United States v. Bullock, 4th Cir. (2002)
United States v. Bullock, 4th Cir. (2002)
United States v. Bullock, 4th Cir. (2002)
No. 02-4227
COUNSEL
Craig W. Sampson, LAW OFFICE OF CRAIG W. SAMPSON, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellant. Michael Cornell Wallace, OFFICE OF
THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Richmond, Virginia, for
Appellee.
OPINION
PER CURIAM:
Joseph Bullock appeals the district courts order on remand granting specific performance as the remedy for the United States breach
of its plea agreement with him. In a brief filed by counsel pursuant
to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967),* Bullock argues the district court should have deferred to his preference of rescission in
selecting a remedy. We disagree.
Bullock contends the concurring opinions in Santobello v. New
York, 404 U.S. 257, 263 (1971), indicate a district court should consider the defendants preference in selecting a remedy for a breach of
a plea agreement. Based on our review of the record and the relevant
case law, however, we find this contention unpersuasive. Courts consistently confer upon district courts unfettered discretion in selecting
a remedy for a breach of a plea agreement. See, e.g., United States v.
Jureidini, 846 F.2d 964, 965-66 (4th Cir. 1988). Furthermore, we find
the timing and context of Bullocks request to vacate his plea agreement attenuates his reliance on those concurring opinions. See Santobello, 404 U.S. at 267, 268. Nor do we find other error in the district
courts finding that Bullock was entitled only to specific performance
of his plea agreement.
We have examined the entire record in this case in accordance with
the requirements of Anders and find no meritorious issues for appeal.
Accordingly, we affirm the district courts order granting specific performance.
This court requires that counsel inform his client, in writing, of his
right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further
*Bullock was notified of his right to file a pro se supplemental brief,
but he has not done so.