United States v. Reggie Beckton, 4th Cir. (2014)

PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-4037
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
REGGIE ANDRE BECKTON,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Wilmington.
W. Earl Britt,
Senior District Judge. (7:11-cr-00061-BR-1)
Argued:
December 12, 2013
Decided:
January 21, 2014
Before MOTZ, KEENAN, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Motz wrote the opinion, in

which Judge Keenan and Judge Thacker joined.
ARGUED: Richard Croutharmel, Raleigh, North Carolina, for

Appellant.
Kristine L. Fritz, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
ON BRIEF:
Thomas G. Walker, United States Attorney, Jennifer P. MayParker, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED
STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
DIANA GRIBBON MOTZ, Circuit Judge:

A jury convicted Reggie Andre Beckton of two counts of bank
robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2113(a).
contending
that
the
district
court
abused
Beckton appeals,
its
discretion
in
refusing to permit him to testify in narrative form, and erred

in forcing him to choose between his right to testify in his own
defense and his right to represent himself.
For the reasons
that follow, we affirm.
I.
In May 2011, a grand jury indicted Beckton on two counts of
robbery
of
Carolina.
federally
insured
banks
in
Wilmington,
North
A year later, after a two-day trial, a jury convicted
him on both counts.

In the months leading up to Becktons trial, the district
court appointed three different public defenders to represent
him.
Because
Beckton
alleged
conflicts
of
interest
and
personality with the first lawyer and made crude sexual remarks
to the second, the court permitted each of them to withdraw.
A
week
before
trial,
Beckton
made
an
oral
motion
to
disqualify his third court-appointed attorney, Thomas Manning.

The
district
court
denied
the
motion
after
determining
that
Becktons objections to Manning did not constitute a conflict of

interest
warranting
appointment
2
of
fourth
public
defender.
The
court
also
denied
postpone his trial.
Becktons
eleventh-hour
request
to
Rather than proceed with Manning as his
lawyer, Beckton stated that he wanted to represent himself at

trial.
appear
The court acknowledged that Beckton had the right to

pro
se,
but
strongly
cautioned
him
against
doing
so.
Explaining that Beckton would be bound by the same rules of

evidence and procedure as trained lawyers, the court advised
Beckton that self-representation was not in his best interest.
When Beckton insisted, the court permitted him to proceed pro
se, with Manning serving as standby counsel.
On the first day of trial, the court again warned Beckton
about
the
inadvisability
of
appearing
pro
se.
But
Beckton
responded that he was confident about [his] decision.
The
court
for
then
reviewed
the
basics
of
courtroom
procedure
Becktons benefit, stressing that Beckton needed to follow all

of th[e] rules, and warning him that outbursts or comments
addressed to the jury or to the [c]ourt are not permitted by the
rules and w[ould] not be tolerated.
The
courts
warnings
went
unheeded.
Beckton
repeatedly
sought to present to the jury inadmissible evidence and improper

arguments.
Indeed,
in
the
course
of
his
opening
statement
alone, he impugned the honesty of the prosecutor; claimed that

the
State
charges
against
him,
based
on
the
same
evidence
about to be put to the jury, had been dismissed for a reason;

3
and argued - after repeatedly asserting to the district court

his desire to appear pro se -- that he had been denied his
constitutional right to counsel.
At the close of the prosecutions case, Beckton indicated
that he wished to take the stand in his own defense.
Without
the jury present, the court advised Beckton that of course he

could do so, but if he did, he would not be permitted to present
narrative testimony.
would
have
to
Instead, like all other witnesses, Beckton
proceed
in
question-answer
form
so
opposing
counsel could object to a question before it was answered.

