Impact of Nuclear Weapons On International Relations
Impact of Nuclear Weapons On International Relations
Impact of Nuclear Weapons On International Relations
DEPARTMENT: B.BHS-IV
Submitted by: Affifa Faiz, Saeeda, Nadia, Fariha Batool, Sana Kainat
Project Topic:
MPACT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
Our project further gives the detailed explanation of types of nuclear weapons, causes and
consequences of spreading of nuclear weapons, nuclear strategies, non proliferation treaty,
control on nuclear weapons, major nuclear incidents, nuclear weapons in twenty first century and
role of nuclear weapons in international relations in the post cold war era.
Sana Kainat
continue underground. The Treaty contained a preamble promise to continue negotiations for an
end to all nuclear test explosions, which would limit the ability of the nuclear weapons states to
make qualitative improvements in their nuclear arsenals. A Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty (CTBT) would take more than three decades from the signing of the Partial Test Ban
Treaty to be opened for signatures. The next important arms control agreement was signed five
years after the Partial Test Ban Treaty. This was the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons (NPT). The NPT, a Treaty put forward by the US, UK and USSR, was signed in 1968
and entered into force in 1970. The Treaty was built on the promise that non-nuclear weapons
states would not acquire nuclear weapons. It is further explain under separate heading in coming
section of this document. The year following the indefinite extension of the NPT, a
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty was opened for signatures. As of 1999, it has been signed by
over 150 countries. To enter into force it must be ratified by all 44 states with a nuclear capacity.
By late 1999, it had been ratified by more than half of the 44 countries. Among the nuclear
weapons states, only the UK and France had ratified the Treaty. Nuclear weapons states that had
yet to ratify the Treaty were the United States, Russia, China, India, Pakistan and Israel. The key
to the continued effectiveness of the NPT may prove to be the willingness of the nuclear
weapons states to fulfill the promises they made in Article VI of that Treaty and those in the
Principles and Objectives document agreed to at the time of the indefinite extension of the NPT.
If the non-nuclear weapons states feel that these promises are not being kept, they may decide to
exercise their right to withdraw from the Treaty in the "supreme interests" of their country. This
would be a major setback to the nuclear arms control regime that has been created in the post
World War II period. Other key nuclear arms control treaties are the Anti-Ballistic Missile
Treaty (ABM), the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaties (SALT I and II agreements) and the
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (START I and II agreements). The 1972 ABM Treaty
limited the anti-missile defenses that could be deployed by the United States and the Soviet
Union. Each country was allowed to emplace anti-ballistic missile defenses at only two sites, its
capital and one other site (later reduced to only one site). This Treaty, signed by President
Richard Nixon for the US, and General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev for the Soviet Union, was
considered important because it was designed to prevent a defensive arms race that would spur a
further offensive nuclear arms race. It was considered essential in order to allow the US and
USSR to move ahead on limiting the quantity of their nuclear warheads and delivery systems.
Following the end of the Cold War, the US has sought to change the terms of the ABM Treaty to
allow for the deployment of a National Missile Defense system, to counter perceived threats
from countries such as North Korea. The SALT I and II agreements put limitations for the first
time on the number of nuclear weapons delivery systems that the US and USSR each could have.
The first SALT accord was reached simultaneously with the ABM Treaty. The START
agreements for the first time began to reduce the number of strategic nuclear weapons that each
side could deploy. START I called for reductions to some 6,500 to 7,000 nuclear weapons on
each side, and START II brought this number down to 3,000 to 3,500 strategic nuclear weapons
on each side. It should be noted that the Russian Duma has still not ratified START II, and that
neither the US nor the USSR has moved below START I levels as of the end of 1999, ten years
after the end of the Cold War. A few other nuclear arms control treaties deserve mention.
The Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, signed in 1988 by Presidents Reagan and
Gorbachev, eliminated a whole class of nuclear weapons (those with a range between 500 and
5,000km). There are also a number of treaties prohibiting nuclear weapons in certain geographic
areas. These include the Antarctic Treaty(1959), the Outer Space Treaty (1967), the Latin
American Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty (1968), the Seabed Arms Control Treaty (1972),
the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty (1986) , the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Free Zone
Treaty (1995), and the African Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty(1996). In effect, the Southern
hemisphere is made up of nuclear weapons free zones. The countries of the Northern
hemisphere, however, have failed to place geographic limitations on the emplacement of nuclear
weapons on their territories.
Summra Jabeen
Constitution. This presents a potential problem for democratic governance of nuclear weapons in
grave or extreme circumstances.
Russia: The Russian Federation is the legal successor state to the Soviet Union, the second
state to test a nuclear weapon, in 1949.Its challenges in nuclear governance reflect not only the
difficult and still inchoate course of its democratic transition, but also a strategic setting in which
nuclear weapons are seen as one of the last symbols of Russias status as a superpower. The
Russian president has the formal decision-making power over the nuclear weapon cycle,
including the development, production, storage, deployment and use of nuclear weapons.
