Republic of The Philippines Manila Second Division: Supreme Court
Republic of The Philippines Manila Second Division: Supreme Court
Republic of The Philippines Manila Second Division: Supreme Court
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-55674 July 25, 1983
LA SUERTE CIGAR AND CIGARETTE FACTORY, petitioner,
vs.
DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS, THE LA SUERTE
CIGAR AND CIGARETTE FACTORY PROVINCIAL (Luzon) AND METRO
MANILA SALES FORCE ASSOCIATION-NATU, and THE NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION OF TRADE UNIONS, respondents.
Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala & Cruz Law Office for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
Marcelino Lontok, Jr. for respondent NATU.
GUERRERO, J.:
In the determination of the basic issue raised in the case at bar involving the
status of some 14 members of private respondent local union whether they
are employees of petitioner company in which case they should be included in
the 30% jurisdictional requirement necessary to support the petition for
certification election, or independent contractors and hence, excluded
therefrom, Our rulings in Mafinco Trading Corp. vs. Ople, 70 SCRA 139,
where We reiterated the "control test" earlier laid down in Investment Planning
Corp. vs. Social Security System, 21 SCRA 924, and in Social Security
System vs. Hon. Court of Appeals and Shriro (Phils.) Inc., 37 SCRA 579 are
authoritative and controlling.
In the Mafinco case, the Court, through Justice Aquino, said:
In a petition for certiorari, the issue of whether respondents are
employees or independent contractors should be resolved mainly
in the light of their peddling contracts. Pro hac vicethe issue of
the right to control the employee not only as to the result of the
work to be done but also as to the means and methods by which
the same is to be accomplished. In other words, where the
element of control is absent; whether a person who works for
another does so more or less at his own pleasure and is not
subject to definite hours or conditions of work, and in turn is
compensated according to the result of his efforts and not the
amount thereof, we should not find that the relationship of
employer and employee exists. This decision rejected the
economic facts of the relation test.
The instant petition for certiorari seeks to reverse the resolution of the Director
of the Bureau of Labor Relations dated January 15, 1980 ordering that a
certification election be conducted among the sales personnel of La Suerte
Cigar and Cigarette Factory, as well as his resolution dated November 18,
1980 denying the motion for reconsideration and directing that a certification
election be conducted immediately. The said resolutions reversed and set
aside the order of dismissal dated August 29, 1979 of the Med-Arbiter.
The antecedent facts show that on April 7, 1979, the La Suerte Cigar and
Cigarette Factory Provincial (Luzon) and Metro Manila Sales Force
Association (herein referred to as the local union) applied for and was granted
chapter status by the National Association of Trade Unions (hereinafter
referred to as NATU).
On April 16, 1979, some thirty-one (31) local union members signed a joint
letter withdrawing their membership from NATU.
Nonetheless, on April 18, 1979, the local union and NATU filed a petition for
direct certification or certification election which alleged among others, that
forty-eight of the sixty sales personnel of the Company were members of the
local union; that the petition is supported by no less than 75% of the sales
force; that there is no existing recognized labor union in the Company
representing the said sales personnel; that there is likewise no existing
collecting bargaining agreement; and that there had been no certification
election in the last twelve months preceding the filing of the petition.
The Company then filed a motion to dismiss the petition on June 13, 1979 on
the ground that it is not supported by at least 30% of the members of the
proposed bargaining unit because (a) of the alleged forty-eight (48) members
of the local union, thirty-one (31) had withdrawn prior to the filing of the
petition; and (b) fourteen (14) of the alleged members of the union were not
employees of the Company but were independent contractors.
NATU and the local union opposed the Company's motion to dismiss alleging
that the fourteen dealers are actually employees of the Company because
they are subject to its control and supervision.
On August 29, 1979, the Med-Arbiter issued an order dismissing the petition
for lack of merit as the fourteen dealers who joined the union should not be
counted in determining the 30% consent requirement because they are not
employees but independent contractors and the withdrawal of the 31
salesmen from the union prior to the filing of the petition for certification
election was uncontroverted by the parties.
Thereafter, on September 24, 1979, the local union on its own signed only by
the local union President, filed a motion for reconsideration and/or appeal
from the order of dismissal on the following grounds: (a) the findings of facts
of the med-arbiter as it appears on the order are contrary to facts and (b) in
finding that no employer-employee relationship exists between the alleged
dealers and respondent firm, the med-arbiter decided in a manner not in
accord with the factual circumstances attendant to the relationship.
