War, Propaganda and the Media

Anup Shah | March 2005

We must remember that in time of war what is said on the enemys side of the front is always
propaganda, and what is said on our side of the front is truth and righteousness, the cause of
humanity and a crusade for peace.
Walter Lippmann
Probably every conflict is fought on at least two grounds1: the battlefield and the minds of the people
via propaganda. The good guys and the bad guys can often both be guilty of misleading their
people with distortions, exaggerations, subjectivity, inaccuracy and even fabrications, in order to
receive support and a sense of legitimacy.

I. Elements Of Propaganda
Propaganda can serve to rally people behind a cause, but often at the cost of exaggerating,
misrepresenting, or even lying about the issues in order to gain that support.
While the issue of propaganda often is discussed in the context of militarism, war and warmongering, it is around us in all aspects of life.
As the various examples below will show, common tactics in propaganda often used by either side
include:

Using selective stories that come over as wide-covering and objective.

Partial facts, or historical context

Reinforcing reasons and motivations to act due to threats on the security of the
individual.

Narrow sources of experts to provide insights in to the situation. (For example, the
mainstream media typically interview retired military personnel for many conflict-related
issues, or treat official government sources as fact, rather than just one perspective that needs
to be verified and researched).

Demonizing the enemy who does not fit the picture of what is right.

Using a narrow range of discourse, whereby judgments are often made while the
boundary of discourse itself, or the framework within which the opinions are formed, are often
not discussed. The narrow focus then helps to serve the interests of the propagandists.
Some of the following sections look into how propaganda is used in various ways, expanding on the
above list of tactics and devices.

II. Propaganda And War

At times of war, or build up for war, messages of extremities and hate, combined with emotions of
honor and righteousness interplay to provide powerful propaganda for a cause.
The first casualty when war comes is Truth. U.S. Senator Hiram Johnson, 1917
Many say that it is inevitable in war that people will die. Yet, in many cases, war itself is not
inevitable, and propaganda is often employed to go closer to war, if that is the preferred foreign
policy option. Indeed, once war starts, civilian casualties are unfortunately almost a guaranteed
certainty.
In wartime, truth is so precious that she should always be attended by a bodyguard of lies.
Winston Churchill, British Prime Minister during World War II
Those who promote the negative image of the enemy may often reinforce it with rhetoric about the
righteousness of themselves; the attempt is to muster up support and nurture the belief that what is

to be done is in the positive and beneficial interest of everyone. Often, the principles used to
demonize the other, is not used to judge the self, leading to accusations of double standards and
hypocrisy.
Next the statesmen will invent cheap lies, putting the blame upon the nation that is attacked, and
every man will be glad of those conscience-soothing falsities, and will diligently study them, and
refuse to examine any refutations of them; and thus he will by and by convince himself that the
war is just, and will thank God for the better sleep he enjoys after this process of grotesque selfdeception. Mark Twain, The Mysterious Stranger, 1916, Ch.9
The list of tactics used in propaganda listed further above is also expressed in a similar way by
Johann Galtung, a professor of Peace Studies and summarized here by Danny Schechter (Covering
Violence: How Should Media Handle Conflict?2, July 18, 2001):
Galtung laid out 12 points of concern where journalism often goes wrong when dealing with
violence. Each implicitly suggests more explicit remedies.
1. Decontextualizing violence: focusing on the irrational without looking at the reasons
for unresolved conflicts and polarization.
2. Dualism: reducing the number of parties in a conflict to two, when often more are
involved. Stories that just focus on internal developments often ignore such outside or
external forces as foreign governments and transnational companies.
3. Manicheanism: portraying one side as good and demonizing the other as evil.
4. Armageddon: presenting violence as inevitable, omitting alternatives.
5. Focusing on individual acts of violence while avoiding structural causes, like
poverty, government neglect and military or police repression.
6. Confusion: focusing only on the conflict arena (i.e., the battlefield or location of violent
incidents) but not on the forces and factors that influence the violence.
7. Excluding and omitting the bereaved, thus never explaining why there are acts of
revenge and spirals of violence.
8. Failure to explore the causes of escalation and the impact of media coverage
itself.
9. Failure to explore the goals of outside interventionists, especially big powers.
10. Failure to explore peace proposals and offer images of peaceful outcomes.
11. Confusing cease-fires and negotiations with actual peace.
12. Omitting reconciliation: conflicts tend to reemerge if attention is not paid to efforts to
heal fractured societies. When news about attempts to resolve conflicts are absent,
fatalism is reinforced. That can help engender even more violence, when people have no
images or information about possible peaceful outcomes and the promise of healing.
Arthur Siegel, a social science professor at York University in Toronto, describes four levels of
varieties of propaganda:
No matter how it is spread, propaganda comes in four basic varieties, said Arthur Siegel, social
science professor at York University in Toronto, whose 1996 book Radio Canada International
examines World War II and Cold War propaganda (Beth Gillin, Philadelphia Inquirer, Oct 2001).
The first level is the Big Lie, adapted by Hitler and Stalin. The state-controlled Egyptian press
has been spreading a Big Lie, saying the World Trade Center was attacked by Israel to
embarrass Arabs, said Siegel.
The second layer says, It doesnt have to be the truth, so long as its plausible.
The third strategy is to tell the truth but withhold the other sides point of view.
The fourth and most productive is to tell the truth, the good and the bad, the losses and the
gains.

