David Bonner Richardson

BERDYAEV'S PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY
BERDYAEV'S PHILOSOPHY
OF HISTORY
AN EXISTENTIALIST THEORY
OF SOCIAL CREATIVITY AND ESCHATOLOGY
by
DAVID BONNER RICHARDSON

Utah State University
Preface by
CHARLES HARTSHORNE
II
MARTINUS NI]HOFF / THE HAG UE / 1968
ISBN 978-94-011-8210-2
ISBN 978-94-011-8870-8 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-94-011-8870-8
C I968 by Marlinus Nijholl, The Hague, Netherlands

All rights reserved, including the right to translate or to
reproduce this book or paris thereof in any form
To Charles Hartshorne
One 01 the Great Twentieth Century Philosophers
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PREFACE
by
CHARLES HARTSHORNE
IX
INTRODUCTION
XIV
CHAPTER I: BERDYAEV'S PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY
A. Introduction
B. The "historical" and the philosophy of history
(I) The "Historical"
(2) The "Historical" and the Human Memory
(3) The "Historical" and Universal History
(4) Universal History: An Interaction Between Man and Nature
(5) The Ages of the World
C. Philosophy of history and metaphysics of history
(I) The Relationship of Philosophy of History to the Metaphysical
(2) Metaphysics
D. The philosophy of history and the end of history
E. Philosophy of history in respect to time
F. Philosophy of history and the doctrine of godmanhood
G. Summary
CHAPTER
II:
GODMANHOOD,
FREEDOM
AND
PHILOSOPHY
I
10
18
24
26
28
28
33
35
37
43
44
OF
HISTORY
A.
B.
C.
D.
Introduction
The doctrine of godmanhood
Godmanhood and the freedom of man
Some consequences of the doctrine of godmanhood
(I) Sobornost' - Unity of the World
(2) Cosmology and the Unity of the World
(3) Eschatology and the Age of the Spirit
E. Summary
CHAPTER
III:
EXISTENTIALISM: A PERSONALIST PHILOSOPHY OF
HISTORY
A. Introduction
B. Personalism: the existent and the ego
90
90
92
VIII
TABLE OF CONTENTS
C. Personality is spirit: an existentialism of spirit

D. Personality: the concrete and universal existent
E. Personality and existence not isolated from the thou and the we
F. Personality: the microcosm
G. Summary
loB
II3
122
126
134
CHAPTER IV: EPISTEMOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY

CONCLUSION
Introduction
The rejection of the subject-object relationship
Knowledge not anti-rational, but super-rational
Knowledge an identity
True knowing is communal in character
True knowing is loving and creative in character
Image, symbol and mystical experience: concrete and creative
knowing
(I) Image
(2) Symbol and myth
(3) The Whole Man Knows
(4) Mysticism
H. Summary
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.
G.
138
138
138
148
152
155
160
165
165
167
172
176
178
CONCLUSION
182
BIBLIOGRAPHY OF SOURCES
185
INDEX
189
PREFACE
BERDYAEV AS A PHILOSOPHER
How shall a non-Russian, above all a North American, assimilate the

extraordinary assemblage of ideas which is Berdyaev's philosophy?
Dr. Richardson does not exaggerate the difficulties. And he introduces
us with great care (and what a formidable task it must have been)
precisely to what is most strange in this writer, his fusion of historical..
eschatological-metaphysical-mystical-Christian conceptions. By some
standards Berdyaev is a theologian rather than a philosopher; for he
takes the truth of the Christian revelation for granted and his work can
readily be viewed as an elaborate apologetic for one religion against all
others and against irreligion. Yet I incline to sympathize with him in
his claim to be a philosopher. What an eccentric one, however! There
are indeed some partial analogies in the general European tradition.
Certainly this Russian is a disciple of Kant, and strong traces of
Kantianism survive in him. He also moved away from Kant somewhat
as did Fichte, Hegel, and, above all, Schelling in his last period. His
sympathetic response to Heracleitos and Boehme recalls Hegel. The
interest in Boehme and Schelling is found also in Tillich. Like the late
German-American, Berdyaev rejects conceptual in favor of symbolic
speech about God. Like Bergson, he stresses intuition and makes a
radical distinction between scientific logical analytic thought and the
mode of apprehension by which, he believes, metaphysical truth is to
be appropriated. Here one thinks also of Heidegger.
Since Berdyaev is an extremely bold imaginative thinker, almost
the opposite of the fashionable types of positivistic, agnostic, merely
linguistic, or commonsensical philosophers of today, it seems fair to
compare him with his counterpart in speCUlative boldness outside of
the Russian tradition, the Anglo-American mathematician and metaphysician, A. N. Whitehead. The following ideas or concerns are
common to the two.
I. A universal principle of "creative advance" (Whitehead) or
PREFACE
creativity (that most positive idea of our century) by which reality

perpetually transcends all rational or causal necessities and enriches
itself, not merely, as in Platonism, by realizing eternal or preexistent
patterns or images, but by producing new patterns, "new images"
(Berdyaev). Berdyaev uses both "creativity" and "freedom" for this
idea; Whitehead uses chiefly the first of these terms. In both writers
there is a rejection or limitation of the deterministic conception of
causality. The difference is that for Whitehead this does not mean a
rejection of scientific causal explanation, or its limitation to a secondary role, but rather a revision of the concept of causality itself, a revision readily related, though Whitehead was not in a position to relate
it, to what has happened in physics and biology in recent decades.
Whitehead's "eternal objects" might be too Platonic for Berdyaev; but
on the other hand it is Whitehead who most radically universalizes
freedom so that it applies even to atoms or particles.
2. The explanation of evils in the world, not by some mysterious
divine justice, but by the universal presence of creative freedom in reality. Creatures are not free to make decisions of their own because God
decided they should be so, but because freedom is an ultimate aspect
of reality as such, any reality, divine or otherwise. "God does not create
freedom" (Berdyaev); creativity is the "ultimate category," of which
all other universals are special aspects (Whitehead).
3. The most concrete or complete value is beauty, not moral
goodness or mere truth.
4. Tragedy is not basically the conflict of good with evil but of good
with good. Indeed evil itself is (in a large part at least) this very conflict;
it is "good in the wrong place" (Whitehead) or out of proper relation to
other things or to God. There are incompatibles and not even God
can realize all possible good. There is in some real sense tragedy even
for God. See (6).
5. God has ideal power, but no power could simply suppress creative
freedom in the creatures or monopolize decision-making, leaving no
genuine option for other creatures. To be is to be in some degree free.
Hence the conventional notion of "omnipotence" is not an ideal that
God falls short of, but a pseudo conception, a rationalistic myth. God is
not and could not be "author of the play" (Whitehead), since the
players help to write it. We are co-creators with God.
6. God, though primordial and everlasting and in this sense eternal,
is not the unmoved mover, but is in some real sense in process of creation, is both eternal and in some sense temporal, in some way creature
PREFACE
XI
as well as creator, and we participate in the creation of God himself,

contribute real value to his life. Indeed we contribute ourselves, as creatively selfdetermined, to that life; for "pantheism though rationalistically false is mystically true" (Berdyaev), or as Whitehead puts it,
"all things are together in the consequent nature of God," though he
suggests we can hardly hope to have clear understanding of this togetherness. The "self-created creature" (Whitehead) is thus in God,
hence in that way creates God. We "enrich the divine life itself"
(Berdyaev). God is not immune to suffering but is "the fellow sufferer
who understands" (Whitehead).
7. The ethical imperative is to create beauty, harmonious experience,
in oneself, in and for others, ultimately in and for God.
8. There is no eternal damnation; the doctrine of hell is a "piece of
sadism" (Berdyaev). The only immortality is God's imperishable possession of us "transmuted" (Whitehead), "transfigured" (Berdyaev)
into his own. For Whitehead this is meant in a fashion farther from
conventional views of personal immortality than for Berdyaev, who
says that all will achieve beatitude. Whitehead's "transmutation" is
meant in a more modest sense; God makes the best use in his own life of
a bad human life on earth. He does not turn it into a good one in another sphere. Berdyaev's "spiritual determinism," which he characteristically leaves in some apparent conflict with his rejection of causal
determinism, may represent a more complete or more anthropomorphic
optimism than Whitehead would accept.
These are some at least of the striking analogies between two thinkers
whose backgrounds are widely diverse and whose styles are no less
contrasting. Among the ideas which one finds in Berdyaev but not in
Whitehead are: the radical centrality of man in the cosmos (there is no
such anthropomorphism in Whitehead); the centrality of Jesus, the
Godman, in both man and the cosmos (for Whitehead Jesus is only a
supreme teacher and symbol of the basic place of love in reality) ; the
notion of a "Fall" affecting the entire cosmos; something like the traditional idea of personal immortality; the notion of the substantial ego
as a preexistent or eternal entity (remarkably like ideas one finds in
some Hindu thinkers); the eventual radical community of all souls
(Sobornost') ; and finally and pervasively the radical distrust of rational
or univocal concepts and radical trust in mystic experience of the
Christian type.
Whitehead, like the Buddhists, is a sharp critic of soul-substance and,
like them, holds that this doctrine is an ally of egoism or self-interest
XII
PREFACE
theories of motivation. (If Berdyaev escapes this unfortunate consequence, it is only, Whitehead might have argued, by taking Sobornost'
in so extreme a sense that it is dangerously close to the Hindu denial of
individuality). Here I go with Whitehead and the Buddhists. We are
indeed only relatively distinguished from our fellows, truly "members
one of another," but this is possible just because we are only relatively
self-identical with ourselves through time. Neither self-identity nor
nonidentity with others is absolute.
Berdyaev has affinities not only to Whitehead but also to a broader
tradition. Basically there have been two ideas of deity in the theistic
religions: (I) the divine nature is the eminent form of independence,
immutability, impassibility, infinity, simplicity or absence of parts or
composition - in short, the negative theology taken without qualification; (2) the divine nature is both the eminent form of independence,
changelessness, simplicity, etc. and the eminent form of dependence,
changeability, complexity, etc. God is both supreme creator and supreme creature, supreme cause and supreme effect. He has alike supreme permanence and supreme capacity for novelty. He is thus the
synthesis of eternity and time, absoluteness and relativity. The following thinkers, among others, more or less explicitly and clearly affirm
this view:
Socinus and his followers, Schelling (late period), Fechner (the
German psychologist), Heinrich Scholz (the German theologian and
logician), J. Lequier (the brilliant though tragic French philosopher),
Bergson, Varisco (the Italian metaphysician), James Ward (the English
psychologist and philosopher), W. P. Montague (the American moralist
and metaphysician), W. E. Hocking (my first and in a sense only teacher
in metaphysics), N. Berdyaev, A. N. Whitehead, Charles Hartshorne.
I list these people because this tradition is often omitted from the histories of philosophy and other works of reference. They are a small but
increasing number. From their standpoint the identification of God
with "the absolute," or "the unconditioned," i.e., with the object of the
negative theology, is a blunder of the first magnitude and indeed a
typical piece of philosophical idolatry. Eternity, absoluteness, infinity,
by themselves are the merest abstractions; they cannot apply without
radical supplementation to the living God. Of those who have seen this,
Berdyaev is surely not the least. He is sharp and clear on the main
issues: God is not simply unmoved, eternal, or independent. He is not
immune to all suffering. He is not identical with being in contrast to
becoming.
PREFACE
XIII
If, as these authors hold, God is the eminent being-becoming, causeeffect, creator-creature, then ordinary individuals are simply noneminent forms of the same duality. They, too, in their humble way both
create and are created. But then it is no longer cogent to refute belief in
God by taking the evils of the world to be divinely chosen. Certain
outlines of reality are divinely chosen ("spiritually determined"); but
the details result from partly self-determined creaturely choices. And
what an individual creatively decides no one else, not even God, can
have decided. Thus at long last the old problem of Job has a reasonable
solution. Odd that Berdyaev, the professed irrationalist, should give
the most rational of all theories concerning perhaps the nost perplexing
of human puzzles. How far other matters are reasonably dealt with by
the Berdyaev method I leave to the reader.
CHARLES HARTSHORNE
The Uni'llersity of Texas
INTRODUCTION
Nicolas Alexandrovich Berdyaev (1874-1948) was born in the city of

Kiev, into an aristocratic and landed Russian family.l He was interested in philosophy from the time of his childhood and read Schopenhauer,
Kant and Hegel in his father's library when he was fourteen. From his
earliest days he never complied with any philosophical tradition but
always had a sense of radical freedom and repUdiation of authority.2
When he became a Marxist it was as a Fichtean idealist and as a rebel
against the society into which he was born. 3 His true master in philosophy was Kant, though he may not be called a Kantian. 4 He became
very widely read in philosophy and found thinkers in the German
mystical tradition and in 19th century Russia congenial to his thought. 5
Indeed, the authors he mentions that he read would make a very long
list and would include names from all periods of Russian and Western
thought. In 1900, as a Marxian idealist, he began a literary activity,
writing books and articles, which was to continue until interrupted by
his death in 1948. At the same time he entered upon a life-long participation in and leadership of various philosophical societies and meetinggroups,6 and a career of speaking on the platform. 7 I would say that he
was whole-heartedly a professional philosopher all his life. As his autobiography and other books show, he was enormously erudite in philosophy, especially in 19th- and 20th-century European thought. He kept
up with contemporary European movements, especially ExistentialN. Berdyaev, Dream and Reality (Bles, London, 1950), 3-4.
Ibid., 48-50.
3 Ibid., 50, 55, 92.
4 Ibid., 93.
5 Ibid., 83.
a Ibid., Chapter V.
7 Ibid., 135.
INTRODUCTION
xv
ism. 1 And he maintained constant association with other philosophers

all his life.
About 1905 he was attracted to the Orthodox Church and became a
friend of some of the great Orthodox theologians. 2 As he says, he became conscious of himself as a Christian (conscious of his faith) ,3 and he
turned from Marxism to a Christian philosophy. Very active in various
intellectual circles at this time, he became president of a religiousphilosophical society in St. Petersburg 4 and in 1907 participated in a
similar society in Moscow. He was then in constant association with the
greatest intellectuals in Russia. The magnitude, catholicity and ferquency of his various associations with Russian thinkers from that time until
he was expelled from Russia in 1922 are very impressive. He was professor of philosophy at the University of Moscow for two years just
previous to being exiled by the Communist government (he had been
teaching a Christian philosophy).
His activity in lecturing, writing and meeting with intellectuals continued in his exile, first in Berlin for two years and then in Paris for the
rest of his life. 5 Both in Berlin and in Paris Berdyaev had various associations with a large group of exiled Russian intellectuals; and in both
cities he wrote numerous articles and books which were printed and
published in Russian. 6
In Paris "he took the initiative in arranging interconfessional gatherings between Orthodox, Catholics and Protestants." 7 He had a frequent and long association with Catholic theologians and philosophers.
As in Russia, so, too, in Paris he associated variously with leading intellectuals and maintained in different ways a close contact with the
thought of contemporary European philosophers. Berdyaev died
suddenly, while working at his writing table, on March 24, 1948.
Nicolas Alexandrovich Berdyaev writes so vividly, goes so quickly
from one subject to another and refers so frequently to historical traditions that his books appear very easy to read. He is so popular a philosopher that most of his works have been translated from the Russian
or French into the English tongue, and about ten translated books are
now in print. We soon find that what Berdyaev says looks easy to
understand when we glance through the majority of his works (though
1
2
3
6
5
Ibid.,
Ibid.,
Ibid.,
Ibid.,
Ibid.,
Ibid.,
Ibid.,
Index.
Chapters VI and VII.
180.
162.
Chapter X.
Chapter X.
258.
XVI
INTRODUCTION
there are one or two exceptions). And we cannot but be struck by his
predominent interest in the meaning of history and by the clarity of
his insights into the course of world history.
Why, then, should one attempt to penetrate Berdyaev's philosophy
of history when he sets it forth so brilliantly himself? Why re-examine
lucid texts when Berdyaev repeatedly returns to the various themes of
his philosophy of history in his numerous books? Further, why attempt
to simplify what seems already simple? A reader unfamiliar with
Berdyaev may take away the first impression of an always brilliant and
sometimes profound author, but a superficial philosopher who seems
unable to follow out a line of thought in close argumentation.
Berdyaev's style is deceptive. Despite appearance, he is a very deep
philosopher. In his own way he has elaborated a philosophy which
constitutes a very full and complete doctrine. At the very time he is
moving so nimbly from one subject to another in his books - for that is
his method - he has a great and complex philosophy in mind.
When one reads his books he sees the outlines of this doctrine only
sporadically and vaguely. At one and the same time that one finds
Berdyaev's comments on the course of world history so clear, brilliant
and meaningful, his complete philosophy lies obscurely at a deeper
level. I may almost say that there are two levels in Berdyaev's writings,
and one could, in fact, understand Berdyaev's comments on world
history without understanding the philosophic principles which inspire
them. The various historical and political traditions and cultures to
which Berdyaev so often refers, serve not only to exempl:fy his deepest
principles but also exist in their own right as the materials of his philosophy of history.
Yet, because the historical materials are presented by Berdyaev in
the light of his first principles, one cannot rest content to understand
him superficially. What those first principles are and how they function
in the whole structure of Berdyaev's philosophy need still to be determined. For only when one understands his first principles can it be
decided how far one may assent to his comments on the course of world
history.
Berdyaev's first philosophy is so deep, complex and strange, and so
closely related to his philosophy of history, that it takes considerable
efforts to understand it. That is why this book is an analysis, not a criticism. We must understand the philosopher before we can truthfully say
anything about him. It was not possible to understand his definitive
position until recently because his most important books - several of
INTRODUCTION
XVII
them - were published in the fifties. Truth and Revelation and The
Realm 01 Spirit and the Realm 01 Caesar, his last writings, were first
published in 1952 and 1953, and The Meaning 01 the Creative Act
(originally published in 1916) became available to English speaking
readers in 1955.
Further, his outlook itself is unfamiliar to the Western mind because
he is a Russian philosopher. The Russian mind has received a peculiar
world-outlook from the Orthodox Church. There are striking differences between the outlooks of Western and Eastern Christianity and
between the civilizations which they have formed. What is more, there
exists no tradition of scholarship about his doctrine and writings. There
is no tradition of learning about the "school" to which Berdyaev belongs, as for example we find for the German Idealists or the Greeks.
These, then, are SOme of my reasons for undertaking this study.
I have not investigated the Russian aspects of this doctrine by means
of a philological study of the language. English texts of Berdyaev have
been exclusively used, and a half dozen important words in his vocabulary have been investigated. I rely partly on Berdyaev's own stated
interpretation of the Russian quality of his philosophy and partly on
my own. These philological limitations are not so serious as they might
seem. Most of the key philosophical terms have Western origins and are
used in the light of Western thought as well as that of the Russians.
However, the technical terms of Berdyaev must be defined, in the last
analysis, through a study of his own peculiar doctrine. The terms, will
and existence, for example, have to be defined finally in the light of no
other theory except that of Berdyaev. It is a commonplace in the history of philosophy that the primary principles of a philosopher are expressed by terms common to a multitude of differing systems of thought,
but defined finally by reference to his own doctrine.
II
I would like to raise a question about a recent problem, to be found,

not only in Berdyaev, but in many recent Christian philosophers. It is
the problem of adiusting a Christian philosophy to the historical fact
of a world in which other higher religions exist; and prominent among
them are the Jewish, Mohammedan, Buddhist and Hindu religions. It
is an anachronism to be unconconcerned with this problem. During the
interval between the early centuries of Christianity and the seventeenth
century theologians took it for granted that Christianity might be forci-
XVIII
INT.kODUCTION
bly imposed on a people, and eventually, by law or fiat, on the entire

world. During those centuries Christianity, or a particular form of
Christianity, had usually been imposed on a people because their ruler
or their conqueror had decided what their religion would be.
The presupposition of Christianizing by coercion, in my opinion, or
by exterminating rival religions, is the only presupposition whereby a
Christian philosopher can actually think of the destiny of mankind in
solely Christian terms. This all-embracing sort of thinking really requires the premiss that a Christian nation shall conquer the world, and
then, through a ruthless dictatorship, extirpate or isolate all the other
religions of mankind. Such a presupposition is, of course, far from
Berdyaev's mind; he is pre-eminently a philosopher of freedom, for
whom totalitarian coercion is a loathsome solution of human problems.
So far as I can see, this question never did attract the attention of
Berdyaev. He thought of the salvation of mankind with ideas shared
with Dionysius the Pseudo-Areopagite, Scotus Erigena and a large
number of subsequent theologians and mystical writers. A universal
Christianization of mankind was a thoroughly feasible possibility to
those earlier Christians, however, but not for Berdyaev.
Despite his brilliant solution of the problem of developing a philosophy of humanity, he was caught in the dilemma of the nineteenth and
twentieth century Christian eschatologists whose eschaton had not
come to grips with the fact that a huge mass of religious humanity will
never in the foreseeable future be converted to Christianity, except by
force. To be sure, one may claim rightly that Berdyaev's eschatological
emphasis leads finally 1 to a state of apokatastasis (the resurrection of
all), and perhaps Berdyaev personally did slip between the horns of the
dilemma by anticipating the end of the world (and, thereby, the salvation of all mankind) in a not very distant future. Nevertheless, could
not the idea of Godmanhood, one of his key concepts, a notion in which
the second Person of the Divine Trinity figures very importantly, be
brought into a fertile relationship with the theories and doctrines of the
non-Christian world-religions? Indeed, he wrote, in an early essay at
the time of his conversion to Christianity (195):
We are living in an epoch ... of the beginning of a new religious renaissance, a
dawning new religious consciousness, which fascinates by its universal significance.
The man of the new religious consciousness cannot renounce either paganism
or Christianity: in both he sees divine revelation ... There can be no return to
1 C. S. Calian, The Significance of Eschatology in the Thoughts of Nicolas Be,dyaev (Brill,
Leiden, 1965), 2II 212.
INTRODUCTION
XIX
paganism as thesis and Christianity as anti-thesis

If religion in general is
possible and useful, then we must consider the whole world-historical process as
divine revelation, as the intimate mutual action and reaction between humanity
and Divinity.1
Berdyaev's writings contain a proposal which, I think, points the

way to the answer to the problem: "Perhaps an anthropodicy is the
only way to a theodicy ... " 2 One of the most far-reaching revolutions
of the past hundred and fifty years has been a massive movement of
Western Civilization, and, more lately, of all mankind, toward a
humanism, not like that of the Renaissance, but a metaphysical humanism, based on an "anthropodicy," rather than on a theodicy. We
encounter numerous cults of Humanity, among which are that of
Comte, that of Marx and of his contemporary, Feuerbach, whom he
admired and Frank Lloyd Wright's religion of Humanity. Subsequent
to the Western development of various religions of humanity, twentieth
century scholars have been discovering the presence of humanisms in
the venerable civilizations of India and China. Chinese Confucianism
was a strikingly successful cult 3 of humanity, as evidenced by its longevity. India, in its metaphysical fashion, has long possessed a humanism whose influence has sometimes been contrary to divine (non-human)
worship. I refer, for example, to the "cosmic MAN of the Jainas." 4
The most striking feature of Oriental philosophy, it seems to me, is its concern
with the status of man in this world (China) and with man's ultimate goal (Indian).
It is my impression that this interest in man clearly predominates over any
interest in Nature or in God. s
Berdyaev's philosophy, in its extraordinary social awareness, and its

mystical anarchism, is reminiscent, respectively, of the Confucianist
and the Taoist currents of Chinese thought; and, in its peculiar emphasis upon religious gnosis - the fulfillment of human and divine history
by means of knowledge - it is deeply evocative of ancient Indian wisdom.
1 "Life's Questions," NO.9, 1905, selected and translated by D. A. Lowrie in Christian
Existentialism. A Berdyaev Anthology (Allen and Unwin, London, 1965), 226.
2 N. Berdyaev, The Meaning of the Creative Act, tr. D. A. Lowrie (Harper, New York,
1955), 19
3 See J. K. Shryock, The Origin and Development of the State Cult of Confucius (Paragon
Book Reprint Corp., New York, 1966), including ch. VI, "The Worship Paid to the Spirits
of Men in Ancient China," 79-92.
4 "The Christian notion of God as a giant human form is rendered by the Swedenborgians
in a figure that somewhat suggests the cosmic MAN of the J ainas. Emmanuel Swedenborg
(1688-1772) experienced in his visions the whole of heaven in this anthropomorphic way."
H. Zimmer, Philosophies of India, ed. J. Campbell (Pantheon, New York, 1953), 244.
5 W. H. Werkmeister, "Scientism and the Problem of Man," in C. A. Moore, ed., Philosophy
and Culture. East and West (Univ. Hawaii, Honolulu, 1962), 136.
xx
INTRODUCTION
A contemporary of Berdyaev, Whitehead, synthesized the philosophy of an almost human-like divine intelligence, together with a theory
of almost human-like psyches in all material particles, in a new "social"
description of the cosmos,l and more recently Hartshorne wrote:
"Electrons and protons are, for all that anyone knows, simply the
lowest actual levels of social existence." 2 Contemporary Judaism contains a trend which intensifies a keen Jewish sense of humanity, which
this religion has always had. "(Buber's) rejection of mysticism for responsibility to his fellowman strikes a very Jewish note . .. a mysticism operating within the law ... " 3 Berdyaev's own Boehmian theory
is admittedly indebted to a "Semitic ingrafting of the Kabbala, with
the exclusive position it accords to man, with its concrete spirit. In the
nineteenth century Franz Baader and Vladimir Soloviev were permeated with the anthropological and concrete spirit of the Kabbala and
of Jakob Boehme ... " 4
Berdyaev is aware, moreover, of a profound East Asian influence
which is affecting the religious and metaphysical thought of the West:
" . .. Christianity is becoming more foreign and less acceptable to the
modern mind than Buddhism," 5 and he finds that the "German spirit
is ... somehow akin to the spirit of India: there is the same idealism,
the same spirituality, the same vast distance from the concrete flesh of
being ... " 6
The massive religious and metaphysical revolution (and I include
Marxism), which seems to be going on in the present century, recalls to
mind one that occurred over two thousand years ago. E. V. Arnold, in
his monumental work on Roman Stoicism, discerned a vast cultural
revolution in the Mediterranean world in the time-interval extending
from the Graeco-Persian Wars to the early Christian centuries. "The
1 A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality. An Essay in Cosmology (Macmillan, New York,
1927; Harper Torchbook, New York, 1960), 331, f.
a C. Hartshorne, The Divine Relativity: A Social Conception ot God. The Terry Lectures,
1947 (Yale Univ., New Haven, 1948), 28.
8 (Rabbi) E. B. Borowitz, A Layman's Introduction to Religious Existentialism (Dell, New
York, 1966), 165.
The Meaning ot the Creative Act, 307.

Ibid., 310.
6 Ibid., 329. Concerning the influence of East Asia on the West see, in particular, L. A.
Maverick, China A Model tor Europe (Paul Anderson, San Antonio, 1946); J. Needham,
Science and Civilization in China (Cambridge Univ., Cambridge, 1954; seven vols. projected,
vol. 6 to be published in 1967); A. Reichwein, China and Europe; Intellectual and Artistic
Contacts in the Eighteenth Century (Regan Paul, London, 1925); G. F. Hudson, Europe and
China. A Survey ot Their Relations From the Earliest Times to I800 (E. Arnold, London, 1931);
R. Schwab, La Renaissance Orientale (Payot, Paris, 1951). This last-named book is devoted
to the Indianization of European culture in the nineteenth century.
4
&
INTRODUCTION
XXI
meaning of Persism and its immense influence on the Graeco-Roman

world are still so little realized ... " 1 Persia's attack on fifth-century
Greece was a war of religion, of a theodicy which was destined to
establish itself victoriously over the Roman world, whether in Stoicism,
Cynicism, Judaism or the other Near-Eastern religions. " ... its warlike
zeal is directed towards establishing throughout the world the
worship of the 'god of heaven,' and the destruction of all images,
whether in the shape of man or of beasts, as dishonoring to the divine
nature." 2
Something of comparable magnitude and metaphysical depth has
been revolutionizing recent world thought, and, like the "Persian" revolution, the force and momentum of the movement has carried it beyond
the simple removal of a religious status quo. The "destruction of all
images" of ancient times, in its excess, is comparable to the "religion of
Humanity"; and the essential purpose of "Persism," to establish an
ideology of a perfect God, corresponds to the aim of the nineteenth and
twentieth century movement, to modify the traditional ideology about
God in order to include characteristics of the divine being which are
limitations: the eminent forms, as Dr. Hartshorne states above, of
dependence, changeability, complexity, etc.
It is not surprising that the recent revolution has taken various
forms of "anthropodicy," in view of the extraordinary development of
humanism since r800; a development in which the ancient Chinese
cult of Humanity seems to have communicated itself to the Western
World.
Berdyaev, in his philosophy of history, his ideal of creativity, his
eschatology, his Christian anthropodicy of Godmanhood and his existentialism, is one of the great moving personalities of this revolution.
After his death in r948, among his papers was found the outline of a
new work on creativity, in which one of the main ideas is that man's
co-creativity with God is even more important than man's personal
salvation. 3 This movement progresses toward a rapproachment of all
the higher religions, and the philosophy of history of Berdyaev might
playa significant role.
1 E. V. Arnold, Roman Stoicism. Being Lectures on the History of the Stoic Philosophy With
SPecial Reference to its Development within the Roman Empire (Cambridge Univ., Cambridge,
19II; reissued 1958 by The Humanities Press, New York), 7.
2 Ibid., 8-9.
3 D. A. Lowrie, Rebellious Prophet. A Life of Nicolai Berdyaev (Harper, New York, 1960),
.248.
XXII
INTRODUCTION
III
I would like to express my gratitude to the many whom I consulted
for their friendly suggestions, to those who have underwritten the
expense of writing the book, particularly in freeing me from other
duties during two summers in order to study Berdyaev and interpret
him and to those who prepared the final typescript. My particular
thanks to G.E.A., M.S.A., C.S.B., C.S.C., E.F., L.E.L., A.M., B.M.,.
A.P. and H.A.R. I am grateful, too, to Professor Charles Hartshorne
who kindly consented to write a Preface in the light of his own valuable
interpretation of Berdyaev's philosophy.
DAVID BONNER RICHARDSON
Utah State University

January I7, I967
CHAPTER I
BERDY AEV'S PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY
A. INTRODUCTION
We begin this study by considering Berdyaev's philosophy of history

as a complete doctrine. But his philosophy 1 partakes of the
great complexity of early I9th-century German philosophy. Numerous
questions must occur to the reader of this chapter. Indeed, the most
nagging questions must concern the deepest principles of Berdyaev.
The chapters following, therefore, explain doctrines mentioned in
Chapter I.
In the present chapter the subject matter of philosophy of history
is studied first. Then, its definition is investigated. Next, the purposiveness, the eschatology, will be examined. Next, Berdyaev's doctrine
of time and eternity will be seen. Finally, the main principle, the
doctrine of Godmanhood, will be considered briefly.
B. THE "HISTORICAL" AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY
(I) The "Historical"

Berdyaev, in a definitive work, The Meaning ot History, gives a
comprehensive view of his philosophy of history. This book, therefore,
is given the most attention in the present chapter; nevertheless, many
1 Philosophy of history, for Berdyaev means both philosophy of history and theology of
history at once. When he speaks of his philosophy, he means philosophy that is both philosophy
and theology at once. When he speaks of his metaphysics, he means, also, both a metaphysics and a theology at once. We must note this well because Berdyaev terms himself a
philosopher rather than a theologian; and he constantly refers to his philosoPhy or his
metaphysics. He never uses theology to name his work.
His terminology (and his rejection of the use of the term, theology) will be used in this
study. When I speak of Berdyaev's philosophy of history, I use the term in the sense that
Berdyaev uses it - with all its theological import, as well as philosophical. When I speak
of his philosophy or his metaphysics I refer, like Berdyaev, more or less to the theological,
as well as philosophical, subject-matter.
PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY
other books of Berdyaev, written later, enable us to clarify what is

written in The Meaning 01 History.
Berdyaev begins his consideration of the "historical" early in The
Meaning 01 History:
Historical knowledge has as its goal an absolutely specific and original object
which cannot be sub-divided into other objects either material or spiritual. It
is, of course, impossible to regard the 'historical' as a reality of a material, physiological or geographical order. It is likewise unthinkable to consider historical
reality in terms of any psychic reality. The "historical" has its peculiar and specific
nature; it is a reality of a particular kind, a particular stage of existence. The
acceptance of historical tradition and of communion with history is indispensable
for the knowledge of what constitutes the specifically "historical." Historical
speculation is impossible outside the category of historical tradition. The acceptance of this latter forms a certain a priori, a certain absolute category for all
historical knowledge. l
The philosophy of history - of historical knowledge - is one of the ways to the
knowledge of spiritual reality. It is a science of the spirit bringing us into communion with the mysteries of spiritual life. 2
In the first quotation, above, Berdyaev discusses both the historical

reality and the knowledge whereby it is known. He distinguishes reality
known and the knowledge of it.
He is not talking about historical science at all as he understands it.
Historical science, for Berdyaev, tells us of the superficial causes which
lead to events; but philosophy of history is concerned with the spiritual
meaning of history. 3
The historical reality is a "particular stage of existence." The
knowledge of it is closely associated with the "category of historical
tradition." The distinction between knowledge and reality is unmistakably stated. Why, then, does Berdyaev consider the "historical" and
the knowledge of it in the same paragraph, in the same breath, as it
were? The answer to this question is indicated in the second quotation,
where he says: "the philosophy of history - of historical knowledge is one of the ways to the knowledge of spiritual reality." Berdyaev
1
2
N. Berdyaev, The Meaning
Ibid., 14.
0/
History (Bles, London, 1949), 12-13.
3 N. Berdyaev, The End 0/ Our Time (Sheed and Ward, London, 1935), 148. Berdyaev
says, in a last work, Truth and Revelation (Bles, London, 1953),97:
"What historical science sees is not the primary break-through of the noumenal world
into this phenomenal world, but what is already a derivative objectivization. That is why
historical science, for all its knowledge, and for all its devotion to the discovery of truth, can
say nothing in reality about the revelation of God in history."
We will see that "derivative objectivization" which historical science studies is only a superficial aspect of the true world and of true history. Indeed, for Berdyaev, objective and
scientific disciplines, such as historical science, are incapable of getting at the truth of what
they study. See Chapter IV, Section B.
means to identify history and historical knowledge. Yet, for him, history
is a reality distinct from knowledge. Therefore, according to Berdyaev,
the "historical" is a reality, a stage of existence; yet, according to philosophy of history, the historical is also knowledge. Historical reality is
both distinct from knowledge and is knowledge. We will have to study
both in Chapter III, which concerns existential reality, and in Chapter
IV, which investigates Berdyaev's theory of knowledge, how the
knowledge of the existential reality is at the same time reality.
Berdyaev says that historical knowledge has as its goal an object
which cannot be sub-divided into other objects. Object, in this early
work, here refers to historical reality. (In later works, Berdyaev, rejects
the use of object to indicate a reality existing outside of knowledge.) 1
This historical "object" (reality) is not physical or physiological;
that is, it is not material. It is not psychological, either. When Berdyaev
says it should not be considered in terms of any psychic reality, he
means that the knowledge proper to the soul of man, alone, does not
attain the "historical." 2 The philosophy of history (which attains
knowledge of the "historical"), he says, is a science of the spirit.S That
is, the philosophy of history is a spiritual knowledge, which is known by
the spirit of man, rather than by the isolated soul. 4
The "historical," then, is spiritual, and philosophy of history "brings
us into communion with the mysteries of spiritual life." This means
that the historical reality, which exists distinct from the knower, is
spiritual and the knowledge of it is also spiritual. The identity which
Berdyaev indicates to exist between the historical reality and the
knowledge of it is a spiritual one.
The seeming contradiction of identifying historical existence with the
knowledge of it can now be partly explained. The knowledge is not the
knowledge by the soul but by the spirit; the identity is spiritual.
Berdyaev associates this knowledge with the human spirit and also the
historial existence with the human spirit. The "historical" (which is
not material, physiological, geographical or psychic) pertains, somehow,
in its existence to the human spirit.
See Chapter IV, Section B.
a Concerning the knowledge by the soul, alone, see Chapter IV, Section B.
8 Again, as in the case of object, Berdyaev uses a term, science (for true knowledge), which
he will not use in later works. In the works written after he wrote The Meaning 01 History,
Berdyaev does not use the term, science, to describe the true knowledge of philosophy or
history. He rejects science, along with object from the terminology of the true knowledge
which is philosophy of history. He does so because he rejects the scientific, rational and
discursive method of philosophy. See Chapter IV, Section B.
4 See Chapter IV, Section G, Part 3.
1
Berdyaev says, in the passage quoted above, that the historical must
be known through the category of historical tradition. That is, historical tradition is a category, a mode of knowledge of the "historical."
Berdyaev indicates that historical tradition is a part or aspect of the
spiritual reality which is, on the one hand, the "historical," and, on the
other hand, knowledge of the "historical." By "acceptance of historical
tradition as a reality," Berdyaev means the recognition of historical
traditions (such as, for example, the historical tradition of modern
technocracy).1 And he must accept these traditions as realities which
have truly existed in their own right. Berdyaev associates knowledge of
historical traditions with a "communion with history." And he says
that philosophy of history "brings us into communion with the mysteries of spiritual life. "
He says on the following page:
(Historical reality) is above all a concrete and not an abstract reality; and no
concrete reality other than the historical does or can exist. The "historical" is
essentially a coherent form of existence. For the concrete in its literal sense
signifies something that grows together and coheres, as opposed to the abstract.
detached, dissociated and divided. Everything abstract is by its nature opposed
to the historical ... it is both concrete and particular ... 2
After saying (we saw) that an important aspect of the "historical" is

the historical tradition, Berdyaev says, in the above-quoted passage,
that the "historical" is particular and concrete. The historical tradition,
then, is particular and concrete according to his philosophy.
According to the above quotation, the historical is concrete. But how
the "historical," a spiritual entity, can be concrete and yet not material
will have to be investigated in Chapters III and IV. Further, not
everything (e.g. the material or the physiological), is "historical." We
must study, in Chapters III and IV, how Berdyaev distinguishes things
which truly exist ("historical") from those that do not.
The "historical" is not an abstraction imposed upon our knowledge
of history, but, to sum up Berdyaev's remarks, it is organic ("something
that grows together and coheres"). This follows from Berdyaev's previous definition of the "historical" as something which is an existent and
a being. It is "essentially a coherent form of existence." To explain why
we must use the word, organic, to characterize Berdyaev's "historical,"
it will be necessary in the following chapters to consider the cosmology
1 See Chapter IV, Section G, Part 2. Cf. N. Berdyaev, The Realm of Spirit and the Realm
of Caesar (GoUancz, London, 1952), 47.
2 The Meaning of History, 13.
of Berdyaev and the unifying principles of his doctrine. We must also

consider, in a later chapter, how the preference for the concrete and the
distaste for the abstract affects the theory of knowledge; that is, the
method of philosophy of history.
Berdyaev continues and presents an example taken from history
which is as singular and particular as anything can be, so as to illustrate
the concreteness and particularity of the "historical":
The "historical" ... is both concrete and particular.... Everything genuinely
historical has both a particular and a concrete character. Carlyle, the most
concrete and particular of historians, says that John Lackland came upon this
earth on such and such a day. This indeed is the very substance of history.1
Berdyaev does not mean here that the historical is restricted to

momentary events (for we have already seen mention of the relevance
of historical tradition). Rather, he is indicating two things: First, the
historical refers not only to historical tradition but also to particular
events. Second, the historical, when it refers to a tradition, is just as
particular, concrete and existential as the fact that "John Lackland
came upon this earth on such and such a day." That is to say:
... there are cases in which the general may itself be the particular. As an illustration of this let us take the term "historical nation." This latter is a general
concept; but a concrete historical nation is at the same time an absolutely historical concept. The age-long dispute between the Nominalists and the Realists
reveals an insufficient grasp of the mystery of the particular.... The apprehension of being as a gradation of particularities does not necessarily imply
Nominalism, for the general can also be the particular. 2
The "historical nation," taken in itself, is an example of the historical.

That is, when a philosopher of history considers the historical, one of
the entities he knows is the "historical nation." In using this example,
Berdyaev shows that the historical, though it is always concrete and
particular, may be general so that it can be grasped in a general concept.
Berdyaev indicates, above, that this existent reality - the historicalhas an intelligibility which is not nominal but inheres in it, and which is
not abstract or separate, but exists concretely. This existentialism of
an intelligible existent will have to be considered later in detail. It is
very important to our study because Berdyaev is much concerned with
the metaphysics of the historicaL
The remainder of the above paragraph throws more light on the
complex notion of the historicaL Berdyaev speaks of the "apprehension
1
2
Ibid., 13.
Ibid., 14.
of being as a gradation of particularities," and he means that the

historical itself refers to a gradation of particularities. Being, in this text
refers to existential reality. The term, being, like object and science (see
p. 3, preceding), will be criticized in later books of Berdyaev. 1 Recalling
the illustrations given above, we may note than the fact that John
Lackland was born on such and such a date occupies a lower place in the
hierarchy of particularities than does the entity of a historical nation. 2
My book is concerned ... with the problems ... of the philosophy and the
knowledge of historical destinies. The philosophy of history - of historical
knowledge - is one of the ways to the knowledge of spiritual reality. It is a science
of the spirit bringing us into communion with the mysteries of spiritual life. It
deals with that concrete spiritual reality man ... The philosophy of history
studies man in the concrete fulness of his spiritual being; psychology, physiology
and the other sphere of human knowledge study him incompletely in one or other
of his aspects. The philosophy of history examines man in relation to the world
forces which act upon him, that is, in his greatest fulness and concreteness. By
comparison all other ways of approaching man are abstract. 3
The purpose of the philosophy of history is to help us to know spiritual

reality. It is a "science of the spirit" because it deals with the concrete
spiritual reality, man. We find, here, the emphasis on man explicit. We
say that the study of the "historical" comprises such things as the birth
of John Lackland and the historical nation. But these historical entities
are in turn understood in respect to man. The philosophy of history
studies man in the concrete fulness of his spiritual being and, hence,
examines man in relation to the world forces which act upon him; that
is, in his greatest fulness and concreteness. The particular historical,
the historical nation, is ultimately understood in respect to man as one
of "the world forces which act upon him." To sum it up, philosophy of
history studies the historical in all its diverse complexity in order to
understand man "in the concrete fulness of his spiritual being."
Berdyaev says, "by comparison all other ways of approaching man
are abstract." We will see that he opposes the abstract approach to
reality.4 Philosophy of history is the least abstract way of approaching
man. The implication is that this philosophy is the best approach to
reality. We will see what sort of a metaphysics this implies in Section C
of this Chapter; for Berdyaev considers himself to be a metaphysician.
See Chapter III, Section D.
This is not to say that the existence of John Lackland is inferior to the historical nation
in the hierarchy of particularities. John Lackland, according to Berdyaev's psychology,
which is based on his doctrine of Godmanhood, is absolutely eternal and is transcendentally
superior to the "historical" as historical. See Chapter III, Section E.
3 The Meaning 0/ History, 14-15.
4 Chapter III, Section D; Chapter IV, Section B.
1
Berdyaev says, a little further on:

It is as impossible to detach man from history and to consider him abstractly as
it is to detach history from man and to examine it from without, that is form a
non-human point of view .... The historical in the real sense of the word brings
with it the revelation of essential being, of the inner spiritual nature of the world
and of the inner essence of man, and not merely of the external phenomena. The
"historical" is by its nature not phenomenal but deeply ontological. It has its
roots in some deep primal foundation of being which it makes available for our
communion and understanding. The "historical" is a sort of revelation of the
deepest essence of universal relaity of the destiny of the world focused in that of
man. 1
The philosophy of history cannot detach man from history or history

from man because the two are understood in terms of each other. The
"historical" reveals "essential being," that is, the deepest reality,2
though the "historical" being itself is not essential being. It is not mere
phenomena, but it is ontological because it is rooted in "some deep
primal foundation of being." Berdyaev concludes the passage saying,
"the 'historical' is a sort of revelation of the deepest essence of universal
reality, of the destiny of the world focused on that of man." The historical is rooted in the spiritual. And the "historical" is a revelation of
Divine truths. It reveals the deepest intelligibility of reality.
Berdyaev's notion of the "historical" becomes refined in this text.
Note the use of quotation marks in "historical." With quotation marks
"historical" refers to something not phenomenal but deeply ontological.
Note the lack of quotation marks in historical. Without quotation marks,
the historical is that which merely "brings with it the revelation of essential being." Historical, without quotation marks, refers not to the
spiritual meaning of history, but to the material, geographical and
natural conditions in which the meaning of history is imbedded. 3 The
"historical," with quotation marks, names the spiritual meaning of
history, the true existential reality.
Thus, Berdyaev refers, in Solitude and Society to the "historical" as
it characterizes the human personality and existence:
The personality is a biography one and unique, an "history." ... Existence is invariably "historical." 4
1
The Meaning of History, 15-16.
See Chapter III, Section D, which shows that the deepest reality is the concrete existent.
This is what "essential being" refers to. Berdyaev uses the term, "essential being," but in
his later books, he develops an existentialism and a vocabulary according to which the
"essential being" is a concrete existent. Cf. ibid., notes.
3 See the treatment of the mere historical by Berdyaev, discussed in Section C of this
chapter.
4 N. Berdyaev, Solitude and Society (Bles, London, 1947), 124.
2
When Berdyaev writes of the spiritual meaning of history, he is discussing something that is not historical in the common sense ofthe term,
historical. This is why he terms it "historical," written with quotation
marks. It does not partake of the material conditions of historical traditions, although, the acceptance of historical tradition is indispensable
for knowing the "historical." (See p. 3).
The "historical," therefore, is different from the mere historical. The
true subject of philosophy of history (the "historical") is not the mere
historical. In later books Berdyaev is very critical of history as such.
Thus, in Slavery and Freedom 1 he says that "the greatest of all forms
of the seduction and slavery of man is connected with history ... he is
crushed by history."
We have said that the philosophy of history "studies man in the
concrete fulness of his spiritual being"; it is a philosophy of the spirit
and it primarily is concerned about man. This means, for Berdyaev, the
"historical," a spiritual meaningfulness, is also man, insofar as man
is a spirit.
Berdyaev does not speak precisely of the "historical," because it is
mysterious; there is, in his discussion, a great respect for the mystery
of it. He says that "the 'historical' is a sort of revelation of the deepest
essence of universal reality ... " The "historical," then, is not the
ultimate spiritual reality. It is not exactly historical, on the one hand,
nor is it precisely ultimate metaphysical 2 reality, on the other hand.
The "historical," however, is far more spiritual than the mere historical.
Berdyaev intends the term to express the ultimate reality insofar as the
reality has a historical quality or aspect. We will see in Section F of this
chapter how it is the ultimate metaphysical and religious Reality has
a historical quality or aspect.
We must recall, too, that Berdyaev has a strong sense of the organic
unity of the world. Further, his discussion of the "historical," which
has been in terms of both spiritual reality and plain history, shows a
strong sense of the unity of plain history with the spiritual. There is no
assertion of a sharp division between history and the "historical," or,
moreover, between the "historical" and the ultimate reality. Berdyaev
says, on the following page of the text: "history ... is synonymous
with the greatest spiritual reality." 3 We see in this assertion the
strongest sense of the unity of history with the ultimate (yet Berdyaev,
1 N. Berdyaev, Slavery and Freedom (Bles, London, 1943), 255.
For metaphysical, see Section C of this chapter.
I The Meaning 01 History, 17.
we saw, is very aware of the difference between them). Berdyaev is implying that, history, in its inner existential meaning, is the "historical,"
and that the "historical," in its truest and most real aspect, is the
greatest spiritual reality.
Thus, Berdyaev does not employ the term "historical" in a strict and
rigid sense; he intends that the" historical," in the truest sense of the
term, refers to the historical aspect of the ultimate reality. We will see,
in Chapter IV,l that Berdyaev characteristically uses philosophical
terms in this way. We will see how and why Berdyaev's terms have a
truest sense and a less true sense.
We should note , at this time , that the "historical," in the truest sense
of the term, refers to man "in the concrete fulness of his spiritual being"
and at the same time to the ultimate reality.2 In the truest sense of the
term, the "historical," indicates something which is not historical in the
plain sense of the word, but which, nevertheless, has a certain historical
aspect.
In order to understand the "historical," we must investigate more
closely how Berdyaev relates his theory of it to his theory of man and
man's knowledge of it. Indeed, insofar as the "historical" is a revelation
of something beyond history, it can "be approached only through the
most intimate concrete tie between man and history ... " 3
Berdyaev says: "the 'historical' is a revelation of noumenal reality." 4
Revelation, according to Berdyaev, is properly not knowledge, it is,
rather, the ultimate reality in which knowledge is indistinguishable
from the metaphysical reality.5
When Berdyaev says, "the historical in the real sense of the word
Chapter IV, Section G, Part 2.
The "historical" refers both to the ultimate Reality, so far as it is the meaning of history,
and to man through whom the diffusion of meaning into history occurs. This is a Christian
spiritual doctrine which asserts the divine Logos, the Godman. See Chapter II, Section B.
Berdyaev says, in Slavery and Freedom, 29: "The triumph of the spiritual principle means,
not the subordination of man to the universe, but the revelation of the universe in personality." "The revelation of the universe in personality" refers to the "historical"; that is
the "historical" is a "sort of revelation" (The Meaning of History, 16). The "historical" is,
in part, the true universe, as it is in the ultimate reality; and it is revealed in the
human personality.
a The Meaning 0/ History, 16.
4 Ibid., 16.
5 Berdyaev asserts that the ultimate reality is ineffable and can properly be known only
negatively, or apophatically. See N. Berdyaev, The Beginning and the End (Bles, London,
1952), 102-103. This is so, though a positively asserted philosophy can be developed. For
Berdyaev, what can be asserted about the ultimate reality is only symbolic of it. See
Chapter IV, Section G, Part 2.
As for the distinction Berdyaev makes between revelation and knowledge, see Chapter IV,
Section G, Part 2.
1
10
brings with it the revelation of ... the inner spiritual nature of the
world and of the inner spiritual essence of man," he means that it
brings with it the "historical." 1 The "historical," the true reality, is
revealed in the historical.
Since the "historical". refers to the inner spirituality of man as well
as that of the world, we may penetrate the mystery of the true "histori...
cal" if we consider the relationship of man to it. Berdyaev's approach
to the problem is to consider historical knowledge.
(2) The "Historical" and the Human Memory
Berdyaev continues, in the passage quoted on p. 8,
In order to grasp the mystery of the "historical," I must have a sense of it and
history as something that is deeply mine, that is deeply my history, that is deeply
my destiny. I must situate myself within historical destiny and it within my own
human destiny. The presence of the historical destiny then becomes revealed in
the very depths of the human spirit. All historical epochs, from the very earliest
to that at the topmost peak of modern history, represent my historical destiny;
they are all mine. 2
We have seen that the notion of the "historical" refers transcendentally

to all of history in its various levels of gradations of being and at the
same time to the human spirit. It follows that, if one is to attain the
mystery of the "historical," he must identify his own historical destiny
- in knowing - with all historical epochs: "a profound integration of
my historical destiny with that of mankind". 3
We have, here, the expression of a personalism and an existentialism:
Berdyaev strongly advises the philosopher of history to identify himself, in the depths of his personality, with the historical destiny of the
world. We will see, in Chapter III, the way in which this doctrine
expresses a personalism and existentialism. We can observe the existentialism at this time. When Berdyaev speaks of the mystery of the
"historical" and the sense of history that is "deeply my history, that is
deeply my destiny," he is personalist and existential. That is, he refers
not merely to the person's knowledge of history and of the "historical,"
but also to an existential identity of the person with them, achieved by
"situating himself within historical destiny."
As always, we must note the subtlety of Berdyaev's discourse. This
Existential communion and identity with history, achieved by the
person is directed toward the "historical," rather than merely history.
1
B
The Meaning of History, 16.

Ibid., 16.
Ibid., 17.
II
He qualifies "deeply my history" to say, "that is, deeply my destiny. I

must situate myself within historical destiny and it within my own
human destiny." That is, the activity is directed toward the "historical" the meaning of history to be achieved, the destiny of history.
Berdyaev speaks early in The Meaning of History, of a primitive
wisdom that lingers in mankind.
Reason ought to be attuned to the primal wisdom of man, to those first apprehensions of being and of life which are born with the dawn of human history or
even prehistory.... This wisdom which is shared by the very earliest epochs
persists in the inner mysterious depths of life throughout the history of the
human spirit, the birth of Christianity and the Middle Ages, down to our times. 1
Berdyaev means that the primal metaphysical apprehensions of primitive man (which are contained in their myths) should never be lost,
sight of. In the context from which the passage is taken he criticizes
the mind of the 18th century enlightenment which "was a self-assertive
and limited reason." 2 He posits a continuity of human wisdom, which,
if a mind loses it, it loses "all inner contact with the mysteries of the
historical life. " 3
History, since it is synonymous with the greatest spiritual reality, is not a given
empirical fact or a naked factual material. As such it neither exists nor can be
apprehended. It can, however, be approached through the historical memory,
that is, through a certain spiritual activity, a certain given spiritual relation to
the "historical" within the sphere of historical knowledge which, as a result, becomes inwardly transfigured and transformed. The inner soul of history emerges
in all its clarity only in the process of transformation and transfiguration which
takes place in historical memory. This is as true for the apprehension of the soul
of history as it is for that of man; for the human personality when not bound by
memory into an integral whole, lacks the faculty of apprehending the human soul
as a certain reality.4
History is synonymous with the greatest spiritual reality because (we

saw) in its truest sense history is the "historical" (p. 9). History, for
Berdyaev, cannot be known empirically because empirical knowing is
a phenomenal knowing, which knows according to the ways of empirical
and necessitarian nature. The historical memory, through which history is truly known, is a spiritual activity, "a certain given spiritual
relation to the 'historical' within the sphere of historical knowledge."
We will have to consider the natures of spirit and spiritual knowing in
later chapters. But it is clear from our foregoing section that spirit is
1
2
3
Ibid.,
Ibid.,
Ibid.,
Ibid.,
7.
6.
7.
x7-x8.
12
able to penetrate beyond the natural world, seen by empirical sciences.

to a mysterious realm where the spiritual instead of a natural necessity
prevails.
Historical knowledge becomes inwardly transfigured and transformed in this spiritual activity upon condition that the knowing spirit
sees beyond the natural and categorical intelligibility in which historycal actions, events and entities are encrusted: the transfiguration of the
knowledge occurs because the historical memory achieves a spiritual
relation "to the historical within the sphere of historical knowledge."
This spiritual relation brings about the transfiguration of historical
knowledge.
"The inner soul of history emerges in all its clarity only in the
process of transformation ... which takes place in historical memory."
When he next compares the soul of history to the human soul he exemplifies the organic, complex and unified character of universal history. And he implies that the soul of history is as superior and preeminent
over the particular historical facts and institutions as the soul is over
the body it vivifies.
We will see in Chapter II 1 that Berdyaev refers toa soul of the
cosmos, as well. He refers, with the notions of a soul of history and soul
of the cosmos, to the organic unity of history and of the cosmos. Soul
0/ history should not be considered apart from the human soul or apart
from Berdyaev's cosmological doctrine. 2
This is how (obscure as the notion is) Berdyaev understands history
"to be synonymous with the greatest spiritual reality." Note especially
the unity of history this notion presupposes. We can see that Berdyaev's
universal history presupposes a living unifying agent that vivifies all of
history with the same life and the same intelligibility. The process of
history is the process of this vivifying agent as it is participated in by
history. We will see in Chapter III how this unifying agent unites history through the human soul and spirit.
This shows that the "historical" is truly interior, both in the human
spirit of the philosopher of history, and in history. Historical tradition
is both a metaphysical reality (in its meaningful depths) and the
epistemological means of knowing that reality. This is, at present.
somewhat mysterious and must be cleared up in chapters III and IV.
Berdyaev continues:
1
I
See Chapter II, Section D, Part
Ibid.
2.
13
But the historical memory as a means of knowing the "historical" is inalienably

part of the historical tradition outside of which it has no existence. The abstract
use of documents never leads to the knowledge of the "historical." It does not
bring us into communion with the latter.... historical tradition ... only, undoes
the knot that binds man's spiritual destiny to that of history, no great cultural
epoch ... is comprehensible unless we approach it through the historical memory
whose data constitute our spiritual past, our spiritual culture and our ultimate
source. To grasp these great epochs we must inform them with our own spiritual
destiny, for, considered superficially, they are all inwardly dead to us. But the
historical memory, which obliges us to commune inwardly with the "historical,"
is an inalienable part of the historical tradition.
The historical tradition is precisely this inner historical memory which is
transposed into historical destiny.l
We learn in this passage that the abstract use of documents will not
give knowledge of the "historical" for the simple reason that historical
tradition (which reveals "historical") is none else than "this inner historical memory," so far as it is transposed into historical destiny. In this
way the historical memory becomes an inalienable part of historical
tradition. So that when Berdyaev says a great historical epoch is
comprehensible only if we approach it through the historical memory,
he means that it is comprehensible through historical tradition and
ultimately through the "historical." Since tradition is historical memory, the epoch is comprehensible through historical memory. It will be
obvious that historical memory can be considered external to the man
who knows, since in knowing traditions he is knowing the memory in
which the traditions are preserved. Nevertheless, Berdyaev says, "to
grasp these great epochs, we must inform them with our own historical
destiny"; that is, to see the "historical" through the expressed memory
of somebody else is not enough. But we must inform it with our own
spiritual destiny; we must understand the "historical" in the light of
our knowledge of our own spiritual destiny. Historical traditions, then,
are not spiritually dead, but live in the dynamic intelligibility of a
known and sought-after historical destiny. (Wehave yet to see Berdyaev' s
explanation of what historical destiny is.) Indeed, in a later book,
Slavery and Freedom, Berdyaev, says:
Memory of the past is spiritual; it conquers historical time. This however is not
a conserving but a creatively transfiguring memory. It wishes to carry forward
into eternal life not that which is dead in the past but what is alive, not that
which is static in the past but what is dynamic. 2
The manifestations of the "historical" (the traditions, cultures), there1

Slavery and Freedom, III.
fore are not merely re-created in the knowing subject, but actively
created in his historical memory. And this means, in knowing historical
traditions, we create something new and better - this is the significance
of Berdyaev's assertion that the historical memory carries into eternal
life what is dynamic in the past. We must study the creativity of
knowing in Chapter IV.
Berdyaev continues, in The Meaning 0/ History, as follows:
The philosophy of history represents a certain spiritualization and transfiguration
of the historical process. In a certain sense, historical memory implies a merciless
war between eternity and time; and the philosophy of history is always the
witness of the triumph of eternity over time and corruption.... The goal of
historical knowledge and philosophy is not natural but supernatural. For just as
there exists an after-life in relation to individual life, so the great historical paths
likewise lead us to such a world. And that explains why the historical memory,
when directed to contemplating the past, evokes an absolutely peculiar feeling of
communion with a world other than the empirical whose nightmare oppression
we must overcome before we can attain to that historical reality which is the
authentic revelation of other worlds.
The philosophy of history is therefore that of an after-world rather than that
of empirical realities. 1
The historical process is spiritualized and transfigured in philosophy of

history and in the historical memory; that is to say, it is informed with
the spiritual destiny which is known and asserted in philosophy of
history. There is war between eternity and time in historical memory
because the spiritualization of temporal entities, in a direction toward a
supernatural goal, is the conquest of the temporal by the eternal. Indeed the spiritual is also supernatural, the goal is supernatural in
Berdyaev's Christian philosophy.2
History is not annihilated in being spiritualized or subjectivized in
the individual knowing man. There is not only an other-world for the
individual knower but also an other-world for history in its true spiritual reality. Indeed, Berdyaev mentions a feeling of a "communion"
with a world other than the empirical, which is experienced in the
activity of the historical memory.
This communion with an other-world recalls our investigations a few
pages back, of the organic unity of history (and of the cosmos, too),
effected through the human soul. The historical memory, which is
spiritual, in knowing history and the cosmos, spiritualizes them; thus,
it communes with an other world. See chapters III and IV.
1
B
The Meaning of History, 18-19. The Spiritual is supernatural.