China: China conducted its first nuclear weapon test in 1964, the last of the five NPT-defined
nuclear weapon states to do so. Its nuclear decision-making system has been described as one of
civilian control with Chinese characteristics, but one which is not democratically accountable.
Although the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) stays firmly in control of the gun, the military
possesses a critically important, although not necessarily determinant, role in nuclear weapon
affairs. As for the legislative branch, the constitution formally grants the National Peoples
Congress (NPC) wide constitutional powers that amount to parliamentary supremacy in decision
making. In reality, under the dominance of a single party, the NPC has never sought to exercise
such a role and merely rubber-stamps executive decisions on matters of high policy. There is no
publicly available evidence of legislation or parliamentary debate on the subject of nuclear
weapons.
budgetary and debating powers is possessed by the US Congress. The British and French
parliaments can hold debates (as is the case in India) and exercise a more generalized budgetary
control, while other parliaments (those of China, Israel and probably Pakistan) are not allowed to
address nuclear issues at all.
Saeeda Wazir
Europe. More than 200 cancer deaths are attributed to the disaster, which is considered to have
been the worst to occur in the West.
Three Mile Island accident:
The accident occurred Three Mile Island Nuclear Power Plant near Middletown, Pennsylvania
(United States), 28 March 1979. A combination of design and operator errors caused a gradual
loss of coolant, leading to a partial meltdown. Radioactive gases were released into the
atmosphere. It was the most serious in U.S. commercial nuclear power plant operating history,
although it led to no deaths or injuries to plant workers or members of the nearby community.
Chernobyl, Ukraine:
Chernobyl is considered the worlds worst nuclear disaster to date. It occurred on April 26, 1986,
when a sudden surge in power during a reactor systems test resulted in an explosion and fire that
destroyed Unit 4. Massive amounts of radiation escaped and spread across the western Soviet
Union and Europe. As a result of the disaster, approximately 220,000 people had to be relocated
from their homes. Unit 4 was to be shut down for routine maintenance. A test was conducted to
determine the plant equipments ability to provide sufficient electrical power to operate the
reactor core cooling system and emergency equipment during the transition period between a
loss of main station electrical power supply and the start-up of the emergency power supply.
Workers did not implement adequate safety precautions or alert operators to the electrical tests
risks. This lack of awareness led the operators to engage in actions that diverged from safety
procedures. Consequently, a sudden power surge resulted in explosions and nearly complete
destruction of the reactor. The fires that broke out in the building contributed to the extensive
radioactive releases
Fukushima Daiichi:
The earthquake and tsunami that struck eastern Japan on March 11, 2011, caused a serious
accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant on the northeastern coast of Japan.
The earthquake cut off external power to the reactors. Tsunami, which reached levels more than
twice as high as the plant was designed to withstand, disabled backup diesel generators, crippling
the reactor cooling systems. Battery power was quickly exhausted and overheating fuel in the
plant's operating reactor cores led to hydrogen explosions that severely damaged three of the
reactor buildings. Fuel in three of the reactor cores melted, and radiation releases from the
damaged reactors contaminated a wide area surrounding the plant and forced the evacuation of
nearly half a million residents.
Fareeha Batool
Nuclear weapons and International Conflict
It should be noted that nuclear weapons have changed the character of warfare. Taking into
account their destructive capacity, nuclear weapons are unique, causing significant changes in the
calculations of costs and benefits by nation-states.
Betts argues that during the Cold war, inherent nuclear capabilities play a coercive role resulting
in influencing crisis situations. As Betts writes Any sort of nuclear threat in the midst of crisis,
which is by definition an unstable situation, ought to be considered serious business. However
indirect or tentative it may be, such a threat must be intended to raise by some degree the danger
that disastrous escalation might result, and any degree is worrisome at that level of stakes (Betts
1987, 9).
Other studies on the effect of nuclear weapons on international politics suggests that nuclear
weapons influence the success of states in international disputes as well as whether or not
conflicts escalate (Simon, 1999). Recent work by Gartzke and Jo (this issue) indigenizes a model
which shows that, in general, nuclear weapons states are not necessarily more likely to either
initiate disputes or face challenges. Finally, examining behavior in international crisis, rather
than militarized disputes, Beardsley and Asal (this issue) highlight how the asymmetric
possession of nuclear weapons in a dispute dyad increases the probability of a favorable
outcome.
However, other work has analyzed whether or not the length of time countries possess nuclear
weapons influences their behavior and the way other states respond. There is growing evidence
that prior experiences influence why actors think about the international security environment
(Khong 1992; Leng 2000; Reiter 1996). In some cases, through information diffusion, actors can
also learn from events they did not directly experience. For Example: Argentina and Brazil
developed a mutual understanding of risk and the link between bilateral tension and the failures
of economic integration in the late 1980s, contributing to bilateral tension reduction in the early
1990s (Knopf 2003).
launch postures, like launch on warning, or at least be perceived that way by other states (Blair
1993; Feaver 1992; Sagan 1995).