Governments in Western society take the last three steps. They avoid the Big Lie, which
nobody here will swallow (Siegel).
With the last point above, Siegel is pointing out that as well as enemies having propaganda
mechanisms, we also have our own propaganda mechanisms.

A. Propaganda When Preparing Or Justifying War

In preparing for or justifying war, additional techniques are often employed, knowingly or
unknowingly:
Ottosen (Peace Journalist Option, August 1997) identifies several key stages of a military campaign
to soften up public opinion through the media in preparation for an armed intervention. These are:
The Preliminary Stageduring which the country concerned comes to the news, portrayed
as a cause for mounting concern because of poverty/dictatorship/anarchy;
The Justification Stageduring which big news is produced to lend urgency to the case for
armed intervention to bring about a rapid restitution of normality;
The Implementation Stagewhen pooling and censorship provide control of coverage;
The Aftermathduring which normality is portrayed as returning to the region, before it
once again drops down the news agenda.
OKane notes there is always a dead baby story and it comes at the key point of the Justification
Stagein the form of a story whose apparent urgency brooks no delayspecifically, no time for cool
deliberation or negotiating on peace proposals. Human interest stories are ideal for engendering
this atmosphere.
(OKanes reference to the dead baby story is about the 1991 Gulf War where a U.S. public relations
firm got a Kuwaiti Ambassadors daughter to pose as a nurse claiming she saw Iraqi troops killing
babies in hospitals. The purpose of this was to create arousal and demonize Iraq so war was more
acceptable. More information about this is on this sites Iraq section 5.)
Award-winning investigative journalist, Phillip Knightley, in an article for the British paper,The
Guardian also points out four stages in preparing a nation for war 6:
1. The crisis. The reporting of a crisis which negotiations appear unable to resolve.
Politicians, while calling for diplomacy, warn of military retaliation. The media reports this as
Were on the brink of war, or War is inevitable, etc.
2. The demonisation of the enemys leader. Comparing the leader with Hitler is a good
start because of the instant images that Hitlers name provokes.
3. The demonisation of the enemy as individuals. For example, to suggest the enemy is
insane.
4. Atrocities. Even making up stories to whip up and strengthen emotional reactions.
Knightley also points to the dilemma that while some stories are known to have been fabrications
and outright lies, others may be true. The trouble is, he asks, how can we tell? His answer is
unfortunately not too reassuring: The media demands that we trust it but too often that trust has
been betrayed. The difficulty that honest journalists face is also hinted to in another article by
Knightley (Fighting Dirty, The Guardian, March 2000):
One difficulty is that the media have little or no memory. War correspondents have short working
lives and there is no tradition or means for passing on their knowledge and experience. The military,
on the other hand, is an institution and goes on forever. The military learned a lot from Vietnam and
these days plans its media strategy with as much attention as its military strategy.
Miren Guiterrez, editor-in-chief of Inter Press Service notes a number of elements of propaganda
taking the more recent wars into account, the War on terror and the Iraq crisis8. Summing up his
short but detailed report, he includes the following as propaganda strategies:
Incompleteness
Inaccuracy
Driving the agenda

Milking the story (maximizing media coverage of a particular issue by the careful use of
briefings, leaking pieces of a jigsaw to different outlets, allowing journalists to piece the story
together and drive the story up the news agenda, etc.)
Exploiting that we want to believe the best of ourselves
Perception Management (in particular by using PR firms)
Reinforcing existing attitudes
Simple, repetitious and emotional phrases (e.g. war on terror, axis of evil, weapons of mass
destruction, shock and awe, war of liberation, etc)

B. Military Control Of Information

Military control of information during war time is also a major contributing factor to propaganda,
especially when the media go along with it without question. The military recognizes the values of
media and information control very well.