See Sections C, D and F.
IS
The other-world is an after-world (which has been referred to in the

term historical destiny). The after-world (the goal and final end of history) is communed with as an other-world in the historical memory. This
is mysterious and will be clarified when we study the mystical principle
of Godmanhood in Chapter 11.1
The human memory is of the utmost importance in the doctrine.
"Historical science ought to adopt to its needs, with certain modifications, it is true, the Platonic doctrine of knowledge as an act of remembranche." This theory is one of the distinguishing marks of
Berdyaev's philosophy of history and doctrine of man, and we will
need to study it later when we consider his metaphysics and epistemology.2 So important is memory, that Berdyaev says, later, in The
Meaning 01 History:
The historical memory is the greatest manifestation of the eternal spirit in our
temporal reality. It upholds the historical connection of the times. It is the very
foundation of history. . .. Memory is therefore the eternal ontological basis of
all history. 3
For, Berdyaev says, "purely objective history would be incomprehensible. "4

Each man represents by virtue of his inner nature a sort of microcosm in which
the whole world of reality and all the great historical epochs combine and
coexist. He . . . is a world in his own right, a world revealed or hidden according
as consciousness is more or less penetrating and extensive. In this development
of self-consciousness the whole history of the world is apprehended .... assuming
an external stimulus for every profound act of remembrance, it should be possible
for man to apprehend history within himself; he should be able. for example.
to discover within himself the profoundest strata of the Hellenic world and thus
grasp the essentials of Greek history.5
Man is a microcosm because, as we saw, the "historical" is created and

preserved in its integrity in the human spirit. We saw, too, that the
living, organic unity of history (and the cosmos) unites history through
the human soul and spirit. The "historical" is truly interior, in the
human spirit. Berdyaev then says that the whole history of the world
is apprehended in the development of self-consciousness. He means
Chapter II, Section B.
Let us note at this time, concerning the memory, that Berdyaev says in a later book,
Solitude and Society, I07, "memory is the primary constituent of the personality." See
Chapter III, Section F; Chapter IV, Section G, Part 2.
3 The Meaning 01 Histo,y, 73.
4 Ibid., 22.
6 Ibid., 22-23.
1
16
that history and the cosmos are progressively spiritualized during universal history in man. 1
"AssUIning an external stimulus for every profound act of remembrance, it should be possible for man to apprehend history within
himself." This indicates that the act of historical remembrance, in its
essence, is unworldly with respect to the external world of the past and
the present, and completely subjective. Berdyaev posits a Platonic
doctrine of knowledge of remembrance, and it implies that our knowledge
of the meaning of universal history, throughout its various epochs,
comes from an internal principle. It is brought to consciousness in the
historical memory. 2 We have here a philosophy of history in which man
is a microcosm, containing, obscurely or consciously, universal history.3
"The profoundest stratum of the Hellenic world" is discovered by an
1 See Chapter III, Section F.
a Is Berdyaev's adaptation of the Platonic doctrine of remembrance antihistorical? Not
in Berdyaev's view, for the following reasons. One aspect of the divine Universal History
posited by Christianity is a movement within the Godhead of the Blessed Trinity, and
involving the Incarnation of the divine Logos. It is a Celestial History. Another aspect is
the terrestrial history which occurs in the fallen cosmos and in fallen man. (See Sections C
and E of this chapter). Berdyaev is unhistorical to the extent that he denies terrestrial history
is a completely true reality. But he asserts the truth and reality of celestial history and that
man, as well as God, participates in it. The meaning of universal history is spiritual (mystical)
rather than rational or natural; it does not partake of the rationality of Platonic ideas.
(Berdyaev opposes Plato on this point. See N. Berdyaev, The Russian Idea (Bles, London.
1947), 240-241.
8 See preceding note. Berdyaev's doctrine of man is truly reminiscent of Leibniz' doctrine
of the monad and properly so because Berdyaev in his early career was strongly influenced
by a Russian movement of Leibnizians.
" At that early period, Berdyaev asserted a hierarchical unity of spiritual monads boun,d
together into a cosmic whole by the Primary Divine monad. See Chapter III, notes.
"
However, the definitive doctrine of Berdyaev is more historical than that of Leibniz. In
Leibniz, the notion of law is extremely important. The laws of God unite and harmonize the
monads. In political terms, we may say that the world of monads unites a maximum of
individualism with a maximum of socialism. They are all together and they are all alone.
See "The Monadology," translated by G. R. Montgomery in Leibnill's Discourse on Metaphysics, etc. (Opencourt, La Salle, Illinois, 1945).
Indeed, Leibniz says (No. 88, p. 271): "This harmony brings it about that things progress
of themselves towards grace along natural lines, and that this earth, for example, must be
destroyed and restored by natural means ... for chastisement .....
In a universe dominated by rational laws, without Grace, and ordered by a pre-established
harmony (Ibid., 268-269), there is no real universal history. We may contrast Berdyaev's
doctrine of a radical freedom of God and of man. The Divine Universal History which
Berdyaev asserts is a historical movement. The meaning, the essential intelligibility of
Universal History does not destroy its freedom or render meaningless its movement. See
E. Gilson, Les Metamorphoses de la Cite de Dieu (Nauwelaerts, Louvain, 1952), Chapter VIII,
"La Cite des Philosophes," which treats of Leibniz.
Berdyaev accepts Leibniz' ideas only so far as Leibniz has shown the necessitarianism
and alienation which men have experienced as a result of the Fall of man from God. He says,
in The Beginning and the End, 130: "Leibniz' monad loses its character of a microcosm as a
result of alienation, the prOjection into the external of that which ought to be within, and
is subjected to the forcible action of nature and society in their capacity of forces established
as external things. The sun no longer shines from within man."
17
act of Platonic remembrance, provoked by an external stimulation. It

is, then, "a penetration that is really into the depths of (man's) own
nature. Only deep down in his own self can man really discover the
secrets of time." 1
The result of the external stimulations to historical remembrance is
the historical myth:
Historical myths have a profound significance for the act of remembrance. A
myth contains the story that is preserved in popular memory and that helps to
bring to life some deep stratum buried in the depths of the human spirit .... This
leads us to reconsider the significance of the part played by tradition in the inner
comprehension of history. For historical tradition ... makes possible a great and
occult act of remembrance. It represents, indeed, no external impulse or externally imposed fact alien to man, but one that is a manifestation of the inner
mysterious life, in which he can attain to the knowledge of himself and feel
himself to be an inalienable participant .
. . . The tradition of a people is valuable in so far as it symbolizes the historical
destiny of that people. This symbolism is of primary importance for the elaboration of a philosophy of history and for the apprehension of its inner significance ....
. . . This inner tradition, this inner myth of history ... 2 (my italics)
The historical myth is important for the philosopher of history because

it reveals, not the superficial intelligibility of history, but "some deep
stratum buried deep in the depths of the human spirit." Berdyaev does
not identify the myth with historical tradition; for, as we shall see
when we study his epistemology, the myth, that is, the symbol, is one
of the most important forms of knowledge, while a tradition is only a
particular kind of historical myth. The historical myth, created in the
memory, is a way of truly and occultly knowing the "historical," which
is to say, of knowing the mysterious depths of history, and of man.
Berdyaev then says that the historical tradition symbolizes the historical destiny of a people. The destiny of a people is not merely historical but metaphysical. We are thus dealing with a philosophy of
history which seeks reality in knowing symbolically.
Berdyaev speaks of a "manifestation of the inner mysterious life, in
which (man) can attain to the knowledge of himself"; namely, the historical tradition or symbol 3 or myth. And he mentions, too, that this
symbolism affords the philosopher the "apprehension of the inner significance" of the philosophy of history. An "inner tradition," he says.
1
2
8

Ibid., 23-25.
We will see, in Chapter IV that historical symbol and myth are synonymous.
18
Note the stress on the interiority of historical tradition, both in history

and in the metaphysical depths of the philosopher. This knowledge has
such a mystery because it is in the order of metaphorical or poetic
knowledge. And, since tradition is a reality existing in history, outside
the knower as well as within, history itself is a metaphorical and symbolic reality. In such an outlook, the organic unity of history (achieved
through man) is provided for. But we will have to investigate how historical knowing and terrestrial history itself must be symbolic and
metaphysical.
(3) The "Historical" and Universal History

Now we must consider Berdyaev's doctrine of the destiny of history.
He says:
In the destiny of mankind, I must recognize my own destiny, and in the latter,
that of history. This is the only way we can commune with the mystery of the
historical and discover in it the great spiritual destinies of mankind. And,
inversely, this is the only way we can ... unite our own individual destiny with
that of universal history instead of merely discovering the void of our isolation
in opposition to all the riches of universal historical life. Thus the real goal of the
philosophy of history is to establish a bond between man and history, between
man's destiny and the metaphysics of history.1
In order to commune with the mystery of the "historical," Berdyaev

exhorts the reader to realize that his own destiny is bound up with the
destiny of mankind. Indeed, he points out the emptiness and solitude
that occurs in a human life if the person will not recognize his own
destiny in the destiny of mankind. He means that if one would achieve
his proper goal ("commune with the mystery of the 'historical' "), he
must establish a bond between his own individual destiny and that of
mankind. 2
When he speaks of the" goal of the philosophy of history" he means
it in an axiological sense. The goal is not only to achieve the true
knowledge of history, to commune intellectually with the "historical"
but to establish a bond between the entire being of man and the "historical." This is the bond with the metaphysics of history, of which he
speaks. (Concerning metaphysics of history see section E of this chapter.)
Thus, when Berdyaev shows the reader something of what he means
by historical destiny (both of history and of man) he introduces the
religious doctrine of Universal History.1 His essay takes on the moral
1
D
The Meaning oj History, 17.

Ibid., 17.
See Section B, Part 4 of the present chapter.
I9
quality of a religious doctrine. Thus, his philosophy of history is moral.

It is a religious and nonnative philosophy which seeks to bring about
the destiny of man. He is saying, as it were, "en route!" See The
Destiny of Man, an ethical work. 1
Thus we see that the word, philosophy, pertains to Christian theology
as well as to a religious philosophy expressed in philosophical terms.
The goal of historical knowledge and philosophy is not natural but supernatural.
For just as there exists an after-life in relation to individual life, so the great
historical paths likewise lead us to such a world. . ..
The philosophy of history is therefore that of an after-world rather than that
of empirical realities. 2
We may then add, concerning metaphysics (of history), that it is understood in a more spiritual sense than philosophy (of history); it also has
the concrete meaning. The meaning of history, on any level, is concrete,
according to Berdyaev's philosophy (see p. 8).3 However, metaphysics
of history is so spiritual, that it does not, like philosophy of history,
refer to the material and historical conditions in which the "historical"
is involved. I am describing (as we will find) the way in which Berdyaev's
use of "metaphysics of history" tends to differ from his use of "philosophy of history." However, philosophy of history, in its truest
aspect, is entirely metaphysical, about "an after-world rather than that
of empirical realities." Metaphysics of history refers to that part of
philosophy of history which considers the transcendental or religious
intelligibles and nonns, insofar as they are spiritual. (See Section C of
this chapter.)
We saw that the philosophy of history "studies man in the concrete
fullness of his spiritual being."
But spiritual life is concrete and demands concrete study, since it is manifested
in the knowledge of a concrete spiritual culture, and not in that of the abstract
elements of the soul-life. The knowledge of spiritual life is a historical science
which deals with culture and not a natural science ... The materials of a spiritual
life are contributed by the spiritual life of humanity itself as it has developed in
history. 4
Note how consistently Berdyaev refers to the historical aspect of the

"knowledge of spiritual life." By "historical science," Berdyaev refers
to philosophy of history insofar as it is a "science of the spirit." 6 Note,
1
2
B
N. Berdyaev, The Destiny
0/ Man (Bles, London, 1948).

The Meaning 0/ History, 19.
See Chapter III, Sections D and F; Chapter IV, Section G.
N. Berdyaev, Freedom and the Spirit (Bles, London, 1935), 19.
The Meaning 0/ History, 14.
20
too, that Berdyaev is treating philosophy as the "knowledge of spiritual

life." Observe, also, though the materials of this knowledge are found in
historical cultures (which are in historical and material conditions),
they are seen from a spiritual point of view. Indeed, Berdyaev says:
"the materials of a spiritual life (that is, of a life lived according to the
'historical,' the meaning of history) are contributed by the spiritual life
of humanity itself as it has developed in history."
We are then dealing with a religious philosophy 1 in which the
intelligibility of man and of history is sought through studying the
relationship between historical entities and man and spirit. And this,
Berdyaev says, is the way to the spiritual life. This life is one lived
according to the "historical."
Berdyaev states in a later work:
Spirit is historically incarnated . . historical bodies ... 2
Spirit is incarnated in man and, through man, in history and in

historical entities. Spirit is manifested in a culture, and the knowledge
of spiritual life must therefore be attained through historical knowledge.
Philosophy of history then must refer to the merely historical as well as
to the metaphysical. (This is not to say philosophy is historical.)
The historical entities with which philosophy of history is especially
concerned are historical traditions and also cultures. We may say that
though Berdyaev's doctrine deals with a whole order of gradations of
historical facts and entities, it is especially interested in historical
cultures. The meaning of history, aside from religious doctrine, is especially revealed, not in a study of man, nor in a scrutiny of visible
historical events, but in a study of cultures. Indeed, for Berdyaev, our
knowledge of man comes (in part) from a study of historical cultures.
This is Berdyaev's doctrine 3 and his practice. We saw (p. 2) that
historical tradition is the indispensable category of knowledge in philosophy of history. Berdyaev studies cultures in order to learn the
historical tradition embodied in them. The historical tradition, for
Berdyaev, is a mode of knowing the "historicaL" 4
On the one hand, he views culture as a sort of "living organism" 5
and "no great culture has been immune from decadence." 6 The his1
S
8
4
&
See note I. We will see that Berdyaev unites philosophy and Christian doctrine.
N. Berdyaev, Spirit and Reality (Bles, London, 1946), 64.
See Chapter IV, Section G, Part 2.
See P.4 above.
The Meaning 01 History, 194.
Ibid., 194
2I
torical tradition, on the other hand, is a symbol "of primary importance for the elaboration of a philosophy of history and for the
apprehension of its inner significance. Tradition is synonymous with
the knowledge of historical life ... " 1 Historical tradition, for
Berdyaev, therefore, is more spiritual than historical culture, though
"every culture ... is spiritual and the product of the creative work of
the spirit as applied to the natural elements .... Culture is the living
process and destiny of peoples." 2 And cultures, in a deeper (spiritual)
sense, continue to live in men after particular cultures have disappeared. 3
He is, like Oswald Spengler,4 contemptuous of civilization as he
understands it.
Spengler proclaimed civilization to be the doom of every culture. ... The
theme is not new. It has long been part of Russian thought, philosophy and
history. 5
Every culture (even the material one) is spiritual and the product of the creative
work of the spirit as applied to the natural elements. But culture develops a
tendency to disintegrate in its religious and spiritual foundations and to repudiate its own symbolism in passing to civilization. 6
Culture, for Berdyaev, is an organic embodiment of the spiritual

meaning of history. The loss of culture's religious and spiritual foundations, mentioned above, occurs in the passage to civilization. Civilization, he says, brings with it barbarism, the vulgarization or loss of the
perfect forms contributed by culture. 7 It is not in civilization (as he
understands it) that Berdyaev seeks the meaning of history.s He seeks
a unity of history, realized in the material conditions of terrestrial
existence, and it is to culture that he turns.
The most important culture in view of the unity and finite temporality of history is the total culture of all history:
The fall of Rome ... teaches us not only that culture has its stages of birth,
flower and decay, but that it is also based upon an eternal principle ... (it is)
a sort of historical catastrophe; an upheaval on the surface of the earth during
which some new elements is added to the foundations of history, and the basic
principle of ancient culture is left intact. Thus Roman law is still alive; and so
are Greek art and philosophy and all the other ancient principles that constitute
1
B
8
4
8
8
7
&
Ibid., 24.
Ibid., 213.
Ibid., 221.
See O. Spengler, The Decline of the West (Knopf, New York, 1939), Index: "culture."
The Meaning of Histo,y, 207.
Ibid., 213.
Ibid., 221.
Cf. ibid., 207-224.
22
the foundations of our culture, which is one and eternal, though passing through
various stages of existence. 1
The most important culture that philosophy of history studies is the

eternal culture of man, which preserves the deathless principles of
peoples from cultures that have passed away. As we shall presently
see, the cultures that have grown and declined will provide Berdyaev
with a means of considering distinct moments in the development of
the whole culture of mankind. "Culture," Berdyaev says, "is the living
process and destiny of peoples." 2
When Berdyaev speaks of one eternal culture what he has in mind
is the Augustinian 3 doctrine of universal history:
Christianity ... supplied the postulate of universal history without which a
philosophy of history is altogether impossible. Thus, while establishing itself
upon the ground of a united East and West, Christianity offered the postulate
of a united mankind and a Providence manifesting itself in historical destinies. 4
That the postulate of a universal history is necessary to a philosophy of

history is one of the implications of Berdyaev's doctrine of the "historical," as we have described it.
Though he admits to the growths and deaths of a succession of
cultures, his Christian doctrine of the one culture of universal history
excludes the possibility of accepting the Greek notion of ever-recurring
cycles of cultures.
The dynamism introduced by Christianity derived from its idea of the immediacy
and uniqueness of events which was foreign to the pagan world .... The Christian
consciousness ... held that events were immediate, non-recurrent and unique,
and it imposed this conception on historical reality.5
While the Greek consciousness had conceived the time process as a cycle, Christianity passed beyond the cyclic idea, asserted the progression of history in time
and discovered a historical purpose. 6
The reason why Christianity went beyond the Greek consciousness and
asserted the progression of history in time and a historical purpose is that:
It was convinced that an event of central importance in history had taken place;
an event that had been completed once and for all; a non-recurring, indivisible,
Ibid., 121.
Ibid., 213.
8 See ibid., 33.
4 Ibid., 123. In his reference to the East and the West, Berdyaev is speaking of Christianity
as it has been "the meeting ground of the Eastern and Western spiritual and historical forces."
& Ibid., 33.
e Ibid., 35.
1
23
incomparable and unique event that was both historical and metaphysical, ...
in a word, Christ's revelation.
History ... both ends and begins with the fact of Christ's revelation. 1
Now we see why Berdyaev speaks of the one culture that is history.
There are really two reasons to be found in these passages why Christianity had to posit the uniqueness and unrepeatability of history: First,
the fact of Christ's Revelation is absolutely unique and unrepeatable,
yet, it is historical; consequently, it indicates that historical events not eternally recurring - are unique, not determined in the fact of their
existence nor the circumstances by the necessity of their intelligibility.
Second, to say that "history both ends and begins with the fact of
Christ's Revelation" is to mean that universal history is explainable
according to the doctrine of Sacred Scriptures. And that is to say,
history, from the beginning of history, has contained a revelation of
Christ (or a preparation for it); and with the Second Coming of Christ,
history will end. Hence, universal history itself is a unique fact.
Christianity introduced a freedom and a dynamism into the notion
of history through its insistence upon the unique character of historical
and metaphysical facts.
Consequently a great and distinct Christian world evolved - a world that was
dynamic by contrast with the static world of antiquity.2
This dynamic and historical character is peculiar to Christianity which alone
attributed a general and ultimate goal to mankind. 3
That is, the coming to awareness, in Christianity, of the freedom of man

made it possible for Christians to choose freely the means of progressing
towards an ultimate goal. (The Greeks thought themselves bound and
determined in endless historical cycles.) 4 Hence:
... Christianity laid the foundations of philosophy of history.1i
Hence:
... historical reality implies the existence of an irrational principle which makes
dynamism possible. Neither history not true dynamism is possible without this
principle, which is turbulent, mobile and pliant, and which kindles the conflict
between the opposing forces of light and darkness. ... the sine qua non of
freedom and dynamism. 6
1 Ibid., 33-34.
a Ibid., 35.
3 Ibid., 36.
, See Ibid., 34-35.
a Ibid., 36.
8 Ibid., 36
In this passage Berdyaev sets forth the notion of an ultimate dynamic

principle. We will find, in the following chapter, that the dynamic
principle is an irrational Freedom or Will which is the deepest and most
ultimate principle in God and in man. The uniqueness of the "historical," and the consequent meaningfulness of history, which Berdyaev
asserts, is possible only upon the conditions of the radical freedom that
Christianity finds in man. 1
Universal History, for Berdyaev, has two main aspects (see Sections
C and E of this Chapter); namely, a terrestrial history and a celestial
history. The Greek doctrine of the eternal recurrence, or cyclical returns,
is denied on two grounds: First, terrestrial history, according to
Christian Universal History, has a beginning and an end, it is unique
and unrepeatable. Second, there is a divine movement a celestial "history" involving, for example, the Incarnation of the divine Logos and a
spiritualization of mankind. We will see how it happens that, for
Berdyaev, terrestrial history is not a fully true reality and celestial
history is a true reality. There is no doubt that Berdyaev means to
assert a real and true history in his doctrine of Universal History. In
contrast to the Greeks, Berdyaev asserts an intelligible principle (the
revealed divine Logos) Who gives meaning to the unique history. He
also posits an irrational principle, a radical freedom which makes the
dynamism and movement of history possible.
(4) Universal History: An Interaction Between Man and Nature
Our encounter with the primacy of freedom in Berdyaev's philosophy
reintroduces us to a "main theme of universal history" :
What is the main theme of universal history? In my opinion it is that of man's
destiny seen in the light of the interaction between the human spirit and nature,
which constitutes the foundation and motivating principle of the "historical."
We can observe in the history of mankind various stages of interaction between
the human spirit and nature which falls into historical epochs.2
Universal history concerns man's destiny. And, here, man's destiny is

seen in the light of the interaction of man and nature. But what is the
"interaction of the human spirit and nature?" In order to retain the
comprehensive viewpoint of Berdyaev, as we follow him in this passage,
it is necessary to understand his notion of nature. "The interaction of
1 Meaningfulness flows from radical freedom, from the irrational. Indeed, we will see, in
Chapter II that the Holy Trinity, of which the divine Logos is the Meaning, is born out of
a primal Will. Cf. Chapter II, Section C.
I Ibid., II2.
25
the human spirit and nature" must be understood to refer not only to
the relation of the human spirit and the cosmos, but also to the relation of the human spirit and historical entities.
We will see, in Chapter IV,! that he has taken his notion of nature
from Kant and consequently defines "nature" in respect to phenomenal
causality and necessity. Hence, the "natural" refers to the Newtonian
external cosmos and to the Kantian phenomenal epistemology, presented in the Critique of Pure Reason. Berdyaev accepts the Newtonian
universe of Kant as existing in fact,2 but he calls such a cosmos an
objectified world. 3 He dose not understand the knowing which is correlated with the natural world as merely phenomenal, however.4 "Objectified" indicates the debased situation of the world and of man's
knowledge, which occurred because of the Fall of man. He believes
that it is possible to know in a truer manner (that is, subjectively) which
overcomes the obstruction between reality and true knowledge. We
must study this in Chapter IV when we investigate his theory of
knowledge.
Guided by his religious doctrine he believes that, in the interaction
between the human spirit and nature, nature and the fallen cosmos
will not be transformed until the end of the world, but nature in man is
gradually transcended and transformed into free spirit during history.5
Thus Christianity had affected man's deliverance from the terror and slavery of
nature; but, in order to achieve this, it had been obliged to declare an uncompromising, passionate and heroic war on the natural elements both within and
outside man, an ascetic war illustrated by the astounding lives of the Saints. 6
Berdyaev says that this interaction between the human spirit and
nature "constitutes the foundation and motivating principle of the
'historical.'" 7 Man's destiny, seen in the light of the interaction between the human spirit and nature, which constitutes the motivating
principle of the "historical," is to transcend the natural, as such,
completely. This is known in its simplicity through basic religious
doctrine and known in its difficult complexity in the philosophy of
history where a theory of freedom is developed.
Berdyaev associates the natural with necessity and the spiritual with
Chapter IV, Section B, notes.
a Ibid.
See Chapter III, Section B; Chapter IV, Section B.
4 Ibid.
5 The Meaning 0/ History, IU, ff.
Ibid., II6.
7 Ibid., II2.
1
26
freedom; 1 therefore, the interaction of man and nature, with which

philosophy of history is concerned, may be expressed in the following way:
The philosophy of history is concerned with the fundamental antinomy between
freedom and necessity, between the freedom of man and his lot in history. The
massive scale of history impresses man and imposes itself upon him to the
extent of overwhelming him.2
"Antinomy" is here understood in the sense of "contradiction." 3

There is an antinomy which arises from the conflict of the freedom
of man with the necessity that is imposed upon him by being immersed
in history. By nature, alone, man is enslaved. The historical has the
element of necessity, the natural element, because the fallen cosmos,
visible nature, in its necessity is involved in history, along with the necessitarian outlooks of man which he has borrowed from the fallen cosmos.
He says, however, in a later book:
The word, nature can be interpreted in two ways: there is a preconscious existential nature, and there is a post conscious and objectified nature. The first
admits of spiritual communion, the latter only of scientific or technical relations. 5
That is, the struggle during universal history between man and nature
(objectified world) will not culminate in the destruction of nature. For
Berdyaev asserts there is an "existential nature," attainable in spiritual communion.
(5) The Ages 01 the World

Berdyaev's theory of the epochs or ages of the world, like the doctrine
of time with which it is connected, was not set forth in its clarity until
some years after The Meaning 01 History was written. 6 Earlier, in The
Meaning 01 History (1921) and in Freedom and the Spirit (1926), he
proposed three epochs of the world, but later, in a posthumous work,
The Realm of the Spirit and the Realm of Caesar (1953) four epochs:
We may fix four periods in man's relationship to the cosmos. I. Man's submersion
in cosmic life, his dependence on the objective world .... 2. Man is freed from
1 Though the natural is necessitarian and the spiritual is fact, the two are not necessarily
opposed. Nature wi1\ be completely spiritualized at the end of history. Nature, taken by
itself (fallen) is opposed to the spiritual. See Spirit and Reality, I75.
a N. Berdyaev, Truth and Revelation, 84.
3 See Chapter IV, Sections Band C.
5 Spirit and Reality, I75.
6 Though the doctrine of time is not wel\-developed in The Meaning of History, yet
Berdyaev composed Chapter VI, "Christianity and History," with the idea of the epochs of
the world in mind; cf. Tht Meaning of History, IIZ, II6.
27
the power of cosmic forces, from the spirits. and demons of nature - man struggles
by means of ascesis ... 3. the mechanization of nature, its scientific and technical
control ... 4. the disruption of cosmic order in the discovery of the infinitely
great and the infinitely small ... the terribly augmented power of man over
nature, and his slavery to his own discoveries. These phases are typological and
not chronological. ... 1
The cosmic epoch is exemplified by early societies where man is submerged in the visible natural world. But, as Berdyaev defines it, it
could conceivably refer to an epoch in .modern times which was dominated by a cosmic outlook. The second, ascetic epoch is exemplified by
the Middle Ages. The third, mechanical epoch is exemplified by that
which has arisen since the Renaissance. The fourth is exemplified by
the present technical age, where man has become partly enslaved by his
technical fabrications.
This outline is applicable to a chapter (VI) in The Meaning 01 History,
entitled, "Christianity and History," where Berdyaev writes a short
universal history which treats historical progress in terms of eras. 2 The
main theme of universal history is that of man's destiny, seen in the
light of the interaction between the human spirit and nature.
We can observe in the history of mankind various stages of interaction between
the human spirit and nature which fall into historical epochs. . ..
The theme of man's worldly destiny is the liberation of the creative human
spirit from the depths of natural necessity and its enslavement by the lowest
elements. 3
This elaborates how the epochs of history (itself an epoch) are essentially contained in the divine history as a necessary condition of its
fulfilment.4 That is, "the liberation of the human spirit" (a divinehuman action) occurs through various stages of history, and consequently, through a historical progress which is described by the doctrine
of the epochs of the world. Christianity enabled man to escape the rule
of the cosmic and finally has mechanized nature, exalting man above
nature.:;
The four epochs correspond to cosmic time (the cosmic epoch) and to
historical time (the other three epochs), and therefore mostly concern
N. Berdyaev, The Realm of Spirit and the Realm of Caesar, 47.
I refer this outline of the epochs of the world, taken from The Realm of Spirit and the
Realm of Caesar, back to The Meaning of History because the short chapter where the outline
is found, entitled "Man and the Cosmos - Technics," is concerned merely with the technical
age.
I The Meaning of History, 112.
4 See Chapter II, Section C; also the present chapter, Section E.
5 The Meaning of History, 113-117.
1
28
the historical. Above all, they attest to the power of the "historical," a
power which is grounded in the dynamism of the meta-historical.
Berdyaev prophesies in The Realm 01 Spirit and the Realm 01 Caesar
a future epoch:
We may conceive of a fifth period in the relationship between man and nature.
In this period will come man's still greater control of the forces of nature, the real
emancipation of labor and the workers, technics made subject to spirit.1
This age will be the New Middle Ages, an epoch to follow the present
age and which will be a preparation for the end of the world. It will be
more spiritual than the present epoch and will be culminated by the
appearance of Antichrist. 2 That is, the tragedy of history will culminate in the coning of Antichrist, though man will have attained the
greatest spirituality in history. Men will culminate his progress in history towards meta-history with the final preparation in the last age,
though the solution of the problem of evil will lie beyond its ability. As
we shall see, Berdyaev develops a doctrine of the age of the Spirit
where man and the world are reintegrated in God after the end of the
world. 3 And just as this Christian doctrine controls his philosophy of
history, so it controls his description of the final age of the world, the
preparatory age, the New Middle Ages. 4
C. PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY AND METAPHYSICS OF HISTORY
(I) The Relationship 01 Philosophy 01 History to the Metaphysical

We saw that Berdyaev introduces philosophy of history in the light
of both metaphysical and historical considerations and that he considers philosophy of history to include a metaphysics of history. But
the question as to whether philosophy of history is or is not metaphysical in its essence has not yet been investigated. With this in mind,
let us read the following passage from The Meaning 01 History:
The history of the world and that of mankind are fulfilled not only in the
object, and, objectively, in the macrocosm, but also in the microcosm. The connection between these two fulfilments in essential to the metaphysics of history
and implies a special relation between the historical and the metaphysical. The
opposition between these latter had long been the dominant conception in science
and philosophy ... It is based on the assumption that the metaphysical cannot
The Realm of Spirit and the Realm of Caesar, 48.
a See conclusion of Section D of this chapter.
8 See Chapter II, Section D, Part 3.
4 Ibid.
1
29
manifest itself in the historical; and it did not consider the possibility of the
historical being other than a merely external and empirical fact which, methodically, must always be antithetical to everything metaphysical.
Anotherl point of view holds that the metaphysical may be transposed and
made manifest in terms of the historical. This standpoint is particularly favorable
to the elaboration of a philosophy of history, postulating as it does a sort of
historical center where the metaphysical and the historical meet. 1
We may note, first of all, that Berdyaev says that there are two fulfilments: that of the history of the world (and of mankind) which occurs
in the macrocosm (the reality external to the individual subject), and
that which occurs in the microcosm. When he says, "the connection between these fulfilments ... implies a special relation between the
historical and the metaphysical," he implies, exactly, that the historical is particularly concerned with the macrocosm, and the metaphysical is particularly concerned with the microcosm. 2
Berdyaev adds that the historical has been predominantly understood to be only an "external and empirical fact which, methodically,
must always be antithetical to everything metaphysical." Berdyaev
allows the traditional meaning of historical to define his own notion of
the historical; that is, he agrees it essentially refers to the macrocosm,
rather than to the metaphysics of the microcosm. Only, he adds, "the
metaphysical may be transposed and made manifest in terms of the
historical." He believes that this latter assertion is particularly favorable to a philosophy of history because it postulates "a sort of historical
center where the metaphysical and the historical meet."
Berdyaev sharply distinguishes the historical and the metaphysical
but does not separate them. The historical manifests the metaphysical,
is metaphysical: We have seen (Section B) to how great anextentthe
metaphysical (the "historical") is historical. He says:
But, as I shall attempt to prove, the metaphysical and the historical are really
brought together and intimately fused only in the Christian philosophy of
history. 3
The new note that this passage brings in is to be found in the words,
Christian philosophy of history, and especially in the word, Christian.
For Berdyaev, Christianity is historical. Christianity gets its historical
character from the coming of Christ.4 It is for Berdyaev also philoThe Meaning of History, 26.
This discussion of microcosm and macrocosm is reminiscent of Spengler, whom, we saw,
Berdyaev mentions. Cf. The Decline of the West, Vol. I, Chapters V and VI.
4 Ibid., 108.
1
30
sophical and metaphysical. The metaphysical will have a historical

aspect, not only as it relates to terrestrial history, but even as considered completely apart from terrestrial history. There is a celestial
history.
What do we understand by celestial history? In it, in the depths of the inner life
of the spirit, resides that predetermination which reveals and manifests itself in
the terrestrial life, destiny and history of mankind. This heavenly prologue is
analogous to that which opens Goethe's Faust. Faust's destiny is that of man;
and this heavenly prologue pre-determines the terrestrial destiny of mankind. 1
It is the doctrine of celestial history, a history revealing itself in the

terrestrial life, which justifies Berdyaev's positing the fusion of the
metaphysical and historical. Celestial history which contains a heavenly
prologue, is not the terrestrial history of the cosmos and of man. It is,
we will see in Section E, the history within the divine Godhead. It is a
predetermination of terrestrial history. We will see, in Chapter II 2
that Berdyaev asserts the illumination of the divine principle, an
illumination which is symbolized in the illumination of mankind in
terrestrial history.
In our study of Berdyaev's epistemology (Chapter IV), we will find
that he justifies his stretching and spiritualizing of such terms as history
(in "celestial history") by asserting a noetic of symbols and "myths.
Celestial history is a true reality, revealed to us and one which we know.
The philosophy of history ought to be the metaphysics of history; it has its
origin in that heavenly prologue which predetermines historical destinies, and
in the revelation of the inner spiritual history; for heaven is our inner spiritual
heaven. Here is to be found that true tie between the historical and the metaphysical in which I see the deepest significance of every Christian philosophy of
history.3
"Here" (in the heavenly prologue and in the revelation of the inner
spiritual history), "is to be found that true tie between the historical
and the metaphysical ... " Berdyaev understands the celestial history
to be a predetermination, in God, of historical destinies in which human
freedom is allowed to operate. When Berdyaev speaks of "the revelation of the inner spiritual history," he means the revelation of the
celestial history, both as such and as it is reflected in the terrestial
history.
When Berdyaev says that "here is to be found that true tie between
1
Ibid., 39-40
Chapter II, Section C.
The Meaning 01 Histcwy, 40.
31
the historical and the metaphysical," he intends that the spiritual

history is both historical (as found in history) and metaphysical (in
itself). It is celestial and terrestrial, and the philosophy of history ought
to be the metaphysics of history because the former has its origin in
celestial history, the heavenly prologue, and in the revelation of inner
spiritual history, which are metaphysical.
He says that in the "true tie between the historical and the metaphysical" he sees the deepest significance of Christian philosophy of
history. He sees, here, the deepest significance because:
The tie ... transcends cleavage and antithesis; it achieves the maximum union
reconciliation and identification; and it brings about the mysterious adaptation
and transfiguration of the one into the other, of the heavenly into the terrestrial,
of the metaphysical into the historical, of the interior into the exterior.l
Hence, in the tie between the historical and the metaphysical is the
deepest significance of the Christian philosophy of history because it
achieves the maximum union and brings about the transfiguration of
history. The truest and deepest intelligibility of Berdyaev's philosophy
of history is thus religious; the purpose of philosophy of history is
religious, since the tie between the historical and the metaphysical
brings about transfiguration of the historical.
Note the direction of the spiritual movement, as Berdyaev understands it. It is not the movement of the terrestrial and historical upward,
toward God, but rather of God acting immanently in man and through
man in history.2 Berdyaev thinks in terms of the spiritualization of
man and of history. Man is spiritual, already has something of the
divine. God is immanent as well as transcendent. 3 Berdyaev says, in
concluding the chapter on the metaphysics of history in The Meaning
ot History:
We draw a sharp line of demarcation between the historical and the metaphysical, between terrestrial and celestial history. But this distinction does not reflect
the true reality and but forms an abstraction of our consciousness. ... The
metaphysics of history ... approaches man's destiny from the standpoint of the
inner intimacy and union subsisting between his celestial and terrestrial destinies. 4
The truth of philosophy of history is to be found, not in the "abstraction of our consciousness" which divides the historical and the
Ibid., 40.
Berdyaev considers the immanent action of God to be gracious in the higher spiritual
activity of man. The action of God, immanent in man, is the source of Grace. Cf. The Realm
of Spirit and the Realm of Caesar, 181. He does not define the exact conditions of Grace.
S See Chapter II.
1
2
32
metaphysical. Philosophy of history finds its truth in the symbolic

metaphysics which asserts the inner intimacy and union of man's
celestial and terrestrial destinies. l
Metaphysics, Berdyaev asserts in a later book, The Divine and the
Human, is understandable upon condition of its reference to history. In
this book he uses a new term which etymologically comprehends both
metaphysics and history; namely, meta-history. 2
My thought ... admits of only one possible metaphysics, and that is metahistory. Everything existential is history, dynamic force, destiny, man, the world,
are history, God is history, a drama that is working itself out .... The philosophy
to which I would give expression, is a dramatic philosophy of destiny, of existence which is in time and passes over into eternity, of time which presses on to
an end, and which is not death but transfiguration, Everything, therefore, ought
to be regarded from the point of view of the philosophy of history. And the
philosophy of history can itself be nothing but prophetic, and that which
unriddles the secrets of the future. 3
This passage refers our thought to what we have seen concerning the
historical quality of divine celestial history. The mere historical, on the
other hand, in whatever degree of spirituality or materiality, is spiritual. "Everything existential is history .... God is history." 4 That is
why Berdyaev's doctrine admits of only one possible metaphysics meta-history. He sees everything - including all the objects of metaphysics - in respect to history (which is not to say that he asserts only
the historical). His is a metaphysics of existence, an existence which has
a historical aspect. Meta-history gives rise to philosophy of history because the object of the latter is an existence "which is in time and passes
over into eternity." Meta-history brings into being a philosophy of
history that is prophetic of the future transfiguration of historical
existents, whereby they become solely metaphysical entities.
From the foregoing pages we can see that the philosophy of history is
in its essence a metaphysics of history. But while meta-history, or
metaphysics, is absolutely spiritual, philosophy of history partakes of
1 Ibid., 52: "This is ... not a philosophy but a mythology.... Only a mythology, which
conceives the divine celestial life as celestial history and as a drama of love and freedom
unfolding itself between God and His other self, which He loves and for whose reciprocal
love He thirsts, and only an admission of God's longing for His other self, can provide a
solution of celestial history and, through it, of the destinies of both man and the world."
54; " ... this is the sphere of mythology, in which I find not the negation but the affirmation
of reality. And thus mythology may offer a real key to the metaphysics of history."
2 The term, meta-history, appears at least as early as I940 in Berdyaev's WIiting, when he
wrote Slavery and Freedom. It becomes accepted in his philosophical vocabulary from that
time onward.
S N. Berdyaev, The Divine and the Human (Bles, London, I949), v-vi.
4 In Section E we study in what sense God is historical.
33
the material conditions of history. We need only glance at the contents

of Berdyaev's books: they have much history, not historical details, but
universal history. Berdyaev's philosophy of history attempts to fuse
history with metaphysics.
(2) Metaphysics
But this implies that metaphysics can be considered apart from the
history to which it gives meaning. Does Berdyaev ever discuss metaphysics as distinct from the historical? One of his last books, The Beginning and the End, is an attempt "to write a book in which he should
describe his metaphysical position as a whole."l He displays a tremendous erudition in the history of philosophy and refers to dozens of
metaphysical positions in all periods of Western philosophy. He gives
special attention to 19th-century German metaphysical positions. 2 A
large section of the book is devoted to the problems of being. He obviously understands the traditional notion of metaphysics; a science
which studies transcendental entities, such as Being and Existence.
He defines his own notion of metaphysics in the Preface:
1 have for a long while wanted to write a book in which 1 should describe my
metaphysical position as a whole. 1 use the word "metaphysics," but my readers
must not give it here its traditional and academic meaning. 1 am concerned
rather with the kind of metaphysics which is disclosed in the spirit of, for instance,
Dostoyevsky, Kierkegaard, ..... with existential metaphysics. 1 want to survey
all problems in the light of eschatology in the light which streams from the
End. 3
As 1 deal with the problems of metaphysics 1 find myself inmanyrespects
indebted to Boehme . .. Of all the writers of the ancient world it is Heraclitus
with whom 1 have the greatest affinity.l should describe my book as an essay in
the epistemological and metaphysical interpretation of the end of the world, of
the end of history, that is to say it is a book on eschatological epistemology and
metaphysics. So far as I am aware no interpretation of that kind has been made
hitherto. Eschatology has been left as a part of dogmatic theology ... 4
Berdyaev is thus claiming eschatology from dogmatic theology, to be

used in his own philosophy. Metaphysics, for him, is both philosophical
and Christian. He does not intend to change philosophy to religion; indeed, he considers it to be different from religion as well as from science
"though standing in ... intimate relations with science and religion." 5
The Beginning and the End, v.
a See ibid., Table of Contents.
3 Ibid., v.
4 Ibid., vi.
S The Destiny of Man, 4-5.
34
"Philosophy is neither religious faith nor science - it is itself." 1 He

admits, on the other hand, that his philosophy "goes beyond the accepted limits of philosophy and represents a confession of faith." 2 In
his last work, Truth and Revelation, he denies the sharp distinction between faith and philosophical knowledge. "If on the one hand religious
philosophy ... presupposes faith, so also on the other ... does knowledge
which is purely philosophical and even scientific knowledge ... " 3
The truth which metaphysics seeks is the same truth that religion
and even science seek.4 There is one truth, and "there are degrees in the
apprehension of truth." 5
. Metaphysics for Berdyaev, therefore, is distinct and yet not separate
from religion. We will study his indebtedness to the Heracleitean metaphysics of the German religious mystic, Boehme, in Chapter II. And in
Chapter III, we will see the close relationship of his metaphysics to the
existentialism of modern philosophers whose inspiration flows from the
religious philosopher, Kierkegaard. His eschatology is treated in both
Chapters II and III.
Metaphysics is in its essence associated with philosophy of history
through its eschatology and through its existentialism. 6 Berdyaev has
said that "Christian metaphysics ... is above all a philosophy of
,history." 7 Metaphysics, however, is peculiarly transcendent. 8
Let us note that Berdyaev's metaphysics is a new kind of metaphysics.
The source of it is an attitude which is at once consciously philosophical
and yet religious. Metaphysics treats both philosophical first principles
and eschatology. Eschatology is religious and therefore prior in importance, and it is the principle of philosophy of history. We may expect to discover in Chapters II and III, therefore, that Berdyaev's
metaphysics places philosophical first principles at the service of philosophy of history. And since his eschatology is a messianism, his metaphysics is profoundly influenced by a doctrine of Christ the Godman
and Messiah. Christ is a concern of metaphysics. In Chapter III we will
consider a personalism and an existentialism which are part of
Berdyaev's metaphysics of Godmanhood.
1
2
8
4
&
Ibid.,5.
Dream and Reality, 301-302.
Truth and Revelation, 41.
See Chapter IV.
a Concerning the affinity of existentialism with philosophy of history, see Chapter III.
7
8
The Divine and the Human, 168.
Cf. Dream and Reality, 127.
35
D. THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY AND THE END OF HISTORY
We have been dealing with a metaphysics of historical existence because it is an existence "which is in time and passes overinto etemity,
QI time which passes on to an end, an end which is not death but
transfiguration. "
The philosophy of history is in its origins intimately allied to eschatology;
eschatology is the doctrine of the goal of history, its issue and fulfilment. It is
absolutely essential for the conception and elaboration of the idea of history, as
a significant progression or movement capable of fulfilment. . .. it postulates a
final solution and issue, it presupposes a catastrophic fulfilment ... 1
That history and philosophy of history are eschatological is implicit

in the doctrine of universal history. Eschatology asserts that history
will end at the time of the Second Coming of Christ the Divine Messiah,
and it looks toward this event.
Berdyaev frequently refers to the messianism of his philosophy of
history, and with good reason. History, considered without reference
to the event of the Second Coming, he often says, is inexplicable despite all the partial meanings which can be found in it.
For if we are convinced that history has no immanent solution, then all its failures
become imbued with a deep significance that transcends the fulfilment of a given
aim in particular epoch. The conception of a transcendent goal gives history a
deep significance which it lacks when interpreted as the pursuit of and fulfilment
of immediate aims .... Nor does my interpretation of history as a profound
failure imply that it is devoid of significance, for I consider its failure to be sacred.
It helps to demonstrate that the higher calling of both man and mankind is
super-historical ... 2
This eschatological viewpoint adds a new note to our considerations

ofthe historical and philosophy of history. We found that, for Berdyaev,
historical reality contains intelligible meaning, especially the meaning
found in cultural, traditional development. Now, Berdyaev adds that
history, if understood without the significance it has when seen in
the light of a transcendental principle, has no immanent solution of
its own.
The "fulfilment of a given aim in a particular epoch" is incapable of
accounting for the failures of history; but, says Berdyaev, "the conception of a transcendent goal" imbues the failures of history with a
deep significance. Indeed, Berdyaev interprets history as a "profound
1
2
The Meaning of Hiskwy, 32.

Ibid., 182-183.
failure," but it is a sacred failure because it shows that the superhistorical is the "higher calling of man and mankind." 1
The failure of history does not mean that history is devoid of necessity or relevance .... Historical success and achievement do not constitute a valid criterion
of the true. ... The profound significance of historical destiny and experience
do not depend on any realization. It rests beyond the limits of history.2
We now find that Berdyaev sharpens the distinction between the mere
historical and the metaphysical. The mere historical, we see, refers to
something peripheral. There, only the superficial intelligibility of history exists, where historical movements are seen to achieve or miss realization. But philosophy of history employs a messianic perspective
where the solution of history - not merely immanent - is and must be
transcendent over history. There is a divine necessity and relevance
being realized in history and, not being of history, is not subject to
the vicissitudes of history.
We must note that the principle of divine Grace is active in the history and
destiny of both world and man, together with that of natural necessity ....
. . . Thus history is made up of the complex interaction of the three principles
of necessity, freedom and transfiguring Grace. 3
In addition to the principles of natural necessity and freedom, transfiguring Grace interacts with them. Transfiguring Grace because it
favors the progress of man towards the transfiguration which will occur
at the end of history.4
The failure of history, on the other hand, to provide its own solution
must be understood in terms of Berdyaev's doctrine of freedom. We
will see, in Chapter II, that ultimate Freedom, primal Will, which is
beyond good and evil, is the source of good and evil. The metaphysics
1 The failures of history (which are human) submit to a testing and a self-realization. Cf.
Slavery and Freedom, 263: "History is the failure of spirit, the Kingdom of God is not realized
or expressed in it. But that very failure itself has a meaning. The great testing trials of man
and the experience of the seductive lures through which he lives have a meaning. Without
them the freedom of man would not have been fully tested and proved."
3 Ibid., 60-61.
4 But let us make no mistake concerning the basic historical pessimism of Berdyaev, even
if he is, on the meta-historical level, a Christian optimist. He says, in Truth and Revelation,
80: "History is not the incarnation of Spirit as Hegel and others have taught, it is not a
progzessive march and the triumph of reason, nor is it progzess along a straight and rising line.
History is a horrible tragedy .
. .. On the one hand I accept history as my path, the past of man, and on the other hand
I indignantly tear the mask from it and rebel against it."
Yet, we will see in Chapter II, Section D, Part 3, that Berdyaev sees a true progress in
history. And he looks forward to greater spirituality in the world, to a new middle ages.
37
of history applies the light of the Christian doctrine of apocalypse (end

of the world):
to those positive Christian forces which culminate in the Coming of Christ
together with those negative anti-Christian forces which must culminate in the
coming of the Anti-christ.!
There are two freedoms and hence two paths taken by men: positive
Christian forces which must culminate in the coming of Christ (at the
end of the world), and negative, evil forces which must culminate in
the coming of the Antichrist (just before the end of the world). The
tragic meaning of history is thus seen in the light of sacred Christian
doctrine, and the happy meaning of history is seen in the light of the
doctrine of the Second Coming at the end of the world. As Berdyaev
implies in the foregoing passages, though history by itself could arrive
at no solution, yet man, with the aid of meta-history, does progress
toward a better consciousness. Berdyaev refers to this when he speaks of
"those positive Christian forces which culminate in the Coming of Christ. "
E. PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY IN RESPECT TO TIME
We have seen reference to the idea of celestial history, a doctrine of

some kind of history in God. According to celestial history, the destiny
of man is predetermined. This theory leads Berdyaev to problems
connected with time.
Every metaphysical system ... which regards the "historical" as something
essential to the innermost depths of being, is bound to recognize the ontological
significance of time, that is, the doctrine that time exists for the very essence of
being. And this brings us to the problem of the relation of time and eternity.2
Note that he speaks of the "historical" the spiritual significance of

history and the mere historical. He is saying, not that the innermost
depths of being is historical, but that in some way there is a "historical"
quality. Berdyaev associates this "historical" quality with time. If the
"historical" is essential to the innermost depths of being, it is necessary
for Berdyaev to account for the relation of time to the "historical" and
yet continue to respect the meta-physical character of metaphysics. It
is a problem, he says, of the relation of time and eternity. "But perhaps
time is itself rooted in eternity and forms part of it?" he asks. "This
The Meaning
z Ibid., 63.
0/
History,
204.
is precisely the problem I should like to consider; I regard it as a

fundamental problem of the metaphysics of history ... " 1
Time therefore is not a finite circle into which nothing eternal can penetrate, but
one that can be extended to comprehend it. This is one aspect of the problem.
The other assumes that time itself is rooted in the depths of eternity. And thus
what we call time in our world historical process, in our world reality, which is a
process in time, is a sort of interior epoch in eternity itself.2
Note, first of all, that Berdyaev does not define the notion of time; he
sets out by discussing time as if his readers agree as to what it is. He
seems to understand it to be the measure of change. He will distinguish
kinds of time but will not separate them. Time can be spiritualized so
that the eternal can penetrate it. Time itself has its origin in eternity;
it is an interior epoch in eternity. We will have to examine, presently,
the meaning of epoch (or age, or era, or aeon) .
. . . neither Platonism nor ancient Hindoo philosophy provide a tie between time
and the inner essence of being. This latter is generally conceived as timeless and
not as any process possessing its own time and epochs, in other words, as an
immobile eternity opposed to any time process. 3
His assumption, in the passage above, is that that the metaphysical

existent is itself a process or becoming; hence, eternity is temporal in
some way. God in His inmost depths is a Becoming. 4 We saw (Section
B, Part 3) that the primal depths of God is a will, and we will see in
Chapter II that it is a becoming. And we have seen that the fact of a
freedom from endless cycles (which have no real history) is posited in
universal history. For Berdyaev, universal history is properly a celestial
history, is metaphysical. Hence, for him, the metaphysical partakes
of the temporal character of history. When Berdyaev says:
. .. time, our world, the whole of our world process, from the moment of its
inception to that of its end, represents a period, an aeon in the life of eternity, a
period or an epoch rooted in it. 5
he does not mean that our world process is an epoch within an unchanging eternity, but within an eternity out of which occurs a celestial
history.
I believe, therefore, that a real metaphysics of history can be built up only upon
1
Ibid., 63-64.
Ibid., 65.
See Chapter II, Section C.
z Ibid., 64.
4
PHILOSOPHY OF HI STORY
39
the basis of a dynamic and not a static interpretation of the nature of the world
process. 1
That is, the inner intelligibility of the world process, which is to be in

celestial history, must be dynamic in order to have a true metaphysics
of history. This means that the "historical," even in its least historical
and most spiritual and metaphysical aspect, is dynamic and changeful,
partaking of freedom's changefulness.
Berdyaev worked over and reconsidered the problem of time and
eternity for nearly twenty years after he wrote The Meaning of History
before he discovered a doctrine of time which explains the temporal
character of celestial history.2 We find the new doctrine first presented
in the book, Slavery and Freedom, first published in I940.
The philosophy of history is to a considerable extent the philosophy of time. . ..
Time has a variety of meanings and it is needful to make distinctions. There are
three times: cosmic time, historical time, and existential time, and every man
lives in these three forms of time. Cosmic time ... is nature's time, and as natural
beings we live in this time. Cosmic time is objectivized time, and it is subject to
mathematical calculation.... Man is not only a cosmic being, ... Man is also
a historical being. . .. The time of history is also objectivized time, but there is
also a break-through in it from a deeper stratum of human existence....
In addition to cosmic time and historical time, which are objectivized and
subordinated to number, though in different ways, there is existential time,
profound time. Existential time must not be thought of in complete isolation
from cosmic and historical time, it is a break through of one time into the other.
.. the irruption of eternity into time, and interruption in cosmic and historical
time ...
This is inward time, not exteriorized in extension, nor objectivized. It is the time
of the world of subjectivity, not objectivity. It is not computed mathematically
.. the infinity of existential time is a qualitative infinity, not a quantitative.
.. A moment of existential time is an emergence into eternity. It would be untrue
to say that existential time is identical with eternity, but it may be said that it is a
participant in several moments 0/ eternity.3 (my italics)
Man lives in all three times, cosmic, historical and existential time.
Cosmic and historical time are both objectified, and both are subject
to mathematical calculation. But cosmic time is only nature's time.
Ibid., 66.
a Berdyaev's theory of time follows very properly out of his doctrine. It is very possible
that Berdyaev was influenced by a scheme of three times which was published by Alexeyev
a few years b",fore The Meaning of History was written. N. O. Lossky, in his History of Russian
Philosophy (International Universities Press, New York, 1951), 381, mentions Alexeyev's
Thought and Reality, written 1914. In the article on "Time," Alexeyev distinguishes between
ontological, psychological and physical time. Ontological time is cognized by thought apart
from connection with movement in space; in that time there exists a "now" univalent for
all world systems.
3 Slavery and Freedom, 257-261.
1
Historical time, however, refers, not only to nature's time (time

measured by the astronomical movements) but also to historical epochs
known by memory and tradition. In tradition and in the suggestiveness
of tradition historical time is at once conservative and revolutionary.!
Existential time is a break-through of eternity into historical and
cosmic time. It is subjective and inward and cannot be externalized
mathematically. Though it is not exactly eternity, it is a participant in
eternity. Every creative act of man (such as a metaphysical insight or
an artistic creation), is performed in existential time and projected in
historical time. 2
We find Berdyaev's answer to the problem of the temporality of
celestial history, the "history" within the divine. It is "temporal," but
its temporality cannot be understood at all in the mathematical way in
which cosmic and historical times are understood. Neither can the
duration of culture, which is grasped by the memory, though beyond
the reach of mathematical extension, define the temporality of existential time. The temporality of celestial history, Berdyaev seems to
mean, consists in its dynamism and creativity, in its ability to spiritualize measurable times, and in its power to contain eternally all historical and cosmic histories. The "several moments" of eternity that
existential time participates in are celestial history.
Berdyaev's theory of time, besides explaining his doctrine of the
temporality of celestial history, by the same token, shows the close
spiritual relationship of the merely historical with celestial history,
and yet the definite distinction between them.
The existential breaks through in the historical and the historical in return acts
upon the existential. ... Within history there is meta-history, which is not a
product of historical evolution. ... The revelation of God in history is also this
irruption of events belonging to existential time. The full significance of an event
in the life of Christ moved in e~istential time; in historical time it only shines
through the burdensome environment of objectivization. The meta-historical is
never contained in the historical, history always distorts meta-history in adjusting it to itself. 8 (my italics)
The mere historical is not the existential; the existential only breaks
through in the historical, and history acts upon and distorts this revelation in adjusting it to itself.4 When Berdyaev says, above, that "the
Ibid., 259.
See Chapter II, Section C.
Slavery and Freedom, 262.
, We will see, in Chapter III, that the existential, so far as we know it, concerns man in
his spiritual subjectivity.
1
8
8
4I
meta-historical is never contained in the historical," he means that this

revelation, in history, is not historical. Philosophy of history understands the intelligibility of history in enabling the philosopher to know
the existential as such. But for Berdyaev, philosophy of history does
not assert history to be an existential reality. We see, in the example
Berdyaev uses; namely "an event in the life of Christ"; that the
existential reality (which occurs, really, only in celestial history) is not
historical, is not of history. Berdyaev, we will see in Chapter III, tends
to be unhistorical. He does not recognize an autonomous existence of
terrestrial history. We will find that he wants mankind to divest itself
of the conditions of life which are historical in order to prepare itself
for the transfiguration of history.1
He next considers the relationship of historical time to cosmic time:
There are two ways out of historical time, in two opposite directions, towards
cosmic time and towards existential time. The submersion of historical time in
cosmic time is the way out for naturalism ... History returns to nature and
enters into the cosmic cycle. a
Since historical time includes cosmic time, it is possible for historical

time to be submerged in cosmic time if man's outlook became exclusively cosmic. This would happen if men forgot the "historical" and
forgot themselves and considered only the cosmic world.
The other way is the submersion of historical time in existential time. This is the
way out taken by eschatology. History passes into the realm of the freedom of
the spirit. And a philosophy of history is always in the last resort either naturalistic, even though it makes use of the categories of spirit, or it is eschatologica1. 3
Indeed, there could be a philosophy of history dominated by the cosmic

outlook. 4 The other alternative is Berdyaev's philosophy of history,
which, he says, is eschatological, "the submersion of historical time in
existential time." Eschatological, because the eternity of existential
time contains the apocalypse of history.
Berdyaev takes only two alternatives (ignoring the possibility of a
philosophy of history which would remain in historical time),5 because
See Chapter II, Section D, Part 3.
8 Ibid., 262-263.
4 See Spengler, Decline 0/ the West, Volume II, Chapter 1.
5 Berdyaev ignores the possibility of a philosophy of history which would remain in
historical time because, for him, it would not be philosophical. It would be a relativism,
lacking the intelligibility which occurs in a cosmic or an eschatological philosophy of history.
He accuses Hegel of such a relativism, precisely because Hegel remains in the historical.
(Slavery and Freedom, 256) "In History, Hegel subordinated not only man, but God - God
is the creation of history - The above view - inevitably asserts relativity ... "
But Hegel, for Berdyaev (and for anybody), has truly a philosophy of history. Berdyaev
1
both alternatives set themselves outside the relativity of terrestrial

history. The cosmic alternative would find an intelligibility beyond
history in natural laws. The eschatological alternative would find an
intelligibility beyond history in the spiritual realm.
Can Berdyaev's philosophy be called historical because the intelligibility of terrestrial history that he finds is in celestial history? No, not
if we define his philosophy in his own terms; for it is clear that he believes celestial history is not historical. It is meta-historical. We may
call his philosophy historical if we mean that it is very much concerned
with terrestrial history, but, properly speaking, we must say it is not
historical. Its light is metaphysical and religious, not natural or
historical; its interest is predominantly meta-historical all the time;
and it must be termed a mystical philosophy.l We will encounter its
mysticism in Chapter IV. Berdyaev continues:
Historical time with everything that happens in it has a meaning, but that
meaning lies outside the limits of historical time itself, it is to be seen in an
eschatological perspective. 2
And the meaning of history breaks through into the mere historical
through the freedom or free creativity of man:
is referring to Hegel in the text above cited (Cf........ ) when he speaks of a naturalistic
philosophy of history which yet uses the categories of spirit. For Berdyaev, Hegel has a
naturalistic philosophy of history because he makes the historical into a law, relative though
it may be. "A philosophy of history, in the last resort, is eiiher naturalistic, even though it
makes use of the categories of spirit, or it is eschatological." (Slavery ana Freedom, 263).
He says, in Truth ana Revelation, 88: "And revelation must be freed from the power of the
historical, or, to speak more truly, from the power of historism, from the process of making what
is relative absolute." (my italics)
1 It is a temptation to call Berdyaev's philosophy merely historical because a philosophy
of celestial history partakes of the metaphorical or unscientific knowledge, of the historical
that is found in a great work of history. That is, it uses the same epistemological approach
and often-times diverts itself with a purely historical study. And if one were not on guard,
in defining the philosophy of Berdyaev, he might believe there is an essential historicism in
his philosophy or theology of history. He says, concerning his mysticism of history, in
Freedom ana the Spirit, 268: "Mysticism is the opposite of historical realism. Yet there is,
nevertheless, a mysticism of history. The whole history. of the world is the history of my
spirit, for in the spirit these two histories cease to be externally opposed to one another.
This, however, does not mean that reality of myself is destroyed or that I lose my identity
by being merged into all other objects. It means, rather, that I acquire being, reality, and
personality when everything about me has ceased to be external, strange, impenetrable, or
lifeless, and when the kingdom of love is realized."
For Berdyaev, therefore, what we may call a historical metaphor becomes identified in the
knower with a mystical knowledge of one's spirit. And, since a mystical knowledge of one's
spirit is at the same time mystical knowledge of the highest religious reality, the metaphor
becomes identical, in the knower, with a mysticism of meta-history, but there is not a
historicism in this mysticism of history, because the whole history of the world is spiritualized into meta-history in joining with the mysticism of one's spirit. In short, in a mysticism
of history, history is transfigured, eternity, the end of the world, is at that moment apprehended.
I Slavery ana Freedom, 263.
43
... this break-through from the depths is the work of man and God, it is the
combined work of man and God, a divine-human action.... The whole mystery
here lies in the fact that God does not act in the determined arrangement of
things which belongs to objectivized nature. He acts only in freedom, only
through the freedom of man. 1
The key to understanding "the combined work of man and God" is

found in the phrase: "a divine-human action." Berdyaev means, not
two actions in transfiguring history, God's and man's, but the action
of a divine-human man in whom God and man act. It is an implicit
reference to the doctrine of Godmanhood, where, we will find, man is
said to be divine, as well as human. This is why the meta-historical can
break through into history by means of man; man is divine. Consequently, Berdyaev says:
... the end of history is thought of as taking place in time, while at the same time
the end of history is the end of time, that is to say, the end of historical time. The
end of history is an event of existential time. And at the same time we must not
think of this event as being outside history.2
And thus Berdyaev solves the problem of the relation of time and
eternity which he sets himself in The Meaning of Hist01'Y. Celestial
time, the end of history, must take place in history (though not as historical time), because it is brought about by the divine-human action
occuring in man. And this brings us to a consideration of Berdyaev's
doctrine of Godmanhood.
F. PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY
AND THE DOCTRINE OF GODMAN HOOD
Berdyaev says in The Meaning of History:

