EASA Reliability Program Guidance

Appendix I to AMC M.A.302 and AMC M.B.301 (b)

6. Reliability Programmes
6.1 Applicability
6.1.1 A reliability programme should be developed in the following cases:
(a) the aircraft maintenance programme is based upon MSG-3 logic
(b) the aircraft maintenance programme includes condition monitored components
(c) the aircraft maintenance programme does not contain overhaul time periods for
all significant system components
(d) when specified by the Manufacturers maintenance planning document
or MRB.
6.1.2 A reliability Programme need not be developed in the following cases:
(a) the maintenance programme is based upon the MSG-1 or 2 logic but only
contains hard time or on condition items
(b) the aircraft is not a large aircraft according to Part-M
(c) the aircraft maintenance programme provides overhaul time periods for all
significant system components.
Note: for the purpose of this paragraph, a significant system is a system
the failure of which could hazard the aircraft safety.
Notwithstanding paragraphs 6.1.1 and 6.1.2 above, an M.A.Subpart G
organisation may however, develop its own reliability monitoring programme
when it may be deemed beneficial from a maintenance planning point of view.
6.2 Applicability for M.A.Subpart G organisation/operator of small fleets of aircraft
6.2.1 For the purpose of this paragraph, a small fleet of aircraft is a fleet of less
than 6 aircraft of the same type.
6.2.2 The requirement for a reliability programme is irrespective of the M.A.Subpart
G organisations fleet size.
6.2.3 Complex reliability programmes could be inappropriate for a small fleet.
It is recommended that such M.A.Subpart G organisations tailor their reliability
programmes to suit the size and complexity of operation.

6.2.4 One difficulty with a small fleet of aircraft consists in the amount of
available data which can be processed: when this amount is too low, the
calculation of alert level is very coarse. Therefore alert levels should be used
carefully.
6.2.5 An M.A.Subpart G organisation of a small fleet of aircraft, when establishing
a reliability programme, should consider the following:
(a) The programme should focus on areas where a sufficient amount of data is likely
to be processed.
(b) When the amount of available data is very limited, the M.A.Subpart G
organisations engineering judgement is then a vital element. In the following
examples, careful engineering analysis should be exercised before taking decisions:
A 0 rate in the statistical calculation may possibly simply reveal that enough
statistical data is missing, rather that there is no potential problem.
When alert levels are used, a single event may have the figures reach the alert
level. Engineering judgement is necessary so as to discriminate an artefact from an
actual need for a corrective action.
In making his engineering judgement, an M.A.Subpart G organisation is
encouraged to establish contact and make comparisons with other M.A.Subpart G
organisations of the same aircraft, where possible and relevant. Making comparison
with data provided by the manufacturer may also be possible.
6.2.6 In order to obtain accurate reliability data, it should be recommended to pool
data and analysis with one or more other M.A.Subpart G organisation(s). Paragraph
6.6 of this paragraph specifies under which conditions it is acceptable that
M.A.Subpart G organisations share reliability data.
6.2.7 Notwithstanding the above there are cases where the M.A.Subpart G
organisation will be unable to pool data with other M.A.Subpart G organisation,
e.g. at the introduction to service of a new type. In that case the competent authority
should impose additional restrictions on the MRB/MPD tasks intervals (e.g. no
variations or only minor evolution are possible, and with the competent authority
approval).
6.3 Engineering judgement
6.3.1 Engineering judgement is itself inherent to reliability programmes as no
interpretation of data is possible without judgement. In approving the M.A.Subpart G
organisations maintenance and reliability programmes, the competent authority is
expected to ensure that the organisation which runs the programme (it may be the
M.A.Subpart G organisation, or an Part-145 organisation under contract) hires
sufficiently qualified personnel with appropriate engineering experience and
understanding of reliability concept (see AMC M.A.706)

6.3.2 It follows that failure to provide appropriately qualified personnel for

the reliability programme may lead the competent authority to reject the approval of
the reliability programme and therefore the aircraft maintenance programme.
6.4 Contracted maintenance
6.4.1 Whereas M.A.302 specifies that, the aircraft maintenance programme
-which includes the associated reliability programme-, should be managed
and presented by the M.A.Subpart G organisation to the competent authority, it is
understood that the M.A.Subpart G organisation may delegate certain functions to
the Part-145 organisation under contract, provided this organisation proves to have
the appropriate expertise.
6.4.2 These functions are:
(a) Developing the aircraft maintenance and reliability programmes,
(b) Performing the collection and analysis of the reliability data,
(c) Providing reliability reports, and
(d) Proposing corrective actions to the M.A.Subpart G organisation.
6.4.3 Notwithstanding the above decision to implement a corrective action (or
the decision to request from the competent authority the approval to implement a
corrective action) remains the M.A.Subpart G organisations prerogative and
responsibility. In relation to paragraph 6.4.2(d) above, a decision not to implement a
corrective action should be justified anddocumented.
6.4.4 The arrangement between the M.A.Subpart G organisation and the Part-145
organisation should be specified in the maintenance contract (see appendix 11) and
the relevant CAME, and MOE procedures.
6.5 Reliability programme
In preparing the programme details, account should be taken of this paragraph.
All associated procedures should be clearly defined.
6.5.1 Objectives
6.5.1.1 A statement should be included summarising as precisely as possible
the prime objectives of the programme. To the minimum it
should include the following:
(a) to recognise the need for corrective action,
(b) to establish what corrective action is needed and,
(c) to determine the effectiveness of that action
The extent of the objectives should be directly related to the scope of the
programme. Its scope could vary from a component defect monitoring system for a
small M.A.Subpart G organisation, to an integrated maintenance management
programme for a big M.A.Subpart G organisation. The manufacturers maintenance
planning documents may give guidance on the objectives and should be consulted in
every case.

