316

Current Law Journal

[2014] 8 CLJ

TEOH KIM HENG

v.
TAN ONG BAN
COURT OF APPEAL, PUTRAJAYA
ABDUL MALIK ISHAK JCA
ABDUL WAHAB PATAIL JCA
AZIAH ALI JCA
[CIVIL APPEAL NO: P-02-2400-09-2011]
9 MAY 2014
LAND LAW: Sale and purchase of property - Agreement - Indefeasibility
of title - Whether earlier sale and purchase agreements validly terminated
- Whether subsequent sale and purchase agreements null and void Whether subsequent purchaser acquired indefeasible of title to property Whether subsequent purchaser bona fide purchaser for value without notice
- National Land Code, s. 340
LAND LAW: Indefeasibility of title and interest - Sale and purchase of
property - Agreements - Whether earlier sale and purchase agreements
validly terminated - Whether subsequent sale and purchase agreements null
and void - Whether subsequent purchaser acquired indefeasible of title to
property - Whether subsequent purchaser bona fide purchaser for value
without notice - National Land Code, s. 340
The appellant entered into a sale and purchase agreement (third
SPA) with one Mohd Ismail for the sale and purchase of an
apartment unit in Villa Mas Ewani Apartments (property). Mohd
Ismail had earlier purchased the property from the developer vide
a sale and purchase agreement dated 1 November 2002
(the second SPA). The respondent also claimed that he had
purchased the property from the developer vide a sale and
purchase agreement (first SPA) and had paid RM5,250 as
deposit. Since the project was abandoned, no further payments
were made by the respondent. In 2006, the respondent
discovered that the appellant was carrying out renovation works
on the property. The respondent claimed that he was the
beneficial owner of the property and demanded that the appellant
vacate the property. The respondent contended that he received
a letter from Januari Properties Sdn Bhd, representing the
developer, informing him that the first SPA had been terminated
and enclosed a cheque for RM5,250 which was the refund of the
deposit paid. The respondent objected to the termination,

[2014] 8 CLJ

Teoh Kim Heng v. Tan Ong Ban

317

contending that the first SPA between him and the developer was
valid and enforceable and that the developer had no right to sell
the property to any other party. However, the respondent did not
take any further step to challenge the termination by the developer
until the year 2010. The respondents claim was that the first
SPAs was still valid and subsisting and its termination by the
developer was invalid. Consequently, the second and third SPAs
were null and void. On the contrary, the appellant claimed that he
had paid the full purchase price to Mohd Ismail and Mohd Ismail
had, with the consent of the developer, assigned all rights over the
property to the appellant vide a deed of assignment dated 20 May
2005. As such, the appellant claimed that he was a bona fide
purchaser for value and was neither a party nor privy to the first
and second SPAs. The High Court decided in favour of the
respondent. Hence, the appeal. The issue that arose for
consideration inter alia was whether the appellant was a bona fide
purchaser for value without notice.
Held (allowing appeal with costs)
Per Aziah Ali JCA delivering the judgment of the court:

(1) Since the appellant was a subsequent purchaser, the appellant

would obtain an indefeasible title if he could prove that he
was a purchaser in good faith for valuable consideration. The
appellant was not privy to the first SPA or the second SPA
as the appellant had inspected the property to be unoccupied
and in good condition. (paras 18 & 20)
(2) There was no evidence that Mohd Ismail had instituted any
action against the appellant for payment of the balance of the
purchase price. That the appellant was in possession of the
property was also not challenged. As such, there was sufficient
evidence to show that the sale and purchase transaction
between the appellant and Mohd Ismail had been completed.
(para 21)
(3) There was no evidence to show that the appellant had acted
in concert with Mohd Ismail to effect the disposition of the
property. It was apparent that the appellant had no knowledge
about the first and second SPAs. As such, the appellant had
shown that he was a bona fide purchaser for value without
notice and therefore clothed with the statutory protection
accorded by s. 340 of the National Land Code. Consequently,
the appellant had acquired an indefeasible title to the property.
(para 23)

