Ceferino Paredes, Jr. Vs Sandiganbayan

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Ceferino Paredes, Jr.

vs Sandiganbayan
252 SCRA 641 Political Law The Legislative
Department Suspension of a Member of Congress
RA 3019
In January 1990, Teofilo Gelacio, the then vice mayor of
San Francisco, Agusan del Sur filed a case against
Ceferino Paredes, Jr. (who was then the governor of the
same province), Atty. Generoso Sansaet (counsel of
Paredes), and Mansueto Honrada (a clerk of court). The
three allegedly conspired to falsify a copy of a Notice
of Arraignment and of the Transcript of Stenographic
Notes. Gelacio claimed that, in fact, no arraignment
notice had ever been issued against him in a criminal
proceeding against him. Gelacio was able to produce a
certification from the judge handling the case himself
that the criminal case against him never reached the
arraignment stage because the prosecution was
dismissed. Atty. Sansaet on his part maintained that
there was indeed a Notice of Arraignment but he later
retracted his testimonies. Paredes claimed that
Sansaet only changed his side because of political
realignment. Subsequently, the Office of the
Ombudsman recommended that Paredes et al be
charged with Falsification of Public Documents.
Paredes appealed but was eventually denied by the
Sandiganbayan.
ISSUE:Whether or not Paredes, now a member of
Congress, may be suspended by order of the
Sandiganbayan.

HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed the order of


suspension of Congressman Paredes by the
Sandiganbayan, despite his protestations on the
encroachment by the court on the prerogatives of
congress. The SC ruled:
x x x. Petitioners invocation of Section 16 (3), Article
VI of the Constitution which deals with the power of
each House of Congress inter alia to punish its
Members for disorderly behavior, and suspend or
expel a Member by a vote of two-thirds of all its
Members subject to the qualification that the penalty
of suspension, when imposed, should not exceed sixty
days is unavailing, as it appears to be quite distinct
from the suspension spoken of in Section 13 of RA
3019, which is not a penalty but a preliminary,
preventive measure, prescinding from the fact that the
latter is not being imposed on petitioner for
misbehavior as a Member of the House of
Representatives.
Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. vs Pedro
Gimenez
7 SCRA 347 Political Law Journal Conclusiveness
of the Enrolled Bill
Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. (Casco) was
engaged in the production of synthetic resin glues
used primarily in the production of plywood. The main
components of the said glue are urea and

formaldehyde which are both being imported abroad.


Pursuant to a Central Bank circular, Casco paid the
required margin fee for its imported urea and
formaldehyde. Casco however paid in protest as it
maintained that urea and formaldehyde are tax
exempt transactions. The Central Bank agreed and it
issued vouchers for refund. The said vouchers were
submitted to Pedro Gimenez, the then Auditor General,
who denied the tax refund. Gimenez maintained that
urea and formaldehyde, as two separate and distinct
components are not tax exempt; that what is tax
exempt is urea formaldehyde (the synthetic resin
formed by combining urea and formaldehyde).
Gimenez cited the provision of Sec. 2, par 18 of
Republic Act No. 2609 which provides:

Congress intended to exempt urea and


formaldehyde separately as essential elements in
the manufacture of the synthetic resin glue called
urea formaldehyde, not the latter a finished product,
citing in support of this view the statements made on
the floor of the Senate, during the consideration of the
bill before said House, by members thereof.
The enrolled bill however used the term urea
formaldehyde
ISSUE: Whether or not the term urea formaldehyde
should be construed as urea and formaldehyde.

XVIII. Urea formaldehyde for the manufacture of


plywood and hardboard when imported by and for the
exclusive use of end-users.

HELD: No. Urea formaldehyde is not a chemical


solution. It is the synthetic resin formed as a
condensation product from definite proportions of urea
and formaldehyde under certain conditions relating to
temperature, acidity, and time of reaction. Urea
formaldehyde is clearly a finished product, which is
patently distinct and different from urea and
formaldehyde, as separate articles used in the
manufacture of the synthetic resin known as urea
formaldehyde.

