GT Homework 1 PDF
GT Homework 1 PDF
GT Homework 1 PDF
Department of Economics
ECON 329 - Game Theory
Spring 2015
Homework #1
Lectures 1, 2, 3 & 4
Return in Class on Thursday Jan 29th
Name:
Player 1
A
B
C
A
2, 2
3, 1
4, 1
Player 2
B
3, 1
4, 2
2, 3
C
1, 3
0, 0
-1, 1
a) Write down the normal form representation of this game, describing the three essential elements of the game
(2 points).
b) Can this game be solved using Iterated elimination of dominated strategy (IEDS)? If so find the equilibrium
using IEDS. Explain your solution. (2 points).
c) Find all Nash equilibria of this game. Explain your solution. (2 points).
Player X
T
M
D
Player Y
C
0, 4
1, 5
0, 1
L
8, 3
4, 2
3, 7
R
4, 4
5, 3
2, 0
a) Write down the normal form representation of this game, describing the three essential elements of the game
(2 points).
b) Can this game be solved using Iterated elimination of dominated strategy (IEDS)? If so find the equilibrium
using IEDS. Explain your solution. (2 points).
c) Find all Nash equilibria of this game. Explain your solution. (2 points).
4. Give in (6 points). Suppose that you manage a firm and are engaged in a dispute with one of your
employees. The process of dispute resolution is modeled by the following game, where your employee chooses
either to settle or to be tough in negotiation, and you choose either to hire an attorney or to give in. In
the matrix, x is a number that both you and the employee know.
Employee
Manager (You)
give in
hire attorney
1, 0
1, 1
3, 0
x, 1
settle
be tough
b) Under what conditions be tough is a strictly dominant strategy for employee? (2 points).
c) Find all Nash equilibria of this game for any values of x. Explain your solution. (2 points).