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    United States v. Thurmond, 10th Cir. (1998)

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    Elliott Sylvester Thurmond pleaded guilty to armed robbery and use of a firearm charges. At sentencing, the district court enhanced Thurmond's offense level for obstruction of justice based on evidence that while in pretrial custody, Thurmond had discussed a plan to hire illegal aliens to falsely confess to the charges. On appeal, Thurmond argued this evidence violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, but the Tenth Circuit affirmed, finding that even if a Sixth Amendment violation occurred, the exclusionary rule does not generally apply to exclude improperly obtained evidence at sentencing.

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    United States v. Thurmond, 10th Cir. (1998)

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    Elliott Sylvester Thurmond pleaded guilty to armed robbery and use of a firearm charges. At sentencing, the district court enhanced Thurmond's offense level for obstruction of justice based on evidence that while in pretrial custody, Thurmond had discussed a plan to hire illegal aliens to falsely confess to the charges. On appeal, Thurmond argued this evidence violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, but the Tenth Circuit affirmed, finding that even if a Sixth Amendment violation occurred, the exclusionary rule does not generally apply to exclude improperly obtained evidence at sentencing.

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    Filed: 1998-04-08 Precedential Status: Non-Precedential Docket: 97-3035

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    Elliott Sylvester Thurmond pleaded guilty to armed robbery and use of a firearm charges. At sentencing, the district court enhanced Thurmond's offense level for obstruction of justice based on evidence that while in pretrial custody, Thurmond had discussed a plan to hire illegal aliens to falsely confess to the charges. On appeal, Thurmond argued this evidence violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, but the Tenth Circuit affirmed, finding that even if a Sixth Amendment violation occurred, the exclusionary rule does not generally apply to exclude improperly obtained evidence at sentencing.

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    27 views6 pages

    United States v. Thurmond, 10th Cir. (1998)

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    Scribd Government Docs
    Elliott Sylvester Thurmond pleaded guilty to armed robbery and use of a firearm charges. At sentencing, the district court enhanced Thurmond's offense level for obstruction of justice based on evidence that while in pretrial custody, Thurmond had discussed a plan to hire illegal aliens to falsely confess to the charges. On appeal, Thurmond argued this evidence violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, but the Tenth Circuit affirmed, finding that even if a Sixth Amendment violation occurred, the exclusionary rule does not generally apply to exclude improperly obtained evidence at sentencing.

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    F I L E D

    United States Court of Appeals


    Tenth Circuit

    APR 8 1998

    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

    PATRICK FISHER

    TENTH CIRCUIT

    Clerk

    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,


    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    v.

    No. 97-3035
    (D. Kansas)

    ELLIOTT SYLVESTER
    THURMOND,

    (D.C. No. 96-40052-01-DES)

    Defendant - Appellant.
    ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
    Before ANDERSON, McKAY, and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges.

    Defendant Elliott Sylvester Thurmond pleaded guilty to two counts of


    armed robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2113(d), and one count of use of a
    firearm in relation to a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1).
    Enhancing his offense level for obstruction of justice, see U.S.S.G. 3C1.1, the
    district court sentenced Mr. Thurmond to a prison term of 157 months.

    This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of
    law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the
    citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under
    the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
    *

    Mr. Thurmond appeals his sentence, contending that the evidence supporting the
    enhancement for obstruction of justice was obtained in violation of his Sixth
    Amendment right to counsel.
    The facts are not disputed. On April 5, 1996, Mr. Thurmond was arrested
    pursuant to an indictment charging him with two firearms violations (the
    firearms charges). At his detention hearing, defense counsel learned that
    Mr. Thurmond was being investigated in connection with the bank robberies that
    are the subject of the convictions in this appeal (which, for simplicity, we will
    refer to as the bank robbery charges even though this group of charges also
    included other charges related to firearms). The firearms and bank robbery
    charges did not arise out of the same or related conduct.
    Sometime after the detention hearing, it became clear that Mr. Thurmond
    would be indicted on the bank robbery charges; so, on May 1, he instructed
    counsel to initiate plea negotiations relating to the as-yet-uncharged bank
    robberies. On May 3, defense counsel began plea negotiations on the bank
    robbery charges, although no formal agreement was worked out. Defense counsel
    next met with Mr. Thurmond on May 6, to discuss the plea negotiations, plea
    colloquy, and sentencing guidelines. However, at the May 6 meeting, Mr.
    Thurmond instructed counsel to discontinue plea negotiations on the bank robbery
    charges. Mr. Thurmond was indicted on these charges on July 24, 1996, and
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    eventually pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement in which the government