Casco however averred that the term urea


formaldehyde appearing in this provision should be
construed as urea and formaldehyde. It further
contends that the bill approved in Congress contained
the copulative conjunction and between the terms
urea and, formaldehyde, and that the members of

The opinions or statements of any member of


Congress during the deliberation of the said law/bill do
not represent the entirety of the Congress itself. What
is printed in the enrolled bill would be conclusive upon
the courts. The enrolled bill which uses the term
urea formaldehyde instead of urea and

The margin established by the Monetary Board


pursuant to the provision of section one hereof shall
not be imposed upon the sale of foreign exchange for
the importation of the following:
xxx

xxx

xxx

formaldehyde is conclusive upon the courts as


regards the tenor of the measure passed by Congress
and approved by the President. If there has been any
mistake in the printing of the bill before it was certified
by the officers of Congress and approved by the
Executive on which the SC cannot speculate,
without jeopardizing the principle of separation of
powers and undermining one of the cornerstones of
our democratic system the remedy is by
amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial
decree.

and its Registers of Deeds, along with certain other


government offices.
The petition assails the constitutionality of R.A. No.
7354 on the grounds that: (1) its title embraces more
than one subject and does not express its purposes;
(2) it did not pass the required readings in both Houses
of Congress and printed copies of the bill in its final
form were not distributed among the members before
its passage; and (3) it is discriminatory and encroaches
on the independence of the Judiciary.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Sec 35 of RA 7354 is constitutional.
RULING: No. SC held that Sec 35 R.A. No. 7354 is
unconstitutional.

PHIL JUDGES ASSOCIATION VS PRADO ENBANC


227 SCRA 703 G.R. No. 105371 November 11, 1993
FACTS:
Petitioners assailed the validity of Sec 35 R.A. No. 7354
which withdraw the franking privilege from the
Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Regional Trial
Courts, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal
Trial Courts, and the Land Registration Commission

1. Article VI, Sec. 26(l), of the Constitution providing


that "Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace
only one subject which shall be expressed in the title
thereof."
The title of the bill is not required to be an index to the
body of the act, or to be as comprehensive as to cover
every single detail of the measure. It has been held
that if the title fairly indicates the general subject, and
reasonably covers all the provisions of the act, and is
not calculated to mislead the legislature or the people,
there is sufficient compliance with the constitutional
requirement.

We are convinced that the withdrawal of the franking


privilege from some agencies is germane to the
accomplishment of the principal objective of R.A. No.
7354, which is the creation of a more efficient and
effective postal service system. Our ruling is that, by
virtue of its nature as a repealing clause, Section 35
did not have to be expressly included in the title of the
said law.
2. The petitioners maintain that the second paragraph
of Sec. 35 covering the repeal of the franking privilege
from the petitioners and this Court under E.O. 207, PD
1882 and PD 26 was not included in the original
version of Senate Bill No. 720 or House Bill No. 4200.
As this paragraph appeared only in the Conference
Committee Report, its addition, violates Article VI, Sec.
26(2) of the Constitution. The petitioners also invoke
Sec. 74 of the Rules of the House of Representatives,
requiring that amendment to any bill when the House
and the Senate shall have differences thereon may be
settled by a conference committee of both chambers.
Casco Philippine Chemical Co. v. Gimenez laid down
the rule that the enrolled bill, is conclusive upon the
Judiciary (except in matters that have to be entered in
the journals like the yeas and nays on the final reading
of the bill). The journals are themselves also binding
on the Supreme Court.
Applying these principles, we shall decline to look into
the petitioners' charges that an amendment was made

upon the last reading of the bill that eventually


became R.A. No. 7354 and that copies thereof in its
final form were not distributed among the members of
each House. Both the enrolled bill and the legislative
journals certify that the measure was duly enacted i.e.,
in accordance with Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the
Constitution. We are bound by such official assurances
from a coordinate department of the government, to
which we owe, at the very least, a becoming courtesy.
3. SC annuls Section 35 of the law as violative of
Article 3, Sec. 1, of the Constitution providing that no
person shall "be deprived of the equal protection of
laws."
It is worth observing that the Philippine Postal
Corporation, as a government-controlled corporation,
was created and is expected to operate for the
purpose of promoting the public service. While it may
have been established primarily for private gain, it
cannot excuse itself from performing certain functions
for the benefit of the public in exchange for the
franchise extended to it by the government and the
many advantages it enjoys under its charter. 14
Among the services it should be prepared to extend is
free carriage of mail for certain offices of the
government that need the franking privilege in the
discharge of their own public functions.

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