Christ, the Absolute Man, the Son of both God and man, stands in the center
of both celestial and terrestrial history. He is the inner spiritual tie between these
two destinies. Without His help the tie between the human and the absolute
reality, could not exist. In fact, history owes its existence entirely to the presence
of Christ at its very heart. He represents the deepest mystical and metaphysical
foundation and source of history and of its tragic destiny. Both the divine and
the human energy flow towards and away from Him. Without Him this energy
would neither exist nor possess any significance .
... The coming of Christ put an end to the cleavage between the metaphysical
and the historical which become united and identified in Him. Thus, the meta1
I
Ibid., 263.
Ibid., 263-264.
44
physical becomes the historical and vice-versa; and celestial becomes terrestrial
history which can be apprehended as a stage of the former.l
Christ is the Absolute Man because, as we shall see in Chapter II, He

is absolutely True Man. He "stands in the center of both celestial and
terrestrial history" in the sense that He dominates both "Histories,"
and also in the sense that His activity in both histories occurs neither at
the :first moment nor at the last moment of the historical progress. He is
the inner spiritual tie between these two destinies because, while he is
ineffably God, and a divine celestial history, he is also the Godman, the
Existent, Who is the metaphysical destiny of history. The divine and
the human energy flow towards Him and away from Him because it
is an energy grounded in an irrational and absolute freedom. So far as
it is illuminated by Him (in God and, sporadically, in man) it is good.
So far as it is not illuminated by Him, it is evil. Without Him (Who is
God) this (divine) energy would not exist; this energy would not
possess any significance, because only the divine Word, or Meaning,
can give it (irrational freedom) significance.
This is why Christ's coming put an end to the cleavage between the
religious, the metaphysical and the historical; the participation of
pre-Christian man in this energy or irrational freedom before Christ's
coming was unilluminated by the revelation of Christ. The historical,
therefore, before His coming was separated from the metaphysical. The
two are identified in Him and, as a result of His coming, they progressively became identified with one another. Berdyaev implies that
the "historical" is most properly the divine Logos. In Him, celestial
history becomes terrestrial history; and terrestrial history can be
apprehended as a stage of the celestial history.
G. SUMMARY
I. The reality with which philosophy of history is primarily concerned is not the superficial history studied by historical science; but a
spiritual reality which Berdyaev terms the" historical." And philosophy
of history is a spiritual knowledge known by the human spirit. The
spirituality of the "historical" is such, that the "historical" is both the
reality which is known and also is identical with the knower through
his knowledge of it. The "historical" is especially known through the
1
The Meaning 01 History, 58-59.
45
category of historical tradition. Historical tradition is itself a reality,

even though it is the mode of knowing the "historical." The "historical" is organic and a coherent spiritual unity.
The "historical" (with quotation marks) refers to something beyond
history. It is the spiritual meaning of history and does not partake of
the material conditions of history. The "historical" also refers to man
in the concrete fullness of the spiritual being, that is, in his most existential reality. It refers both to the ultimate Reality; so far as it is the
meaning of history, and to man through whom the diffusion of meaning
into history occurs. Hence, there is no separation between the "historical," the human spirit, or the mere historical. The mere historical
itself is more or less spiritual (as are, for example, historical traditions
or the "historical nation.") And philosophy of history studies the mere
historical in the light of the "historical" in order to find the spiritual
meaning materialized in history.
The "historical," the spiritual meaning of history is identical with
the true spiritual being of man. The True Man is the Godman, the
divine Logos. Christ, the Godman is the true meaning of history. For
Berdyaev, it seems, He is the "historical" which the philosopher of
history seeks. And each man is a microcosm in whom the "historical"
is sought; a microcosm in which all the past historical epochs coexist.
The "historical" is thus grasped by the historical memory of man. The
historical memory is a spiritual activity and the ontological basis of
history. It is through the historical memory that the philosopher
approaches history and existentially identifies his destiny with its
destiny. This is an existential philosophy. And the memory, which is
also spiritually related to the "historical," transfigures history and
brings it closer to reality, to the "historical." It does this by means of
the symbols it creates, the historical myths and traditions. They
symbolize historical destinies.
Berdyaev exhorts the reader to recognize and experience the unity of
his own destiny with that of all mankind. This is necessary in order to
attain the "historical." Berdyaev thus asserts the religious and moral
doctrine of universal history. His philosophy is religious; it is about an
after-world, the "historical," the goal of history. All history is a unique
history, with a beginning and an end. There is one historical culture, of
which all other cultures are parts. The philosopher of history studies
historical cultures in order to understand the meaning of history. It is
incarnated in them and in the single culture of all history. Christianity
posits a universal history, without which a philosophy of history is
impossible. Christian consciousness asserts that events are unique and

non-recurrent, participating in a single history, whose course is known
in Christian revelation. The Christian world is therefore dynamic and
purposeful. The condition of this dynamism is freedom, a radical
freedom that Christianity finds in man and in God. Indeed, universal
history is the story of the interaction between the free human spirit and
necessitarian and fallen nature. Fallen nature, which enslaves man,
needs to be spiritualized so that it will be transfigured, with man, at
the end of the world.
Berdyaev sees five epochs of terrestrial history, during which the
divine-human action gradually frees man from the cosmos and fallen
nature in a progress towards the end of history. Historical epochs are
seen to culminate in a future age, a New Middle Ages; which is nigh
and will be a final spiritual preparation of man for the end of the world.
Berdyaev asserts the unity of history and the "historical," and,
consequently, the unity of universal history, both in its terrestrial
aspect and in its divine aspect. Terrestrial history of man is determined
by a celestial "history" within the Godhead, of which the Incarnation
of Christ is one moment. Celestial history, the divine development, is
the true reality, while terrestrial history is not fully true.
2. There is a metaphysics of history, a meta-history which is about
the existential reality found in celestial history. Philosophy of history is
meta-history (or metaphysics) in its truest essence. But meta-history is
more spiritual and not so concerned with the mere historical. Philosophy
of history is less spiritual, more concerned with the mere historical.
Metaphysics itself is a philosophical discipline in Berdyaev's doctrine;
it is Christian, but Berdyaev does not intend to change philosophy to
religion. There is no sharp distinction between faith and philosophical
knowledge; both are concerned with the same truth. Metaphysics treats
both philosophical first principles and eschatology; it is existential,
personalist and is concerned with Christ, the Godman and Messiah.
3. Philosophy of history is eschatological. It looks forward to the

Second Coming of the Messiah and the end of the world. History is
explainable only in the light of eschatology. It has no immanent solution but a transcendent one. Its failure (which will culminate in the
coming of the Anti-Christ) can only be overcome beyond the limits of
history. Man is free and the working of Divine Grace in history
transfigures his freedom.
47
4. The doctrine of celestial history, through which the unity of universal history is asserted, requires a philosophy of time. There is a
cosmic time of the fallen cosmos. There is a historical time of the past
and the present, which, in tradition, reaches towards the future. An
there is an existential time, which is the irruption of eternity into time.
Celestial history, which consists of several moments of existential time,
is "temporal" in the sense of being dynamic and in its power to spiritualize terrestrial history as an eternal epoch within itself. This celestial
"history," then, is not historical in the usual sense of the word; and we
will find that Berdyaev does not recognize an autonomous existence of
terrestrial history. Furthermore, his philosophy is mystical. The spiritualization of historical time in existential time which is to occur, will be
the combined work of God and of man, a divine-human action. Man
himself is properly unhistorical and, in his true reality, divine.
5. Christ, the absolute Man, is the inner spiritual tie between celestial
history and terrestrial history. Both the divine and human energy flow
towards and away from Him. The Coming of Christ put an end to the
the cleavage between the metaphysical and the historical which become
united and identified in Him. Thus, celestial becomes terrestrial history which can be apprehended as a stage of the former.
CHAPTER II
GODMANHOOD,
FREEDOM AND PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY
A. INTRODUCTION
We saw in Chapter I that the principle of philosophy of history, for

Berdyaev, is Christ, Godmanhood. We observed, too, that the free will
of man figures importantly. By studying Berdyaev's doctrine of
Godmanhood and his voluntarism we will be able to understand his
philosophy of history. The present chapter studies the metaphysical
sUbject-matter of philosophy of history especially as it is divine or
religious.
First, we will consider the doctrine of Godmanhood, that is, of Christ
Who is the Principle and Term of Berdyaev's philosophy of history.
Then we will study Berdyaev's voluntarism and the all-important
function of the free will of man in the philosophy of history. The voluntaristic philosophy, we will find, is a philosophy of spirit and a philosophy of beauty. Next, we will investigate three important consequences
which follow from the doctrine of Godmanhood. First to be seen is the
doctrine of Sobornost' or alltogetherness of mankind. Second to be
studied, is the place of cosmology in the philosophy of history, a cosmology which is inseparable from the doctrine of Godmanhood. Finally
to be investigated is the eschatological doctrine of the age of the Spirit.
It is a Christian doctrine of a goal of history which discovers and
strengthens the purposiveness that exists in human history.
B. THE DOCTRINE OF GODMANHOOD
Berdyaev says in Freedom and the Spirit:

The Christian conception of man is hierarchical and not evolutionist. Man is not
a transitory fragment of the cosmos, a mere step in its evolution; he is superior to
the cosmos, independent of its infinity, and in principle embraces it completely.l
1
Freedom and the Spirit, 275.
GODMANHOOD, FREEDOM AND PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY
49
The Christian conception of man is hierarchical. Man is superior to

the cosmos by virtue of a pre-ordained hierarchical supremacy, not by
virtue of a natural evolution to the summit of the universe. He is independent of the cosmic infinity because he is above it. As we will see
in Chapter III, Section F, he embraces the cosmos in principle because
Christ, the True Man, the Eternal Man, is the principle from whom men
and the cosmos come (and to whom they will return).
The time has come to write a justification of man, an anthropodicy. Perhaps an
anthropodicy is the only way to a theodicy ... A religion of man is being born.l
The problem of Godmanhood for Berdyaev, at least, comes from

contemporary Russian thought.2
The idea of God-manhood, the development of which was principally due to
Vladimir Soloviev, and the religious philosophy of the beginning of the twentieth
century, means the mutual penetration and the union of two natures, the Divine
and the human, while the distinction between them and their independence is
preserved.
The doctrine of God-manhood presupposes commensurability between God and
man, the presence of the divine principle in man, and at the same time it does not
admit monistic identity.3
Berdyaev refers to Solovyev, the founder of the doctrine of Godmanhood

who formulated his theory shortly before the twentieth century.4 The
movement of religious philosophy Berdyaev mentions is Russian. The
mystical quality of Berdyaev's philosophy is clearly seen, particularly
in the phrase, "the mutual penetration and the union of two natures,
the Divine and the human." 5 This is why Berdyaev's philosophy of
history is primarily a metaphysics of history in which the light of
revelation and Sacred Doctrine is stronger than the light of reason.
Man is considered to be divine. His philosophy of history is seen to be
divine rather than historical. 6 True knowledge is mystical and divine.
The Meaning of the C~eative Act, 19.
Berdyaev leaves no doubt of the origin of the doctrine of Godmanhood in his book, The
Origin of Russian Communism (Bles, London, 1948), 180: "Russian creative religious thought
has introduced the idea of GodHumanity"; 172: "There is nothing of this doctrine in such
a form either in Schelling or in other representatives of Western thought."
3 The Beginning and the End, 36.
4 Cf. V. Solovyev, Lectu~es on Godmanhood (Dobson, London, 1948).
5 The human and the divine (in every man) are distinct however. See Chapter III, Section F.
6 We find the following statement in The Meaning of History, 44, concerning the divinity
of man's knowledge: "For heaven is not a remote transcendental and unattainable sphere:
it is a paxt of the inmost depths of our spiritual life. When we dive below the surface and
penetrate into these depths we then readily commune with celestial life .... in this interior
spiritual reality ... lies the source of history. And in it, too, is revealed the drama of the
mutual relations between God and man."
1
50
The doctrine of Godmanhoodisthe principle by which Berdyaev's philosophy states that human history is an epoch in a divine and mystical
celestial history. Man and his history are more or less divine, symbols
of God and His history.
Though the immediate origin of Berdyaev's doctrine of Godmanhood
is in contemporary Russian thought, it is inspired by an ancient outlook
of Eastern Orthodoxy.
For the idea of the divinization of man is the fundamental concept of Orthodox
mysticism, the object of which is the transfiguration of everything created. 1
The gulf between the natural and the supernatural does not exist for mystical and
patristic writers of the East in the same sense as it does for Catholics ...
The Eastern Fathers, who were steeped in the spirit of Platonism, have never
regarded the non-divinity of the natural as absolute. 2
These are the thoughts that are always present with Berdyaev, and
when he considers history, the basic reality he seeks in historical events
is the divinization of man and the transfiguration of everything created. His philosophy both attempts to reveal this in history and strives
to make it an ethical and mystical norm. God is seen to be both immanent in man as well as transcendent over man.
Pure transcendence involves a complete dualism between the divine and the
human and makes impossible any real union between them. This is the reason
why both theology and plilosophy must refuse to take either God or man as their
starting point, but must rather begin with the God-Man whose theandric nature
is beyond and above this antithesis. 3
If a philosopher starts his philosophy with Christ the God-Man, then

he will avoid the danger of separating God and man or of identifying
God and terrestrial man. (The word, theandric, originating in the Greek
theos god, plus andros man, refers to the union of the divine and the
human.)
Berdyaev because he is a philosopher of history, is interested in the
divinity of man as well as in the divinity of Christ the Second Person of
the Blessed Trinity. He says in a later work, The Divine and the Human:
The birth of man in God is a theogonic process. In the eternal idea of him, man
is rooted in God-manhood and linked with the God-man ... Humanity exists in
eternity and ought to be realized in time. 4
1 Freedom and 'he Spirit, 254-255.
s Ibid., 256.
8 Ibid., 95.
4 The Divine and the Hllman, III-II2.
51
The Birth of man in God is a theogonic process, a process within God,

because it is the birth of the God-man, Christ, in the birth of the Trinity,
out of the primordial depths of God. l Eternal Man is the eternal idea of
man, Christ, Godmanhood. Humanity exists in eternity, in Christ. 2
Humanity ought to be realized in time says Berdyaev; that is, the
divine idea of humanity should be attained by men. s It is a metaphysical doctrine of redemption of mankind by Christ that Berdyaev
stresses in his philosophy. He opposes a notion of attainment through
legality or good works. 4 "Man is redeemed from the power of the law. "5
In Berdyaev's theory, God historically became man in order to raise
him to divinity but not, primarily in order to redeem him morally.
Christ is our revelation, not primarily our ransom. 6
Berdyaev understands "eternal idea of man" in the light of his metaphysics. It is not an idea in which man is created, but an idea in which
man eternally exists. 7 For Berdyaev this idea is not merely intelligible
but also imaginable. The mind knows by means of images and ideas in
which there is no sharp distinction between intelligence and imagination. Berdyaev's doctrine of Eternal Man and the theory of knowledge
that goes with it is especially favorable to the philosophy of history
that we find in Berdyaev. 8
Berdyaev often calls his philosophy a prophetic philosophy. We saw
in Chapter I how the (prophesied) future events of universal history are
both future and eterna1. 9 The knowledge of the future, which must be
peculiar to prophecy and to universal history, requires an imaginative
component. Hence, Berdyaev's philosophy can easily conceive of a
universal history which manifests an Eternal Manhood; for his imagi1 "Out of the Divine Nothing, the Gottheit or the Ungrund, the Holy Trinity, God the
Creator is born," The Destiny of Man, 25. Berdyaev says, in The Beginning and the End, 107;
"The divine Ungrund, before its emergence, is in the eternity of the Divine Trinity. God gives
birth to himself, realizes himself out of the Divine Nothingness."
2 Cf. Dream and Reality, 182, See Chapter III, Section C.
8 Dream and Reality, 182.
4 Indeed the FaIl of man is considered metaphysicaIly rather than morally. The FaIl cannot
be considered juridically as a formal transgression of God's will and an act of disobedience:
It is simply a wrong orientation by which man loses the idea of himself as a microcosm and
separates himself from the inner radiance. Freedom and the Spirit, 20, 21-23; 131-133; 148,
199-201.
The Destiny of Man, 105.

"The moral end of life is for it not the salvation of one's soul or the redemption of guilt
but creative realization of righteousness and of values which need not belong to the moral
order .... This is the basis of the ethics of creativeness." The Destiny 0/ Man, 133.
7 See Chapter III, Section D.
9 See Chapter I, Section D, which concerns eschatology. Thus the prophesied return of the
world to God is a metahistorical event, occuring in eternity; yet it will occur in the future
also as a goal of history.
5
52
GODMAN HOOD, FREEDOM AND PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY
native noetic is adaptable to a universal history and suited to a

mysticism of Eternal Man.
We will see 1 that Berdyaev's mystical doctrine of an Eternal Man,
considers terrestrial man an image, a metaphor of the Proto-type. The
image improves and there occurs the return of all men to God. That is
why a mystique and metaphoricism of history are amalgamated with a
mysticism of history in Berdyaev. We should understand in this light
the closing sentence of the above-quoted passage which says, "Humanity exists in eternity and ought to be realized in time." 2 Terrestrial man
is an image of Absolute Man and therefore is capable of realizing and
ought to realize, his Proto-type. s The "ought" is a mystical and also a
mythical or metaphorical" ought." That is, Eternal Man can be realized,
not absolutely but only in a metaphorical approximation, in time. 4
With this limitation, eternal humanity ought to be realized in time.
Berdyaev's philosophy of history sees, in its metaphoricism and in its
Christian mysticism, that the image of the Eternal Man, of Christ, is
improving throughout history. For example, man passes from an era
dominated by the cosmos to an era in-which the natural is ruled by man. 5
Berdyaev says in his last (and posthumous) work, Truth and Revelation:
Pure humanity, however, actually is the divine in man. 6
It is not man, but God who is human. 7

. . . the Son is not only God but man in the absolute and spiritual sense of the
word, that is the Eternal Man. s
And Eternal Man is mystically and metaphorically revealed in man and

in the various historical myths and particular cultures. It is the problem
of philosophy of history, along with the other parts of philosophy, to
bring forth this revelation of the Eternal Man. 9
Chapter III.
To say the image of the Eternal man is improving throughout history is a way of referring
to the progressive incarnation of spirit. See Chapter IV, Section G, Part 3, notes.
a See Chapter III, Section F.
4 See Chapter IV, Section G.
5 Berdyaev refers to the passage of man from an era dominated by the cosmos to an era
in which the natural is ruled by man, He describes this in terms of spirit, i.e., "spirit's
active conquest of nature." The Bourgeois Mind and Other Essays (Sheed and Ward, London,
1934), 35
6 Truth and Revelation, 50.
7 The Divine and the Human, no. Concerning Berdyaev's idea of Grace, see Chapter I,
p. 31, note 2.
8 Freedom and the Spirit, 137.
9 Solitude and Society, 22.
1
53
In order to understand distinctly Berdyaev's Principle of Godmanhood

let us turn to his doctrine of freedom. For, while Berdyaev has given us
the principle by which the patterns of events and entities may be explained, we have not yet seen the way in which he accounts for the
freedom of man and of God. There are two reasons why the role of
freedom in Berdyaev's doctrine will interest us. First, terrestrial history
needs to be an epoch of celestial history because freedom allowed the
Fall of man. Second, Berdyaev asserts on the one hand, an existential
metaphysics, and on the other hand, a metaphorical theory of the participation of man in Godmanhood. (a) The primacy of freedom does
allow the supremacy of existentialism over objective philosophy. (b)
The primacy of freedom is the condition of the metaphorical theory of
participation.
C. GODMANHOOD AND THE FREEDOM OF MAN
Berdyaev understands his own idea of freedom in relation to the philosophy of some Russian predecessors and contemporaries. They have
taken over the cosmologies and cosmogonies of German Idealist philosophers, particularly those of Schelling.1 And the question that Berdyaev has brought to these philosophers is: how well is the primacy of
freedom accounted for?
Vladimir Solovyev (I853-I900), a Russian philosopher, set forth the
doctrine of Sophia (the supreme Wisdom) and Godmanhood and attempted to synthesize the cosmogonical and cosmological doctrines to
which he fell heir. 2 Sophia for Solovyev is the pan-human organism (all
mankind), the eternal world-soul. It is also the divine Logos, Christ. 3
This sophiology (as it is called) is added to the doctrine of Godmanhood
by Solovyev. Godmanhood is the source of Solovyev's philosophical
inspiration. 4
His followers (and Berdyaev's contemporaries) 5 set forth a sophiology in their own doctrines and thus kept the views of Solovyev alive in
Berdyaev's own day. Berdyaev has found the primacy of freedom so ill
accounted for or neglected in their writings that he has defined his own
See Chapter III, notes.
z V. V. Zenkovsky, A History of Russian Philosophy (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London,
X953), 529-53x. Solovyev, Lectures on Godmanhood, x54, x59, x63.
8 Lectures on Goodmanhood, x63.
4 Zankovsky's History of Russian Philosophy, 483.
6 P. A. Florenski (x882-C. 1941) andS. N. Bulgakov (1871-1944) are Sophiologistsfollowing
Solovyev. Cf. Zenkovsky's History of Russian Philosophy, 480, 875, 890.
1
54
philosophical position in contrast to theirs. By so defining his doctrine,

he is able to assert a free Christian cosmogony, and can establish the
reality of history itself. History and historical movements tend to be
generalized and slighted in the intellectualist system. Their unique
quality is recognized in a doctrine which emphasizes the freedom of
God and of man. 1
His anti-intellectualist approach may be viewed through a criticism
he makes of a fellow Russian emigre, Sergei Bulgakov, a professional
theologian and a sophiologist. Berdyaev says, in Bulgakov's doctrine:
There is no absolute division between the Creator and His creation. The uncreated
Sophia exists in God for all eternity, it is the world of Platonic ideas. Through
Sophia our world was created, and there exists a created Sophia which permeates
creation. . .. The chief difficulty for Sophiology arises from the problem of evil
which is indeed inadequately stated and left unsolved. It is an optimistic system;
the fundamental idea is not that of freedom but the idea of Sophia. . .. the lack
of clarity in defining what Sophia is gives rise to criticism. Sophia appears to be
the Holy Trinity and the cosmos and humanity and the Mother of God. The
question arises: does there not result too great a multiplication of intermediaries?
... it remains doubtful how the eschatological expectation is to be reconciled
with sophiological optimism. There is an identification of the Church with the
Kingdom of God and that contradicts eschatological expectation. I do not myself
share the view of the sophiological school, but I place a high value on Bulgakov's
line of thought in Orthodoxy and upon his statement of new problems. His
philosophy does not belong to the existential type; he is an objectivist and a
universalist and fundamentally a platonist. He has too great a belief in the
possibility of arriving at the knowledge of God through intellectual concepts. 2
And, as Berdyaev states in his last book, Truth and Revelation:

In spite of everything, (Bulgakov's) religious metaphysics is a metaphysics of an
ontological datum not of an act. His nature philosophy is not free from sophiological determinism. The problem of freedom in such a system is full of difficulty
and it finds no solution, and the same is true of the problem of evi1. 3
Berdyaev is critical of Bulgakov's stand that there is no absolute division between the Creator and His Creation. But, for Berdyaev, too, so
far as the intelligibility of the world and of history is concerned, there is
no absolute division between them and God. The division which
Berdyaev asserts must be seen with respect to willing and in the order
of freedom; and the doctrine of freedom is uppermost in his mind when
he criticizes the sophiological doctrine.
1 But though Berdyaev recognizes the reality of history, he believes that human history
is not completely real or true. Only celestial history - that of God - is completely true. This
unhistorical attitude is due to Berdyaev's mystical outlook.
S The Russian Idea, 240-241.
55
Berdyaev mentions the various meanings of Sophia in Bulgakov's

doctrine and complains of a lack of clarity. He says there are too many
intermediaries posited in Bulgakov's sophiology. He means, that, since
Bulgakov makes no absolute division between the Creator and the
world, the cosmos, humanity and the Mother of God become divine
intermediaries instead of something less.
Berdyaev says, "I do not share the view of the sophiological school."
The sophiological doctrine amalgamates intellectual notions such as the
doctrines of the world-soul, humanity, and the cosmos with the Ineffable. It seeks the knowledge of God through intellectual concepts.
Berdyaev does not like this objective, universal and rational approach
to knowing God, and he calls it Platonic. It intellectualizes God. It is
in this light that he criticizes the objectivism, universalism and platonism of Bulgakov. In Bulgakov, then, Berdyaev is criticizing the "sophiological determinism" of the school. There is, he believes, no solution
to the question of freedom in such a system. He associates freedom with
a metaphysics of act, and determinism with a metaphysics of essence
("an ontological datum.") Hence, the doctrine of freedom is connected
with an existentialism, here.
The nature of this doctrine of freedom reveals itself when Berdyaev
criticizes another sophiologist, Vladimir Solovyev. Berdyaev says, in
The Russian Idea:
Solovyev was an intellectualist not a voluntarist. For that reason freedom does
not play such a part with him as it does with the voluntarist Khomyakov. His
world outlook belongs rather to the type of universal determinism, but the
determinism is spiritual. .. , The attainment of the all-embracing, both social
and cosmic, is for him of an intellectual character. There is no irrational freedom
with him.The falling away from God is the acceptance of principles which are
hostile to God. l
Berdyaev frequently says that he himself is a voluntarist; and he here

opposes a voluntarism which insures freedom to Solovyev's intellectualism. He modifies the criticism by admitting that Solovyev's determinism is spiritual (that is to say, it is not a determinism of pure essential
intelligibility, but a determinism by the Divine Logos, spiritual and ineffable). Berdyaev's philosophy, in fact, has an aspect of "spiritual
determinism"; for he accepts the Christian prophecy of the destiny of
history and of man and goes so far as to predict the beatitude of every
man. This is a "spiritual determinism," and his philosophy of history
therefore posits a "spiritual determinism."
1
The Russian Idea, 168-169.
56
Berdyaev says there is no irrational Freedom with Solovyev, but, in

Berdyaev's doctrine, we will see, irrational freedom is at the basis of
God and operates in man. In Berdyaev's eyes, Solovyev's attainment of
the all-embracing unity is intellectua1. Berdyaev asserts that, for
Solovyev, the Fall occurs by virtue of intelligible principles; but in his
own doctrine, the Fall occurs because of the irrational Freedom.
We cannot, however, study the difference between Berdyaev's position and the outlook he opposes without noting the compatibility of
the two doctrines . .As we have seen, the voluntarism does not at all
nullify the "spiritual determinism" but attempts to clarify some events
in terrestrial and celestial history. In brief, voluntarism is compatible
in the same doctrine with "spiritual determinism." 1
Solovyev's philosophy tends towards the existentialism of Berdyaev.
Berdyaev says:
... he, so to speak, approaches existential philosophy, but his own philosophical
thought does not belong to the existential type. At the basis of his philosophy
there lies the living intuition of the concrete existent ... But his philosophy
remains abstract and rationalist. In it the existent is overwhelmed by his schemes.
He all the while insists upon the necessity of the mystical element in philosophy.
. .. But as a philosopher, Solovyev certainly was not an existentialist. 2
Like Solovyev, who indeed is his true predecessor in the doctrine of

Godmanhood, Berdyaev finds at the basis of his own philosophy the
concrete existent; namely, the Godman, Christ. And that is why he says
Solovyev approaches existential philosophy; for the concrete Godman,
the metaphysical object of both philosophers, is not an essence. He is an
existent. Yet, adds Berdyaev, Solovyev overwhelms the existent in his
philosophy with abstract rational schemes. The mystical element is existential; nevertheless Solovyev was not truly an existential philosopher.
Berdyaev contrasts a doctrine of Sophia asserted by the 16th-century
mystic, Jacob Boehme, with the doctrine of his own Russian contemporaries. "Sophiology in Bo~hme is chiefly of an anthropological character.
In Solovyev it is mainly cosmologica1." S Berdyaev, we have seen,
denies the sophiological doctrine is true. He presents the sophiological
doctrine of Boehme in Freedom and the Spirit,4 not as his own doctrine
1 The compatibility of a voluntarism with "spiritual determinism" seems clear in Professor
Gilson's discussions on the subject of voluntarism in his book, Jean Duns Scot (Vrin, Paris,
1952),606. Cf. Index: "Volontarisme."
The Russian Idea, 171.

Ibid., 176.
, Freedom and the Spirit, 300, ff.
57
but to contrast it with the Russian kind. After showing that man instead of the cosmos rules, in Boehme's doctrine, he concludes as follows:
"Russian sophiology seems to deny that man is at the center of the
world and that the cosmos is in him ... " 1
Boehme's formulation of the primary metaphysical principle in God
and in man is the model of Berdyaev's primary doctrine. The primacy
of freedom, as it is conceived by Boehme, is reasserted by Berdyaev.
In a chapter on celestial history in The Meaning of History, Berdyaev
attempts to show a connection between the dynamism of history and
that of the divine life. He says:
. .. it is impossible to assert the tragic destiny of the Son of God and His
expiatory death without at the same time admitting movement in the divine life. 2
That is, there is a movement, and a tragic one, in the divine life. A few
pages further, he says:
. '. the origins of history lie in the inmost depths of the Absolute and in the
tragic potential of divine life itself (and this constitutes the true hypothesis of the
esoteric Christian philosophy of history) ...
I am thinking of Boehme. ... and particularly of his The Dark Nature at God.
Somewhere, in immeasurably greater depths, there exists a state which may be
called Ungrund or "groundlessness" to which neither human words nor the
categories of good and evil nor those of being or non-being are applicable.
Ungrund is deeper than anything else ... In the nature of God, deeper than Him,
lies a sort of primal dark abyss, and in its inmost depths occurs a theogonic
process or that of divine genesis.
This process is secondary when compared with that primal "groundlessness"
3
The origins of history, according to the passage, lie beyond the Triune
existence of God, in the U ngrund, the dark abyss from which the Trinity
is born. When Berdyaev says this is "the true hypothesis of the esoteric
Christian philosophy of history," he intends several things. He says
"hypothesis" in order to indicate that the doctrine cannot be demonstrated; and "true hypothesis" in order to indicate its truth can be
known with certitude. It introduces us, mystically, into an esoteric
knowledge of the divine life. It is esoteric because it is mystical, abstruse, secret and knowable only to the initiates in such matters.
This irrational force, Ungrund or dark abyss, is beyond the distinctions between good and evil. Good and evil, the Holy Trinity and
1
Ibid.,
301.
The Meaning
a Ibid., 54-55.
0/
History, 48.
58
potentially everything else, come from this source through a divine

genesis. When Berdyaev says that the process itself is secondary when
compared with the primal groundlessness, he gives the basis for his
doctrine of a celestial history. For the Ungrund is the condition of a
movement in the divine life the passage tells us.
He continues:
for the fact of such a dark primal source and nature implies the possibility of
tragic destiny for the divine life ... the passion of God Himself and His Son ... 1
That is, the evil of the tragic passion of Christ the Godman on Calvary
originates, along with the good, in the Ungrund. And now Berdyaev is
ready to remark the voluntarism of this doctrine. The evil, the tragedy,
originates in the primordial Will.
. .. the primal foundations of being rest upon a certain irrational and wilful
principle, and the whole significance and essence of the world process consists in
the illumination of this dark irrational principle in cosmogony and theogony.
And this is the hypothesis of my metaphysics of history, that the terrestrial
destiny is predetermined by the celestial, in which the tragedy of illumination
and Redemption take place through the divine passion, and that tragedy
determines the process of illuminating world history.2
Here occurs the explicit voluntarism of this doctrine. 3 Berdyaev calls

this irrational principle "wilful." 4 It is a primordial Will. The purpose,
not merely of history but of the world process, is to illuminate this dark
principle, both in a theogony (in a celestial history) and in a cosmogony
(in a terrestrial history). When Berdyaev says that the terrestrial
destiny is predetermined by the celestial, he assumes that the tragedy
of the passion of Christ is primarily celestial destiny, a necessary part
of celestial history, in order to illuminate the Primal Abyss. And the
tragedy determine the process of illuminating world history (that is, the
passion of Christ illuminates world history). The Ungrund is not only
the primal basis of God, but it is also the primal basis of man, a basis
which gives man an absolute freedom to will good or evil. 5 This must be
understood, not rationally, but mystically.6 The history of the world
Ibid., 55.
Ibid., 56.
a Cf. The Beginning and the End, 107: "Will, that is, freedom, is the beginning of everything.
... The Ungrund, ... the abyss, the free nothingness ... The divine Ungrund, before its
emergence, is in the eternity of the Divine Trinity."
4 Berdyaev has accepted Boehme's doctrine of Ungrund as primordial freedom early in
his career. Cf. Dream and Reality, his autobiography, 179. He asserts the doctrine of primordial Will in his posthumous book, The Beginning and the End, 107, 108, 109. Always remember,
however, that Berdyaev does not posit the Will as other than God. Cf. Ibid., 105.
5 The Destiny of Man, 25, ff.
a The Beginning and the End, I07. See Chapter IV, Section G.
1
8
59
must serve as an epoch within celestial history in order to complete the

illumination of the Ungrund.
It was no merely poetic thing for Berdyaev to assert: that the
terrestrial history is an epoch within celestial history. He writes, indeed,
a little further on in The Meaning of History of the need of God for the
revelation of man. He says:
In the Image of Christ is brought about the genesis of God in man and of man in
God ... Thus for the first time, in response to God's movement and longing, a
perfect man is revealed to Him. This mysterious process occurs in the interior
depths of the divine reality itself; it is a sort of divine history of mankind. History
is, indeed, not only the revelation of God, but also the reciprocal revelation of
man in God.
. .. History would not be tragic if it were only the revelation of God and its
gradual apprehension. Its drama and tragedy are not only determined in the
divine life itself, but also by the fact that they are based upon the mystery of
freedom, which is not only a divine, but also a human revelation - that longed
for by God in the depths of the divine life.1
There is a real and actual drama and history in God because the
Ungrund, which does not lie outside of God, has to be illuminated; and
the dialectic of this doctrine leads to the assertion that God Himself
needs to be illuminated. Man shares in illuminating the Ungrund and,
consequently, man shares in illuminating God. This is why Berdyaev
says that God needs man, and there is a revelation of man to God, as
well as a revelation of God to man.
In Berdyaev's philosophy, history is therefore the revelation of man
in God (as well as the revelation of God).2 Hence, history - both celestial and terrestrial- orientates itself by the perfect Man, Christ, Who
illuminates the Ungrund.
We can now see where the doctrine of Godmanhood is joined to the
voluntarism of Boehme. The Ungrund, the primal Will, is illuminated
both by terrestrial man and by the God-man. The complexity of history
arises from the relation of the two revelations (of God and of man). The
tragedy and chaos of history occurs because the divine voluntary principle allows, in the hierarchy of being, the freedom of man to operate untrammelled by intelligibility.
Berdyaev, in the next paragraph, reveals a certain stress in his phiThe Meaning of History, 57-58.
Berdyaev does not consider history to be identical with revelation. He says history is a
revelation, but history for him may be said to contain revelation. Human and terrestrial
history are not a completely true reality. History is a revelation only in the sense that it
reveals meta-history, the true reality. See Chapter I, 9-10.
1
60
losophy of history, caused by the doctrine of Godmanhood and his

voluntarism. He begins, saying:
There would be no history without freedom. It is the mataphysical basis of
history;1
He does not mean that it is the one and only absolute metaphysical
basis of history; he continues:
The revelation of history can be apprehended only through Christ as perfect man
and God ... in fact, history owes its existence entirely to the presence of Christ
at its very heart. He represents the deepest mystical and metaphysical foundation
and source of history and of its tragic destiny.2
Christ, the perfect Man, represents "the deepest metaphysical foundation and source of history." Now, where are we? Berdyaev has just
said that freedom is the metaphysical basis of history. Yet, we have to
interpret the paragraph to mean that Christ, the Godman, is a more
important metaphysical foundation of history than freedom.
We must conclude that there is a structural flaw and a stress in
Berdyaev's doctrine, or there would be if his philosophy were rationalistic instead of mystical. He is a voluntarist; that is, he does not merely
assert that God is free - along with most Christians - but that the
freedom is absolutely prior to God's intelligibility. This is Berdyaev's
doctrine, there is not the slightest doubt of it. And yet, he says that
Christ, the divine Logos, is the deepest metaphysical basis of history.
Berdyaev is not so careless as to contradict himself; he is fond of
expressing himself in antinomies, such as the one we have seen. He
knows that there is a contradictory quality in what he says; this life,
for him as for Hegel,3 is antinomic, must be understood by antinomies. 4
It is his Heraclitean way; he considers himself to be in a tradition which
stems from Heraclitus. 5 Heraclitus is "one of the greatest of philosophers." 6 He often says he has a paradoxical philosophy, expressed in
paradoxes. The paradoxes are supposed to be reconcilable. Berdyaev
has some reconciliation of the paradox of freedom and divine Logos in
mind. Christ, according to Berdyaev is perfect illuminated freedom, 7
Ibid., 58-59.
7 Berdyaev discusses the relation of freedom to Christ in Freedom and the Spirit. He says:
"How ... can freedom be separated from the evil it brings in its train except by the destruction of freedom itself?"
"To this universal problem there is no solution save in the coming of Christ ... The
1
6r
the freedom of the God-man is the true, the best freedom. Thus it is
that Berdyaev, very probably, resolves the antinomy in his own mind.
The reconciliation is "historical," there is a celestial history, a theogony.
It is the mystical pattern of human history:
The explanation of history as an interior metaphysical and spiritual, and not an
antimetaphysical, principle can be based only on a tie between the theogonic,
cosmogonic and anthropogonic processes. This tie unites and integrates our
spiritual experience. l
By introducing a historical process into the profoundest reality,

Berdyaev is able to posit a voluntarism in which Will is supreme, and
yet Logos, intelligibility, is supreme, too, because it illuminates Will
completely at the end of the history. Mystical intelligibility wins out
as it were over irrationality When universal history is viewed. This,
indeed, seems to be the explanation of history according to Berdyaev.2
He says, in The Destiny of Man:
Victory over meonic freedom is impossible for God, since that freedom is not
created by Him and is rooted in non-being; it is equally impossible for man, since
man has become the slave of that dark freedom and is not free in his freedom. It
is possible only for the God-man Christ Who descends into the abysmal darkness
of meonic freedom ... Apart from Christ, the tragic antinomy of freedom and
necessity is insoluble ... 3
mystery of Christianity, the religion of God made man, is above all the mystery of liberty .
... the Christian doctrine of grace is the true doctrine of freedom." Freedom and the Spirit,
135
"The source of man's freedom is in God, and that, not in God the Father, but in God the
Son." Ibid., 137.
There is a movement in Berdyaev's doctrine of freedom which is particularly discernible
when his posthumous works are read after all his other books. At the end of his life, he asserts
Trinitarian Christian Doctrine more strongly than before. Thus freedom becomes more
Christianized.
In The Beginning and the End, Berdyaev discusses the role of freedom in the creative act
of man. Something new breaks through out of freedom, he says, "and not out of a dark
freedom, but out of an illuminated freedom." The Beginning and the End, 171.
2 In fact, in his posthumous papers, gathered into the book, The Realm of Spirit and the
Realm of Caesar, 102. Berdyaev says that a metaphysics of the Will or of Freedom, taken in
itself, would be inadequate. He says: "Of the two types of metaphysics, the intellectual and
the voluntary, the former is always unfavorable, and the latter favorable, to freedom. But
voluntary metaphysics, taken by itself, is not yet a philosophy of freedom. What we must
decisively affirm is this, that freedom is spirit ... " That is, the complete metaphysics is
concerned with a spiritually illuminated freedom, not the irrational alone.
3 The Destiny 0/ Man, 281. In The Beginning and the End, 106, Berdyaev says: "The
Ungrund, then, is nothingness, the groundless eye of eternity; and at the same time it is
will, not grounded upon anything; bottomless, indeterminate will .... at the same time the
Ungrund is freedom. In the darkness of the Ungrund a fire flames up and this is freedom,
meonic, potential freedom." He says on the preceding page: "Free will in God is the Ungrund
in God, the nothingness in him."
62 GODMANHOOD, FREEDOM AND PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY
Berdyaev states most strongly God's need of man. 1 Meonic in "meonic

freedom," is an adaptation of the Greek word for non-being. So
Berdyaev next says, freedom is vested in non-being. The notion of God's
need of man is significant in his philosophy of history because it shows
that human history is a real and necessary epoch within celestial
history. In Christ, the Godman, the tragic antinomy of freedom and
intelligibility is solved.
The affiliation which Berdyaev establishes between the divine intelligibility and the primal Will is set forth in two metaphysical
doctrines; the doctrine of Spirit and the doctrine of beauty. His philosophy can be called a philosophy of beauty and a philosophy of spirit.
Beauty is a metaphysical entity in Berdyaev's theory, and Spirit is
likewise a metaphysical entity.
Firstly, spirit is treated by Berdyaev in distinction from the Holy
Spirit. He says, in Freedom and the Spirit:
Spirit cannot be identified simply with the Holy Spirit, the third Hypostasis of
the Trinity. Spirit is the sphere in which the divine and the human are united ... 2
Spirit cannot be identified with the Holy Spirit because the Holy
Spirit is born out of the Ungrund in the theogonic process, but Spirit
is wilful, the primordial will acts in it. Berdyaev, in his last book, Truth
andRevelation, c1arifies the relation of Spirit and the Holy Spirit. Hesays:
The divine element in man is not a special act of grace communicated to him,
neither is it a natural element. It is the spiritual element in him, a reality of a
special kind.
There is a difference between Spirit and the Holy Spirit, but they are one and
the same reality in different degrees. 3
Spirit is not Holy Spirit, yet they differ only in degree and are really
the same reality. And the divine element is the spiritual element in man.
The human spirit is not divine by nature, but in virtue of being spirit.
There is no natural divinity here. Berdyaev explains his notion of spirit
in a work devoted to the philosophy of spirit; namely, Spirit and Reality:
Spirit emanates from God but it is not a Divine creation like nature; it is a Divine
infusion, an inspiration. That is the biblical image. But spirit emanates from not
only the Deity but also from the primal pre-existential freedom from the
1
2
Cf. The Meaning of History, 57-58.

GODMANHOOD, FREEDOM AND PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY 63

Ungrund. That is, indeed, the fundamental paradox of spirit: it is a Divine
emanation, and at the same time it can reply to the Deity in terms not dictated
by it. ... it is freedom in God and from God. . .. The Logos is akin to spirit,
it informs everything with purpose. But at the same time spirit is irrational,
extra-rational, supra-rational. l
This doctrine of spirit, since spirit is different from God, is not a

doctrine of the Holy Spirit, but of something less. 2 Inasmuch as
Berdyaev's doctrine of man holds that man is an incarnate spirit, this
passage shows us that it is through spirit that the primordial freedom is
communicated to man (the human spirit). Moreover, in Berdyaev's
philosophy, man, an incarnate spirit, receives everything else through
spirit; imagination, intelligence and all the powers ofthe soul. 3 Spirit,
therefore, communicates both the mind and the will to man from the
Logos and the Ungrund. 4 This is why Berdyaev says the Logos is akin
to spirit, because the spirit informs everything with purpose. But spirit
differs from the Logos, from the perfect God-man beca,use spirit is also
irrational. This is mysterious, and the mystery of the irrationality of
spirit remains in Berdyaev's writings.
Spirit is incarnated in the cosmos. Berdyaev says, in Spirit and
Reality:
Spirit is incarnated ... not only in the human body but also in the ... historical
bodies, in natural life, tradition and so forth.5
Berdyaev goes on to show that the incarnation of spirit is the progress

of the world through historical epochs. Thus, spirit has progressed from
organic incarnation, where man was the slave of the cosmos, to technical incarnation, where man rules the cosmos. 6
Berdyaev calls his philosophy a philosophy of the spirit more often
than he calls it a philosophy of Godmanhood. (He has many names for
his philosophy.) He devotes far more time to the theory of the spirit
(as it is in itself and as man) than to the doctrine of man as the image of
the perfect Man, Christ.7 The doctrine of spirit becomes a vehicle of his
voluntarism; and the doctrine is the means of reconciling intelligibility
Spirit and Reality, 34.
See p.6g, note I below.
8 Freedom and the Spirit, 27; Slavery and Freedom, 32.
4 How rational powers ensue ultimately from an irrational basis is an unanswered mystery
in Berdyaev's philosophy.
6 Spirit and Reality, 66.
6 Ibid., 68.
? Berdyaev, however, devotes considerable space in his writings to the doctrine of
Godmanhood.
1
64
and purpose with voluntarism. Rational intelligibility, however is

slighted in his mystical doctrine. 1
This doctrine of spirit should be understood in the light of the
meaning of the Russian word for will: velya. It is the Russian word,
both for will and also for freedom. The will, in Berdyaev's doctrine
means principally non-compulsion, freedom not for something but
from something, and particularly from compulsion to personal doing.
Free will is seen as a condition in which no one else can command it.
Berdyaev asserts not so much a spirit, an esprit, a Geist, which aspires
heavenward in search of God. He rather describes a spirit, duch is the
Russian word, which descends as it were from heaven to man, a spirit
which incarnates itself. The free will of the human spirit does not seek
supplicatingly, like the steeples of Gothic cathedrals, towards God. 2 The
free will of the human spirit participates in the incarnation of spirit, in
which man experiences freedom from the objectivizations of the fallen
world. It is a spirit which diffuses itself like the many domes of Russian
churches, freeing and divinizing the world. Indeed, the Russian word
for spirit, duch, is etymologically associated with the Russian word for
breath; the relation suggests the divine breath bringing life to man. 3
The doctrine of will which is found here is like the will of Western
voluntarists: that is, both wills are conceived of as freedom from
something, as well as for something. Berdyaev finds Western voluntarism (as that of Boehme) suitable to his own Russian outlook. His
philosophy of history is seeking, through the spirit, freedom from the
objectivization of the world and man.
Secondly, Berdyaev's philosophy is a philosophy of beauty. He says,
in a later work, The Destiny of Man:
The real transfiguration and enlightenment of human nature means the attainment of beauty. The good realized actually, and not formally and symbolically, is beauty. The highest end is beauty and not goodness, which always
bears a stamp of the law .... The transfiguration of the world is the attainment
See Chapter IV.
To understand how very much opposed Berdyaev is to the typically Western and ascetic
type of spirituality, see Spirit and Reality, Chapter VII. Ascetism (as, for example, that of
St. Simon Stylities), is not asserted in this doctrine, but opposed. See the ethical work, The
Destiny 0/ Man.
3 Berdyaev, however, does not entirely reject the aspect of spiritualism which h< finds in
Latin Christendom: rather, it is a difference of emphasis. "Love is the path to the realization
of personality and there are two types of love, there is a love which ascends and a love which
descends, love which is eros and love which is agape." Slavery and Freedom, 55.
He criticizes Nygren, who has written Agape and Eros (S.P.C.K., London, 1953), for
rejecting the "eros" type of love. The Divine and the Human, 137.
1
GODMAN HOOD, FREEDOM AND PHI LOSOPHY OF HISTORY
65
of beauty. The kingdom of God is beauty.... Beauty is God's idea of the

creature, of man and of the world. 1
We could guess this philosophy of beauty from Berdyaev's doctrine of

creativity. The philosopher of history, like every other thinker, is
creative, as we saw in Chapter I. The historical memory is creative,
and it creates historical tradition and culture. 2
Berdyaev is speaking here of the highest beauty, not of the beautiful
symbols in this world. When he says "The highest end is beauty
and not goodness, which always bears a stamp of the law," he is
showing us how Beauty provides a mystical reconciliation of the
doctrines of Ungrund and Godmanhood, of voluntarism and intelligibility. The good cannot be the highest end because it bears
the stamp of the law; it would disallow freedom and the primacy of
freedom. Berdyaev has a doctrine of something that is beyond good
and evil; namely the Ungrund, primal and irrational Will, that
which is deepest in God. It is illuminated by the Godman, the divine
Logos. Beauty is Berdyaev's goal because beauty is, I think, sought
and discovered in an intellectual quest which is creative. The will
and the intellect work so closely together that the reason does not
hesitate to conform itself to the guidance of volition. I believe
this may be said of every artistic creativity where transcendental
Beauty is sought.
He says, finally, that Beauty is God's idea of the world. 3 This
doctrine is very amenable to the prophetic philosophy of history we
find in Berdyaev's universal history. Indeed, Berdyaev's prophecy is
concerned with the future, as such, as well as with the present. Prophecy, therefore, requires the use of the imagination, as well as the intellect;
because the future, as such, can only be known through the singular
knowledge of the imagination. A philosopher of beauty such as
Berdyaev, is disposed to prophetic plilosophizing. The imagination
plays an important role in prophecy.
Berdyaev's philosophy of history is a philosophy of beauty, and the
theory of knowledge set forth in his doctrine explans knowing the beautiful. The imagination will play an important role, and the will or desire
will predominate over the intellect. The mystical doctrine of Godmanhood can be synthesized with voluntarism by means of a phiThe Destiny of Man, 247.
See Chapter I, Section B, Part 2 and Chapter III, Section F.
3 When Berdyaev says Beauty is God's idea of the world, he is not referring to ideas as
humans rationally have them. He is probably influenced by Schopenhauer's notion of divine
Idea (See 140, n, above). He is describing the Divine Idea as Beauty.
1
66
losophy of beauty. And we will find in chapter IV, the same synthesis
of intelligibility and irrationalism in the doctrine of knowledge.
D. SOME CONSEQUENCES OF THE DOCTRINE OF GODMANHOOD
(I) SOb01'nost' - Unity of the W01'ld

Sobornost' is a Russian word which cannot be translated into English.
O. F. Clarke, who has translated many of Berdyaev's books, says:
In Russian the adjective sob01'ny corresponding to the noun, sobornost,'
translates the word "Catholic" as applied to the Church in the Creed. As
sobernost' and sob01'ny have a wealth of meaning not found in any equivalent
English words, I have used them where even the symphonic character of Catholic
consciousness seems to be indicated. 1
Sobo1'nost' means symphonic character of Catholic consciousness,

communion, a11togetherness of the people. It distinguishes the Russian
communal outlook from the Western individualism. Berdyaev says:
An individualist form of humanism could not be imported into Russia. Only a
communal form of humanism is possible there, a form of sob01'nost', to use a
religious term. 2
Sobo1'nost' is a commonalty, and it is typically Russian. R. M. French,

another translator of Berdyaev, says:
.. Altogetherness" would come near to its meaning. It is the dynamic life of the
collective body.3
N. O. Lossky, a Russian contemporary of Berdyaev, an emigre, an

eminent philosopher, and a good historian of philosophy, says in his
Histo1'Y of Russian Philosophy (written in English):
Sob01'nost' means the combination of freedom and unity of many persons on the
basis of their common love for the same absolute values. 4
Sobo1'nost', we may say, is an altogetherness, a communal life, a religious communion, the combination of freedom and unity of many
persons on the basis of their common love for the same absolute values.
How does the theory COme from the doctrine of Godmanhood? What is
the use of the idea of Sobo1'nost' in Berdyaev's philosophy of history?
1
S
3
4
Freedom and the Spirit, xiv, note.

N. Berdyaev, Towards a New Epoch (Bles, London, 1949),67.
Slavery and Freedom, title page.
A History of Russian Philosophy, 41.
67
Sobornost', a doctrine of simplicity, and of altogetherness, characterizes

Berdyaev's philosophy. It is an ethical norm according to his ethics; it
is a condition of knowledge according to his noetic (and we will consider
this in our chapter on epistemology). At present, we are merely seeking
the philosophical foundation of the doctrine of Sobornost' and its place
in philosophy of history.
The doctrine follows from the doctrine of Godmanhood. Berdyaev
says, in Spirit and Reality:
Spirit - the Holy Spirit - is incarnated in human life, but it assumes the form
of a whole humanity rather than that of authority.1
Not only individual men but society - "whole humanity" - are incarnated
Spirit. "A whole humanity, rather than that of authority," because, as
we will see, it is a communion in love, a Sobornost'. This incarnation of
spirit (ultimately, of the Holy Spirit), is not completed at the beginning
of the world-process. Berdyaev says, in Spirit and Reality:
Spirit is historically incarnated in hierarchical authority, in historical bodies, in
authority whereas spirit is really incarnated in truth, in man's creative emancipation from slavery. The symbolical incarnation of spirit is merely a way
determined by the fallen world, while the real incarnation of spirit is the goal,
the supreme achievement. 2
When Berdyaev says that Spirit is historically incarnated in historical

bodies, he is referring to the fallen world; "historically incarnated"
assumes the condition of fallen world. And just as spirit is incarnated
in an individual man through the soul, so spirit is incarnated in history
through the world-soul and through the historical memory of men. The
organic doctrine of spirit is here extended to historical entities. Historical entities are created and preserved in the historical memory, and
this process is a "symbolical incarnation of spirit."
The passage closes in stating the real incarnation of spirit (distinguished from the symbols of incarnation that are at hand) as a norm,
a religious goal. Now, the basis of the doctrine of Sobornost' is making its
appearance. The real incarnation of spirit is in truth; and truth, here, is
the Divine Truth, Christ, the God-man; this is the real incarnation of
spirit. Thus we can see that spirit provides a unity of the cosmos and of
man and history, both in their fallen state and in their true and perfect
state.
Sobornost' indicates the communion of all persons in history, both
1
2
Spi,it and Reality, 167.