1. Information Operations
The military often manipulates the mainstream media, by restricting or managing what information
is presented and hence what the public are told. For them it is paramount to control the media. This
can involve all manner of activities, from organizing media sessions and daily press briefings, or
through providing managed access to war zones, to even planting stories. This has happened
throughout the 20th century. Over time then, the way that the media covers conflicts degrades in
quality, critique and objectiveness9.
Information is the currency of victory an August 1996 U.S. Army field manual. From a militarys
perspective, information warfare is another front on which a battle must be fought. However, as well
as needing to deceive adversaries, in order to maintain public support, information to their own
public must no doubt be managed as well. That makes sense from a military perspective. Sometimes
the public can be willing to sacrifice detailed knowledge. But that can also lead to unaccountability
and when information that is presented has been managed such, propaganda is often the result.
Beelman (The Dangers of Disinformation in the War on Terrorism 10, Coverage of Terrorism
Women and Journalism: International Perspectives, from Nieman Reports Magazine, Winter
2001, Vol. 55, No.4, p.16; from The Nieman Foundation for Journalism at Harvard University) also
describes how this Information Operations is used to manage information:
For reporters covering this war [on terrorism], the challenge is not just in getting unfettered
and uncensored access to U.S. troops and the battlefielda long and mostly losing struggle in
the pastbut in discerning between information and disinformation. That is made all the
more difficult by a 24-hour news cycle, advanced technology, and the militarys growing
fondness for a discipline it calls Information Operations. IO, as it is known, groups together
information functions ranging from public affairs (PA, the military spokespersons corps) to
military deception and psychological operations, or PSYOP. What this means is that people
whose job traditionally has been to talk to the media and divulge truthfully what they are able
to tell now work hand-in-glove with those whose job it is to support battlefield operations with
information, not all of which may be truthful.
Danny Schechter, also referring to the article above by Beelman, describes Information Operations
more bluntly as being a way of obscuring and sanitizing that negative-sounding term propaganda
so that our information warriors can do their thing with a minimum of public attention as they seek
to engineer friendly write ups and cumulative impact. This, he points out, can be accomplished via
several strategies11:
Overloading the Media
This can be done by providing too much information!
Schechter gives an example of the Kosovo War, where briefers at NATOs headquarters in
Belgium boasted that this was the key to information control. They would gorge the media
with information, Beelman writes, quoting one as saying, When you make the media happy,
the media will not look for the rest of the story.

Ideological Appeals
A common way to do this is to appeal to patriotism and safeguarding the often unarticulated
national interest
Schechter describes, how Condaleezza Rice and other Bush administration officials
persuaded the networks to kill bin Laden videos and other Al-Jazeera work during the initial
months after the September 11 2001 tragedy. This is nothing new, however, as he points out;
All administrations try to seduce and co-opt the media. (and of course, this happens all
around the world.)
Schechter describes the ramifications: It is this ideological conformity and world view that
makes it relatively easy for a well-oiled and sophisticated IO propaganda machine to keep the
U.S. media in line, with the avid cooperation of the corporate sector, which owns and
controls most media outlets. Some of those companies, such as NBC parent General Electric,
have long been a core component of that nexus of shared interests that President Eisenhower
called the military-industrial complex. As Noam Chomsky and others have argued, that
complex has expanded into a military, industrial and MEDIA complex, in which IO is but one
refinement.
Spinning Information
Press briefings by military institutions such as NATO, Pentagon etc, where journalists
questions are answered and information is presented is of course a form of spin. It is the spin
that the military will put on it.
Journalists no doubt expect this, but true to many media propaganda models, seldom are
such official statements verified and followed up on, especially if from ones own nation,
with whom there is often a lot of trust. A result of this is propaganda and spin becoming the
official version.
Withholding Information
Of course, the military can often hide behind this one!
Sometimes from a military operational perspective it can be understood why they dont want
to give much (or any) real details. Looked in isolation from other issues, this seems like an
understandable and acceptable military strategy.
Yet, when combined with the other propaganda strategies, it is another way to withhold
information.
Co-Option And Collusion
As Danny Schechter asks on this issue, why do we in the media go along with this approach
time and again? We are not stupid. We are not robots. Too many of us have DIED trying to
get this story (and other stories). Ask any journalists and they will tell you that no one tells
them what to write or what to do. Yet there is a homogenized flavor and Pentagon echo to
much coverage of this war that shames our profession. Why? Is it because reporters buy into
the ideology of the mission? Because there are few visible war critics to provide dissenting
takes? Or is it because information management has been so effective as to disallow any
other legitimate approach? An uncritical stance is part of the problem. Disseminating
misinformation often adds up to an inaccurate picture of where we are in this war.
Stratfor, a global intelligence consultant comments on the war on terrorism saying that the
media have become cheerleaders12 as Coverage of the war on terrorism has reversed the
traditional role between the press and the military. The problem with this, as they continue,
is that The reversal of roles between media and military creates public expectations that can
affect the prosecution of the war. Or, more bluntly put, the media becomes an effective
mouthpiece for propaganda.

