Emperors of The Peacock Throne - Abraham Eraly
Emperors of The Peacock Throne - Abraham Eraly
Emperors of The Peacock Throne - Abraham Eraly
passion with him. He does not however seem to have been keen on the
fourth component of Omar Khayyarn's paradise, women. He was a
good provider and a caring householder, affectionate and deferential
towards his women, especially towards his elder relatives, but he was
not, unlike his roly-poly father, a ladies' man. Babur preferred the
macho bonhomie of his friends to the pleasures of the harem.
Babur's first wife was Aisha, a cousin, to whom he was betrothed
at the age of five. Eleven years later, she joined him in Fergana. She
found him a bashful lover. As Babur tells it, "Though I was not illdisposed towards her, yet, this being my first marriage, out of modesty
and bashfulness, I used to see her once in ten, fifteen, twenty days.
Later on, when even my first inclination did not last, my bashfulness
increased. Then my mother Khanum used to send me, once a month or
every forty days, with driving and driving, dunnings and worrying."
Babur had his first child, a daughter, by Aisha three years after she
joined him, but the baby died in infancy, and Aisha herself deserted
him during his days of homeless wandering. By and by Babur acquired
other wives and several concubines, as behoved a prince, and he
fathered a number of children, as duty required of him, to ensure the
continuity of his line. But there was no ardour in him for women.
There was only one romantic infatuation in Babur's life, his
unabashed love for a bazaar boy in Andizhan. Babur was sixteen then,
and Aisha had just joined him. "In those leisurely days," he confesses,
"I discovered in myself a strange inclination . . . for a boy in the campbazaar, his very name, Baburi, fitting in. Up till then I had had no
inclination for anyone, indeed of love and desire, either by hearsay or
experience, I had not heard, I had not talked . . . From time to time
Baburi used to come to my presence, but out of modesty and bashfulness
I could never look straight at him; how then could I make conversation
and recital? ... In that frothing-up of desire and passion, and under
that stress of youthful folly, I used to wander, bare-head, bare-foot,
through street and lane, orchard and vineyard. I showed civility neither
to friend nor stranger, took no care for myself or others . . ."
Babur does not tell how the affair ended. But he got over it soon
enough. Baburi was just an adolescent fancy, not unusual in an
environment in which, among Central Asian aristocrats, bisexuality was
common, and pederasty high fashion. In Babur's case, however, the
affair appears to have been virginally romantic and without carnal
expression. Later, in Kabul, when he once again had time to enjoy
himself, he preferred the gentler seductions of literature, art, music and
gardening to carnal pleasures.
12
IN KABUL, THOUGH he did not yet know what fate had in store for
him, Babur began to organize himself for the battles ahead, whipping
his men into a superb fighting force. "I had been at great pains to train
and exercise them to the utmost point," he writes. "Never, perhaps,
were my troops in such perfect discipline." He also took care to
modernize his army, introducing muskets and cannons (till then used
mostly in siege operations) into field battle, a tactic he adopted from
the Ottoman Turks. That innovation would give him a crucial advantage in
India.
Meanwhile, the political jigsaw in India had rearranged itself, to
open a passage for Babur. And Babur needed that exit, to get away
from the ever menacing Uzbegs. "The foe mightily strong, I very weak,
with no means of making terms, no strength to oppose," he laments.
"In the presence of such power and potency, we had to think of some
place for ourselves and, at this crisis and in the crack of time there was,
put a wider space between us and the strong foeman. That choice lay
between Badakshan and Hindustan and that decision must now be
made."
The choice fell on India.
Babur states that from 1519 on he led five expeditions into India,
but long before that, in fact from the time he took Kabul, he had been
active along India's north-western marches. Those early campaigns
were however only pillaging raids, and he probably did not cross the
Indus till 1519, when he advanced as far as the Jhelum. Even then, till
1524 he had no ambition beyond Punjab, which he claimed as his
Timurid legacy, by virtue of it having been a part of Timor's empire a
century earlier. Then, fortuitously, a greater opportunity came knocking.
