Espinoza v. Novak, 10th Cir. (2001)

F I L E D
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit
JUN 4 2001
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
ARTHUR ESPINOZA,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
JUANITA NOVAK and ATTORNEY
GENERAL OF THE STATE OF
COLORADO,
No. 00-1351
(D.C. No. 00-Z-1383)
(D. Colo.)
Respondents-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT
Before SEYMOUR , BRORBY , and BRISCOE , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination
of this appeal.
See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Petitioner Arthur Espinoza appeals the district courts order dismissing as

untimely his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
2254. Because petitioner has not made a substantial showing that the district
courts procedural ruling is debatable, we deny his application for a certificate of
appealability, and dismiss the appeal.
Petitioner is currently serving a life sentence in the custody of the Colorado
Department of Corrections. In 1990, while on escape status, he was arrested and
charged with the armed robbery of a convenience store. Petitioner was provided
an attorney from the public defenders office who represented him during trial.
Petitioner was convicted of aggravated robbery after a jury trial. In
September 1990, he received a life sentence based on an enhancement for
committing the crime while on escape status and three counts of being an habitual
criminal. Petitioner appealed, and on October 8, 1992, the Colorado Court of
Appeals affirmed his conviction, but vacated his sentence and remanded for a
proportionality review. The Colorado Supreme Court denied certiorari review on
June 21, 1993. On February 18, 1994, the state district court issued its order
denying petitioners motion for extended proportionality review, and he appealed.
The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed on March 6, 1997, and the Colorado
Supreme Court denied certiorari review on October 6, 1997.
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On June 19, 1998, petitioner filed a motion for post-conviction relief

pursuant to Colorado Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(c). The state district court
denied petitioners motion on the ground that it was time barred. The Colorado
Court of Appeals affirmed on July 8, 1999, holding that even if the motion was
not time barred it was insufficient to show ineffective assistance of counsel.
Petitioner failed to file his petition for certiorari review within the forty-five day
period following the court of appeals affirmance. On October 20, 1999, he filed
a motion for leave to file a certiorari petition out of time, which was granted, and
his petition for certiorari was denied on March 13, 2000.
On June 30, 2000, petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in
the federal district court, alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective. The
district court ordered petitioner to supplement his petition with information
regarding the date he filed for post-conviction relief and any other information
relevant to the timeliness of his petition. After receiving petitioners supplement,
the district court denied the habeas petition as untimely. Petitioner appealed.
On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), which substantially amended the process of
applying for habeas relief. Under AEDPA, a prisoner must obtain a certificate of
appealability as a prerequisite to appellate review, 28 U.S.C. 2253(c), by
making a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. Where, as
-3-
here, the district court dismisses a habeas petition on a procedural ground, the
prisoner must show both that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether
the district court was correct in its procedural ruling, and that jurists of reason
would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a
constitutional right.
Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Each of
these steps is part of a threshold inquiry that must be satisfied before the court
of appeals may hear the appeal.
Id. at 485.
We examine first whether defendant has made a substantial showing that

the district court erred in dismissing his habeas motion as untimely. AEDPA
imposed a one-year limitation on a prisoners right to apply for habeas relief,
running from the date the prisoners conviction became final.
See 28 U.S.C.
2244(d)(1). Petitioner has filed documents in this court showing that the
district court was incorrect in concluding that his conviction became final before
the enactment of AEDPA. We need not address the effect of filing such
documentation for the first time on appeal because, even if petitioners conviction
did not become final until October 6, 1997, his habeas petition was still untimely.
Using the date of October 6, 1997, as the date petitioners conviction
became final, he had until October 6, 1998, to file his habeas petition, absent
tolling of the limitations period. Pursuant to 2244(d)(2), the limitations period
is tolled by [t]he time during which a properly filed application for State
-4-
post-conviction or other collateral review . . . is pending. Thus, the limitations

period was tolled by petitioners filing of his Rule 35(c) motion with the state
district court on June 19, 1998. At this time, two hundred and fifty-five days of
the limitations period had already run.
Under our case law, petitioners state post-conviction proceeding was
pending until August 22, 1999, which is the last date he could have filed for
certiorari review of the denial of relief.
See Gibson v. Klinger , 232 F.3d 799, 804
(10th Cir. 2000). The limitations period then began to run, and it was not tolled
until fifty-nine days later when petitioner filed his motion for leave to file a
certiorari petition out of time on October 20, 1999.
Id. at 807. This motion tolled
the limitations period until the Colorado Supreme Court denied certiorari review
on March 13, 2000. Petitioner then had fifty-one days in which to file his federal
habeas petition, that is, until May 3, 2000. He did not file his petition until
June 30, 2000, which was fifty-eight days after the limitations period expired.
Thus, even accepting that the district court used the wrong date in determining
when petitioners conviction was final, its conclusion that the habeas petition was
untimely is correct.
Because petitioner has not made the threshold showing that jurists of reason
would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural
-5-
ruling, we need not address whether he made a substantial showing of the denial
of a constitutional right.
Slack , 529 U.S. at 485.
Petitioners motion to proceed in forma pauperis is granted, his application

for a certificate of appealability is denied, and the appeal is dismissed.
Entered for the Court
Stephanie K. Seymour
Circuit Judge
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F I L E D

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

United States Court of Appeals

Before SEYMOUR , BRORBY , and BRISCOE , Circuit Judges.

See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is

therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.

Petitioner Arthur Espinoza appeals the district courts order dismissing as

On June 19, 1998, petitioner filed a motion for post-conviction relief

Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Each of

We examine first whether defendant has made a substantial showing that

post-conviction or other collateral review . . . is pending. Thus, the limitations

See Gibson v. Klinger , 232 F.3d 799, 804

Id. at 807. This motion tolled

Slack , 529 U.S. at 485.

Petitioners motion to proceed in forma pauperis is granted, his application

Entered for the Court

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