318

Current Law Journal

[2014] 8 CLJ

Bahasa Malaysia Translation Of Headnotes

Perayu telah memeterai suatu perjanjian jual beli (PJB ketiga)
dengan Mohd Ismail bagi jual beli sebuah pangsapuri di Villa Mas
Ewani Pangsapuri (hartanah). Mohd Ismail sebelum ini telah
membeli hartanah tersebut daripada pemaju melalui suatu perjanjian
jual beli bertarikh 1 November 2002 (PJB kedua). Responden
juga mendakwa bahawa dia telah membeli hartanah tersebut
daripada pemaju melalui suatu perjanjian jual beli (PJB pertama)
dan telah membayar RM5,250 sebagai deposit. Oleh kerana projek
tersebut diberhentikan, tiada bayaran selanjutnya telah dibuat oleh
responden. Pada tahun 2006, responden telah mendapati bahawa
perayu telah menjalankan kerja-kerja pengubahsuaian ke atas
hartanah tersebut. Responden mendakwa bahawa dia adalah
pemilik benefisial hartanah tersebut dan menuntut perayu
mengosongkan hartanah tersebut. Responden berhujah bahawa dia
telah menerima surat daripada Januari Properties Sdn Bhd, yang
mewakili pemaju, memberitahunya bahawa PJB pertama telah
ditamatkan dan menyertakan cek bernilai RM5,250 yang
merupakan bayaran balik deposit yang telah dibayar. Responden
membantah penamatan itu, menegaskan bahawa PJB yang pertama
antaranya dan pemaju itu adalah sah serta boleh dikuatkuasakan
dan bahawa pemaju tidak mempunyai hak untuk menjual hartanah
kepada mana-mana pihak lain. Walau bagaimanapun, responden
tidak mengambil apa-apa langkah selanjutnya untuk mencabar
penamatan oleh pemaju sehingga tahun 2010. Tuntutan responden
adalah bahawa PJB pertama masih sah dan berkuat kuasa dan
penamatan PJB pertama oleh pemaju adalah tidak sah. Oleh itu,
PJB kedua dan ketiga adalah batal dan tidak sah. Sebaliknya,
perayu mendakwa bahawa dia telah membayar harga pembelian
penuh kepada Mohd Ismail dan Mohd Ismail telah, dengan
persetujuan pemaju, menyerahkan semua hak ke atas hartanah
tersebut kepada perayu melalui surat ikatan penyerahan hak
bertarikh 20 Mei 2005. Oleh itu, perayu mendakwa bahawa dia
adalah seorang pembeli bona fide dengan nilai dan bukan pihak
kepada PJB pertama dan kedua. Mahkamah Tinggi membuat
keputusan yang memihak kepada responden. Oleh itu, rayuan ini.
Isu yang timbul untuk pertimbangan, antara lain, adalah sama ada
perayu merupakan seorang pembeli bona fide dengan nilai tanpa
notis.

[2014] 8 CLJ

Teoh Kim Heng v. Tan Ong Ban

319

Diputuskan (membenarkan rayuan dengan kos)

Oleh Aziah Ali HMR menyampaikan penghakiman mahkamah:
(1) Oleh kerana perayu adalah seorang pembeli terkemudian,
perayu akan mendapat hak milik tidak boleh disangkal jika dia
dapat membuktikan bahawa dia adalah seorang pembeli dengan
niat yang baik dan balasan bernilai. Perayu bukan privi kepada
PJB pertama atau kedua kerana perayu telah memeriksa
hartanah tersebut dan mendapati bahawa hartanah tersebut
berada dalam keadaan baik dan tidak berpenghuni.
(2) Tiada sebarang bukti bahawa Mohd Ismail telah memulakan
apa-apa tindakan terhadap perayu untuk membayar baki harga
belian. Bahawa perayu mempunyai milikan hartanah juga adalah
tidak dicabar. Oleh itu, terdapat bukti yang mencukupi untuk
menunjukkan bahawa jualan dan transaksi pembelian antara
perayu dan Mohd Ismail telah selesai.
(3) Tidak ada keterangan yang menunjukkan bahawa perayu telah
bertindak bersama-sama dengan Mohd Ismail untuk
melaksanakan pelupusan hartanah tersebut. Adalah jelas
bahawa perayu tidak mempunyai pengetahuan mengenai PJB
pertama dan kedua. Oleh itu, perayu telah menunjukkan
bahawa dia adalah seorang pembeli bona fide dengan nilai tanpa
notis dan oleh itu terlindung di bawah perlindungan statutori
yang diperuntukkan oleh s. 340 Kanun Tanah Negara. Oleh
itu perayu telah memperolehi hak milik tidak boleh disangkal
terhadap hartanah tersebut.
Case(s) referred to:
Ng Hee Thoong & Anor v. Public Bank Berhad [1995] 1 CLJ 609 CA (refd)
Yap Ham Seow v. Fatimawati Ismail & Ors And Another Appeal [2013]
9 CLJ 577 CA (refd)
Legislation referred to:
National Land Code, s. 340

For the appellant - Simon Murali; M/s Lio & Partners

For the respondent - Saw Lip Khai; M/s Chooi, Saw & Lim
[Appeal from High Court, Pulau Pinang; Civil Suit No: 22-442-2005
[MT2]]

Reported by Sandra Gabriel

320

Current Law Journal

[2014] 8 CLJ

JUDGMENT

[1] The appellant Teoh Kim Heng, (the first defendant in the
court below), had entered into a sale and purchase agreement
dated 31 May 2004 (the third SPA) with one Mohd Ismail bin
Md Ibrahim (Mohd Ismail) for the sale of premises known as
Unit 15-6, Level 15, Building No. Block A at Villa Mas Ewani
Apartments, Bandar Jelutong, Penang (the property).