    agreed to dismiss the firearms charges. The district court accepted the plea.
    The reason Mr. Thurmond originally canceled plea negotiations was that he
    was planning to hire illegal aliens to perjure themselves by confessing to both the
    firearms charges and the bank robbery charges. As the Presentence Report
    (PSR) notes, while Mr. Thurmond was in custody on the firearms charge, he
    discussed this plan with his cellmate, who became a government informant and
    who arranged several phone calls between Mr. Thurmond and an undercover
    Kansas Bureau of Investigation (KBI) agent to discuss the plan. R. Vol. IV at
    7. Mr. Thurmond also sent money on two occasions to the KBI agent to facilitate
    the plan. Id. The PSR recommended that Mr. Thurmonds plan to hire the illegal
    aliens be considered obstruction of justice and that his offense level be increased
    by two levels as a result. Over Mr. Thurmonds objection, the district court
    agreed.
    On appeal, Mr. Thurmond does not challenge the courts determination that
    his conduct amounted to obstruction of justice. He contends instead that by
    obtaining evidence of the obstruction through the informant, the government
    violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Arguing that his right to counsel
    had clearly attached with regard to the firearms charges on which he had been
    indicted, and for which he had been taken into custody, he claims that his right to
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    counsel also attached to any uncharged misconducti.e., the bank robbery


    chargeswhich could affect his sentence. He further argues that his right to
    counsel on the bank robbery charges had attached because he had already begun
    plea negotiations on these charges, even though he had not yet been indicted on
    them. Implicit in both arguments is his claim that the government deliberately
    elicited incriminating information from him through the informant, see, e.g.,
    United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 270-75 (1980); United States v. Johnson,
    4 F.3d 904, 910 (10th Cir. 1993), a claim the government does not dispute. 1 Both
    arguments raise a legal issue that we review de novo. See United States v.
    Shumway, 112 F.3d 1413, 1426 (10th Cir. 1997).
    The Sixth Amendment right to counsel generally attaches at or after the
    initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedingswhether by way of formal
    charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment. McNeil v.
    Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 175 (1991) (quotations omitted); see also United States
    v. Baez-Acuna, 54 F.3d 634, 637 (10th Cir. 1995). Once this right attaches and
    the defendant properly invokes the right by retaining or requesting counsel, see
    id., the government may not knowingly circumvent[] the accuseds right to have
    counsel present in a confrontation between the accused and a state agent. Maine

    We note, however, that Mr. Thurmond makes no entrapment argument.

    -4-

    v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 176 (1985); see also Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S.
    625, 636 (1986).
    Ordinarily, the remedy for a violation of a defendants Sixth Amendment
    right to counsel is the exclusion at trial of any improperly obtained evidence.
    See, e.g., Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 207 (1964). Here, however, the
    evidence was used not at trial, but at sentencing. Consistent with other circuits,
    we have held that the exclusionary rule generally does not apply to exclude
    improperly obtained evidence at sentencing, at least so long as there is no
    indication the evidence was illegally obtained to secure an increased sentence.
    See United States v. Jessup, 966 F.2d 1354, 1356-57 (10th Cir. 1992); United
    States v. Graves, 785 F.2d 870, 873-76 (10th Cir. 1986); accord United States v.
    Jenkins, 4 F.3d 1338, 1344-45 (6th Cir. 1993); United States v. Tejada, 956 F.2d
    1256, 1260-63 (2d Cir. 1992).
    Mr. Thurmond does not contend that the government obtained the evidence
    to enhance his sentence, nor does he question the governments explanation that
    its purpose for using the informant was to discover the identities of two other
    suspects in the bank robberies and the location of the proceeds. See Appellants
    Br. at 4. Therefore, even if we assumed, arguendo, that Mr. Thurmonds Sixth
    Amendment right to counsel on the bank robbery charges is one which applies to
    the use of uncharged conduct at sentencing, and that such right had attached, and
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    that the governments conduct therefore violated that right (issues which we find
    unnecessary to resolve in this case), we would still find no basis to exclude the
    resulting evidence at sentencing. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court
    did not err in enhancing Mr. Thurmonds sentence for obstruction of justice based
    on the information obtained through the informant.
    The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
    ENTERED FOR THE COURT
    Stephen H. Anderson
    Circuit Judge

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