2. Embedded Journalists: An Advantage For The Military

During the short invasion of Iraq in 2003, journalists were embedded with various Coalition forces.
This was an idea born from the public relations industry, and provided media outlets a detailed and
fascinating view for their audiences.

For the military, however, it provided a means to control what large audiences would see, to some
extent. Independent journalists would be looked upon more suspiciously. In a way, embedded
journalists were unwittingly (sometimes knowingly) making a decision to be biased in their reporting,
in favor of the Coalition troops. If an embedded journalist was to report unfavorably on coalition forces
they were accompanying they would not get any cooperation.
So, in a sense allowing journalists to get closer meant the military had more chance to try and manage
the message.
In U.K., the History Channel broadcasted a documentary on August 21, 2004, titled War Spin:
Correspondent. This documentary looked at Coalition media management for the Iraq war and noted
numerous things including the following:
Embedded journalists allowed the military to maximize imagery while providing minimal insight
into the real issues;
Central Command (where all those military press briefings were held) was the main center from
which to:
Filter, manage and drip-feed journalists with what they wanted to provide;
Gloss over set-backs, while dwelling on successes;
Limit the facts and context;
Even feed lies to journalists;
Use spin in various ways, such as making it seems as though reports are coming from troops on
the ground, which Central Command can then confirm, so as to appear real;
Carefully plan the range of topics that could be discussed with reporters, and what to avoid.
In summary then, the documentary concluded and implied that the media had successfully been
designated a mostly controllable role by the military, which would no doubt improve in the future.
For more about the issues of embedded journalism during the Iraq invasion, various propaganda
techniques employed, and more, see this web sites Iraq media section13.

C. Dilemma Of Journalists And Wartime Coverage

With military conflicts then, reporting raises an interesting dilemma for some; one the one hand, the
military wish to present various aspects that would support a campaign, while on the other hand, a
journalist is supposed to be critical and not necessarily fall in line. The is captured well by Jane
Kirtley (Enough is Enough14, Media Studies Journal, October 2001), a professor of Media Ethics and
Law:
Shortly after the end of the American Civil War, journalist F. Colburn Adams wrote, The
future historian of the late war will have [a] very difficult task to perform sifting the truth
from falsehood as it appears in official records.
Similar to the oft-repeated axiom that truth is the first casualty of war, Adams observation
succinctly summarizes the nub of the conflict between the military and the news media. The
militarys mission is to fight, and to win, whatever conflict may present itself-preferably on the
battlefield but certainly in public opinion and the history books. The journalist, on the other
hand, is a skeptic if not a cynic and aims to seek, find and report the truth a mission both
parties often view as incompatible with successful warfare, which depends on secrecy and
deception as much as superior strategy, tactics, weaponry and manpower.
Often, especially when covering conflicts, the media organizations are subject to various constraints
by governments, military, corporate pressure, economic interests, etc. Sometimes, however, the
media are more than willing to go along with what could be described as self-censorship, as
highlighted vividly in the following:
We live in a dirty and dangerous world. There are some things the general public does not need to
know about and shouldnt. I believe democracy flourishes when the government can take
legitimate steps to keep its secrets and when the press can decide whether to print what it knows.
David McGowan, Derailing Democracy
Other times, the sources of information are limited. For example, Information warfare of a military
or government might be targeted at enemy nations and groups, but often affects their own
populations:

In [many cases], the U.S. and other western news media depend on the military for information.
And when the information that military officers provide to the public is part of a process that
generates propaganda and places a high value on deceit, deception and denial, then truth is indeed
likely to be high on the casualty list. William M. Arkin, Media principles: Killed by friendly fire
in US infowar15, Index on Censorship, November 2002
Journalist Harold Evans (Propaganda vs. Professionalism16, War Stories, Newseum) addresses the
issue of war correspondents duties, as being the challenge of patriotism versus professionalism:
The history of warfare suggests this is not a false antithesis. Governments, understandably,
put a priority on nurturing the morale of the armed forces and the people, intimidating an
enemy with the force of the national will They have few scruples about whether they are being
fair and just as their propaganda demonizes an alien leader or even a whole population. The
enemy is doing the same to them. That is the emotion wars generate, inviting a competitive
ecstasy of hate. There is a duel in vicious stereotypes in propaganda posters, illustrations and
headlines; populations would be astounded if they could see how they and their leaders are
portrayed by the other side. Authority resents it when a newspaper or broadcast shades the
black and white.
Atrocity stories have been debased currency in the war of words. The other sides are
propaganda and should be ignored or discredited by patriotic correspondents; ours are an
integral part of the cause, and should be propagated with conviction, uniting people in
vengefulness for a cause higher than pedantry. Only after the conflict, the zealots argument
runs, is there time enough to sift the ashes for truth. History knows now that the Germans did
not, as charged in World War I, toss Belgian babies in the air and catch them on bayonets, nor
boil down German corpses for glycerin for munitionsa story invented by a British
correspondent being pressed by his office for news of atrocities. The French did not, as the
German press reported, routinely gouge out the eyes of captured German soldiers, or chop off
their fingers for the rings on them. Iraqi soldiers invading Kuwait did not toss premature
babies out of incubators, as The Sunday Telegraph in London, and then the Los Angeles
Times, reported, quoting Reuters. The story was an invention of the Citizens for a Free Kuwait
lobby in Washington and the teen-age witness who testified to Congress was coached by the
lobbys public relations company. It was only two years later that the whole thing was exposed
for the fraud it was. But the myth galvanized public opinion at a critical moment on the need
to go to war, as it was intended to.
History is a mausoleum of errant emotions: Who is the more patrioticthe government
that conceals the blunders its soldiers endure, the cruelties they may inflict, or the
correspondent who exposes them so that they might be rectified?
[In the dilemmas journalists often have between reporting and intervening], Alan Dower,
who reported the Korean War for the Melbourne Herald reporter Rene Cutforth and
cameraman Cyril Page saw a column of women in Seoul being marched off to jail; many were
carrying babies. The journalists were told the families were all to be shot because someone in
the street had identified them as communists. Dower, who was a commando before he was a
reporter, was carrying a carbine. He used it to bully his way into the jail, where the trio of
journalists found that the women had been made to kneel with their babies in front of an open
pit, two machine guns at their backs. Dower threatened to shoot the guard unless he took the
trio to the prison governors office. There Dower aimed his carbine at the governor and
threatened: If those machine guns fire, Ill shoot you between the eyes. Dower, making
another threat, that of publicity, secured a promise from the United Nations command in
Seoul that it would stamp out such practices.
Did Dower break the normal limits of journalism? Yes, and he was right to do so. Ones first
duty is to humanity, and there are exceptional occasions when that duty overrides the canons
of any profession.
Phillip Knightley, in his award-winning book The First Casualty (Prion Books, 1975, 2000 revised
edition) traces a history of media reporting of wars and conflicts and towards the end says:

The sad truth is that in the new millennium, government propaganda prepares its citizens for war so
skillfully that it is quite likely that they do not want the truthful, objective and balanced reporting
that good war correspondents once did their best to provide.

