Aristotle: On the Constitution of Carthage

"...held up as a model" c. 340 B.C.

The Carthaginians are also considered to have an excellent form of government, which
differs from that of any other state in several respects, though it is in some very like the
Spartan. Indeed, all three states---the Spartan, the Cretan, and the Carthaginian---nearly
resemble one another, and are very different from any others. Many of the Carthaginian
institutions are excellent. The superiority of their constitution is proved by the fact that
the common people remain loyal to the constitution. The Carthaginians have never had
any rebellion worth speaking of, and have never been under the rule of a tyrant. Among
the points in which the Carthaginian constitution resembles the Spartan are the following:
The common tables of the clubs answer to the Spartan phiditia, and their magistracy of
the Hundred-Four to the Ephors; but, whereas the Ephors are any chance persons, the
magistrates of the Carthaginians are elected according to merit---this is an improvement.
They have also their kings and their Gerousia, or council of elders, who correspond to the
kings and elders of Sparta. Their kings, unlike the Spartan, are not always of the same
family, nor that an ordinary one, but if there is some distinguished family they are
selected out of it and not appointed by seniority---this is far better. Such officers have
great power, and therefore, if they are persons of little worth, do a great deal of harm, and
they have already done harm at Sparta.
Most of the defects or deviations from the perfect state, for which the Carthaginian
constitution would be censured, apply equally to all the forms of government which we
have mentioned. But of the deflections from aristocracy and constitutional government,
some incline more to democracy and some to oligarchy. The kings and elders, if
unanimous, may determine whether they will or will not bring a matter before the people,
but when they are not unanimous, the people decide on such matters as well. And
whatever the kings and elders bring before the people is not only heard but also
determined by them, and any one who likes may oppose it; now this is not permitted in
Sparta and Crete. That the magistrates of five who have under them many important
matters should be co-opted, that they should choose the supreme council of One
Hundred, and should hold office longer than other magistrates (for they are virtually
rulers both before and after they hold office)---these are oligarchical features; their being
without salary and not elected by lot, and any similar points, such as the practice of
having all suits tried by the magistrates, and not some by one class of judges or jurors and
some by another, as at Sparta, are characteristic of aristocracy.
The Carthaginian constitution deviates from aristocracy and inclines to oligarchy,
chiefly on a point where popular opinion is on their side. For men in general think that
magistrates should be chosen not only for their merit, but for their wealth: a man, they
say, who is poor cannot rule well---he has not the leisure. If, then, election of magistrates
for their wealth be characteristic of oligarchy, and election for merit of aristocracy, there
will be a third form under which the constitution of Carthage is comprehended; for the
Carthaginians choose their magistrates, and particularly the highest of them---their kings
and generals---with an eye both to merit and to wealth. But we must acknowledge that, in
thus deviating from aristocracy, the legislator has committed an error. Nothing is more

absolutely necessary than to provide that the highest class, not only when in office, but
when out of office, should have leisure and not disgrace themselves in any way; and to
this his attention should be first directed. Even if you must have regard to wealth, in order
to secure leisure, yet it is surely a bad thing that the greatest offices, such as those of
kings and generals, should be bought. The law which allows this abuse makes wealth of
more account than virtue, and the whole state becomes avaricious.
For, whenever the chiefs of the state deem anything honorable, the other citizens are
sure to follow their example; and, where virtue has not the first place, their aristocracy
cannot be firmly established. Those who have been at the expense of purchasing their
places will be in the habit of repaying themselves; and it is absurd to suppose that a poor
and honest man will be wanting to make gains, and that a lower stamp of man who has
incurred a great expense will not. Wherefore they should rule who are able to rule best.
And even if the legislator does not care to protect the good from poverty, he should at any
rate secure leisure for them when in office. It would seem also to be a bad principle that
the same person should hold many offices, which is a favorite practice among the
Carthaginians, for one business is better done by one man.
The government of the Carthaginians is oligarchical, but they successfully escape the
evils of oligarchy by enriching one portion of the people after another by sending them to
their colonies. This is their panacea and the means by which they give stability to the
state. Accident favors them, but the legislator should be able to provide against revolution
without trusting to accidents. As things are, if any misfortune occurred, and the bulk of
the subjects revolted, there would be no way of restoring peace by legal methods.1
Aristotle on the Carthaginian State
It is a general opinion that the Carthaginians live under a polity which is excellent and
in many respects superior to all others, while there are some points in which it most
resembles the Lacedaemonian. The fact is that these three polities, the Cretan, the
Lacedaemonian and the Carthaginian have a sort of family likeness and differ widely
from all others, and not a few of their institutions are excellent. It may be inferred that a
polity is well ordered, when the commons are ever loyal to the political system, and no
civil conflict worth speaking of has arisen, nor has anyone succeeded in making himself
tyrant. The points in which the Carthaginian polity resembles the Lacedaemonian are that
the common meals of the Clubs correspond to the Phiditia and the office of the Hundredand-Four to the Ephoralty, with this advantage that the Hundred-and-Four are elected for
their personal merit, whereas the Ephors are taken from any ordinary people, and lastly
the Kings and Senators in the one to the Kings and Senators in the other. It is a point of
superiority in the Carthaginian polity that the Kings do not belong to a separate family
and this one of no particular merit, and that, although they must belong to one of certain
distinguished families, they succeed to the throne by election and not by seniority. For as
the Kings are constituted the supreme authorities in important matters, the result is that, if
they are worthless persons, they do serious injury and in fact have done it to the
Lacedaemonian State.

