Abdul Conteh v. Shamrock Community Ass'n, 4th Cir. (2016)

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UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS


FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-2171

ABDUL CONTEH; DADAY CONTEH,


Plaintiffs - Appellants,
v.
SHAMROCK COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION, INC.; NAGLE & ZALLER, P.C.,
Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore.
Beth P. Gesner, Magistrate Judge.
(1:14-cv-00794-BPG)

Submitted:

April 29, 2016

Decided:

May 19, 2016

Before KEENAN, WYNN, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by unpublished


per curiam opinion.

E. David Hoskins, Steven B. Isbister, THE LAW OFFICES OF E.


DAVID HOSKINS, LLC, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellants.
Craig
B. Zaller, Brian R. Fellner, NAGLE & ZALLER, P.C., Columbia,
Maryland, for Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:
Abdul

and

Daday

Conteh

(Conteh)

appeal

the

magistrate

judges order dismissing their complaint that featured claims


under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C.
1692-1692p (2012), the Maryland Consumer Debt Collection Act,
Md.

Code

Ann.,

Com.

Law

14-201

to

-204

(2013),

and

the

Maryland Consumer Protection Act (MCPA), Md. Code Ann., Com. Law
13-101 to -501 (2013).

Contehs claims stem from Nagle &

Zaller, P.C. (Nagle) filing a writ of execution to satisfy a


judgment in favor of Shamrock Community Association (Shamrock)
for condominium homeowner payments that Conteh failed to timely
pay.

Contehs complaint alleged that the judgment principal and

amount owed on the judgment as listed in the writ of execution


exceeded the actual judgment principal and amount owed on the
judgment.

The

parties

consented

complaint by a magistrate judge.

to

the

resolution

of

the

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(6), the magistrate judge dismissed Contehs complaint in


its entirety.
We

review

de

novo

the

district

courts

dismissal

failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

for
Secy

of State for Defence v. Trimble Navigation Ltd., 484 F.3d 700,


705 (4th Cir. 2007).
dismiss,

judge

[W]hen ruling on a defendants motion to

must

accept

as

true

allegations contained in the complaint.


2

all

of

the

factual

Erickson v. Pardus,

551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). While a complaint attacked by a Rule


12(b)(6)

motion

to

dismiss

does

not

need

detailed

factual

allegations, . . . a formulaic recitation of the elements of a


cause of action will not do and the complaint must contain
enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face.
(2007).

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 570

Having reviewed the record and the relevant case law,

we affirm the magistrate judges order in part, vacate in part,


and remand for further proceedings.
I.
Contehs

complaint

provisions

of

listed

inflated

an

judgment.

the

FDCPA

alleged
by

judgment

that

filing

principal

Nagle

writ
and

of

violated

two

execution

that

amount

due

on

the

Turning to Contehs first claim under the FDCPA, a

debt collector is prohibited from using any false, deceptive,


or misleading representation or means in connection with the
collection

of

any

debt.

15

U.S.C.

1692e.

Whether

communication is false, misleading, or deceptive in violation of


1692e

is

determined

sophisticated consumer.

from

the

vantage

of

the

least

Powell v. Palisades Acquisition XVI,

LLC, 782 F.3d 119, 126 (4th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks
omitted).

When viewing a misstatement from the perspective of

the least sophisticated consumer, we consider how a naive


consumer would interpret the statement.
3

Elyazidi v. SunTrust

Bank,

780

F.3d

marks omitted).

227,

234

(4th

Cir.

2015)

(internal

quotation

A misstatement must be material to sustain a

claim under 15 U.S.C. 1692e; that is, the misstatement must


have

the

potential

to

frustrate

[the

least

sophisticated]

consumers ability to intelligently choose his or her response,


id. (internal quotation marks omitted), or must be the type of
misstatement that would have been important to the consumer in
deciding how to respond to efforts to collect the debt, Powell,
782 F.3d at 127.
Although
sophisticated

the

magistrate

consumer

test,

judge
the

stated

magistrate

the

judge

least
erred

by

relying on how Conteh actually acted when determining whether


Nagles misstatement regarding the judgment principal and amount
owed

on

the

judgment

was

material.

Instead,

as

stated

in

Powell, the proper analysis requires consideration of the degree


to which the amount due on the debt was overstated and whether
the extent of the overstatement would have been material to the
least sophisticated consumer.

Id. at 126-27 (noting that mere

technical falsehoods are not actionable and that a de minimis


misstatement might not be actionable but that an overstatement
of 50% easily satisf[ied] the materiality requirement).

Here,

the writ of execution identified $1,748.98 as the amount Conteh


owed while Contehs amended complaint alleged that the amount
due

on

the

judgment

at

the

time
4

the

writ

was

filed

was

$1,583.96.

Accordingly,

the

writ

allegedly

amount owed by $165.02, or by 10.4%.

overstated

the

While the degree of the

alleged overstatement is not as significant as the overstatement


in

Powell,

sufficient

we
to

conclude
be

that

important

an
to

overstatement
how

the

of

least

10.4%

is

sophisticated

consumer responds by causing confusion and a potential challenge


by the consumer to the writ.
increased

potential

for

In so concluding, we note the

confusion

where

the

writ

allegedly

identified a judgment principal from a prejudgment demand letter


even though the state court judgment awarded Shamrock a lesser
judgment

principal

magistrate

judges

than

demanded.

dismissal

of

Therefore,
Contehs

15

we

vacate

U.S.C.

the

1692e

claim.
Turning to Contehs second claim under the FDCPA, a debt
collector

is

prohibited

from

engag[ing]

in

any

conduct

the

natural consequence of which is to harass, oppress, or abuse any


person in connection with the collection of a debt.
1692d.