Ibid., 64.
68
directly and through the medium of historical institutions and entities;

it also means the communion of humanity with the cosmos. The notion
of Sobornost' shows the unity oi history. It gives significance to historical symbols. It lays down a norm, a perfect goal to be sought after.
Berdyaev, in his last book, Truth and Revelation, speaks oi Sobornost' as
it will exist at the end of the world, when the world and mankind is returned to perfect integrity:
The era of the Spirit can be nothing but a revelation of a sense of community
which is not merely social but also cosmic, not only a brotherhood of men, but a
brotherhood of man with all cosmic life, with the whole creation. 1
We will soon see why Berdyaev calls the final age "the era of the Spirit" ;
it is the adaptation and spiritualization of a terminology which has also
been used by the proponents of the doctrine of "the Ages of the World"
(such as Schelling and Slavic thinkers.)2 The sense of community, the
brotherhood of man with all creation, is Sobornost' taken in its most
inclusive sense. And yet, it is a personal community, a communion, not
an impersonal collectivism. The individual personality is preserved:
The significance of communion as a goal of human life is essentially religious ....
This participation must take place in the very heart of the Ego's union with the
Thou. The inter-penetration of the Ego and the Thou is consummated in God. 3
The brotherhood of man with the cosmos and with all creation must
therefore be understood in view of the fact that man is a microcosm; for
it is by virtue of each individual man containing the whole creation in
himself that this personal union of the Ego and the Thou is attained.
Berdyaev says, in the same text:
... one Ego is accessible to another, to the Thou. As a corollary, the Ego also
postulates the We, in whose depths the communion of the Ego and the Thou is
achieved. 4
How vividly the personalism of this philosophy comes to light when

Berdyaev postulates the We, the Sobornost', from the communion of an
Ego and a Thou. Philosophy of history postulates a We, whether it is
only symbolically realized in a stage of history, or truly realized beyond
history. In the communal doctrine of the We, Berdyaev's anthro1 Truth and Revelation, 149. Did Spinoza suggest this to Berdyaev? Who knows? At least
the sentiment follows from Berdyaev's cosmogony.
a See Part 3 of this Section.
S
4
Solitude and Society,

Ibid., 140.
141.
69
pocentrism is clearly seen to have replaced the cosmocentrism of his

predecessors. 1
Berdyaev says, in his last book:
That to which Khomyakov gave the name of Sobornost' and which is difficult
to define in rational terms, is not an "objective" collective reality, it is an
interior quality ... an existential subjectivity ... 2
The doctrine of Sobornost' shows us that Berdyaev's philosophy of history neither sees a collectivism or blind cosmic togetherness at the root of
history, nor posits it as the goal of history. The true altogetherness or
communion is subjective, not impersonal. It is existential, not merely
ideal. We will investigate, in the next chapter, how it is possible to have
an existentialism which, properly speaking, refers only to the human
subject. For the present, we will consider the cosmological aspect of
this doctrine.
1 Quite possibly the doctrine of the We is inspired by passages in Spengler's Decline of the
West.
Spengler says, Vol. II, 295, note I: "That 'All' are responsible for 'all' - the 'it' for the 'it'
in this boundlessly extended plain - is the metaphysical fundament of all Dostoyevski's
creation. .., Mystical Russian love is love of the plain, the love of brothers under equal
pressure all along the earth, ever along and along; the love of the poor tortured beasts that
wander on it, the love of plants - never of birds and clouds and stars."
And, as if to inspire Berdyaev, if he read it, Spengler concludes the note saying:
"What sort of a Christianity will come forth one day from this world-feeling?" (of the
Russians).
Spengler's use of the word, we, occurs in a discussion of the spiritualism of a school of
thought which he terms M agian. He says, 234-235:
"But still more important than all this is the opposition of Spirit and Soul (Hebrew Ruach
and nephesh, Persian ahu and u,van, Mandaean monuhmed and gyan, Greek pneuma and
psyche) ... Philo ... Plotinus, Gnostics .. Islam and the Kabbalah.
"But souls are at bottom discrete entities, whereas the Pneuma is one and ever the same.
The man possesses a soul, but he only participates in the spirit of the Light and the Good;
the divine descends into him, thus binding all the individuals of the Below together with the
one in the Above. This primary feeling, which dominates the beliefs and opinions of all
Magian men, is something perfectly singular, and not only characterizes their world-view,
but marks off the essence and kernel of their religiousness in all its forms from that of every
other kind of man. . ..
"Whereas the Faustian (i.e. Western, Latin) man is an 'I' that in the last resort draws its
own conclusions about the Infinite; whereas the ... Magian man, with his spiritual kind of
being is only a part of a pneumatic' We 'that, descending from above, is one and the same in all
believers.' ,
I am certain Berdyaev has studied The Decline of the West. The work has an index. The
reader can find many subjects that would fascinate Berdyaev. Joachim of Flora, for example,
is much revered by Spengler (see index: "Joachim of Flora.") Both Spengler and Berdyaev
are philosophers of history; both owe a tremendous debt to German Idealism. Berdyaev is
vitally interested in much of the subject matter of the book. Berdyaev may well have taken
his notion of the We from Spengler. He mentions Spengler in his last work, Truth and
Revelation, 148: "I use the words 'culture' and 'civilization' in a sense which is closely akin to
the meaning that Spengler attaches to them."
2 Truth and Revelation, 39-46.
70
(2) Cosmology and the Unity 01 the World

We just saw that the Sobornost' of mankind which Berdyaev seeks is
also "brotherhood of man with all cosmic life, with the whole creation."
Indeed, Berdyaev's philosophy of history requires a very definite cosmic
consciousness. The reason for an emphasis upon cosmology is found in
his doctrine of Godmanhood. He asserts the return of the Cosmos to a
unity within man and the return of man to a unity within God. The
doctrine is one of the main themes of his philosophy of history.
This doctrine of cosmology interests us because Berdyaev himself
makes a point of stressing a cosmic consciousness. We want to see the
place of cosmology in his philosophy of history.
He says, in Freedom and the Spirit:
We must return in some entirely new way to a sense of the cosmos. The task of
Christian gnosis is to establish an ideal balance between theosophy, cosmosophy,
and anthroposophy. For mysticism, occultism, and religion do exist side by side
in human consciousness. Mysticism is immediate communion with God, the
contemplation of God and union with Him. Occultism is union with the secret
forces of the cosmos and it is also cosmic development. Religion is the attitude
of man towards God in an organized form, it is the hierarchical and normative
method of communion with Him. Boehme ... knew how to unite in himself the
mystical, occult, and religious moments; thus his gnosis, in spite of certain errors,
is nearest to a true Christian gnosis. 1
Berdyaev means that we need a doctrine of the cosmos, comparable in

importance to that of the scholastics, a doctrine which finds the temporal unity and order of the cosmos and its significance in the philosophical and religious world outlook. And this is why Berdyaev's cosmology
is one of the principles of his philosophy of history; fot it is a necessary
condition of a universal history.
A Christian gnosis (a body of philosophical and religious knowledge),
should contain theosophical, cosmosophical and anthroposophical elements. Theosophy, for Berdyaev, pertains to the mystical knowledge of
divine things.2 Cosmosophy refers to an occult knowledge of the secret
forces of the cosmos. 3 And anthroposophy refers to the pre-eminence of
man in the universe and to organized Christian religion. 4 Boehme is
1
F,eedom and the Spi,it,
301-302.
Cf. Ibid., Chapter Eight: "Theosophy and Gnosis."

Cf. Ibid., 271: "cosmosophy ... deals with ... the composition and development of the
cosmos."
4 Berdyaev uses the term, anth,oposophy, to add the distinguishing mark that shows the
advance of his philosophy beyond that of the Russian Sophiologists. He says: " ... today, the
main religious problem is that of man, not of Sophia or the cosmos. Sophiology must be linked
to the problem of anthropology.... Russian sophiology seems to deny that man is at the
center of the world and that the cosmos is in him ... " Ibid., 271.
71
praised for combining the three elements of a Christian gnosis. Berdyaev

combines than also.
Why is he so interested in cosmology and cosmogony and their relations to philosophy of history? Why does he say that "the main theme
of universal history ... is that of man's destiny seen in the light of the
interaction between the human spirit and nature?" 1 Why does he
define the ages of the world in terms of man and the cosmos? 2
Berdyaev's approach to his philosophical problems gives rise to these
questions. It is a way of viewing the problems which he has found in his
predecessor, Vladimir Solovyev. 3 It is an approach which characterizes
such German predecessors of Russian philosophy as Schelling and
Hege1. 4 This cosmogonical and cosmological way of defining the philosophic attitude is one of the genera of philosophic positions. One of the
most outstanding examples is the theology of John Scotus Erigena (9th
century). Indeed, the similarities between his doctrine and Berdyaev's
are numerous and far-reaching. 5
The Meaning of History, II2, quoted in Chapter I, Section B, Part 4.
Cf. Chapter I, Section B, Part 5.
3 Cf. V. Solovyev, Lectures on Godmanhood, 192, ff; Cf. present chapter, Section C.
4 Cf. F. W. J. Schelling, The Ages of the World, tr. F. Bolman, Jr. (Columbia Univ., New
York, 1942); G. W. F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind (Allen & Unwin, London, 1949),
"Reason," 271-453; The Logic of Hegel, tr. from The Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical
Sciences by W. Wallace (Oxford Univ., Oxford, 1950), 70-71.
5 The following doctrines, which Berdyaev also holds, have been asserted by Scot us
Erigena:
I. The meaning of the world is above and beyond being. De Divisione Naturae, in]. Migne,
Patrologia Latina (Paris, 1853), Vol. CXXII, Col. 443B. ("Patrologia Latina, Vol. CXXII,"
will subsequently be indicated as: "P.L."). The Beginning and the End, 98.
2. Essences are not supreme, but God is above essential intelligibility; consequently,
a negative or apophatic theology, is preferred to an affirmative, or catophatic theology.
P.L., 458A. Both philosophers take pains to show that the Aristotelian categories must
not be applied to God. P.L., 469A, Liber Primus in passim. The Beginning and the End,
102-103.
3. There is a true revelation of God in the hierarchy of creation; to grasp the revelation
contained in created beings is to ascend to God. P.L. 449C. Truth and Revelation 143, ff.
4. The doctrine of the Trinity is not merely a mysterious truth of revelation relating to the
nature of the Deity, but a fundamental fact in the organization of the universe. P.L. 456.
The Meaning of History, 58-59.
5. The act of knowledge is an act of creation; to understand is to create. P.L. 579D. The
Beginning and the End, 38.
6. Man is the microcosm in the strictest sense of the word. He is the summary of all
existence. P.L. 530. Dream and Reality, X-Xl.
7. The whole of man is made in the image of God. P.L. 790D. The Realm of the Spirit and
the Realm of Caesar, 170.
8. Both thinkers give a mystical interpretation of the Fall. Everything is spiritualized.
Paradise is human nature in its first state, not a place but a state. (Much like Berdyaev's
doctrine of Godmanhood.) P.L. 822A. See 49, n6; 51, m4 above.
9. Evil cannot be perpetual, but must come to an end, altogether abolished (et omnino
abolebitur). P.L. 918. Truth and Revelation, 136.
Berdyaev differs from Erigena where voluntarism occurs. N. Lossky, in his History of
Russian PhilosoPhy, says: "Berdyaev is wrong in thinking that his Ungrund is identical
1
72
Note, however, that I do not distinguish this doctrinal position by

first principles which are peculiar to it. I simply find that these
doctrines all have the peculiarity of making an outstanding study of the
place of cosmogony and an attendant cosmology in human wisdom.
with the 'Divine Nothing' of Dionysius the Areopagite. The Divine Nothing in every respect
transcends all possible determinations ... " 148.
Creation is out of nothing for Erigena, which is to say,lt is out of God's ineffable self. (P.L.
634B) But Berdyaev asserts that the Ungrund is the divine Nothingness. Hence, God is born
from the irrational Ungrund, and He creates out of the Ungrund. The Beginning and the End,
105-106.
The problem of evil is therefore viewed differently. Erigenasays, like Berdyaev, that evil
is caused by an irrational will. (P.L. 975), but that there is no origin of evil. P.L. 976; 944.
Berdyaev, however, says that the irrational Ungrund is the origin of evil. The Divine and
the Human, 90-91.
If we compare Berdyaev with Erigena, it helps to answer the question: How much is
Berdyaev's philosophy affected by his voluntarism?
Berdyaev shares many principles with Erigena. Yet, the addition of voluntarism causes
Berdyaev to bring the irrational ineffability, which Erigena found in God, down into the
creation, from the lowest to the highest level. The ultimate metaphysical principle in any
created object is irrational; it is a Heraclitean becoming, a flux. Berdyaev says, of the
irrational ineffability, on the highest level: "Parmenides ... conceived the deepest ...
reality ... as something that was unique and immobile. But Heraclitus ... conceived it as
fiery movement." The Meaning 0/ History, 49. Berdyaev, like Boehme, identifies the Heraclitean "fiery movement," or "becoming," with the irrational Ungrund.
Berdyaev calls the reader's attention to the similarity of Heraclitus' doctrine and that
of his and Boehme. He says, in Spirit and Reality: "Boehme stands out as the first voluntarist
in European thought ... In the dark void, anterior to being, freedom is kindled. Boehme's
vision discloses being and dynamic depths of being, much vaster probably, than being itself.
There is an affinity between Boehme and Heraclitus .... Boehme's vision is dynamic ... "
In the definitive (and posthumous) work on his metaphysics, The Beginning and the End,
Berdyaev writes of the irrational ineffability, on the lowest level: "What is the source of
movement and change? Is it potency or act? Pure act is unmoved and unchanged, for it is a
completed condition, whereas movement and change indicate incompleteness ... "
" ... it is possible to adopt a point of view which differs in principle from the Aristotelean
and scholastic position ... there is more in potency than in act, more in movement than in
immovability and there are greater spiritual riches in freedom than in being." The Beginning
and the End, 157.
Along with the voluntarism, the meaning of history is found in the mystical doctrine of
Godmanhood. True, the doctrine of voluntarism is added in order to account for the presence
of change, tragedy and evil, and to explain the freedom of man. Yet - and this is importantthe meaning of history, the meta-historical meaning of history, is intelligible; and, at th('
end, it completely illuminates the irrational Ungrund. History consists in the illumination,
and philosophy of history shows what the illumination is and how it occurs. It is in this part
of Berdyaev's philosophy, above all, that the doctrine of Godmanhood is stressed. And if the
voluntarism were taken away, a philosophy of history would still remain. Berdyaev's
voluntarism dominates the picture when he discusses the problems of evil, love, ethics,
freedom, being and existence, potency and act; but Godmanhood rules in his philosophy of
history. And Godmanhood therefore rules in all his philosophy, since all his philosophy
is guided by philosophy of history. Christ, the source of intelligibility, is the meaning of
history.
Berdyaev points out that the doctrine of Ungrund is figurative rather than literal. "Free
will in God is the Ungrund in God, the nothingness in him." The Beginning and the End,
108-109. The Ungrund is really identical with God. Berdyaev takes Boehme's distinction
between God and Ungrund only in a symbolic sense. He means that if he is to understand
in any way whatever how will is primary in God and in man, than the theogonic myth is very
helpful.
73
Such a study is placed at the service of philosophy of history in

Berdyaev's doctrine.
In Chapter III we will find Berdyaev asserts that man in his true
depths is at the center of the world and the cosmos is in him.l And the
world, the cosmos (which has fallen away from man as well as from God)
is properly in Man. The Divine Principle, from which the world has
fallen, is Integral Man. Indeed, Berdyaev says, in the chapter quoted
from above:
The cosmos can only be conceived as a living organism. We must be able to see
the spirit in nature and nature in the spirit, the objective in the subjective, the
natural in the spiritual, and the cosmic in the anthropological. Cosmology has
always been based on the inner identity of spirit and nature, that is to say, on
a conception of nature which regards it as a spiritual phenomenon. 2
The key of Berdyaev's cosmology is the inner identity of spirit and

nature. Nature is a spiritual phenomenon. The cosmos is natural because it has fallen; nevertheless, it is spiritual because it originates in
man (and ultimately in Godman), who is spiritual. It is spiritual, also,
because its spiritualization is being prepared for in the progress of
mankind. 3 This is the cosmological outlook that Berdyaev is attempting
to teach. He says in an earlier chapter:
The world is an organic hierarchy in which every part is linked to another and
in which everything that takes place in the upper regions affects the lower. The
separation from God of one part involved the separation of the whole soul of the
world with it, including all humanity and indeed all creation.... Man, together
with all creation and the whole hierarchy of the universe, became separated
from God ... 4
The separation of the highest part of the world, man, from God involved the separation of the soul of the world and of the whole of
creation from God. The notion of a world-soul is not stressed or elaborated in Berdyaev's doctrine. The above is the only assertion of it I have
found. Berdyaev refers to the organic unity of the world, especially as it
is unified in man at the beginning and the end of history. World-soul
should not be considered apart from the human soul. This interpretation does not betray Berdyaev. 5
We see the cosmological and cosmosophical aspects of Berdyaev's
doctrine of time. When he says, "everything that takes place in the
1
B
Chapter Ill, Section F.

Freedom and the Spirit, 299-300.
See Chapter Ill, especially Section F.
See Chapter I, 12, where we find mention of a soul of history.
74
upper regions also affects the lower," he means that celestial history,
which is spiritual, affects terrestrial history; because terrestrial history
is an epoch within celestial history.
Cosmic consciousness in Berdyaev is an attitude which does not see
visible nature and the visible world except in relation to the higher
reality. He says, in the same work:
The problem that disturbs me may be expressed in the following manner, in the
terms which I have adopted; how can the natural world be transfigured and
brought into the spiritual world as something real and not illusory? How can
the "psychical" be related to the spiritual? ... Man, the cosmos, and the divine
creation are not merely for time but also for eternity. The deification of creation
does not mean any loss in its significance, still less its extinction. Man and the
world are not annihilated in God, but illuminated and transfigured. 1
In the line, "how can the 'psychical' be related to the spiritual?" when
Berdyaev says, "psychical," he has in mind th~ trasfiguration of the
soul of man by the spirit; and this brings about the transfiguration of
the cosmos. The deification of man will involve the deification of the
cosmos, its return to unity with man, and the return of mankind to
unity with the Godman. 2 The relation of the psychical to the spiritual
is one where the psychical in all its distinct multiplicity preserves its
identity in transfiguration. The Godman principle is a spiritual
terminus where all the individuals of creation will maintain their being
and identity when united with Godmanhood.
We can see the significance of Berdyaev's rejection of the Greek
cycle theory of histories in favor of the Augustinian doctrine of a single
and unique Universal History. 3 In accordance with his cosmic theory,
Berdyaev prophesies deification of the whole creation in its absolute
integrity and identity; that is, in its truth. If a Christian philosopher
brings the doctrine of a single universal history into prominence, the
doctrine of historical cycles is of secondary importance. 4 It is possible
to draw historical rules from the recurrence of certain historical
patterns over a greath length of time. But if Berdyaev explained
history this way, the unity of his universal history would become very
mysterious. Indeed, it is just the unity of celestial history with temporal
history (universal history) that Berdyaev is seeking to illuminate. He
preserves the unity of celestial and temporal history by forbidding the
1
8
8
See Chapter III, Section F.

See The Meaning of History, 113-115.
75
intelligibility of history to be explained and dismissed [he thinks] by

rules of eternal cyclical recurrences. He acknowledges cycles of recurrences in history, but he is not interested in this part of philosophy
of history.1 He emphasizes the overall psychic and spiritual unity of
history - in the human and divine spirit. 2 The unity presupposes the
termination of history and final transfiguration.
And though he seems to take the historical culture as the unit of
history, it is not a numerical unit, identical with other units, but
primarily a step in the progress of universal history. Berdyaev does not
ever abstract from the image of a culture in order to examine its intelligibility. History, with its concrete cultures, is seen in the light of
cosmic doctrine which (along with anthropological and theosophical
doctrine) shows the integrity of history within the unity of Godmanhood.
"History has a meaning simply because meaning, the Logos, appeared
in it; the God-man became incarnate, and it has meaning because it is
moving towards the realm of Godmanhood." 3
The main observation that we have made is to see the positive purpose
of cosmology, rather than to view the attempt of Berdyaev's anthropocentrism to escape the slavery of the cosmos. He says in a late work,
Slavery and Freedom:
Behind the call of the "natural," of the "organic," there lies hidden the need to
get free from the disuniting multiplicity of the world of civilization, and to pass
over to the completeness and unity of the divine life. Man feels himself crushed
by this intolerable mUltiplicity, disintegration, and relativeness and conventionality of the civilized world. 4
Berdyaev wants to bring a doctrine of organic unity into his philosophy

of history, so that history and the activities of man can be understood
as parts of a divine unity. He therefore recognizes the legitimacy of
the call of the organic cosmos, a call which is answered in historical
cultures and in the one culture of universal history. And Berdyaev sees
a relativity, an "intolerable multiplicity," in the modern historical
outlook which views history and civilization without the illumination of
a cosmology.
Berdyaev, in the same work, relates this personalist philosophy to
his view of the world.
1 Berdyaev acknowledges cycles of recurrences of history, "a periodical return of similar
'Stages." The Meaning 0/ History, 179. But he mentions this only in passing. Such a doctrine
is rational, abstract and scientific and therefore does not interest Berdyaev as something
to be studied in itself.
3
4
The Beginning and the End,

Slave,y and F,eedom, 1I9.
1I5.
76
There is no hierarchical unity of the cosmos, in relation to which personality

would be a part. . .. That the world is partial, that the world as a whole and a
unity does not exist, is entirely in accord with the revolution in contemporary
physics. A whole, and a unity, can be sought only in spirit which is not alienated
from itself and not objectivized. But in that case the whole and the unity acquire
a different meaning, and do not imply the suppression of the "partial," the
multiple, the personal.1
Berdyaev states again the doctrine of a living and organic principle

which provides a unity. He opposes the mechanical outlook. It has
argued from the assumed isolation of natural events to the isolation
of historical events and entities. He asserts a principle of unity which is
above and beyond the cosmic. It is the spirit, where not only the multiple is organically preserved, but also the personal. This personalist
doctrine is investigated in the next chapter. Before turning to the
personalism, however, let us attempt to find out why it is that
Berdyaev's philosophy so vitally concerns itself with the Second
Coming of the Messiah. Does his messianic doctrine order and diviniz('
the anthropocentric cast of his philosophy?
(3) Eschatology and the Age of the Spirit
Berdyaev's mysticism, which is based on the Godman doctrine, is
necessarily eschatological or messianic: it looks forward to the Second
Coming of the Messiah and to the end of the world, and the New
Jerusalem. In nearly all Berdyaev's books, messianism is very important. In The Meaning of History (1923), messianism and eschatology
occur at the beginning of the book in the definition of philosophy of
history, and at the end of the book. In The Destiny of Man (1931), he
entitles Part III, the last division of the book: "Of the Last Things,
Eschatological Ethics." He turns, in the final pages of Spirit and Reality
(1937), to the theme of the Second Coming. In Slavery and Freedom,
he closes with a section entitled "Active-Creative Eschatology." The
Beginning and the End has the subtitle in the Russian edition: "An
Essay in Eschatological Metaphysics." In his spiritual autobiography,
Dream and Reality (1950), he devotes some pages (294, ff) to eschatology
and says that Russian thought has always been preoccupied with the
problems of philosophy of history and with eschatology.
History has meaning because it comes to an end .... the historical process ought
to be understood in the light of the end. The philosopher of history, therefore,
speaks as a prophet ... 2
1
Z
Ibid., 98.
Dream and Reality, 294.
77
The Realm 0/ Spirit and the Realm 0/ Caesar (I952), closes with a page
which expounds his own kind of mysticism:
... prophetic and messianic mysticism; that is, super-historical and eschatological ...
In his last book, Truth and Revelation (I953), he devotes the last
chapter to describing the age of the Spirit and the Eternal Man. It will
occur after the Second Coming and the End of the World. He never
tires of reminding the reader of his books that his is a "prophetic philosophy of history," an "eschatological metaphysics," "philosophy of
the end of history," etc.
Berdyaev's philosophy looks to the future because the future is given
in universal history. Since the goal will be realized in the future,
Berdyaev treats it, not as a transcendent and ever-present norm, but
as a future event.
Further, his metaphysics rules philosophy of history through the
doctrine of Godmanhood. Metaphysics is eschatological.
Eschatology, in Berdyaev, is a practico-theoretical norm (which he
teaches because of his religious principles).1 He is himself absolutely
preoccupied with the messianic expectations.
Eschatology, for him, is a description and also an ethical norm. It
describes a kind of progress towards the end of history which develops
through historical epochs. This progress is itself an eschatology; it is
bringing history towards the Second Coming and the end of history.
And this is also the object of the philosophy of history. Berdyaev says,
in The Beginning and the End:
The end of history is not only a truth of religious revelation but also a moral
postulate of existential philosophy. That is why it is so important to grasp the
fact that the objective world does not exist as a whole, as a cosmos; it is partial.
The cosmos is a regulative idea. The cosmos is still to be created; it will make its
appearance as a result of the transformation of the world. 2
Berdyaev shows, in this passage, the interdependence of his doctrines

of cosmology and messianism. The return of the Messiah and the end
of the world is the attainment of perfect integrity of man and the
cosmos. He says in the above-quoted passage:
... the objective world does not exist as a whole, as a cosmos; it is partial. The
cosmos is a regulative idea.
1
B
Cf. The Destiny 01 Man, Part III: Eschatological Ethics."

The Beginning and the End, 148.
78
The world is objectified, bound in natural laws (it is the world discovered by Isaac Newton).! because it has fallen, with man, from
cosmic integrity in man. The cosmos is a regulative idea; that is, a norm,
a goal, because the true cosmos will be in the Godman. The cosmos is
to be created (created, because this philosophy asserts the creativity
of man, the microcosm, and the primacy of beauty which is the object
of human creativity). Finally, the true cosmos will appear as a result of
the transfiguration of the world. For, unlike man, who gradually escapes from objectivization during the course of history, the visible
world of space and time is transformed into the true cosmos only at the
end of time.
Berdyaev says, later, in the same book:
A genuine act of love is eschatological, it makes an end of this world, this world
of hatred and enmity, and the beginning of a new world. 2
This expresses not merely a conclusion from the cosmological doctrine

but also a persistent attitude of Berdyaev. It is part of his eschatological preoccupation. Every good or beautiful act or event takes the
world towards the end of the world; therefore, every such act or event
is eschatological.
But when we read this passage, we can find a difficult and momentous
problem; namely, what sort of a beginning does the future world of
Integral Man, which is beyond history, have in the fallen world? It is
a momentous problem because Berdyaev's Slavic and German predecessors and his Slavic contemporaries have indulged in a nationalistic
futurism of earthly paradise. 3
He approaches the problem of futurism in The Meaning of History,
via the notion of time. He says:
1 The Newtonian world-outlook is presented in Kant's C~itique of Pu~e Reason, and
Berdyaev, without mentioning Newton, accepts this view of the natural world. Immanuel
Kant's C~itique of Pu~e Reason, tr. N. K. Smith (MacMillan, London, 1950). See Chapter IV,
Section B, notes.
3 On eartly paradise see 81, ff., below. D. Merejkowski, the Russian novelist writes in his
book, The Menace of the Mob (Nicholas L. Brown, New York, 1921), 105: "In this land of
ours, rather than in any other, will the Glorious Resurrection of Christ be celebrated. Is that
a dream? But why does this dream come to no one else but the Russian?" See also 83, 84.
On 47, Merejkowski describes the three Joachite Dispensations. See also Merejowski's Pete~
and Alexis (Modern Library, New York, 1931),582. "there shall be a new Church of Joann."
Ibid., 58, " ... the third Rome ... " (Moscow).
Concerning the significance of this outlook to the Slavic consciousness, see: F. Baldensperger, Melanges d'Histoire Litterai~e Gene~ale et Comparee offe~ts It Fe~nand Baldensperge~
(Libraire Ancienne Honore Champion, Paris, 1930), Vol. II, 365-366. "C'est dans cette
~ealization de la troisieme epoque que la part de la race elane - et, parmi les nations slavic, ceUe
de la Pologne - doit avoir, selon Cjeszkoski, une impo~tance toute speciale. La tendence messianiste
apparait ici avec nettete ... ".
79
The fundamental weakness of the idea of progress lies in its attitude to the
insoluble problem of time. The only possible solution of universal history and
its anti-thesis is in terms of a victory over time ... The theory of progress is
not concerned with the solution of human destiny and history in timeless eternity,
beyond the limits of history itself. It is concerned solely with a solution within
the time torrent of history ... 1
Berdyaev rejects futurism if it means everlasting progress in time, because the goal of history is beyond time. 2 The theory of everlasting
progress is historical, instead of meta-historical. Berdyaev, however, is
faced with the problem of the link between history and the end of
history; how will the transition occur, gradually or suddenly? He discusses the link between time and eternity in a late book, and says:
. .. the process which goes on in the world is inwardly linked with the process
which goes on in God, in eternity not in time ... 3
This indicates the answer. If the world process is linked with the
process which goes on in God, but in eternity, not in time, then the
age of the Spirit cannot occur in the world epoch. Societies, cultures and
civilizations belong to the historical, not to the meta-historical. A
future age of history - a splendid new civilization - could not be the
age of the Spirit nor the beginning of the age. 4
But the question: what kind of an earthly beginning of the age of the
Spirit will there be? has not been answered. For, though the link between our epoch and the future (and eternal) epoch of the Spirit is in
eternity and not in time; yet, time may conceivably become saturated,
as it were, with the eternal, and thus provide the beginning. To see
Berdyaev's answer, we must study his philosophy of revelation.
He says, in a chapter of The Divine and the Human, entitled, "Religion
of the Spirit":
The Eastern doctors of the Church were of great importance in their contribution
to the interpretation of Christianity as the reign of the Spirit, especially Origen
and St. Gregory of Nyssa ... Further, the religious movement in Italy at the
end of the twelfth and the beginning of the thirteenth centuries, which was a
quest for the Christianity of the Holy Spirit, is of enormous importance. Its
central figures were St. Francis of Assisi ... Joachim of Flora ... ... . ..
The German mystical movement ... Eckhardt, Tauler ... Jacob Boehme and
later Angelus Selesius ...
See Chapter I, Section E.
3 The Divine and the Human, 47.
4 See Chapter I, Section E. Berdyaev has developed a theory of three times: cosmic,
historical and existential time. He leaves no chance that the reader or himself will mistake
God's "time" for historical time. Reality (the past, the present and the future), has been
disrupted and shattered into pieces by fallen time. And fallen time itself is distinguished into
cosmic time and historical time.
1
80
GODMANHOOD, FREEDOM AND PHILOSOPHY OF HISTOR Y
German idealistic metaphysics of the beginning of the nineteenth century, also

constituted a most outstanding event in the history of the European spirit ...
German mysticism, as a whole, however, inclines to be hostile to eschatological
thought. It was in Russia that eschatological aspiration, with its expectation
of a new epoch of the Spirit, and belief in the possibility of a crowning revelation,
was most forcibly expressed .... Dostoyevsky, Vladimir Solovyev ... 1
This is a good summary of the history of the doctrine of the Church of

the Holy Spirit, as Berdyaev understands it. He finds the origin of the
doctrine in the Eastern, Greek Fathers of the Church. Then he mentions
Joachim of Flora who lived just before 1200. The movement that took
place "is of immense importance," he says. He singles out this 12th
century movement above all the others in importance, though he does
not give an explanation here or elsewhere of the doctrine of Joachim.
He seems to be justified in singling out the age of Joachim of Flora,
because the modern notion of the ages of the world (which are consummated in the age of the Spirit) was first set forth by Joachim. Joachim
was an Italian monk and an exegete of Sacred Scriptures. 2
He asserted three great dispensations,3 three ages of the world, respectively associated with the Father, the Son and the Holy Ghost
The first age reaches from Adam to Christ. The second age (overlapping
The Divine and the Human, 186-188.
a The work of Joachim which develops his doctrine of the ages of the world is not available
to me. H. Bett presents the theory in Joachim of Flcwa (Methuen, London, 1931), 44-46. Bett
refers to the Conccwdia novi ac veteris of Joachim, printed at Venice in 1519. "This appears
to be the only edition in existence ... The excessive scarcity of copies makes it difficult for
a student to have access to the volume ... " Ibid., 26.
Bett says:" ... the three great dispensations which are respectively identified with God the
Father, God the Son, and God the Holy Spirit. The first age reaches from Adam to Christ ...
age of those who marry and give in marriage. The second age reaches from Uzziah, fructified
from Zacharias to the forty-second generation following, and consummated, therefore, in the
year 1260. During this age men live a mixed life, between the flesh and the spirit; it is the age
of clerics. The third age reaches from St. Benedict to the end of the world. It is initiated in St.
Benedict, and fructified from the twenty-second generation after St. Benedict, i.e., about
1200, to the end of the dispensation. During this age men live a spiritual life; it is the age
of monks. The three ages therefore overlap. The age of the Son begins to appear in the age
of the Father, and reaches on into Joachim's own lifetime. The age of the Spirit begins to
appear in the age of the Son, some centuries before Joachim's time, and reaches on to the end
of the world. ... The three ages therefore represent a spiritual progress. Truth is revealed
dimly in the first age of the Old Covenant, more clearly in the second age of the New Covenant,
and fully and finally in the last age, the dispensation of the Spirit." 44-46.
"Thus Joachim has really one theme in all his books. It is the thought of the three dispensations - the progress of revelation through an age of God the Father, an age of God the
Son, and a final age of God the Spirit." Ibid., 48.
" ... Joachim's general doctrine came to be known later as the Eternal Gospel . ... he does
expressly say that this everlasting gospel is the gospel of the Holy Spirit. And he speaks of the
gospel of Christ as transitory and temporal, but of the spiritual significance of it as eternal."
(my italics)
"Again, Peter, Paul, and John represent the Father, the Son and the Spirit, and also the
three ages ... " Ibid., 38.
3 See preceding note.
1
8I
with the first and the third) reaches from Uziah to the year I260. The
third age, the age of the Spirit, reaches from St. Benedict to the end of
the world. The three ages represent a spiritual progress, a progress of
revelation. There is a gospel of the Holy Spirit which is finally revealed
in the age of the Spirit, and the gospel of Christ is only transitory and
temporal. Joachim's doctrine came to be known as the' 'Eternal Gospel."
Berdyaev, in the above quotation, says the German idealistic metaphysics was a "most outstanding event" in the history of philosophy of
the spirit. There has been, we may remind ourselves, a whole tradition
of philosophy of the Spirit in German Idealism. Berdyaev's philosophy
of revelation is akin to that of the German Idealists. The influence of
the German philosophers upon Berdyaev has probably been both direct
and indirect. His Russian predecessors were strongly influenced by the
German Idealists, particularly by Schelling. l I am not concerned to
establish the exact sources of the parts of Berdyaev's philosophy of
revelation. Berdyaev displays a tremendous philosophical erudition,
and particularly in I9th-century German thought. The exact sources
of his doctrine probably could never be determined, even by himself.
But we can note some similarities between his theory and that of
Schelling. We may observe the way in which Berdyaev participates in
a doctrinal complex or current of thought which has been in existence
at least since the time of Schelling. Schelling wrote a late work entitled
Philosophy 01 Revelation,2 and other German philosophers, especially
Hegel, approached Christian Revelation in the same philosophical way. 3
This current of thought is affiliated with a certain religious outlook, an
outlook which is interested in the Church of the Spirit. It considers
Divine Revelation to be unfinished, and revelation of Christ is to be
followed by a revelation of the Spirit which is to occur in the Church
of the Spirit.
Schelling followed the general scheme first set forth by Joachim of
1 Berdyaev states, in The Russian Idea, 72, that Hegel's philosophy was of immense importance in Russis. See Chapter III, notes. See Lossky's History of Russian philosophy, 13'
23, 51, 53.
2 Cf. F. W. J. Schelling, Sammtliche Werke (Stuttgart and Augsburg, 1856 seq.), II,
Vol. 3 and 4.
3 Indeed Hegel's Philosophy of History attests that other philosophers or theologians are
familiar with the Joachite doctrine of the ages of the world. Cf. G. W. F. Hegel, The Philosophy of History (The Colonial Press, New York, 1900), Part IV. "The German World - The
Principle of Spiritual Freedom," 345. "We may distinguish these periods and Kingdoms of
the Father, the Son and the Spirit. The Kingdom of the Father .... The Kingdom of the Son
is the manifestation of God merely in a relation to secular existence - shining upon it as upon
an alien object. The Kingdom of the Spirit is the harmonizing of the antithesis."
Hegel adds, in a footnote: "The conception of a mystical regnum Pat,is, regnum Filii and
regnum Spiritus Sancti is perfectly familiar to metaphysical theologians ... "
82 GODMANHOOD, FREEDOM AND PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY
Flora and wrote an important work entitled The Ages of the World. He
proposed to present a philosophy of revelation divided into three parts
concerning the age of the Father, the age of the Son, and the age of the
Spirit. 1 The Apostles, Peter, Paul and John represent, as in Joachim,
the three ages, and the third age is known as the Joannineage,ortheage
of the J oannine Church. 2
Berdyaev, however, has criticized Schelling (and Fichte and Hegel)
for not being Christian enough in their philosophy. Schelling,S I find,
asserts an overlapping of the three ages. For Schelling, a large-scale
beginning of the age of the Spirit occurs in human history; he looks
forward to an earthly Church of the Spirit, to be devoted to St. John (a
See 71, note 4.
See next note. See also K. Lowith, Meaning in HistOf'Y (Univ. Chicago, Chicago, 1949),
Appendix I.
a D,eam and Reality, 94. Indeed, Schelling's theogony, cosmogony and phlilosophy of
revelation are ordered by a doctrine of three potencies in God; he constantly refers to the
three potencies in The Ages of the WOf'ld and in his Philosophy of Revelation, and the three
potencies replace, to a large extent, the Trinitarian doctrine of Christianity.
The ages of the world, in Schelling's view, are adapted to his cosmology. He devises a
number of three-fold divisions of reality (Cf. Translator's Introduction, The Ages 0/ the W Of'ld),
but, in The Ages of the WOf'ld, he has the Joachite division of Father, Son and Spirit in mind.
This division seems to be associated in his mind with three cosmological ages of time; namely
pre-temporal eternity; the present time of creation; and the future eternity to be attained.
They are non-continuous with each other, and their relation is supra-historical, because
between the ages an act of freedom intervenes. Cf. Translator's Introduction, The Ages of the
Wo,la, 58, also 75.
The age of the Father, Schelling seems to believe, merges in time and in eternity with the
pre-temporal eternity; and the age of the Son is identical with history as it has been since the
time of the Incarnation. The age of the Spirit merges with the future eternity to be attained;
that is, the age of the Spirit is to begin sooner or later (f,uher oaer spliter). See following
passage.
He says: "Hlitte ich in unserer Zeit eine Kirche IIU bauen, ich wu,de sie dem heil. Johannes
wiamen. Abe" f,uhe, oller spliter wi,a eine gebaut weraen, aie aie arei A postel/u,sten vereinigt, aa
aie letxte Potenll aie /,uhere nicht au/hebt ode, ausschlieszt, sonaer sie verklli,end in sich au/nimmt.
Diese wu,de aann rlas wahre Pantheon Iler Ch,istlichen KifChen-geschichte sehn." Slimmtliche
Werke, 11,4, 332.
This passage follows a statement of Schelling of the threefold dispensation of Christianity:
that of Peter, that of Paul and that of John. It indicates that Schelling's position is
this: the age of the Spirit will begin in historical time; for Schelling says that if "he
were to found a Church in our time, he would dedicate it to St. John. But sooner or later
one will be built ... Then the true Pantheon of the history of the Christian Church will
be seen."
Karl Lowith, in his Meaning in Histrwy, Appendix I, refers to Schelling's philosophy of
history. His words confirm the above-mentioned finding. He shows that Schelling's age of the
Spirit has an earthly beginning. He says, 209-210:
"The most profound and original attempt to establish the reign of the spirit philosophically
is that of Schelling, in the thirty-sixth lecture of his PhiloSOPhy of Revelation. Schelling, like
Joachim, refers to St. Paul (I Cor. 13: 8, ff.) and to St. John as the apostles of the future, in
order to justify his elaboration of a spiritual religion of the human race; 'for only thus can
Christianity remain the religion of the Germans after the Reformation.' ... Schelling's thesis
was, that the work of Christ could only lay foundations but could not survive in its contemporary settings .... in place of himself Christ proclaims the Spirit which is independent of the
ecstatic gifts of the apostolic age."
1
83
Joannine Church.} 1 Berdyaev criticizes this outlook, along with the

philosophical approach of German mysticism, in the passage from The
Divine and the Human, quoted above, when he says:
German mysticism, as a whole inclines to be hostile to eschatological thought,
It was in Russia that eschatological aspiration, with its expectation of a new
epoch of the Spirit, and belief in the possibility of a crowning revelation, was
most forcibly expressed.
Yet, Berdyaev participates in the Joachite tradition of philosophy of

revelation so far as it is Christian. He says, in The Divine and the Human:
The Church of the New Testament was a symbolic image of the eternal Church
of the spirit. In the Church of the Spirit the eternal Gospel will be read. 2
This might have been lifted from Joachim. Indeed, earlier in the same
chapter (entitled "Religion of the Spirit"), Berdyaev speaks approvingly of Joachim of Flora: "There are always spiritually-minded
people who live before their time . . . Joachim of Flora ... " 3
There is an affinity between the spiritualism of the German Idealists
and that of Berdyaev. But when he says" eternal Church of the Spirit,"
he means something different from the national Church of Schelling.
His Russian mysticism transforms the notion.
His mystical preoccupation causes him to place a low value on nature
in his doctrine. There is not, as we find in Schelling,4 an interest in the
natural as well as the supernatural. Rather, he sees from his mystical
viewpoint the transfiguration of the natural in the supernatural. For
a western proponent of philosophy of revelation, such as Schelling, who
is interested in the natural for its own sake, it is all right for the visible
Church to have natural manifestations, and for the future Church of the
Spirit to have a beginning on earth. The trouble is, Schelling's Church
would no longer be Christian. For Berdyaev, the visible Church can
only be a symbol of the True Church; and revelation, so far as it is
historicized, is symbolic and falls short of the complete revelation of the
Eternal Gospel. Therefore, the "Church of the Spirit," according to
1 The Divine and the Human, 202. See The meaning of the Creative Act, 320: "The world is
passing through three epochs of divine revelation: the revelation of the law (the Father), the
revelation of redemption (the Son) and the revelation of Creativity (the Spirit) .... It is not
given to us to know the definite chronological limits of these three epochs: they are all coexistent. Today we have not fully lived out the law, and redemption from sin has not yet been
completed, although the world is entering a new religious epoch. Even in the epoch of the
law the world had a premonition of new religious epochs ... "
2 Ibid., 186-187.
3 See The Divine and the Human, 47.
4 Cf. The Ages of the World, 141-142.
84
Berdyaev, cannot be established, as a historical church, on earth. He

remains consistent and true to his key doctrine: transfiguration of
mankind by the Godman, Christ.
Berdyaev uses the phrases of a philosopher of revelation - "Eternal
Gospel," "Church of the Spirit." The terms represent what has been
imperfectly revealed in the Gospel and in the Church. They have,
consequently, a signification in his mystical doctrine which differs from
that of Schelling. Furthermore, Berdyaev needs phrases such as these
to help him define the age of the Spirit. The age of the Spirit is completely out of this historical world. Yet, it is the termination of the
progress which the world has made during universal history. This
presupposes the doctrine that the cosmos, along with man, will return
to unity within Godmanhood. Man will take this world - spiritualized with him. The futuristic earthly and spiritual Utopias of his German
and Slavic predecessors 1 provide Berdyaev with material to define
the age of the Spirit. And he wants to define the age of the Spirit in
order to lay down a goal which will guide men in their progress towards
the day of the transfiguration of the world.
His concern with the inadequacy of man's understanding of revelation does not assume that the second dispensation, that of Christ,
has been inadequate, but rather that it would be inadequate by itself
in the present age.
The Christian renaissance of a new humanity, matured in the Spirit, moving out
of the epoch of fearfulness and guardianship, can take place only under the sign
not of the Church of Peter but of John and of the mystic Joannine tradition.
... The historic Church of Peter is unable to satisfy the modem man; it cannot
cope with his religious tragedy; it is always answering the questions which have
not been asked; it soothes the wrong suffering, heals the wrong wounds; it is
helping to save men from childish sins, but is powerless to help with the sins of
maturity ... in the Christian world humility and obedience have long since been
transformed into servitude and opportunism ... To overcome this religious
servility, this heteronomic consciousness, is the first task of a Christian renaissance. Man must know himself religiously not as the slave of God but as a
free participant in the divine process. 2
Nevertheless, Berdyaev holds that the Christian Church is not to be

superseded by the Church of the Spirit:
The new revelation is certainly not to be thought of as a new religion distinct
from Christianity, but as the fulfilment and crowning of the Christian revelation
3
1 See The Beginning and the End, 115; The Divine ann Human, 47.
I
The Meaning of the Creative Act, 332-334.

85
We can understand Berdyaev's outlook only if we recall that he is

intensely eschatological, the Second Coming of the Messiah is always
in his mind. The whole world will be saved, not just a few persons. It is
as if the City of New York and all its citizens were going to be saved.
Berdyaev does not make the break between the concrete aspect of
history and metahistory,l or between man and the divine that we
Westerners do. History will be transfigured in its concreteness and in
its entirety,2 and Berdyaev describes this transfiguration as if it is the
true revelation, "the fulfilment and crowning of the Christian revelation."
He continues:
The revelation of the Spirit cannot just be simply waited for; it depends also
upon the creative activity of man; it cannot be understood simply as a new
revelat;on of man to God. This means that it will be a divine human revelation. 3
Man must creatively help to bring on the end. This new revelation of
the Spirit- which needs the efforts of man, as well as of God, to be
achieved - is the "fulfilment and crowning of the Christian revelation."
The age of the Spirit will not occur in history, even though it is a
human, as well as a divine, revelation. It will have only a beginning in
history. There will be certain men who are forerunners:
We are not yet entering into the era of the Spirit; we are entering into the dark
era. There have been forerunners of the new revelation of the Spirit throughout
the whole extent of the history of Christianity, and such there are also now. 4
There, we have found the answer to our question: how the world can
progress towards the age of the Spirit and what sort of a beginning the
age of the Spirit will have in history? The age of the Spirit has certain
great men who are forerunners. Berdyaev names many men, starting
with some Eastern Doctors of the Church and ending with some
moderns, as, for example, Leon Bloy and Vladimir Solovyev. 5
Berdyaev has not cheated the reader of a promise to remain spiritual
and other-worldly in his philosophy of history. No, he has, on the
contrary, remained true to his spiritualism. In particular, the world has
a tragic history as well as a happy history, and the reign of Anti-Christ
will precede the end and glorification of the world. Of the people in
1
9
3
See Chapter IV, Section G.

Ibid.; Chapter III, Section F.
The Divine and the Human, r83.
Ibid., r86.
Ibid., r86, ff.
86
the world, there are only forerunners, few in numbers, of the age of
the Spirit. And yet through them (and their influence on society) the
progress of history towards the end of history is realized.
Berdyaev has worked out an elaborate doctrine of the age of the
Spirit in which he shows how progress towards it has been made, and
is to be made in the New Middle Ages. To investigate this is beyond the
economy of my study; it would take us to the periphery of Berdyaev's
doctrine. We are investigating the principles and method of his philosophy of history, which need more clarification than do his conclusions.
Here, we must rest content to have determined that Berdyaev's
eschatology has remained metaphysical and spiritual, that the old theory of the ages of the world, which has been an earthly futurism in
Berdyaev's predecessors and contemporaries, has been given an new
meaning in Berdyaev's doctrine.
E. SUMMARY
I. According to Berdyaev's doctrine of Godmanhood, man in principle
contains the cosmos completely and is superior to it. The idea of God-.
manhood, upon which this theory is based, means the mutual sharing
of two natures, the Divine and the human, while the distinction between them is preserved. Every man is a distinct creation, but he is, in
principle, divine; hence Berdyaev's philosophy of history is ruled far
more by the light of revelation than by the light of reason. His outlook
is that of ancient Eastern Orthodoxy; it is mystical, and its object is
the transfiguration of everything created. And the basic reality
Berdyaev seeks in his philosophy of history is the divinization of man
and creation. There is an Eternal Humanity which ought to be realized
in time. Terrestrial man is metaphorically related to the Proto-type;
hence, a metaphoricism of history is subordinated to a mysticism of
history. Philosophy of history seeks, metaphorically, and also mystically, the revealtion of the Eternal Man.
2. To understand Berdyaev's use of the doctrine of Godmanhood in

his philosophy of history, it was necessary to see the role of freedom.
Berdyaev, in the light of an existential doctrine of freedom, rejects the
Sophia theory of the Russians, Bulgakov and Solovyev. Russian
Sophiologists are not existentialists, but intellectualists; their philosophies are bound by an essentialistic determinism. Berdyaev, inspired
87
by the voluntarism of Boehme, observes that they are not voluntarists.

An irrational Freedom is not the ultimate principle of their philosophies. Berdyaev's difference with the Russian Sophiologists defines his
own cosmogony; it prevents his cosmogony from being completely
unhistorical and his philosophy of history from being enslaved by
essences.
The fall of man has its roots in freedom, not in an intelligible principle. The freedom of the will and the tragedy of history have their roots
in the Ungl'und, an irrational and primordial Will, a groundlessness
which is the deepest force in God. This irrational principle needs to be
illuminated by Christ. The tragic destiny of the Son of God and His
expiatory death is part of a movement in the divine life of God. The
movement in the divine life is a theogonic process, or divine genesis, in
which the Holy Trinity is born. And it is the condition which allows
Berdyaev to assert there is a celestial history, a history of God in His
theogonic process. Hence, the whole significance and essence of history
and the world process consists in the illumination of the dark irrational
principle in cosmogony and theogony. And this is the hypothesis of
metaphysics of history, that the terrestrial destiny is predetermined by
the celestial, in which the tragedy of illumination and Redemption take
place through the divine passion, and that tragedy determines the
illumination of world history.
A terrestrial history, as an epoch of celestial history, is needed, be'"
cause God Himself needs to be illuminated, and man shares in the illumination of the U ngl'und. The God-man, the perfect man, is the
principle of this doctrine. The Ungl'und, however, is the basis of divine
and world processes. A stress between Berdyaev's voluntarism and his
intelligibility arises, due to the twofold primacies of irrational freedom
(Ungl'und) and of Godmanhood in Christ (intelligible Logos). The stress
is overcome in Berdyaev's universal history. The process begins with
irrational freedom and ends with freedom being perfectly illuminated
by the divine Logos.
The reconciliation of voluntarism and intelligibility is seen in two
metaphysical doctrines: the doctrine of Spirit and the doctrine of
beauty. Spirit is the sphere in which the divine and human are united;
at the same time,Spirit emanates from both God (Godmanhood) and
from primordial Freedom (Ungl'und). And Spirit is incarnated, not only
in the human body but also in the cosmos and even in historical bodies
and traditions. The incarnation of Spirit is progressive in universal
history, diffusing itself more and more completely, so that man ex-
88
periences more and more freedom from the objectivizations of the fallen
world.
Beauty, in the same way, is a principle of reconciliation. That is, the
transfiguration of human nature and of the world is the attainment of
beauty. Universal history progresses towards beautification as towards
spiritualization. Beauty is a principle of reconciliation because the
intellectual quest of man is creative and artistic, and the will is prior to
the intellect. Yet, beauty is God's idea of the world, and, hence, beauty
is finally perfect illumination of the irrational will.
Berdyaev's philosophy of history is a philosophy of beauty, where
beauty is known imaginatively and voluntarily, as well as intellectually.
Such a doctrine serves his prophetic philosophy.
3. One of the consequences of the doctrine of Godmanhood is Berdyaev's
theory of Sobornost'. Sobornost' is an alltogetherness, a communal life of
many persons, properly, of all mankind. It is achieved in the incarnation
of Spirit; attained symbolically in historical bodies and actually in a
free brotherhood of men. True and complete Sobornost' is attained in
the transfiguration of the world and the cosmos when there will be a
brotherhood of men with the whole creation. It is a subjective communion or brotherhood.
Another aspect of the doctrine of Godmanhood is an emphasis upon
a cosmic consciousness. Berdyaev belongs to that group of philosopher
who make an outstanding study of the place of cosmogony and an attendant cosmology in human wisdom. Like Scotus Erigena, he asserts
the return of the cosmos to a spiritual unity within man and the return
of man to a unity within God. The cosmos is a living organism because
it belongs to the anthropological; it is a spiritual phenomenon because
it originates in the Godman, Christ, and because its future spiritualization is being prepared in the progress of mankind. The world is an
organic hierarchy, and the separation of man from God involves the
separation of the whole creation from God. Thus, celestial history is
seen to affect terrestrial history, itself an epoch within celestial history.
Berdyaev wants to show that the psychical - both the world, so far
as it participates in the human soul, and also the souls of men - can be
brought into the spiritual world without being destroyed. The psychical,
in all its distinct multiplicity, preserves its identity in transfiguration.
Such a cosmology predisposes Berdyaev to set forth a philosophy of
history in terms of an Augustinian Universal History rather than in
terms of historical cycles. He is interested in the unity of universal
89
history, not in the rules of historical cycles. He sees history as a progress

rather than as the manifestation of laws and consequently does not ever
abstract from the images of cultures. He wants to assert a doctrine of
organic unity, and the unity is ultimately spiritual.
A further consequences of the doctrine of Godmanhood is the notion
of the age of the Spirit, a theory that was first formulated by Joachim
of Flora. Berdyaev's mystical theory looks forward to the coming of the
Messiah and the end of the world. He posits an age of the Spirit much in
the same way that Schelling and other thinkers have done. Berdyaev
does not, as they do, posit an earthly futurism as the goal of history.
Unlike Schelling, Berdyaev looks forward, not to a Church of the Spirit
to supplant the Christian dispensation, but to a Church of the Spirit
which will completely reveal the Christian dispensation after the end of
the world. Berdyaev's Orthodox messianism and mysticism sees that,
though the world does and should progress towards the age of Spirit,
the latter has only a modest beginning in this world. There are forerunners, great and spiritual men, through whose influence the progress
of history towards the end of history is realized.
CHAPTER III
EXISTENTIALISM:
A PERSONALIST PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY
A. INTRODUCTION
I seek in this chapter to discover the way in which Berdyaev's Existentialism fulfills a need in his philosophy of history. What relation
does his Existentialism have to his doctrine of the "historical?" In this
connection, we will have to study a Personalist doctrine which is
inspired by religious thought and stems from certain philosophical
currents.
We saw in Chapter I that "his thought ... admits of only one possible metaphysics, and that is meta-history. Everything existential is
history; dynamic force, destiny, man, the world, are history, God is
history.... The philosophy to which he would give expression, is a
dramatic philosophy of destiny, of existence which is in time and passes
over into eternity ... Everything, therefore, ought to be regarded from
the point of view of the philosophy of history." 1
We saw, too, in Chapter I that history is transformed and transfigured in the historical memory,2 that every man is a sort of microcosm "in which the whole world of reality and all the great historical
epochs combine and coexist. He . .. is a world in his own right ... " 3
In Chapter II, we studied the pre-eminent place of personal freedom
in the doctrine. We noted the mutual dependency of a voluntarism and
an anti-intellectualist Existentialism. We saw how the pre-eminence of
the Will and of Freedom made it possible for Berdyaev to assert an
Existentialism in which the primary existent is the person. 4
Thus we have witnessed a Personalist philosophy of history which
holds that man should go outside himself and enter history in order to
bring it within the unity of his personality. We observed the outstanding
place of cosmogony in this philosophy,5 according to which the freedom
1
I
3
4
6
The Divine and the Human, v-vi, quoted on 32, above.

The Meaning of Hist01'Y, 17-18, quoted on II, above.
Cf. ibid., 22-23, quoted on IS, above.
Cf. The Russian Idea, 171, quoted on 56, above.
Cf. Chapter II, Section D, Part 2.
EXISTENTIALISM
91
and worth of every person was asserted, where the Existential is most
truly approached through personal and mystical creativity, and where
the world and history is seen to be taken up into the divine and human
unity of the person.
The Existentialism of Berdyaev's philosophy o~ history is therefore
in some sense a Personalism; indeed, we want to find out whether or
not the philosophy may be characterized as a peculiarly Personalist
doctrine; and we seek to know the way in which it articulates its need
for a Personalism. We know, from our study of his doctrine of the
microcosm,1 that "the personality is a biography ... a 'history'.
Existence is invariably 'historical,'" 2 and the human Ego - as we
may term it - realizes its personality through the historical memory
which indeed is "attuned to the primal wisdom of man ... of the
earliest epochs (and which) persists ... throughout the history of
the human spirit"; 3 and it is attuned as well to the later epochs of
history.
In Section B the first principles of Berdyaev's philosophy of history
with respect to Existentialism will be studied. We seek to know whether
or not these principles require a peculiarly Personalist doctrine. In
Section C, Berdyaev's spiritual philosophy of personality will be studied.
We enquire there whether the spiritualism is irrational, rational or
mystical. In Section D, the question of a spiritual personality and its
connection with the concrete (and "historical") existent will be investigated. The connection of the existent with universality, the relation of
the imaginableness of reality with concreteness and the relation of
human creativity with concrete existence must all be studied. This
study will uncover further the Personalism of Berdyaev's philosophy of
history. In Section E, the metaphysics of the communion of the person
with the Thou and the We will be studied. How necessary is this
Personalist doctrine of communion to Berdyaev's philosophy of history
and universal history? Finally, in Section F the doctrine of human
microcosm will be investigated; namely, the theory of the inclusion of
the cosmos, mankind and all history in the personality. We will then be
able to decide how greatly Berdyaev's philosophy of history needs a
Personalism and Existentialism.
Chapter I, Section B, Part 2.

Cf. Solitude and Society, 124, quoted on ,.
a Cf. The Meaning 0/ History, " on II. (my italics).
1
B
92
EXISTENTIALISM
B. PERSONALISM: THE EXISTENT AND THE EGO
Berdyaev says, in Truth and Revelation:

He who creates is a microcosm .... The world is my creative act. Another man
is my creative act. God is my creative act.... Beauty in the world is a creative
act not an objective reality. Creative transformation must therefore go on all
the time. 1
This doctrine of creativity is very important to Berdyaev's philosophy

because it explains how the person knows the transcendent Truth and
yet takes it existentially into his own subjectivity. It is both immanent
and transcendent. We saw, in Berdyaev's voluntarism, that he asserts
a philosophy of beauty. And he finds that beauty is both to be known
and to be created by the historical memory.
The idea of beauty, which is so necessary to his metaphysics is necessary to his philosophy of history. The historical and the entities which
are known in Berdyaev's philosophy are known as symbols, as true
myths. 2 Philosophy of history is not historical, it is meta-historical; and
this requires that the myth or symbol, by which the philosopher sees
meaning in history, is a symbol of a higher entity (not a lower, historical,
entity). The reality which the philosopher of history seeks to know by
his true myths is the "historical," the divine meaning of history, the
Truth of history.
But note: a myth or a symbol - true myth, too, as Berdyaev has it is a fiction (and a true fiction). A fiction is a work of art, in Berdyaev's
doctrine a thing of beauty. When his philosopher of history forms
historical myths (such as "historical culture") he is a creator of beauty,
seeking after beauty. His myths serve to bring him in his mystical
philosophy to the reality, the true meaning of history. The reality, consequently, is beauty; his philosophy is a philosophy of beauty. The philosopher both creates beauty and knows beauty. Philosophically
speaking, Berdyaev is interested in the divine Beauty of history.
These considerations about the beauty of history are closely related
to Berdyaev's Personalism and Existentialism. When he says the world,
another man, or God, is my creative act, he means that we create myths
or symbols by means of which we attain higher and higher approximations to the realities which our creations symbolize. The philosopher,
here, obviously takes them into his own subjectivity while at the same
1 Truth and Revelation, 75-76. See The Meaning of the Creative Act, 138: "The worldprocess is the eighth day of creation, it is continuing creation."
2 Cf. Chapter IV, Section G, Part I.
EXISTENTIALISM
93
time approximating to a knowledge of them in their transcendent Truth.

