UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-4119

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff Appellee,
v.
MARCELLUS EDWARD CHEATHAM, III,
Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Newport News. Henry Coke Morgan, Jr.,
Senior District Judge. (4:12-cr-00111-HCM-LRL-1)

Submitted:

October 31, 2014

Decided:

February 10, 2015

Before MOTZ, KING, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Vaughan C. Jones, JOHNSON & JONES, LLP, Richmond, Virginia, for

Appellant. Dana J. Boente, United States Attorney, Howard J.
Zlotnick, Assistant United States Attorney, Newport News,
Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:
Marcellus Edward Cheatham, III, was charged in a five-count
superseding indictment for interference with commerce by robbery
(count one); brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence
(count two); felon in possession of a firearm (count three);
felon in possession of ammunition (count four); and possession
with intent to distribute a schedule II controlled substance
(count five).

On the morning the trial was to begin, Cheatham

pleaded guilty to counts one and five and proceeded to trial on

the remaining counts.

Count three was dismissed under Federal

Rule of Criminal Procedure 29, and a jury found Cheatham guilty

of counts two and four.

He received a total sentence of 235

months.
On appeal, Cheatham challenges the district courts denial
of his motion for a mistrial based on improper remarks by the
prosecutor,

the

courts

denial

of

his

motion

to

suppress

evidence, the sufficiency of evidence on the counts on which the

jury found him guilty, the sentencing enhancements for his role
in the offense and obstruction of justice, and the denial of a
sentencing reduction for acceptance of responsibility.

Finding

no error, we affirm.
Cheatham first argues that the district court erred in not
granting his motion for a mistrial after the Assistant United
States

Attorney

questioned

Cheatham
2

about

sentencing

consequences during his cross-examination.

We review the denial

of a motion for mistrial for an abuse of discretion.

United

States v. Wallace, 515 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 2008); see also
United States v. Dorlouis, 107 F.3d 248, 257 (4th Cir. 1997)
([D]enial of a defendants motion for a mistrial is within the
sound discretion of the district court and will be disturbed
only under the most extraordinary of circumstances.).
to

show

an

abuse

of

discretion

in

denying

mistrial, a defendant must show prejudice.

if

the

jury

could

make

individual

In order

motion

for

No prejudice exists

guilt

determinations

following the courts cautionary instructions.

by

Wallace, 515

F.3d at 330 (quoting United States v. Dorsey, 45 F.3d 809, 817

(4th Cir. 1995)).
A prosecutors improper [remarks] may so infect the trial
with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of
due process.
Cir.

2010)

(internal

(discussing
reverse

United States v. Lighty, 616 F.3d 321, 359 (4th

remarks
conviction

quotation
made

during

based

on

marks

and

closing

alteration
argument).

improper

omitted)
We

prosecutorial

will

remarks

only if the remarks were, in fact, improper, and . . . the

improper
rights

remarks

that

(internal

the

so

prejudiced

defendant

quotation

marks

was

the
denied

omitted).

this court considers

3

defendants
a
In

fair

substantial

trial.

assessing

Id.

prejudice,

(1) the degree to which the prosecutors remarks have

a tendency to mislead the jury and to prejudice the
accused; (2) whether the remarks were isolated or
extensive; (3) absent the remarks, the strength of
competent proof introduced to establish the guilt of
the
accused;
(4)
whether
the
comments
were
deliberately
placed
before
the
jury
to
divert
attention to extraneous matters; (5) whether the
prosecutors remarks were invited by improper conduct
of
defense
counsel;
and
(6)
whether
curative
instructions were given to the jury.
United States v. Wilson, 624 F.3d 640, 656-57 (4th Cir. 2010).
These factors are to be viewed in the context of the trial as a
whole, and no single factor is dispositive.