Aziah Ali JCA:

Salient Facts

[2] Mohd Ismail had earlier purchased the property from the
developer Juara Aspirasi (M) Sdn Bhd (the second defendant in
the court below), vide a sale and purchase agreement dated
1 November 2002 (the second SPA).
[3] The respondent Tan Ong Ban, (the plaintiff in the court
below), claims that he had purchased the property from the
developer vide a sale and purchase agreement dated 3 July 1996
(the first SPA) and had paid RM5,250 as deposit. However the
project was abandoned at certain stages and delayed. No further
payments were made.
[4] In 2006 when the respondent visited the property he
discovered that the appellant was carrying out renovation works
on the property. He then issued a notice through his solicitor to
the appellant demanding the appellant vacate the property. The
respondent claims that he is the beneficial owner of the property
and that the appellant has trespassed onto the property.
[5] In the amended statement of claim, the respondent states
that he had received a letter dated 12 May 2004 from Januari
Properties Sdn Bhd, purportedly representing the developer,
informing him that the first SPA had been terminated and
enclosing a cheque for RM5,250. By a letter through his solicitor
dated 19 May 2004, the respondent objected to the termination
inter alia on the ground that the developer had no valid reason to
terminate the first SPA. He returned the cheque to the developer.
However by another letter dated 3 June 2004 the developer
asserted the termination and again enclosed the said cheque.
[6] The respondent contends that the first SPA between him
and the developer was valid and enforceable and that the
developer had no right to sell the property to any other party.

[2014] 8 CLJ

Teoh Kim Heng v. Tan Ong Ban

321

However the respondent did not take any further step to

challenge the termination by the developer until the year 2010
when the High Court allowed his application to add the developer
as the second defendant.
[7] The appellant in his defence claims that he has paid the full
purchase price to Mohd Ismail and Mohd Ismail had, with the
consent of the developer, assigned all rights over the property to
him vide a deed of assignment dated 20 May 2005. Upon
obtaining possession, he commenced renovation works. The
appellant claims that he is a bona fide purchaser for value. He was
neither a party nor privy to the first and second SPA.
Respondent/Plaintiffs Claim

[8] In his suit, the respondent sought for inter alia the following
reliefs:
(a) a declaration that the termination of the sale and purchase
agreement by the developer on 3 June 2004 is invalid;

(b) a declaration that the sale and purchase agreement dated

3 July 1996 between the respondent and the developer is still
valid and legally enforceable;
(c) a declaration that any sale and purchase agreement entered
into between the developer and another party after 3 July
1996 is invalid;
(d) a declaration that any sale and purchase agreement entered
into by the appellant in respect of the property is invalid;

(e) a declaration that the respondent is the rightful owner of the

property based on the sale and purchase agreement dated
3 July 1996;
(f) an order that the appellant transfer the strata title to the
property to the respondent;

(g) an injunction to prohibit the appellant from entering the

property;
(h) an order that the appellant deliver vacant possession of the
property to the respondent immediately.

[9] It must be mentioned that the developer was in liquidation

and was represented at the High Court by an officer from the
Insolvency Department who took the stand not to defend the
suit. No statement of defence was filed on behalf of the

322

Current Law Journal

[2014] 8 CLJ

developer. No witnesses were called for the developer, but a

former director and shareholder of the developer was called as a
witness for the appellant.

Decision Of The High Court

[10] The learned judge decided in favour of the respondent.
Essentially His Lordship decided as follows:
(a) the respondent had not fully paid the purchase price and the
strata title to the property has yet to be issued, therefore the
respondent has no beneficial interest over the property;

(b) the first SPA between the developer and the respondent is still
valid and subsisting and the respondent has clearly acquired a
legal right over the property;
(c) the second SPA between the developer and Mohd Ismail is
null and void because it was executed without the consent
and signature of Goldencolt, the proprietor of the land;
(d) Mohd Ismail could not pass over the property which he did
not possess to the appellant;

(e) the third SPA between Mohd Ismail and the appellant is
invalid;
(f) the appellant is not protected by the doctrine of bona fide
purchaser as he had failed to prove that he had fully paid the
purchase price because Mohd Ismail was not called to confirm
the fact;
(g) the appellant did not acquire any interest on the property from
Mohd Ismail.

[11] Dissatisfied with the decision of the learned judge, the

appellant filed this appeal against the whole judgment of the
learned judge. No appeal was filed by the developer.
[12] We have perused the appeal records and considered the
submissions made by both parties. Having considered the evidence
before us, we agreed with learned counsel for the appellant that,
on the evidence, the appellant is a bona fide purchaser for value.
We therefore allowed the appellants appeal. The judgment of the
High Court in respect of the appellant is set aside. We award
costs of RM20,000 here and below. The deposit was ordered to
be refunded. We give our reasons below.