Acting on the motion for reconsideration/appeal, the Director of the Bureau of
Labor Relations, in the Resolution dated January 15, 1980, reversed and set
aside the order of dismissal, holding that the withdrawal of the 31 signatories
to the petition two days prior to the filing of the instant petition did not establish
the fact that the same was executed freely and voluntarily and that the records
are replete with company documents showing that the alleged dealers are in
fact employees of the company.
The Company then filed a motion to set aside the resolution dated January
15, 1980 of the Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations, contending that the
appeal was never perfected or is jurisdictionally defective, copy of the motion
for reconsideration/appeal not having been served upon the Company, and
that the Resolution was based solely on the distorted and self-serving
allegations of the union.
The local union opposed the Company's motion for reconsideration and
submitted a memorandum on April 22, 1980 in amplification of its opposition.
At this juncture, the legal counsel of NATU filed a manifestation on May 15,
1980 stating that the act of the local union of engaging another lawyer to
handle the case amounts to disaffiliation, for which reason said legal counsel
was withdrawing from the case. The local union counter manifested that the
local union had not been officially notified of its expulsion from the NATU; that
there was no valid ground for its expulsion; that the National Executive
Council of NATU had not approved such expulsion; and that it had no
objection to the withdrawal of Atty. Marcelino Lontok, Jr. as its counsel.
Then came a motion of NATU through its President and legal counsel
withdrawing as petitioner and contending that since the local union was no
longer affiliated with it, it was no longer interested in the case. Twelve
members of the National Executive Council then came in and manifested that
they constitute a majority of the Executive Board of NATU and affirmed that
the local union was still an affiliate of NATU.
There followed a counter-manifestation of Atty. Marcelino Lontok, Jr. on
August 27, 1980 stating that six signatories to the aforesaid manifestation had
no authority to make the said foregoing statement as they had resigned from
the Executive Board en masse; that the acts of the President may not be
reversed by the Executive Council; and that the twelve signatories did not
constitute a majority of the sixty (60) members of the Executive Council.
The local union made its reply to the counter-manifestation stating that the
power to expel an affiliate exclusively belonged to the National Executive
Council of NATU, under Section 2, Article V of the NATU Constitution and ByLaws; that such power could only be wielded after due investigation and
hearing; that disaffiliation is effected only by voluntary act of the local union,
which is not the case here, because it is the President and legal counsel who
are trying to expel the union.
Simultaneously with said reply, the local union filed an opposition to Atty.
Lontok's motion to dismiss-withdraw petition, stating that Atty. Lontok had no
more personality to file the same inasmuch as he had previously withdrawn as
counsel in his manifestation dated May 7, 1980, and the local union has
accepted the same in its counter-manifestation dated May 16, 1980; that
expulsion requires two-thirds vote of the members of the National Executive
Council, as well as investigation and hearing; that engaging another lawyer is
not a ground for expulsion of an affiliate; and that the local union was
compelled to hire another lawyer because up to the last day of the
reglementary period, Atty. Lontok still had not filed an appeal from the decision
of the Med-Arbiter.
(SGD.) LIM HAN ENG (SGD.) JOSE TAN SIU KEE, JR.
Assistant Manager Dealer
Sales Department TAN 5976-397-9
SIGNED IN THE PRESENCE OF:
(SGD.) ILLEGIBLE (SGD.) ILLEGIBLE"
(Acknowledgment omitted)
The records embody standard copies of the Dealership Supplementary
Agreement which We also quote hereunder:
DEALERSHIP SUPPLEMENTARY AGREEMENT
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
This Supplementary Agreement, made and entered into
this 14th day of February, 1975 inPasay City, Philippines, by and
between:
TELENGTAN BROTHERS & SONS, INC., a
corporation duly organized and existing under the
laws of the Philippines and doing business under the
business name and style of "LA SUERTE CIGAR &
CIGARETTE FACTORY", with principal place of
business at Km. 14 South Super Highway,
Paranaque, Rizal, represented in this act by its duly
authorized Manager, Mr. ROBERT UY, hereinafter
referred to as COMPANY;
and
MR. PURISIMO EMBING of legal age, married,
Filipino and with postal address at 3047 Lawaan, UP
II, Paranaque, Rizal hereinafter referred to as
DEALER,
WITNESSETH: That
Suburbs. However, the Company may change or subdivide the territory as the
business exigencies and the policy of the Company will dictate (par. 2).
