United States v. Ennis Billups, 4th Cir. (2016)

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UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS


FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-4959

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,


Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
ENNIS TREVOR BILLUPS,
Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro.
William L. Osteen,
Jr., Chief District Judge. (1:14-cr-00142-WO-1)

Argued:

March 24, 2016

Decided:

June 14, 2016

Before MOTZ, GREGORY, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by unpublished


opinion.
Judge Keenan wrote the opinion, in which Judge Motz
and Judge Gregory joined.

ARGUED: Robert Lynn McClellan, IVEY, MCCLELLAN, GATTON &


SIEGMUND, LLP, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellant.
Ripley Eagles Rand, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY,
Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Michael F.
Joseph, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED
STATES ATTORNEY, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

BARBARA MILANO KEENAN, Circuit Judge:


In

this

appeal,

we

consider

whether

the

district

court

properly determined that Ennis Billups qualified as an armed


career criminal based on his prior convictions for felony common
law

robbery

robbery).

in
Upon

convictions

our

for

categorically
qualify

North

review,

North

as

we

Carolina

violent

otherwise

Carolina

felonies,
an

armed

(North

Carolina

conclude
common
and

that
law

that

career

common

Billups

robbery
Billups

criminal.

law
prior

are

not

does

not

Because

we

issued our precedential holding that North Carolina common law


robbery is not categorically a violent felony in United States
v. Gardner, No. 14-4533, slip op. at 18, 20 (4th Cir. May 18,
2016),

while

Billups

Court,

Billups

is

direct

entitled

appeal
to

the

was

pending

benefit

of

before
that

this

holding

despite his failure to raise the issue in the district court.


See Henderson v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1121, 1130-31 (2013).
Thus, we conclude that the district court committed plain error
in

classifying

Billups

as

an

armed

career

criminal,

and

we

vacate Billups sentence and remand the case for re-sentencing.

I.
Ennis Billups pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm by
a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) and 924(e).
the

presentence

report

(PSR)

prepared
2

in

Billups

case,

In
the

probation officer classified Billups as an armed career criminal


under

the

Armed

Career

Criminal

Act

(ACCA),

18

U.S.C.

924(e)(2), based on one prior North Carolina state conviction


for

felony

drug

trafficking

and

seven

prior

convictions

for

North Carolina common law robbery.


Billups objected to application of the ACCA enhancement on
various

grounds

and

also

moved

to

withdraw

his

guilty

plea,

contending that his plea was not knowing and voluntary because
he had not taken his medications on the day of his plea hearing.
The district court rejected Billups challenges to the armed
career criminal designation, and denied his motion to withdraw
his guilty plea.

The court adopted the recommendation in the

PSR that Billups be classified as an armed career criminal, and


sentenced

him

imprisonment.

to

the

statutory

minimum

of

180

months

This appeal followed. 1

Billups counsel originally filed an appellate brief


pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating
that he found no meritorious grounds for appeal but asking this
Court to review the record for any prejudicial error.
While
Billups appeal was pending, the Supreme Court issued a decision
in Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), and
invalidated the residual clause of the ACCA.
We ordered
supplemental briefing to address whether, in light of the
Courts decision in Johnson, the district court committed
reversible error by treating Billups robbery offenses as
violent felonies under the ACCA.

II.
Before

turning

to

the

parties

arguments,

summarize the relevant statutory provision.


violent

felony

is

defined

as

any

we

briefly

crime

Under the ACCA, a


punishable

by

imprisonment for a term exceeding one year that either has as


an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical
force against the person of another (the force clause), or is
burglary, arson, or extortion, [or] involves use of explosives
(the enumerated language), or otherwise involves conduct that
presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another
(the residual clause).
Billups

argues

18 U.S.C. 924(e)(2)(B)(i), (ii).

that

his

previous

convictions

for

North

Carolina common law robbery do not qualify as predicate offenses


under the ACCA because North Carolina common law robbery does
not categorically match any of the enumerated offenses, nor does
it necessarily require the use, attempted use, or threatened
use of physical force against the person of another.
U.S.C. 924(e)(2)(B).
Johnson
ACCAs

v.

United

residual

See 18

Also, because the Supreme Court held in

States,

clause

is

135

S.

Ct.