The messengers of destiny were Dilawar Klan (son of Daulat Khan, the
rebel Afghan governor of Punjab) and Alarm Khan (an uncle of Ibrahim
Lodi, the Sultan of -Delhi), who arrived in Kabul to solicit Babur's help
in ousting Ibra_him. Babur then took an omen, found it favourable, and
agreed to their proposal, intending not so much to help them as to help
himself.
The campaign of 1524 was abortive. The allies, after occupying
Punjab, fell out over the division of the province. Daulat Khan wanted
13
all of Punjab for himself, while Babur had other ideas. Babur therefore
prudently withdrew to Kabul, leaving a garrison in Lahore. It would
have been dangerous for him to advance further into India, with a
truculent Daulat Khan behind him in Punjab threatening his line of
retreat.
Babur set out from Kabul on his final invasion of India in midNovember 1525, before the snows closed the mountain passes. He
moved leisurely, holding frequent wine parties along the way. By midDecember he crossed the Indus, never to recross it. His immediate
adversary was Daulat Khan, who had entered the field against him
with two swords girded to his waist to display his victory-or-death
resolve. That, it turned out, was just bluster, for as soon as Babur
approached, the Khan's army scattered and the old man himself tamely
surrendered. He was brought before Babur with his two swords hanging
from his neck. Babur upbraided him: "I called thee Father. I showed
thee more honour and respect than thou couldst have asked . . . What
ill sayest thou I have done thee, that thus thou shouldst hang a sword
on thy either side, lead an army out, fall on lands of ours, and stir strife
and trouble?" The Khan had no answer.
But Daulat Khan was irrelevant. The real challenge lay ahead, at
Panipat, where Ibrahim Lodi waited with his army. "I put my foot in
the stirrup of resolution," writes Babur, "set my hand on the rein of
trust in God, and moved forward against Sultan Ibrahim."
14
/I
BABUR DID NOT tarry in Punjab. Even then it took him a while to
settle his affairs there, so that by the time he crossed the Satluj and
advanced to the Yamuna, it was April, and the dreaded Indian summer
was upon him. On reaching the Yamuna, at a point east of Kurukshetra,
the epic battleground of the Mahabharata, Babur encamped.
Meanwhile Ibrahim Lodi, haughtily disregarding the dire warnings
of his astrologers, had advanced with his troops to Panipat, eighty
kilometres north of Delhi, to challenge the intruder. The opposing
forces thus lay two marches away from each other, the Afghans
immediately to the south of Panipat and the Mughals some way to the
north of it.
The going had been easy for Babur in India till then, as he had met
only desultory resistance from the Afghan provincial forces in Punjab.
Now he had to face the imperial Afghan army. His own army was
small by Indian standards. Four months earlier, when he was crossing
the Indus, his army, Babur reports, numbered 12,000 men, "great and
small, good and bad, retainer and non-retainer." He was later joined by
the contingents he had left behind in India during his previous campaign,
as well as by a few renegade Afghan officers and soldiers. With these
accretions, by the time Babur reached Panipat his army had probably
swelled to about 20,000 men.
The actual strength of the Afghan army is not known. Babur
estimated it to be roughly 100,000 strong, with some 1000 elephants.
Whatever the true count, the Afghan army was certainly much larger
than the Mughal army. This Afghan advantage was somewhat offset by
Babur's superior weaponry: a train of artillery (estimates vary from just
two to a few hundred pieces) and a contingent of musketeers (again of
unknown number, but probably about 4000) which would be used in
India in a field battle for the first time at Panipat. Still, the balance of
power favoured Ibrahim. Babur could win only by clever tactics.