Under said supplementary agreement, the dealer undertakes to: (a) diligently
canvass for buyers of the Company's products; (b) refrain from selling or
distributing goods of similar nature; (c) furnish the Company every 3 months a
list of buyers/customers, specifying their addresses and individual daily
supply; (d) abide by the Company policy, particularly with respect to pricing;
(e) keep account of all his dealings and promptly liquidate his accounts; (f)
refrain from engaging in any activity which will prejudice the Company from
withdrawing cigarettes beyond the maximum volume allotted to him (par. 3.)
In case of incapacity of the dealer, the Company may designate a substitute
(par. 6). The Company also reserves the right to determine, from time to time,
the amount of credit granted or to be granted to the dealer (par. 7).
It is likewise immediately noticeable that no such words as "to hire and
employ" are present. The Dealership Agreement uses the words "the factory
has accepted the application of (name of applicant) and therefore has
appointed him as one of its dealers"; whereas the Dealership Supplementary
Agreement is prefaced with the statement: "For and in consideration of the
mutual covenants and agreements made herein, by one to the other, the
COMPANY and the DEALER by these presents, enter into this Supplementary
Agreement whereby the COMPANY will avail of the services of the DEALER
to handle the sale and distribution of the cigarette products". Nothing in the
terms and conditions likewise reveals that the dealers were engaged as
employees.
Again, on the basis of the clear terms of the dealership agreements, no
mention is made of the wages of the dealers. In fact, it specifies that the
dealer shall not receive any commission from the factory but the latter shall
give the dealer a discount for all sales either on consignment or in cash (par.
4).
Considering the matter of wages, the term "wages" as defined in Section 2 of
the Minimum Wage Law (Rep. Act No. 602) as amended, is as follows:
(g) 'Wage' paid to any employee shall mean the remuneration or
earnings, however designated, capable of being expressed in
terms of money, whether fixed or ascertained on a time, task,
piece, commission basis, or other method of calculating the same,
which is payable by an employer under a written or unwritten
therein as in the instant case, were free to reject the terms of the dealership
but having signed it, they were bound by its stipulations and the
consequences thereof under existing labor laws. The fact that the 14 local
union members voluntarily executed with La Suerte formal dealership
agreements which indicate the distribution and sale of La Suerte cigarettes
signifies that they were acting as independent businessmen.
We ruled earlier that the terms and stipulations of the dealership agreement
leave no room for doubt that the parties entered into a transaction for the
distribution and sale of La Suerte products whereby the distributor/sever or
dealer assumes the status of an independent contractor. We note that the
applicant who is appointed dealer "is willing and able to do as such for the
main purpose of extensively selling the products of the FACTORY in the said
territories under certain expressed terms and conditions" among them: "1.
That the DEALER shall handle for sale and distribution cigarette products of
the factory ..."; "2. That for the purpose of selling cigarettes or products of the
factory, the dealer shall send his order to the factory plant in Paraaque,
Metro Manila either in cash or on credit ..."; "4. That the dealer shall not
receive any commission from the factory but the latter shall give the dealer a
discount for all sales either on consignment or in cash ..."; "7. (b) He shall
not sell or distribute goods of a similar nature or such as would compete and
interfere with the sale of the products of the factory in the territory, either on
his account or on behalf of any other person whatsoever ..."; "8. That the
dealer shall sell the products of the factory at a price to be agreed upon
between both parties."
It is not disputed that under the dealership agreement, the dealer purchases
and sells the cigarettes manufactured by the company under and for his own
account. The dealer places his order for the purchase of cigarettes to be sold
by him in a particular territory by filling up an Issuance Slip. The Issuance Slip
is approved by the Sales Manager and after the sale is approved, a Sales
Invoice is then issued to the dealer. On the basis of the approved Issuance
Slip and the Sales Invoice, the dealer secures the delivery of his order from
the warehouse of the company and upon delivery of the cigarettes from the
warehouse, the dealer has the 'obligation to pay whether the cigarettes are
disposed or not. The dealer on his own account sells the cigarettes in any
manner he deems best without constraint as to time. The dealers do not
devote their full time in selling company products. They are likewise engaged
in other livelihood and businesses while selling cigarettes manufactured by
the company.
