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    United States v. Rahman, 4th Cir. (1996)

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    The document summarizes a court case involving Tariq A. Rahman who was convicted of making false statements to acquire firearms and unlawful possession of firearms. The court affirmed the convictions. It describes the evidence presented, including that Rahman purchased 6 firearms but falsely stated on forms that he had not been convicted of a felony. It also discusses Rahman's arguments and the court's analysis, including that the jury instruction on the element of "likely to deceive" accurately stated that a statement would deceive a reasonable person. The court found the instruction properly directed the jury to apply an objective standard in evaluating if a statement would deceive.

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    United States v. Rahman, 4th Cir. (1996)

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    35 views7 pages
    The document summarizes a court case involving Tariq A. Rahman who was convicted of making false statements to acquire firearms and unlawful possession of firearms. The court affirmed the convictions. It describes the evidence presented, including that Rahman purchased 6 firearms but falsely stated on forms that he had not been convicted of a felony. It also discusses Rahman's arguments and the court's analysis, including that the jury instruction on the element of "likely to deceive" accurately stated that a statement would deceive a reasonable person. The court found the instruction properly directed the jury to apply an objective standard in evaluating if a statement would deceive.

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    Filed: 1996-05-09 Precedential Status: Precedential Docket: 95-5357

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    The document summarizes a court case involving Tariq A. Rahman who was convicted of making false statements to acquire firearms and unlawful possession of firearms. The court affirmed the convictions. It describes the evidence presented, including that Rahman purchased 6 firearms but falsely stated on forms that he had not been convicted of a felony. It also discusses Rahman's arguments and the court's analysis, including that the jury instruction on the element of "likely to deceive" accurately stated that a statement would deceive a reasonable person. The court found the instruction properly directed the jury to apply an objective standard in evaluating if a statement would deceive.

    Copyright:

    Public Domain
    Download as PDF or read online from Scribd
    Download as pdf
    35 views7 pages

    United States v. Rahman, 4th Cir. (1996)

    Uploaded by

    Scribd Government Docs
    The document summarizes a court case involving Tariq A. Rahman who was convicted of making false statements to acquire firearms and unlawful possession of firearms. The court affirmed the convictions. It describes the evidence presented, including that Rahman purchased 6 firearms but falsely stated on forms that he had not been convicted of a felony. It also discusses Rahman's arguments and the court's analysis, including that the jury instruction on the element of "likely to deceive" accurately stated that a statement would deceive a reasonable person. The court found the instruction properly directed the jury to apply an objective standard in evaluating if a statement would deceive.

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    PUBLISHED

    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS


    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v.
    No. 95-5357
    TARIQ A. RAHMAN, a/k/a Ace
    Johnson, a/k/a Graham Johnson,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Richmond.
    James R. Spencer, District Judge.
    (CR-95-1)
    Argued: March 4, 1996
    Decided: May 9, 1996
    Before WILKINSON, Chief Judge, and HALL and WILKINS,
    Circuit Judges.
    _________________________________________________________________
    Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Wilkins wrote the opinion, in
    which Chief Judge Wilkinson and Judge Hall joined.
    _________________________________________________________________
    COUNSEL
    ARGUED: Steven Dwain Goodwin, STEVEN D. BENJAMIN &
    ASSOCIATES, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellant. David T.
    Maguire, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, Richmond,
    Virginia, for Appellee.
    _________________________________________________________________

    OPINION
    WILKINS, Circuit Judge:
    Tariq A. Rahman was convicted of six counts of making a false
    statement in connection with his acquisition of a firearm, see 18
    U.S.C.A. 922(a)(6) (West Supp. 1996), and six counts of unlawful
    possession of a firearm after having been convicted of a crime punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year, see 18 U.S.C.A.
    922(g)(1) (West Supp. 1996). He appeals these convictions, principally arguing that the district court erroneously instructed the jury on
    an element of a 922(a)(6) offense and that the evidence was insufficient to support his 922(g)(1) convictions. We affirm.
    I.
    Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, the record demonstrates the following. See Glasser v. United
    States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942). While executing a search warrant at
    a Virginia residence, law enforcement officers seized two firearms.
    The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) traced the
    serial numbers of the firearms and learned that they had been sold by
    the Virginia Police Equipment Company (VPEC), a local privatelyowned business and a federally-licensed firearms dealer.
    An inspection of VPEC records disclosed evidence indicating that
    Rahman had purchased these two firearms as well as four others. For
    each of these six weapons, VPEC records contained two pertinent
    documents: (1) a sales receipt listing the date of the transaction and
    showing Rahman as the purchaser and (2) a Firearms Transaction
    Record--an ATF form that federal law dictates must be completed
    prior to all firearm transactions--indicating that Rahman had completed and signed it on the same date as shown on the corresponding
    receipt. In response to the question on each of these ATF forms asking whether the transferee had been convicted of a crime punishable
    by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year, Rahman had
    answered, "No."
    The parties stipulated that at the time of all of the sales Rahman
    was a convicted felon, that he was prohibited from possessing a fire2