MOST OF BABUR'S battles till then had been close combats in the hill
country, in constricted battlefields where large forces could not be
deployed, and it was not the size of the army but its spirit, the tactical
use of the terrain and the element of surprise that decided the outcome
of battles. Babur was now in flat, open country. Here numbers would
matter. There was little scope for a surprise attack, no tactical advantage
in the terrain. And valour, rapidity of response and manoeuvrability,
though they all could make a difference, would not be decisive.
To defeat Ibrahim Lodi, Babur had to neutralize the awesome
Afghan superiority in numbers and enable his own strengths in cavalry
and gunnery to prevail. The critical requirement for him was to create.
a narrow battlefront, to prevent the Afghans from sweeping around the
flanks of his small army and encircling it. But that in itself was not
enough, for however narrow the front, Babur would not have enough
depth of array to withstand the Afghan onslaught which could, by its
sheer mass and velocity, smash through the Mughal ranks like a giant
tidal wave. Babur had to devise a means to steel his frontline, to hold
the Afghans in check long enough for his slow-firing guns to break the
Afghan formation. If he could do that, then the Mughal cavalry could
charge into their midst and scythe them down.
What had Babur to do to gain that tactical advantage? In his
quandary, he summoned his veterans to a war council. Together,
reaching back to the lore of their turbulent land and the memory of
Babur's own thirty-two years of incessant wars, they conceived a
revolutionary new strategy that dexterously modified the traditional
Mughal battle formation to accommodate the Ottoman wall-of-fire
gunnery tactics and the wheeling cavalry charge of the Uzbegsto halt
the Afghan juggernaut in its tracks and annihilate it.
Having decided on the strategy, Babur sent out scouts to survey
the prospective battlefield at Panipat. The stretch of open land on the
eastern flank of Haryana along the Yarnuna was the traditional passage
into the Gangetic Plain, a corridor between the mountains on the north
and the desert on the south, at the end of which lay Delhi. This was the
arena of India's destiny where other decisive battles had been fought in
the past, as they would be in the future. The ground at Panipat was
ideal for a conventional field battle. It suited Ibrahim Lodi.
But it did not suit Babur. There was nothing at all in the terrain
that he could take advantage ofit was just a vast, open, flat field, its
monotony relieved only by a few trees and thorn bushes. Babur had
somehow to modify the battleground to serve his particular strategic
needs.
In two rapid marches southward along the Yamuna, Babur reached
Panipat and deployed his army to the east of the town, between the
town and the river, which in the sixteenth century flowed close by. His
16
right wing abutted the buildings of the town, secure against being
outflanked; to protect his left wing, he dug ditches and laid an obstacle
of felled trees between the river and his position, thus effectively
narrowing the width of the field to ensure that the battle would be
fought precisely along the front on which he deployed his army. The
enemy would have no chance to sweep around him, either on the left
or on the right.
To protect his frontline and to impede the Afghan cavalry onset,
Babur set up along his entire front a barrier of gun-carriages and other
carts, some 700 of them, placed about four metres apart and with ropes
of rawhide stretched between them. In between the carts, Babur placed
his musketeers, six or seven in each gap, protected by breastworks.
And to give an offensive potential to this essentially defensive
deployment, he left several gaps, each about a bow-shot wide, between
groups of carts through which a couple of hundred horsemen could
charge abreast. By 12th April Babur was ready for the enemy, his
preparations complete.
His was a perfect defensive-offensive arrangement, which could
hold the enemy at bay until he was ready to attack. The only
disadvantage, and this was a crucial factor, was that its success depended
on the Afghans attacking his entrenched position; if they did not attack,
all his elaborate preparations would be worth nothing. Babur confidently
expected the Afghans to attack, for after all the Mughals had intruded
into the Lodi domain and it was for Ibrahim Lodi to expel them.
Ibrahim Lodi viewed the situation differently.
He was close by, straddling the route to Delhi in a good blocking
position. As Babur set about preparing his defences, the sultan made
no move to interfere. Clearly, he was not planning to attack. He had no
need to, as his objective was only to deny Babur passage to Delhi.