[2014] 8 CLJ

Teoh Kim Heng v. Tan Ong Ban

323

The Appeal

[13] The respondents claim is premised on the contention that

the first SPA is still valid and subsisting and the termination of the
first SPA by the developer is invalid. Consequently the second
SPA and the third SPA are null and void.

[14] As we have mentioned earlier, the developer did not defend

the suit. No statement of defence was filed. It is a well settled
principle that where one party makes a positive assertion upon a
material issue, the failure of his opponent to contradict is usually
treated as an admission by him of the fact so asserted. (Ng Hee
Thoong & Anor v. Public Bank Berhad [1995] 1 CLJ 609). Hence
the claim by the respondent that the termination of the first SPA
by the developer is invalid and that the said SPA remains valid
and subsisting stands unchallenged.
[15] Insofar as the claim by the respondent against the appellant
is concerned, the facts show that the second SPA between the
developer and Mohd Ismail was entered into on 1 November
2002. The certificate of fitness for the property was issued on
7 February 2004 (p. 331 appeal record).
[16] The third SPA between Mohd Ismail and the appellant was
entered into on 31 May 2004. At the material time strata title has
not been issued.

[17] The issue before us is whether there is sufficient evidence to

support the appellants contention that he is a bona fide purchaser
for value without notice.
[18] On the evidence it is clear that the appellant is a subsequent
purchaser. Being a subsequent purchaser, the appellant would
obtain an indefeasible title if he could prove that he was a
purchaser in good faith for valuable consideration. This is a
statutory protection accorded by s. 340 of the National Land
Code (NLC). The burden of proving that there was a valuable
consideration and good faith in the conveyance of the property
lies on the appellant (see Yap Ham Seow v. Fatimawati Ismail &
Ors And Another Appeal [2013] 9 CLJ 577).
[19] Section 340 of the NLC states as follows:

(1) The title or interest of any person or body for the time
being registered as proprietor of any land, or in whose name
any lease, charge or easement is for the time being
registered, shall, subject to the following provisions of this
section, be indefeasible.

324

Current Law Journal

[2014] 8 CLJ

(2) The title or interest of any such person or body shall not
be indefeasible:

(a) in any case of fraud or misrepresentation to which the

person or body, or any agent of the person or body,
was a party or privy; or
B

(b) where registration was obtained by forgery, or by means

of an insufficient or void instrument; or
(c) where the title or interest was unlawfully acquired by the
person or body in the purported exercise of any power
or authority conferred by any written law.

(3) Where the title or interest of any person or body is

defeasible by reason of any of the circumstances specified in
sub-section (2):
(a) it shall be liable to be set aside in the hands of any
person or body to whom it may subsequently be
transferred; and
(b) any interest subsequently granted there out shall be liable
to be set aside in the hands of any person or body in
whom it is for the time being vested;
Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall affect any title
or interest acquired by any purchaser in good faith and for
valuable consideration, or by any person or body claiming
through or under such a purchase.

[20] We have perused the testimony of the appellant. According

to him he runs a coffee shop and he was acquainted with Mohd
Ismail because Mohd Ismail patronised his coffee shop. However
he knew about the property being for sale not from Mohd Ismail
but from a broker. Prior to this he did not know that Mohd
Ismail was the owner of the property and he was not privy to the
first SPA or the second SPA. Before executing the third SPA, he
had inspected the property with the broker and found it to be in
good condition and unoccupied. He also knew that the certificate
of fitness had been issued. He then contacted Mohd Ismail and
asked for a discount on the purchase price but Mohd Ismail
refused. He agreed to buy the property at the price asked for by
Mohd Ismail. He took possession of the property in 2005.

[2014] 8 CLJ

Teoh Kim Heng v. Tan Ong Ban

325

[21] The appellant says that he has paid the full purchase price
to Mohd Ismail. The respondent disputes this. However there is
no evidence that Mohd Ismail has instituted any action against the
appellant for payment of the balance of the purchase price.
Further the fact that the appellant is in possession of the property
is not challenged. We are of the considered view that there is
sufficient evidence to show that the sale and purchase transaction
between the appellant and Mohd Ismail has been completed.
[22] We find no evidence to show that the appellant had acted
in concert with Mohd Ismail to effect the disposition of the
property. It is apparent that the appellant had no knowledge
about the first SPA and the second SPA.
[23] We find that the appellant has shown that he was a bona
fide purchaser for value without notice and therefore he is clothed
with the statutory protection accorded by s. 340 NLC.
Consequently the appellant has acquired an indefeasible title to
the property. We agree with the learned counsel for the appellant
that the respondents remedy would be against the developer for
breach of contract.
[24] For the aforesaid reasons, we allowed the appeal with costs.