intelligence manager. And thats across the entire spectrum of FBI
programs. That means in criminal cases as well as national security matters, IAs are on

the front linesanalyzing and disseminating actionable intelligence that enables the
FBI and our domestic and international partners to get ahead of existing and
emerging threats. The Bureaus transformation into an intelligence-driven
organization has been successful, Pepper explained, because our leadership
understood that the change was necessary and that it was simply the right thing to
do to mitigate the threats the country faces . The Directorate of Intelligence (DI),
established in 2005, is a key component of the FBIs National Security Branch and manages
all Bureau intelligence activities. With regards to intelligence, were not doing anything
today that we didnt do before 9/11, but it wasnt systematic then, and now it is, said Dina
Corsi, a senior manager in the DI and a veteran analyst who specialized in counterterrorism
work. Prior to 9/11, Corsi said, IAs could always do what was needed, but there was no
system-wide program across the FBI as there is now, with formal training, standardized
intelligence products, and clear-cut career paths for analysts. In those days, she recalled,
the efforts of IAs, while considerable, existed in pockets. Now, with the entire intelligence
analyst program administered under the DI, all areas of the Bureau can leverage

intelligence resources, and those resources can be used much more broadly and
efficiently to connect programs and investigations. That helps agents in the field and
underscores the value and importance of IAs throughout the FBI. The scope and topic of
particular intelligence needs may be different for agents in Portland and in Miami, Corsi
explained, but now the process and the training are the same, which makes information
that much more accessible and analysis more consistent across the organization. New
Bureau analysts attend the 10-week Intelligence Basic Course at our Quantico training
facility, where they learn critical thinking skills, research and analysis techniques, and
communications skills, as well as how to produce a variety of intelligence reports and
briefings. Within the U.S. intelligence community , Pepper said, the FBI is no longer

seen as just a law enforcement agency but also a national security intelligence
entity. And in the intelligence community, we are one of the few agencies that not
only have the responsibility to gather intelligence, but to act on it as well .

FBI K2 Counterintelligence and Counterespionage Domestic

Jurisdiction
FBI 11 (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 11/4/11, A Blueprint for Protecting US Secrets,
https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2011/november/counterintelligence_110411, Accessed
7/27/15)

Espionage may seem like a throwback to earlier days of world wars and cold wars,
but the threat is real and as serious as ever . We see itand work hard to counter itall
the time. Its not just the more traditional spies passing U.S. secrets to foreign governments,
either to fatten their own wallets or to advance their ideological agendas. Its also students
and scientists and plenty of others stealing the valuable trade secrets of American
universities and businessesthe ingenuity that drives our economyand providing them to
other countries. Its nefarious actors sending controlled technologies overseas that help
build bombs and weapons of mass destruction designed to hurt and kill Americans and
others. In late October, in fact, we took part in a multi-agency and multi-national operation
that led to the indictment of five citizens of Singapore and four of their companies for
illegally exporting thousands of radio frequency modules from the U.S. Allegedly, at least 16
of these modules were later found in unexploded improvised explosive devices in Iraq. As

the lead agency for exposing, preventing, and investigating intelligence activities on
U.S. soil, the FBI continues to work to combat these threats using our full suite of
investigative and intelligence capabilities. Weve mapped out our blueprint in what
we call our Counterintelligence National Strategy, which is regularly updated to
focus resources on the most serious current and emerging threats. The strategy
itself is classified, but we can tell you what its overall goals are: Keep weapons of
mass destruction, advanced conventional weapons, and related technology from
falling into the wrong handsusing intelligence to drive our investigative efforts to keep
threats from becoming reality. Our new Counterproliferation Center will play a major role
here. Protect the secrets of the U.S. intelligence communityagain, using intelligence to
focus our investigative efforts and collaborating with our government partners to reduce the
risk of espionage and insider threats. Protect the nations critical assetslike our

advanced technologies and sensitive information in the defense, intelligence,

economic, financial, public health, and science and technology sectors . We work to
identify the source and significance of the threats against these assets, and to help their
owners to minimize vulnerabilities. Counter the activities of foreign spieswhether they
are representatives of foreign intelligence agencies or governments or are acting on their
behalf, they all want the same thing: to steal U.S. secrets. Through proactive investigations,
we identify who they are and stop what theyre doing. One important aspect of our
counterintelligence strategy involves strategic partnerships. And on that front, we focus on
three specific areas: The sharing of expertise and resources of the FBI, the U.S. intelligence
community, other U.S. government agencies, and global partners to combat foreign
intelligence activities; Coordination of U.S. intelligence community efforts to combat insider
threats among its own ranks; and Partnerships with businesses and colleges and universities
to strengthen information sharing and counterintelligence awareness. Focus on cyber
activities. Another key element of our counterintelligence strategy, according to FBI

Counterintelligence Assistant Director Frank Figliuzzi, is its emphasis on detecting

and deterring foreign-sponsored cyber intelligence threats to government and
private sector information systems. Sometimes, he said, the bad guys dont have to
physically be in the U.S. to steal targeted informationsometimes they can be halfway
around the world, sitting at a keyboard. The FBIs Counterintelligence National Strategy
supports both the Presidents National Security Strategy and the National
Counterintelligence Strategy of the United States