15 U.S.C.

Other circuits have concluded that the filing of a

debt collection action, or the threat of such action, does not


constitute

harassment

or

abuse

of

the

debtor

where

collector relies on valid state court proceedings.

the

debt

See Harvey

v. Great Seneca Fin. Corp., 453 F.3d 324, 330-31 (6th Cir. 2006)
(holding

that

filing

of

debt

collection

action

did

not

constitute harassment or abuse even when debt collector lacked


5

means to establish debt at time of filing action); Jeter v.


Credit

Bureau

Inc.,

760

F.2d

1168,

1179

(11th

Cir.

1985)

(holding that threat of legal action if debt not paid does not
harass

or

abuse

the

debtor).

In

the

context

of

15

U.S.C.

1692f, we have found that a debt collectors enforce[ment]


[of] their contractual rights in compliance with state court
procedure

cannot

plausibly

unconscionable conduct.

be

construed

as

unfair

Elyazidi, 780 F.3d at 235.

or

We apply

our holding in Elyazidi and adopt the position stated in Harvey


to conclude that a debt collectors initiation of a state court
proceeding cannot legally constitute harassment, oppression, or
abuse of the debtor. 1

Accordingly, we affirm the magistrate

judges dismissal of Contehs claim under 15 U.S.C. 1692d.


II.
With

respect

to

the

MCDCA,

Contehs

amended

complaint

alleged that the filing of and the misstatement in the writ of


execution violated Md. Code Ann., Com. Law 14-202(6), (8).
The magistrate judge concluded that Nagle and Shamrock did not
1

On appeal, Conteh contends that the filing of the writ of


execution constituted harassment because Nagle knew there was no
equity in the condominium unit in seeking to force its sale to
satisfy the judgment in favor of Shamrock.
We find no legal
authority supporting Contehs argument and decline to adopt the
argument, given that the alleged lack of equity in the
condominium at the time the writ was filed did not necessarily
foreclose Nagle from recovering all or part of the judgment owed
through the sale of the condominium.

violate 14-202(6) because the filing of a writ of execution is


not a communication with the debtor and that no violation of
14-202(8) occurred because, although the writ of execution may
have sought an amount in excess of the amount owed, the writ was
filed in an effort to recover a valid debt.
Under

Md.

Code

Ann.,

Com.

Law

14-202(6),

debt

collector, in collecting or attempting to collect an alleged


debt, may not [c]ommunicate with the debtor or a person related
to him with the frequency, at the unusual hours, or in any other
manner as reasonably can be expected to abuse or harass the
debtor.
conclude

As with Contehs claim under 15 U.S.C. 1692d, we


that

debt

collectors

resort

to

state

court

proceedings and the filing of a writ of execution cannot legally


constitute a communication that harasses or abuses the debtor.
Accordingly, we decline to address whether the filing of a writ
of execution constitutes a type of communication sufficient to
trigger

the

protections

afforded

by

Md.

Code

Ann.,

Com.

Law

14-202(6); instead, we affirm the magistrate judges dismissal


on this alternative ground.
Sys.,

Inc.,

432

F.3d

564,

Cf. Toll Bros., Inc. v. Dryvit


572

(4th

Cir.

2005)

(noting

that

appellate court may affirm a grant of summary judgment on any


ground appearing in the record).
Pursuant to Md. Code Ann., Com. Law 14-202(8), a debt
collector may not [c]laim, attempt, or threaten to enforce a
7

right with knowledge that the right does not exist.

A debt

collector

on

violates

this

provision

by

placing

lien

the

debtors property for an amount in excess of the amount to which


the debt collector is rightfully entitled if the amount sought
exceeds the amount owed as a result of the debt collectors
inclusion of an unauthorized type of charge.

See Allstate Lien

& Recovery Corp. v. Stansbury, 101 A.3d 520, 529-30 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 2014) (holding that debt collectors inclusion of
unauthorized $1,000 processing fee in filing of lien constituted
seeking right that did not exist for purposes of 14-202(8)
even though lien was filed on valid debt).

Although the writ of

execution allegedly sought an amount in excess of what Conteh


owed, because the magistrate judge dismissed the case prior to
discovery,

it

is

not

apparent

from

the

record

whether

the

alleged misstatement of the amount owed was the result of a


typographical or mathematical error by Nagle or whether it was
the result of Nagle and Shamrock including a type of charge not
authorized

by

satisfaction.

the

underlying

Therefore,

we

judgment
vacate

on
the

which

they

magistrate

sought
judges

dismissal of Contehs claim under Md. Code Ann., Com. Law 14202(8) and remand for further proceedings. 2

Because we vacate the dismissal of one of Contehs claims


under the MCDCA, we also vacate the magistrate judges dismissal
of Contehs claim under the MCPA.
See Md. Code Ann., Com. Law
(Continued)
8

Accordingly, we affirm the magistrate judges order with


respect

to

the

dismissal

of

Contehs

claims

under

15

U.S.C.

1692d and Md. Code Ann., Com. Law 14-202(6), but vacate the
order with respect to the dismissal of Contehs claims under 15
U.S.C.

1692e

and

Md.

Code

Ann.,

Com.

Law

14-202(8).

We

remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.


dispense

with

contentions

are

oral

argument

adequately

because

presented

in

the
the

facts

We

and

legal

materials

before

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED IN PART,
VACATED IN PART,
AND REMANDED

13-301(14)(iii) (providing that plaintiff makes out viable


claim for violation of MCPA by pleading viable MCDCA violation).

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