III. Wider Propaganda

A principle familiar to propagandists is that the doctrine to be instilled in the target audience
should not be articulated: that would only expose them to reflection, inquiry, and, very likely,
ridicule. The proper procedure is to drill them home by constantly presupposing them, so that they
become the very condition for discourse. Noam Chomsky
It is easier to dominate someone if they are unaware of being dominated. Colonised and colonisers
both know that domination is not just based on physical supremacy. Control of hearts and minds
follows military conquest. Which is why any empire that wants to last must capture the souls of its
subjects. Ignacio Ramonet, The control of pleasure 17, Le Monde diplomatique, May 2000
But the issue of propaganda can go beyond just war, to many other areas of life such as the political,
commercial and social aspects:
When there is little or no elite dissent from a government policy, there may still be some slippage
in the mass media, and the facts can tend to undermine the government line. We have long
argued that the naturalness of [the] processes [of indirectly pressing the media to keep even more
tenaciously to the propaganda assumptions of state policy], with inconvenient facts allowed
sparingly and within the proper framework of assumptions, and fundamental dissent virtually
excluded from the mass media (but permitted in a marginalized press), makes for a propaganda
system that is far more credible and effective in putting over a patriotic agenda than one with
official censorship It is much more difficult to see a propaganda system at work where the media
are private and formal censorship is absent. This is especially true where the media actively
compete, periodically attach and expose corporate and government malfeasance, and aggressively
portray themselves as spokesmen for free speech and the general community interest. What is not
evident (and remains undiscussed in the media) is the limited nature of such critiques, as well as
the huge inequality of the command of resources, and its effect both on access to a private media
system and on its behavior and performance. Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky,
Manufacturing Consent; The Political Economy of the Mass Media
The use of words is integral to propaganda techniques. Dr. Aaron Delwiche, at the School of
Communications at the University of Washington, provides a web site discussing propaganda18.
Delwiche recounts how in 1937, in the United States, the Institute for Propaganda Analysis was
created to educate the American public about the widespread nature of political propaganda. Made
up of journalists and social scientists, the institute published numerous works. One of the main
themes behind their work was defining seven basic propaganda devices. While there was appropriate
criticism of the simplification in such classifications, these are commonly described in many
university lectures on propaganda analysis, as Delwiche also points out. Delwische further classifies
these (and adds a couple of additional classifications) into the following:
Word Games:
Name-calling. Labeling people, groups, institutions, etc in a negative manner
Glittering generality. Labeling people, groups, institutions, etc in a positive manner
Euphemisms. Words that pacify the audience with blander meanings and connotations
False Connections
Transfer. Using symbols and imagery of positive institutions etc to strengthen acceptance
Testimonial. Citing individuals not qualified to make the claims made
Special Appeal
Plain Folks. Leaders appealing to ordinary citizens by doing ordinary things
Band Wagon. The everyone else is doing it argument

 Fear. Heightening, exploiting or arousing peoples fears to get supportive opinions and
actions
A vivid example of such use of words is also seen in the following quote from Dr. Aaron Delwiche
(Propaganda Analysis19, Propaganda Critic Web site, School of Communications, Washington
University, March 1995):
Since war is particularly unpleasant, military discourse is full of euphemisms. In the 1940s,
America changed the name of the War Department to the Department of Defense. Under the
Reagan Administration, the MX-Missile was renamed The Peacekeeper. During war-time,
civilian casualties are referred to as collateral damage, and the word liquidation is used as
a synonym for murder.
Political Scientist and author, Michael Parenti, in an article on media monopoly 20, also describes a
pattern of reporting in the mainstream in the U.S. that leads to partial information. He points out
that while the mainstream claim to be free, open and objective, the various techniques, intentional or
unintentional result in systematic contradictions to those claims. Such techniques applicable to
other nations media, as well as the U.S. include:
Suppression By Omission
He describes that worse than sensationalistic hype is the artful avoidance of stories that
might be truly sensational stories (as opposed to sensationalistic stories).
Such stories he says are often downplayed or avoided outright and that sometimes, the
suppression includes not just vital details but the entire story itself even important ones.
Attack and Destroy the Target
Parenti says, When omission proves to be an insufficient mode of censorship and a story
somehow begins to reach larger publics, the press moves from artful avoidance to frontal
assault in order to discredit the story.
In this technique, the media will resort to discrediting the journalist, saying things like this is
bad journalism, etc., thus attempting to silence the story or distract away from the main
issue.
Labeling
Parenti says that the media will seek to prefigure perceptions of a subject using positive or
negative labels and that the label defines the subject without having to deal with actual
particulars that might lead us to a different conclusion.
Examples of labels (positive and negative) that he points to include things like, stability,
strong leadership, strong defense, healthy economy, leftist guerrillas, Islamic
terrorists, conspiracy theories, inner-city gangs and civil disturbances. Others with
double meanings include reform and hardline.
Labels are useful, he suggests, because the efficacy of a label is that it not have a specific
content which can be held up to a test of evidence. Better that it be self-referential,
propagating an undefined but evocative image.
Preemptive Assumption
As Parenti says of this, Frequently the media accept as given the very policy position that
needs to be critically examined
This is that classic narrow range of discourse or parameters of debate whereby
unacknowledged assumptions frame the debate.
As an example he gives, often when the White House proposes increasing military spending,
the debates and analysis will be on how much, or on what the money should be spent etc, not
whether such as large budget that it already is, is actually needed or not, or if there are other
options etc. (See this sites section on the geopoltiics21 for more on this aspect of arms trade,
spending, etc.)
Face-Value Transmission
Here, what officials say is taken as is, without critique or analysis.
As he charges, Face-value transmission has characterized the presss performance in almost
every area of domestic and foreign policy