In case of a MSG-3 based maintenance programme, the reliability programme

should provide a monitor that all MSG-3 related tasks from the maintenance
programme are effective and their periodicity is adequate.
6.5.2 Identification of items.
The items controlled by the programme should be stated, e.g. by ATA Chapters.
Where some items (e.g. aircraft structure, engines, APU) are controlled by separate
programmes, the associated procedures (e.g. individual sampling or life
development programmes, constructors structure sampling programmes) should be
cross referenced in the programme.
6.5.3 Terms and definitions.
The significant terms and definitions applicable to the Programme should be clearly
identified. Terms are already defined in MSG-3, Part-145 and
6.5.4 Information sources and collection.
6.5.4.1 Sources of information should be listed and procedures for the
transmission of information from the sources, together with the procedure for
collecting and receiving it, should be set out in detail in the CAME or MOE as
appropriate.
6.5.4.2 The type of information to be collected should be related to the objectives of
the Programme and should be such that it enables both an overall broad based
assessment of the information to be made and also allow for assessments to be
made as to whether any reaction, both to trends and to individual events, is
necessary.
The following are examples of the normal prime sources:
(a) Pilots Reports.
(b) Technical Logs.
(c) Aircraft Maintenance Access Terminal / On-board
Maintenance System readouts.
(d) Maintenance Worksheets.
(e) Workshop Reports.
(f) Reports on Functional Checks.
(h) Reports on Special Inspections
(g) Stores Issues/Reports.
(i) Air Safety Reports.
(j) Reports on Technical Delays and Incidents.
(k) Other sources: ETOPS, RVSM, CAT II/III.
6.5.4.3 In addition to the normal prime sources of information, due account should be
taken of continuing airworthiness and safety information promulgated under Part-21

6.5.5 Display of information.

Collected information may be displayed graphically or in a tabular format or a
combination of both. The rules governing any separation or discarding of information
prior to incorporation into these formats should be stated. The format should be such
that the identification of trends, specific highlights and related events would be
readily apparent.
6.5.5.1 The above display of information should include provisions for nil returns to
aid the examination of the total information.
6.5.5.2 Where standards or alert levels are included in the programme,
the display of information should be oriented accordingly.
6.5.6 Examination, analysis and interpretation of the information. The method
employed for examining, analysing and interpreting the programme information
should be explained.
6.5.6.1 Examination.
Methods of examination of information may be varied according to the content and
quantity of information of individual programmes. These can range from examination
of the initial indication of performance variations to formalised detailed procedures
at specific periods, and the methods should be fully described in the programme
documentation.
6.5.6.2 Analysis and Interpretation.
The procedures for analysis and interpretation of information should be such as to
enable the performance of the items controlled by the programme to be measured;
they should also facilitate recognition, diagnosis and recording of significant
problems. The whole process should be such as to enable a critical assessment
to be made of the effectiveness of the programme as a total activity.
Such a process may involve:
(a) Comparisons of operational reliability with established or allocated standards (in
the initial period these could be obtained from in-service experience of similar
equipment of aircraft types).
(b) Analysis and interpretation of trends.
(c) The evaluation of repetitive defects.
(d) Confidence testing of expected and achieved results.
(e) Studies of life-bands and survival characteristics.
(f) Reliability predictions.
(g) Other methods of assessment.
6.5.6.3 The range and depth of engineering analysis and interpretation should be
related to the particular programme and to the facilities available. The following, at
least, should be taken into account:

(a) Flight defects and reductions in operational reliability.