Defence, in this case, was the best form of offence. By staying fast in his
position, the sultan could force Babur to leave his entrenchments and
attack him. Time was on Ibrahim Lodi's side. He could afford to wait.
But Babur could not. As an aggressor in an alien land, and facing a
superior army, he needed qurck results to keep his men in the high heat
of martial zeal. For seven days, with increasing restlessness, he waited
for the Afghan attack. Meanwhile, the morale of his army began to
crumble. "Many of the troops," he notes, "were in great tremor and
alarm."
Babur tried to calm them by ridiculing Ibrahim Lodi as "an unproved
brave" from whom they had nothing to fear. At the same time he
sought to incite the Afghans into action by sending provocative sallies
into their camp, hurling insults and shooting arrows. These were
17
ignored by the Afghans. "Still he made no move; nor did his troops
sally out," grumbles Babur. The unproved brave was proving to have
a firm and sound strategy of his own.
In the end, it was Babur who was obliged to change his battle plan
and launch, on 19th April, a night attack on the Afghans, hoping to
take them by surprise. The main body of Babur's left wing, a contingent
of some four or five thousand men, nearly a fourth of his army, was
sent into the attack, while Babur himself stood at arms with the rest of
his men, ready to press the advantage should the attackers make
headway, or to cover their retreat should they fail.
The foray was a fiasco. Instead of surprising the Afghans, the
Mughals were in for a surprise themselvesthey found the Afghans
alert and ready for them, so that, in peril of being decimated, they
retreated abruptly, without engaging.
But such was Babur's luck that it was this apparent rout that got
him what he wantedan Afghan attack on his position.
APRIL 20TH, THE day after the failed night attack, was a quiet day in
the Mughal camp, as Babur waited for the Afghan countermove. He
waited in vain, though late that night the Mughal camp was thrown
into panic by a false alarm about a surprise Afghan attack"For
twenty minutes there was uproar and call to arms," says Babur. The
Mughals were edgy,
Then, as dawn broke over the plain on Saturday, 21st April,
Mughal pickets reported that the Afghans were on the move. Apparently,
the easy rout of the Mughal night-raiders had emboldened the Afghans.
They scented an easy victory, and moved in for the kill.
This was a fatal error. The Afghans were walking into the trap
cunningly laid by Babur.
Babur waited, his cavalry, his barricade of carts and breastworks,
his cannoneers and musketeers, all in position. Behind the gun line, the
Mughal army, with soldiers as well as horses clad in mail, was drawn
up in the classic Timurid formationthe advance guard up front at the
centre, with the main contingent directly behind it, flanked by the right
and left wings, and flying squadrons at the far right and the far left. At
the rear of it all, Babur kept a large reserve force ready for any
contingency.
The Afghans came on at a fast gallop, as if they meant simply to
overrun the Mughals.
But they were in trouble even before they engaged the Mughal
army. Squeezed between the walls of Panipat on their left and Babur's
18
commanded two of his top amirs, Dilawar Khan and Amir Khatifa, to
bathe Ibrahim Lodi and to bury him with full honours at the spot
where he had fallen.
Panipat had given Babur his place in history, but it was only a
provisional place. If he abandoned India after Panipat, or if his successors
failed to preserve his conquest (as nearly happened), Babur would be
relegated to the nether regions of history crowded with petty potentates.
Babur could not afford to rest on his laurels. He had, as he enigmatically
noted m his memoirs, "seen his task whole".