This is a mystical philosophy to which Berdyaev's definition of spirit
is suited. His notion of spirit, where the wilful principle predominates
over the intellectual, and yet where the wilful principle is finally all
illuminated by the intellectual, is correlative with a philosophy of
beauty. For beauty is not humanly attained, except under spiritual
conditions where the will predominates over the reason. And beauty
is known under the same conditions.
The philosophy is an Existentialism because the human spirit, in
knowing the world, other men and God - by symbols - is creating,
discovering and knowing himself. We saw, in Chapter I, that Berdyaev
posits a doctrine of creative reminiscence. A person recalls and creates
what he is, a spirit eternally created by God, an image of the Godman
and a microcosm in whom world history is spiritualized. This is an
Existentialism because man is a microcosm, and all the things he knows
and the history he creates become himself by truly revealing him to
himself. His knowledge becomes the existent which he is, the microcosm in whom true existence is finally attained.
Indeed Berdyaev recognizes the Existentialism of the cognitive mind.
He says first, in Truth and Revelation:
Existentialism may be defined in various ways, but the most important in my
opinion is the description of existentialism which regards it as a philosophy which
will not accept objectifying knowledge. Existence cannot be the object of
knowledge. l
This first and most important definition defines negatively in respect

to objectified knowledge. He then takes up another definition:
Another definition of existential philosophy is this. Existential philosophy is
expressionist. In other words, it seeks to express the existentiality of the
cognitive mind rather than something abstracted from that existentiality, which
is what objectifying philosophy seeks to do. In this sense an element of existentialism behind the process of objectivization may be discovered in all great
philosophers. 2
Berdyaev SO connects his Existentialism with the creative knowing of

the world, other men and God, that he finds an Existential element in
another part of the human spirit, as well as in its freedom and its spirituality; namely, in its knowing mind. When he says that Existential
philosophy is expressionist, he is getting at the cognitive part of the
existent. Existential philosophy is expressionist, and seeks to express
Truth and Revelation,
z Ibid., 12.
II.
94
EXISTENTIALISM
the existentiality of the cognitive mind (which is the existentiality of

the spirit, the existent, to whom the mind belongs). And he even discovers an element of Existentialism in the objectivization which would
set up an essence as an existent, because even the objectivization participates in the existentiality of the cognitive mind. We will see, in the
following chapter, that the existentiality of the cognitive mind consists
in the existentiality of the concrete human spirit. 1
The two definitions of Existentialism, in fact, are the only ones that
Berdyaev offers in Truth and Revelation, and both refer to knowledge,
to the subjective knowledge of man the microcosm. Thus the spiritual
and human principles of Berdyaev's philosophy of history are explained
by a philosophy of beauty and by an Existentialism which asserts the
primacy of the knowing person. 2
At the same time beauty is not only the invented symbol, but the
reality which Berdyaev's Existential doctrine seeks .
. . . the subject can orientate himself by means of Existential philosophy, which
dispenses with objectivization:
the human subject does not apprehend the object, but the revelation of human
existence and, through it, that of the divine world. Thus in the light of Existential philosophy, knowledge is both active and creative, though in a somewhat
different way, I can illuminate the objective world wherein meaning is revealed,
the meaning of human existence and of the universe as part of the Divine Being. S
Thus beauty is not only subjective in this Existential philosophy, but,

through beauty, human existence and the universe reveal the Divine
Being. Note that, for Berdyaev, there are two principal moments of this
revelation: there occurs the revelation of human existence and through
it that of the divine world. Thus Berdyaev seeks to express the existentiality of the cognitive mind. This reveals human existence and,
thereby, the existence of the divine world.
How does Berdyaev further conceive of the relationship between the
"existential" and the "personal" in his philosophy? Does he identify
them? Is the person one and the same as the existent, or the act of
Chapter IV, Section G.
Berdyaev offers a description of his Existentialism in Dream and Reality, 102, which is
as follows:
"I was an existentialist even before I came to know Kierkegaard's writings ... I believe
that Russian thought has always been marked by an existentialist tendency. This applies,
evidently, above all to Dostoevsky, but is also true of Leo Shestov. Existentialism is, indeed,
not a new phenomenon: we may discern its vivifying theme throughout the wholehistoryof
thought. The emphasis on the subject as against the object, of the will as against the general
and universal; the antithesis between intuitive and conceptual knowledge, between existence
and essence, were understood by some medieval thinkers and, in some measure, even in Greek
thought .. . "
1
EXISTENTIALISM
95
existence, at the origin of reality? To find an answer to these questions

will enable us to know whether Berdyaev's philosophy is primarily a
Personalism or primarily an Existentialism or equally a Personalism
and Existentialism. And this will throw some light on his philosophy of
history. If the personal is supreme in his doctrine, this will emphasize
the personal quality of the SUbject-matter of philosophy of history,
namely, the "historical," and, therefore, of philosophy of history itself.
Further, if the personal is prior, if the creative Existentialism is predominately personal, then the unity of Berdyaev's universal history
will be preserved.
Outside personality there is no absolute unity and totality in the world, to which
personality would be subordinate ... An existential center, and a suffering
destiny are to be found in subjectivity, not in objectivity.... And everything
which is existential in the objectivized ranks of the world, in mankind, in the
cosmos, etc. belongs to the inward being of personality ... 1
Berdyaev thus conceives his idea of man the microcosm in Existential

terms. 2 Existential is the predicate, in this text, and personality is the
implied subject. Thus he also is discussing a Personalist doctrine in Existentialist terms. He refers to the existential reality of the external
world, but relates this in its existentiality to the human personality.
The personality is not only superior to the external world, but the reality of the world belongs to the personality. "Personality is a microcosm,
a complete universe .... Personality is not a part and cannot be a part
in relation to any kind of whole, not even to an immense whole, or to
the entire world. This is the essential principle of personality and its
mystery .... For personality ... in its self-revelation is directed towards
an infinite content. And at the same time personality presupposes form
and limit ... it is the universal in an individually unrepeatable form." 3
Later in the chapter in Slavery and Freedom where personality is defined, Berdyaev indicates that personality most properly speaking is
the Godman, Christ, insofar as He is reflected in every individual man. 4
The individually personal for Berdyaev is the most Existential of all
things. S We saw, in Chapter I, that through the historical memory, the
Cf. Chapter I, Section B, Part 2.
3 Slavery and Freedom, 21-22. The Russian word for personality, lichnost, is very similar
in meaning to the English term. Lichnost connotes the quality of having form and separate
distinguishable features. Lich means face, gestalt. Razlichat means to discern, distingiush;
razluka means separation, partition.
4 Ibid., 28.
1
96
EXISTENTIALISM
person experiences the world and history as part of himself.1 "My own
existence is the most 'existential' of all .... I have experienced the
world around me and all the historical processes and events of my time
as part of myself, as my spiritual biography. At the deepest mystical
level, everything that has happened to the world happened to me." 2
Indeed, "Existence," he says, "is not fully realized until we can pass
from the subject to the human personality. Existential philosophy is a
Personalist philosophy; the human personality is the real subject of
knowledge." 3 He understands his Existential doctrine in terms of
modern Existentialism.
Existence (Existenz) is not essence, it is not substance, it is a free act. Existentia
takes supremacy over essentia. From this point of view existential philosophy
is akin to every philosophy of action and all philosophies of freedom. . ..
Existenz in its depths is freedom. This is to be seen both in Jaspers, who allied
himself with Kant, and again in Sartre who has very little in common with him.
The events which take place in the existential sphere lie outside any causal
sequence. . .. It cannot, therefore, be said, for example, that God is the cause of
the world. There can be no causal relations between God and man. 4
We will see below how Berdyaev relates the Existentialism of Jaspers

and Sartre to his own. Existence, which is supreme over essence, is a
free act. He points out the voluntarism of an Existential philosophy,
and speaks of philosophy of freedom. This is why he denies a principle
of causality in an Existential philosophy. Causality, Kant has shown
him, belongs to the natural and necessary realm, not to the realm of
freedom.5 Because existence is voluntary, wilful - that is, intimately
related to primordial will and freedom 6 - existence in its depths cannot
be a cause. The world is not an effect of God but an image of the true
Christian world.
A little later Berdyaev says:
Freedom, that is to say, the act of freedom, is in fact Existenz. 7
Note how carefully Berdyaev relates Existenz to freedom. He does not

say freedom is exactly Existenz, but freedom, that is to say, the act of
freedom, is in fact Existenz. Later in the same work he says:
Dream and Reality, X-Xl.
S Solitude and Society, 51.
4 Truth and Revelation, I2-I3.
5 See Chapter IV, Section A, concerning the Kantian notion of freedom and nature
which is found in Berdyaev.
6 Concerning the connection of will and freedom, see Chapter II, Section C.
7 Truth and Revelation, I4.
1
2
EXISTENTIALISM
97
Primary existence is freedom and act, it is creative power.!
Note, again, that he does not identify existence and freedom. He speaks,
instead, of a primary existence which is freedom. By "primary existence," he means the ultimate aspect of existence; and this ultimate
aspect of existence is freedom. He adds, "it is creative power." The
ultimate in existence, namely freedom, is a creative power. He understands by creative power a principle which is a creative potentiality. He
continues in the same text and adds: "The primary thing is movement. "2
I do indeed love freedom above all else. Man came forth out of freedom and issues
into freedom. Freedom is a primordial source and condition of existence ... 3
This passage confirms the hints given above; namely, that existence
follows freedom; that Existenz is freedom only as the act of freedom, or
is freedom with respect only to its own ultimate reality. Berdyaev is
careful in defining the relation of existence to freedom; it is not a causal
relation. He speaks, not of the cause of existence, but of the "primordial
source and condition" of existence. And this primordial source, which is
here called "freedom," may also be called "will," because the primordial
freedom is one and the same as the primordial will. The Russian word
for will, velya, is also the Russian word for freedom. 4 The Ungrund, the
primordial source and depth of God and of man, is "at the same time
will ... and freedom." "In the darkness of the Ungrund a fire flames up
and this is freedom, meonic, potential freedom." 5 It is meonic, Berdyaev
says, using a word taken from the Greek which means non-being, a sort
of nothingness. 6 This is a potential principle, a principle which is potency. The source of movement and of change is potency, not act; there is
more in potency than in act.7
We saw, in the text quoted above, that "primary existence is freedom
and act, it is creative power." And we have just seen that potency is
prior to act, according to Berdyaev. Act refers more properly to existence and potency refers more properly to primary freedom or will.
The Ungrund, the dark abyss, the primordial source is meonic. 8 This
is the dark will,9
Ibid., 70.
Ibid., 70.
4 Concerning the identification of primordial will and primordial freedom in Berdyaev's
philosophy, see 71, n 5 above.
6 Ibid., 106.
7 Ibid., 157.
8 71, n 5 above.
1
98
EXISTENTIALISM
the non-being ... the dark abyss .. This non-being ... does not exist,
but has an existential significance. l
The primordial will or freedom does not exist; it is prior to existence.

Existenz, for Berdyaev, is not identical with the ultimate principle because the ultimate will and freedom is prior to existence.
As always, however, when he discusses Existenz and freedom, he asserts the close relationship between them. We have seen in past pages
that existence in its depths is freedom; now we see that the dark abyss,
the primordial freedom, though it does not exist, "has an existential
significance. "
Thus, in Berdyaev's doctrine, freedom or will is prior, absolutely
speaking, to existence. And this may be said of God and man; for he
says it of God and sometimes of man. Man in his truth is the True Man,
the Godman, Christ; 2 that is, true man is God. The Ungrund, the
primordial freedom, is the deepest reality, both in man and in God. 3
Berdyaev's Existentialism posits something deeper than existence;
namely, the primordial will which operates in man as well as in God.
Berdyaev's philosophy is more properly called a Personalism than an
Existentialism. It is an Existential commonplace that God in His
depths is, but does not exist. 4 In Berdyaev's doctrine this is a PersonIbid., 143.
See Section F of the present chapter.
3 Cf. Chapter II, Section C and notes. Berdyaev says, in Freedom and the Spirit, 165: "The
void (the Ungrund of Boehme) is not evil, it is the source of every kind of life and every
actualization of being. It conceals within itself the possibility of both evil and of good. And
initial, irrational, and mysterious void lies at the heart of the whole life of the universe, but
it is a mystery beyond the reach of logic."
Yet, although the Ungrund (primal Freedom) is the profoundest reality it is not the
dominating reality in God. We have seen the Trinitarian doctrine of Berdyaev in Chapter II.
Nor is the Ungrund the dominating reality in man, even though it is the primal freedom.
Berdyaev speaks, in The Beginning and the End, 171, of: "an illuminated freedom" (not a
dark freedom), which is introduced in creative activity. He means the illumination of Christ.
4 James Collins in his book, The Existentialist, A Critical Study (Regnery, Chicago, 1952),
15, writes of the primacy of the personal in Kierkegaard's Existentialism. He says:
" ... Kierkegaard has associated existence exclusively with the exercise of human freedom
in the formation of self. For the same reason, he is prevented from applying existence to God.
He is the fountainhead of the existential commonplace that God is, but does not exist.
Existence cannot be predicated of the eternal, immutable being, since to exist means to be
engaged in becoming, time, freedom, and history. This has given rise to the existentialist
quandary of how to relate existential thinking to the divine Being, who is by definition placed
beyond the existential order. Man is not only central in existence: he is the only truly
existential being .
. .. His own answer to the problem of man's relationship to God was formulated in terms
of faith in the Incarnation. In the person of Christ, God Himself enters into the zone of the
existen tial."
We can now understand how Berdyaev's Existentialism differs from Kierkegaard's. For
Kierkegaard, God does not exist (God is); and existence pertains to the merely historical. For
him, it is an unexplanable paradox how existence and Godhead meet in the Person of Christ.
For Berdyaev, however, God does exist in a certain sense, though the deepest ground of God,
1
EXISTENTIALISM
99
alism, according to which God in His depths is the Ungrund. Not only
is the primary principle a personal one (for the will pertains to the
personal in contra-distinction from merely natural and external objects).
What is more, the primary principle is asserted in a philosophy which
holds that man is a microcosm. 1 The reality of anything in this world
is human and the ultimate principle is personal. Since existence in its
depths is freedom and will, the existence of any external natural thing
cannot be, except in its relationship to man.
We find in Berdyaev's philosophy that the metaphysical principles of
will or freedom and existence are treated in a doctrine of the human
Ego. The scheme, we will find, is similar to that of the German Idealists,
particularly Fichte and Schelling.
Indeed, Berdyaev has always attempted to relate his philosophy to
19th-century European currents of speculation. 2 He refers to the points
of agreement and disagreement between his philosophy and the outlooks
of German Idealism. But he has turned to German Idealism in most
cases, not for doctrine, but for confirmation of his own theories. Thus
he notes the turning of philosophy from objectivism to subjectivism in
German philosophy, but adds that the followers of Kant betrayed him
by objectifying the human subject.3
Kant's philosophy is a source in his Personalism and Existentialism.
Berdyaev says that "his true master in philosophy was Kant." 4 Fichte
the Ungrund, is prior to existence. We have seen, in the present Section the Existentiality of
the Ungrund and the willfulness of Existenz. Ung,und and Existenll are very close, though
distinct. On the other hand, Berdyaev seems to accept the "historicity" of existence. But he
overcomes the paradox of history and meta-history by making God Himself "historical," by
asserting a celestial history. Berdyaev is therefore better able than Kierkegaard to relate
Existential thinking to the divine Being, to relate the existentiality of Christ to His divinity.
Existence, for Berdyaev, has more metaphysical meaning than it does for Kierkegaard.
However, though Berdyaev gets closer to a metaphysics of existence in his Existentialism,
Kierkegaard respects the reality of history more than Berdyaev does. See III,n 3 below.
1 See Chapter I, Section B, Part 2; Section F of the present chapter.
S Berdyaev says (Dream and Reality, 121 and 122) that in his first book, Subjectivism and
Individualism in Social Philosophy, he "endeavoured to show the possibility of a synthesis of
critical Marxism and the Idealist philosophy of Kant and partly of Fichte." (my italics).
We find, in Solitude and Society, 36, if, a treatment of the influence of German Idealism on
the history of philosophy. Berdyaev indicates both the work of German Idealism that he
thinks should survive and the work that should not. "The work done in this sphere (the
subject's deliverance from the external tyranny of the objective world) by Kant and t"e
German Idealists ... precludes any return to the ancient metaphysical system of the sub
stantialist type which identified Being with object. Henceforth Being could only be apprehended subjectively ... but in the process they interpreted the subject in an objective and
non-existential way." In Chapter I of The Beginning and the End Berdyaev discusses both the
desirable and undesirable accomplishments of German Idealism in metaphysics and anthropology.
lOO
EXISTENTIALISM
also has been an influence. Indeed Berdyaev's first book attempted a

synthesis of Marxism with the idealism of Kant and partly that of
Fichte.1 In the works, however, that are referred to in this book (those
published since 19l6), he has never referred to himself as a follower of
Fichte but has criticized the latter for betraying Kant's philosophy)!
Indeed "Anti-personalism" he says, "is a property of all German
idealistic metaphysics, with the exception of Kant ... " 3
The exact influence of Kant and Fichte upon Berdyaev cannot be
determined. We can only note certain parallels between Berdyaev's
doctrine of the human Ego and Kant's and Fichte's. Like Kant,
Berdyaev believes that man as a noumenon, an absolute reality, is
beyond the category of causality.4 Like Fichte, he develops a doctrine
of the human Ego, according to which an irrational and ungrounded
wilful principle in man is the source of consciousness, and it is illuminated during the course of history.5
The following passage occurs in a section in Solitude and Society
entitled, "The Ego and the Personality":
The fundamental problem of Existential philosophy is that of the personality.
I am an Ego before I become a personality. The Ego is primary and undifferentiated; it does not postulate a doctrine of the personality. The Ego is postulated
ab initio; the personality is propounded. The Ego's purpose is to realize its
personality, and this involves it in incessant struggle. The consciousness of the
personality and the endeavor to realzie it are fraught with pain. Many would
rather renounce their personality than endure the suffering which its realization
involves. 6
We have seen in the foregoing pages what Berdyaev means by "Existential philosophy"; namely, a philosophy which states the primacy
of existence and the priority in existence of a personal principle: primordial and wilful freedom. To see, however, why Berdyaev says the
fundamental problem of Existential philosophy is that of the personality will require further investigation. We must know how, in history,
the Ego can realize its personality. And we must see the role of suffering
in Berdyaev's Existentialism. For we want to know the Personalism of
his universal history and the tragic element of his philosophy of history.
When he says the Ego is primary and undifferentiated, he means that
the Ego occurs prior to the differentiation contained within personality:
See 99, n 2 above.
Ibid.
3 The Divine and the Human, 26.
4 See 141, n 6; 142, n 2, below.
6 See 101, n 2, below.
e Solitude and Society, I21.
1
EXISTENTIALISM
101
spirit, soul and corporeal body. The Ego does not postulate a doctrine
of the personality because the personality flows out of it.
The Ego is primitive; it can neither be deduced from nor reduced to anything .
. . . It is not true to say, "I think, therefore I am"; but rather "I am surrounded
on all sides by impenetrable infinity, and therefore I think." I am, in the first
place. The Ego belongs to the sphere of existence.
The Ego is primarily existential ... it is synonymous with freedom.1
Berdyaev rejects an idealism which would derive existence (I am) from

thought (I think). The word, existence, is not quite as good as freedom
as a word in this text. The Ego is existential, he says. But, what is more,
it is synonymous with freedom. In this description of the Ego freedom
expresses his intention better than existence.
His doctrine is similar in some respects to that of Fichte, if not in its
Existentialism and Personalism, at least in its voluntarism. Like Fichte,
he asserts that the basic Ego of a person is freedom.2 This means, we
Ibid., 65.
Concerning the primacy of will in Fichte's philosophy of man, see ]. G. Fichte, "The
Vocation of Man," translated by W. Smith in Modem Classical Philosophers, edited by
B. Rand (Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1908), 516. Fichte says: "I am a member of two orders:
the one purely spiritual, in which I rule by my will alone, the other sensuous, in which I
operate by my deed .... The will is the living principle of reason." 517: "My will, which is
directed by no foreign agency in the order of the super sensual world, but by myself alone,
is this source of true life, and of eternity ... an absolutely first, primary and original power,
before which there is no preceding influence by which it may be governed ... "
Schelling, in Of Human Freedom, tr. ]. Gutmann (Opencourt, Chicago, 1936), 62, describes
the voluntarism of Fichte's doctrine. "The Ego, said Fichte, is its own deed ... this Being
(the being underlying the concious Ego) which is assumed as prior to knowledge is no being,
even if it is not knowledge either; it is real self-positing, it is a primal and basic willing which
makes itself into something and is the basis and foundation of all essence."
Fichte, hoewever, associates with the will, the reason as an intelligible principle. Cf. Modern
Classical Philosophers, 516. His philosophy asserts a rationalism, even though itis voluntaristic.
Berdyaev's philosophy is not a rationalism. The principle of intelligibility is concrete. For
him, it is Christ, the Godman, not Reason. Berdyaev does not teach a rationalistic approach
but (I) a Personalistic way which would attain knowledge and intelligibility through a
communion of the knower with other persons (see Section E of this chapter); and (2) a
symbolic and metaphorical approach. (See Chapter IV, Section G.) Berdyaev says, in The
Beginning and the End, 42:
"The depth of my ego is steeped in infinity and eternity and it is only a superficial layer
of my ego which is illuminated by the mind, rationalized, and recognized on the basis of the
antithesis between subject and object." Rationalization and generality are only a superficial
aspect of the Ego, for Berdyaev. Indeed he criticizes Fichte on this score, in Solitude and
Society, 67:
"Fichte's Ego is not authentic, because it is universal rather than individual, and because
it postulates the non-Ego rather than another Ego or the Thou. The Ego becomes conscious
of itself as the product of its own activity; but this activity is based upon the existence of
something and of someone else as well as upon that of the active Ego. But we are primarily
concerned here with the existence of another Ego, of the Thou."
That is, according to Berdyaev, Fichte asserts a non-Ego, in this scheme, which is known
rationally and universally, but not other Egos (persons), known in communion. (See the
present section of the present chapter.) See following note.
1
I02
EXISTENTIALISM
have seen, that the Ego participates in the U ngrund, primordialfreedom,

the deepest principle in man. The mode of discussion is similar in
Fichte's and Berdyaev's philosophies, insofar as it is descriptive of the
Ego's realization of itself.1 And for both Fichte and Berdyaev a universal history is posited in the scheme. 2 That is, the Ungrund, the
primordial will of the Ego, is illuminated in both doctrines and personalized in Berdyaev's theory; and the illumination is understood and
propounded in nothing less sweeping than a universal history. This
scheme seems to originate in German Idealism (Schelling also subscribed to it as it was developed by Fichte).3 The characteristic assertion is: the pure willing, which is the basic Ego, is not consciousness,
nor a self-apprehension; but is the fecundating source which freely seeks
illumination. The notion is personalized and etherialized in Berdyaev's
philosophy.
We have seen that the Ego is "primarily existential ... it is synonymous with freedom." Berdyaev intends that existence is a principle
almost as primary as freedom; and he is refering to his Existential
doctrine.
Originally there was not a line of demarcation between the Ego and the "totality"; later, when the existence of the non-Ego was revealed, the Ego developed
in contact with it a particularly acute and anguished sensibility.... The stages
1 The scheme of development of the Ego, according to Fichte's theory is presented in his
"Science of Knowledge." Cf. Modern Classical Philosophers, 497, ff. Fichte says that to the
Ego (I) the non-Ego (2) is opposited; and thus it is posited in the Ego. And the non-Ego is
united (3) with the Ego.
In Berdyaev's doctrine there are also three stages, Solitude and Society, 66: "'firstly, the
undifferentiated unity of the Ego with the universe; secondly the dualist opposition of the
Ego and the non-Ego; thirdly and finally, the achievement of the concrete union of every Ego
with the Thou, a union which preserves plurality in a transfigured form."
The schemes are apparently similar. But the conclusion of both dialectics are different.
First, Fichte's rationalistic philosophy considers the relationship between the individual man
and divine Providence. And from this follows a co-operation with other persons in the race.
Modern Classical Philosophers, 532. Berdyaev's Personalist philosophy always considers,
rather, the communion between men and through it communion with God. See Section E of
this chapter. Second, Fichte asserts a naturalistic rationalism: "All that happens in this world
is subservient to the improvement and culture of man, and, by means of this, to the promotion of the purpose of his earthly existence. I t is this higher world-plan which we call Nature,
when we say, - Nature leads men ... to industry ... to a just constitution ... to endless
peace on earth. Thy will, 0 Infinite One! thy Providence alone, is this higher Nature .... all
things must work together for the good of those who love their duty and who know thee."
(my italics) Modem Classical Philosophers, 533. We may contrast what we have seen of
Berdyaev's opposition to Nature: Chapter I, Section B, Part 4; Cf. Chapter IV, Section B.
And as for a world-plan which leads to an endless peace on earth, we may contrast what we
know of Berdyaev's unworldliness and his historical pessimism: Chapter II, Section D, Part 3.
2 See note preceding, concerning the universal history that is posited by the respective
schemes.
3 Cf. Of Human Freedom, 62. Schelling summarizes Fichte's scheme, here, and states that
it is his own scheme, too.
EXISTENTIALISM
I03
of its development are as follows: firstly, the undifferentiated unity of the Ego
with the universe; secondly the dualist opposition of the Ego and the non-Ego;
thirdly and finally, the achievement of the concrete union of every Ego with
the Thou, a union which preserves plurality in a transfigured form.l
This is a short history of the Ego. Berdyaev means one man's Ego and
even more the development of human consciousness through the epochs
of history.
"The concrete union of every Ego with the Thou" refers primarily to
the perfect state of man after the end of the world and secondarily to
the Ego of a person still living in this world. The Ego develops an
anguished sensibility in contact with the non-Ego because it has to
overcome its submersion in the non-Ego (in cosmic nature, for
example, or in technocracy). 2
His reference to the final union of the Ego with the Thou, "a union
which preserves plurality in a transfigured form," gives us a hint of a
Personalism and an Existentialism which are, at the same time, part of
philosophy of history. He is here speaking of the union of every Thou
with the Ego (every person in history) and of a union which preserves
plurality (that is, preserves, ultimately, all of history) in a transfigured
form.
Despite the grand potentialities of the Ego and of the person, the
most important thing about the Ego is that it is a principle of enduring
self-identity in the process of change:
for unless there existed a subject of mutation, a subject capable of preserving
his identity in the process of change, the Ego could not suffer a temporal change
or actualize itself. But the Ego does preserve its identity and uniqueness despite
its ever changing aspect .... The Ego may, therefore, be defined as the constant
unity underlying all change .. . It is self determining; it determines itself from
within when responding actively to all external influences. 3
The Ego, at one and the same time, provides the unity of the person,
underlying all change, and determines the change and development of
the person in responding to external influences.
I t is the principle of the change and development of the personality
because:
The personality postulates further (besides the principle of self-identity) the
existence of a dark, violent and irrational principle ... 4
2
Solitude and Society, 66.
Cf. The Realm of Spi,it and the Realm of Caesar, 48.
Solitude and Society, 66-67.

Ibid., 122.
104
EXISTENTIALISM
Berdyaev refers to the self-determining principle, the primitive will

which is at the basis of the Ego and the personality.
The personality . .. also postulates the soul's ultimate and everlasting triumph over
this irrational principle. But although it is rooted in the unconsciousness, the
personality implies an acute self-consciousness of its unity in the midst of change.
It is sensitive to all the currents of social and cosmic life and open to a variety of
experience, but it takes care not to lose its identity in society or in the cosmos. 1
(my italics)
Thus as soon as Berdyaev sets forth the primordial foundation of the

person, just as quickly, he asserts the soul's ultimate victory over this
irrational principle. He seems to associate this victory with the selfconsciousness, with a sensitivity to the currents of social and cosmic life.
This, then, is a philosophy of history which holds that social and
cosmic life are revealed in history and that this figures importantly in
the development of the Ego and the personality.
all Egos resemble each other in that each is unique and distinct. Each Ego is an
entity, a world in itself, postulating the existence of other Egos without seeking
to identify itself with them. The Ego I have in mind is the extra-social and nonobjective Ego. The Ego's existence precedes its materialization in this world, and
yet it is inseparable from the existence of the Other Self and of other Egos.2
The uniqueness and distinctness of every Ego is a condition of personal

freedom, and hence Berdyaev insists upon the notion that every Ego is
a "world in itself" (a microcosm). The Ego postulates the existence of
other Egos because it knows; and thus illuminates its irrational basis
(primal will); in knowing them. We will see, in Section E, why it seeks
to know other Egos and not just things. The Ego's existence precedes
its materialization in the world; that is, its manifestation as body and
soul. 3 "And yet it is inseparable from the existence of the Other Self
and of other Egos." "Other Self" refers to God, while "other Egos"
refers to other created persons. Berdyaev is trying to show that the Ego
is subjective, absolutely free and self-determined; yet, it cannot be an
Ego (and a microcosm) in solitude, in isolation from other Egos.
Self-consciousness implies consciousness of others; it is social in the depths of its
metaphysical nature. Man's life, insofar as it is the expression of the Ego's,
presupposes the existence of other men, of the world, and of God. The Ego's
absolute isolation, its refusal to communicate with anything outside it, with
the Thou, would be suicidal. The Ego's existence is threatened whenever it
denies the potential existence within itself of another Ego, or of the Thou. 4
(my italics)
1
2
3
4
Ibid., 122.
Ibid., 67.
See ibid., 67.
Ibid., 67.
EXISTENTIALISM
10 5
Not only man's life, the expression of the Ego, but the very existence
of the Ego itself, presuppose the existence of other men, of the world,
and of God. This is so because its isolation would be suicidal. And,
Berdyaev indicates, these are known in another Ego insofar as it is a
Thou. "The potential existence within the Ego of another Ego or of the
Thou" refers to a knowledge which transcends the division into subject
and object. Berdyaev is showing that the Ego and the personality can
exist only in a communion with other Egos and with the world.
Berdyaev speaks, in the first citation in this chapter, of a suffering
which the realization of personality involves. This suffering is primarily
an anguish which arises in the face of the abyss of existence (the
Ungrund, ultimately) which the person finds in himself.
It is necessary to distinguish anguish (Angst) from fear (Furcht). Kierkegaard
does this, although it is a relative distinction in the terminology of every language.
Fear has causes, it is connected with danger and with the every day world of
common experience. Anguish, on the other hand, is experienced, not in the face
of empirical danger, but in confronting the mystery of being and non-being, when
face to face with the transcendent abyss, in the face of the unknown. l
While fear is caused, anguish, a truer and deeper experience, is uncaused

because it faces not a cause but the condition, the ground, (the Ungrund)
of existence, the mystery which is beyond being and lies in non-being.
Here too, Berdyaev is an Existentialist, using the language of Existentialism.
Nevertheless, in order to understand Berdyaev's position, we must
see that this anguish, A ngst, in the the face of non-being is not the
fundamental Existential experience in Berdyaev's philosophy. As
James Collins says, in The Existentialists:
If the fundamental existential experience is an encounter with utter nothingness,
then there is little room for a philosopher who consistently studies such positive
attitudes as fidelity and hope and worship. 2
And Berdyaev consistently studies and propounds such positive attitudes. For him, is anguish a fundamental Existential experience? He
asserts a primal will is at the basis of the person and proposes that
personality should be achieved in illuminating the will. The radical
awareness of freedom of choice produces an anguish. He criticizes the
French atheist Existentialists who are captivated, he says, by non-being.
Present-day man, oppressed by fallen and disintegrating being, is being captivated by non-being. Face to face with the very brink of non-being, he wants to
1 Slavery and Freedom, 52.
a The Existentialists, II5.
106
EXISTENTIALISM
experience the final ecstasy, whether the ecstasy of heroism for the sake of
nothingness, or the ecstasy of creativeness which arises out of his own nothingness .... It is in the Godman, in the Son of God and the Son of Man, that the new
man takes his beginning, the man of a new and eternal humanity. 1
Berdyaev is referring here to a new notion of non-being, different from

that of his own; and, consequently, he is discussing an Existentialism
whose principle is different from that of his own Existentialism. J. H.
Randall, in an essay about a contemporary and follower of Berdyaev,
Paul Tillich, explains the two notions of non-being which we are here
encountering. He says:
The Platonists distinguish between the ()Vl( ()V which means "nothing at ali,"
and the !L1J ()V which meant for them that which does not yet have being but can
become being if united with ideas. This Platonic "matter" had a positive power
of resisting the evil "nonbeing" - not nothing at all, but something with no positive ontological standing that yet could resist and pervert being. In Boehme's
Ungrund, Schelling's "first potency," Hegel's "anti-thesis," this dialectical
negativity was located in God himself. Existentialism has given to nonbeing a
still more positive character and power: Heidegger's "annihilating nothingness"
threatens man with nonbeing in the form of death, thus giving his life its "existential" character. For Sartre nonbeing includes the threat of meaninglessness
- the destruction of the very structures of being. 2
Berdyaev's nothingness (Ungrund) is that of Boehme, not that of

Sartre. 3 This means that he does not view the nothingness, the U ngrund,
J. H. Randall, Jr. "The Ontology of Paul Tillich," in The Theology 01 Paul Tillich, edited
by C. W, Kegley and R. W. Bretall (Macmillan, New York, 1952), 156.
3 Berdyaev does not associate Heidegger's Existentialism of non-being with Sartre's
nihilism. He says, in Truth ana Revelation, 107-108:
"The idea of non-being, of nothingness, takes a very prominent place in Heidegger's
thought, indeed, it might even be supposed that his philosophy is a philosophy of non-being.
The last word belongs to death, there is no infinity in man, everything in him is finite. But
some reminiscences of the old German mysticism are left in Heidegger. For this reason his
non-being may be taken to approximate to the Ungrund of Boehme." He says, concerning
Sartre's philosophy, Towards a New Epoch, 98: "In his great philosophical work (L'Etre et Ie
Neant) Sartre's use of the word 'nothingness' remains ambiguous. It can mean either that
which precedes being or that which follows it. Consequently the meaning of the term changes.
Nothingness in Sartre means the corruption of being, whence, so it seems to him, comes nausea .
. . . The word, has, however, another meaning. It is with nothingness that the possibility of
creating something new is connected ... I am afraid that his creative work springs from an
already rotten being and not from the freedom of nothingness! ... There is a difference
between the conception of nothingness in Heidegger and that of Sartre. In the former one
catches from time to time certain reminiscences of the old type of German mysticism, of the
'undetermined' (Ungrund) of Boehme. Nothingness here acquires a deep meaning, but there
is nothing like this in Sartre, rather he shows the corruption and falling-away of being while
at the same time he wants to save it and to affirm freedom." 103: "The whole Sartrian
movement is chilling; it possesses no fire, which alone would make it possible to create the
future. The morality of this movement ... is a cold virtue deprived of every trace of charity."
We can see, especially in the last quotation, why Berdyaev's nothingness (meonic Ungrund)
is like that of Boehme and not like that of Sartre. There is a dynamism in the Ungrund, ac1
EXISTENTIALISM
107
the existence, as merely a nothingness. He does not propose "an ecstasy

of heroism for the sake of nothingness," but "the ecstasy of creativeness
which arises out of (man's) own nothingness." The nothingness is merely
a starting-point for Berdyaev, but not the terminus. The terminus is the
God-man, "the man of a new and eternal humanity."
Therefore, Angst in the face of non-being is not the fundamental Existential experience in Berdyaev's philosophy. His Christian and mystical philosophy of history and his universal history, require a happier
and more meaningful Existential doctrine. He asserts the illumination
during history of the Ungrund and the fallen world in a divine-human
creativity, guided by an eschatological metaphysics. We have studied
this metaphysics, in Chapter II, in respect to the doctrines of Godmanhood and of freedom and will study it in this chapter with respect to
Berdyaev's doctrine of man. The metaphysics of man and Existential
doctrine are understood by Berdyaev always in the light of universal
history. The philosophy of history and the universal history of Berdyaev
posit a creativity of man in a historical progress which is both divine
and human. The suffering, the Angst, which Berdyaev notes in the
formation of personality, is not to be relieved in "the ecstasy of a
heroicism for the sake of nothingness." But it is superseded in "the
ecstasy of creativeness which arises out of man's own nothingness."
And this beginning occurs "in the God-man, in the Son of God and the
Son of Man, the man of a new and eternal humanity."
And, since Godmanhood is Logos or divine Truth, Personality is,
finally, the child of Truth.
Truth is the meaning of the existent, and meaning is the truth of the existent.
-cording to Berdyaev's philosophy, which expresses itself, not only in an intelligent creativity
but also in a supernatural charity. Cf. Jacob Boehme, The Way to Christ tr. J. J. Stoudt, with
.a foreward by the Quaker, Rufus M. Jones (Harper, New York, I947). Stoudt says, in his
Introduction, xxvi: "The U ngrund is the highest metaphysical principle in Boehme's system.
. .. Boehme also employs several other descriptions of this idea, notable Nichts (nothing)
which is reminiscently Neoplatonic in tone." Stoudt then points out that when the unconditionel,i Ungrund becomes conditioned being, the image by which it becomes conditioned
and before it has manifested itself in substantial reality is the Great Mystery (the essential
Logos of God which has become manifested in the world; namely Christ). The book which
follows - The Way to Christ - is a devout work where the name of Christ appears on every
page, and sometimes on the same page with the word, Ungrund. Cf. I77.
Berdyaev defines his notion of Ungrund or nothingness as follows: Note that he does not
subscribe to a Platonic notion of a (J.~ (Iv in the Greek sense: "Is the idiom of the theology and
metaphysics capable of explaining Ungrund? That is a task which only an apophatic
knowledge can undertake. ... U ngrund is nothingness as distinct from something in the
-category of being; it is not ouxyv, (J.~3v. But it is not (J.~ (Iv in the Greek sense. Boehme goes
beyond the limits of Greek thought, of Greek intellectualism and ontology. Like Eckhart's
Gottheit, Boehme's Ungrund goes deeper than God. We should probably be right in thinking
of Ungrund as the primal pre-existential freedom." Spirit and Reality, I30.
108
EXISTENTIALISM
This found its expression in the doctrine of the Logos . . . Truth is meaning born
in God before all ages, in God the existent one. And this birth is repeated in all
who exist, and because of it personality emerges into view.
Personality is not the offspring of a generic process; it is the child of meaning, of
truth. l
The meaning of the existent is the truth of the existent, and just as
meaning (the Logos) is born in God, so it is born in man; and personality
appears. Thetruthwhichisborninmenis,finally, the Logos, the Godman.
Personality, therefore, cannot be the offspring of a generic process;
that is to say, it is not the resultant of an interplay of mere essences; it
is not, in short, a mere essence or form. For the truth, or meaning which
brings about the appearance of personality is ultimately an existent the Godman. And this is a spiritual problem. The Existentialism is a
spiritualism.
C. PERSONALITY IS SPIRIT: AN EXISTENTIALISM OF SPIRIT
Berdyaev's Existentialism of Personalism (which now seems to be

the same thing) is a voluntarism in which the primal Will is illuminated
by intelligible truth. This recalls Section C in Chapter II where we saw
that his philosophy is one of the spirit. Spirit can be understood in the
light of a voluntarism which asserts the loving illumination of the Will
by the divine Logos.
He defines Personalism in terms of spirit.
Man has to realize personality. Personality is spirit, free spirit and the link
between man and God. It is a link of man with God which is outside the false
submergence of man in his own closed circle. 2
Personality is spirit because, so to speak, at the moment in the formation of a personality when the Ego realizes itself as personality, the
conditions of spirit are present. These are the conditions, namely, of
will and intelligibility.s Spirit is the link of man with God because it
transcends objectivized knowing through the primacy of the will; and
because it transcends a pure subjectivity through the divinity of the
human spirit. The way in which the human spirit transcends both
objectivization and subjectivization, and thus remains a link of man
The Beginning and the End, 64-44.
8 We will see, in Section D, more clearly why we cannot say that (abstract) intellect is a
principle of personality.
1
EXISTENTIALISM
109
with God, will be seen in Chapter IV. Suffice it to say that he distinguishes between the soul and the spirit of man. 1 In refusing to see an
identification of the soul and the spirit, Berdyaev considers man especially in his divinity. Insofar as man is ruled by his soul, he is human
and not divine; but insofar as the spirit gains the ascendancy, man is
human and also divine (like Godmanhood).2 Such a psychology (but let
us use Berdyaev's word: such a pneumatology) 3 asserts an alternative
to the objectified or isolated knowing of the soul. The spirit is quite
distinct from the part of the personality (the soul) which knows objectively or falsely.4 Spirit is a link of man with God because spirit in
itself knows in a perfect manner.5 Man in this life knows imperfectly,
but the progress of history is at the same time a progress of the incarnation of spirit; 6 man is becoming more an incarnate spirit. His
knowledge is therefore achieving greater transcendence over the
objectivization.
It seems, in Berdyaev's philosophy, that the Ego of a man comes to
him through the spirit.
The spiritual principle alone constitutes personality and gives it a permanent
center. Personality is created by the logos ... Without the logos, without the
spiritual principle, personality disintegrates. The synthesizing spiritual principle
embraces both the soul and the body.?
The spirit is the principle of both the soul and the body, which is to say,
man is an incarnate spirit. When he says that the spiritual principle
gives the personality a permanent center, his remark brings to mind the
deepest part of spirit and of personality; namely, the Ego, the wilful
acting, the will. In addition to the Ego, which is "the constant unity
underlying all change," 8 the spiritual principle, the logos, integrates
the personality and indeed "creates" it.
Berdyaev calls the spiritual principle the logos because man refers,
ultimately, to the perfect prototype: the Godman, the divine Logos. In
1 Berdyaev is clear, in Freedom and the Spirit, on the distinction he makes between the
spirit and the soul. He says, 27: "The spiritual must not be separated from the 'psychical' and
natural; rather, it must illuminate it and spiritualize it."
2
Ibid, 27.
He says, in The Beginning and the End, 96: "Does a subject of meaning, value and idea
exist? My answer to this question is that it does. It exists as spirit. Spirit moreover is not
abstract being ... Ontology should be replaced by pneumatology." (my italics).
4 See Chapter IV, Section B, notes.
5 Knowledge through spirit, for Berdyaev, is above consciousness. He says, in Spirit and
Reality, 18: "Consciousness and self-consciousness are related to spirit ... Spirit is the agency
of super-consciousness in consciousness."
3
7
8
Spirit and Reality, 66-67.

lIO
EXISTENTIALISM
Berdyaev's philosophy, consequently, the deepest part of man, the Ego,

the primal willing, comes from the spiritual principle; and the spiritual
principle, the logos, is based on the Godman. The mystery of how man
participates in the Ungrund, in irrational Freedom, by means of his
spiritual principle, his logos, is not investigated by Berdyaev. He has
tried, with his esoteric doctrine, to uncover the mystery of freedom in
God and in man, that is, with the Boehmian doctrine of a divine
theogony out of the Ungrund. But the mystery still remains, both in
God and in man, a mystery.
The paradox of freedom and intelligibility becomes more noticable in
Berdyaev's later than in his earlier works. In Freedom and the Spirit
(1926), for instance, an earlier work in his mature period, the Boehmian
voluntarism is uppermost in his mind. Freedom (Ungrund), rather than
Logos (Christ), is the interest. But the doctrine of Logos or Godmanhood is stressed in the last works.
But God is spirit, and spirit is activity. Spirit is liberty. The nature of spirit is
the opposite of passivity and necessity ... 1
He means, not that spirit is irrational but that the will, the profoundest
part of spirit, acts freely in spirit. He takes care to point out in the
latest works that spirit is not irrational.
Spirit is not something opposite to the rational or the irrational. The true
existentialist philosophy is philosophy of the spirit.2
When he says that spirit is not opposed to the rational or irrational, he

means that the divine Truth (the Logos) is known by the integral human
spirit. 3 There are rational and irrational elements. "Spiritual knowing is
divine-human, knowledge neither by reason nor by feeling, but by
integral Spirit." 4 And when he says that the true Existentialist philosophy is philosophy of the spirit, he means that his Existentialism does
not accept the irrational nihilism of Sartre and Simon de Beauvoir, "the
idolatry of death," he says.5 On the contrary, he is concerned with
nothing less than the search for truth. The chapter in which he discusses
the rejection of nihilistic and irrational Existentialism, has been enFreedom and the Spirit, 2.
The Realm ot Spirit and the Realm ot Caesar, 31.
4 The Realm ot Spirit and the Realm ot Caesar, 30.
5 Ibid., 27. Concerning Sartre's nihilism see note above. Concerning Simone de Beauvoir,
see Towards a New Epoch, 100: "The articles" (in Sartre's Review, Temps Modernes) of Simone de Beauvoir, intelligent, and reasonably clear as they are, are superior to those of Sartre,
but they also reveal nothing original. If one lays the philosophical language aside in wihch
they are clothed, the subjects themselves are ... almost banal."
1
EXISTENTIALISM
III
titled "The Struggle for the Truth." This way of truth, which is the
philosophy of the spirit, is Existentialism:
Knowledge of Truth means the transfiguration, the enlightenment of the world
and not abstract knowledge ... 1
That is, his Existentialism seeks the Truth, not an abstract (essentialistic) truth which, he thinks, would be an objectivization. Rationalism
would be an unsatisfactory substitute for the irrational nihilism of some
Existentialists. But Berdyaev's Existentialism creatively seeks an existent (Truth) which is intelligible. Knowledge of the Truth, which for
Berdyaev is one aspect of the ultimate union of man with the existent
Truth, means the transfiguration of the world. The macrocosm, the
world, is transfigured in the microcosm, man, and brought back to
integral unity.2
It is clear that Berdyaev has an Existentialism, and it is spiritual
rather than irrational; that is, it is something more than rational or
irrational. This is the mystery of freedom and intelligibility. Freedom
is an absolute principle, but it is not contrasted with knowledge.
As I have already said existential philosophy cannot be ontological. Jaspers
The Realm ot Spi,it and the Realm ot Caesa" 30.

See Section F of this chapter.
3 Jaspers, of all the contemporary Existentialists, is most to Berdyaev's liking. He says,
in D,eam and Reality, 103:
"Jaspers seems to be more faithful, and gives a more dramatic relief, to the original
Kierkegaardian inspiration (than does Heidegger). His thought contains, moreover, strong
Nietzschean elements .... Jaspers is richer and more sensitive as a thinker than Heidegger;
his thought abounds in psychological insights, and he has a deep sympathy for history. I have
much more in common with him than with the other contemporary existentialists. An
existentialist philosopher should be aware of an identity between his thinking and his
personal and the world's destiny."
But Berdyaev inferentially criticizes the subjectivism of J aspers' Existentialism. He says,
in T,uth and Revelation, 12:
"Kierkegaard regarded as existential only the knowledge which exists in the sphere of
SUbjectivity, not in that of objectivity, in what is individual rather than in the common. In
this respect he was a pioneer. It is Jaspers who remains most faithful to (Kierkegaard) ....
But Kierkegaard did not take up a position which lies entirely on the other side of the
distinction between subject and object. He preserved that distinction and at the same time
took the side of the subject."
This criticism of Jaspers' and Kierkegaard's subjectivism, whether Berdyaev realizes it or
not, is a criticism of contemporary Existentialism. See ibid., 56, where the supremacy of a
Personalism in his Existentialism reveals itself.
Further, the criticism of Jaspers' subjectivism is a criticism of Jaspers' histo,icism.
Berdyaev's philosophy is suprahistorical; his solution to subjectivism is suprahistorical.
Jaspers' doctrine of "frontier-situations" is a historicism. For Jaspers, "L'historicite est alors
Ie caracte,e de tout ce qui est concret ... " M. Dufrenne and P. Ricoeur, Karl] aspe,s et la Philosophie de l'Existence (Seuil, Paris, 1947). 181. Dufrenne and Ricoeur observe that (Ibid.,
182) Jaspers' philosophy is influenced by the historisicm of Kierkegaard.
A Comparison of Kie,kegaard's Historicism with Berdyaev's Suprahisto,icism:
Kierkegaard's historicism is apparent in his Philosophical Fragments (Princeton Univ.,
1
2
IIZ
EXISTENTIALIMS
speaks truly when he says that the sphere of freedom is Existenz, that the Ego
actually is freedom of choice, that freedom is an absolute principle. But with him
freedom is contrasted with knowledge, and that is true only if it is the objectivization of knowledge which we have in mind.!
The ontological, which Existentialism opposes, is an essentialism.

Hence, an ontological knowledge with which Jaspers, for example,
contrasts freedom. 2 Berdyaev thus indicates he does not contradict
Jaspers' Existentialism, but is proposing a free and existent Truth.
Princeton 1946}. His historicism is clearly present, and in such a way as to contradict the
suprahistoricism of Berdyaev. On p. 50 and following Kierkegaard points out that if we
accept the Socratic principle that learning is a process of selfrecollection; than the object of
faith is the teaching, not the Teacher. And Kierkegaard rejects this solution and observes that
it is not historical. (St. Augustine, incidentally, does not suffer in this argument because,
unlike Berdyaev he asserts the historical teacher as well as the teaching. De Civitate Dei,
Book IB, Chapter 49).
"But the historical is the past (for the present pressing upon the confines of the future has
not yet become historical}."
Then he shows that nature cannot be called historical. It is interesting that Berdyaev, when
he considers the possibilities of a philosophy of history, turns to the two un historical ones:
the cosmic and the supernatural. Slavery and Freedom, 262-263. But he leaves out the historical approach. Kierkegaard says:
" ... nature is too abstract to have a dialectic with respect to time in the stricter sense....
On the other hand it is the perfection of the eternal to have no history, the eternal being the
only existence that has absolutely no history." Philosophical Fragments, 62.
Kierkegaard contradicts the suprahistoricism of Berdyaev on at least two points. He says,
ibid., 92:
"It is well known that Christianity is the only historical phenomena which in spite of the
historical, nay precisely by means of the historical, has offered itself to the individual as a
point of departure for his eternal consciousness ... "
But Berdyaev says that Christianity is a historical phenomenon which, by means of the
suprahistorical in it, has offered itself as a point of departure. See 129, n 3 and works cited.
This is the important difference.
Kierkegaard then says:
"Christianity ... has proposed to base man's eternal happiness on his relations to something
historical. No system of philosophy, addressing itself only to thought, no mythology, addressing itself solely to the imagination, no historical knowledge, addressing itself solely to
the memory has ever had this idea ... " (my italics).
Berdyaev does assert the historical Christ. Cf. Truth and Revelation, Chapter V, but he
asserts, far more, the suprahistorical Christ. This philosophy addresses itself, precisely, to
concrete thought, imagination and memory; and it is a mythical philosophy (in the sense of
symbolism). We will see that the memory is all-important in Berdyaev's Personalism and
Existentialism. The concrete Existent, the Godman, is recollected and created in the memory;
and the recollection is suprahistorical. Berdyaev is interested in the "historical," not in the
mere historical as such. See Chapter I, Section B.
Finally, if Kierkegaard encountered Berdyaev's philosophy he would class it with Hegel's
universalism. Berdyaev's existent is a concrete universal and, so far as it is an existent, not
merely historical. See II4, n I below. Hegel, however, intends to be historical. The essence
of Hegel's man is defined by the whole historical universe. Berdyaev is suprahistorical; man,
according to him, transcends, in his essence, the whole universe.
Truth and Revelation, 6B.

Berdyaev says, in Towards a New Epoch, 96-97:
"Ontology is a doctrine of essence. Jaspers is infinitely more right in not admitting an onto1
logical knowledge by means of concepts ... Existential philosophy can only be a knowledge
of God, of the world, and of man in the deep subjectivity or human existence ... " (my italics)
EXISTENTIALISM
II3
That is, he maintains the primacy of freedom, and overcomes irrationalism in the super-rationalism of the divine Logos.
It is written in the Gospel, "Ye shall know the Truth and the Truth shall make
you free." The final and decisive liberation can be reached only by the vital
assimilation of truth. In the last resort this is divine freedom, the freedom of the
Kingdom of God, freedom which is finally united with grace.!
The mystery of freedom and intelligibility is recognized here. "The vital

assimilation of truth," he says, "in the last resort is divine freedom ...
freedom which is finally united with grace." Berdyaev uses the mysterious terms, divine and grace. He says, "finally united with grace," means
that irrational freedom finally is perfectly illuminated after a process.
And he refers to this doctrine of truth when he says;
I have already said many times that spirit ... is freedom, that it is a creative act
which is effected in depth, it is what nowadays is called Existenz. 2
We may anticipate Chapter IV in noting how this Existentialism can

remain a Personalism and yet posits that the person resorts to a
transcendent Truth. The human spirit escapes objectivization and yet
goes outside itself. Berdyaev says that the spirit is a creative act, and
that is the answer.
D. PERSONALITY: THE CONCRETE AND UNIVERSAL EXISTENT
The philosophy of the concrete existent is typical of Russian philosophers:

... it may be said that Russian philosophy, colored as it was by religion, desires
to be existential. In it the apprehending and philosophizing self was existential.
... The fundamental idea of Russian philosophy is the idea of concrete existent,
of the underlying real existence which preceeds rational thought. 3
The most important point Berdyaev makes in this passage is that

Russian philosophy has been colored by religion. Berdyaev admits even
to a certain quality of Existentialism in the essentialist, Vladimir
Solovyev. This is so because Solovyev is a Christian religious philosopher and therefore propounds a philosophy of the Existent, the
Godman. 4 And a hundred years' tradition of many Russian thinkers,
Truth and Revelation, 7I.
Ibid., 74.
3 The Russian Idea, 159-160. Cf. Dream and Reality.
4 See Chapter II, Section C.
102.
EXISTENTIALISM
whose thought has been at once metaphysical and religious. exists. 1

Russian philosophy has been concrete. existential and religious.
First. the Russian religious outlook is Orthodox and stems from the
mystical way of ancient Orthodoxy. Second. the organicism of Schelling
and his contemporaries. their irrationalism and Schelling's naturephilosophy. have permeated Russian Philosophic thought. Third.
Russian philosophy has been greatly influenced by Hegel's concrete
universalism. The influence is understandable. Hegel combines a cosmogonical doctrine of Spirit. which is akin to the supernaturalism of
Russian Orthodoxy. with a concrete universalism. 2 The division between the natural and the supernatural is denied. and it is therefore
1 Lossky says, in his History 01 Russian Philosophy, 29:
"The doctrine of metalogical knowledge as the essential complement to logical knowledge
particularly occupies Florensky, Bulgakov and Berdyaev; ... Interest in the metalogical
principles of existence is closely combined in Russian religious philosophy with an insistence
upon the concreteness and wholeness of existence." (my italics) See, also, the Table of
Contents, Zenkovsky's History 01 Russian PhilosOPhy.
2 In the case of Berdyaev, it is misleading to talk of influences concerning many points of
doctrines. The influences are exceedingly numerous and impossible of determination. We
cannot know Berdyaev's mind, and if we could, Berdyaev would probably give an incorrect
answer to himself and to us. But we can point out certain currents of thought, doctrinal
complexes, and observe that Berdyaev participated in them. We cannot even say Berdyaev
was exclusively determined by them.
Berdyaev's philosophy is a part of that doctrinal complex which asserts the concrete
universalism. But he does not consider himself a Hegelian. "The metaphysical development
of post-Kantian German Idealism as represented by Fichte, Schelling and Hegel, was really
a betrayal of Kant." Dream and Reality, 94. He attacks them for their monism, pantheism
and evolutionism.
On the other hand, Berdyaev recognizes the origin of concrete universalism in German
Idealism. He looks upon German Idealism as a movement which freed philosophy from
intellectualist doctrines. "But concrete living realities have always eluded those metaphysical doctrines." Freedom and the Spirit, I.
The Sophiological doctrine of Solovyev is of great importance to Berdyaev's philosophy he defines his doctrine in terms of Sophiology. And Solovyev asserts a concrete universalism.
Cf. Zenkovsky's History 01 Russian PhilosoPhy, 520. Berdyaev's contemporaries, Bulgakov
and Florensky, are both followers of Solovyev. And they assert a concrete universalism.
Cf. Lossky's History 01 Russian Philosophy, 208. But the outlook is already old in Russian
thought. Zenkovsky says, History 01 Russian Philosophy, 529-530:
"Solovyev did not introduce new themes to the Russian philosophic consciousness; even in
the most original part of his system - his Sophiological doctrine - he merely gives a new name
to a complex of problems which had been considered by Russian thinkers many times before
him."
The Schellingism of Solovyev (and of other Russians) is important. We find, here, the
positing of the organic structure of the world, the world-soul, the notion of totality. Cf.
Zenkovsky's History 01 Russian PhilosoPhy, II9. "Russian Schellingism has not yet wholly
disapperaed; we need only recall Schelling's enormous importance for the world-view of
Vladimir Solovlev, whose influence is still alive in our day". Ibid., II6.
Berdyaev's philosophy may also be considered a part of a philosophical current which is
called "Romanticism." Zenkovsky attempts to make out an overwhelming case for the
Romanticism of Berdyaev. Zenkovsky fails. All the evidence he gives to prove that Berdyaev
is a Romantic philosopher is true, but he fails to see that Romanticism is only one among the
terms that must be used to describe Berdyaev. Cf. History 01 Russian PhilosoPhy, 760, ff.
The root of Berdyaev's Romanticism, he believes, lies in "his constant readiness to repudiate
lIS
EXISTENTIALISM
propitious for a philosophy centered about the Godman to arise.