Lighty, 616 F.3d

at 361.
Our assessment of the record in light of the above factors
leads us to conclude that Cheatham was not so prejudiced by the
prosecutors
trial.

problematic

remarks

that

he

was

denied

fair

They were isolated and in response to defense counsels

questioning

of

Cheatham

on

direct

potential punishment he faced.

examination

about

the

Further, the court instructed

the jury that evidence where an objection was sustained by the

judge must be disregarded, that statements by lawyers are not
evidence, and that punishment is a matter exclusively within
the province of the Court and should never be considered by the
jury in any way in arriving at an impartial verdict as to the
guilt or innocence of the accused. J.A. 516.
Cheatham

next

challenges

the

district

courts

ruling

denying his motion to suppress evidence based on the arresting

4

officers conducting a protective sweep of his residence prior to

the arrival of police with a search warrant.

He argues that the

entry of Richmond police officers into his home to conduct a

protective sweep was an illegal search.

We review the district

courts factual findings regarding the motion to suppress for

clear error, and the courts legal conclusions de novo.

United

States v. Burgess, 684 F.3d 445, 452 (4th Cir. 2012); United
States v. Edwards, 666 F.3d 877, 882 (4th Cir. 2011).

When, as

here, a motion to suppress has been denied, the court views the
evidence

presented

government.

in

the

light

most

favorable

to

the

United States v. McBride, 676 F.3d 385, 391 (4th

Cir. 2012).
The need to preserve evidence and the concern for officer
safety are important law enforcement goals.

United States v.

Watson, 703 F.3d 684, 693 (4th Cir. 2013).

With respect to

officer

officers

safety,

the

protection

of

police

is

of

particular concern in cases in which both drugs and firearms are

the

subject

of

pending

search

warrant.

Id.

[P]olice

officers need to be assured that the persons with whom they are
dealing are not armed with, or able to gain immediate control
of, a weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against
[the officers].

Id. (quoting Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325,

333-34 (1990) (holding that a protective sweep when executing an

arrest warrant at a residence does not require probable cause)).
5

We conclude that the district court did not clearly err in

determining that, considering the totality of the circumstances,
police legally conducted a protective sweep of the residence.
The denial of the motion to suppress was therefore proper.
Cheatham next challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to
support the jury verdicts.

For his conviction for brandishing a

firearm during a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C.

924(c)(1) (2012),

Cheatham claims that there was insufficient

evidence to prove that he brandished a real firearm and not a

simulated

one.

ammunition

by

As
a

to

his

convicted

conviction

felon,

in

for

possession

violation

of

18

of

U.S.C.

922(g)(1) (2012), Cheatham argues that there was insufficient

evidence to suggest that he exercised dominion or control over
the ammunition.
We review de novo a district courts denial of a motion
made

pursuant

to

Rule

29

of

the

Federal

Rules

of

Criminal

Procedure for judgment of acquittal. United States v. Alerre,

430

F.3d

681,

693

(4th

Cir.

2005).

We

must

uphold

jury

verdict if there is substantial evidence, viewed in the light

most favorable to the Government, to support it.
United States, 437 U.S. 1, 17 (1978).

Burks v.

[S]ubstantial evidence

is evidence that a reasonable finder of fact could accept as

adequate and sufficient to support a conclusion of a defendants
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
6

United States v. Burgos, 94

F.3d 849, 862 (4th Cir. 1996).

In applying this standard of

review, we must remain cognizant of the fact that [t]he jury,

not the reviewing court, weighs the credibility of the evidence
and resolves any conflicts in the evidence presented, and if the
evidence

supports

different,

reasonable

interpretations,

jury decides which interpretation to believe.

the

Id. (quoting

United States v. Murphy, 35 F.3d 143, 148 (4th Cir. 1994)).

After reviewing the evidence as a whole, we conclude that
there was sufficient evidence to support the jurys findings
that Cheatham brandished a firearm and possessed the ammunition
found during the execution of the search warrant.

The jury was

entitled to reject Cheathams testimony that he brandished a

simulated firearm in the form of a cell phone and that he did
not exercise dominion or control over the ammunition.

It is the

jurys function to weigh the credibility of witnesses and to

resolve conflicts in the evidence.

United States v. Dinkins,

691 F.3d 358, 387 (4th Cir. 2012).

The jurys determinations

regarding witness credibility and conflicting evidence will not

be disturbed if supported by substantial evidence, even if we
were inclined to draw contrary inferences.

United States v.