There was, however, a lull in action after Panipat, as Babur's
adversaries, the Rajputs and the Afghans, waited to see what his moves
would be. Meanwhile, Babur's decision to make India his home brought
him several Indian allies, including a few Afghan nobles, who sought
to hitch their fortunes to the rising Mughal star. Also, the hostile public
mood in India, which had troubled Babur initially, now began to
dissipate, because, as Ahmad Yadgar puts it, "during the first two
months of His Majesty's reign, he behaved to every one with such
kindness and generosity that dread and terror were banished from the
hearts of all men." Babur's position further improved around this time
with the arrival of a number of Mughals from Central Asia to join him
on his invitation. "The Most High has given us sovereignty in
Hindustan," he had written to them; "let them come that we may see
prosperity together."
Babur needed all the strength he could marshal, for his position in
India was still perilous. By Central Asian reckoning, the domain that
Babur acquired by his victory over Ibrahim Lodi was immense, but it
was nevertheless only a strip of land staked out along the Lahore Delhi-Agra belt. The Mughals were by no means the dominant power
in India. The Afghans, defeated but not crushed, remained in power in
Bihar and Bengal. Immediately to the south of the Mughal lands lay a
powerful Rajput confederacy under Rana Sanga of Mewar, who dreamed of
raising a Hindu empire from the ashes of the Delhi Sultanate.
Further south was the prosperous Afghan kingdom of Gujarat, a
rallying ground for ambitious Afghans. Still further south, beyond the
Vindhya Mountains, were other powerful kingdoms, the Deccan
sultanates and the Vijayanagar empire.
Babur's immediate concern was with the Afghan chieftains who
had regrouped in eastern India and had menacingly advanced to
Kanauj, some 200 kilometres east of Agra. But the Afghan challenge
turned out to be a weak bluff. As the Mughals advanced, they scattered.
The Rajputs were quite another matter. Babur however remained
Kabul.
THEN THE RAINS ceased, and it was time again for Babur to return
to the battlefield. Rana Sanga of Mewar, heading a formidable Rajput
confederacy, and joined by several Afghan chieftains, including Mahmud
Lodi, the brother of Ibrahim Lodi, was rapidly advancing on Agra.
Babur and the Rana had been in friendly contact with each other before
the battle of Panipat, but now they had bitter grievances against each
otherBabur accused the Rana of not keeping his word to make a
diversionary attack on Ibrahim Lodi on the eve of Panipat, and the
Rana resented Babur occupying lands to which he had a claim. These
recriminations were, however, mere pretexts. The real issue was who
should have sway over Hindustan.
Rana Sanga was a dangerous adversary. According to James Tod,
an early-nineteenth-century chronicler of Rajput history, the Rana was
so intrepid and ferocious a warrior that at the close of his life "he
exhibited . but the fragments of a warrior. One eye was lost in a broil
with his brother, an arm in an action with the Lodi king of Delhi, while
he was cripple owing to a limb having been broken by a cannon ball.
From the sword or lance he counted eighty wounds on various parts of
his body."
As the Rana approached, Babur, who had been earlier sanguine
about the Rajputs, recognized the gravity of the threat. "Rana Sanga the
pagan . . . Satan-like he threw back his head and collected an army of
24
accursed heretics," writes Babur. "Ten powerful chiefs, each the leader
of a pagan host, uprose in rebellion, as smoke rises, and linked
themselves, as though enchained, to that perverse one." Babur calculated
the potential strength of the Rajputs as 200,000, an army much larger
than that which Ibrahim Lodi had deployed at Panipat.
This alarmed the Mughals. The problem, however, was not just of
numbers. There was also the Rajput valour to be reckoned with. As the
advancing Rajputs decimated every probing contingent that Babur sent
against them, "the fierceness and valour of the pagan army" made the
Mughal troops "anxious and afraid," admits Babur. Some of Babur's
Indian allies, especially the Afghans who had joined him after Panipat,
now began to desert him. Even his own men were sullen, reluctant to
fight a dangerous and uncertain battle, risking all their gains in India,
their rich booty, merely to defend a land they hated and did not want
to hold. They again pleaded with Babur to return to Kabul. "No manly
word or brave counsel was heard from any one soever," laments Babur.