(b) Defects occurring on-line and at main base.
(c) Deterioration observed during routine maintenance.
(d) Workshop and overhaul facility findings.
(e) Modification evaluations.
(f) Sampling programmes.
(g) The adequacy of maintenance equipment and publications.
(h) The effectiveness of maintenance procedures.
(i) Staff training.
(j) Service bulletins, technical instructions, etc.
6.5.6.4 Where the M.A.Subpart G organisation relies upon contracted maintenance
and/or overhaul facilities as an information input to the programme, the
arrangements for availability and continuity of such information should be
established and details should be included.
6.5.7 Corrective Actions.
6.5.7.1 The procedures and time scales both for implementing corrective actions and
for monitoring the effects of corrective actions should be fully described. Corrective
actions shall correct any reduction in reliability revealed by the programme and could
take the form of:
(a) Changes to maintenance, operational procedures or techniques.
(b) Maintenance changes involving inspection frequency and content, function
checks, overhaul requirements and time limits, which will require amendment of the
scheduled maintenance periods or tasks in the approved maintenance programme.
This may include escalation or de-escalation of tasks, addition, modification or
deletion of tasks.
(c) Amendments to approved manuals (e.g. maintenance manual, crew manual).
(d) Initiation of modifications.
(e) Special inspections of fleet campaigns.
(f) Spares provisioning.
(g) Staff training.
(h) Manpower and equipment planning.
Note: Some of the above corrective actions may need the competent authoritys
approval before implementation.
6.5.7.2 The procedures for effecting changes to the maintenance programme
should be described, and the associated documentation should include a planned
completion date for each correctivaction, where applicable.
6.5.8 Organisational Responsibilities.
The organisational structure and the department responsible for the administration of
the programme should be stated. The chains of responsibility for individuals and
departments (Engineering, Production, Quality, Operations etc.) in respect of the
programme, together with the information and functions of any programme control
committees (reliability group), should be defined. Participation of the competent
authority should be stated. This information should be contained in the CAME or

MOE as appropriate.
6.5.9 Presentation of information to the competent authority.
The following information should be submitted to the competent authority for
approval as part of the reliability programme:
(a) The format and content of routine reports.
(b) The time scales for the production of reports together with their distribution.
(c) The format and content of reports supporting request for increases
in periods between maintenance (escalation) and for amendments to the approved
maintenance programme. These reports should contain sufficient detailed
information to enable the competent authority to make its own evaluation where
necessary.
6.5.10 Evaluation and review.
Each programme should describe the procedures and individual responsibilities
in respect of continuous monitoring of the effectiveness of the programme as a
whole. The time periods and the procedures for both routine and non-routine reviews
of maintenance control should be detailed (progressive, monthly, quarterly, or annual
reviews, procedures following reliability standards or alert levels being exceeded,
etc.).
6.5.10.1 Each Programme should contain procedures for monitoring and, as
necessary, revising the reliability standards or alert levels.
The organisational responsibilities for monitoring and revising the standards should
be specified together with associated time scales.
6.5.10.2 Although not exclusive, the following list gives guidance on the criteria to be
taken into account during the review.
(a) Utilisation (high/low/seasonal).
(b) Fleet commonality.
(c) Alert Level adjustment criteria.
(d) Adequacy of data.
(e) Reliability procedure audit.
(f) Staff training.
(g) Operational and maintenance procedures.
6.5.11 Approval of maintenance programme amendment
The competent authority may authorise the M.A.Subpart G organisation to
implement in the maintenance programme changes arising from the reliability
programme results prior to their formal approval by the authority when satisfied that;
(a) the Reliability Programme monitors the content of the Maintenance
Programme in a comprehensive manner, and
(b) the procedures associated with the functioning of the Reliability

Group provide the assurance that appropriate control is exercised by the

Owner/operator over the internal validation of such changes.
6.6 Pooling Arrangements.
6.6.1 In some cases, in order that sufficient data may be analysed it may be
desirable to pool data: i.e. collate data from a number of M.A. Subpart G
organisations of the same type of aircraft. For the analysis to be valid, the aircraft
concerned, mode of operation, and maintenance procedures applied should be
substantially the same: variations in utilisation between two M.A. Subpart G
organisations may, more than anything, fundamentally corrupt the analysis. Although
not exhaustive, the following list gives guidance on the primary factors which need to
be taken into account.
(a) Certification factors, such as: aircraft TCDS compliance (variant)/ modification
status, including SB compliance.
(b) Operational Factors, such as: operational environment/utilisation, e.g.
low/high/seasonal, etc./respective fleet size operating rules applicable (e.g.
ETOPS/RVSM/All Weather etc.)/operating procedures/ MEL and MEL utilisation.
(c) Maintenance factors, such as: aircraft age maintenance procedures;
maintenance standards applicable; lubrication procedures and programme;
MPD revision or escalation applied or maintenance programme applicable.
6.6.2 Although it may not be necessary for all of the foregoing to be completely
common, it is necessary for a substantial amount of commonality to prevail.
Decision should be taken by the competent authority on a case by
case basis.
6.6.3 In case of a short term lease agreement (less than 6 month) more flexibility
against the para 6.6.1 criteria may be granted by the competent
authority, so as to allow the owner/operator to operate the aircraft under
the same programme during the lease agreement effectivity.
6.6.4 Changes by any one of the M.A.Subpart G organisation to the above,
requires assessment in order that the pooling benefits can be maintained.
Where an M.A.Subpart G organisation wishes to pool data in this way, the
approval of the competent authority should be sought prior to any formal
agreement being signed between M.A.Subpart G organisations.
6.6.5 Whereas this paragraph 6.6 is intended to address the pooling of data
directly between M.A.Subpart G organisations, it is acceptable that the
M.A.Subpart G organisation participates in a reliability programme managed
by the aircraft manufacturer, when the competent authority is
satisfied that the manufacturer manages a reliability programme which complies with
the intent of this paragraph.