Long-range ballistic missile technology: It is apparent that countries like North Korea, Iran,
India, Pakistan, and other countries have or will soon have the capability to project force at
intercontinental distances. The developing international marketplace in these technologies may
make long-range missiles available to almost any country that has the money and the basic
technical capability to acquire and use them.
Space imaging: Commercial services already provide high-resolution images from space. The
technical capability to provide these images in real time to customers should be expected to
develop. Third World countries will have the capability to launch their own intelligence
satellites, thus bypassing the need for commercial services.
Advanced communications and computer technology: The spread of communications and
computer technology will serve as a force multiplier for a growing number of countries. The
ability to effectively employ a small number of electronic weapons against a technologically
and/or numerically superior enemy is a cost-effective force-leveling tactic.
Nadia Kiran
markedly different security environment. In the post-Cold War era, the US no longer needs to be
as concerned about its international image as it had in the past.
The Use of Nuclear Weapons for Fearful and Threatened States
In its new position of hegemony the US has adjusted to a different type of adversary (Davis and
Gray in Baylis et al, 2002: 262).A US government document from 1995 makes clear the
administrations belief that rogue states form a new type of threat to be countered (SAG
Document, 1995 a statement issued by the North Korean government (shortly after the invasion
of Iraq) said the war teaches the lesson that, there should be a strong physical deterrent force to
protect the sovereignty of the country (CNN, 25/04/03).
Realist philosophers have long argued that states fear other powerful actors regardless of their
intentions. This helps to explain why there is also increased demand for nuclear weapons in
states not directly threatened by the US. Since the revolution in military affairs, the USAs
conventional strength has become so far in advance of any possible opponent that it can only be
challenged by nuclear means (Manning in Schmidt, 2001: 59). In the bombing of Kosovo in
1999 the US demonstrated this strength and its willingness to act without UN Security Council
approval. Both small states faced with the prospect of US intervention, and larger states whose
interests are not necessarily aligned with the USA, have use for nuclear weapons in the post-cold
war environment.
Increased Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
The spread of nuclear knowledge is also thought to be more pervasive since the end of the Cold
War. Again the break-up of the USSR is important, as Soviet nuclear scientists now belong to
many different states. Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine are known to have nuclear knowledge
which could be utilized to build weapons. Many governments, especially the US and Russia, are
concerned about this in the former USSR. In an international system where both terrorist groups
and rogue states are increasingly seeking a means to respond to US global dominance, the
increased proliferation of nuclear material and knowledge is a trend which suggests that nuclear
weapons will have an ever increasing role in the post-cold war environment.
Despite calls for disarmament in the post-Cold War era, it seems that nuclear weapons will retain
their importance in international relations for the foreseeable future. At the same time there are
now many more small states with no powerful allies who are seeking new means to protect
themselves. Nuclear weapons are still very important for many states as a means to ensure their
security against the overwhelming military might of the USA.
The global dominance of the US in both cultural and military terms means that nuclear weapons
could be, and are, strategically beneficial to many. In the post-Cold War era they remain
important in international relations.
Affifa Faiz
Conclusion:
The emergence of Nuclear weapons and the monopoly of some states over these became
responsible for the emergence of nuclear hegemony and a threat of nuclear blackmail in
international relations. The nuclear powers gained the ability to use threat of nuclear weapons
for securing their national interests in international relations.
They got the ability to use the threat of nuclear war for securing their desired objectives in
relations with non nuclear states. Further, these impelled them to maintain their nuclear power
superiority and to prevent non nuclear states from securing nuclear weapons and nuclear
technology. They kept on developing and expanding their nuclear power and at the same time
always tried to prevent non nuclear states from securing it in the name of world peace.
Moscow Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT), Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) were all governed by this hidden desire. The issue of nuclear
proliferation vs Nonproliferation emerged as major issue in international relations and even
today it continues to a hot issue.
The emergence of nuclear weapons materially affected the nature and content of international
relations. The nuclear weapons are responsible for making the international system almost totally
different from the classical international system.
Nuclear weapons can now be legitimately described as the major factor of international relations.
During 1945-90 the nuclear weapons influenced the politics of cold war. These kept the securing
of disarmament and arms control highly complex and problematic and unsuccessful exercise.
These became responsible for creating a balance of terror in international relations.
Even today nuclear weapons constitute a major determinant of relations between nuclear powers
and non-nuclear nations. The USA has been maintaining its status as a sole surviving super
power with a high level of nuclear capability, but at the same time it is forcing other states to sign
treaties like the NPT and CTBT. In-fact all the P-5 states (Five recognized N- powers) want the
non-nuclear powers to accept non-proliferation require. The politics of nuclear weapons forms an
important dimension of contemporary international relations.
Sana Kainat
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