2551

unconstitutional,

(2015),
Billups

that

the

observes

that his robbery convictions cannot qualify as violent felonies


under that portion of the ACCA.
In response, the government argues that the district court
correctly

classified

Billups

as
4

an

armed

career

criminal,

because robbery necessarily requires the use, attempted use, or


threatened use of physical force against another person. The
government relies on decisions in which we have held that the
crime of common law robbery in other jurisdictions qualified as
a violent felony under the force clause.
Presley,

52

F.3d

64,

69

(4th

Cir.

See United States v.

1995)

(concluding

that

Virginia common law robbery involved the use or threatened use


of force and therefore was a predicate offense under the ACCAs
force clause); United States v. Wilson, 951 F.2d 586, 588 (4th
Cir.

1991)

crime

(holding

of

that

violence

under

Maryland
the

common

force

law

clause

robbery

was

of

career

the

offender provision in the sentencing guidelines).


Because Billups did not preserve in the district court the
issue whether North Carolina common law robbery categorically
matched the definition of a violent felony under the ACCA, 2 we
review

the

See United

district

States

v.

courts
Carthorne,

decision
726

F.3d

for
503,

plain
509

error.

(4th

Cir.

Billups argued to the district court that, in light of


this Courts decision in United States v. Simmons, 649 F.3d 237
(4th Cir. 2011) (en banc), his robbery convictions did not
qualify as predicate felonies because they were not punishable
by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year.
He also argued
that his seven robbery convictions should only count as a single
predicate offense because they were consolidated into one
judgment. Billups reasserts his Simmons argument in his pro se
brief.
Because we vacate his sentence on other grounds, we do
not address this alternative argument.

2013).

To establish plain error, Billups must show (1) that an

error was made; (2) that the error was plain; and (3) that the
error affected his substantial rights.
is

plain

if

the

settled

law

of

the

Id. at 510.
Supreme

Court

circuit establishes that an error has occurred.


(internal

quotation

and

citation

omitted).

An error
or

this

Id. at 516

And,

notably,

regardless whether the question was settled when the district


court made its decision, it is enough that an error be plain
at

the

error.

time

of

appellate

consideration

to

constitute

plain

Henderson, 133 S. Ct. at 1130-31 (internal quotation and

citation omitted).
North Carolina common law robbery is the felonious, nonconsensual taking of money or personal property from the person
or presence of another by means of violence or fear.

North

Carolina v. Smith, 292 S.E.2d 264, 270 (N.C. 1982).

As we

recently have explained, a conviction for North Carolina common


law robbery may be based on the use of only de minimis contact
in accomplishing the taking of another persons property.
Gardner, No. 14-4533, slip op. at 17.
clause

requires

force

capable

of

See

Because the ACCAs force


causing

physical

pain

or

injury to another person, and does not include the slightest


offensive

touching,

we

held

that

North

Carolina

common

law

robbery does not categorically constitute a violent felony under

the ACCA force clause. 3

See id., slip op. at 16, 18 (quoting

Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133, 139 (2010)).


When Billups was sentenced in the district court, we had
not

yet

common

issued
law

our

robbery

decision
does

not

in

Gardner

qualify

as

that
a

North

Carolina

violent

felony. 4

Nevertheless, to constitute plain error, it is enough that the


district courts error is plain at the time of our appellate
consideration

here.

See

Henderson,

133

S.

Ct.

at

1130-31.

Given our conclusion in Gardner, we hold that the district court


plainly erred in determining that Billups North Carolina common
law robbery convictions qualified as violent felonies under the
ACCA.

This error affected Billups substantial rights, because

it triggered the ACCAs mandatory 15-year minimum sentence, when


he otherwise would have been subject to a maximum sentence of
ten

years

Accordingly,

imprisonment.
we

vacate

See

Billups

18

sentence

U.S.C.

924(a)(2).

applying

the

ACCA

We also concluded that North Carolina common law robbery


does not match any of the ACCAs enumerated offenses, and cannot
qualify as a violent felony pursuant to the ACCAs invalidated
residual clause. See Gardner, slip op. at 13 n.5.
4

Our decision in United States v. Bowden, 975 F.2d 1080,


1082 (4th Cir. 1992), on which the government relies, merely
acknowledged the parties agreement in that case, which is not
binding on us here, that North Carolina common law robbery
qualified as a violent felony under the force clause of the
ACCA.

enhancement, and remand the case to the district court for resentencing.

III.
In

accordance

with

Anders,

record and find no other error.

we

have

reviewed

the

entire

Therefore, we affirm Billups

conviction, but vacate his sentence and remand the case to the
district court for re-sentencing.
AFFIRMED IN PART,
VACATED IN PART,
AND REMANDED

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