Of the points which may fairly be censured as deviations from the best polity nearly all
are common to the three polities mentioned above; whereas those which are censurable as
offending against the primary conception of an Aristocracy or a Polity which the State
proposes to itself are errors partly on the side of Democracy and partly of Oligarchy. For
instance, it is within the competence of the Kings and the Senate, provided that they are
unanimous, to decide whether business shall or shall not be brought before the Commons;
although, if they disagree, it is necessarily referred to the Commons. On the other hand,
whenever they submit business to the Commons, the popular assembly is thereby
empowered not merely to listen to all the resolutions of the government, but it has
authority also to pronounce judgment upon them, and anyone who chooses is at liberty to
object to the proposals - which is not the case in the Lacedaemonian and Cretan polities.
So far the polity of Carthage is democratical. But there is an oligarchical element in the
power of cooption enjoyed by the Pentarchies, which are boards of high and various
authority, in their right of electing the Hundred who are the highest officers of State and
in their tenure of official power for a longer period than any other board of officers, as
their power begins before they actually enter upon office and continues after they have
actually gone out of it. The unpaid character of the Pentarchies, their appointment by
other means than by lot, and other similar features of the polity may be regarded as
aristocratical; so too is the rule by which all cases alike are tried by certain fixed boards
of magistrates, instead of being divided among different boards as at Lacedaemon. The
point in which the Carthaginian system departs most widely from Aristocracy on the side
of Oligarchy is in the popular idea that wealth as well as merit deserves to be considered
in the election of officers of State, as it is impossible for a poor man to enjoy the leisure
necessary for the proper performance of official duties. Assuming then that election by
wealth is oligarchical and election by merit aristocratical, we may reckon as a third
method the one which obtains in the constitutional system of the Carthaginians who in
the election of officers of State generally and especially of the highest officers, viz. the
Kings and the Generals, pay regard not to wealth only nor to merit only but to both. This
departure from the principles of Aristocracy must be regarded as an error of the legislator.
It is a point of primary importance to provide in the first instance that the best citizens,
not only during their period of office but in all their private life, may be able to enjoy
leisure and be free from degrading duties. But granting that it is right to have regard not
only to merit but also to affluence as a means of securing leisure, we may still censure the
arrangement by which at Carthage the highest offices of State, viz. the Kingship and
Generalship, are put up to sale. The effect of such a law is that wealth is more highly
esteemed than virtue, and the whole State is avaricious. Whenever the ruling class regards
a thing as honourable, the opinion of the citizens generally is sure to follow suit. No
polity however can be permanently aristocratical where merit is not held in supreme
honour. Nor is it unreasonable that people, if they pay for the privilege, should get the
habit of making their official status a source of pecuniary profit, when they have been put
to heavy expenses in order to hold it. If a poor man of good character will aspire to be the
gainer by his office, the same will be true, a fortiori, of one whose character stands lower,
as is the case with the purchaser of official power, when he has already been put to great
expense. It follows that the offices of State ought to be in the hands of the persons who
are able to fill them best. But even if the legislator did not trouble himself about the

poverty of the higher class of citizens, it would be worth while to make provision for
their leisure at least during the time that they hold office.
Another objectionable point is the concentration of several offices in the same hands,
which is a favourite plan of the Carthaginians. For a single work is best performed by a
single person. It is the legislator's business to secure this division of labour and not
appoint the same man to be flute-player and cobbler. Thus in any state of considerable
size a division of offices among a number of people is the more statesmanlike and
popular arrangement; not only does it admit a larger number of citizens to official power,
but, as we said, the same work is more successfully and rapidly performed, as may be
seen in naval and military affairs, in both of which the principle of rule and subjection
may be said to pervade the whole force. But despite the oligarchical character of the
polity the Carthaginians are most successful in avoiding civil disturbance by sending out
from time to time a certain number of the common people to their subject States and
thereby enabling them to acquire riches. This is their means of healing the wounds of the
polity and placing it on a permanent basis. But we may fairly object that this is but the
work of Fortune, and that it is the legislator who ought to prevent civil war; while as
things are, in the event of some calamity and a general revolt of the subject class, the
laws afford no means of securing peace. Such then are the conditions of the
Lacedaemonian, the Cretan and the Carthaginian polities which have all a just and high
reputation.2