The sales to the dealers are either on cash or credit basis. Where it is on cash
basis, the amount is paid immediately upon the delivery of the products from
the company's warehouse. If it is on credit, the dealer would usually settle his
account within one week from the time the credit is extended to him. Upon
payment of the purchase price, a company official receipt is issued to him.
Private respondents contend that there are essential differences between the
dealership agreement and that in actual practice and operation, then
proceeded to point them in the attempt to prove the control of La Suerte over
the sales effort of the dealers. They also contend that the dealership
agreement, as stated earlier, is essentially a legal cover, a cloak or disguise to
hide the continuing employer-employee relationship established prior to 1964.
We reject both contentions as being without merit.
In the first place, We cannot accept nor consider evidence varying the terms
of the agreement other than the contents of the writing itself pursuant to
Section 7, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides that:
Section 7. Evidence of written agreements. When the terms of
an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is to be considered
as containing all such terms, and, therefore, there can be,
between the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence
of the terms of the agreement other than the contents of the
writing except in the following cases:
(a) Where a mistake or imperfection of the writing, or its failure to
express the true intent and agreement of the parties, or the
validity of the agreement is put in issue by the pleadings.
(b) When there is an intrinsic ambiguity in the writing.
The term 'agreement' includes wills.
If there are changes by reason of actual practice and operation, certiorari is
not the proper proceeding or remedy therefor.
In the second place, petitioner's claim that respondent local union relies
heavily on evidence dehorsthe record or extraneous evidence found in cases
other than the one at bar, as the testimony in theLimarez case, NCR Case AB3-4960-80 cited extensively (pp. 63, 64, 65-66, 66-67, 68-69, 70-72, 73-76,
77-83, 84-85, 86-87, 89, 90-94, 97-98, 107, Comment of Local Union) and
that practically all the appendages to the Comment of Local Union constituting
the main bulk thereof (Annexes 1 to 52) were evidence introduced in other
cases and not in the case at bar, is meritorious. We reject said
evidence dehors the record and the appendages raised for the first time on
appeal as extrinsic, beyond the scope of this review.
Private respondents contend that under the dealership agreement, the totality
of the powers expressly reserved to the company, respecting essential
aspects or facets of the sales operation of the dealers, clearly establish
company control over the manner and details of performance. And they cite
the following: "(1) The dealer shall be assigned to a particular territory which
the factory shall decide from time to time (par. 6); (2) The dealer shall handle
for sale and distribution cigarette products of the company. . . without however
incurring any expense in doing so, without previous written consent of the
factory being first had and obtained (par. 1); (3) In cases of credit order, the
dealer can only get or order the supply of cigarettes up to the amount of not
more than P 10,000.00 only at any given time during the existence of this
contract, unless allowed by the factory to get more (par. 2); (4) The company
shall give the dealer a discount for all sales . . . and said discount shall be
decided by the factory from time to time (par. 4); (5) It is however agreed and
understood that the company may, from time to time, upon written notice
thereof to the dealer, change or divide the territory as the business exigencies
and policy of the factory with respect thereto will dictate (par. 2, Annex 10); (6)
Each dealer will faithfully and religiously abide by the company policy, rules
and regulations, particularly with respect to pricing of all products to be sold
and distributed by him (par. 3, sub-par. (d), Annex 10); (7) The dealer shall put
up a bond or additional bond with the company in such amounts as in the
judgment of the company may be satisfactory (par. 5, Annex 10); (8) In the
event that the dealer should become incapacitated for any reason whatsoever,
the factory may designate for the duration of said incapacity a substitute to
handle the sale and distribution of the products in the territory (par. 6, Annex
10); (9) The company reserves the right to determine, from time to time, the
amount of credit granted or to be granted the dealer (par. 7, Annex 10); (10)
This agreement may be cancelled and/or terminated by the company should
the dealer violate its undertaking under this Agreement, especially par. 7(f)
hereof (par. 8, Annex 10); (11) That either party may terminate this contract
without cause by giving to the other party 15 days notice in writing (par. 9,
Annex 9); and (12) In the event of breach of this contract, the company may
terminate this contract without notice to the dealer (proviso in par. 9, Annex 9).