There were problems elsewhere too. "Trouble and disturbance rose
on every side . . . Every day some unpleasant news reached us from
one place or another," writes Babur. His stars, it seemed, were once
again turning malevolent. To make matters worse, Muhammad Sharif,
a reputed astrologer who had just then arrived from Kabul, predicted
that, because of the adverse aspect of Mars, Babur would be defeated
by .Rana Sanga. This prophecy shattered the fragile morale of the
Mughal army, though Babur himself, no stranger to adversity, was not
perturbed: nye gave no ear to his wild words, made no change in our
operations, but got ready in earnest for the fight."
On 11th February 1527, having marshalled his forces by calling in
his outlying garrisons, Babur marched out of Agra to confront the
Rajputs. He advanced with great caution, taking care at every halt to
protect his camp with ditches, wooden tripods on wheels (which
served as portable breastworks, a new innovation) and carts joined
together with chains and ropes of rawhide. These precautions helped to
ease the anxiety of his men. But this was not enough. Battles are not
won by troops cowering behind defences. To win, Babur would have to
ignite the blood of his warriors.
Mulling over the problem one day while out tiding, Babur came up
with a perfect solution. For over fourteen years he had been a heavy
drinker, a grave though common infraction among the Mughals. Now, in
his hour of crisis, he decided to "return to obedience"to win divine
favour, and, more importantly, to gain the moral authority to declare the
war against Rana Sanga (his first war against a Hindu monarch) as a jihad,
holy war, and thus to unleash the martial fury of his men.
25
Babur turning the Rajput flanks. Mustafa, the Ottoman Turk in charge
of the Mughal artillery, "had the carts brought forward and broke the
ranks of pagans with matchlock and cannon," reports Babur. And the
Mughal soldiers, inflamed by Babur's oration, "fought with such delight
and pleasure that it was more like a time of mirth than one of war,"
notes Nizamuddin Ahmad.
In the end the Rajputs fled, leaving so many dead in the battlefield
that, according to Babur, the Mughal contingents chasing them "found
no foot-space without the prostrate foe." Rana Sanga himself fled, with
Babur in hot pursuit, But after a chase of about three kilometres beyond
the enemy camp, Babur peeled away, leaving it to others to follow on,
which enabled the Rana to escape. "There was a little slackness; I ought
to have gone myself," writes Babur. Apparently he did not want to
force his luck. Nor did he, as he would normally have done, follow up
the victory with an invasion of Mewar, because of "little water and
much heat on the road."
Returning to the battlefield, Babur ordered a pillar of severed
enemy heads to be erected on the hill beside which the battle was
fought. This was a Mughal military rite performed after almost every
battle, to, strike terror in potential adversaries and thus to cripple their
spirit and defeat them even before the battle was fought on the ground.
By nightfall Babur returned to his camp, and there assumed the
title of Ghazi, Holy Warrior. He then turned to Muhammad Sharif, the
astrologer who had predicted a Mughal rout, but was now waiting to
congratulate Babur on his victory. Babur tore into him: "I poured forth
upon him a torrent of abuse." But eventually his generosity prevailed.
"When I had relieved my heart by it, although he was a self-conceited
fellow . . and an intolerable evil-speaker, yet, as he was my old
servant, I gave him a lakh in a present, and dismissed him, commanding
him to depart from my dominions."
27
limericksand suffered for it! A few days after one such trivial
composition, notes Babur, "I had fever and discharge, followed by
cough, and I began to spit blood each time I coughed. I knew whence
my reproof came; I knew what act of mine had brought this affliction
on me."