    arm, and that he was aware of both of these facts. In addition, the parties stipulated that the firearms had been manufactured outside of
    Virginia and had travelled in or affected interstate commerce prior to
    the dates of the sales. Further, defense counsel conceded in his opening statement that Rahman had completed and signed the ATF forms.
    And, expert testimony confirmed that the handwriting on the ATF
    forms was Rahman's and that his fingerprints had been discovered on
    one of them.
    To rebut this impressive body of evidence pointing toward his
    guilt, Rahman argued that he did not reside at the Virginia residence
    where the two firearms were seized; that no evidence placed him in
    physical possession of any of the weapons; that he had acted merely
    as a straw purchaser in the firearm sales and had never taken possession of the weapons; and that federal law enforcement authorities had
    investigated and prosecuted VPEC for knowingly permitting straw
    purchasers to complete required ATF forms and purchase firearms in
    violation of federal law. With respect to this last assertion, the trial
    testimony revealed that VPEC had been involved in illegal firearm
    sales to straw purchasers, but no evidence was presented indicating
    that Rahman's purchases were related to VPEC's unlawful activities.
    II.
    The Fifth and Sixth Amendments guarantee that "criminal convictions [will] rest upon a jury determination that the defendant is guilty
    of every element of the crime with which he is charged, beyond a reasonable doubt." United States v. Gaudin, 115 S. Ct. 2310, 2313
    (1995). Thus, "[t]he Constitution gives a criminal defendant the right
    to demand that a jury find him guilty of all the elements of the crime
    with which he is charged." Id. at 2314. We review de novo the legal
    question of whether a district court has properly instructed a jury on
    the statutory elements of an offense. See United States v. Fiel, 35 F.3d
    997, 1005 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1160 (1995). However, in reviewing the propriety of jury instructions, we do not view
    a single instruction in isolation; rather we consider whether taken as
    a whole and in the context of the entire charge, the instructions accurately and fairly state the controlling law. See United States v. Park,
    421 U.S. 658, 674-75 (1975).
    3

    Rahman's primary contention is that the district court incorrectly


    instructed the jury on one of the elements that the Government must
    prove in order to establish a violation of 18 U.S.C.A. 922(a)(6).
    This statute provides in pertinent part that it shall be unlawful:
    for any person in connection with the acquisition . . . of any
    firearm . . . from a . . . licensed dealer . . . knowingly to
    make any false or fictitious oral or written statement . . .
    intended or likely to deceive such . . . dealer . . . with respect
    to any fact material to the lawfulness of the sale.
    18 U.S.C.A. 922(a)(6).
    In charging the elements of a 922(a)(6) offense, the district court
    gave the following instruction to the jury:
    [T]o establish a violation of Title 18 U. S. Code Section
    922(a)(6), the United States, the [G]overnment, must establish beyond a reasonable doubt the following three elements.
    First, that the defendant acquired or attempted to acquire a
    firearm from a federally-licensed firearms dealer. Second,
    that in so doing, the defendant knowingly made a false or
    fictitious statement, orally or in writing, or knowingly furnished or exhibited a false or fictitious identification
    intended or likely to deceive such dealer. Third, that the subject of a false statement or identification was material to the
    lawfulness of the sale.
    Transcript of Trial Proceedings Feb. 17, 1995 at 154-55. The district
    court then gave further instructions with respect to some of the terms
    used in this charge. Of relevance here, it charged that:
    A false statement or identification is likely to deceive if the
    nature of the statement or identification, considering all of
    the surrounding circumstances at the time it is made, is such
    that a reasonable person of ordinary prudence would have
    been actually deceived or misled.
    Id. at 155.
    4