Western philosophers usually apply the notion of an existent to created
things, or to metaphysical entities. But Russian philosophers who
follow Solovyev, primarily apply the notion to the Godman. 1 The
philosophy refers, also, to created concrete existents.
The religious orientation of Russian philosophy precludes an idealism,2 or objectivism, in which rational thought (instead of the existent)
is known. Religious doctrine is prior to German Idealism in the Russian
religious philosophers. Berdyaev himself who began as a Marxist idealist, did not remain an idealist when he became a Christian philosopher. 3
It is not necessary for our purpose to study the attack Berdyaev
makes upon the abstract entity which he and Solovyev associate with
the copula in logical predication, and which they believe is an improper
hypostasization of the copula. But this distinction, in terms of predication, between abstract being and concrete being shows us well the
concrete Existentialism of Berdyaev.
Cat ... is the kernel of the phrase, "the cat exists."
This shows that he wants to avoid the theorizing of existence. He

dislikes, in fact, the use of the very word, existence, because it stands
alone, by itself, and thus becomes an empty abstraction with no
concrete content. As he shows some sentences farther, he dislikes the
use of the word existent, because existent is associated with the empty
term, existence.
Indeed following Solovyev, he establishes his Existentialism from the
point of view of logical predication. The doctrine of Hegel (that of
concrete universalism) seems to be in the background.
Vladimir Solovyev established an interesting distinction between abstract Being
reality - which for him was an intolerable banality.'" Ibid., 780. Berdyaev's Romanticism
can be seen in the form his reaction against philosophic essentialism takes.
Like Schelling, he offers, in place of the essentialism, a philosophy of beauty. His organic
outlook is Romantic. Likewise his transcendentalism and spiritualism is Romantic. "1 have
often wondered if 1 might be called a romantic philosopher.... But what does romanticism
really mean. If it is the opposite of classicism, 1 must undoubtedly style myself a romantic .
. . . On the other hand 1 found myself in opposition to Romanticism ... " Dream and Reality,
105. In Dream and Reality, 106, he shows exactly in what sense he considers himself a Romantic
philosopher and in what sense he is not. See also 126, n 1 below concerning the idea of
microcosm.
1 Concerning followers of Solovyev, see preceding note; see also Chapter II, Section C.
2 The 19th-century Christianity of Holy Russia was a world for which Idealism as such
was unreal.
3 V.V. Zenkovsky. A History of Russian Philosophy, 720.
4 Slavery and Freedom, 75.
II6
EXISTENTIALISM
as the predicate and concrete Being as the subject. The notion is, is an example of
abstract Being. 1
The Russian language completely does away with the copula, so that
it presents such phrases as, "he old," "she lovely," "they students."
A correct Russian syllogism might be: "All men mortal; Socrates man;
Socrates mortal." 2 Clearly in such a language, the copula, "is" (which
is represented in Russian, when necessary, by the word, "est"),
represents no reality.
It is the concrete cat Berdyaev is interested in, not in the "existence"
which is ascribed to it. This is his attitude.
He has then, presented the reader with a distinction between two
positions in his Existentialism. We have seen, on the one hand, that
existence (as a primal willing) is at the root of the Ego. And Berdyaev
uses the term existence often. On the other hand, existence, taken in
itself in mere logical thought, is an empty concept.
This shows us that Berdyaev denies the opinion which sees existence
as something added to something else. What is more, he shows in the
context of the passages just cited that he is refuting only doctrines of
being in which being is prior to will or freedom. 3 The basis of his Existentialism and Personalism is the concrete existent whose deepest
root is the pre-existential will. 4
Such a philosophy cannot be an extreme realism, where the idea is
more real than the thing, nor a nominalism, where the meaning, the
logos of the thing is unreal.
... the traditional controversy between the "realists" and the "nominalists."
I am, both intellectually and emotionally, opposed to realist conceptualism and
do not believe in any general ideas or universals representing not particular and
individual images but a supposed essence of things. ... On the other hand, I
cannot identify myself with the nominalist position, because it appears to
undermine the idea of the human person, and fails to recognize the eternal image
of man. I am not concerned to deny any reality to universals or to restrict
philosophy to the particular; rather, I am concerned to lind a universal in the
particular, to understand the abstract concretely, instead 01 understanding the concrete
abstractly . ... The revolt against the domination of the "general," therefore, is
legitimate and receives its impetus from the Christian conception of God, who is
neither Plato's idea of the Good nor Aristotle's concept of the pure act, but the
'God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob," the God who is made man and with whom
a Cf. Professor E. Gilson's book, Being and Some Philosophers (Pontifical Institute of
Mediaeval Studies, Toronto, 1949), 192. The example of a Russian syllogism is Professor
Gilson's.
3 Cf. Slavery and Freedom, 75-76.
4 Berdyaev says, in Spirit and Reality, 130: "We should probably be right in thinking of
Ung,und as the primal pre-existential freedom."
1
EXISTENTIALISM
II7
man enters into personal relations. I am convinced that all philosophical foundations demand re-examination in the light of this Christian affirmation of the
pre-eminence of the personal and the singular ... 1 (my italics)
He is opposed to "realist conceptualism" (he has Plato in mind) 2 because to him it is an essentialism which disregards existents. He opposes
nominalism, ultimately, because it denies his philosophy of Godmanhood, where the divine Logos is seen to be knowable by man. Yet, the
universal does exist (in the particular).
He intends "to understand the abstract concretely, instead of understanding the concrete abstractly." We will study this in Chapter IV,
where his noetic is treated. There is no purely intellectual knowing for
Berdyaev, but highest knowledge has an imaginative component. The
existent is properly known by means of an image (or by a perfect
identity between the knower and the known), rather than by an abstract
concept. 3 And the universal is known along with the image. Berdyaev
refers his solution of the problem of universals to the religious doctrine
of the singular and personal Godman. In this philosophy, then, the
Godman is known conceptually and imaginatively by means of an
image. Berdyaev finds the universal, humanity, in the singular, the
Godman. 4
In short, Berdyaev holds that abstract truths (without imaginative
components) are not real truths; but he thinks that truths known both
intellectually and imaginatively are rea1. 5 Note that this requires every
Ibid., 289. He criticizes the general ideas of Plato. But "1 am not concerned to deny any
reality to universals ... rather, 1 am concerned to find a universal in the particular."
3 See Chapter IV, Section G.
4 Cf. Slavery and Freedom, 50. When we say that Berdyaev finds the universal, humanity,
in the singular, the Godman, we recall Hegel. Russian religious philosophers are interested in
history and reassert the Hegelian doctrine of concrete universals. But Hegel's spiritualism
does injustice to the existent and to the person, and, therefore, to Christianity. Berdyaev has
proffered a doctrine which says: the concrete universal is, finally, the particular Existent,
the Godman, the Second Son of the Holy Trinity. But the concrete world of nature and of
history, in which we move, has suffered in Berdyaev's suprahistorical doctrine.
Hegels" historicism has done better in Solovyev. Historicism for Solovyev is the principle
form and the flowering of existence. "Historiocentrism rather than cosmocentrism, or even
anthropocentricicm, defines Solovyev's approach to all problems ... in the sense that for him
all 'aspects' of being are revealed in history, in the development of mankind." Zenkovsky's
History of Russian Philosophy, 482-483. But then Solovyev falls into a doctrine of "panhuman organism," where "all human elements form an integral organism."
5 Solitude and Society, I30. "The 'general,' as opposed to the individual, is real only when
it is itself individual and unique. The non-individual 'general' is a logical rather than an
ontological category; and its logical significance is determined by the degree of community
existing between consciousnesses that have no bond of communion; in other words, since the
terms of objective and social are synonymous, its nature is fundamentally sociological."
This notion of abstract universality is Hegelian. Professor Fackenheim of the University
of Toronto, in a personal communication, has made a bon mot which is as illuminating for under1
II8
EXISTENTIALISM
real knowledge to partake of certain conditions of singularity and

concreteness.
I want to emphasize in this connection that my whole philosophical approach is
radically incompatible with a belief in the possibility of a rational ontology, that
is to say, of a science of being in which the process of abstraction is pushed to the
point where Being is regarded as devoid of all peculiarities and all concrete
characteristic. I can only admit a phenomenology which describes metaphysical
reality in symbolic terms. Any rationalization of the divine-human relationship,
any attempt at expressing it in terms of a rational philosophy of being, makes
nonsense both of that relationship and of that philosophy. It can only be spoken
of in symbolic and mythological terms which leave the door open to mystery.l
Symbolic and mythological, in this context, refer to an imaginative

knowledge. Logical reasoning is no proper use of the mind, because
logic requires the use of abstract concepts, and he rejects purely conceptual reasoning. 2 A science of a purely intelligible being cannot be
accepted in his metaphysics which is neither scientific nor purely
intelligible. He admits only a "phenomenology" - that is, a noetic which describes metaphysical entities with symbols or myths. 3
He gives special mention to the divine-human relationship; it cannot
be expressed by an abstract metaphysics because the metaphysical
relationship is between, not two purely abstract minds, or between
a mind and a concrete existent, but between two concrete incarnate
spirits. And Berdyaev must, with such a definition of man and of the
divine Logos, use myths and symbols instead of concepts to describe
the metaphysical relationship between them. We will see, in Chapter IV
why this symbolism is needed. The divine-human relationship is, on the
standing Berdyaev as it is for knowing Hegel: "For Hegel, there is a sharp contrast between
abstract universal (opposed to particularity) and concrete universal (opposed to isolated
particularity)." The word, "isolated," is the key. In denying isolation and particularity, he
posits the concrete universal. And this belongs to a doctrine of the organic unity of history.
This outlook is Schellingian as well as Hegelian. Schelling said: "Nothing universal exists
... only what is individual exists, and universal being exists ... only if the absolute individual being is the former." Quoted in the "Introduction" to The Ages of the World, 48. And,
for Hegel, there is no such thing as a class of abstract universals. "Class and members go
with abstract thinking". Phenomenology of Mind, 157. Berdyaev may have got the doctrine of
concrete universals from Solovyev. "Yet the realization of Godmanhood implied the universal
development of mangodhood. 'Man can assume Divinity only in his absolute totality,'
Solovyev insists, 'the mangod is necessarily collective and universal ... '" Zoyboff's "Introduction" to Lectures on Godmanhood, 61.
2 See Chapter IV.
a The term, phenomenology, is used only once by Berdyaev, so far as I can find, and the use
has no connection with the Phenomenological School, except to indicate that the knowledge,
insofar as it is not the reality known, is only a symbol of it. "In the phenomenology of Husserl
the intentional act liberates from the individual and becomes the basis of objectivism." The
Beginning and the End, 54.
EXISTENTIALISM
II9
one hand, a metaphysical fact. On the other hand, it is a religious

communion.
It is the concrete person, not the epistemological subject or the abstract universal
mind, who takes cognizance of and meditates on the object of knowledge, philosophical or otherwise. l
The question which was posed in the preceding section, "how can the
concrete be illuminated by a spiritual activity?" is now partly answered.
The spiritual activity of knowing is itself imaginative and, therefore, in
a sense concrete. Thus the philosopher can arrive at the existent by way
of his own subjectivity and yet not do away with its concreteness. It is
a creative activity because myths and symbols have to be created (invented) in order to illuminate the concrete with the light of metaphysical reality.
Such a metaphysics flows from Berdyaev's philosophy of history.
The divine meaning of history, though it is outside historical time, is
nevertheless "temporal." And although as the divine Logos it is the
reality of which man is only the symbol, it is nevertheless human.
Consequently, the divine meaning of history is, in a way, concrete. And
when the philosopher of history illuminates the concrete, at the same
time he attains the divine Logos.
Man's relation to what is above him is the condition of the personality's existence.
Personality is precisely the divine idea, the divine image and resemblance in man,
in contrast with individuality, which is a naturalistic and biological conception.
Thus in order to understand himself man must address himself to God, he must
fathom the divine idea concerning himself, and direct all his forces to the realization of it.2
When he says personality is a divine idea Berdyaev refers to the divine

Logos, the Proto-type of human personality. He does not divide the
natural and the supernatural; the divine Idea exists in man as the
divine image and resemblance. It is a concrete idea. 3
He contrasts personality with individuality because personality is a
concrete universal, and the concrete universal is opposed to isolated
particularity. We saw, on p. 107, that "personality is the child of
meaning, or truth." And we saw that personality is created by the
Logos, the spiritual principle. The true personality is the personality of
a See 117 n 2 above.
1
120
EXISTENTIALISM
the divine Logos, and man seeks the divine idea of himself and thus
directs all his forces to the realization of personality.
The Suprapersonal world and existence, to which personality strives
to rise, is not an abstract universal for which each personality would be
a means.
The relation of personality to the universal is certainly not a relation to the
species and the common.
The universal is not the common; it is not abstract, but concrete, i.e. it is
plenitude. ... The individual is by no means a part of the universal. The
opposition of universal and singular is incorrect. Personality is certainly not
partial, nor particular as opposed to universal. It can be said with more truth
that personality is a universal. The very singleness of the individual is permeated
not by that which is individual, but by that which is universal. ... The universal
is an essay, an attempt, on the part of the subject, not a reality in the object. l
The individual person is not part of the universal; it is not the individual member forming part of a hypostasized species. For the universal itself is concrete and, hence, incapable of being common to many
individuals. The opposition, therefore, of the universal and singular is
incorrect; and personality is not partiaL General predication, in this
theory, pertains to objectified knowledge and is a necessary evil for
Berdyaev. 2
The last sentence of the text answers the question, how does the
individual participate in the universal? The universal is an attempt on
the part of the individual; that is, it is a sought-after goal. The subject
seeks this goal in his own subjectivity (that is, he does not seek it as an
external object). We saw in Chapter I, for example, the doctrine of the
the creative knowing of historical cultures, and of the cosmos. The
ultimate goal, we have already seen, is the divine Logos, the Godman.
The reason it is sought within the sUbjectivity of the individual is that
it is not only transcendent but also immanent. The individual person is
an image of the divine Incarnate Spirit and seeks to improve this image
in order to realize in himself the true Reality. In short, the concrete
universal Proto-type exists, and concrete universal images exist. And
this must be understood imaginatively (with concrete conditions) as
well as intellectually.3
We saw in Chapter I, when the philosopher knows the historical he is,
Slavery and Freedom, 37-38.
Concerning logical thought and its use, see Chapter IV, Section B.
3 See Chapter IV, concerning the identification of knowledge of the universal with the
universality of the knower.
1
EXISTENTIALISM
I2I
ultimately, knowing himself and man. This is proper to such a philosophy of history, because temporal history itself is contained within the
universality and spiritual "history" of divine Logos, Who is the True
Man. Indeed:
... the personality ... can do what no mere part can aspire to do - it can realize
itself in the process of making its content universal. It is a unity in the midst
of plurality, and can thus comprehend the universe. 1
When the philosopher of history seeks to realize the true Man within
him, he does so by realizing himself as a microcosm. And just as the
history of the world, with its conditions of concreteness, is contained
within the concrete divine Existent, so man progressively brings history
within his own sUbjectivity through the use of concrete historical myths.
Berdyaev says:
The hypostatization of man, the endowment of him with the qualities of personality is the real myth about man, and it also requires imagination. In accord
with this myth man is not a part, he is not particularized, because he is the image
of (God) and is a universe. This is the God-likeness of man ... 2
The greatest myth of all is the image of the divine Personality; namely,
man's own personality in which all the other symbols and myths are
contained and brought toward the reality he seeks. Everything we
know is known by way of myths; 3 the "historical" is known this way,
and man progressively improves the myths in the course of history. In
this way, the world and man are improved during history, along with
man's mythical and symbolic knowledge. The (symbol of) rule of the
cosmos in ancient times was replaced by the (symbol of) technical
conquest of the world by the spirit.4
It is quite clear that the metaphysics we are dealing with is a concrete
Existentialism. Man is a concrete existent; the True Man is a concrete
existent; and the participation of man in the True Man is concrete and
Existential. The image, or symbol, or myth, through which a person
creates and knows the reality is itself a concrete existent because it is an
S See Chapter IV.
4 Freedom and the Spirit, 221, ff. We may see something of this symbolism of the ages of the
world in the following:
"Herein lies the religious meaning of technique. It gives man a planetary feeling of the
earth, very different from the one he experienced in former ages. He feels differently when his
feet touch the depth, holiness and mysticism of the earth than when he sees it as a planet
flying into infinite space, amidst innumerable universes, and he himself able to detach himself
from it, to fly into the air, into the stratosphere." Berdyaev, The Bourgeois Mind,46-47.
1
I22
EXISTENTIALISM
image that is identified with the concrete subjectivity of the person:

himself the "immortal and eternal" 1 image of plenary reality.
Personality is not opposed as the particular to the universal; "it can
be said with more truth that personality is universa1." That is, the
personality can be called particular or singular,2 but there is more
truth in calling it universa1. The universality of the personality is
connected with the communion of it with other persons.
E. PERSONALITY
AND EXISTENCE NOT ISOLATED FROM THE THOU AND THE WE
In a concrete Existentialism and Personalism the personality is a

subject which is not part of a whole; it is not an object, but a subject,
and a whole and which seeks a spiritual union with other Egos. In the
coming section, we shall see just what it means after all for the personality to be a whole. At present we will see how it is that this doctrine
implies the Thou and the We, the spiritual communion of persons .
. . . the personality is never a part but always a whole, never a datum of the inner
world of existence. ... It is not of this world: when confronted with the personality, I am in the presence of a Thou. It is not an object ... Thus the triumph of
the personality will mean the annihiliation of the objective world. S
The personality is a whole, a concrete whole; it, therefore, is never an

objective datum nor an abstraction. It cannot, then, be of this world
(which is objectified). It is, in other words, a subject. Personality is not
known as an impersonal It. Berdyaev introduces in his personalism
the familiar form of the personal pronoun, the Thou. (We will soon see
that one knows his own personality through knowing the Thou, other
personalities.) Berdyaev, we will see, speaks too of knowing me. This
usage shows that, according to Berdyaev, the personality cannot be
understood and known except through a personal communion. The use
of the word Thou also indicates the subjectivity of the other person,
as it truly is apart from any encrustation and distortion of objectivity.
The personality is not of this (objective) world. The triumph of the
personality which is, at the same time, the triumph of its subjectivity,
its true reality, therefore means the transfiguration of the objective
world. As we will see in the following section, the creation of the true
See 95, n 3 above.
a Solitude and Society, 123.
I
EXI STENTIALISM
123
world, in the microcosm, flows out of the transfiguration of the

objective world.
Berdyaev connects the solitude of man and the objectivization of
personality. He criticizes the relationships of society:
Solitude, indeed, can be overcome only in communion, only in the knowledge of
the spiritual world, and not in the world of social frequentation, of the multitude
and its objective relationships. When authentic community is achieved, the
personality is strictly itself, and obeys the dictates of its own nature; ... it unites
with the Thou while at the same time preserving its own identity .... on the
existential plane, on the extra-natural and extra-social plane, the personality
insists on being itself; and man seeks to find his own reflection in another human
.countenance, in the Thou. l
The personality, then, cannot become its true self in a state of solitude.
And it cannot avoid solitude if its relationships with other persons are
ordered according to social formulas. Berdyaev, indeed, condemns
abstract logic, itself, in terms of society. Such a logic is bound up with
the objective relationships and outlooks found in ordinary societies. He
associates all objectified knowledge, and particularly knowledge in the
form of abstractions and essences, with ordinary objectified society.2
We see, then, what he means when he says: "solitude can only be
overcome in communion, only in the knowledge of the spiritual world."
The personality, objectified in society, remains in solitude not only because it fails to find other personalities but also because it cannot find
itself. So far as it can know itself, it sees itself objectively; and in failing
to find its reflection in another human countenance, in the Thou, it
lacks a condition of knowing itselt. 3
When by means of authentic community the personality is strictly
itself, it is free to "obey the dictates ot its own nature." "The personality insists on being itself; and man seeks to find his own reflection in
another human countenance, in the Thou." It is a paradox: a man
preserves his own identity and yet seeks his reflection in another man's
face. Berdyaev refers to the true Man, the true Personality, of Whom
we are images. In this respect the personality insists on being itself and
yet goes out of itself when it seeks its reflection in another man's
countenance. Berdyaev is asserting both immanence and transcendence
of the Godman. We may observe, by the way, Berdyaev's reference to
the concrete image of personality, the human countenance, the face. He
1
Ibid., 125.
a See II7, n 5 above.

a See Chapter IV, Section E, which treats communal knowing.
I24
EXISTENTIALISM
finds the Thou there because the communion is imaginative, as well as

intellectua1. 1
But the existence of the We cannot be ignored, and its relationship to the Ego,
the Thou, and the It must be considered.... the We can be transformed into the
It by the operation of socializing or objectifying processes ... 2
The We can then be understood in two ways. First it can be viewed in

relation to the Thou (and the It); where the relationship is between two
Thous, there is a We. Second, the We can be understood as it is in itself,
and this is the main intention of the passage. The We exists. The We
can be transformed into the It by a socializing or objectifying process
(and we have considered the process). It becomes clear then that
Berdyaev believes the We is an existent reality. He sees it as one
ordinarily sees "society" to be an existent reality; except the We is
more existentia1. It is a spiritual communion.
The personality is not a part of the We (as an ordinary citizen
happens to be part of an objectified society). It is subjectively identified
with the We.
The personality has a creative function to perform in social and cosmic life.
Spiritually, the personality is never isolated, for it postulates the existence of
others, of the Thou and the We, without at the same time every being becoming
a part or a means. 3
Thus, the paradox of the personality remaining itself and yet seeking
its image in the Thou and the We is solved. It becomes identified with
the Thou and the We, and yet within the subjectivity of its own concrete
existence. It creates, in its noetic action, an image which approximates
closer than before to the true reality of the Thou and the We.
We might at this juncture recall Berdyaev's notion of the historica1.
The historical is a historical myth or symbol which the philosopher of
history creates and, through it, knows the meaning of history. The
historical, we saw, ultimately is man. Now, we find, the Thou and the
We are taken up into the person's subjectivity in a creative action. And
one improves his own concrete existence in this creative act. His existence becomes identified with the Thou and the We. If follows from
this, I think, that he clarifies and improves the meaning of history. He
has realized further the true man in himself. The true man is a microcosmos in which the world and history are contained.
1 We will see that religious knowledge is imaginative in its religiosity. Cf. Chapter IV.
Section G, Part I.
I Solitude ana Society, 79-80.
B Ibid., 131.
EXISTENTIALISM
125
The We is a qualitative 1 content immanent in the Ego, for every Ego is

invariably related not only to the Thou but also to multiple mankind. 2
"Ego" is understood to mean personality.3 The Ego is noetic ally and

metaphysically related to the We, that is, to multiple mankind, because this is a "social and human metaphysics, that of the We," 4 a
"metaphysical sociology." 5 The Thou and the We flow cut of something
- the Ego. 6
Even if we assume that the We, as well as the Thou and the It, are immediate
data, it remains none the less true that the Ego is the anterior, primitive entity;
I cannot say, "I," without thereby affirming and postulating the Thou and the
We. In this light, sociability is a constituent property of the Ego's intimate
existence. 7
The We as well as the Thou and the It are "immediate data." Berdyaev
is not asserting idealism; the external reality is really external (as well
as internal, in the subjectivity of knowing). Nevertheless the Thou and
the We are basically implied in the I (the microcosmos, the image of the
True Man). The Ego, therefore, is the anterior, primitive entity. This is
why, in this metaphysical sociology, sociability is a constituent property of the Ego's intimate existence. Let us note that Berdyaev does not
separate the natural and the supernatural; he distinguishes them. 8
The divine Prototype of man is the Source and Terminus of all men
and of all history, and man is the image of Him.
Berdyaev may be classified in a certain philosophical movement
which Helmut Kuhn calls "Social Existentialism." In this sense his
most eminent companions are Martin Buber and Gabriel Marcel. 9 It
1 When Berdyaev says "the We is a qualitative content immanent in the Ego," he does
not mean anything more by "qualitative" than the commonsense idea. That is, he is only
pointing out the super quantitative aspect of the union of the We and and the Ego. There is no
question of a Scholastic doctrine of quality.
a Ego, here, refers to personality; and Berdyaev uses the word, Ego, because he discusses
his Personalism for the moment, in terms of that of Martin Buber. He translates Buber's
distinction between the I chsein, the Dusein, and the Essein as a distinction between the Ego,
the Thou and the It. Berdyaev claims to go beyond Buber. "(Buber) envisages the relation
ship between man and God, as expounded in the Bible. His investigations do not extend to
the relationship between human consciousnesses, between the Ego and the Thou, between
two human beings, or to the diverse relationships. Nor does he consider the problem of social
and human metaphysics, that of the We." Solitude and Society, 79.
4 Ibid., 79.
5 Ibid., 80.
6 Recall that the person, in his true depths, is the Godman. See the followmg section.
S See Spirit and Reality, 175.
9 The notion, "Social Existentialism," is that of Helmut Kuhn. In an article in Virgilius
Firm's encyclopaedia, A History of Philosophical Systems (Philosophical Library, New York,
1950),414, entitled "Existentialism," Kuhn describes Social Existentialism. The only devotee
of this outlook, however, that he mentions is Gabriel Marcel.
I26
EXISTENTIALISM
is a personalism in which the role of the social is personalized and

stressed in a doctrine of personality.
F. PERSONALITY: THE MICROCOSM
It is because man is a microcosm 1 that his own existence is the

"most 'existential'" of all concrete existents.
So-called existentialist philosophy (the novelty of which, by the way, has been
greatly exaggerated) regards philosophy as the knowledge of reality through
human existence and its concrete manifestations. Now it is a fact that my own
existence is the most "existential" of all. In knowing himself man is initiated into
mysteries unknown to him through his knowledge of others. I have experienced
the world around me and all the historical processes and events of my time as
part of myself, as my spiritual biography. At the deepest mystical level everything that has happened to the world happened to me. 2
The definition of Existential philosophy here given states affirmatively

what we have seen stated negatively. We saw before the object rejected,
and we see now the subject affirmed. By the "concrete manifestations"
of human existence, Berdyaev refers to the creations of man, particuto historical entities.
"My own existence is the most 'existential' of all existents," because
all the historical events and processes have entered into my sUbjectivity.
But my existence is not the most "existential" if we mean merely the
coverage knowledge and association give me.
"In knowing himself, man is initiated into mysteries unknown to him
through his knowledge of others." Man has experienced history and
events as part of his spiritual biography. The historical is not the cause
of his greater existentiality. Instead, the historical is the effect of his
1 We cannot say what are the historical origins of Berdyaev's doctrine of man the microcosm. Undoubtedly, he has encountered numerous versions of the doctrine. Solovyev's
doctrine of "pan-humanity" has probably been one influence. Solovyev writes: "mankind,
and not the individual person, is the primary reality; mankind is an entity, which is becoming
absolute through universal progress." And he calls the "pan-human organism" a "totally one
personality." (Quoted by V.V. Zenkovsky, A History of Russian Philosophy, 514). Solovyev's doctrine is the opposite of Berdyaev's Personalism.
Again, we may note the Leibnizian influence which came to him partly through Kozlov
(1831-1900), a member of aneo-Leibnizian movement in Russian philosophy. "In (Berdyaev's)
early period - clearly under the influence of Kozlov - he was ready to acknowledge a 'hierarchical unity of spiritual monads, bound together into a cosmic whole by the primary Divine
Monad ... by means of an emanation (!) which is prior to the creative multiplicity of being."
Ibid., 760. Berdyaev mentions in passing Leibniz' idea of the microcosmic monad in Dream
and Reality, 89.
2 Ibid., X-Xl.
EXISTENTIALISM
127
greater existentiality.l We recall from Chapter I that the process of

knowing and creating the historical (e.g., the historical culture) is a
process of Platonic remembrance. The True Man is, at the core of the
personality, the True Microcosm from Whom the world and history
flow. 2 This is why Berdyaev concludes saying, "at the deepest mystical
level, everything that has happened to the world happened to me." At
the deepest mystical level stands the True Man, in whom the eon of
temporal history is but an epoch in celestial history .
. . . the individually personal is the most existential of all things and perhaps the
most universal too; it is the most spiritual, and it is that which is most closely
linked with meaning. The ego is steeped in its own depths and there it comes
into touch with the noumenal spiritual world. This has been better understood
by mystics than by philosophers. 3
Berdyaev says perhaps the individually personal is the most universal.

He hesitates here because, properly speaking, the individual person is
only potentially all things (in their existential and spiritual reality.) 4
Only an extraordinary act of Platonic remembrance would realize the
ultimate in universality. He associates the spirituality of the person
(since he is a spirit) with meaning and with mysticism. The passage
invites the reader, as it were, to conclude that the perfect universality,
the one truly proper to the individual person, is to be achieved in the
mystical union. The author's conclusion is Berdyaev's, as may be seen
in the following cited text.
Further, the connection of Existentialism and philosophy of history
may be seen, and Berdyaev is well aware of the connection. 5
1 Berdyaev, when he discusses his Existentialism in Truth and Revelation, 20, considers
the temporal priority of the person to the externalization of the world. "The question is
asked - by what organ can transcendental man be recognized? It is he himself who recog
nizes himself in an act which precedes the falling apart into subject and object. The universal
spiritual experience of mankind provides the evidence that this is possible."
2 On 14, ibid., he says: "The spiritual experience of the inner man is not objectified, it is
an existence which precedes the formation of the world of objects and things."
4 "Potentially, (man) includes everything ... " The Divine and the Human, II3.
5 The association of Existentialism and philosophy of history in Berdyaev's mind is to be
seen in a passage from Towards a New Epoch. Indeed, the connection between Existentialism
and philosophy of history in Berdyaev's mind saves the passage from being incoherent. He
says, 103:
"Yet a religious form of existentialism remains possible; it is that of Pascal, Kierkegaard,
as also that of L. Shestov and Gabriel Marcel. I consider myself a representative of religious
and spiritual existentialism. There could not be in Russian thought an existentialism of the
type of Heidegger of Sartre. We are children of Dostoyevsky. Russian thought is full of the
philosophy of history. The expectation of a Messiah remains alive in us."
He says, in Dream and Reality, 103: "An existentialist philosopher should be aware of an
identity between his thinking and his personal and the world's destiny .... what concerns,
I28
EXISTENTIALISM
The unity of history and of the world is only to be found within the
personality, the primary existent:
Outside personality there is no absolute unity and totality in the world, to which
personality would be subordinate; outside personality everything is partial, even
the world itself is partial ... Such is the whole objectivized world. ... An
existential center, and a suffering destiny are to be found in subjectivity, not in
objectivity.... And everything which is existential in the objectivized ranks of
the world, in the nation, in mankind, in the cosmos, etc. belongs to the inward
being of personality and is not subordinate to any hierarchical center. The cosmos,
mankind, nation, etc., are to be found in human personality as in an individualized universe or microcosm, and their falling away from it, their ejection into
external reality among objects, is the result of the fall of man, of his subordination to impersonal reality, exteriorization, and alienation .
. .. The realization of personality, the concentration and actualization of its
strength, takes the sun into itself, it inwardly receives the whole cosmos, the
whole of history all mankind .... There is no wholeness, no universality of any
kind outside personality, it exists only within personality ... 1
Everything outside the personality, even the inanimate world, is partial

because the personality is the principle of total unity. Outside of total
unity are parts with respect to wholes; and therefore not unifiable because lacking the subjectivity of the person. This Personalist doctrine
is the condition of Berdyaev's universal history, a history and a philosophy which envisages the total unity of terrestrial history and of
celestial history within God.
The existential basis exists in every objectified rank of the world: the
nation, mankind, the cosmos, etc. Insofar as all these truly exist, they
exist in the human personality. Their existentiality belongs to the
inward being of personality.
Existents, in their existentiality, are not subordinate to any hierarchical center; that is, to an order modelled, for example, upon the
nation or the cosmos. Indeed these orders, in their proper existence,
belong within the human personality; they dominate the person only
because of the objectivization which occurred in the Fall.
What, then, is the order, if any, to be found in the True World, in the
age of the Spirit (Heaven)? Berdyaev terms himself in a sense a
"mystical anarchist." 2 But he does not oppose anarchism to order and
concrete harmony. He does not assert an anarchy, a chaos or disharmony.3 After the end of this world, both the cosmos, mankind and nations
and absorbs, and haunts me is the destiny of the subject, the microcosmos, in which there
stirs and throbs the whole universe, and which bears witness to the meaning of its own and
the world's existence."
1 Slavery and Freedom, 4I-42.
2 Dream and Reality, ISS.
a Cf. The Russian Idea, IS2. This anarchism, Berdyaev says, is an ideal of freedom, of
EXISTENTIALISM
129
will be integrally preserved in the New Jerusalem, in the Kingdom of

God. 1 Berdyaev is impelled by his Personalist philosophy of history to
elaborate a theory of the Kingdom of God, a kingdom which is sought
after and symbolized in the hierarchical orders of this world. He
must do so because: First, he asserts a philosophy of freedom (from
objectivization), and a universal history which progresses towards the
end of history, the Kingdom of God. And this progress can make sense
only if the goal transcends the objectivization of worldly orders. Second
he asserts a cosmogonical doctrine, according to which the age of the
Spirit will be enjoyed in this world after it is transfigured and made
divine. 2 Consequently, he must figure out how the nations will be
preserved in the New Jerusalem and yet without their slavish groupings
and organisations.
He rejects worldly hierarchies from his conception of the Heavenly
Jerusalem, but not hierarchism. Indeed he proposes a spiritual hierarchism in this life; that is, in the coming New Middle Ages to precede
the end of the world. 3 "The 'hierarchism' natural to life will come back
... life cannot prosper without a spiritual aristocracy." 4 "Humanity
is moving by way of hierarchical development towards the universal
kingdom of freedom ... " 5
What is this true hierarchy, a hierarchy in the future World? "It is a
hierarchy which depends upon gifts, upon the charismata 6 of prophets,
harmony and of order which arises from within ... " Let us recall the notion of will (velya)
or freedom that is held by Berdyaev. We saw, Chapter II, Section C, that his idea of freedom
of the will concerns in a large part a freedom from objectivization and spiritual slavery. And
his notion of mystical anarchism is not a positive ideal but an apophathic theology which
denies any slavery of objectified human institutions in the Kingdom of God. "The perfect life,
the Kingdom of God, can only be conceived in terms of anarchism, which is the apophatic and
the only true way of thinking about it, for it avoids any similarity with the Kingdom of the
Caesar and severs all connection with the categories of this world." The Destiny oj Man, 197.
(my italics)
1 See preceding note for' Kingdom of God."
2 See Chapter II, Section D, Part 3.
3 We may note, in passing, the significance of Berdyaev's mystical anarchism in hlS
religious philosophy. Observe that the always denies a division between the natural and the
supernatural and asserts the divinity of man. This mystical suprahistoricism joins with an
antipathy to the caesaro-papism which has prevailed in the despotic Orthodox realms and
empires for a thousand years. Cf. A. J. Toynbee, A Study of History (Oxford Univ., Oxford,
1934, 1939), Vol. III, 26-27; Vol. IV, 320-321; 352-363. That is, Berdyaev is the heir of a
social order where the Church has been a state-ruled Church for a millenium. He consequently
looks forward to a New Middle Ages, preceding the end of the world, where the Christian
Church will be without visible hierarchy or definite government. He wishes to bring on a
Christianity which is interior (and unhistorical) in place of a Christianity which he thinks is
too exterior (and too historical). Cf. Dream and Reality, 326; Solitude and Society, 91.
4 The End of Our Time, III.
S Freedom and the Spirit, 346.
6 Charismata refers to charism (derived from the Greek word, meaning gift), a special gift,
or grace, given in virtue of one's spirituality.
130
EXISTENTIALISM
apostles, saints; it is the hierarchy of men of genius in human power to

create, the hierarchy of personal nobility of character and beauty of
soul.... What is needed is to set humanity, pure divine humanity, a
human idea of hierarchy and a charismatic sense of it against the fearful
slaverly of man in objectified society, against the vampire-like tyranny
of inhuman and inhumane hierarchical principles and generic ideas." 1
The cosmos, mankind nation, etc., are to be found in human personality as in an individualized universe or microcosm. 2 And their falling
away, their ejection into external objectivity, is the result of the Fall
of man. This is the subordination of man to impersonal reality.
Berdyaev intends that all of the past history, every aspect of the
historical-the City of New York, for instance - belongs to the human
personality in its true depths. Every historical entity - even the City
of New York - has been present from the time of its founding in the
human personality! The Fall of man has involved the fall of the City of
New York. Man has forgotten his true self and is painfully creating a
history which will enable him to create himself - and the true meaning
of history - as he and the historical potentially can be. This is the
Existentialism and Personalism of Berdyaev.
Berdyaev seeks the meaning of history rather than history. Yet he
asserts man is a microcosm and that in him the cosmos and all of history
should and will be preserved. And this seems to put history as history
at the basis of his doctrine. But it really does not do so because the
microcosm, properly speaking, contains "everything which is existential
in the objectified ranks of the world." What is existential in the objectified City of New York is presumable very different from the historical city that we see. According to Berdyaev's apophatic sociology,
the existential City of New York is free from objective hierarchy. He is
interested in the suprahistorical, in celestial history. The mere historical
happens to be objectified. It imperfectly reveals what he seeks: the
meaning of history. His is a suprahistorical doctrine. His Personalism
or Existentialism is therefore suprahistorical. It is ordered to the
mystical realm of celestial history.
Let us note well, however, that Berdyaev's philosophy of history
by no means is anti-historical or uninterested in human history. We
saw, in Chapter 1,3 that historical traditions are not only spiritual but
1 The Beginning and the End,
Spirit, XIV.
I
See 128 above.

Chapter I, Section B, Part
I.
226-227.
See also, Slavery and Freedom,
18;
Freedom and
EXISTENTIALISM
I3 I
also historical; the philosopher of history is profoundly concerned with

history. We saw too that the moral purpose of philosophy of history is
to transfigure history.1 The philosopher of history descends from his
speculations and enters into history to transform it. Indeed "Man is
an historical being; he seeks to realize himself in history, and his destiny
is, therefore, historical. ... By virtue of its objective nature, history is
absolutely indifferent to the human personality.... And yet, for fear
of impoverishing and diminishing himself, man cannot refuse to participate in history - his appointed path, his destiny. But he must take care
never to become merely historically minded. . .. The task of creating
culture devolves on man by virtue of his historical existence. Culture
is his path and his destiny ... " 2 "Tradition is a supra-personal and
soborny experience, and the creative spiritual life transmitted from
generation to generation, uniting the living and the dead and thereby
overcoming death." 3
Berdyaev's philosophy is suprahistorical; it seeks the religious
meaning of history. But this is to seek the transfiguration of the world,
the incarnation of spirit in history. According to Berdyaev's Personalist
doctrine, man should go outside of himself and enter history in order to
bring history within the religious unity of his human and divine personality. He describes 4 the "realization" of the personality in view of
the return of the cosmos and of history to their trans-subjectivity.
He speaks of "the concentration and actualization of personality's
strength." This language shows the essential unity between his Personalism, his cosmogony and his philosophy of history. The personality
"inwardly receives ... the whole of history ... " (and makes the past
present).
Man has forgotten his true self, and the true meaning of history. He
seeks to recover them in a process of creative recollection. 5 The memory
is therefore very important in a doctrine of the microcosm.
Memory is undoubtedly man's most profound ontological principle, the one that
cements and preserves the unity of his personality.6
It may be accident that Berdyaev uses the term, ontological, a term

1

See 128 above.

The platonic doctrine of recollection is found in Schelling's philosophy of history.
Berdyaev probably obtains this Schellingian doctrine from Russian philosophers. Cf. Bolman's
"Introduction" to his translation of Schelling's The Ages of the World, 62.
4
ft
Solitude and Society,
!O2.
EXISTENTIALISM
I32
which he does not like. But it seems that he chooses it in place of existential. Will is man's most profound existential principle. But insofar
as the personality of man is intelligent, memory is the basic principle.
"Ontology," Berdyaev says, in Towards a New Epoch, "is a doctrine of
essences." 1 Hence, the primary ontological principle pertains to
knowledge instead of will. Berdyaev understands by "cementing and
preserving" a principle of synthesis. Personality is synthetic, rather
than analytic. 2 And, since memory is the principle that "cements and
preserves," the unity of the personality after all is to be characterized
more by its knowledge than by its will. This is so, even though the will
is prior. The divine Logos is the terminus.
Yet, the memory is not a repository of static essences, images or
associations.
Reminisances belong to museums and archeology, not to real life. Rather, it is a
matter of memory, which is creating and transfiguring .... The beauty of the
past is not a beauty of past facts recorded in the text books of historyorarcheology; it is the beauty of the real, experienced and transfigured past which has
entered into the present .... When I remember the past I perform a creative act,
whereby it is transfigured and invested with meaning. I am intent on finding a
meaning in the past: but the beauty of the past, of which I am now more
conscious than ever before, is not passively reflected in me; I respond to it and
re-live it creatively. True life is creation and this is the only life which is worth
the having. s
That is, the memory of the past is not only a conserving historicism, but
it is a spiritual creativity. It is a spiritual memory.4 It creates and transfigures the past and thus achieves beauty. It is not a beauty composed
of past facts. Berdyaev advocates creative recollection of the totality.
He does not, therefore, advocate the total recollection of past facts.
"The beauty of the past is the beauty of creative acts in the present." 5
Indeed, there is "a need for oblivion, the need to forget many things." 6
Thus the doctrine of the creative memory which preserves what is true
in the past is correlative to the notion of the true microcosm which is
at the core of the human personality.
Philosophy of creativity is at one and the same time a platonic
1
Towards a New Epoch, 96.
S Cf. Solitude and Society, 41, where Berdyaev points out the synthetic character of the
spirit. He says: "Dilthey is much nearer to Existential philosophy when he refuses to resolve
the spiritula life into its elements or to analyse it, and studies it, instead, as a whole in its
synthetic aspects."

Slavery and Freedom, III.
5 The Beginning and the End, 212. See The Meaning of the Creative Act, 29: "Philosophy is
creativeness, and not adaptation 01' obedience." (sic)
3
EXISTENTIALISM
133
doctrine of recollection. This is so because it is a philosophy of beauty

which uses the method of metaphor to recall the reality. Man is an
image of the Godman and potentially a microcosm (and microtheos).l
He strives to create a better image, and this creativity which is effected
through philosophy of history, is at the same time a recollection.
"Immortality is memory made clear and serene." 2
Berdyaev made a mistake in thinking that the imaginative knowledge
and memory of the past, which is a present memory, preserves the past
solely as present. That is, he would have made a mistake if he were not
a mystical philosopher. He see the present in the historical image or
myth, because he intends the mystical symbol of the eternally present
Reality.3 He says in Slavery and Freedom:
This spiritual memory ... reminds man of the fact that in the past th;}re lived
concrete beings, living personalities, with whom we ought in existential time to
have a link no less than with those who are living now. Society is always a
society, not only of the living but also of the dead ... 4
The communion of the Thous and the We thus extends to all the people
of history. And thus the microcosm, in recalling everything, recovers
and retains a personal communion with history.
This memory is not a "conserving, but a creatively transfiguring
memory." 5 It is a resurrecting memory, not a restoration of the past
with its mixture of good and evil, but a transfiguration. And it takes
the past into the Existential order which is not historica1. 6
He says "true life is creation," 7 and means that it is a creativity in
which one invests the past with meaning and thus relives it. The true
life of spirit (the best life) and of the personality is a life which finds the
meaning in a philosophy of history. Personalist Existentialism thus
articulates his philosophy of history in the sense that history is the
occasion of finding universal history and bringing it into the subjectivity of the person.
The Existentialism and Personalism are eschatological and complete
the messianic doctrine of his meta-history and philosophy of history.
Man ought ... to take all history into his own infinite subjectivity, in which the
world is part of man.
1
2
3
4
5
6
Slave,y and F,eedom, 103.

See Chapter IV, Section G.
Slave,y and F,eedom, III.
Ibid., II I.
Cf. Solitude and Society, 106-II7.
D,eam and Reality, 284.
134
EXISTENTIALISM
The resultant and consistent demand of personalism, when thought out to the
end, is a demand for the end of the world and of history, not a passive waiting
for this end in fear and anguish but an active, creative preparation for it.l
Here, he seeks not fear and anguish but a mystical activity. Not that
man ought to experience fear and anguish, but "man ought to take all
history into his own subjectivity, in which the world is part of man."
This is the demand of Personalism when thought out to the conclusion.
Personalism moves away from Existentialism (as Berdyaev views Existentialism). He is advocating an eschatological Personalism a mystical,
doctrine which looks for the end of the world.
G. SUMMARY
The beauty and spirituality of universal history, as well as its

human an divine significance, are Existential and Personal. Philosophy
of history needs to be articulated by Existential and Personalist
doctrines. Berdyaev's creative philosophy of Beauty, which we observed in Chapter II, is an Existential philosophy which knows the
world, bringingitinto the subj ectivity of the knower. He thereby reveals
himself to himself, and his knowledge thus becomes the existent microcosm; This Existentialism is a Personalism because beyond Existenz is
the primordial personal principle, wilful freedom (the Ungrund); and it
is illuminated, according to this cosmogonical philosophy, by the
divine personal principle, Christ. The philosophy is influenced by
German Idealism. Berdyaev asserts a historical scheme of realization
of the human Ego which is similar to that of Fichte and which, like
Fichte's scheme, assumes a first principle of wilful freedom. The scheme,
however, is personalized and etherialized in Berdyaev's philosophy.
There is an anguish, an A ngst in this Existentialism; and it is
experienced in the face of the primal abyss, mystery, or divine nothingness, which is the basis of the personality. But Angst is not the fundamental experience for Berdyaev. Rather, "the esctasy of creativeness
which arises out of man's own nothingness," is the primary Existential
event. "Nothingness" is not absolute non-being; it occurs in the
principle, not in the terminus. The Godman, the divine Logos, Christ, is
the term. Every personality will finally be illuminated through the full
Truth.
I.
SlaV"" and Freedom, 267.
EXISTENTIALISM
135
2. Existentialism is here a Personalism. Personality, however, is spirit,

and spirit is the link of man with God. This is a pneumatology; man is an
incarnate spirit, a concrete existent. Spirit is the realm of subjectivity
and supra-subjectivity, and it enables the person to overcome obj ectified
conditions of knowledge and of existence. That is, it raises fallen man.
This doctrine of spirit denies the division between the natural and the
supernatural. Every personality has its logos, its spiritual principle
which integrates it. Man is an image of the divine Logos, and the true
man is the Godman. Thus Existentialism is here a mystical philosophy
of the spirit; it is not opposite to rationalism or irrationalism but
transcends both.
This remains a Personalism which asserts the self-identity of every
personality, even in change, because the creative memory achieves a
remembrance of the divine origin of the person and knows it as a mkrocosmo The world, every man, and God are my creative act. We create
symbols (such as "nation") which approximate closer to the true reality
That is why philosophy of history is creative and symbolic; the mere
historical is symbolic. The philosopher takes his creations into his own
subjectivity. At the same time he approaches their transcendent truth.
This is a philosophy according to which the person creatively strives for
a platonic recollection of himself as he truly is. All the things he knows
become himself by revealing him to himself. Berdyaev's Existentialism,
therefore, eminently is subjective, seeking to overcome objectivity. It
seeks the meaning of human existence and of the universe as part of the
divine Existent.
3. This is a concrete Existentialism or Personalism, and Berdyaev

asserts, like Hegel, the reality of the concrete universal. He uses this
Hegelian doctrine to elaborate a Russian religious philosophy. The
supreme concrete Existent, the Godman, is at the center of the philosophy. And this is a cosmogonical outlook. It expresses the doctrine of the
total unity of mankind - all men - and the cosmos in God in terms of
the concrete universal.
Intellectualism, the metaphysics which asserts the reality of abstract
essences, comes under attack. Berdyaev is interested in the concrete
existent, and yet he says it is a universal. Its universality is real, not
nominal. Such a concrete universalism, which attacks the abstraction
from the whole requires a noetic which is at once intellectual and imaginative. That is, the truth is known at once intellectually and imaginatively. Concrete-universalism accords well with the doctrine of cre-
EXISTENTIALISM
ativity, the notion of mythical and symbolic knowing, and with the
mystical Existentialism. Further, it is a concrete Existentialism where
man is an actual microcosm. The unity of the person with the world,
other persons and with God, approached noetically, is concrete in its
conditions. The mystical unity of all things and of history in the Godman
is the concrete goal of man, and sought through recollection. True
personality is the True Concrete Universal.
4. In a cosmogonical philosophy which says that the world and all
men are taken up and divinized in the person's subjectivity, the doctrine
of true community and communion is stressed. It is a metaphysics of
the Thou and the We. In knowing other persons spiritually and subjectively, man finds his own reflection and approaches closer to his true
self. The personality thus becomes subjectively identified with the We.
In the last analysis, the Thou and the We are basically implied in the
Ego which is the microcosm, the image of the Godman. This is the
principle of Berdyaev's Social Existentialism. He would transcend
subjectivity in the Existential meeting with God, with all persons, and
with the interior existence of the world.
5. Since man is a microcosm his existence is the most "Existential" of
all concrete existents. At the deepest mystical level everything that has
happened to the world happened to me. "I have experienced the world
around me and all the historical processes and events of my time as
part of myself, as my spiritual biography." This clarifies Berdyaev's
philosophy of history. The historical (e.g., historical traditions) is not
the cause of greater Existentiality; rather, the historical is the effect
of man's greater Existentiality. Further, the unity of history and of
the world will be found only within the personality, the primary
existent. The realization of personality involves the reception of the
cosmos, history, all mankind. Thus, the doctrine of universal history,
which is the substance of Berdyaev's philosophy of history, is directly
associated with Personalism.
This is a suprahistorical doctrine. All existents so far as they truly
exist - the cosmos, mankind, nations, etc. - exist in the human
personality. But they are not historical in their true existence. It is the
mystical and Existential City of New York, for example, not the
objectified and historical City, which belongs to the human personality
in its depths.
Berdyaev's philosophy of history is, however, by no means anti-
EXISTENTIALISM
137
historical or uninterested in human history. Indeed he understands

man to be a historical being who should realize himself in history as
well as in suprahistory. Man should enter history in order to bring
history within the religious unity of his human and divine personality.
History as such is not preserved in the human memory; the memory
(man's supreme ontological principle) is spiritual and creative. It
transfigures the past into the eternal and Existential present. This is
not a philosophy of history in the sense of knowing the meaning of
history as history itself. It is a universal history, and a Personalism,
which seeks a suprahistorical meaning.
CHAPTER IV
EPISTEMOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY
A. INTRODUCTION
We saw in the foregoing chapter that there is a historical process in the

human personality; at one state it is mainly sub-conscious, at another
state, mainly conscious, at another, mainly supra-conscious. A theory
of knowledge which parallels the history of the personality will be
investigated in the present chapter. Berdyaev's method is not primarily rational and objective and his interest in man is not primarily the
consciousness. But since the rational is necessary to any discourse at
all and admittedly to his own, his theory of rational knowledge will be
studied, as well as his criticism of it.
This study of Berdyaev's theory of knowledge is necessary if we want
to know his philosophy of history. There are especially two reasons why
we must study his method. First, his philosophy by its nature has a
radical unity, so that to understand one part of it one must investigate
all the other important parts. Theory of knowledge and knowledge
itself, we will find, is one with his mystical philosophy of history in the
final position. Second, his theory of knowledge will tell us exactly what
his method is. We will learn both the method by which he discovers philosophy of history and the method by which he expounds it, which are
the same.
B. THE REJECTION OF THE SUBJECT-OBJECT RELATIONSHIP
Berdyaev's approach to knowledge is both positive and negative: he

asserts spiritual knowing and criticizes objective knowing. Objective
knowing, we saw, is a result of the fall of man and of the cosmos. And
the point-of-view from which Berdyaev refutes the objectification is
mystical. Epistemology in this doctrine necessarily is also a metaphysic.
Philosophy is concerned primarily with man's inner life, and it should therefore
investigate all problems from the standpoint of human knowledge. The purpose
139
of existence cannot be elucidated either from things or from objects; it is inherent

in the knowing subject and in existence itself. Thus purely rational philosophy,
as an objective process, cannot apprehend the purpose of existence which is
immanent in the depths of Being ... 1
Philosophy is concerned with man's 4mer life because man is a microcosm in his interior depths. It follows that philosophers of history
should investigate all problems from the standpoint of human
knowledge - man's inner life is intellectual. The purpose of existence
cannot be discovered in things alone because they are not the Godman,
nor images of Him. Nor can the purpose of existence be elucidated
from objects. Objects are the objects of our objectified knowledge,
whether they be God, persons or things. Berdyaev will show us that
objects do not belong to man's inner life or to existence. Rational philosophy, so far as it is an objective process, cannot apprehend the
purpose of existence.
It also follows that, since knowledge is essentially immaterial, its ability to
apprehend the material nature of things and objects remains the great enigma.
. .. It can only be resolved if we admit the ontic nature of knowledge, that it
participates in Being, illuminating its obscure depths and integrating the objective world in the spiritual. The faith in the immutability of natural laws, which
goes back to Greek geometry, is only a faith in reason as a manifestation of
nature's inherent spirituality. This spirituality is oppressed by the objective
world; but we apprehend it as our destiny as soon as we become converted to the
inner world of existence. Thus the so-called natural laws are actually human
destiny. 2
The enigma presented by the immateriality of knowledge facing the

materiality of things is the problem of reconciling knowledge to reality.
Berdyaev solves the problem by regarding knowledge as an existential
reality. But this requires that knowledge. be identified with the
interior subjectivity of the person knowing; so much so, that it partakes of his innermost being, his spirituality, and therefore of his
existentiality. To clarify the problem of the immateriality of knowledge
facing the materiality of things is indeed one of the purposes of this
chapter. When we understand this we will understand Berdyaev's noetic.
Knowledge "integrates the objective world in the spiritual." The
objective world reflects the objectivization of man, his falsification in
the Fall. Knowledge is the way by which man illuminates the world.
This illumination reveals the spirituality inherent in the world. We
recall that the world is the incarnation of spirit and that man is an
l
I

Ibid., 50-51.
140
incarnate spirit. Our immaterial knowledge of natural laws is a

"manifestation of nature's inherent spirituality." This spirituality is
oppressed by the objective world; thus our knowledge of natural laws
is rational, a rational manifestation of nature's spirituality. And since,
in truth, nature's spirituality is our spirituality, the so-called natural
laws of the world are actually part of our inner world, our human destiny.
Berdyaev's notion of objectivization is based largely on his interpretation of the philosophy of Kant. Schopenhauer is influential,1
Berdyaev says, in Solitude and Society:
When in opposing the subject and the object, philosophical theory abstracts
them both from Being, it makes the apprehension of Being impossible. . ..
Objective processes transform Being into a superstructure of the subject,
elaborated for philosophical purposes .... he loses all contact with Being .. .
This is the tragedy of knowledge as expounded by German Idealism ... the
manifold superiority of the German post-Kantian philosophers lay in their critical approach to the problem of objectivization and in their recognition of the
importance of the knowing subject. '" the advent of Kant and of German
Idealism marks a most important stage in the history of human self-conscious1 See The PhilosoPhy 0/ Schopenhauef', edited by I. Edman (The Modern Library, New
York, 1928). This is an Englished edition of Schopenhauer's main work, The World as Will
and Idea, and there are several notions that Berdyaev shares with Schopenhauer, by whom
he has been influenced. The voluntarism is obvious.
The notion of idea, especially the very use of the word, idea, seems to have been inspired
by Schopenhauer. The following text might have been written by Berdyaev:
"The method of our own system is toto genef'e distinct from these two opposite misconceptions (that is, starting a philosophy from the subject or from the object) for we start
neither from the object nor from the subject, but from the idea, as the first fact of consciousness. Its first essential, fundamental form, is the antithesis of subject and object." Schopenhauer means that there is something prior to subject and object which is not conceptual, yet,
on the other hand, is not irrational. And Schopenhauer asserts an intuitive knowledge instead
of a conceptual knowledge. Cf. ibid., 299.
Indeed what we found in Chapter II, namely, that Berdyaev's philosophy is based on tW()
principles, the irrational will and the (divine) intelligibility, is asserted by Schopenhauer of
his own philosophy. "For as the world is in one aspect entirely idea, so in another it is entirely
will." And, like Berdyaev, Schopenhauer resolves these contradictory principles from a
historical point of view. The intelligible principle should finally dominate the irrational. "If,
however, we wish to give an honorary position, as it were emeritus, to an old expression, which
from custom we do not like to discard altogether, we may, metaphorically and figuratively,
call the complete self-effacement and denial of the will, the true absence of will, which alone
forever stills and silences its struggle, alone gives that contentment which can never again be
disturbed, alone redeems the world, and which we shall now soon consider at the close of our
whole investigation - the radical cure of the disease of which all other means are only palliations or anodynes. In this sense the Greek TEo).C; and also finis bonorum correspond tothe thing still better." Ibid., 291-292.
Further, Schopenhauer asserts a concrete knowledge opposed to abstract knowing. He says.
310: "There is a wide gulf between (abstract and intuitive knowing) which can only be
crossed by the aid of philosophy, as regards the knowledge of the nature of the world. Intuitively or in concreto, every man is really conscious of all philosophical truths, but to bring
them to abstract knowledge, to reflection, is the work of philosophy which neither ought nOr
is able to do more than this." Berdyaev asserts a similar notion of (concrete) intuitive
knowledge.
141
ness. It was a step towards human emancipation, towards freeing man from the
constraint and slavery of the objective world. The very fact of a critical awareness
of the subject's participation in the objective processes, implied the subject's
deliverance from the external tyranny of the objective world. . .. Henceforth,
Being could only be apprehended subjectively ... 1
Berdyaev rejects the opposition of subject and object because, in fact,

it never gets away from subjectivity. The term, obiect, connotes the
dependence of objectivity on subjective states and on human relationships. "My use of the term 'object' will never connote that any form of
knowledge is independent of the subject." 2 "Objective processes
transform Being into a superstructure of the subject ... he loses all
contact with Being." 3 Objectivity is an improperform of sUbjectivity.
Berdyaev observes two contributions of the German Idealists, especially Kant, Fichte, Schelling and Hegel: a critical approach to
objectivization and a recognition of the importance of the subject. He
is enthusiastic about the establishment in the German Idealists of "a
critical awareness of the subject's participation in the objective processes" and of the "external tyranny of the objective world." Kant, to
whom Berdyaev acknowledges indeptedness above all other philosophers,4 was quite articulate as to the inability of the object to present
the reality as it really is. ("We can have no knowledge of any object as
thing in itself ... " 5 said Kant.)
Kant rejects the Newtonian philosophy of nature, such as it is understood in his own philosophy, as a knowledge of noumenal reality.6 And
Ibid., 29-30.
3 Ibid., 36.
4 D,eam and Reality, 93.
5 Critique of Pure Reason, 27.
ft The objective knowledge which Kant treats in the Critique of Pun Reason is an empirical
knowledge, a knowledge which was called in the 18th century a philosophy of nature. That is,
it is an empirical knowledge which is defined in philosophical terms: i.e., in terms of categories, concepts, sensible intuition, understanding, etc. See Critique of Pu,e Reason, 162.
Norman Kemp Smith in his Commentary on the Critique of Pure Reason (Humanities Press,
New York, 1950), lv-lvi, says: " ... the term knowledge has, in the Critical philosophy, a
much narrower connotation than in current speech. It is limited to sense-experience, and to
such inferences therefrom as can be obtained by the only methods that Kant is willing to
recognize, namely, the mathematico-physical. Aesthetic, moral and religious experience, and
even organic phenomena, are excluded from the field of possible knowledge."
"In holding to this position, Kant is, of course, the child of his time. The absolute sufficiency of the Newtonian physics is a presupposition of all his utterances on this theme.
Newton, he believes, has determined in a quite final manner the principles, methods and
limits of scientific investigation. For though Kant himself imposes upon science a further
limitation, namely, to appearance, he conceives himself, in so doing, not an weakening
Newton's natural philosophy, but as securing it against all possible objections."
This is why we can say that Berdyaev is attacking a Newtonian world-outlook in his attack
on objectivization. He is attacking an empirical view of reality which is defined in terms of
1
142
Berdyaev, in attacking objectivization, is rejecting the claim of such a

natural necessitarianism to get at the reality of things. True, as we saw,
he is not attacking solely the Kantian "object" but also intellectualist
philosophies. His approach, however, is by way of the objective theory. 1
As for the second contribution of the German Idealists, their recognition of the importance of the knowing subject, Berdyaev again refers
to the advent of Kant and his successors. "It was a step towards human
emancipation, towards freeing man from the constraint and slavery of
the objective world." Kant's categorical imperative, in giving the
human soul an intrinsic value, singled it out from all other natural
existences and strengthened it to face the cold immensities of the
cosmic system. 2 The Critique of Pure Reason, in its strict limiting and
defining of objective knowledge, cleared the ground for the practical
Reason of Kant and secured it in the autonomous control of its own
domain.
And thus Berdyaev says above: "The very fact of a critical awareness
of the subject's participation in the objective processes, implied the
subject's deliverance from the external tyranny of the objective world.
Henceforth, Being could only be apprehended sUbjectively." Berdyaev
understands a metaphysical and existential "Being" in the chapter
cited from,3 a true Being instead of the objectified Being mentioned
in most of his writings.
He discusses the opposition of subject and object in a later book, The
Beginning and the End:
philosophical categories and which is necessitarian and outside of the order of human volition.
See Critique of Pure Reason, 26, as to the use of the categories. Berdyaev uses Kant's termi
nology. "The subject is created by God, whereas the object is a product of the creature. The
subject is noumenon, the object is phenomenon."
1 Berdyaev's attack upon the object should be understood in the light of the intellectualism.
The notion of theoretical object, and the objectivization of philosophy, have predominated in
philosophic thought since the end of the middle ages. Cf. J. Maritain, Les Degres du Savoir
(Desch"e de Brouwer, Paris, 1946), 247.
2 Cf. Commentary on the Critique of Pure Reason, Ivi-Iviii. Also, Cf. 1. Kant, The Moral Law,
or Kant's Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, (Hutchinson, London 1948), 121: "How
is a Categorial Imperative Possible?"
"A rational being counts himself, qua intelligence, as belonging to the intelligible world
and solely qua efficient cause belonging to the intelligible world does he give to his causality
the name of 'will'. On the other side, however, he is conscious of himself as also a part of the
sensible world, where his actions are encountered as mere appearances of this causality."
Then Kant goes on to say that a man is not solely of the intelligible world (which pertains to
the categorical imperative) nor solely of the sensible world (which refers to natural laws).
3 Cf. Solitude and Society, 30, 31, 35. On 38, Being is described in such a way as to mean
existent. This notion of being is unusual in Berdyaev. He constantly attacks the notion of
being and the philosophy of being. Here, he accepts the doctrine of being, it seems, because
he is discussing Existentialism in terms of the philosophies of being of the German Idealists
and the Existentialists.
I43
What are the marks of objectivization, and the rise of object relations in the
world? The following signs may be taken as established: (I) The estrangement
of the object from the subject; (2) The absorption of the unrepeatably individual
and personal in what is common and impersonally universal; (3) The rule of
necessity of determination from without, the crushing of freedom and the concealment of it; (4) Adjustment to the grandiose mien of the world and of history,
to the average man, and the socialization of man and his opinions, which destroy
distinctive character.1
Note that all four of the marks of objectivization consider the subject
to be prior to the object. The object is estranged from the subject; that
is, the object has fallen away from the integral unity in the subject and
has thus become object. This refers to the Fall of man and of the world.
The object is in the essentialistic order; hence, the objectivization of
man is the submission to the rule of the common and impersonally
universal. This crushes the freedom of man; that is, it conceals freedom
(which is at the basis of man's personality). Finally, he speaks of the
socialization of man and his opinions: "adjustment to the grandiose
mien of the world and of history ... "
From the viewpoint of epistemology, objective knowing estranges an
object from the subject (instead of bringing it into the interiority of the
subject); the particular is subsumed in the common and is insufficiently
known. The freedom of the knower is crushed, but true knowing requires the exercise of volition; it is volitional. Finally, the socialization
of man and his opinions, where he is overcome by the grandeur of the
world and human opinions, is due to the rise of objective relations.
Indeed this epistemological and metaphysical problem of objectivization is central to the thought of Berdyaev.
In my opinion the central thought of eschatological philosophy is connected with
the interpretation of the Fall as objectivization, and of the end as the final and
decisive victory over objectivization. 2
Thus sin leads not merely to objectivization through cognition - Kant

went no further than to assert the objectivization of cognition - but sin
actually makes nature a fallen realm of being. And the epistemological
problem is therefore two-fold: to overcome objectivization both in the
subject and in the world with the aid of true knowing. Epistemology
takes account of a temporal sequence and is, therefore, conceived in
terms of Berdyaev's philosophy of history. He asserts a religious
epistemology, as well as a philosophy, defined in terms of religious
doctrine and philosophy of history.
1

Ibid., 5I.
144
His attack upon objectified knowledge is philosophical; that is, like

Kant, he is attempting to take away the pretentions of this knowledge
to arrive at metaphysical reality. In the natural sciences objectivization
does not destroy the object of knowledge since nature is itself the result
of objectivization. 1 This objectivization does not result in the same
devastation as do the objectified historical or psychological inquiries
about spirit. 2 Concepts especially serve the natural sciences. Indeed
they give us our bearing in the dark infinity of the object world which
surrounds us. 3 But the concept lowers the reason towards the fallen
state of the world and therefore has a limited application. 4 The concept
operates in terms of the general and has, Berdyaev believes, no affinity
with the particular or the unique.
The concept is fatal to mystical or spiritual experience, and this is
why he rejects it from the proper noetic of his philosophy of history.
He attacks the use of the concept because his noetic seeks the individual and the unique. 5 We saw that his epistemology is imaginative and
that the concrete conditions of individuality and uniqueness are preserved in the highest knowing. Of course he must reject the concept;
for in philosophy it is no instrument or means of reaching existential
knowing. This is so because it eliminates in itself the very conditions
of concreteness that are contained in existential knowing.
The truth is inherent in the existing subject and not in the opposition of the
abstracted subject with the object. The objective world has no criterion, or source
of truth.
Intellectualist philosophies, whether Greek or Scholastic, tend to make the
subject passive by endowing him uniquely with intellectual perceptions. As a
result we are in danger of identifying concepts with Being, of regarding the uninterrupted activity of intellection as a purely reflective activity. The human
ntellect was originally confronted with chaos; but since its function is to clarify
and to illumine, to introduce meaning into a world devoid of any, the very act of
apprehending the dark and meaningless world should bring illumination and
significance. 6
The truth exists only in the subject (the knowing person). We saw that
the external world is an objective (and rather falsified) world because it
has fallen away from the unity of the microcosm, man. The fall of man
involved the fall of the world. We saw too that philosophy of history
1
2
8
4
5
6
The Destinity of Man, 12.

