G.R. No.

L-40003, October 28, 1986

Shirley Yap, in her own behalf and in her capacity as Administrator of the
estate of Maning Yap, Jaime Yap, and Talina Bianong Vda. de Yap,
petitioners
vs.
Court of Appeals, Nancy J. Yap, Maning Yap, Jr., Julia Yap, Jasmin Yap,
and Samuel Yap, respondents.
Facts: Maning Yap married Talina Bianong, in accordance with Muslim rites
and practices. They had four children, two of them died in infancy during the
Japanese occupation, while the other two lived to be petitioners of the
present case, namely Shirley Yap and Jaime Yap. During the subsistence of
his marriage to Talina Bianong, Maning Yap married Nancy J. Yap on
December 11, 1948 in a civil ceremony, the latter presupposing the former
to be a bachelor. Consequently, the couple had four children, namely
respondents Maning Yap, Jr., Julia Yap, Jasmin Yap and Samuel Yap.
However, on February 21, 1964, Maning Yap died in Piagapo, Lanao
del Sur due to the plane crash of an aircraft of the Philippine Air Lines.
Talina Bianong, already widowed, on March 3, 1964, filed Special
Proceeding No. 1334 before the Court of First Instance of Lanao del Sur,
seeking the issuance of letters of administration for the administration for
the estate of Maning Yap. Inter alia, the petition alleges that Maning Yap left
personal and real properties all located at Malabang, Lanao del Sur,
approximated at about Php 100,000.00.
Nancy J. Yap and her minor children, for her part, assailed the said
petition on the ground that she is the legitimate widow of Maning Yap, and
that her children with the latter are their legitimate children. Nevertheless,
Talina Bianong was initially appointed as special administrator of the
intestate estate of Maning Yap, the former being succeeded by her daughter,
Shirley Yap upon a formal hearing and upon the recommendation of Talina,
with Shirley paying the claims filed by various creditors against the intestate
testate. Upon a hearing set by the lower court in arriving at a declaration of
heirship, and to determine the heirs entitled to inherit his intestate estate,
the said court thus declared Talina Bianong and her children as the legal
heirs of Maning Yap, the decedents estate being adjudicated one-third (1/3)
of the same to each of them, by virtue of Article 996 and Article 980 of the
New Civil Code.
However, the appellate court, upon appeal by Nancy Yap and her
children, reversed and set aside the decision, and instead, ruled that the
estate should be equally divided into two equal parts, that is: one-half (1/2)
to Talina Bianong and her children and the other half (1/2) to Nancy Yap and

her children. The appellate court applied the ruling in Lao and Lao v. Dee
Tim (45 Phil. 739), as the cited case is analogous with the case at bar.
Subsequently, petitioners aver that pursuant to Article 2263 of the
New Civil Code, the distribution of the estate of Maning Yap should be in
accordance with the new codal provisions and not otherwise.
Issue/s: 1) Is the distribution of the estate of decedent Maning Yap
governed by Article 2263 of the New Civil Code?
2) If yes, who are the decedents rightful heirs?
3) Upon determination of the decedents heirs, how shall the estate
be distributed accordingly?
Ruling: (1) Yes, the court ruled in favor of the petitioners, affirming that the
case at bar should be in accordance to new codal provisions, hence,
debunking the ruling of the appellate court as the law applied by the latter,
the Leyes Partidas, has already been obsolete. Emphasizing the essence of
Article 2263 as a transitional provision, said statute provides that:
Article 2263. Rights to the inheritance of a person who
died, with or without a will, before the effectivity of this Code,
shall be governed by the Civil Code of 1889, by other previous
laws, and by the Rules of Court. The inheritance of those who
with or without a will die after the beginning of the effectivity of
this Code, shall be adjudicated and distributed in accordance
with this new body of laws and by the Rules of Court; but the
testamentary provisions shall be carried our insofar as they
may

be

permitted

betterments,

legacies

by

this

and

Code.

bequests

Therefore,
shall

be

legitimes,
respected;

however, their amount shall be reduced if in no other manner

can every compulsory heir be given his full share according to
this Code.
Supplementing the abovementioned provision, Article 2263 governs
the case at bar, inferring from the fact that Maning Yap died in 1964, long
after the New Civil Code had superseded the Spanish Civil Code.
(2) According to the law of succession in the New Civil Code, the
legal heirs of Maning Yap are Talina Bianong and her children Shirley Yap
and Jaime Yap, as well as the children of Nancy Yap, namely: Maning Yap, Jr.,
Julia Yap, Jasmin Yap and Samuel Yap.

Talina Bianong is a legal heir, whose title as wife of the decedent has
not been lost notwithstanding the subsequent marriage contracted by the
latter.
Whereas, Nancy Yap cannot inherit from Maning Yap because their
marriage is illegal and void pursuant to Section 29 of Act 3613 of the
Philippine Legislature, the marriage law in force at the time the subsequent
marriage was celebrated. In addition, Article 83 of the New Civil Code rules
out their marriage as void ab initio, said marriage not falling under any of
the exceptions provided.
Furthermore, Nancy Yaps children to Maning Yap are classified as
natural children by legal fiction as far as Article 89 and 887 of the New Civil
Code is concerned, deeming them as compulsory heirs.
(3) The provisions that shall govern the distribution were determined
as Articles 142 and 185, to wit:
Article 142. By Means of the conjugal partnership of
gains the husband and wife place in a common fund the fruits of
their separate property and the income from their work or
industry, and divide equally, upon dissolution of the marriage or
of

the

partnership,

the

net

gains

or

benefits

obtained

indiscriminately by either spouse during the marriage.

