Not Precedential
BLD-039
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 15-2591
___________
STEPHEN RANDALL SMITH,
Appellant
v.
WARDEN MAIORANA; MR. WRIGHT; DR. FARKUS, DMP;
MR. BURKE, PA; MR. RODRIGUIS;
MULTIPLE UNKNOWN NAMED EMPLOYEES OF THE FEDERAL
BUREAU OF PRISONS; UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 3-13-cv-00070)
Magistrate Judge Honorable Maureen P. Kelly
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2)(B)
or Summary Action Under Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
November 5, 2015
Before: FUENTES, KRAUSE and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges
(Filed: November 12, 2015)
_________
OPINION*
_________
PER CURIAM
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
Pro se appellant Stephen R. Smith appeals from the judgment of the United States
District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania in his civil rights case. As the
appeal does not present a substantial question, we will grant the Governments motion for
summary affirmance and affirm the decision of the District Court.
I.
Stephen R. Smith is a federal prisoner, previously housed in the Federal
Correctional Institution in Loretto, Pennsylvania (FCI Loretto), and under the control
of the Bureau of Prisons (B.O.P.). Smith filed an amended complaint against Warden
Maiorana, Mr. Wright, Doctor Farkas,1 Steven Burk,2 Mr. Rodriguez-Miralles,3 and
multiple unknown named employees, bringing his claims under Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). He also named the
United States of America as a defendant under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C.
1346(b), 2671 et seq. (FTCA). He alleged that: (1) the medical staff of FCI Loretto
were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs; (2) the prison staff failed to protect
him or adequately supervise the prisoners; and (3) he received negligent medical care
from the medical staff. He asked only for damages. The Court found that Smith failed to
exhaust his administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act
Doctor Farkas is incorrectly named as Doctor Farkus.
Steven Burk is incorrectly named as Mr. Burke.
3
Mr. Rodriguez-Miralles is incorrectly identified as Mr. Rodriguis.
1
2
(PLRA) and under the FTCA, and granted summary judgment in favor of the
defendants.4
II.
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1331, and we have
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1291. We exercise plenary review over the District
Courts order granting summary judgment. 5 See Giles v. Kearney, 571 F.3d 318, 322
(3d Cir. 2009). A district court may grant summary judgment only when the record
shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). When making this analysis, a
district court must credit the evidence of the non-moving party, and draw all justifiable
inferences in the non-movants party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 255 (1986). A mere scintilla of evidence in support of the [non-moving party]s
position will be insufficient to create a genuine issue of fact. Id. at 252. The nonmoving party must show where in the record there exists a genuine dispute over a
material fact. See Doe v. Abington Friends Sch., 480 F.3d 252, 256 (3d Cir. 2007).
The District Court correctly entered summary judgment because Smith failed to
exhaust his administrative remedies as required by the PLRA and the FTCA. Under 42
U.S.C. 1997e(a), a prisoner must exhaust all of his administrative remedies. See Booth
v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 739 (2001); see also Nyhuis v. Reno, 204 F.3d 65, 67 (3d Cir.
The parties consented to have the case heard by a magistrate judge, pursuant to 28
U.S.C. 636(c)(1).
5
We may summarily affirm a decision of the District Court if the appeal does not raise a
substantial issue. 3d Cir. LAR 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.
3
2000). Exhaustion is determined by determining answering two questions. First, a court
examines whether a prisoner has literally exhausted his administrative remedies, such that
no further steps are available within the prison remedy system. See Spruill v. Gillis, 372
F.3d 218, 232 (3d Cir. 2004). If a prisoner has not properly exhausted available
remedies, a court then examines whether procedural default applies. Id. For procedural
default purposes, a prisoner has properly exhausted his claims if he has complied with the
prisons regulations that govern inmate grievances, or if prison officials have waived
those regulations. Id. at 222. We have excused the failure to exhaust under limited
circumstances when it is clear that a prisons grievance procedure is unavailable to the
prisoner. See Brown v. Croak, 312 F.3d 109, 113 (3d Cir. 2002). Generally, this will be
due to prison officials thwarting inmate efforts to file grievance procedures. Id.
Exhaustion is mandatory even if a prisoner is only seeking monetary damages. See
Nyhuis, 204 F.3d at 67.
Smith argues before us that because he seeks only monetary damages, exhaustion
is not required. He contends that any usage of the administrative grievance process
would have been futile. In the alternative, he argues that he should not be required to
have exhausted his remedies, as those remedies were effectively unavailable. Smiths
first argument is foreclosed by Nyhuis itself. Id.
Smith also contends that administrative remedies were effectively unavailable to
him, and that he therefore could not have used the administrative remedies provided by
the B.O.P. The only procedure that he utilized was the appeals process in his disciplinary
hearing, and Smith admitted that he did not file any administrative grievances to pursue
4
his claims. Smith did not literally exhaust his claims as required by the PLRA, and now
his claims are procedurally defaulted. See Spruill, 372 F.3d at 232. As such, the district
court properly granted summary judgment on this basis.
Smith has also sued the United States of America. The United States has
sovereign immunity from civil liability, except where it has consented to be sued. See
United States v. Bormes, 133 S. Ct. 12, 16 (2012). The FTCA is a limited waiver of the
United States sovereign immunity, and prisoners may raise negligence claims against the
United States under the FTCA. See United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 150-51
(1963). However, a plaintiff must exhaust his administrative appeals before the requisite
agency. See White-Squire v. U.S. Postal Serv., 592 F.3d 453, 457 (3d Cir. 2010). The
proper agency for Smith to present his FTCA claim to was the B.O.P., and Smith and the
defendants agree that he did not file any tort claim before the B.O.P. Accordingly, the
district court properly granted summary judgment on this claim as well.
For the reasons stated above, we grant the Governments motion for summary
affirmance and will summarily affirm the District Courts decision.