Ibid., 12.
Ibid., 79.
Ibid., 120.
I45
describes the process through which man takes up the world and history
into his truth and his sUbjectivity. Truth, in fact, is primarily the
divine Truth, the divine Logos - a concrete truth of whom man is the
image. 1 Primary Truth is not a comparison (as of the subject to the
external object), but a concrete existent, True Man.
Berdyaev criticizes "intellectualist philosophies" for asserting that
the knower is passive. And he does because they identify concepts with
Being.
He has two reasons for attacking "intellectualist philosophies." One
reason is given above: the conceptualism of them and hence their unreality. The other reason is based on the cosmology of Berdyaev.
The world at the time of the Fall of man became enslaved to essences
and to laws because it fell from its integrality with the Godman,
the divine Meaning. 2 An "intellectualist" philosophy would accept
the objects of a "world devoid of any meaning" and assert them as
the meaning.
This twofold attack on objective philosophy should be noted.
(I) The philosophy is false because it does not know primary reality,
but objects and essences. It never gets beyond the superficial objectivity
or a superficial knowing. 3 (2) The philosophy is false because it provides no way of introducing meaning into a meaningless world; which
is to say, it prevents the spiritualization, the taking up of the world in
the microcosm. The second reason, Berdyaev's interest in cosmogony
and philosophy of history, is more important. An Existential noetic
serves his own cosmogony.
Knowing is an act, though not a purely reflective activity. It is, we
have seen and will see, a creation.
Rational knowing (which depends upon concepts) is objective, not

only because of its nature, but also because it is the accepted means of
communication in (fallen) societies. Berdyaev says in his work, Solitude
and Society, a book of which we have seen so much in the preceding
chapter:
See Section G, Parts 3 and 4 of this Chapter.
a Cf. The Beginning and the End, 87.
3 But Berdyaev does not deny the (limited) validity of objective knowledge. It is based on
nature, and nature does reveal, though imperfectly, the truth from which it springs. "The
word, nature, can bt' interpreted in two ways: there is a preconscious existential nature and
there is a post-conscious and objectified nature. The first admits of spiritual communion,
the latter only of scientific or technical relations." Spirit and Reality, I75.
We will see later on how Berdyaev asserts the limited validity of objective knowledge.
Suffice it to say, here, that objectified nature is a (useful) symbol of existential nature, and
objective knowledge is a (useful) symbol of a truer knowledge.
1
146
(Existential philosophy's) aim is to study the unifying principle which integrated

philosophy and the community of men, and also to demonstrate the social character of logical communication. For this reason, my principal endeavor in this book
has been to establish the relationship between knowledge as an instrument of
objectified society and knowledge as a means of achieving existential communion. 1
When he speaks of a "unifying principle which integrates philosophy

and the community of men," he refers to the spiritual principle: spirit
integrates society and philosophy. Logical communication - that is,
rational, conceptual and objectified communication - is contrasted with
the spiritual principle. Objective knowing never gets beyond the superficial and isolated subjectivity of the knower. Existential knowing does.
And objective knowing, that of concepts and rationalization, organizes
and systematizes the chaotic world in our thought. It is a preparation and a necessary one for the knowing which creates and transforms.
Logical knowing (and logic itself) is social. 2 Logical, rational, conceptual
knowing is a social communication on a low level, on the objectified
level. It is not entirely other than spiritual. 3
Berdyaev practises what he teaches: he says of his method of philosophy:
... my manner of thinking ... is intuitive and aphoristic rather than discursive
and systematic. I am unable to expound anything by way of ratiocination, and I
do not believe in the need to do so. ... what carries conviction . .. is not discursive argument but the original insight. 4
Philosophy is preoccupied with the original insight. That is why

Berdyaev's books seem endlessly repetitious, though each book has a
different aim and teaching; for the original insight is constantly brought
into the exposition. The ratiocinative way is allowed to influence the
exposition only to a certain degree. The books and chapters are planned
and divided logically, but what stands out in the writing is the original
insight. Philosophy is the constant revelation and unfolding of the
original insight, not the ratiocinative deduction.
The opposition to the objective and rational method is seen in the
metaphysics we considered in the foregoing chapter. It is a metaphysics
of all men and the Godman. It is a metaphysics of the Thou and the We
8 Ibid., 125. Cf. The Realm of SPi,it and the Realm of Caesa" 16. Berdyaev never denies the
validity of rational knowledge. And he pays his respects to it. Cf. The Beginning and the End,
87: "Knowledge and science have their own worlds, religion has its own world, so have art
and politics. This does not in the slightest degree mean that the world of science is a world
of phantasy and is devoid of reality. It is of immense importance to man as he takes his way
through life '" This is particularly so in the case of historical science .....
4 D,eam and Reality, 81.
1
147
(not a metaphysics of a general Mankind), and the knowledge is intuitive, subjective and mystical. And hence Berdyaev associates the logical and ratiocinative way of knowing with an objective socialization.
There are two aspects of knowledge: one comprehends the relationship between
the knowing subject and Being; the other includes the relationships between the
knowing subject and other Egos, the multiple world of men and society.l
He thus conceives his epistemology in terms of mankind through all

of history as well as in terms of the Godman. And he refuses to accept
the sociological image, the logical and conceptual knowledge as proper
to philosophy.
Yet, he does not entirely reject the rational type of knowing. Indeed,
we need only glance at his books, which after all are rational, in order to
see the wealth of concepts and ideas which he uses. He continues:
...
the
...
the
Because knowledge is invariable concerned with the general, the abstract and
universal, it tends to overlook the individual, the singular and the personal
in terms of Existential philosophy, knowledge is primarily concerned with
Ego and the Thou ... 2
This passage is valuable for the link it shows existing between the
rational and the intuitive in Berdyaev's theory of knowledge. First, he
admits that "knowledge is invariably concerned with the general."
Second, he says: "the general, the abstract and the universal." But the
universal, we have seen, belongs not only to rational knowledge but
also to intuitive knowledge. The existent is a concrete universal. Consequently, the general and the abstract, which are here associated
with the universal, play some part in the attainment of philosophic
intuition. Proper philosophical knowledge is primarily, not exclusively, concerned with the Ego and the Thou. That is, philosophical
knowledge is primarily but not exclusively intuitive. Philosophy of
history is rational and conceptual because "knowledge is invariably
concerned with the general, the abstract and the universal." But it is
primarily intuitive. 3
Ibid., 87.
3 Berdyaev's psychology and his pneumatology are helpful in a consideration of his theory
of knowledge. Though "man's being is an aggregate in which spirit, soul and body are unified"
(Freedom and the Spirit, 261), yet, if man knows only with his soul he knows only objectively.
Berdyaev says he interprets, here, St. Paul's words on the soul of man in his own way. The
psychological goal is the gradual conversion of soul into spirit. Ibid., 8. He stresses the distinction between the soul and the spirit. "The confusion of spirit and soul ... was one of the
causes alike of a false naturalism and a false 'spiritualism' in philosophy." Ibid., 9. Yet, he
asserts the unity of man. "In the history of spiritual consciousness, the error has often been
perpetuated of identifying spirit and soul, the spiritual and the psychic .... Spirit is the
1
148
C.

KNOWLEDGE NOT ANTI-RATIONAL, BUT SUPER-RATIONAL
Berdyaev's positive affirmation of the rational occurs only in his

last writings, those published since 1941. He seems to have felt the need
to admit and assert its validity. It has value as seen from the perspective
of philosophy of history. That is, it is one of the steps in the historical
ascent of man's knowing from the irrational beginnings of the world to
the future transfiguration of the world.
Knowledge within the objectified world does admittedly reveal truths. There is a
reflected light in it which helps us to take our bearings in the darkness of this
world, but it does not reveal primary and original Truth. . .. 1
The truths that objectified knowledge reveals are not primary truths.
(Thus, Being, we saw, is not primary in Berdyaev's philosophy). When
he says there is a reflected light in our knowledge of the objectified
world which helps us take our bearings, this must be understood in the
light of his symbolism and imagism. Every human knowledge is symbolical, objective knowledge more so than existential knowledge. 2 The
logical concept then is a symbol, diminished though it is, of the true
reality. "For in its depths, even the most positive, exactly scientific,
knowledge of the natural world holds within itself a reflection of the
Logos." 3 Indeed we just saw that Berdyaev asserts that philosophical
thought must be conceptual (his own thought, of course, included). The
highest quality 0/ the soul . .. " (my italics) Spirit and Reality, 39. Again, he says; "The soul
is the kernel of the human creature and the function of spirit should be to endow the soul
with the highest quality and purpose." Ibid., 40.
However, "Spirit is the masculine active principle whereas the soul is the feminine passive
principle. Spirit comes from the Logos, while the soul is cosmic. Spirit performs an act in
relation to the soul; it informs it with purpose and truth, it liberates it from the power of
cosmic forces." Ibid., 40. Berdyaev's mystical noetic is connected with spirit, in contradistinction from soul. Cf. Ibid., 240. The soul is the faculty of knowing the fallen cosmos as such.
It is a "passive principle," which is to say its knowledge is (passively) conceptual.
And so Berdyaev has written; "It is only the soul which can regard itself as opposed to the
known object and can interrogate the criterion of its own knowledge. But no object can be
set in opposition to the spirit, and in the spiritual world the question of a criterion does not
arise. Only an object which appears to us as something alien and impenetrable can raise a
question as to the criterion of our knowledge of it .... The criterion of truth is the spirit
itself ... " Freedom and the SPirit, 25.
For Berdyaev, then, the soul knows in a relation of subject and object; that is it knows,
by itself, only objectively. The soul sets up a criterion outside itself. In Berdyaev's doctrine,
we saw, an exterior criterion is a falsified criterion; it is a universal, an essence, by itself an
objectivization. The soul is the principle of knowing an essentialistic and objectified thing,
according to Berdyaev. When he says the soul "can interrogate the criterion of its own
knowledge," he is referring to rational process, logical reasoning; and this is the proper to
the soul but not to the spirit.
2 See Section G of this chapter.
3 The Realm of Spirit and the Realm of Caesar, r6.
I49
concrete universal, as the term universal shows, is a foundation of conceptual knowledge. It amounts to this: Berdyaev's philosophy cannot
be anti-rational because the anti-rational would be irrational and
consequently would be completely unavailable to knowledge.
Equally false is the naturalist ... type of mysticism, which would remove the
conflict between subject and object, not from above, but from below. This type
of mysticism is not super-rational, but irrational; not super-conscious, but unconscious. It would plunge us into the abyss.l
Berdyaev's mystical philosophy of history, which is at the same time

symbolic and imaginative, cannot assert itself ratiocinatively. It seems
to be opposed to the rational because its type of knowing - mysticalis the type that Berdyaev recommends to the philosopher (as distinguished from the scientist). But his philosophy is not anti-rational.
To deny reason and consciousness would be to assert the irrational and
the unconscious. But Berdyaev seeks the super-rational and the superconscious. His philosophy of history cannot be irrational because,
finally, the divine Logos, the Godman, is the Truth he seeks.
This attitude toward rational cognition and objectivized thought is
also to be seen in terms of the human consciousness. 2 Just as the
rational imposes order on the irrational, so consciousness brings light
into the darkness of unconsciousness.
Human nature is rooted in fathomless, pre-existential meonic freedom, and in his
struggle for personality, for God's idea in him, man had to fashion consciousness
with its limitations, to bring light into darkness, and to subject subconscious
instincts and strivings to the censorship of consciousness. 3
The very limitations of consciousness (which are rational and logical

limitations) serve the progress of man by imposing themselves on the
limitless freedom. It is an intelligible principle, God's idea of man,
whose realization is sought. The intelligibility which plain consciousness finds is a step ahead of the primitive sub-conscious. 4 Consciousness
in itself is the objectified mind that was heretofore discussed. It is the
knowledge of reality so far as it is objectified. The reader will recognize
an attitude which originates in the German Idealists: the notion of the
progress of consciousness out of unconsciousness and to supra-consciousness. 5 Indeed:
1
Ibid.,
Concerning rational cognition, see Section B of this chapter.
180.

5 Cf. Schelling, The Ages of the World; Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind; The Destiny of
Man, 38-39.
S
150
Hegel speaks of the "unhappy consciousness" which implies division and for
which God is transcendent; but this is true of consciousness as such. Unhappy
consciousness can only be overcome through super-consciousness.
There are three stages in the development of the spirit: the original paradisaical
wholeness, pre-conscious wholeness which has not had the experience of thought
and of freedom; division, reflection, valuation, freedom of choice, and, finally,
super-consciousness wholeness and completeness .... 1
This is a historical treatment of consciousness. Consciousness is seen to

be the second part of a grand historical dialectic of the progress of man
toward supra-consciousness. Consciousness, for Berdyaev as well as
Hegel,2 is "unhappy" because it suffers division, endures ratiocinative
reflection and subordinates itself to valuation. Berdyaev, therefore, is
committing himself to a great deal when he rejects the rational and
logical as unworthy of autonomous functioning. He is doing nothing
less than attacking the autonomy of consciousness itself.
He is asserting a mystical doctrine; for, in asserting a universal history, he has committed himself to a mysticism of history. It is not irrational (which is meaningless), it is not rational (which is conceptual
and general), but it is supra-rational (which is both concrete and universal). We will find that it refers, somehow, to the unique as well as
to the universal.
Though Berdyaev attacks the autonomy of consciousness along with
that of reason, he does not reject consciousness, just as he does not
reject reason.
To overcome the unhappiness of consciousness through the supra-conscious is not
a rejection of consciousness. The positive acts of consciousness enter into the
supra-conscious ... 3
Consciousness, which belongs to man, participates in the unity of man

(for man, we saw, is a unified incarnate spirit). There is also a unity of
knowledge; that is, the truth of rational knowledge is preserved in
mystical knowledge. "The positive acts of consciousness enter into
the supra-conscious ... "
We may stress (Berdyaev has never been kindly enough disposed
1 The Destiny of Man, 39. See The Meaning of the Creative Act, 34: "Discursive thought is
a formal, automatic apparatus, brought into action by forces which lie outside it. In the final
analysis, discursive thought is only an instrument of intuition." Berdyaev adds, in a
Bergsonian vein, "Discursive thought is an apparatus beautifully adapted to operations
on the given world which is forced upon us ... "
2 Berdyaev doubtless accepts Hegel's notion of the unhappy consciousness. "Hegel, too,
(that is as well as I) connected the unhappy consciousness with relation to the object, with
dichotomy and disruption." The Divine and the Human, 198.
151
towards Reason to point it out) that his attack on rational philosophy

has now lost some of its sting. For he must, at one and the same time,
attack philosophical consciousness itself. Of course his rejection of the
method of logical process is also a rejection of unmystical thought. But
we just noticed that he allows concepts and ratiocination to be used in
philosophy of history. And he uses them constantly. The ratiocination
is reduced to a minimum and the concepts are taken up into symbols.
He tells us how he writes:
I have already spoken of the unsystematic nature of my thinking.... When I
begin to write I am sometimes carried away to the point of dizziness. My thought
flows so fast that I hardly have time to write it down ... I write in response
to an inner voice which commands me to transmit my mental experience. 1
Thus, his practice follows his theory. It is not scientific. He points out
a little further, however: for all that, the written sentence is ratiocinative and objective to a degree.
It is now time to examine his mystical theory of knowledge. To
understand it will require the remainder of the chapter. In the following
section we will investigate some of the attributes and the necessary
conditions of true knowledge. 2
1
Dream and Reality,
2I9-220.
Just as we found Berdyaev's doctrine of the soul to shed light on his theory of objectivized knowledge, likewise we can find a doctrine of a changing human nature. It elucidates
his synthesis of the irrational, the rational and the supra-rational. The soul, human nature,
is not unchanging, but it changes during history.
He says, in Truth and Revelation, I7: "Transcendental man is not what is called unchangeable human nature, for itis not nature at all. It is creative action and freedom. Neither spirit
nor freedom is nature. The nature of man changes, it evolves, but behind it is hidden the
transcendental man, spiritual man ... "
Berdyaev distinguishes the nature of man from his transcendental (and eternal) principle.
He wants to show that man is changing in history (in nature) and yet is eternal (as transcendental).
He says again, in Truth and Revelation, 56: "the soul and mind of present day man is now
entirely different from his soul and mind in earlier Christian ages. A ray of divine humanity
has lighted upon man inwardly." The nature of man, for Berdyaev, is the soul of man, and
it changes because of the changes of history. However, "man changes, he progresses and
regresses; his consciousness expands and deepens; but it also contracts and is thrown on to
the surface." The Divine and the Human, 126. Berdyaev means that the progress of man in
history is a chequered career, a progress with its gains and losses.
He understands soul from the point of view of mind. He purposely ignores the soul so far as
it is the principle of corporeal functions. That is, he views the soul only in its function as
consciousness. The development of consciousness is identified, in his theory, with a development of the human soul in history. This is the sense in which he means the soul changes during
history. Its change, then, is a change of mind, of consciousness, and is directed towards a goal.
That goal is spiritual. "Spirit is truth, the purpose of the soul. ... Spirit is axiological ..
truth, beauty, purpose ... The soul is invariably, fragmentary and partial; spirit alone is
whole and universal." Spirit and Reality, 39.
However, the significant part of Berdyaev's doctrine of the soul at the present time is
precisely the change itself, not the progress (for there are regresses). And the change is
significant because it allows man to turn to something new, to a new knowledge. Old
2
I52

D. KNOWLEDGE AN IDENTITY
True knowledge seems to be an identity and also a vision, for Berdyaev,

a sight, a seeing.
It is not an adequation of subject with object .
. . . truth is not the relationship or the identity of the comprehending, judging
subject with objective reality, with objective being, but rather is entrance into
divine life which is beyond both subject and object. l
Truth is not the type of identity achieved between knower and known
object. Berdyaev does not allow that apprehension of the object, or
even the judgment of its truth, attains true and spiritual knowledge.
(This is not a natural way, nor the way of Grace, but a spiritual way).2
Truth, he says, is the entrance into the divine life. "The apprehending
mind has never discovered truth by the assistance of the logical apparatus by which he endeavors to convince others." 3 Berdyaev admits
that the knowledge which is for the sake of communications is a real
knowledge. But "knowledge above all ... places (the knower) face to
face with . . . truth." 4
Knowledge is a vision because the truth is a light.
The knowledge of truth ... Truth is the light of the Logos, lighted within being
itself, if we use the traditional terminology, or in the depths of existence, or of
life itself. This one complete Truth is divided into a multitude of truths. A sphere
of knowledge lighted by one path of light (such as a given science) may deny the
source of light, the Logos-Sun. But it could never be lighted save for this one
source of light. 5
He is talking about a divine or spiritual illumination. True knowledge

is the sight of the divine Logos-Sun. 6 The knowledge achieved in the
knowledges and outlooks, and hence old states of human nature, are experiments tried and
discarded. Thus, change, whether it is progress or regress of the human soul, is the condition
of new and better states. It is the condition of the spiritualization of the soul.
He says, in Spirit and Reality, II9: "Mysticism is essentially a spiritual as distinct from a
psychic state and implies a spiritual penetration of the soul." Hence, Berdyaev's noetic, in
asserting a supra-rational which is not irrational, is parallel to a psychology which asserts
that the soul (and its objective consciousness) can be spiritualized by the spirit (with its
mystical knowledge).
The Realm 0/ Spirit and the Realm 0/ Caesar, 16.

a The Beginning and the End, 39.
B Cf. Truth and Revelation, 141.
5 The Realm 0/ Spirit and the Realm 0/ Caesar, 19.
B The Russian word for truth favors the definition of Berdyaev, for whom truth is religious.
The word, pravda, means not only truth but also justice. Thus, the Russian notion of truth is
not as theoretical as the English, but is practical. Zenkovsky in his History 0/ Russian
Philosophy, 364, quotes a "well known" passage from the works of the philosopher,
Mikhailovski: "Whenever the word 'pravda' comes into my mind I cannot help admiring its
1
153
logical and rational sphere, in the adequation of subject and object, is

true in so far as it dimly sees some ray if the Logos-Sun. The truth
of judgment and of adequation is a "diminished Truth." 1
We can understand better now how it is that Berdyaev's philosophy
of history approaches the truth of the "historical," whether through a
concept-symbol such as the "nation," or a more inclusive symbo1. 2
In knowing and creating these symbols, the philosopher of history is
glimpsing dimly a ray of the Logos-Truth. He is not seeking a rational
knowledge in which he forms a concept adequated to an external object.
But he is seeking and creating a vision which will reveal the meaning of
history. That is why, according to Berdyaev, the philosopher of history
insists upon the symbolism of his concepts, and why he calls them
symbols or myths instead of concepts. He is not engaged in a rational
process where the reason comes to rest in the truth of adequation of
subject and object; for example, in the understanding of the concept,
"nation." Instead he he creates the symbol, "nation," in a knowledge
directed toward a mysticism of history.3 He is discontent with any
vision save the religious one, that of the Logos-Sun. The universal
history of the philosopher is based on that revealed in Holy Scriptures,
and historical symbols serve it. The ultimate meaning of universal
history is Christ, the Godman. He and the universal history to which
He gives meaning provide the mystical light in which the philosopher
creates and discovers historical symbols.
The true knowledge, or the symbolic approach to it, is not only a
vision but is also a complete or partial identity of the knower and the
known. I say it is an identity rather than an adequation because:
... The Truth is within me, in the depth of me, in the depth of the knowing
subject, since I have my roots in the noumenal spiritual world. But it is within
me in a drowsy state and awakening of it within me is an awakening to truth. 4
This has been seen in the preceding chapter, in Berdyaev's metaphysics

of Man. The Truth is within man because he is an image of the Godman;
striking inner beauty. It appears that no such word exists in any European language. Only
in Russian, it seems, are 'truth' and 'justice' designated by the same word, fusing, as it were,
into one great whole."
This notion of truth, however, is not exactly Berdyaev's. He seeks a Truth which he thinks
is beyond good and evil, beyond justice. See The Destiny 0/ Man, Chapter II. Nevertheless
the notion of truth described above is practical and religious and Berdyaev's notion is likewise.
2 For Berdyaev all historical traditions are symbols, useful for philosophy of history. Cf.
The Meaning 0/ History, 12. Concerning cultural epochs, Cf. Ibid., 18.
3 The Beginning and the End, 47. Concerning symbolic knowledge, see Section G, Part 2
below.
154
and he knows the Godman in his own most existential depths.1 We

recall Berdyaev's doctrine of remembrance. 2 The greatest truth that
man recalls is the Godman. Man is a Godman by virtue of his divine
origin, not through nature or by Grace. 3
Berdyaev states the notion of the identity between knower and known
in Dream and Reality. He makes some concession to the validity of objective knowledge, but at the same time he shows the difference between objective and philosophical knowledge.
I regard as "object" not the subject-matter of knowledge but that which makes a
certain relationship within the existential sphere, whereby man takes up a
cognitive attitude toward something, whereas his attitude ought to be that
something. In true knowledge man transcends the object or rather possesses the
object creatively and, indeed, creates it himself .... Inasmuch as science and
scientific method evince critically the grounds on which any given piece of
knowledge is based, I am all for it ... 4
This concession to objective and scientific knowledge is definite but

note that the difference between the true knowledge of philosophy and
the less true knowledge of science is stated more clearly than ever. In
objective knowledge, man takes up a cognitive attitude towards the
known reality (the "subject-matter"); that is, he notes the general in
the reality without knowing it in its concrete universality. But the true,
proper and philosophical attitude is to be that reality, to be identical
with it. One becomes that reality because he creates it - the symbol
expressive of the plenary truth in Christ.
Scientific and objective knowledge is good because it evinces critically the grounds of true (symbolic or mystical) knowledge. I may
clarify Berdyaev's statement with my own example. Historical sciences,
which are objective and scientific,S evince critically the grounds upon
which part of philosophy of history may be based. Thus the chapter in
The End of Our Time entitled, "The End of the Renaissance," is based
partly on the findings of historical science. However, Berdyaev's own
("true") knowledge of this era of history is not an objective attitude
toward the disclosures of historical science. It is a creative knowledge,
illuminated by the mystical doctrine of Godmanhood; it utilizes the
grounds provided by science and scientific method; and it knows a
reality, Godmanhood and universal history, through the symbols it
creates.
1
2
3
4
5

See Truth and Revelation, I41.
The End of Our Time, I48.
ISS
The identity of the knower and the known is established. But we have
yet to find out what this true knowledge is. It is not an identity according to concepts because knowledge does not truly know conceptually, but symbolically or mystically .
. . . throughout the whole history of philosophical thinking men turned to selfknowledge as the way of knowing reality. But was this knowledge of "self" a
knowledge of the concrete, unique and unrepeatable human self or was it merely
knowledge about man, man in general, or the species called man? 1
As Berdyaev implies and as we already know, the true knowledge of

reality and of one's self is a knowledge of the "concrete, unrepeatable
human self." A conceptual identity would be an objectified knowledge.
True knowledge is therefore at once a self-knowledge and a knowledge
of a reality which is not the self. It is an identity of knower and known;
it is a creation of the knower; and it is a knowledge of a concrete
existent. In order to find Berdyaev's explanation of this theory, let us
investigate two preliminary aspects of knowledge in the following
sections: namely, the communal character and the volitional aspect
of knowledge.
E. TRUE KNOWING IS COMMUNAL IN CHARACTER
Berdyaev calls objective knowing sociological because it is the generalized mode of communication between civilized men. Communion of
persons in society, however, plays an outstanding role in true knowing,
according to Berdyaev. We can see that Berdyaev in particularly encouraged to stress the relationship of the knower and society (other
persons) in his theory of knowledge. For we have seen that the knower
does not discover the truth in nature as nature but in himself. Berdyaev
must find a way of obtaining true knowledge other than merely by
means of objective nature or even by means of self-analysis. That means
is the communalty of men.
The ego. man, can be a source of truth when he is steeped in his own depth. he
,can be in the truth, whereas the object. on the other hand. cannot be in it. Hence
we shall see that the knowledge of truth is dependent upon the social relations
which obtain among men. 2
We may note in passing that man can exist in the t,ruth when he is
steeped in his own depths. Truth here refers to the mystical Godman
1
B

156
as reflected in him. The identity of the knower and known is therefore

not a perfect identity of one with the other, since created man is not
the Godman but eternally distinct.
Berdyaev in some way connects the (true) knowledge of man with
the social relations that obtain between him and other men.
We should distinguish above all between two types of knowledge: there is ...
rational and objective knowledge ... and secondly, there is the knowledge
immanent in Being and in existence ... this knowledge is synonymous with
community and participation. ... Knowledge can thus be considered from two
different standpoints; from that of society, of communication between men by
means of the objective and the general; and from that of community, of existential communion and of penetration into the heart of the individua1.
This is the very core of my thought.l
True knowledge is "immanent in Being and in existence": This is so

because man knows the truth when "he is steeped in his own depth,"
and because existence and being pertain primarily to the human self.2
This knowledge, immanent in existence," is synonymous with community and participation." This community is an existential communion with the heart of the individual.
The implication is that true knowledge is immanent in man in his
true self; and this true knowledge is therefore attained in knowing the
true man, both as it is in one's self and as it is in the selves of other men.
That is, the communion of the Ego with the Thou and the We is a very
important condition of existential knowledge. When he speaks of a
penetration into the heart of the individual he is using a technical philosophical word; to commune with the heart of another is to know that
person in the intelligible and volitional depths of his spirit.3 It is a
spiritual knowledge.
All our paths converge upon one metropolis when we investigate the
philosophy of history of Berdyaev: True Man. Just as we found, in
Chapter I, that the "historical" is in the last analysis man, so we find
now that true and existential knowledge is knowledge of man. So significant is this that Berdyaev tells us it is ofthe very core of his thought;
"this existential knowledge is synonymous with community." The theory also agrees with his Hegelian concrete universalism; for, in asserting
the community of knowing he is denying the isolation and particularity
of the concrete man as cut off from the universality of manhood. 4 We
1
2
3
4

Cf. Chapter III above.
See Section F of this Chapter.
See Chapter III, note 108.
157
saw indeed in the preceding chapter that the realization of one's personality involves the reception of the whole cosmos, the totality of history
and all mankind. 1 But we find here that true knowledge is of man
primarily because it is through man (and ultimately the Godman, the
True Man) that history and everything else is truly known.
We are beginning to complete the outline of the doctrine of knowledge
of Berdyaev. We are commencing to see a notion of man where the philosopher of history spiritually identifies himself with every man and,
thereby, with the meaning of history and with the true cosmos. For
man is a concrete universal, known in his universality and in his
concreteness. The stress on communion as the mode of true knowing
is strengthened by the doctrine that all nature has emanated from man
and is potentially returned to man. Inasmuch as history and the historical are implicated in the concrete conditions of the cosmos, and since
the cosmos emanates from man and is potentially returned to man, the
stress on communion as the mode of true knowing again is justified.
Berdyaev tells us in his autobiography that he asserted this communal doctrine of knowing in his earliest book (IgOI), when he was a
Marxist (idealist):
The character of knowledge is not only a matter of logic, but also of society, for
the subject, in the act of knowing is not the ... German ... universal Mind, but
concrete man endowed with certain mental and emotional qualities and placed
within certain social relations with other men. 2
This doctrine, he says, always remained. He adds that he expounded it

in Solitude and Society and might have entitled the latter book "The
Sociology of Knowledge." 3
Thus we see that this doctrine of communal knowing is at the core
of Berdyaev's epistemology. We saw in Chapter III that man "seeks to
find his own reflection in another human countenance, in the Thou." 4
Wefound that "the We is a qualitative content immanent in the Ego," 5
because it is a question of "a social and human metaphysics, that of the
We." 6 And we saw that sociability is a constituent property of the
Ego's intimate existence. 7 And in this metaphysical and epistemological sociability man emerges from his own subjectivity and passes over
1
2
3
4
5
6

Ibid., 124.
Ibid., 80.
Ibid., 79.
Ibid., 80-81.
158
into the trans-subjective. 1 Indeed Berdyaev attaches this sociology of

knowing to a religious outlook which he found in the Slavophile philosophers of the 19th century. It is what "might be called a corporate
Church gnosiology ... a method of apprehension which is opposed to
the Cartesian cogito ergo sum. It is not I think, but we think, that is to
say, the corporate experience of love thinks ... " 2
However, Berdyaev defends the subjectivity of the individual person
against the domination of rational and logical forms of social communication. There is not, I want to point out, any question but that Berdyaev
affirms the value and dignity of the individual person so far as he is
distinct from other persons.
Intuition is the foundation of communion, the faculty of being able to identify
oneself with all things ... In the case of communion, the community becomes a
part of the personality ... In the case of society . . . the personality is merely
a part of the community.3
The intuition of the individual person is the condition of his communion

with others. And the communion of persons itself is of service to the
single person: "the community becomes part of the personality."
Yet, true knowledge is a corporate experience, and an experience in
which love operates. This Russian We think is a religious doctrine and,
as Berdyaev says:
There is to be noted a very original gnosiology which might be called a corporate
Church gnosiology. Love is recognized as the principle or apprehension; it
guarantees the apprehension of truth; love is a source and guarantee of religious
truth. Corporate experience of love, Sobornost' is the criterion of apprehension.
. .. The will is united to reason, not cut off from it.4
In such a Russian outlook, since true knowledge is communal and

religious, it will therefore be an affective, a loving knowledge. This is a
criteriology based on the experience of Sobornost', altogetherness.
Apprehension is judged in the light of communal knowing. And this
Russian idea of knowledge is profoundly Berdyaev's own. 5
Thus in this theory of knowledge we are witnessing the way in which
the human personality realizes itself as a microcosm. Noetic is beginning
to join Berdyaev's metaphysics now that we are at the mystical and
religious level. Berdyaev himself discusses his epistemology and his
Slavet'y and Freedom, 29.
The Russian Idea, 161.
, The Russian Idea, 16I.
5 Cf. Solitude and Society, 136; The Beginning and the End, 37, 70, 77.
1
159
religious metaphysics practically in the same breath at times. Knowledge

is concerned with social communion, and society is existentially part of
the individual's personality.1
Knowledge of communion and Sobornost' depends upon love more
than upon intelligibility (See action following). It is not like the physical and mathematical knowledges which are universally binding upon
men of different beliefs and outlooks. It depends, not upon intellectual
community, but spiritual community.
. .. the universally binding character of cognition is to be found in its highest
degree in mathematics and the physical sciences. ... On the other hand,
knowledge in the historical and social sciences and in sciences of the spirit and
of values, that is to say, in philosophy, has a lower degree of universally binding
character just because it pre-supposes a greater spiritual community in which
people share. Least of all universally binding are truths of a religious character,
because they pre-suppose the maxium of spiritual community.2
According to this passage, Berdyaev's communal theory of knowing

is correlative to his mysticism, a mysticism where the will leads the
intellect and, consequently, where intelligibility does not trammel or
destroy the freedom of the will. Berdyaev says the historical and social
sciences and the sciences of the spirit are less universally binding than
the lower sciences. This is obviously so according to his philosophy.
The significance of communion as a goal of human life is essentially religious ....
This participation must take place in the very heart of the Ego's union with the
Thou. The interpenetration of the Ego and the Thou is consummatedinGod. 5
Berdyaev develops his theory of the commonalty of knowing with the

guidance of the Christian doctrine of communion of saints. And the
main guide is the doctrine of mystical communion of man and God. It
is a guide because Berdyaev describes the partially communal
knowledges of history, of social sciences and spiritual sciences as degrees
of the true communal knowledge. We may note that his metaphysical
doctrines of Sobornost' and microcosm and his cosmogonical approach
have predisposed him to develop a sociology of knowing. His first
principles have caused him to distinguish carefully the objectivized
knowledge, common to the ordinary dwellers of societies, from the
trans-subjective knowledge mutually enjoyed in a communion of saints.
He wants to make denizens into citizens.
Cf. Solitude and Society, 136 amd 137.
Slavery and Freedom, IIS.
a Solitude and Scciety, 141.
1
160
General-validity, which is always external and related to objectivity, is replaced

by a sense of community, spiritual kinship, and reciprocal penetration of feeling. 1
This statement sums up in a way how a communal knowledge happens

to be superior to the knowledge limited by the objective mode of communication in a society. The important words are: General-validity and
jeeling. Berdyaev asserts a communal knowledge which is affective and
loving. The meaning of history, we recall, is at the same time a metaphysical Existent, the Godman, Christ. The knowledge of history
reaches its apogee in Him; at the same time, the knowledge becomes
a metaphysical and mystical union of persons. True knowledge in philosophy of history is therefore loving. What is the role of love in
Berdyaev's epistemology?
F. TRUE KNOWING IS LOVING AND CREATIVE IN CHARACTER
"Freedom," Berdyaev said, in Freedom and the Spirit," ... raises us

up towards the idea of the divine." 2 We saw when we considered
Berdyaev's voluntarism in Chapter II that his philosophy of history is a
philosophy of beauty. It is, therefore, a philosophy which is loving, one
where the reason places itself under the guidance of love. Berdyaev is
most profoundly convinced of the affectivity of metaphysical thought
and not only concerning a religious metaphysic (such as his own) but
every metaphysic. 3
The process of intellection discovers the meaning, the cosmos, underlying the
meaningless and chaotic universe. ... It is essentially creative and promotes
organization by helping the human mind to master chaos and the obscurities of
existence; in a word, to master the world both theoretically and practically by
the exercise of the human faculty of creation ... 4
To begin with, Berdyaev does not deny intellection in his doctrine of

loving knowledge. Intellection discovers the meaning of history (and
of the cosmos) because and only because the human mind masters the
world both theoretically and practically. So far as it masters the world
theoretically it knows conceptually and abstractly; so far as it masters
the world practically it knows affectively and lovingly. And this occurs
because the knower creates that which he knows in his own subj ectivity.
He creates a symbol or true myth which approximates closer to the true
1
s Fl'eedom and the SPil'it,

8
124.
Cf. Solitude and Society, 20.
Ibid., 52.
EPI STEMOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY
161
reality contained in the Godman. l And this creativity - by virtue of the

very nature of creativity - is more volitional than rational. In creatively mastering the world, the philosopher of history proceeds by
way of a loving knowledge.
When Berdyaev says that knowledge is properly active rather than
passive, he is speaking from the point of view of his creative noetic.
Knowledge is essentially active because man is active. When philosophical theory
is based on the opposition of intellect and Being, the affirmation that philosophy
only reflects being passively ... is no longer tenable. Intellection is the outcome
of free human activity; it is not merely reflection, but also creati ve transfiguration
... (Man's) creative freedom should extend to all spheres and it should pursue its
creative work in the sphere of knowledge itself.2
I cite this passage at this time; the assertion of activity of knowing

against the notion of passivity of knowing is a religious statement and
not merely an ontological statement. Proper knowing is not an act of
the intellect but an act of the man, a human act, guided by his love.
This rejects any purely intellectual epistemology and asserts a voluntaristic noetic in its place. In the text above Berdyaev is preoccupied
with the controversy between objectivism and existentialism; he only
touches upon the religious aspect of his noetic. The loving knowledge
here considered is that of the creator for his work, that of the philosopher of history for the symbols and true myths which he creates.
"Knowledge," he says, "is essentially active, because man is active."
This is a greatly loving knowledge, even if the immediate object of
the will is only the symbol, for the symbol participates in the Beauty
of that which it symbolizes. The creation of the philosopher of history,
here, is a metaphor of history. And the metaphor of history, we saw in
Chapter I, becomes identified in the knower with a mystical knowledge
of the highest Reality.3 The affective knowledge of the philosopher of
history when he creates the meaning of history is guided by a loving
and mystical knowledge of religious truths. The lower affective
knowledge is transformed by the mystical knowledge, while at the same
time it merges in its more spiritual heights with religious and mystical
doctrine. Thus the lesser love of the creative thinker is taken up into
the greater love of his religious and mystical communion. There is no
separation of experiences here.
In Berdyaev's doctrine philosophical intuition is loving:
1
S
See following section.

Cf. 42, ll. I above.
162
Philosophical intuition cannot be deduced from anything else; it is primary, and

secretes in itself the light which will illuminate every act of knowledge. . ..
Philosophical knowledge depends upon the range of experience, and it also supposes an essentially tragic experience of all the contradictions of human existence
Philosophy is there/ore based upon the maximum experience 0/ human existence. This
experience integrates man's intellectual affective and volitional life. 1
Intuition is intellectual, but it cannot be intellectual only. It is also

emotional and volitional. As Berdyaev said in a last work, "it is the
activity, the intense effort of the spirit as a whole .... The dispassionately intellectual is a figment of the imagination ... primary intuition
itself is above all emotional." 2
The above quoted passage is the assertion of Berdyaev the philosopher of history and Existentialist. He speaks of a "maximum experience
01 human existence." Philosophical intuition is based upon this experience, a tragic and Existential experience. The primary intuition of the
philosopher of history is the intuition of the Godman. And the philosophical intuition when it is less strictly understood, is attained in the
light of meta-historical principles, at the v~ry time that it bases itself
upon the maximum experience of existence.
Berdyaev connects his idea of philosophical intuition with the
doctrine of the activity of knowing. "Intuition is not only the perception
of something; it is also a creative penetration into meaning; and more
than that, the very existence of meaning presupposes a creative condition of spirit." 3 He understands the creativity of knowing from the
point of view of the unifying action of intuition. The synthesis of
creativity is at the same time the strong unity of intuition. We need

only think for a moment of his philosophy of history. The philosopher,
when he creates his historical symbols, achieves the unity of his synthesis in a spiritual intuition. Berdyaev opposes the concrete and synthetic
unity of creative intuition to the division and abstraction he finds in
objective knowledge. 4
When Berdyaev speaks of the "contradictions of human existence,"
he is expressing one of the tenets of his philosophy: He believes that
contradictions and antinomies belong to the very order of the world
and God. 5
3 Ibid., 38.
4 Dream and Reality, 286; "Objectivity ... is the product of disruption, disunion, estrangement and enmity. Knowledge, which is an activity of the subject, depends on the
victory over disunion and estrangement, on the extent and intensity of spiritual communion."
5 Cf. The Beginning and the End, 18, where Berdyaev discusses Boehme's Heraclitean
metaphysics of opposites.
1
163
The paradox and contradiction that he finds follow :from his peculiar
peculiar notion of knowledge. In particular, the cause of his outlook
is his notion of the concept. All that we have seen of his attack on
intellectualist philosophies show that the concept for him is purely
univocal in meaning. There is an example of the univocity of his idea of
concept in his theory of good and evil. He calls his philosophy a "philosophy of beyond good and evil." 1 He must do this in order to hang
onto his philosophical (and religious) insights, because the concepts
of good and evil, he thinks, are univocal concepts. "Good" (legality),2
for him, means only one thing; furthermore, since it is a concept, it is
non-existential. He must not, therefore, predicate (human) good of
God. Hence God is beyond good.
Herein lies the fundamental paradox of ethics: the moral good has a bad origin
and its bad origin pursues it like a curse. This paradox is brought to light by
Christianity, which shows that the good understood as a law is powerless. For
Christian consciousness law is paradoxical ... Law comes from sin ... 3
He is simply asserting the Christian doctrine that natural good is powerless to bring man to Salvation unless it is perfected by Grace. And there
is a paradox that good is not good enough. But Berdyaev will not see
any sense in this notion of good which is not paradoxical. He will never
state that human natural good is analogous to the Divine Good, but he
denies that the Divine can be good.
Thus Berdyaev, believing in the univocity of concepts, proceeds
from his thoughts about the world to the assertion that the world actually is paradoxical and antinomical to its depths. James F. Anderson, in
his metaphysical work, The Bond of Being, has shown how this notion
of the concept not only leads to a paradoxical metaphysics but requires
a symbolism in place of any other kind of noetic. "Symbolism moves in
the order of univocal concepts." 4
Berdyaev asserts the notion of univocal concept, and this univocity
has served his mystical philosophy of history by setting up a dialectical
necessity requiring him to assert an affective and loving noetic of
symbolization. 5
The Destiny 0/ Man, 17, ff.
2 Concerning the legality of "good," see The Destiny 0/ Man, 84, ff.
a The Destiny 0/ Man, 84-85.

4 James F. Anderson, The Bond 0/ Being (Herder, St. Louis, 1949), 226. See, too, section
entitled, "The Neo-Platonist Symbolism of Nicholas Berdyaev," 198-203. He says, 200:
"Evidently Berdyaev has seen that univocal ideas, like the idea of being, considered univocally
as a logical concept, simply do not work in theology."
He says, again, 201: "In place of (the science of theology), Berdyaev would substitute a
'mysticism' whose terms are 'symbols'."
5 Symbolization is necessary if (I) the ultimate reality is to be known and if (2) the ultimate
reality is non-conceptual; because concepts are univocal.
164
A person seeking to know by way of symbol or metaphor is obviously

not content to remain in the metaphor but looks beyond it to what it
symbolizes. Furthermore, through his knowing, which is affective and
loving, he seeks an individual person. The reality which Berdyaev's
metaphor symbolizes is ultimately a divine Person. Knowledge properly speaking is a religious knowledge, a "movement of the spirit, a
direction of the will, a sensitivity, a search for meaning, a being shaken,
elated, disillusioned and imbued with hope." 1 The divine person, an
existent, which this knowledge seeks, must be concrete (as we saw in
Chapter III).
(Intuition is a passionate break-through of the will towards the light towards truth
as a whole. Then the universal is revealed in the concrete and the individual
without crushing it and turning it into a means. Truth is not common and
abstract, truth is concrete, it is individually personal. Indeed, it is the incarnate
Logos 2.
The knower properly knows the Truth as a totality, a whole. He knows

not only its intelligibility but also its concreteness. Knowing is not an
adequation by way of abstract concepts; truth is individual and personal.
The passage brings to our attention the most difficult problem that
has been encountered in this chapter: how the philosopher knows the
concrete existent in an identity which is not merely conceptual? We
turn, then, to the last and by far the most important section of this
chapter to answer this question. 3
D,eam and Reality, 89.
a The Beginning and the End, 124.
3 Berdyaev's theory of the heart is helpful in understanding his idea of living knowledge.
The notion of the heart in philosophy has a long tradition in Russian thought. See Lossky's
History of Russian Philosophy, 385. Berdyaev says: "In Eastern Christianity there is a special
comprehension of the heart as the kernel of the human creature and his spiritual life. In the
light of this concept the heart appears not as man's emotional-psychic nature but as a
spiritual-psychic whole, comprising also a transfigured mind. Man's longing for truth and
purpose, for spirituality, is an essential part of his nature; it is not deducible from the psychic
and vitalistic process but emanates directly from the Divine spirit inherent in man." Spi,it
and Reality, 41. Berdyaev has synthesized the doctrine of the heart with his philosophy of
spirit. The notion of heart indicates especially the aspect of spirit which is affective and loving,
even though the heart is the organ of wisdom as well as the "organ of moral conscience."
Solitude and Society, 128. The Spirit may be considered apart from the heart: "We may in
truth say that ours is the age of technique and of the spirit, not of the heart." N. Berdyaev,
"Man and the Machine," Hibbe,t Jou,nal, A Qua,te,ly Review of Religion, Theology and
PhilosoPhy, XXXIII (1934-1935), 83. That is, a spirit without a heart, so to speak, is one
in whom knowledge is not loving.
In brief, the notion of the heart refers to the kernel of the human person, the incarnate
spirit, in the sense that the heart combines loving and knowing and the former rules the latter.
"We must not seek the criteria of truth in reason or the intellect, but rather in the integral
spirit. The heart and the conscience remain the supreme agents of value as well as of
knowledge." Solitude and Society, 12.
1
165
G. IMAGE, SYMBOL AND MYSTICAL EXPERIENCE:

CONCRETE AND CREATIVE KNOWING
(r) Image
But although philosophy may start by discrediting the myth, it ands by acknowledging it as the sum of philosophical knowledge. Plato demonstrated this
fact when he passed on from concept to myth as the means of attaining true
knowledge.!
Myth, we will see, is synonymous with symbol in Berdyaev's philosophy.

The passage quoted above gives us our bearing as we set out to investigate the symbolic epistemology of Berdyaev. The myth or symbol
is the sum of philosophical knowledge, and he refers to Plato's use of the
philosophical myth. The philosophical myth, as we can plainly see in
Plato's dialogues, is imaginative because it describes concrete
circumstances in space and time. 2
The creative act always calls up the image of something different; it images
something higher, better and more beautiful than this - than the "given." ...
Productive imagination is a metaphysical force which wages war against the
objective and determinate world ... The creative imagination builds up realities.
The forms which are constructed by the creators of works of art lead a real existence and they are active in the world. Imagination is a way out from an unendurable reality.S
In creative activity ... images arise which are not determined by the empirical
world, or if they are determined by it, it is through the medium of creative
transformation .... There occur, it is true, radiant, luminous visions ... It is not
only the subconscious which is operating in creative activity but the supraconscious also; there is a movement upward. 4
He says "the creative act always calls up the image of something

different"; for, in his theory, the primary creative act is that of the
knowing person, and the imagination has a noble function. It is involved
in creative (and true) knowing; it has an important and essential role.
In fact; he believes the imagination is at work in the highest, the mysti1
2
Ibid., 6.
Cf. Symposium,
203.
The Beginning and the End, 174-175.

4 Ibid., 179-180. Berdyaev refers to Boehme's doctrine of imagination (175). Indeed,
Boehme's notion of the imagination is similar to Berdyaev's. Boehme says in the Epistles:
"Through Imagination and an earnest serious desire, we become again Impregnated of the
Deity." EPistles of Jacob Bemen (London, 1649),69, No. 10. And in No. 13: "But the New
man which in an earnest serious will and purpose, ariseth through imagination (or the effectual operation of true Faith) abideth stedfast in the rest of Christ ... "
8
166
cal knowing. But, unlike Boehme and Schelling,l he does not place
imagination in God's knowing. 2
The myth of a divine imagination is not present in his theory. Imagination is a way out of an unendurable reality. And though the imagination is determined by empirical sources, it creates new images and
thus transforms the old. The images from the subconscious are transformed in the supra-conscious.
Further, "the forms which are constructed by the creators of works
of art lead a real existence and they are active in the world." Berdyaev,
as we saw in Chapter I, is philosophically very aware of the reality of
the forms men create and retain in the memory.3 Their existence - indeed their concrete existence - is real. Their existence comes from the
existence of the existent men who know them. The imagination, then,
is the creator of these forms and hence of existent realities.
We saw in Chapter III that Berdyaev rejects both nominalism and
realism in favor of a concrete existentialism. This metaphysical doctrine
requires the theory of a thought which works with images.
The antithesis of nominalism is integral intuition, the intuition of wholeness,
thinking in terms of images, in which the intellectual is combined with the
emotional. 4
Berdyaev here connects the concrete wholeness of the metaphysical

reality with knowledge's image. "The intuition of wholeness" -"thinking
in terms of images." The identity of the knower with the concrete
existent, of the philosopher of history with the meaning of history,
occurs through mental images. And the intellectual is combined with
the emotional in thinking in terms of images because the images are
created. The knower creates new images in transfiguring old images
which mirror the external world.
1 Boehme refers as follows to God's imagination in the Epistles, 93, No. 79: "The four
elements likewise have such a ground (birth or original) from the imagination of the Eternal
One ... " And Schelling says, in Of Human Freedom", 3S: But there is born in God Himself
an inward, imaginative response, corresponding to this longing, which is the first stirring of
divine Being in its still dark depths. Through this response, God sees himself in his own
image since his imagination can have no other object than himself."
8 The myth of a divine Imagination is not in Berdyaev's theory. Indeed, in a last book,
Truth and Revelation,7S, he distinguishes between "imagination" and "knowledge." "The act
of appraisal which must always be made by man if he is to rise above a given situation which
is doing violence to him is associated with the imagination. But the appraisal is linked also
with knowledge, though not with objectified knowledge nor with rationalized knowledge."
(my italics).
8 Philosophy, too, is an art," ... a special art, differing in principle from poetry, music,
or painting - it is the art of knowing. Philosophy is an art because it is creation.... (it)
creates existential ideas rather than images." The Meaning of the Creative Act, :29.
The Beginning and the End,
I:2o-I:2I.
EPISTEMOLOGY AND PHILOS OPHY OF HISTORY
r67
(2) Symbol and Myth

The philosophical myth or symbol comes into its own in such a
philosophy.
History is not an objective empirical datum; it is a myth. Myth is no fiction, but
a reality; ... Myth is the story preserved in popular memory of a past event and
transcends the limits of the external world revealing an ideal world, a subjectobject world of facts.l
Berdyaev's use of the word, history, refers, not to the historical science,
history, but to something higher. He is referring to the historical, the
meaning of history insofar as it is preserved in popular memory.2 His
terminology is less exact than it is in later books. When Berdyaev says
myth is no fiction but a reality, he means that myth partakes of the
concrete existentiality of the man who knows it. He is referring, ultimately, to the "microcosm (which) seems to contain in itself all the
historical epochs of the past which have not been entirely covered over
by the subsequent strata of time and of more recent historical life." 3
Myth is here understood in the sense of historical symbol, not in the
restricted sense in which we usually say myth. "All great historical
epochs, even those of modern history ... give rise to myths." 4 Plato is
soon mentioned. Ii
The word, symbolize, is used: "The tradition of a people is valuable
in so far as it symbolizes the historical destiny of that people." 6 The
word, myth, is used in order to convey to the reader the sense of popular
and widespread knowledge of a certain historical tradition or symbol.
The word, symbolize (or symbol). is used to indicate the epistemological
and metaphysical significance of the myth. Myth is synonymous with
symbol.'
The Meaning of Histcwy, 21.
In this use of the word, history, he intends to propose that historical science itself, as it
is commonly understood, should change. Historical science, Berdyaev suggests, should adopt
Berdyaev's philosophy of history to its needs. Cf. The Meaning of History, 22-23. To give
the reader an idea of what he is suggesting, I refer to a contemporary achievement in historical writing. A. J. Toynbee's A Study of History is an example which gives an idea of the
sort of history Berdyaev wants historians to write. Not that Toynbee is a Berdyaevian.
Toynbee seeks to write history always in the light of the meaning of history as he understands
it. Unlike Berdyaev, he is not interested in cosmogony or cosmology but devotes his stupendous genius to the moral significations of history.
Concerning the relationship between the notion of history and the notion of the "historical," see Chapter I, Section B.
4 Ibid., 21.
5 Ibid., 22.
6 Ibid., 24.
7 Berdyaev, in his mystical and supra-rational doctrine, cannot consider the Holy Trinity
by way of concepts, but only in a mystical way. In this, he uses myth and symbol synonymously: "With regard to the mystery of the Trinity, myth and symbol alone can be used, and
conceptual thinking is out of the question." (my italics)
1
I68
The myth or symbol is the noblest way of knowing. 1

But although philosophy may start by discrediting the myth, it ends by acknowledging it as the sum of philosophical knowledge. Plato demonstrated this
when he passed on from concept to myth as the means of attaining true knowledge. 2
The myth is the sum of philosophical knowledge because, being supraconceptual, it is able to transfigure a large amount of conceptual
knowledge. Berdyaev gives Plato's philosophy as an example, and we
may note an example in Plato. Thus, Plato, with the myth of the cave
attempts to attain a true doctrine of the relationship between the lower
and the higher worlds. 3
Note, however, that in propounding a philosophy of myth Berdyaev
is not suggesting revelation to be fiction, or even myth or symbol. Myth
and symbol refer to knowledge in Berdyaev's philosophy; revelation is
not a knowledge. "There is no essential affinity between revelation and
knowledge, since the former contains no cognitive element," even
though revelation is known and is a philosophical experience. 4 This
doctrine of revelation combines the spirituality of Berdyaev's philosophy of history and the existentiality of his metaphysics. It is a peculiarly modern Russian outlook, as we saw in the preceding chapter. 5
Western philosophers usually apply the notion of an existent to created
things or to metaphysical entities, but Berdyaev primarily applies the
notion to the Godman. Revelation is both eminently religious and
eminently metaphysical, it is existential and more than knowledge beyond symbol and myth.
When Berdyaev says, in The Meaning 01 History, that history is a
myth, and the myth is no fiction but a reality, we must qualify the bare
statement. The myth or symbol is an imperfect reality, just as the
external world of nature (itself a symbol of a truer reality) is an imperfect reality. And, as we saw, historical traditions and myths which
indeed give meaning to history merely "symbolize the historical
destinies of peoples." 6 True enough, "this symbolism is of primary
importance for the elaboration of a philosophy of history and for the
See preceding note.
a The Republic, VII, 5I4A, ft.
4 Solitude and Society, 5. Berdyaev goes on to say of revelation and knowledge that
"Revelation may therefore prove to be of capital importance to knowledge, for it constitutes
a distinct philosophical experience, a transcendent event which philosophy can transform
into an immanent datum." Concerning the peculiar use of philosophical, see Chapter I,
Section C, Part 2.
a See Chapter III, 113-114 above.
8 The Meaning oj History, 24. Cf. Chapter I, Section B, Part I.
1
169
apprehension of its inner significance." 1 But the symbol or myth is a

secondary reality. It, along with historical traditions, is the condition
of the knowing the "historical." 2
It is essential to grasp the inner meaning of the myth and symbol in a spiritual
manner in order to free oneself from that naively realist influence which they may
possess ... 3
Hence, though historical traditions and myths give a meaning to

history, this meaning in turn has an inner meaning. The meaning of
history for Berdyaev is like a large onion. Beneath the topmost layer
of onion is another layer, beneath that is another layer, and so on down
to the kernel of the onion. And just as a given area of an inner layer
refers to a larger extent of the cover the closer to the center it is obtained; so in Berdyaev's philosophy of history, the layers of meaning
of history become truer as they become more comprehensive and closer
to the kernel, the Godman. And just as the outer layer of the onion is a
true reality and existential participant in the totality of the onion,
though rather dry; so the merest symbols found in history are true
realities, participating in the existence of the Godman, in whom the
knower participates and in whose image the knower exists. This idea of
an onion is useful for understanding Berdyaev. However, the merest
symbols in history are less real than the cover of the onion is part of
the onion.
The symbol, we saw (p. 168), is not revelation; it is, therefore, not
the "historical," truest reality. And in objectification there are only
symbols, no primal realities. 4 However:
The corporeal world is capable of issuing out of objectivity and entering into
subjectivity.... It can be said that the whole material world, the whole natural
world, is a symbol of the spiritual world. . .. 5
The symbol tends toward primal reality, toward the events which take
place in the spiritual world, toward meta-history. "The events take
place in the spiritual world but the image of them is formed in the world
of nature and history.... the symbolic embodiment." 6 Berdyaev will
want to distinguish sharply between symbol and true knowledge in
his epistemology.
See Chapter I, Section B, Part I.
I Freedom and the Spirit, 71.
4 SPirit and Reality, 52.
1
I
I70
In the spiritual life there is a struggle between symbolism and realism. The
interpretation of symbols as ultimate realities is not only a misunderstanding of
symbolism, but also an evil system of servitude. It is a form of naive realism. In
contradistinction true realism is concerned with the knowledge of symbolism,
with an awareness of the distinction between symbolism and realism. It is the
task of the symbolist theory of knowledge to prepare the way for realism. We
must distinguish between symbolized and realized forms of spirit and spirituality.
... We cannot dispense with symbolism in language and thought, but we can
do without it in the primary consciousness. l
Berdyaev is presenting a "symbolist theory of knowledge" which insists upon a distinction between symbolic knowledge and real knowledge.
We have to think symbolically and yet realize at the same time that our
thinking is merely symbolic. Naive realism, for Berdyaev, is the acceptance of the superficial knowledge of the objectified and symbolical
world as primary knowledge.
Realism, true knowledge, on the other hand, is the name Berdyaev
gives to the strange and non-conceptual knowledge which is first. He
indicates in the context quoted from above that the "realism" is a
mysticism; this is the "primary consciousness."
But note something rather interesting: Berdyaev passes, in this
quotation, from speaking of knowledge to speaking of metaphysical
reality. "It is the task of the symbolist theory of knowledge to prepare
the way for realism. We must distinguish between symbolized and
realized forms of spirit and spirituality." He is not saying that symbolical knowledge is to be replaced by something that is not knowledge;
instead, he means that symbolical knowledge is to be followed by
something that is more than knowledge. He is asserting, in his philosophyofhistory, that the goal to be immediately and directly worked for
is the mystical union.
This mystical doctrine throws more light on the problem we have
encountered: the problem of how, in knowledge, the knower can be
identified with the concrete known concretely. Knowledge passes into
something which is not merely knowledge (objectified knowledge), nor
a union in which knowledge and the knower can be distinguished (symbolic knowledge participating in the existentality of the person), but
a mystical union in which knowledge and knower cannot be distinguished. Hence the knower, in this final phase, becomes identified
with the known, with the Godman, a concrete Existent. And this is a
concrete identity according to Berdyaev's intention because it is a real
identity. We will presently see how the identity is concrete, not only on
1
2
Spirit and Reality, 170-171.