In response, Beckton proposed that he draft questions that
Manning, his standby counsel, would ask him.
The court rejected
this plan, stating that Beckton could not have it both ways.
The court explained:
Either Manning would assume control of the
case and question Beckton, or Beckton would retain control and

present his testimony by questioning himself.
Beckton could
not, however, both represent himself and have standby counsel

pose questions to him.
question himself.
Beckton opted to continue pro se and
When the jury returned, the court explained:
[The defendant will] have to ask himself a question

and then answer the question, and the reason for that
is the evidence is presented in a question-and-answer
format. It allows the opposing party to object to the
question because it may be an improper thing for the
jurys consideration - youve seen that throughout
this trial - so obviously the defendant is not
allowed to do any different from any other witness.
He cant just get up on the witness stand or where he
4
is now and make a narrative statement to you - he

cant do that.
So it may be a little awkward, but
well get through it.
Beckton
form.
then
began
to
testify,
but
did
so
in
narrative
The court stopped him and provided sample questions he
might ask.
When Beckton replied that he was given only a few
days to prepare his case and demanded to know why he had to

keep quiet about this corruption, the court asked the jury to
leave the room.
A lengthy discussion ensued.
Beckton:
Ultimately, the court asked
Do I have your assurance that if I bring the jury
back that . . . [you will] ask the question and then give the
government an opportunity to object and then, depending on my
ruling, answer the question?
Beckton reluctantly agreed, and
the court reconvened the jury.
But when Beckton again began to
testify in narrative form and accused the court of favor[ing]

one
party,
the
court
removed
the
jury.
The
court
then
presented Beckton with the choice of continuing to represent

himself -- without testifying on his own behalf -- or allowing
Manning to assume control of the case and direct his testimony.
Beckton responded that he definitely did not want Manning to
represent him.
The court confirmed that Beckton had no other
witnesses to call, marked the evidence closed, and recalled the

jury
for
closing
arguments.
The
following
day,
the
jury
convicted
Beckton
on
both
counts
of
bank
robbery.
Beckton
timely noted this appeal.
II.
Beckton
discretion
form.
in
argues
in
that
refusing
the
to
district
allow
him
to
court
testify
abused
in
its
narrative
He maintains that the courts requirement that he proceed
question-answer
schizophrenic
format
and
served
damaged
his
only
to
make
credibility
[him]
with
appear
the
jury.
Appellants Br. at 6, 9.
We
review
for
abuse
of
discretion
rulings on matters of trial management.
district
courts
See United States v.
Woods, 710 F.3d 195, 200 (4th Cir. 2013).
Trial management
includes such concerns as whether testimony shall be in the

form of a free narrative or responses to specific questions.
Fed. R. Evid. 611 advisory committees note.
District courts
enjoy
[q]uestions
broad
latitude
in
this
realm,
because
trial management are quintessentially the[ir] province.
of
United
States v. Smith, 452 F.3d 323, 332 (4th Cir. 2006); see also
Woods,
710
defendants
F.3d
right
at
200.
to
So
testify
long
are
as
restrictions
not
arbitrary
on
a
or
disproportionate to the purposes they are designed to serve, a

district court will not be held to have abused its discretion.
Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 55-56 (1987).
6
In this case, the district courts refusal to allow Beckton

to
testify
in
narrative
form
was
disproportionate to its purpose.
not
arbitrary
or
As the court explained to
both Beckton and the jury, the court simply required Beckton,
like all other witnesses, to testify in this manner to assure
opposing counsel the opportunity to lodge any objection prior to
Becktons answer.
We find this rationale eminently reasonable,
particularly given Becktons repeated attempts during the trial

to
present
Federal
inadmissible
Rules
reasonable
of
control
evidence
Evidence
over
to
direct
the
the
trial
mode . . . of
jury.
Indeed,
courts
the
to
exercise
examining
witnesses
and presenting evidence so as to make those procedures effective

for determining the truth.
no
different
litigants,
for
they
courtroom rules.
n.46
(1975)
pro
must
se
Fed. R. Evid. 611(a).

litigants.
comply
with
This duty is
Rather,
like
substantive
and
all
other
procedural
See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834
(explaining
that
self-representation
is
not
license to ignore relevant rules of procedural and substantive

law.).
Accordingly, the district court was well within the proper
exercise of [its] discretion in denying Becktons request[]
that, as a pro se [litigant], he be permitted to testify in
narrative
form.
Hutter
N.
Trust
v.
Door
Cnty.
Chamber
of
Commerce, 467 F.2d 1075, 1078 (7th Cir. 1972); cf. United States
7
v. Gallagher, 99 F.3d 329, 332 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that the
district court did not abuse its discretion in restrict[ing]
defendants
right
to
testify
[]
when
defendant
attempted
to
proceed in a narrative fashion); see generally United States v.

