Law of Evidence
Law of Evidence
Law of Evidence
Verma:
The evidence of the respondent and his witnesses was not taken in the mode
prescribed in the Evidence Act. The respondent did not cross-examine the witnesses
because there was nothing left for him to cross-examine. Thus, there was no crossexamination, which is a fact, not that the request of the respondent to cross-examine
was disallowed. The record in the light, find that there has been no violation of the
principles of natural justice. The witnesses have been examined, and have spoken to
all relevant facts bearing on the question.
Theory of Relevancy
Fruits of the poisonous tree:
1.
The doctrine is an offspring of the EXCLUSIONARY RULE. It
mandates
that
evidence
obtained
by
illegal
arrest,
unreasonable search and coercive interrogation cannot be
admitted in the court of law.
2.
The doctrine has certain exceptions to it. The tainted
evidence can be admitted to the court if:
Pooran Mal v. Director of Inspection: 1973
1.Facts: A search and seizure was conducted at the petitioners
place. The authorisation given under section 132 of ITA was
challenged.
2.
Issue: Whether evidence obtained by illegal means
admissible?
3.Rule: First, constitution allows for the preservation and detection
of crime. Second, the power of search and seizure overrides the
protection of social security by the state.
4.Held: First, UNFAIR OPERATION EXCEPTION, a judge can disallow
evidence procured by illegal means if it operates unfairly against
the accused. Second, evidence can be admitted if it is relevant
and is not limited by express or implied law or constitution.
R.M. Malkani v. State of Maharshtra: 1972
1. Facts: Telephonic conversation being recorded by the police about a doctor who
asked for bribe for providing a certificate for non-negligence.
1. Issue: Whether incriminating conversations on a recorded tape can be admissible as
evidence?
5. Rule: Is admissible if: first, the conversation is RELEVANT and
CONTEMPORANEOUS. Secondly, there is identification of the voice. Thirdly,
there is no possibility of erasing or tampering with tape.
State of Punjab v. Baldev:1999
1. Facts: Search under section 50 of NDPS Act.
7.
Held: The items if available in correspondence will be comprehended
towards the guilt of an individual.
Doctrine of Res gestae
Section 6 of the Indian Evidence Act embodies the theory of Res
Gestae. It is an exception to the rule of hearsay. Hearsay is an
evidence which is not direct. The doctrine of Res Gestae pre
supposes a rule. If a statement uttered is immediate,
contemporaneous and spontaneous to the incident it will form the
part and parcel of the same transaction. It will be admissible in
the court even if it disposed by a third party.
G.V. Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh
1 Facts: 2 people put a bus on fire. They steal possessions while trying to
escape. 2 witnesses gave dying declaration but later recovered.
3.Issue: If statements are made after an interval will they be considered
under section 6 of IEA?
4.Rule:
Firstly, res gestae statements must be immediate,
contemporaneous and simultaneous to the incident. Secondly, it must
form the part and parcel of the same transaction. Thirdly, an interval
allows for fabrication and hence would be rejected to be admitted in the
court of law.
5.Held: Due to time lapse between the incident and the statement being
recorded by the magistrate it becomes a reported statement under
section 152 of IEA (corroborative evidence) but cannot be admitted as
res gestae.
Sukhar v. State of UP
1.Facts: Sukhar was forcibly farming on Nakkars land. They had a
dispute over batai. Nakkar was walking on street when Sukhar held him
from the back and fired him with a pistol. Two people were present. They
carried him to the hospital. Pita was informed that Sukhar shot Nakkar.
2.Issue: Whether a statement made to an onlooker after being injured be
considered as a res gestae statement?
3.Rule: It is a res gestae statement unless it is corroborative.
4.Held: it was not a part and parcel of the same transaction.
T I Parade
Section 9 of the Indian Evidence Act finds identification as a
relevant piece of evidence. There are six types of identification.
The most important of them are dock identification. In a dock
identification the witness identifies accused in the courtroom. The
second is Test identification parade. A TI Parade is a corroborative
Dying Declarations
A dying declaration can be admitted in the court of law under section 32(i) of IEA.
testify his own opinion. He is also subject to cross examination. His role is of an advisory
and the court is not bound by his opinion.
Sri Chand Batra v. State of U.P.
1. Facts: Illicit liquor was ceased by an officer and he proved that the liquor was illicit.
2. Issue: Whether an Excise Inspector could be considered an expert?
3. Held: Even when an expert does not have a degree he can be comprehend as one if he has
experience.
State of H.P. v. Jai Lal
1.Facts: A scab affects the apple orchid. All the apples are required
to be disposed. The person who was to check the orchids gave a
false record of the infected apples to the horticulture officer.
2.Held: He cannot be called an expert since he did not have any
experience, one. Also, he did not research or write a thesis.
The State (Delhi Administration) v. Pali Ram
1. Issue: Can a specimen of signature and handwriting be admitted as evidence?
25.