    Rahman argues that this instruction is erroneous because it defines


    "likely to deceive" as that which will deceive"a reasonable person."
    Noting that the statute specifies that the false statement must be likely
    to deceive "such" dealer, not a reasonable dealer, he contends that
    922(a)(6) requires that the false statement be intended or likely to
    deceive the specific dealer involved in the transaction. By instructing
    the jury that a false statement is likely to deceive if it would deceive
    a reasonable person, Rahman maintains, the jury was not free to
    accept his theory of defense--that VPEC was a participant in the illegal firearm sales and thus could not have been deceived by his statements.
    Rahman's argument is misdirected. The challenged instruction provided the jury with guidance concerning how to evaluate whether a
    statement is a misrepresentation that is likely to cause deception: It
    properly directed the jury to apply an objective, or reasonable person,
    standard in evaluating the likelihood that a statement would deceive
    anyone.* If a jury concludes that a statement is likely to deceive--i.e.,
    _________________________________________________________________
    *The plain language of 922(a)(6) permits the Government to carry
    its burden of proof with respect to the second element in either of two
    ways. It may prove that a defendant's statement was intended to deceive
    the dealer or that the statement was likely to deceive the dealer. See
    United States v. Harrelson, 705 F.2d 733, 736 (5th Cir. 1983) (noting
    that 922(a)(6) is a disjunctive statute). The "intended to deceive" prong
    focuses on the subjective mental state of the defendant, so the defendant
    must have intended deception of the dealer in order for the Government
    to obtain a conviction under this prong. See United States v. Brebner,
    951 F.2d 1017, 1028 (9th Cir. 1991). Under the "likely to deceive"
    prong, on the other hand, the intent of the defendant to deceive the dealer
    is irrelevant; this clause focuses on the statement itself and whether it
    was likely to cause deception of the dealer. Evidence that a defendant
    made a knowing misrepresentation of a fact material to the legality of the
    sale is sufficient to permit a reasonable jury to conclude that the defendant possessed the intent to deceive the dealer or, alternatively, that his
    statement was likely to deceive such dealer. See United States v.
    Hernandez, 913 F.2d 1506, 1513 (10th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S.
    908 (1991); United States v. Ortiz-Loya, 777 F.2d 973, 979-80 (5th Cir.
    1985); United States v. Washington, 485 F.2d 578, 578-79 (5th Cir.
    1973) (per curiam); United States v. Ledbetter , 432 F.2d 1223, 1225
    (10th Cir. 1970) (per curiam).
    5

    that considering all of the surrounding circumstances, a reasonable


    person of ordinary intelligence would have been misled or deceived
    by the statement--the jury may properly infer that the false statement
    was likely to deceive "such" dealer.
    Thus, the portion of the jury charge to which Rahman objects correctly charged how a jury should approach the issue of whether a
    statement is likely to deceive. This portion of the charge was not
    addressing the "such" dealer language in the statute, nor did it prohibit
    the jury from considering evidence that "such" dealer was not likely
    to be deceived by a statement that was likely to deceive a reasonable
    person. On the contrary, the jury was adequately informed of the statutory requirement that the defendant's false statement be intended or
    likely to deceive "such" dealer in the portion of the instructions setting forth the elements of the offense. Accordingly, we reject Rahman's argument that the challenged instruction erroneously prevented
    the jury from considering his defense theory.
    III.
    Rahman also maintains that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions pursuant to 922(g)(1). In evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction, we must
    determine--viewing the evidence and all of the inferences reasonably
    to be drawn from it in the light most favorable to the Government-whether a reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant
    guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.
    307, 319 (1979); United States v. Tresvant, 677 F.2d 1018, 1021 (4th
    Cir. 1982).
    In order to prove that Rahman violated 922(g)(1), the Government was required to prove that (1) he "had been convicted in some
    court of a crime punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one
    year; (2) he thereafter voluntarily and intentionally possessed a firearm; and (3) the firearm had been shipped or transported in interstate
    or foreign commerce at some point during its existence." United
    States v. Langley, 62 F.3d 602, 604 (4th Cir. 1995) (en banc), cert.
    denied, 116 S. Ct. 797 (1996). Because the parties stipulated that he
    had been convicted of a crime punishable by a term of imprisonment
    exceeding one year and that the firearms had been shipped in inter6

    state commerce prior to the sales, Rahman is relegated to asserting


    that the evidence was insufficient to demonstrate that he voluntarily
    and intentionally had possessed the firearms, either actually or constructively.
    This argument is meritless. Store receipts listed Rahman as the purchaser of the firearms, and the dates of the receipts corresponded to
    those on the Firearms Transaction Records--forms that Rahman
    admittedly completed and signed. As such, the evidence clearly demonstrated that Rahman was present and purchased the firearms. Viewing this evidence and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from it
    in the light most favorable to the Government, we conclude that a
    rational jury could find that Rahman possessed the weapons at the
    time he purchased them. Cf. United States v. Wight, 968 F.2d 1393,
    1395, 1397-99 (1st Cir. 1992) (noting that evidence sufficient to convict may be entirely circumstantial, with factfinder free to choose
    among reasonable interpretations of the evidence, and upholding sufficiency of the evidence to support 922(g)(1) conviction on circumstantial evidence of knowing possession); United States v. McNeal,
    900 F.2d 119, 121 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that jury could reasonably
    infer that a defendant had possessed a firearm from circumstantial
    evidence that he had fired the weapon). Consequently, we hold that
    the evidence was adequate to support Rahman's 922(g)(1) convictions.
    IV.
    In conclusion, we hold that the instructions given by the district
    court did not prevent the jury from considering Rahman's defense to
    the 922(a)(6) charges and that the evidence was more than adequate
    to sustain his convictions under 922(g)(1). We have carefully considered Rahman's remaining arguments and find them to be without
    merit. The judgment of the district court, therefore, is affirmed.
    AFFIRMED
    7

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