Young, 745 F.2d 733, 761 (2d Cir. 1984) (noting that a trial
judge has broad discretion in deciding whether or not to allow
narrative testimony).
To be sure, it may be uncomfortable for a pro se litigant
to
question
himself,
and
court
could,
in
its
discretion,
permit a pro se litigant additional time to formulate questions.

But our task is not to decide whether the court below chose the
best,
or
tidiest,
examination.
Cir.
1989);
means
of
effecting
the
defendants
direct
United States v. Nivica, 887 F.2d 1110, 1121 (1st

see
also
id.
at
1122
(explaining
that
self-
examination adequately permit[s] a [pro se] defendant to tell
At oral argument, counsel for Beckton maintained that the

district courts refusal to permit narrative testimony was an
abuse of discretion because Beckton could not get his head
around how to proceed in question-answer form.
This argument
has no footing in law and no basis in fact.
Appearing pro se
does not relieve a litigant of his obligation to follow
legitimate rules. See Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834 n.46; Woods, 710
F.3d at 200.
Beckton, moreover, apparently had the ability to
follow the rules when he chose to do so. A high school graduate
with an associates degree in criminal justice and another 400
hours
of
training
through
correspondence
study,
Beckton
repeatedly demonstrated his ability to formulate questions
appropriate for witness examination when he cross-examined the
prosecutions witnesses.
8
his
side
of
the
story).
Rather,
we
review
for
abuse
of
discretion only, and here there was none.

Furthermore, rather than question himself, Beckton had the
option of permitting standby counsel to assume control of the
case
and
elicit
testimony
from
him.
But
Beckton
would
not
consent to this arrangement, insisting instead that he continue

to control the defense pro se and that standby counsel question
him.
As with its denial of Becktons request to testify in
narrative
form,
discretion in
1121-22
the
district
court
rejecting this proposal.
(holding
that
the
district
was
well
within
its
See Nivica, 887 F.3d at
court
did
not
abuse
its
discretion in requiring a pro se defendant to question himself,

rather than permitting standby counsel to do so).
Although a criminal defendant has both a right to counsel
and a right to represent himself, those rights are mutually
exclusive.
United States v. Singleton, 107 F.3d 1091, 1100
(4th Cir. 1997).
In other words, a pro se defendant has no
right to standby counsel when he chooses to proceed pro se.

id.
See
It follows, therefore, that a district court has broad
discretion
to
guide
what,
if
any,
assistance
standby,
or
advisory, counsel may provide to a defendant conducting his own

defense.
Cir.
United States v. Lawrence, 161 F.3d 250, 253 (4th
1998).
constitutional
And
certainly,
right
to
[a]
defendant
choreograph
9
special
does
not
have
appearances
a
by
counsel, as Beckton wished to do here.
McKaskle v. Wiggins,
465 U.S. 168, 183 (1984).
III.
Beckton also argues that the district court impermissibly
forced him to choose between his right to represent himself and
his right to testify in his own defense when it compelled him to
choose between testifying pro se in question-answer form and
testifying in response to questions from standby counsel who
would then control the case.
We are not persuaded.
As Beckton himself acknowledges, this argument rests on the

contention that the district courts requirement that he testify
in question-answer format was not an option authorized by law.
Appellants Br. at 15 (Beckton assumes he has established that
questioning himself using a question-and-answer format was an
arbitrary
and
testify.).
disproportionate
restriction
on
his
right
to
As we have explained, however, this restriction was
well within the district courts discretion.
Beckton was free
to testify pro se in his own defense; he simply could not do so