Held: It can be admitted as an evidence if SC or a Magistrate directs a person
under section 73 to give a specimen of his handwriting and then either send it to an
expert for an opinion under section 45 or call upon a witness and make a
comparison under section 47. The witness should be familiar to the handwriting.
The court suo moto cannot be the expert.
Ramesh Chandra Agarwal v. Regency Hospital Limited:
1. Held: The disputed documents must be submitted in the court before the opinion is
taken on record. Absence of material evidence would lead to an incomplete opinion
and such opinion would have no value.
Documentary Evidence
Section 3 and 65 of the IEA
Marwari Kumhar v. B. G. Ganeshpuri
1. Facts: The appellant represents the Marwari Kumhar Community of Devas. The
community held a religious functions in the temple and were using the Dharmshala
situated in the suit property. The respondent asserted that they had title over the suit
property.
26.
Issue: Whether a secondary copy of a document is admissible?
27.
Held: The Supreme Court states that the respondents did not contend that the
copy which had been produced was not the correct copy. In the absence of any
proof as to the date, time and the manner in which possession as a Pujari got
converted into open, hostile and adverse the claim for adverse possession could not
be upheld. The first appellate Court and the impugned judgment requires to be set
aside. The decree of trial court is restored.
Oral Evidence
Bai Hira Devi v. Official Assignee of Bombay
1 Issue: Whether the appellants were entitled to lead oral evidence with a view to show the
real nature of the impugned/false transaction?
6. Rule: s.91 and s.92 of Evidence Act.
7. Held: As the Court observed the s.91 and s.92 really supplement each other. It is because
s.91 by itself would not have excluded evidence of oral agreements which may tend to vary
the terms of the document that s.92 has been enacted and if s.92 does not apply in the
present case, there is no other section in evidence act which can be said to exclude
evidence of the agreement set up by the appellants. The result is that s.92 is wholly
inapplicable to the present proceedings and so the appellants are entitled to lead evidence
in support of the plea raised by them. Accordingly set aside the decree passed by the High
Court and send the appeal back to that Court for disposal on the merits in accordance with
law. The court held that S. 92 is only applicable to cases where
the parties to the instrument are representatives in interest
and not strangers.
Burden of Proof:
Shambhu Nath Mehra v. State of Ajmer
1. Fact: Appellant S.N.Mehra, a camp clerk in the office of the Divisional Engineer
Telegraphs has been convicted of offences under s.420 of IPC and s.5 (2) of the
Prevention of Corruption Act.
28.
Issue: What is the ambit of section 106 of IEA?
29.
Held: Section 106 of the IEA cannot override the principle of law that the
burden of proof is on the appellant. It can only apply in exceptional cases where the
prosecution does not have the knowledge of the crime and the same can be
produced by the appellant without any inconvenience.
Collector of Customs, Madras v. D. Bhoormal
1. Facts: Some information was received that some packages containing smuggled
goods had been left by a person in the premises of M/s. Sha Rupaji Rikhabdas and
that these packages were about to dispatched to Bangalore for disposal. D.
Bhoormal had asked one of the staff of Shri Rupaji Rikhabdas to keep the goods in
their shop until his return. The reading of section 167 (8) of Sea Customs Act,
goods found to be smuggled can, be confiscated without proceeding against any
person and without ascertaining who is their real owner or who was actually
concerned in their illicit import.
30.
Issue: What does section 106 allow?
31.
Held: One, the burden to establish a fact that lies within the special knowledge
of a person lies upon the appellant. Two, if the fact that lies within the special
knowledge is not provided an adverse inference of it can be drawn. Though, this
must be coupled with presumptive evidence.
Evidentiary Presumptions
Estoppel
Deshpande v. Deshpande
The case is about a dispute between Gangabai and the plaintiff on the one hand and
the defendant on the other hand in regard to the validity of the adoption of the
plaintiff. The dispute was referred to an arbitrator, who stated the following: It is
declared that the adoption of the plaintiff is not valid. It is declared that the right of
adoption is lost to Gangabai from the very beginning. It is declared that the plaintiff is
not and can never become entitled to the property belonging to the family of Devarao.
The plaintiffs claim is barred by estoppel as he received Rs. 8000 as a consideration
for accepting the terms of compromise from the defendant and relinquished all rights
which he then had or which he could ever have had in the future to the property
belonging to the family of Devrao. The Court has concluded that the plaintiff was
estopped from contending that Gangabai had the right to adopt him as a son to her
deceased husband. The Apex Court held that therefore the suit filed by plaintiff is
barred by estoppel, that he is not entitled to any relief which he has prayed for in his
plaint, and the decree which has been passed by Trial Court and High Court have
passed in his favor is liable to be set aside.
Shreedhar v. Munireddy
An estoppel is not a cause of action; it is a rule of evidence which precludes a person
from denying the truth of some statement previously made by himself. If a man either
by words or by conduct has intimated that, he consents to an act which has been done
and that he will not offer any opposition to it, although it could not have been lawfully
done and that he will not offer any opposition to it. Although it could not have been
lawfully done without his consent, and he thereby induces others to do that which
they otherwise might have abstained from, he cannot question the legality of the act
he had sanctioned to the prejudice of those who have so given faith to his words or to
the fair inference to be drawn from his conduct. The factual conclusions arrived by the
High Court, the appeal is bound to fail.