"1
Disputing private respondents' above contention that the company exercises company control over the
manner and details of the sales operation of the dealers and not merely over the result of the work of
each dealer, petitioner maintains that:
1. The allocation of a definite territory to be assigned to a dealer or distributor is standard practice in
dealership agreements, whether international or domestic. Allocation of area responsibility and territorial
and customer restrictions are common features of dealership agreements. Thus, a company may be
appointed exclusive distributor or dealer of a product in the Philippines, the Asian region or in the Far East
in the same way that some Philippine manufacturers appoint exclusive dealers for the United States or
Canada;
2. In the Shriro case, the expenses for handling and delivery of the goods to the customers are all for the
account of the company (See Social Security System vs. Hon. Court of Appeals & Shriro (Phil.) Inc., 37
SCRA 579) and there, the Supreme Court did not consider the facts as indicia of an employment relation;
3. In limiting a credit order for cigarettes up to the amount of P 10,000.00 only at any given time during the
existence of the contract, unless allowed by the factory to get more, the company merely controls the
result of the work of the dealer. The credit order is limited because in a dealership contract, the
transaction is one of buy and sell and once an order is made, specially a credit order, the risk of loss is
passed on to the dealer;
4. In the Mafinco case, the peddlers are given also a discount and the Supreme Court held that the
peddling contract is not a contract of employment but signifies an independent contractor relationship.
5. The change or division of the territory to which a dealer is assigned as the business exigencies and
policy of the factory with respect thereto will dictate from time to time is no indicia of company control over
the means and methods for in theMafinco case the peddlers are also assigned definite area routes or
zones.
6. That the dealers shall abide with the company policies and rules, particularly in pricing of products is a
standard practice in dealership agreements and more so in franchising agreements. The fact that a
person has to conform with standards of conduct set by the company does not declassify such a person
as an independent contractor so long as he can determine his own day to day activities. In independent
contracts, there is always the element of control as to what shall be done as distinguished from how it
should be done.
7. The posting of a surety bond under par. 8 of the Dealers Agreement is similar to the giving of a cash
bond under par. 7, Peddlers Contract in the Mafinco case wherein it is ruled that the Peddlers Contract
involved therein is not an employment agreement.
8. The right to designate a substitute dealer in the event of the incapacity of the regular dealer is no
indication of an employer-employee relationship. It is just business prudence to provide for substitute
dealers in case of the regular dealer's incapacity.
9. That the company may determine from time to time the amount of credit granted or to be granted the
dealer is more a control over the result rather than the means as in Shriro case where the company even
reserves the right to approve or reject a sales order, whether on cash or on credit basis.
10. The power to cancel or terminate should the dealer violate its undertaking under the agreement on the
basis of the company's opinion that the dealer must engage in any activity which will in any manner
prejudice either the business or name of the factory is a standard practice in dealership agreements.
We agree with the petitioner. We hold further that the terms and conditions for the termination of the
contract are the usual and common stipulations in independent contractorship agreements. In any event,
the contention that the totality of the powers expressly reserved to the company establish company
control over the manner and details of performance is merely speculative and conjectural.
There are indeed striking similarities between the Peddler's Contract in the Mafinco case and the Dealer's
Agreement and Supplementary Dealer's Agreement in the case at bar. Thus:
1. Use of company facilities La Suerte provides dealers with truck or panel delivery (par. 3, Dealer's
Agreement) whereas in Mafinco, the company also provides peddler with delivery truck (par. 1, Peddling
Contract);
2. Salary of drivers Dealer in this La Suerte case pays salary of driver (par. 3, Dealer's Agreement). In
Mafinco, the salary of drivers is for peddler's account (par. 2, Peddling Contract);
3. Expenses of operation and maintenance La Suerte pays for expenses and repair pertaining to the
truck or panel delivery (par. 3, Dealership Agreement). In Mafinco, the company furnishes gasoline and oil
to run trucks and bear costs of maintenance and repair (par. 4, Peddling Contract);
4. Profit Margin In instant La Suerte case, no commission given. Company gives a sales discount (par.
4, Dealership Agreement). In Mafinco, no commission is also given. Peddler given a sales discount (par.
