United States v. Chrisman, 10th Cir. (2009)
United States v. Chrisman, 10th Cir. (2009)
United States v. Chrisman, 10th Cir. (2009)
July 9, 2009
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
v.
JACK L. CHRISMAN,
Defendant-Appellant.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and
collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent
with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Background
In April of 2008, Chrisman was stopped for a traffic violation and a pipe
bomb was discovered in the back seat of his car. He was charged with one count
of possession of an unregistered firearm, pursuant to 26 U.S.C. 5841, 5861(d),
and 5871. He ultimately entered a guilty plea to the charge. At the sentencing
hearing, the district court first approved a correction to the presentence report
(PSR). As corrected, the PSR calculated Chrismans total offense level at 19 and
his criminal-history category at VI, for an imprisonment range of 63 to 78
months. The government argued for a sentence of 70 months. The defense took
the position that the Court [could] justify under [18 U.S.C. ] 3553 the same
type of sentence that the guidelines calculate here, which is a sentence between 5
and 6 years. R. Vol. III at 5. In announcing the sentence of 63 months, the
district court stated that it would follow the [PSRs] recommendation and impose
the minimum recommended sentence of 63 months. Id. at 8. The court then
reviewed the Guidelines calculations resulting in an imprisonment range of 63 to
78 months and stated, I find no reason to depart from that range, which does not
exceed 24 months, and will impose a sentence within that range. Id. 1 Before
closing the hearing, the court asked the parties if there was anything further and
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proper sentence (in terms of 3353(a) and other congressional mandates). Rita
v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2468 (2007). 2 Further, Chrisman
did not ask the court to clarify its no reason to depart remark, even though the
court provided him an opportunity to do so. His failure to seek clarification
prevented the court from correct[ing] or avoid[ing] the mistake so that it [could
not] possibly affect the ultimate outcome. Puckett v. United States, 129 S. Ct.
1423, 1428 (2009). Finally, Chrisman received the sentence he requestedhe
requested and received a sentence at the low end of the sentencing range. For
Chrisman to now argue that the district courts sentencing was procedurally
unreasonable smacks of invited error. See United States v. LaHue, 261 F.3d 993,
1011 (10th Cir. 2001) (The invited error doctrine prevents a party from inducing
action by a court and later seeking reversal on the ground that the requested
action was in error. (quotation omitted)). Accordingly, we conclude that
Chrismans sentence is not procedurally unreasonable.
AFFIRMED.
We are aware that Chrisman does not argue on appeal that the district
courts stated reasons are insufficient and, in fact, disclaims any such argument.
Aplt. Opening Br. at 8 n.2.
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