Gomez-Jimenez, 750 F.3d 370, 379 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 135
S. Ct. 305 (Oct. 6, 2014) (No. 14-5921) & 135 S. Ct. 384 (Oct.
14, 2014) (No. 14-6102).

Here, substantial evidence supported

the

the

jurys

decision

on

brandishing
7

count

because

the

pharmacist

testified

that

Cheatham

robbed

him

at

gunpoint.

Substantial evidence also supported the jurys determination on

the possession of ammunition count because Cheatham testified he
was

living

in

the

house

where

the

police

recovered

the

ammunition, and the ammunition w[as] not so well hidden, as to

prohibit

defendant]

reasonable

fact

was

of

aware

finder

[its]

from

concluding

presence.

United

that

[the

States

v.

Shorter, 328 F.3d 167, 172 (4th Cir. 2003).

Cheatham

next

challenges

the

two-level

sentencing

enhancement applied for being a manager or supervisor under U.S.

Sentencing
qualifies

for

organizer,
activity

Guidelines
the

leader,

[that

did

USSG 3B1.1(c).
the

defendant

Manual

two-level
manager,
not

3B1.1(c)

(2012).

enhancement
or

involve

[i]f

supervisor
five

or

in

more

defendant

[he]
any

was

an

criminal

participants].

Application of the enhancement is proper when

exercises

[l]eadership

over

only

one

other

participant . . . as long as there is some control exercised.

United States v. Rashwan, 328 F.3d 160, 166 (4th Cir. 2003).
The evidence supported the conclusion that Cheatham supervised
or organized the activities of at least Zeek Walton in their
dealings while planning and after the robbery.

The government

introduced text messages in which Cheatham and Walton discussed

the location of the pharmacy to rob, who would drive, and how to
split the proceeds.

Cheatham also directed Walton to delete

8

pictures

and

text

messages

from

his

phone.

Therefore,

the

district court did not clearly err in applying the enhancement.

See United

States v.

Kellam,

568

F.3d

125,

147-48

(4th

Cir.

2009) (stating standard of review).

Next, Cheatham challenges the district courts decision to
apply

an

3C1.1.

enhancement

for

obstruction

of

justice

under

USSG

The court ruled that the enhancement applied based on

the fact that Cheatham arrived on the day of trial and withdrew
his

notice

of

an

alibi

defense

and

pleaded

guilty

to

the

robbery, that he committed perjury regarding whether he pointed

a

cell

phone

or

firearm

at

the

pharmacist,

and

that

he

directed a coconspirator to erase incriminating text messages

and photos from his phone.

On appeal, Cheatham argues that he

should not be penalized for planning to utilize an alibi defense

and testifying on his own behalf, his actions did not impede the
governments investigation, and there was insufficient evidence
that the messages and photos that Cheatham directed Walton to
erase were incriminating.
Under

USSG

3C1.1,

an

enhancement

for

obstruction

justice is permitted if:

(1) the defendant willfully obstructed or impeded, or
attempted to obstruct or impede, the administration of
justice
with
respect
to
the
investigation,
prosecution, or sentencing of the instant offense of
conviction, and (2) the obstructive conduct related to
(A) the defendants offense of conviction and any

of

relevant
conduct;
offense . . . .

or

(B)

closely

related

Committing perjury qualifies a defendant for the enhancement.

USSG 3C1.1 cmt. n.4(B).
applicable

merely

because

subsequently was convicted.

87, 95 (1993).

The adjustment for perjury is not

the

defendant

testified

and

United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S.

Instead, the court must find that the defendant

gave false testimony under oath concerning a material matter

with the willful intent to provide false testimony, rather than
as a result of confusion, mistake, or faulty memory.

Id. at

94; United States v. Smith, 62 F.3d 641, 646-57 (4th Cir. 1995).
In assessing whether a sentencing court properly applied
the Guidelines, we review the district courts factual findings
for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo.
States

v.

Osborne,

514

F.3d

377,

387

(4th

Cir.

United

2008).

We

conclude that, under the above authorities, the district court

correctly applied the enhancement.