6, Peddler's Contract);
5. Collateral Dealer in La Suerte gives a surety bond (par. 8, Dealer's Agreement). In Mafinco, peddler
gives a cash bond (par. 7), Peddler's Contract);
6. Payment Dealer required to promptly liquidate account (par. 3, (e), Supplementary Dealer's
Contract). In Mafinco, peddler liquidates everyday at the end of each day, otherwise his cash bond shall
answer for unliquidated account (par. 8, Peddler's Contract);
7. Termination In La Suerte case, no fixed period but either party may terminate after 15 days written
notice (par. 9, Dealer's Contract). In Mafinco, the contract is for one year but either party may terminate
earlier upon 5-day written notice (par. 9, Peddler's Contract);
8. Government licenses Dealers secure own municipal license and Mayor's permit (Annexes 23 to 24,
Comment of Local Union). In Mafinco, peddler secure own licenses to peddle (Committee Report, 70
SCRA 157);
9. Working hours Dealers have to get quotas daily but no fixed time. In Mafinco, peddlers get their
trucks in the morning and have to report daily (Report of Committee, 70 SCRA 154-156). No fixed time;
10. Territory Dealer assigned a particular territory (par. 6, Dealer's Agreement). In Mafinco, peddlers
have a fixed territory in Manila, see whereas clause of Peddler's Contract, subject to prearranged routes,
areas and zones agreed upon by Peddler's Association (Committee Report, 70 SCRA 156);
11. Supervision Supervisors also for market analysis in La Suerte case. In Mafinco, Liaison Officer or
Supervisors for market analysis (Committee Report, 70 SCRA 156);
12. Basic Agreement In the instant La Suerte case, the dealer is "appointed" (not hired as in
employment contract) "to handle" products without commission but with sales discount through sales
invoices which state "sold to" dealer (Annex B, Petition; Annex D, Petition). Payments duly receipted
(Annex E, Petition). In Mafinco, the peddler is "desirous of buying and selling" (70 SCRA 143).
On the second issue-whether or not the withdrawal of 31 union members from NATU affected the petition
for certification election insofar as the 30% requirement is concerned, We reserve the Order of the
respondent Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations, it appearing undisputably that the 31 union
members had withdrawn their support to the petition before the filing of said petition. It would be otherwise
if the withdrawal was made after the filing of the petition for it would then be presumed that the withdrawal
was not free and voluntary. The presumption would arise that the withdrawal was procured through
duress, coercion or for valuable consideration. In other words, the distinction must be that withdrawals
made before the filing of the petition are presumed voluntary unless there is convincing proof to the
contrary, whereas withdrawals made after the filing of the petition are deemed involuntary.
The reason for such distinction is that if the withdrawal or retraction is made before the filing of the
petition, the names of employees supporting the petition are supposed to be held secret to the opposite
party. Logically, any such withdrawal or retraction shows voluntariness in the absence of proof to the
contrary. Moreover, it becomes apparent that such employees had not given consent to the filing of the
petition, hence the subscription requirement has not been met.
When the withdrawal or retraction is made after the petition is filed, the employees who are supporting the
petition become known to the opposite party since their names are attached to the petition at the time of
filing. Therefore, it would not be unexpected that the opposite party would use foul means for the subject
employees to withdrawal their support.
In recapitulation, We hold and rule that the 14 members of respondent local union are dealers or
independent contractors. They are not employees of petitioner company. With the withdrawal by 31
members of their support to the petition prior to or before the filing thereof, making a total of 45, the
remainder of 3 out of the 48 alleged to have supported the petition can hardly be said to represent the
union. Hence, the dismissal of the petition by the Med-Arbiter was correct and justified. Respondent
Director committed grave abuse of discretion in reversing the order of the Med- Arbiter.
With the above pronouncements, the resolution of the third issue raised herein is unnecessary.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Resolution dated January 15, 1980 of
respondent Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations and the Resolution dated November 18,1980 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the petition for certification election is ordered dismissed.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Makasiar (Chairman), Concepcion Jr., Abad Santos and Escolin JJ., concur.
Aquino, J, concurs in the result.
De Castro, J., is on leave.
Footnotes
1 Annex 9 refers to the Dealership Supplementary Agreement; Annex 10, to the Dealership Agreement.