Of course, for journalists and news organizations, the claim can be that they are reporting
only what is said, or that they must not inject personal views into the report etc. Yet, to
analyze and challenge the face-value transmission is not to [have to] editorialize about the
news but to question the assertions made by officialdom, to consider critical data that might
give credence to an alternative view. Doing such things would not, as Parenti further points
out, become an editorial or ideological pursuit but an empirical and investigative one.
Slighting of Content
Here, Parenti talks about the lack of context or detail to a story, so readers would find it hard
to understand the wider ramifications and/or causes and effects, etc.
The media can be very good and can give so much emphasis to surface happenings, to style
and process but so little to the substantive issues at stake.
While the media might claim to give the bigger picture, they regularly give us the smaller
picture, this being a way of slighting content and remaining within politically safe
boundaries. An example of this he gives is how if any protests against the current forms of
free trade are at all portrayed, then it is with reference to the confrontation between some
protestors and the police, seldom the issues that protestors are making about democratic
sovereignty and corporate accountability, third world plunder, social justice, etc. (See this
sites, section on free trade protests around the world22 for a more detailed discussion of this
issue.)
False Balancing
This is where the notion of objectivity is tested!
On the one hand, only two sides of the story are shown (because it isnt just both sides that
represent the full picture.
On the other hand, balance can be hard to define because it doesnt automatically mean 5050. In the sense that, as Parenti gives an example of, the wars in Guatemala and El Salvador
during the 1980s were often treated with that same kind of false balancing. Both those who
burned villages and those who were having their villages burned were depicted as equally
involved in a contentious bloodletting. While giving the appearance of being objective and
neutral, one actually neutralizes the subject matter and thereby drastically warps it.
(This aspect of objectivity is seldom discussed in the mainstream. However, for some
additional detail on this perspective, see for example, Phillip Knightley in his award-winning
book, The First Casualty (Prion Books, 1975, 2000 revised edition).)
Follow-up Avoidance
Parenti gives some examples of how when confronted with an unexpectedly dissident
response, media hosts quickly change the subject, or break for a commercial, or inject an
identifying announcement: We are talking with [whomever]. The purpose is to avoid going
any further into a politically forbidden topic no matter how much the unexpected response
might seem to need a follow-up query.
This can be knowingly done, or without realizing the significance of a certain aspect of the
response.
Framing
The most effective propaganda, Parenti says, relies on framing rather than on falsehood.
By bending the truth rather than breaking it, using emphasis and other auxiliary
embellishments, communicators can create a desired impression without resorting to explicit
advocacy and without departing too far from the appearance of objectivity. Framing is
achieved in the way the news is packaged, the amount of exposure, the placement (front page
or buried within, lead story or last), the tone of presentation (sympathetic or slighting), the
headlines and photographs, and, in the case of broadcast media, the accompanying visual
and auditory effects.
Furthermore, he points out that Many things are reported in the news but few are
explained. Ideologically and politically the deeper aspects are often not articulated: Little is
said about how the social order is organized and for what purposes. Instead we are left to see
the world as do mainstream pundits, as a scatter of events and personalities propelled by

happenstance, circumstance, confused intentions, bungled operations, and individual