Cheathams

notice of an

alibi defense alleged that Cheatham was at his home at the time
of the robbery and offered the names of three witnesses who
would

testify

government

was

on

his

forced

behalf,
to

including

prepare

to

his

rebut

mother.

the

alibi

The
defense

because it was not withdrawn until the morning of trial, at

which time Cheatham admitted to the robbery.
thus impeded the investigation.

10

The false alibi

Cheatham also instructed his

coconspirator

to

delete

text

messages

and

photos,

which

the

district court found as a fact was an attempt to obstruct the

prosecution of the case or impede the administration of justice.
See United States v. Malki, 609 F.3d 503, 511 (2d Cir. 2010)
(finding the obstruction enhancement supported by, among other
things,

the

defendant

deleting

cell

phone

records

before

an

interview with government agents and erasing emails afterward).

Finally,
testimony

the

courts

also

finding

supports

the

of

perjury

based

enhancement.

The

on

Cheathams

jury

did

not

believe Cheathams testimony that he did not possess a firearm

at the time of the robbery, which was a material matter and was
intended to deceive the court and jury.

The jury also did not

believe Cheathams testimony that he did not possess or control

the ammunition found in his home.

See United States v. Curry,

461 F.3d 452, 461 (4th Cir. 2006) (noting that the sentencing
court

is

bound

to

accept

the

facts

implicit

from

the

jury

verdict).
Finally, Cheatham argues that the district court erred in
denying a reduction for acceptance of responsibility when he
pleaded guilty to two counts and acknowledged his associated
criminal conduct.
not

give

its

He submits that the court (1) improperly did

reasons

and

(2)

should

not

have

withheld

the

reduction because he decided to go to trial on the remaining

three counts, one of which was dismissed.
11

As to Cheathams first contention, the district court must

make adequate findings as to a controverted matter.
States v. Morgan, 942 F.2d 243, 245 (4th Cir. 1991).

United
If the

district court fails to resolve a disputed factual matter on

which

it

necessarily

relied

at

sentencing,

this

vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing.

court

Id.

must

Although

the district court in this case did not explain why it denied
the reduction, it did make an express finding that Cheatham did
not

qualify

factual

for

acceptance

findings

when

of

responsibility.

discussing

the

It

obstruction

also

made

enhancement

that relate to acceptance of responsibility.

Turning

to

Cheathams

second

contention,

the

district

courts determination that a defendant is not entitled to an

adjustment

for

clear error.
Cir.

2010).

acceptance

of

responsibility

is

reviewed

for

United States v. Knight, 606 F.3d 171, 177 (4th

A

guilty

plea

generally

is

an

indication

of

acceptance of responsibility; however, conduct that results in

an adjustment for obstruction of justice ordinarily indicates
that

the

criminal

defendant

has

conduct,

although

adjustments may apply.

not

accepted
in

responsibility

extraordinary

USSG 3E1.1 cmt. n.4.

for

cases

his
both

The question of

whether a defendant who obstructed justice is entitled to an

acceptance-of-responsibility

reduction

12

[is]

largely

factual

matter to be determined by the district court.

Knight, 606

F.3d at 176.
We conclude that the district court did not err in denying
the reduction for acceptance of responsibility where Cheatham
committed

perjury

obstructed justice.

and

the

court

determined

that

he

had

Although the application of 3C1.1 does

not automatically disqualify the defendant from receiving the

3E1.1 reduction, it is rare that both Guidelines provisions
apply.

USSG 3E1.1 cmt. n.2.

Cheatham argues that United

States v. Hargrove, 478 F.3d 195 (4th Cir. 2007) demonstrates

that it is error to deny the reduction where a defendant has
pleaded
charges.

guilty

to

some

charges,

but

denied

other

related

In Hargrove, we remanded to the district court when

the court stated that it could not apply both the obstruction of
justice and acceptance of responsibility provisions.
478 F.3d at 201-02.

Hargrove,

Here, the district court acknowledged that

it had the discretion to apply both provisions, but determined

that the facts did not support it.

We therefore conclude that

the court did not err in denying the reduction.

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.

We dispense with oral

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately

presented in the materials before this court and argument would
not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
13