Unfortunately, very little of Babur's poetry has survived, so his
literary reputation today rests solely on his autobiography, and even
from this large--portions are missing. Babur used to carry his journal
with him all the time, even on military campaigns, working on it
whenever he had a little time. This habit of his once led to a near
disaster. He was at that time encamped at a riverside, sitting up late in
the night, writing. Suddenly, a great storm burst over the camp. "Such
a storm burst, in the inside of a moment, from the up-piled clouds of
the rainy season, and such a stiff gale rose, that few tents were left
standing," Babur records. "I was in the audience tent, about to write;
before I could collect papers and sections, the tent came down, with its
porch, right on my head . . . Sections and book were drenched under
water and were gathered together with much difficulty. We laid them in
folds of the woollen throne-carpet, put this on the throne and on it piled
blankets . We, without sleep, were busy till shoot of day drying folios
and sections." It was probably in some such mishap that the missing
sections of his memoirs were lost.
The great charm of Babur's memoirs is its directness and simplicity,
its total lack of affectation. Babur was a candid chronicler. "In this
history I have held firmly to it that the truth should be reached in
every matter, and that every act should be recorded precisely as it
occurred," he writes. "From this it follows of necessity that I have set
down of good and bad whatever is known, concerning father and elder
brother, kinsman and stranger; of them all I have set down carefully
the known virtues and defects."
This was his precept. His practice did not always quite match the
high ideal. Babur was writing about himself, with his eyes on posterity,
and he would not have been human if he did not intensify the drama
of his life. Babur's descriptions of events do sometimes vary in detail
from other contemporary sources, and it cannot be assumed that his
version was always right. The discrepancies are, however, minor, and
could be due to differences in perception or quirks of memory.
Apart from the books he wrote, Babur had to his credit several
other cultural accomplishments, such as musical compositions, and the
creation of a new and distinctive style of calligraphy, called Baburi. But
his greatest passion outside literature was gardening. He would even
pause in the midst of critical military campaigns to lay out gardens, as
30
BACK IN AGRA after the battle of Khanua, Babur rewarded his men
suitably, distributed fiefs among his nobles, and, as he had promised
32
BABUR HAD NOT been in good health for quite some time. Despite
his phenomenal physical vitality, he had always been prone to illness,
and at least once, in 1498, when he was fifteen, was so critically ill that
his life was despaired of. His memoirs are dotted with accounts of his
numerous ailments. "It was a strange sort of illness," writes Babur
about a bout of fever, "for whenever with much trouble I had been
awakened, my eyes closed again in sleep. In four or five days I got
quite well." On his final Indian expedition, as soon he crossed the
mountains he fell ill. "That evening I had fever and discharge which
led on to cough, and every time I coughed, I spat blood," he notes. In
India, because of the oppressive climate and the rigours of incessant
wars, he was ill quite often, especially in the last couple of years of his life
he suffered from recurrent fever, boils, diarrhoea, sciatica,
discharges of the ears and spitting of blood.
Amazingly, despite his ill health, even late in his life Babur could
perform physical feats from which a much younger man would have
flinched. At forty-six we find him exuberantly swimming across the
Ganga. "I swam the Ganga river, counting every stroke," he writes, "I
crossed with thirty-three, then, without resting, swam back. I had
swum the other rivers, Ganga had remained to do." Still, age had
begun to tell on him. He suffered from ennui as much as from ill
health. For all his vigorous enjoyment of life, Babur had a renunciatory
streak in him, a predilection for mysticism. "I am a king but yet the
slave of dervishes," he used to say. He had led a full life, had seen
everything, done everything, and now he was tired. Sometimes he
went into a deep depression and talked of becoming a hermit. "My
heart is bowed down by ruling and reigning," he said. "I will make
over the kingdom to Humayun."
His iron will began to falter. He returned to wine. And, though he
had not till then shown any great fondness for the company of women,
he now became attached to two Caucasian slave girls, Gul-nar and Nar g ul, whom he had received as a gift from Shah Tahmasp of Persia a
couple of years earlier. The death of an infant son, Alwar, at this time
upset him greatly. He missed his children, and kept asking to see
Hindal, his youngest son, who was away in Kabul. There were signs of
senility. His mind often wandered. He took little interest in government.
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