Privileged Communication
Ram Bharosey v. State of U.P. (pp. 253-255)
The appellant has been convicted under s.302 IPC to which he has appealed. Bitter
feeling existed between Manna and his son Ram Bharosey since long. The
prosecution witness 1 thinks that Ram Bharosey certainly has his hands in his fathers
murder. There is ample evidence that the relations between the appellant and his
father were not cordial, that there were frequent quarrels between them resulting in
partition, and that difference continues even thereafter. The evidence was accepted by
the courts below as furnishing a motive for the crime. Reference to Rams conduct
and to any communication made by him to his wife is not inadmissible under s.122.
The testimony of PW 2 does not fall within inadmissibility of s.122, as it has
reference to acts and conduct of the appellant and not to any communication made by
him to his wife. Accordingly confirm with conviction under s.302 IPC.
State of Punjab v. Sodhi Sukhdev Singh
The question of privilege raised under s.123 it is not part of Courts jurisdiction to
decide whether the disclosure of the given document would lead to any injury to
public interest, that is a matter for the Head of the Department to consider and decide.
No doubt the litigant whose claim may not succeed as a result of the non-production
of the relevant and material document may feel aggrieved by the result, and the Court,
in reaching the said decision, may feel dissatisfied; but that will not affect the validity
of the basic principle that public good and interest must override considerations of
private good and private interest. Therefore, in opinion of the court the conclusion
appears inescapable that the documents in question are protected under s.123, and if
the Head of the Department does not give permission for their production, the Court
cannot compel the appellant to produce them.
Witnesses
Rameshwar v. State of Rajasthan - Oath does not deal with
competency
Appellant Rameshwar was charged with committing rape with Mst. Purni. Asssitant
Session Judge convicted the Rameshwar and sentenced him rigorous imprisonment.
Appeal made to Session Judge the evidence was sufficient for moral conviction but
fell short of legal proof because, in the courts opinion, the law requires corroboration
of the story of the prosecution in such cases as a matter of precaution and the
corroborative evidence, is so far as it sought to connect the appellant with the crime,
was legally insufficient though morally enough. The judge acquitted the accused
giving him benefit of doubt. The High Court the learned judge certified that she did
not understand the sanctity of an oath and accordingly did not administer one to her
but he did not certify that the child understood the duty of speaking the truth. Oath act
does not deal with competency.
As a matter of prudence a conviction should not be ordinarily be based on the
uncorroborated evidence of a child witness. The Court should look at the demeanor,
unlikelihood of tutoring and so forth, may render corroboration unnecessary but that
is a question of fact in every case. No thumb rule applies in cases of these sorts. The
Supreme Court concluded that by considering the conduct of the girl and her mother
form start to finish, no corroboration beyond the statement of the child to her mother
was necessary. High Court was right in holding that was enough to make it safe to act
on her testimony. Direct the appellant to surrender to his bail.
Laxmipat Choraria v. State of Maharashtra- Ask any question
relevant to the relevant issue
Under s. 132 a witness shall not be excused from answering any question as to any
matter relevant to the matter in issue in any criminal proceeding (among others) upon
the ground that the answer to such question will incriminate or may tend directly or
indirectly to expose him to a penalty or forfeiture of any kind. The safeguard to this
compulsion is that no such answer, which the witness is compelled to give, exposes
him to any arrest or prosecution or can it be proved against him in any criminal
proceeding except a prosecution for giving false evidence by such answer.
R. D. Nayak v. State of Gujarat - confession by a child can be
applied if the case is convinced about the quality of the witness
The evidence of a child witness is not required to be rejected per se; but the Court as a
rule of prudence considers such evidence with close scrutiny and only on being
convinced about the quality thereof and reliability can record conviction, based
thereon. It is also an accepted norm that, if after careful scrutiny of their evidence the
Court comes to the conclusion that there is an impress of truth in it, there is no
obstacle in the way of accepting the evidence of a child witness.
Examination
and
Cross
Examination
and
Re-Examination
of
Witnesses
Pannayar v. State of Tamil Nadu
Suspicion is not the substitute for proof. There is a long distance between 'may be
true and 'must be true' and the prosecution has to travel all the way to prove its case
beyond all reasonable doubt.
B. B. Hirjibhai v. State of Gujarat- victim of a sex offence is
entitled to great weight in the absence of corroboration.
Discrepancies which do not go to the root of the matter and shake the basic version of
the witnesses therefore cannot be annexed with undue importance. On principle, the
evidence of a victim of sexual assault stands on par with evidence of an injured
witness. Just as a witness who has sustained an injury (which is not shown or believed
to be self-inflicted) is the best witness in the sense that he is least likely to exculpate
the real offender, the evidence of a victim of a sex-offence is entitled to great weight,
absence of corroboration notwithstanding.