ambition rarely by powerful class interests.
Furthermore, with concentrated ownership increasing (as is discussed in detail in the next section on
this site) a narrower range of discourse can arise, sometimes without realizing. The consequences of
which are summed up by the following from UK media watchdog, MediaLens (Daniel Edwards,
Turning Towards Iraq23, November 2001):
Focusing on leaders thoughts is often a kind of propaganda. It involves repeating the
government line without comment, thereby allowing journalists to claim neutrality as simple
conduits supplying information. But it is not neutral to repeat the government line while
ignoring critics of that line, as often happens. It is also not neutral to include milder criticism
simply because it is voiced by a different section of the establishment, while ignoring more
radical, but perhaps equally rational, critiques from beyond the state-corporate pale. A big
lesson of history is that it is wrong to assume that power, or respectability, confers
rationality. Media analyst Sharon Beder describes the reality of much mainstream reporting:
Balance means ensuring that statements by those challenging the establishment are balanced
with statements by those whom they are criticising, though not necessarily the other way
round.
Talk of leaders hopes teaches us to empathise with their wishes by personalising issues:
Blair desperately hopes to build bridges in the Middle East. This is also a kind of
propaganda based on false assumptions. It assumes that the reality of politicians hopes
their intentions, motivations and goals is identical to the appearance. Machiavelli was kind
enough to explain what every politician knows, and what almost all corporate media
journalists feign not to know:
It is not essential, then, that a Prince should have all the good qualities which I have
enumerated above [mercy, good faith, integrity, humanity, and religion] but it is most
essential that he should seem to have them; I will even venture to affirm that if he has and
invariably practises them all, they are hurtful.
As mentioned above just concentrating and reporting on the official line without offering a wider
set of perspectives can also impact peoples opinions. In another article, MediaLens (Daniel
Edwards, Burying Big Business24, May 2002) also highlights this and the impact it has on how
global issues are perceived:
One of the secrets of media manipulation is to report the horror and strife of the world as
though Western power, interests and machinations did not exist. Vast poverty, injustice and
chaos in the Third World are depicted as unconnected to the cool oases of civilisation in
Europe and the United States, which look on benignly but helplessly, or pitch in heroically to
right wrongs as far as they are able. The idea, for example, that the vast economic and military
might of North America might in some way be linked to the vast poverty and suffering of
neighbouring Central and South America is unthinkable.
An important feature of the reporting that maintains this audacious deceptionnot
consciously but through an internalised sense of what is just not done is to relay our
enemies claims of benign motives as claims, while reporting our governments claims
without comment, or as obviously true the message, tirelessly repeated, gets through to the
public and an important propaganda function is thereby fulfilled. This is called honest,
factual reporting.
Furthermore (and while not a complete study of the mainstream media), media watchdog, Fairness
and Accuracy In Reporting (FAIR) did a study showing that there can be heavy political biases on
even the most popular mainstream media outlets25. The outlets they looked at were ABC World
News Tonight, CBS Evening News and NBC Nightly News in the year 2001. They found that 92
percent of all U.S. sources interviewed were white, 85 percent were male and, where party affiliation
was identifiable, 75 percent were Republican.

IV. Propaganda In Democracies

Propaganda in totalitarian regimes is easy to recognize for its blatant and crude methods. In
democratic societies, propaganda exists, as most of the above attests to. But, it is harder to see.
As a result, it is important to keep such elements of propaganda in mind when we see coverage of
conflicts or even other issues in the media, regardless of the media organization and their apparent
reputation.
In many democracies, people hold dear the freedom of speech that they are supposed to have. Yet,
propaganda is to democracy what violence is to totalitarianism, notes Noam Chomsky. Public
accountability of major institutions and of the government must be constantly maintained to avoid
propaganda.
In 1921, the famous American journalist Walter Lippmann said that the art of democracy requires
what he called the manufacture of consent. This phrase is an Orwellian euphemism for thought
control. The idea is that in a state such as the U.S. where the government cant control the people by
force, it had better control what they think. The Soviet Union is at the opposite end of the spectrum
from us in its domestic freedoms. Its essentially a country run by the bludgeon. Its very easy to
determine what propaganda is in the USSR: what the state produces is propaganda.
Propaganda is to democracy what violence is to totalitarianism.
For those who stubbornly seek freedom around the world, there can be no more urgent task than to
come to understand the mechanisms and practices of indoctrination. These are easy to perceive in the
totalitarian societies, much less so in the propaganda system to which we are subjected and in which
all too often we serve as unwilling or unwitting instruments.
Noam Chomsky, Propaganda, American-style26, Interview conducted by David Barsamian of
KGNU-Radio in Boulder, Colorado (Mid 1986)
Power must be held accountable. The mainstream media is a pillar of a functioning democracy, and
one of its roles therefore, is to hold power accountable.
What journalism is really aboutits to monitor power and the centres of power.
Amira Hass, quoted by Robert Fisk, Amira Hass: Life under Israeli occupationby an Israeli27, The
Independent, August 26, 2001