in narrative form.
Beckton maintains that United States v. Midgett, 342 F.3d
321
(4th
Cir.
2003),
lends
him
support.
In
Midgett,
the
defendant sought to provide testimony his lawyer believed to be

false.
Although Midgetts lawyer was not certain that Midgett

10
intended to perjure himself, the lawyer nonetheless sought to

withdraw his representation.
of
permitting
the
lawyer
Midgett, 342 F.3d at 323.
to
withdraw,
however,
the
Instead
district
court offered Midgett the choice of either acceding to defense

counsels
refusal
to
put
him
on
the
stand
or
himself without further assistance from counsel.
representing
Id.
Midgett
reluctantly chose to continue with counsel and forgo his chance

to
testify.
We
held
that
under
these
circumstances,
the
district court impermissibly forced Midgett to choose between

two constitutionally protected rights: the right to testify on
his own behalf and the right to counsel.
Midgett is no help to Beckton.
Id. at 327.
Midgett was denied the
chance to exercise in tandem two constitutional rights -- the

right to testify and the right to assistance of counsel.
In
this case, by contrast, the district court expressly afforded

Beckton
the
opportunity
to
simultaneously
exercise
both
constitutional rights he asserted -- the right to testify and

the right to represent himself.
Beckton lost that opportunity
only when he repeatedly defied the courts instruction to use

the
same
witnesses.
question-answer
procedure
required
of
all
other
Therefore, unlike Midgett, Beckton was not compelled
to choose between two constitutionally protected rights.
11
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district
court is
AFFIRMED.
12

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PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

December 12, 2013

January 21, 2014

Before MOTZ, KEENAN, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Motz wrote the opinion, in

ARGUED: Richard Croutharmel, Raleigh, North Carolina, for

DIANA GRIBBON MOTZ, Circuit Judge:

refusing to permit him to testify in narrative form, and erred

For the reasons

that follow, we affirm.

A year later, after a two-day trial, a jury convicted

him on both counts.

disqualify his third court-appointed attorney, Thomas Manning.

Becktons objections to Manning did not constitute a conflict of

postpone his trial.

Rather than proceed with Manning as his

lawyer, Beckton stated that he wanted to represent himself at

The court acknowledged that Beckton had the right to

Explaining that Beckton would be bound by the same rules of

responded that he was confident about [his] decision.

Becktons benefit, stressing that Beckton needed to follow all

sought to present to the jury inadmissible evidence and improper

alone, he impugned the honesty of the prosecutor; claimed that

about to be put to the jury, had been dismissed for a reason;

and argued - after repeatedly asserting to the district court

the jury present, the court advised Beckton that of course he

Instead, like all other witnesses, Beckton

counsel could object to a question before it was answered.

The court rejected

Either Manning would assume control of the

case and question Beckton, or Beckton would retain control and

not, however, both represent himself and have standby counsel

Beckton opted to continue pro se and

When the jury returned, the court explained:

[The defendant will] have to ask himself a question

is now and make a narrative statement to you - he

The court stopped him and provided sample questions he

When Beckton replied that he was given only a few

days to prepare his case and demanded to know why he had to

Ultimately, the court asked

Do I have your assurance that if I bring the jury

Beckton reluctantly agreed, and

the court reconvened the jury.

But when Beckton again began to

testify in narrative form and accused the court of favor[ing]

presented Beckton with the choice of continuing to represent

The court confirmed that Beckton had no other

witnesses to call, marked the evidence closed, and recalled the

timely noted this appeal.

He maintains that the courts requirement that he proceed

rulings on matters of trial management.

See United States v.

Woods, 710 F.3d 195, 200 (4th Cir. 2013).

includes such concerns as whether testimony shall be in the

trial management are quintessentially the[ir] province.

disproportionate to the purposes they are designed to serve, a

In this case, the district courts refusal to allow Beckton