Rand - Sortie-Rate Model

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Appendix B

SORTIE-RATE MODEL

This appendix describes the method used to calculate aircraft sortie


rates. Based on earlier unpublished work by former RAND colleague
Lawrence Hollett,1 the method was chosen to facilitate a simple and
fast spreadsheet analysis of USAF aircraft sortie rates under a variety
of assumptions about range to target, aircraft speed, and basing options. This analysis is based on historical F-15 and F-16 maintenance
data and statistical analysis conducted by the Boeing Corporation on
the relationship between maintenance time, sorties, and sortie duration for Boeing 737 airliners.
The use of airliner data to explore the relationship between maintenance requirements, sorties, and sortie duration may seem strange.
However, using these data helps us understand and represent the influence on sortie rates of two very distinct classes of aircraft system
failures: those that are a function of cyclingturning a component on
and offand those that are a function of aggregate time in use.
Avionics components, for example, tend to produce cycle-related
failures, whereas hydraulic pumps fail in relation to the hours of use
that they have accumulated.
The model presented here relies on a recent study of F-15 and F-16
maintenance data2 to help predict the relationship between sortie
duration (or distance to target) and maximum sortie rates for USAF
______________
1 J. Lawrence Hollett, USAF Responses to Weapons of Mass Destruction Use: Standoff

Tactical Airpower Projection Option, unpublished RAND research.


2 Craig Sherbroke, Using Sorties vs. Flying Hours to Predict Aircraft Spares Demand,

McLean, Va.: Logistics Management Institute, April 1997.

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Airbase Vulnerability

units. The model reproduces sortie rates achieved by USAF fighters


operating from Saudi bases during Operation Desert Storm, 10
percent. While our simple aircraft-sortie-generation model does not
generate absolutely precise estimates of USAF sortie-generation
potential, it provides estimates that are close enough to what could be
achieved to allow us to estimate the costs and benefits of various
adversary base-attack strategies and USAF responses.
Our model takes as its starting point the simple observation that, at
any given time, an aircraft must be either in the air or on the ground.
Time spent in the air is denoted FT (flight time), and time spent on the
ground is denoted GT (ground time). Therefore, sortie rate (SR) is a
function of FT and GT:
SR =

24 hours
FT + GT

(B.1)

Ground time can be divided into the time to accomplish routine actions required before a perfectly operating aircraft can accomplish its
next mission, and those actions required to repair or replace malfunctioning systems. The former we refer to as turnaround time (TAT)
and the latter as maintenance time (MT). Since GT = TAT + MT, we get
the following equation by substitution:
SR =

24 hours
FT + TAT + MT

(B.2)

Table B .1 summarizes the average time required for various routine


TAT tasks and shows the basis for our 180-minute (3-hour) constant
TAT.
Flight time is the distance from an aircrafts base to the target and back,
divided by the average cruise speed:
FT = 2

distance to target
average cruise speed

(B.3)

Sortie-Rate Model

83

Table B.1
Average Time Required for Various Turnaround-Time Tasks
Turnaround Time (TAT)
Average Time Required
Major Actions
(minutes)
Land and Taxi
10
Make Aircraft Safe for Ground Ops
5
Shut Down Systems
2
Conduct Post-Flight Inspection/Debrief
15
Re-arm
50
Service
20
Refuel
30
Conduct Pre-Flight Inspection
15
Start Engine
5
Perform Final Systems Check
5
Arm
5
Taxi
10
Wait in Queue
5
Take Off
3
TOTAL
180
NOTE: These turnaround times represent typical performance of
USAF maintenance personnel in force-employment exercises
conducted during the late 1980s and early 1990s, as determined
through interviews of senior F-15 and F-16 maintenance personnel
by J. Lawrence Hollett in 1995. While it may appear that substantial time could be saved by performing the post-flight inspection,
re-arming, service, and refueling operations in parallel, safety
considerations prevent doing so. When refueling or re-arming
operations are in progress, only fuels and munitions personnel are
permitted near an aircraft.

Recent analysis of the relationship between sorties, sortie duration,


and maintenance requirements for F-15 and F-16 aircraft revealed that
there is a constant average of 3.4 hours of maintenance time per sortie
and an additional 0.64 hour of maintenance time for every hour the
aircraft is in the air.3 This relationship yields the following formula
for maintenance time:
MT = 3.4 hours + 0.68FT

(B.4)

______________
3 Authors conversation with Craig Sherbroke of the Logistics Management Institute,

McLean, Va.

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Airbase Vulnerability

So, for a 24-hour aircraft flying a mission against a target 500 nautical
miles (nmi) from its base with a cruise speed of 500 knots, the sortie
rate would be

SR = 24 hours 1.68FT + TAT + 3.4

)]

= 24 hours 1, 000 nmi 500 nmi hour + 3 hours

+ 3.4 hours + 0.68 1, 000 nmi 500 nmi hour

(
= 24 hours (9.76 hours)

)]

(B.5)

= 24 hours 2 hours + 3 hours + 3.4 hours + 1.36 hours


= 2.45 sorties per day

For 12-hour, day or night only aircraft (such as F-117s or


A-10s), sortie rates are rounded down to the integer number of sor-ties
an aircraft could fly in a 14-hour period.4 Using the same cruise
speed and distance to target from the above example gives a day-ornight sortie rate of 2, because an aircraft flies a sortie and is ready for
relaunch in 9.76 hours. Its second sortie requires 2 hours, for a total of
11.76 hours. There is not enough time to complete the 7.76-hour
average ground cycle before darkness or light makes further operations impractical for the particular aircraft type, so only 2 sorties can
be flown.
Note that, as the distance between an aircrafts base and its target increases, sortie rate decreases, because of two factors. The first and
most obvious is that flight time has increased. However, in this
model, the increase in flight time also leads to an increase in maintenance on those systems sensitive to sortie duration. So, not only do
maintenance personnel have less time to work on a given aircraft as
sortie duration increases (the more time it spends in the air, the less it
spends on the ground), but they also have more work to do. As a
result, sortie rate is not a linear function of distance to target.
______________
4 This assumes an average 12-hour night with 30 minutes each of twilight at dawn and

dusk and 30 minutes of transit in darkness or daylight over friendly territory at both
dawn and dusk.

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