Concerning "historical," see Chapter I, Section B.
171
the side of the concrete Existent, the Godman, but also on the side of
man. Man in his own concreteness is identified with the known.
We also see the indication that the problem of the concrete identity
of knower and known, of the identity of the philosopher of history and
the concrete "historical," is solved in the mystical order of knowing.
For, in that order, knowledge becomes the metaphysical (and concrete)
reality, that is, the man and the Godman. There, the microcosm realizes
itself and achieves the concrete identity with all of remembered history
and with the world. This remembered history (in the existentiality of
of remembrance) is the "historical," and the world is the existential reality of the visible and fallen world.
Indeed, both the mystical aspect of knowledge and the historical (not
to say "historical") aspect are so important that Berdyaev considers
them each to be a principle of knowledge.
Knowledge is based upon the action of three principles: the human, the divine
and the natural. It is the outcome of the reciprocal action of human culture,
Divine Grace, and natural necessity. The philosopher's tragedy has its origin in
the attempt to restrict his pursuit of knowledge by the invocation of Divine Grace
or by an appeal to the universal character of natural necessity. If God and nature
are the objects of philosophical investigation, then its antagonism to both dogmatic religion and science is inevitable. But its true sphere is the investigation of
human existence, human destiny and human purpose. Man is the real subject of
the philosopher's knowledge ... 1
The first assertion, "knowledge is based upon the action of three

principles, the human, the divine and the natural," has been implicit
in the presentation of Berdyaev's epistemology and metaphysics. The
natural itself is real, though a symbol. The natural is, consequently, a
principle of knowledge; and Berdyaev refers to the "universal character
of natural necessity." The human and the divine are the other two
principles of knowledges.
The second sentence deserves close attention: "(knowledge) is the
outcome of the reciprocal action of human culture, Divine Grace and
natural necessity." Note that Berdyaev associates "action of human
culture" with the human principle of knowledge. This is very interesting
because Berdyaev implies that what is particularly human (with a
small 'h') in our knowledge is not the inner dynamism of the knower
but the action of human culture. The inner dynamism of the knower
refers to the Godman of which every man is an image; every man is
human and divine. And every man is divine in so far as he is truly
1
SoUtude and Society, 14-15.
172
EPISTEMOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY OF HISTOR Y
human. l To sum it up, the human aspect of knowledge (as distinguished

from the divine and the natural aspects) is based upon the action of
human culture. That is, our knowledge of man, insofar as he is not the
Godman, comes from the action of human culture.
Knowledge of human culture 2 is the condition of knowing the
"historical." Philosophy of history is the term of the knowledge of
human culture. Philosophy of history, in fact, is intimately related to
all three sources of knowledge because (1) it is a mystical philosophy,
(2) it is attained through knowing human culture, and (3) it is a
doctrine which makes use of reason. These three principles are unified
in philosophy of history.
I said that, according to Berdyaev, the identity of the knower and
the known is an identity, concrete both on the side of the known and
on the side of the knower. The known must be understood by the
knower under the concrete conditions in which the knower exists. The
mystery of such a knowing, we saw, is partially illuminated when we
realize that the knowing (when it is true) is mystical.
The mystery is illuminated a little more by the foregoing passage.
The quotation ends, saying: "Man is the real subject of the philosopher's
knowledge." And Berdyaev means both man and the Godman, created
and uncreated man. It is according to this notion we must understand
Berdyaev's doctrine that knowledge passes beyond itself to the metaphysical and religious existent. This mystical union which is more than
knowledge is approached by way of the knowledge of man; and it
should be so approached because it is a union with the True Man. The
approach takes the path of philosophy of history because philosophy of
history knows the intelligibility of human culture - its meaning - the
source of the human aspect of knowledge. The question remains, how
is it possible to know concretely?
(3) The Whole Man Knows

The answer is that it is the whole man who knows, not the reason of
man or his mind so far as it is merely intellectual. 3 Not only the consciousness is involved in it, but "wholeness is peculiar to the sub-conscious
or to the superconscious." 4
1 Concerning the divinity of man, see Truth and Revelation,
Cf. Chapter I.
8
4

141.
173
Spiritual life is a whole in which separate mental elements are synthesized. There
may be more truth and wholeness in the unconscious than in consciousness which
introduces division and separation. But this may only be the case when the
unconscious is hallowed, purified from resentment and ennobled by lofty religious
symbolism .... The unconscious, with its instincts, emotions and affective states,
must be ennobled and sublimated. l
Berdyaev is then saying that the corporeal states of man, instincts and
emotions, understood in the term, unconscious, enter into the makeup
of true knowledge. He means that man truly knows instinctively as well
as mentally and that these knowledges are ennobled and sublimated in
the via metaphorica enroute to the true knowledge of mysticism. This
union of instinctive knowledge with what is higher is understood when
he speaks, in The Beginning and the End, of "Integral Intuition, the
intuition of wholeness, thinking in terms of images, in which the intellectual is combined with the emotional." 2
The imaginative knowledge, the loving knowledge, the symbolic
knowledge must be understood not only with regard to the human will
and the imagination. It is based also on the corporeal states, the bodily
emotions and instincts. "Consciousness is not whole but divided.
Wholeness is peculiar to the subconscious or to the superconscious. "3
The ideal of integral knowledge. i.e., of knowledge as an organic allembracing unity is being asserted. And it can be attained only if the
subrational aspect of the world (sense qualities), its rational aspect,
and the supra-rational are all given together in experience which combines sensuous, intellectual and mystical intuition. This is the sense in
which Berdyaev believes that the whole truth is revealed only to the
whole man.
Man, we saw, is an incarnate spirit. It is only by combining all his
spiritual powers - subrational experience, rational thought, esthetic
perception, moral experience and religious contemplation - that man
begins to apprehend the world's true being and see the super-rational
truths about God. 4 Berdyaev's doctrine of incarnate spirit underlies
1
I
3

The Beginning and the End, UQ-U1.
Lossky, in his History of Russian Philosophy, describes this doctrine of integral knowledge
very well and is worth quoting. He not only presents the doctrine, but he also shows that this
is a peculiarly Russian doctrine, well-established in Russian thought. He says, 404: "The ideal
of integral knowledge - i.e., of knowledge as an organic all-embracing unity, proclaimed by
Kireyevskyand Khomiakov - appealed to many other Russian thinkers; but it can only be
attained if the subrational aspect of the world (sense qualities), its rational (or ideal) aspect,
and the superrational principles are all given together in experience which combines sensuous,
intellectual and mystical intuition. The whole truth is only revealed to the whole man, said
Kireyevsky and Khomiakov. It is only through combining all his spiritual powers - sense
experience, rational thought, aesthetic perception, moral experience and religious contem-
I74
this noetic. "It is the whole man who receives and interprets revelation,
not abstract, partial and merely psychological man." 1 (my italics) It is
not the psyche, the soul, which gives true knowledge, but the spirit; and
the spirit is incarnate, includes the whole man; and hence there are
irrational elements in knowing. 2
This theory of knowledge raises new problems when we turn our attention from the knowledge of revelation and the knowledge of external
things to the historical knowledge of the past. The philosopher of history is particularly concerned with the remembrance of past entities,
events and cultures. This remembrance, we saw, is a concrete knowledge.
But it is not concrete in the fullest sense of the word; culture is not perceived through the external senses. It is, however, a concrete knowledge
upon the condition that the imagination, the fancy, participates in
knowing. This is so in the sense that the past is known as past, even
though it is a present knowledge. Although this creative memory is "a
victory over the empire of time," 3 and escapes from historical time,
it preserves the past.
Let us affirm once more that the past has never existed in the past. The ontologically real experience of the past is based upon memory and remembrance.
which alone ontologically resists the ravages of time. Memory alone can apprehend the inner mystery of the past; it is the temporal agent of eternity....
History, like everything else, has two aspects; on the one hand, it is an objective
process in so far as it investigates the past as an object and is, consequently,
relegated like nature to the objective world; on the other hand, it is a spiritual
event, in the inner sphere of existence. As a spiritual event, history can only be
apprehended by means of the ontological memory and active communion with
the past. 4
Memory, according to this passage, both spiritually preserves the past

and also "apprehends the inner mystery of the past," since it is creative
as well as retentive.
Berdyaev here affirms the spirituality of the concrete identity of
knower and known. The philosopher of history identifies himself with
the historical in its concrete reality and this identification is "a spiritual
event in the inner sphere of existence." It is spiritualized (either in
popular consciousness or in the representation of popular consciousness
by others, or in the mind of others). This is certainly no sensory identiplation - that man begins to apprehend the world's true being and grasp the superrational
truth's about God. It is precisely such integral experience that underlies the creative work of
many Russian thinkers .,. Berdyaev ... "
2 The Realm of Spirit and the Realm of Caesar. 103.
S Solitude and Society. 106.
4 Ibid., 106-107.
175
fication with the past. This historical knowledge is that of a "past"

which did not historically exist but which is created in the historical
memory. It seems to be Berdyaev's intention that this concrete
knowledge has spiritualized the corporeal aspect of historical knowledge. 1
1 Indeed the corporeal body is spirit in its inner essence as it is, also, in Schelling. Cf. Tht
Ages oj the World, 171. And, therefore, the spiritualizing of the corporeal state is the spirit
ualizing of what is already spiritual. In Berdyaev's concrete spiritualizing, where he asserts
that the whole world is redeemed in man, he does not mean that the corporeal conditions, as
we sense them are immortal. "The form of the body pertains to man's personality and will
inherit eternal life. But the matter ('flesh and blood') do not inherit eternal life .. The body
is not to be equated with matter.... body is spirit. The splendour and the beauty of the body
for me is contained in its form rather than in its material substance, which is a source of
necessity." Dl'eam and Reality, 175-176.
As we saw in the preceding chapter, the world of reality, the true world, will differ from the
world that we sense. The true world will be contained, in its imaginative reality, in man the
microcosm.
Berdyaev's theory of incarnation of spirit is helpful in understanding his doctrine of

concrete knowledge and mystical experience - the goal of knowledge.
We have seen that man is an incarnate spirit and that historical entities, such as nations
and cultures, are incarnations of spirit. Cf. 5pil'# and Reality, 66. Indeed, "Man is an incarnate
spirit and his vocation is creative incarnation." Ibid., 56. And, "Spirit is incarnated both
really and existentially in the human personality, in its creatively intuitive attitude to life,
in a fraternal communion with other men." Ibid., 57. Berdyaev means that the objectivization
of the human spirit, seen in poor social orders or bad human customs or outlooks, is overcome
by this diffusion of spirit. This is incarnation of spirit, carried on by man. "In reality, incarnation implies descent of the Divine Spirit and its union with real human and world destiny,
... But spirit does incarnate itself in the real ascent of the subject, of the personality towards
God, and in the real descent of Divine love and charity towards the subject, in the intuitive
communion of the knowing with the known, in the real creation of the hitherto non-existent,
in original judgment." Ibid., 65.
The above-quoted description of the incarnation of spirit is very similar to the definition of
true and concrete knowing we have studied. Incarnation of spirit is the same as true concrete
knowing because concrete knowing is at once spiritual and incarnated; it is incarnated because it preserves the concreteness of the known. Incarnation, let us note, is not moving
toward the solid and tactile qualities of bodies, according to Berdyaev. It refers, rather, to
spirit, so far as it partakes of the concrete (integral, total) condition either in the true world
or in the fallen world. The world moves towards spirit. True incarnation, I think, is not more
concrete than is the imagination and memory, according to Berdyaev. Man, by definition is
(1) an incarnate spirit and (z) eternal. He therefore does not fall into a material body, but is
eternally incarnate. Incarnation is eternal. According to Berdyaev, for spirit to be truly and
fully incarnate means, I think, for the spirit to be, so to speak, with a form. The human form,
I think, is the true human reality so far as it is concrete, in the last analysis of Berdyaev's
writings. Cf. 5lavemy and Fl'eedom: "But the body belongs to the image of man." (31) "The
spirit also includes the body in itself." (3Z).
Spirit is incarnated in the flesh; "flesh is the incarnation and symbol of spirit." Fl'eedom and
the SPil'it, 18. But this does not mean that man, when his spirit is fully incarnated, is fleshly.
It means, rather, that flesh is incarnated spirit; and when a spirit is fully incarnated, his flesh
will be spiritualized Berdyaev shows in Fl'eedom and the SPil'it, 18, that: (1) flesh is part of
the absolute unity of man; (z) yet, flesh is a symbol of spirit and is associated with historical
life; (3) "but the exterior reality of history is only the image of spiritual life under the conditions of time and divisibility. Everything without is but the symbol of that which is within."
Ibid., 18. Hence, flesh is not all opposed to spirit (for it owes its reality to spirit); but the
historical conditions of flesh, Berduaev means, are to be transformed and spiritualized in a
further incarnation of spirit. " ... flesh and blood do not inherit eternal life." Dl'eam and
Reality, 175.
176
As we saw in the preceding chapter the world of reality, the true world,
will differ from the world that we sense. Berdyaev tends to be unhistorical with respect to the history of man. He tends to be unhistorical
also with respect to the empirical history of bodies. It is the spiritual
truth of the corporeal world and historical world which interests
Berdyaev. This is a concrete truth with the concrete conditions of the
imaginative sight or vision, but not a solid.!
Thus the mystery of the concrete identity of knower and known is
further cleared up. It is simply a total identity. True knowledge is an
identity, but the concrete truth is not solid or tactile. Just as true
knowledge is unhistorical, so the concrete truth itself is unhistorical,
whether it refers to human history or to the empirical history of corporeal
bodies. In brief, the vision of truth, the identity of the knower and the
concrete existent, is no more concrete than the human imagination
itself. Berdyaev's "concrete" is not very concrete. He seems to intend
that the "concrete" is total and includes (spiritualizes) the concrete
conditions of its historical existence.
(4) Mysticism
According to this theory of knowledge, Berdyaev's metaphor of
history (which approaches the meaning of history by way of symbol
and myth), easily affiliates with a mysticism of history (which sees the
Meaning of history). The highest knowledge becomes one with the
concrete existing Logos. The concrete conditions of true knowledge,
contained in the imagination and the memory, remain in the mystical
vision according to Berdyaev's philosophy. Mystical experience, the
mystical knowledge of the philosopher of history, begins in the symbolic
realm of knowing. Mysticism begins in knowing the meaning of history
by the merest symbols. It begins very early, according to this mystical
philosophy, because the symbolic knowledge already overcomes the
separation of the divine and the human.
In mystical experience there is no longer any insurmountable dualism between the
supernatural and the natural, the divine and the created, for in it the natural
becomes supernatural and the creature is deified. 2
The soul of man, with its logical and objective knowledge is contained in the spiritual
unity of the human personality, Slavery and Freedom, 30-31. As soul is thus related to the
spirit, so the consciousness, which pertains to logical knowledge, is related to supra-consciousness. Spirit and Reality, 18. Only objectified spirit submits to the limitations of consciousness,
says Berdyaev. Ibid., 55. Thus, the mystical action of supra-consciousness pertains to the
human spirit, qua spirit.
Freedom and the Spirit,243.
177
We have noted frequently that Berdyaev stresses the unity of the

natural in the supernatural, and attacks the dualism of the natural and
the supernatural. His description of mysticism above defines his philosophy as mystical. And, as we have amply seen in previous pages,
Christ is He in Whom the mystical union occurs.
Berdyaev distinguishes kinds of mystical experience:
We may distinguish three types of mysticism, in the past: the mysticism of
individual souls' approach to God. This is the most churchly form. Second,
gnostic mysticism which must not be confused with the gnostic heretics of the
first Christian centuries: this is a mysticism involving not only the individual
soul, but cosmic and divine life, as well. Third, we have prophetic and messianic
mysticism; this is a super-historical and eschatological, the beginning of the end.
And each of these three types of mysticism has its limits. 1
This general classification serves Berdyaev as a definition of mysticism

with respect to its intention and goal. Besides a mysticism of the
individual person, there is also a communal mysticism, one of Sobornost',
and Sobornost' both with other persons, with the cosmos and with history. By implication of the text above, the communal type of mysticism
is also an "historical" one, achieved in communion with the "historical."
The third type of mysticism, he says, is super-historical and eschatological. This is a mysticism whose intention is to bring about the end
of the world, the transfiguration of creation. The divine meaning of
history, the return of creation to its unity with Christ the Godman,
is the goal.
Berdyaev continues:
The world is moving through darkness towards a new spirituality and a new
mysticism. ... The prophetic-messianic element will be strong in the new
mysticism ... II
This doctrine of mysticism simply does not make sense unless Berdyaev's
metaphor of history and mysticism of history (and therefore his philosophy of history) are understood also. The temporal element (which, we
found, exists even in the divine life and processes), as it is "historically"
known in every level of human experience, is understood along with the
divine principles. The very classification of mysticism which Berdyaev
presents here, a classification which adequately describes the mysticism
of his own doctrine, assumes for a condition the concrete noetic we have
been studying.
At the same time, the classification of mysticism that he describes
1
2
The Realm of Spirit and the Realm of Caesar,

Ibid., 181-182.
181.
178
indicates that his own philosophy has the noetic and the metaphysics
which is proper for the third type, the New Mysticism. This messianic
mysticism (as well as the cosmogonical and communal mysticism) is an
essential part, and the noblest, of Berdyaev's epistemology. Thus we see
that his theory of knowledge not only serves his philosophy but becomes,
finally, identical with his philosophy of history. The return of the world
to its Truth occurs through the loving knowledge of man.
H. SUMMARY
1. In rejecting the subject-object relationship in philosophical knowing,
Berdyaev is continuing in a tradition of philosophy which begins with
German Idealism. Kant has destroyed the philosophy of the abstract
object for Berdyaev. Yet Berdyaev is still faced with the problem of the
immateriality of knowledge facing the materiality of things. The spirituality of man faces the materiality of fallen nature.
He rejects the opposition of the subject and object because it never
gets away from subjectivity; the object is an expression of the subject.
But he seeks reality in his knowledge, not to be found through objectivist, intellectualist philosophies. Objectivization submits knowledge
and the freedom of man to the common and impersonal and to the
grandiose mien of the world and of history. What is more, according to
Berdyaev's philosophy of history, objective knowledge is an adjustment
to the objectivized world instead of a transfiguration of the world and
history in the existential subjectivity of the knower. The (objective)
concept, though it is necessary and useful, impedes a mysticism of
history. Mysticism is concrete while the concept is abstract. Mystical
truth is primarily the divine Truth, the concrete Existent Christ.
Philosophy is primarily an intuitive approach to universal history and
to the divine Logos, rather than ratiocinative. Philosophy is rational
but primarily intuitive.
2. Berdyaev's philosophy of history cannot be anti-rational. The

rational method and the concept are necessary instruments of thinking
and communication. However, like all things, conceptual knowledge is
symbolic of a higher knowledge or reality and gives place to a symbolic,
imaginative and metaphorical method which leads to the suprarational,
the mystical. The concept is truer if used as a symbol. The symbol- the
metaphor of history - brings the knower to the reality, to the mystical
179
meaning of history. This noetic may be understood also in terms of the

progress of consciousness to supra-consciousness. Autonomous consciousness, by itself the realm of objective and conceptual knowledge,
gives no true philosophical knowledge. Berdyaev is opposed to unmystical philosophy.
3. True knowledge is an identity of knower and known. Truth is not
a relation or adequation but the divine life. True knowledge is a vision,
a sight, where the knower is face to face with Truth. It is a vision which
sees Truth even in the imperfect symbols imbedded in historical life.
This vision is an identity of knower and known because the Truth (the
Godman) is at the existential kernel of the knowing subject. The true
philosophical attitude is to be the reality.
4. True knowing is communal in character. This is so because man
cannot discover the truth in nature; and to find it in himself he must
see the reflection of his true self in other persons in a spiritual communion. The knowing of truth is being steeped in one's own depths, and
this is synonymous with community of existential communion. This
notion of community fulfills the concrete universalism of Berdyaev;
for the mystical theory asserts the multiple unity of the cosmos, history
and mankind in the universality of Christ the Godman. It is proper to
this cosmogonical doctrine of history to stress communion in knowing
because the philosopher of history identifies himself with every man
and, thereby, with the cosmos, history and the meaning of history. We
recall the metaphysical doctrine of the We in the foregoing chapter.
True knowledge is corporate: "We think." This doctrine of communal
knowledge is religious; indeed, Berdyaev's theory of knowledge joins
his metaphysics at the mystical level.
5. Such a knowledge must be loving in character. In fact, the primacy
of freedom and volition in his metaphysics requires a volitional noetic.
The philosopher of history creates his historical symbols. Creativity
proceeds by way of a loving knowledge. For this reason, knowledge is
properly active rather than passive. And this active knowledge passes
from the metaphor of history to the most loving knowledge, mysticism
of history. Berdyaev's notion of the (purely intellectual) concept is
univocal, and this concept is therefore inadequate to carry the freight
of any metaphysical doctrine. To remain true to his metaphysics, he
must turn to symbolism and assert a loving knowledge. Love carries the
180
philosopher beyond the symbols that he knows to the plenary Reality

that he seeks in mystical union.
6. To understand how the knower can know a concrete existent in its
concreteness, according to a knowledge which is not only a vision but
an identity, we had to consider the use of image, symbol and mystical
doctrine in philosophy of history. For Berdyaev, the symbol or true
myth is the sum of philosophical knowledge, the means of attaining the
ultimate Truth. The myth is imaginative, and the intellectual imagination creates the symbols.
The knower, according to Berdyaev's philosophy of intuitive
knowledge, intuits images and through them, reality. This is possible
because the symbol is an image of reality, contains some reduced ray of
the Sun-Logos. Such are, for example, the historical myths of the philosopher of history. Revelation, however, is not a symbol or myth; it
is the reality rather than the knowledge.
The historical symbols and myths are themselves a meaning of history, but this meaning in turn has an inner meaning, and the ultimate
meaning is the divine Logos. Berdyaev therefore, seeks not the symbol
but the reality. But his philosophy of history is symbolical in method.
Symbolic knowledge is to be superceded by something which is more
than knowledge.
In Berdyaev's doctrine of man the microcosm, the historical culture
is one of the primary principles of knowledge (along with the rational
and the mystical). Historical culture is a source of knowledge about
both man and the cosmos: particularly, about man insofar as he is
distinct from the divine Prototype of man. Philosophy of history is the
spiritual philosophy which sees through historical cultures to the "historical," the meaning of history. The three principles of knowledge are
unified in philosophy of history.
The problem of knowing concretely is solved by the doctrine that the
whole man knows in true knowledge. The sub-conscious and the supraconscious, as well as the conscious, operate; in addition the corporeal
states, the emotions and instincts, as well as the will, act in true knowing.
The imaginative, symbolic and loving knowledge, asserted in Berdyaev's
philosophy of history, is partly based on corporeal states. Yet, it is a
spiritual knowledge because man is an incarnate spirit. The spirit includes the whole man; the spirit knows when the whole man knows.
True knowledge, however, is not concrete to the extent that it includes
knowledge of the exterior senses. The philosopher of history, by a cre-
181
ative act of remembrance, attains an in imaginative and symbolic

knowledge of culture. It is not a sense knowledge; yet it is a concrete
knowledge, and the concrete conditions of imaginative knowing become
part of the knowledge. Berdyaev, however, tends to be unhistorical with
respect to the history of corporeal bodies as well as with respect to the
history of man. It is the spiritual truth of the corporeal and historical
world which interests him. The vision of truth is no more concrete than
the imagination itself; and its attainment is the spiritualization of the
concrete conditions of sense and imagination.
This noetic is suited to the via metaphorica enroute to mysticism of
history. The highest knowledge in mysticism becomes something more
than knowledge. The person becomes one with Christ the concrete existing Logos. The meaning of history, which involves the person, the
cosmos and Universal History, is perfectly attained in mystical union.
Here the theory of knowledge becomes identical with the philosophy
of history.
CONCLUSION
Now that I have made a close analysis of Berdyaev's text, I shall

draw the threads of my findings together. Philosophy for him has revealed itself as a typically Eastern Christian doctrine. That is, philosophy has shown itself to be concerned with both purely philosophical
matters (such as Existential metaphysics) and also with theological
subjects (such as the doctrine of Incarnation, its key doctrine in
Berdyaev's estimation).
In his philosophy of history he has had to distinguish between the
historical and "historical." The "historical" - with quotation marks is the spiritual reality which philosophy of history studies. It is the
spiritual meaning of history, beyond history and yet known and attained through historical traditions. The "historical" is indeed the
ultimate Reality in Berdyaev's Christian doctrine, Christ the Godman.
He is the True Man, the perfect Proto-type, and every man is an image
of Him. The "historical" is identical with the true spiritual being of
man. Thus philosophy of history studies true man, redeemed man, the
existential reality at the core of every man, in studying the "historical."
If history is a symbol of the "historical" towards which it moves, the
"historical" itself has a historical quality. That is why Berdyaev posits
a divine, a celestial "history" within the Godhead. Though God is
timeless, yet He suffers a "historical" progress and illumination. To
account for the "historical" unity of divine and terrestrial histories,
Berdyaev posits an Ungrund, a divine Will, a primordial and irrational
basis of God. Celestial and terrestrial history contain the divine and
human spiritual illumination of the Ungrund, through Christ and
through man. Berdyaev asserts a voluntarism in which the dark Will
and radical Freedom is illuminated so that it becomes perfect freedom
in Christ, in God and in Man. Through the revelation of Christ the fallen
world - fallen by virtue of man's radical freedom - can be taken up
into the unity within true man from which it fell.
CONCL USION
For man is indeed a microcosm attempting to bring back the world

- the macrocosm - and mankind into unity within Christ. Philosophy of
history enables us to find the meaning of the world and thereby shows
us the goal of history. We see universal history according to this view,
both in the light of Christian doctrine and in the light of historical
traditions and cultures.
This Russian philosophy is mystical. Only mystical knowledge is true
knowledge; conceptual knowledge is just a symbol of the truth.
Historical traditions and cultures are grasped as metaphors or symbols
rather than as concepts. A given historical entity - a nation or an era is a symbol of the true "historical," of the age of the Spirit, when man
and the world will be again reunited with God. The metaphorical
knowledge of philosophy of history is the path to the final mystical
attainment of the age of the Spirit.
The metaphorical path is a concrete knowledge, one that takes
concrete reality (in its spiritual truth) as a whole, with all particular
conditions. Because it is concrete (and imaginative), the knowledge can
function as a metaphor; because concrete, the knowledge becomes
mystically the existential reality itself. Thus history is being mystically
taken up, through man and his creative knowledge, into integral unity
with man and with True Man, Christ. It is in his explicit mystical
doctrine that the voluntarism, the doctrine of Incarnation, the cosmogony, cosmology and spiritualism are all united in service of
Berdyaev's Christian philosophy of history.
The voluntarism of Berdyaev is seen at work in the very philosophy
of history, as well as in the metaphysics of Ungrund on which the philosophy stands. And his philosophy is one of beauty: we actually create
metaphorical and beautiful symbols in a mystical way in philosophy of
history. It entails a practical and loving knowledge guided by love of
beauty. At the same time, symbols bring the cosmos and history - in
their true reality - within the true unity of man. And thus occurs the
cosmogonical return of man and the world to their truth. The enslavement of man by nature and the cosmos, or by technics, is superseded by spiritualization. The incarnation of spirit, which occurs
through man, the human spirit, will finally be consummated at the end
of history in the age of the Spirit. Then, all history, all cultures and
nations and cities, will exist spiritually and mystically in their true
reality.
Such a philosophy of history - at once universal and concrete,
meaningful and "historical" - requires a metaphysics which is Ex-
CONCLUSION
istential. Berdyaev, following the lead of his philosophy of history,

turns with fellow Existentialists from intellectualist doctrines to a philosophy of the concrete existent. The existent, even the divine Source
of man and the world, is "historical" in some way. At the same time,
a cosmogony and cosmology, wherein the roles of man and the Godman
command an outstanding place, will be personalist in nature. Berdyaev,
therefore, uses a personalist Existentialism in his philosophy of history.
The Existential emphasis upon the subjectivity and personality of the
knower properly serves his mystical doctrine of the microcosm. Thus
his philosophy of history is essentially a personalist Existentialism; for
he sees man - and indeed history - as an image of Christ, and this is to
view man and history Existentially.
In this philosophy are expressed the mysticism of Eastern Orthodoxy,
the messianism of the Slavic races and the Sobornost' - the commonalty,
the doctrine of the We - of Russia. The earthly futurism of Western
philosophers of history is spiritualized into a doctrine of the age of the
Spirit, vitalized by Christian eschatology. The ancient doctrines of the
brotherhood of man and communion of the Saints are invigorated.
Berdyaev both examines the conditions of true social communion and
investigates the means of true communion between man and Nature.
These doctrines - the eschatology and the Sobornost' between men and
between man and nature - express in different ways the unity of his
philosophy. Indeed the outstanding place of cosmogony in the doctrine
and the mysticism of it guarantee its doctrinal unity. Everything in
Berdyaev's doctrine pertains to philosophy of history because everything pertains to the return of man and the world to God. And every
assertion, every notion of his philosophy relates to his mysticism of
history, to his mystical doctrine of Christ, the true Man and true
Microcosm in Whom the cosmos, all history and every man belongs.
BIBLIOGRAPHY OF SOURCES
1. PRIMARY SOURCES: BERDYAEV
The Beginning and tke End (Bles, London, 1952).

Opyt eschatologiceskoj metafiziki. Tvof'cestyo i objektivacija (Y.M.C.A.-Press, Paris,
1947)
The Bouf'geois Mind and Otkef' Essays (Sheed and Ward, London, 1934).
Chf'istian Existentialism. A Bef'dyaev Anthology. Selected and translated by
D. A. Lowrie (Allen & Unwin, London, 1965).
The Destiny of Man (Bles, London, 1948).
o naznacenii celoveka. Opyt paf'adoksal'noj etiki (Y.M.C.A.-Press, Paris, 1931).
The Divine and the Human. (Bles, London, 1949).
Dialectique existentielle du divin et de l'humain (Paris, 1947).
Ekzistencial'naja dialektika bozestvennago i celoveceskago (Y.M.C.A.-Press, Paris,
1952).
Df'eam and Reality (Bles, London, 1950).
Samopoznanie. Opyt filosofskoj avtobiogf'afii (Y.M.C.A.-Press, Paris, 1949).
The End of OUf' Time (Sheed and Ward, London, 1935).
Novoe sf'ednevekov'e. Razmyslenii 0 sud'be Rossii i Ewopy (Obelisk, Berlin, 1924).
Pf'eedom and the Spif'it (Bles, London, 1935).
Pilosofija svobodnogo ducha. Pf'oblematika i apologija ckf'istianstva (Y.M.C.A.Press, Paris, 1927).
"Man and the Machine," Hibbef't jouf'nal, A. Quaf'tef'ly Review of Religion, Theology and Philosophy, XXXIII (1934-1935).
The Meaning of the Cf'eative Act (Harper, New York, 1955).
Smysl tvOf'cestva. Opyt opf'avdeanija celoveka (Moscow, 1916; partially revised for
a German edition, Berlin, 1927).
The Meaning of Histof'Y (Bles, London, 1949).
Smysl istOf'ii. Opyt filosofi celoveceskoj sud'by (Berlin, 1923).
The Of'igin of Russian Communism (Bles, London, 1948).
Les SOUf'ces et Ie sense du communisme f'usse (Paris, 1938).
The Realm of SPif'it and the Realm of Ceasaf'. (Gollancz, London, 1952).
Caf'stvo Ducha i caf'stvo Kesaf'ja (Y.M.C.A.-Press, Paris, 1951).
The Russian Idea (Bles, London, 1947).
Russkaja ideja. Osnovve p"oblemy f'usskoi mysli XIX veka i nacala XX veka
(Y.M.C.A.-Press, Paris, 1946).
Slavef'Y and Pf'eedom (Bles, London, 1943).
o rabstve i svobode celoveka. Opyt Pef'sonalisticeskoi filosofii (Y.M.C.A.-Press,
Paris, 1939).
Solitude and Society (Bles, London, 1947).
186
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Ja i mir obiektov. Opyt lilosolii odinocestva i obscenija (Y.M.C.A.-Press, Paris,

1934)
Spirit and Reality (Bles, London, 1946).
Duch i real'nost'. Osnovy bogocel-oveceskoi duchovnosti (Y.M.C.A.-Press, Paris,
1937)
Towards a New Epoch (Bles, London, 1949).
Au seuil de la nouvelle Epoque. (Neuchatel-Paris, 1947).
Truth and Revelation (Bles, London, 1953).
Pravda i otkrovenie (Paris, c. 1950).
Bibliographical Note: I have encountered one book in which scores of articles of
Berdyaev have been listed, numerous translations of his books noted and an
extensive list of works about Berdyaev has been prepared: M. A. Vallon, An
Apostle 01 Freedom: Lile and Teachings 01 Nicolas Berdyaev (Philosophical
Library, New York, 1960).
II. OTHER PRIMARY WORKS REFERRED TO
Anderson, James F., The Bond 01 Being (Herder, St. Louis, 1949).
St. Augustine, De Civitate Dei.
Boehme, Jacob, The Epistels 01 Jacob Bemen (London, 1649).
- The Way to Christ, translated by J. J. Stoudt Harper, New York, 1947.
Fichte, J. G., "The Science of Knowledge" (Introduction), in Modern Classical
Philosophers, edited by B. Rand (Houghton Mifflin, Boston 1908(.
- "The Vocation of Man," translated by W. Smith, in Modern Classical Philosophers, edited by B. Rand (Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1908).
Gilson, Etienne, Being and Some Philosophers (Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval
Studies, Toronto, 1949).
Hegel, G. W. F., The Logic 01 Hegel, translated from The Encyclopaedia 01 the
Philosophical Sciences by W. Wallace (Oxford Univ. Press, Oxford, 1959).
- The Phenomenology 01 Mind (Allen & Unwin, London, 1949).
- The Philosophy 01 History (The Colonial Press, New York, 1900).
John Scotus Erigena, "De Divisione Naturae," in J. Migne, Patrologia Latina
Paris, 1853).
Kant, Immanuel, Immanuel Kant's Critique 01 Pure Reason, translated by N. K.
Smith (MacMillan, London, 1950).
- The Moral Law, or Kant's Groundwork 01 the Metaphysic 01 Morals, translated
by H. J. Paton (Hutchinson, London, 1948).
Kierkegaard, S., Philosophical Fragments (Princeton Univ. Press, Princeton,
1946).
Leibniz, F. W., "The Monadology," in Leibniz, Discourse on Metaphysics, etc.,
translated by G. R. Montgomery (Opencourt, La Salle, lllinois, 1945).
Maritain, Jacques, Les Degres du Savoir (Desclee de Brouwer, Paris, 1946).
Merejkowski, D., The Menace 01 the Mob (Nicholas L. Brown, New York, 1921).
- Peter and Alexis (Modem Library, New York, 1931).
Plato, The Republic.
- The Symposium.
Schelling, F. W. J., The Ages 01 the World, translated by F. Bolman, Jr. (Columbia Univ..Press, New York, 1942).
- 01 Human Freedom, translated by J. Gutmann (Opencourt, Chicago, 1936).
- Siimmtliche Werke (Stuttgart and Augsburg, 1856 seq.), II, Vol. 3 and 4.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Schopenhauer, A., The World as Will and Idea, in The PhilosoPhy of Schopenhauer, edited by 1. Edman (Modern Library, New York, 1928).
Solovyev, V., Lectures on Godmanhood (Dobson, London, 1948).
Spengler, 0., The Decline of the West (Knopf, New York, 1939).
St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae (Marietti, Rome, 1949).
Toynbee, A. J., A Study of History (Oxford Univ. Press, Oxford, 1934-1953).
III. SELECTED SECONDARY SOURCES
Arnold, E. V., Roman Stoicism. Being Lectures on the History of the Stoic Philosophy with Special References to Its Development Within the Roman
Empire (Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge, 1911; reissued 1958 by the
Humanities Press, New York).
Baldensperger, F., Melanges d'Histoire Litteraire Generale et Comparee offerts Ii
Fernand Baldensperger (Librairie Ancienne Honore Champion, Paris, 1930),
Vol. II. Edgar Quinet et Auguste Cieszkowski.
Bett, H., Joachim of Flora (Methuen, London, 1931).
Bolman, F., Jr., "Introduction," in F. W. J. Schelling, The Ages of the World
(Columbia Univ. Press, New York, 1942).
Borowitz, (Rabbi) E. B., A Layman's Introduction to Religious Existentialism
(Dell, New York, 1966).
Calian, C. S., The Significance of Eschatology in the Thoughts of Nicolas Berdyaev
(Brill, Leiden, 1965).
Clarke, O. F., Introduction to Berdyaev (Bles, London, 1950).
Collins, James, The Existentialists, A Critical Study (Regnery, Chicago, 1952).
Dufrenne, M., and P. Ricoeur, Karl Jaspers et la Philosophie de I'Existence (Seuil,
Paris, 1947).
Fackenheim, E., "Schelling's Philosophy of Religion," in University of Toronto
Quarterly (October, 1952).
Gilson, Etienne, Les Metamorphoses de la Cite de Dieu (Nauwelaerts, Louvain,
1952).
Hartshorne, C. A., The Divine Relativity; A Social Conception of God. The Terry
Lectures, 1947 (Yale Univ. Press, New Haven, 1948).
Kuhn, H., Encounter with Nothingness, an Essay on Existentialism (Regnery,
Hinsdale, Illinois, 1949).
- "Existentialism," in A History of Philosophical Systems, edited by V. Ferm
(Philosophical Library, New York, 1950).
Lossky, N. 0., A History of Russian Philosophy (International Universities Press,
New York, 1951).
L6with, K., Meaning in History (Univ. of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1949).
Lowrie, D. A., Rebellious Prophet. A Life of Nicolai Berdyaev (Harper, New York,
1960).
Munzer, E., "Nicolas Berdyaev," in University of Toronto Quzrterly, Vol. XIV
(1944- 1 945).
Nygren, A., Agape and Eros (S.P.C.K, London, 1953).
Pfleger, K, Wrestlers with Christ (Sheed and Ward, London, 1957).
Porret, E., Berdiaeff Prophete des Temps Nouveaux (Delachaux & Niestle, Paris,
1951).
Randall, J. H., Jr., "The Ontology of Paul Tillich," in The Theology of Paul
Tillich, edited by C. Kegely and R. Bretall (MacMillan, New York, 1952).
Shryock, J. K, The Origin and Development of the State Cult of Confucius
(Paragon Book Reprint Corp., New York, 1966).
188
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Smith, N. K., Commentary on the Critique 0/ Pure Reason (Humanities Press,

New York, 1950).
Spinka, M., Nicolas Berdyaev: Captive 0/ Freedom (The Westminster Press,
Philadelphia, 1950).
Werkmeister, W. H., "Scientism and the Problem of Man," in Philosophy and
Culture. East and West, edited by C. A. Moore (Univ. of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, 1962).
Whitehead, A. N., Process and Reality. An Essay in Cosmology (MacMillan, New
York, 1927; Harper Torchbook, 1960).
Zenkovsky, V. V., A History 0/ Russian PhilosoPhy (Routledge and Kegan Paul,
London, 1953).
Zimmer, H., Philosophies 0/ India, edited by J. Campbell (Pantheon, New York,
1953)
Zoyboff, P. P., "Introduction," in V. Solovyev, Lectures on Godmanhood (Dobson, London, 1948).
INDEX
(Also see Table of Contents.)
Abraham, II6
Absolute Man, 44, 47
Adam,80n
ages of the world, 26-27, 68, 86; epoch
of history, 26-28, 27n, 46; epoch of
time, 38
agnostic, ix
Alexeyev, 39n
Anderson, James F., 163, 163n
Angst, 105, 134
anthropomorphism, xi
anthroposophy, 70
antichrist, 28, 46, 85
Arnold, E. V., xx, xxin
Assisi, St. Francis of, 79
Aristotle, 16
Augustine, St., II2n
Baader, Franz, xx
Baldensperger, F., 78n
beauty, x, xi, 64-66, 88, 92-94, 132-133,
134, 161, 183
Beauvoir, Simone de, IIO, lIon
becoming, God as, 38
being, 139, 141, 14 . 144, 145, 148, 15 6 ,
161
Benedict, St., 80n, 81
Bergson, ix, xii
Bett, H., 80n
Bloy, Leon, 85
Boehme, Jacob, ix, xx, 33, 34, 56, 57,
58n, 59, 64, 70, 72, 79, 87, 98n. 106,
106n, I07n, 162n, 165n, 166, 166n
Bolman, Jr., F., 71n, 131n
Borowitz, (Rabbi) E. B., xxn
Buber, Martin, xx, 125, 125n
Buddhism, xii
Bulgakov, Sergei N., 53n, 54, 55, 86, 114n
Calian, C. S., xviiin
Campbell, J., xixn
Carlyle, 5
causality, x, 96, 100
Christ, 23. 34, 43, 44, 45, 45, 46, 48, 49.
50. 51. 52, 56, 58, 59, 60, 6on, 61. 62.
63. 72n, 78n. 80,11. 81. 84. 87. 95. 98
98n, 99, lOIn, 107, 110. 112n, 134. 153.

154. 160. 165n. 177, 178, 179, 182. 183.
18 4
Christian gnosis. 70
Christian philosophy. Berdaevs. 14. 107.
115, 129n. 183. 184
Christian philosophy of history. 29. 30-31.
4 8, 57. 18 3
Christianity. being historical. 29
Christian revelation, ix
Church of the Holy Spirit. 80, 81. 83. 84,
89
Clarke. O. F., 66
Collins. James, 98n, 105
Comte, xix
conscioulmess, 149-150, 150n
cosmology, 48, 70-76, 88, 145
cosmosophy, 70
"creative advance". ix
creativity, x, 90, ff., 160, ff.
culture, 21-22, 131
cultures, study of, 20-21, 172
Dionysius, xviii, 72n
Dostoyevsky, 33, 6gn, 94U, 127n
Dufrenne, M . IIln
Eastern Orthodoxy, 50, 86, 114
Eckhardt, 79, 107
Edman, I., 140n
ego, 68, 99-105, 109-110, 112, I16, I17,
122, 124, 125, 125n, 134. 147, 156, 157,
159; union of Thou with, 103, 159
epistomology, 30, 138-147, 158, 169, 174,
176, 178
Erigena, John Scotus, xviii. 71, 7In, 72,
72n, 88; compared with Berdyaev, 71-
72
eschatology, xviii, 33, 35, 46, 76-78, 85,

86, 133, 184
"essential being," 7, 7n
Eternal Man, 51-52, 86
evil, x
existence, 93, 96, 98, 101, I13, 116, 134;
primary existence, 97
existentialism. 10, 34. 45, 56, 90-96. 105-
19
INDEX
108, 110-112, 116, 121, 126-127, 127n,

132n, 135-136, 147, 161, 166, 184
Fackeoheim, E., 170
fall of man, xi, 25, 51, 53, 56, 130, 143, 144
145
Faust, 30
Fechner, xii
Feuerbach, xix
Fichte, ix, 82, 99, 990, 100, 101, lOIn,
102, 102n, 1140, 134, 140
Flora, Joachim of, 69n, 79, 80, 80n, 81, 82,
82n, 83, 89
Florensky, P. A., 53n, II40
Ferm, Virgilius, 1250
freedom, x, 23, 24, 26, 43, 46, 48, 53~0,
61, 88, 90, 96, 97, 101, 104, 1II-II3,
143, 160, 178, 182; irrational principle,
24, 87
French, R. M., 66
Gilson, Etienne, 16n, 560, II6n
God, x, xi, xii, xiii, 16n, 310, 32, 32n, 38,
410, 43, 44, 46, 50, 51, 510, 52, 53, 54,
540,55,58,580,59,6o,61,6In,62,63,
64,65,7,710,720,73,74,79,800,82,
85,87,9,92,93,98,980,99,990,106,
1070, 108, 109, 110, 116, 121, 135, 136,
139, 1420, 149, 150, 159, 162, 163, 166,
166n, 173, 174n, 1750, 177, 182, 183,
18 4
Godman, 90, 34,44,45,46,5,51, 56,58,
60, 61, 63, 67, 73, 74, 75, 78, 84, 87, 88,
93, 1010, 107, 108, 109, 110, 112n, 113,
115,117, II7n, 120, 1250, 133,134,35,
136, 139, 145, 147, 149, 153, 154, 155,
156, 157, 160, 161, 162, 168, 169, 170,
171, 172, 17~ 179, 182, 184
godmanhood, xviii, xxi, I, 15, 34, 43, 48,
49, 49n , 50, 51, 59, 60, 63, 630, 64, 66,
72n, 77, 86, 87, 88, 89, 107, 109, IIO,
117, 154
grace, 36, 152, 154, 163, 171
Gutmann, J., lOIn
Hartshorne, Charles xii, xx, xxn, xxi, xxii
Hegel, ix, xiv, 36n, 41n, 42n, 60, 71, 81,
82, 106, 1120, 114, 114n, 115, 117n,
118n, 135, 141, 149n, 150, 150n
Heidegger, ix, 106, 106n, 1110, 127n
hell, xi
Heraclitus, ix, 60, 72n
Hinduism, xi, xii
"historical," the, 1-10, 18, 22, 25, 37, 39,
44-47, 92, 95, II2n, 121, 169, 171, 182,
184; and the historical, 7-8, 45, 46
historical knowledge, 2-4, 12
historical memory, see memory, historical
historical myth, 121, 133; as symbol, 17,
92, 165
"historical nation," 5, 153

historical reality, 2-4
historical tradition, 2, 4, 13, 20-21, 45, 65,
136, 169
historical science 2, 20, 167
history, celestial, terrestial, 24, 30, 3 I, 32,
37, 39, 40, 41, 44, 46, 58, 59, 74, 87, 88,
136
destiny of, 18, 24, 25
failure of, 35-36, 360, 46
occurring in cycles, 22-24;
rejection of by Berdyaev, 74-75, 75n, 88
Hocking, W. E., xii
Hudsoo, G. F., xxn
Husser!, 118
integral knowledge, 173, 1730
Integral Man, 78
intuitioo, 162, 180
Isaac, 116
(the) It (versus the Thou), 122, 124, 125
Jacob, II6
Jainas, xix
Jaspers, 96, IIIn, II2, II20
Jesus, xi
Job, xiii
John the Apostle, 80, 82, 82n, III
Jones, Rufus M., 107n
Kabbala, xx, 69n
Kant, ix, xiv, 25, 78n, 96, 99, 99n,
114n, 140, 141, 141n, 142, 142n,
Khomyakov, 55, 69, 173n
Kierkegaard, 33, 34, 94n , 98n, 99n,
IIln, 112n, 127n
Kireyensky, 173n
knowledge, 138-141, 1400, 146, 1460,
152-155, 157, 159, 161, 1620, 163,
171-172, 178- 179
Kozlov, 126n
Kuhn, Helmut, 125, 125n
100,
178
105,
147,
164,
Lackland, John, 5, 6, 6n
Leiboiz, 160, 126n
Lequier, J., xii
Logos,9n, 160, 24,24,44,45,53,55,60,
61, 63, 65, 87, 107, 107n, 108, 109, 110,
1I3, II7, 1I8, 1I9, 120, 121, 134, 135,
145, 148, 149, 152, 153, 165, 178, 18o,
181
loving knowledge, 160-161, 173, 178, 179
Lowith, Karl, 82n
Lowrie, D. A., xixn, xxio
Lossky, N. 0., 39n, 66, 71n, 81n, II4n,
164n, 173n
Marcel, Gabriel, 125, 125n, 127n
Maritain, Jacques, 142n
Marx, xix
Maverick, L. A., xxn
INDEX
memory. historical. II-17. 45. 65. 90. 174
human. 15. 15n.93. 112n. 131. 132. 137.
174
meonic freedom. 61. 62. 97
Merejkowski. D . 78n
messianism of Berdyaev's philosophy of
history. 34. 35. 76 89. 133
meta-history. 32. 32n. 40. 42n. 46. 85. 133.
169
metaphysics. 32. 33-34. 46. II9
metaphysics of history. 19. 32. 87;
distinguished from philosophy of history. 19
microcosm. man as. 92. 93. 94. 95. 104.
III. 121. 123. 126-127. 130. 136. 139.
158. 167. 171. 174n. 180. 183. 184
Migne. J . 7m
Mikhailovski. 152n
monads.16n
Montague. W. P . xii
Montgomery. G. R . 16n
Moore. C. A . xixn
mysticism. 70. 152n. 159. 176-178;
of Berdyaev's philosophy of history. 42.
49.52 76 . 3. 127. 144. 149. 150. 163.
170. 176. 177. 178. 181. 183
myth. 172-176. see "memory. historical"
natural law. 139-140
nature. 25. 26. 46. 73. 83. I45n
Needham. J . xxn
New Jerusalem. 129
new middle ages. 46. 86. 129
Newton. 78. 78n. 141n
Nietszche. II I
Nygren. A . 64n
Nyssa. St. Gregory of. 79
organic unity of the world. 73. 75. 88.
II4n;
as opposed to mechanical. 76
Origen.79
pantheism. x
Pascal. 127n
Paul. St . 80. 82. 82n. 147n
personalism. 10. 68. 75. 9Q-()5. 98. 102n.
108. II6. 131. 135
personality. 100-104. 101. 108. II3. II9120. 121. 123. 131. 132. 136. 158
Peter. St . 80. 82. 84
philosophy of history. goal of. according
to Berdyaev. 18. 45;
and metaphysics of history. 28-32. 46
Plato. 16n. II6. II7. II7n. 165. 167. 168
Platonic doctrine of knowledge. 15. 16-17
Platonism. x
pneumatology. 109. 135
Positivist. ix
potency. prior to act. 97
19 1
Randall. Jr . J. H . 106. 106n

Reichwein. A . xxn
religious philosophy. 20. 143
remembrance. Platonic doctrine of. 16-17.
127. 131n. 133. 154
Ricoeur. P . Illn
Rome. fall of. 21
Sartre.96. 106n. 110. lIon. 127n
Schelling. ix. xii. 53. 68. 71. 7m. 81.
81n. 82. 82n. 83. 84. 89. 99. lOIn.
102. 102n. 106. 114. 114n. 115. 118n.
131n. 141. 149n. 166. 166n. 175n
Scholz. Heinrich. xii
Schopenhauer. xiv. 65n. 140. 140n
Schwab. R . xxn
science and religion. 33-34
Selesius. Angelus. 79
Shestov. Leo. 94n. 127n
Shryock. J. K.. xixn
Smith. Norman Kemp. 78n. 14m
Smith. W . 10m
Sobornost'. xi. xii. 48. 66-70. 88. 158. 159.
18 4
Socrates. II6
Socinus. xii
Solovyev. Vladimir. xx. 49. 49n. 53. 55.
56.71. 71n. 85. 86. 113. 114n. 115. 115n.
II7n. II8n. 126n
Son of God. 57. 58. 80. 87. 107
Sophia. 53-55. 56. 70n
Sophiology. 53-54. 56. II4n
Spengler. 21. 21n. 29n. 41n. 69n
Spinoza. 68n
Spirit. 20. 28. 36n. 62-63. 67. 79. 82n. 84.
87. 108. 109. 109n. IIO. II4. 148. 151n.
164n. 175. 175n. 183
and Holy Spirit. 62-63. 67. 79. 80n. 81
age of. 68. 76. 79. 84-86. 89. 129. 184
"spiritual determinism". xi. 55-56
spiritual life. 19-20
Stoudt. J. J . 107n
symbol. 167-172
Stylities. St. Simon. 64n
subject-object. 138-141. 152. 178
Swedenborg. xix n
symbol and myth. 165. 16711. 167-170.
180
Tauler. 79 theology. ix;
negative theology. xii
theology of history. same as philosophy of
history. In. 31
theosophy. 70
Thou. 103. 122-125. 136. 146. 156. 157.
159
Tillich. ix. 106
time. xii. 37-39. 73. 79;
cosmic. historical. and existential. 3947. 79n
INDEX
Toynbee, A. J., I29n, I67n
tragedy, x
Trinity (Father, Son and Holy Spirit),
xvii, 24n, 50, 51, 54, 57, 58n, 62, 87,
II7n, 167n
True Man, 44, 45, 49, 121, 123, 127, 145,
156, 15~ 172, 182, 184
truth,92. 107. 110-113. 134. 145, 148.149.
152. 153. 153n, 155. 164. 178-179, 180;
truth as one. 34
Ung,und. 57-59. 6m. 62. 63. 65. 72. 87,
97. 98 99. 99n. 102. 105. 106. 106-107n.

110. 182
universal. the. 120
universal history. 18, 22, 23. 24. 35, 45,
71, 74, 87, 10~ 13~ 150 154. 183
Uzziah, 80n, 81
Varisco, xii
Voluntarism, 48, 55. 58, 60, 64, 65, 72n,
87, 90, 14on. 183
Wallace, W., 7m
Ward, J ames xii
(the) We, 68, 69n, 122, 124. 136, 146, 156,
157, 179
Werkmeister, W. H., xixn
Whitehead. ix, x, xi, xii, xx, xxn
will, 61-62, 90, 97, 108, 140n
Wright, Frank Lloyd, xix
Zacharias, 80n
Zenkovsky, V. V., 53n, II4n, II5n, II 7,
I26n, 152n
Zimmer, H., xix n
Zoyboff, P. P., n8n

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BERDYAEV'S PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY

C I968 by Marlinus Nijholl, The Hague, Netherlands

CHAPTER I: BERDYAEV'S PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY

EXISTENTIALISM: A PERSONALIST PHILOSOPHY OF

C. Personality is spirit: an existentialism of spirit

CHAPTER IV: EPISTEMOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY

How shall a non-Russian, above all a North American, assimilate the

creativity (that most positive idea of our century) by which reality

as well as creator, and we participate in the creation of God himself,

The Uni'llersity of Texas

Nicolas Alexandrovich Berdyaev (1874-1948) was born in the city of

ism. 1 And he maintained constant association with other philosophers

I would like to raise a question about a recent problem, to be found,

bly imposed on a people, and eventually, by law or fiat, on the entire

paganism as thesis and Christianity as anti-thesis

Berdyaev's writings contain a proposal which, I think, points the

Berdyaev's philosophy, in its extraordinary social awareness, and its

The Meaning ot the Creative Act, 307.

meaning of Persism and its immense influence on the Graeco-Roman

Utah State University

BERDY AEV'S PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY

We begin this study by considering Berdyaev's philosophy of history

B. THE "HISTORICAL" AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY

(I) The "Historical"

other books of Berdyaev, written later, enable us to clarify what is

In the first quotation, above, Berdyaev discusses both the historical

N. Berdyaev, The Meaning

History (Bles, London, 1949), 12-13.

After saying (we saw) that an important aspect of the "historical" is

of Berdyaev and the unifying principles of his doctrine. We must also

Berdyaev does not mean here that the historical is restricted to

The "historical nation," taken in itself, is an example of the historical.

of being as a gradation of particularities," and he means that the

The purpose of the philosophy of history is to help us to know spiritual

Berdyaev says, a little further on:

The philosophy of history cannot detach man from history or history

The Meaning of History, 15-16.

We have seen that the notion of the "historical" refers transcendentally

The Meaning of History, 16.

He qualifies "deeply my history" to say, "that is, deeply my destiny. I

History is synonymous with the greatest spiritual reality because (we

able to penetrate beyond the natural world, seen by empirical sciences.

See Chapter II, Section D, Part

But the historical memory as a means of knowing the "historical" is inalienably

The manifestations of the "historical" (the traditions, cultures), there1

The Meaning of History, 18.

The historical process is spiritualized and transfigured in philosophy of

The Meaning of History, 18-19. The Spiritual is supernatural.

The other-world is an after-world (which has been referred to in the

For, Berdyaev says, "purely objective history would be incomprehensible. "4

Man is a microcosm because, as we saw, the "historical" is created and

act of Platonic remembrance, provoked by an external stimulation. It

The historical myth is important for the philosopher of history because

The Meaning of History, 23.

Note the stress on the interiority of historical tradition, both in history

(3) The "Historical" and Universal History

In order to commune with the mystery of the "historical," Berdyaev