Article

185.

The

net

remainder

of

the

conjugal

partnership of gains shall be divided equally between the

husband and the wife or their respective heirs, unless a
different basis of division was agreed upon in the marriage
settlements.
Considering the abovementioned provisions, after money claims by
creditors against the intestate estate of Maning Yap approved by the lower
court have been paid by the administrator, the net remainder shall be
divided equally between Maning Yap and Taling Bianong as their shares. The
estate of Maning Yap which is one-half pro indiviso of the net remainder of
the conjugal partnership of gains of the first marriage, should be distributed
as follows:
a. The legitimate children, Shirley Yap and Jaime Yap , shall receive
one-half (1/2) of the resulting net estate to be divided equally between them
pursuant to Article 888 of the New Civil Code;

b. The legitimate widow, Talina Bianong, one-fourth (1/4) of the net

estate taken from the free portion or disposable half of the estate pursuant
to Article 999 in relation to Article 897 of the New Civil Code; and
c. The natural children by legal friction, Maning Yap, Jr., Julia Yap,
Jasmin Yap, and Samuel Yap, the remaining one-fourth (1/4)

of the net

estate to be shared equally between them pursuant to the first and third
paragraphs of Article 895 in relation to Article 983 of the New Civil Code.

G.R. No. 107383, February 20, 1996

Cecilia Zulueta, petitioner,
vs.
Court of Appeals, and Alfredo Martin, respondents.
Facts: Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta filed a case for legal separation and
for disqualification from the practice of medicine against her husband
private respondent Alfredo Martin. On March 29, 1982, petitioner entered
the clinic of the respondent, and ransacked the said clinic and took 157
documents consisting of private correspondence between respondent and
his alleged paramours, greeting cards, cancelled checks, diaries, the
respondents passport, and photographs. The seized documents were to be

used by petitioner to insinuate the abovementioned action undertook by the

latter.
Respondent, on his part, sought an action to recover said documents
and exact damages against petitioner. Soonafter, the case was filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch X, whose judgement declaring
private respondent the capital/exclusive owner of the properties described in
paragraph 3 of plaintiffs complaint or those further described in the Motion
to Return and Suppress, and ordering Cecilia Zulueta and any person acting
in her behalf to return the properties to the respondent, as well as to
indemnify him Php 5,000.00 for nominal damages, the same amount for
moral damages and attorneys fees, and to pay the cost of the suit. Also, the
writ of preliminary injunction issued previously was made final, impeding
the petitioner and her attorneys and representatives from using or
submitting/admitting as evidence the sequestered documents in question.
On appeal, the petitioners only ground was that in the case of Alfredo
Martin v. Alfonso Felix, Jr. (Felix Jr. being the counsel of the petitioner), the
Supreme Court ruled that the documents and papers, designated as Annexes
A-I to J-7 of respondents comment in that case, did not constitute
malpractice or gross misconduct. Hence, asserting that the appellate court
erred in ruling against petitioner.
Issues: Are the sequestered documents admissible as evidence?
Ruling: No. The precedence raised by the petitioner lacks of merit, for the
said case against Atty. Felix, Jr. was a disbarment case on the ground of
malpractice or gross misconduct. Inferring from his assertion against the
same, to wit:
4. When respondent refiled Cecilias case for legal
separation before the Pasig Regional Trial Court, there was
admittedly an order of the Manila Regional Trial Court
prohibiting Cecilia from using the documents Annex A-I to J-7.
On September 6, 1983, however having appealed the said order
to this Court on a petition for certiorari, this Court issued a
restraining order on aforesaid date which order temporarily set
aside

the

order

of

the

trial

court.

Hence,

during

the

enforceability of this Courts order, respondents request for

petitioner to admit the genuineness and authenticity of the
subject annexes cannot be looked upon as malpractice. Notably,
petitioner Dr. Martin finally admitted the truth and authenticity
of the questioned annexes. At that point in time, would it have
been malpractice for respondent to use petitioners admission

as evidence against him in the legal separation case pending in

the Regional Trial Court of Makati? Respondent submits it isnot malpractice.
Significantly, petitioners admission was done not thru his
counsel but by Dr. Martin himself under oath. Such verified
admission constitutes an affidavit, and, therefore, receivable in
evidence

against

him.

Petitioner

became

bound

by

his

admission. For Cecilia to avail herself of her husbands

admission and use the same in her action for legal separation
cannot be treated as malpractice.
The enforcement of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction was
temporarily restrained by the Supreme Court. Hence, the admissibility of the
documents in question were merely incidental, and does not necessarily
establish the admissibility of the documents in general. It is worth noting
that once the Temporary Restraining Order by the Supreme Court against
the enforcement of the order by the Regional Trial Court was lifted, the
prohibition against the use of the documents became effective again.
The Supreme Court further ruled that said documents and papers are
inadmissible in evidence. For it to be admissible, the encroachment on the
documents by the petitioner must be enforced by a lawful order from a court
or when the public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law.
The constitutional mandated enshrined in Article IV, Sec. 4(2) of the 1973
Constitution (currently Art. III, Sec 3(2) of the 1987 Constitution) pertains to
the inadmissibility of evidences for any purpose in any proceeding, provided
that there be encroachment of the said provision.
Furthermore, the Rules of Court explicitly provides that: Neither
husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of
the affected spouse while the marriage subsists (Rule 130, Sec. 22). In
addition, neither may be examined without the consent of the other as to any
communication received in confidence by one from the other during the
marriage, save for specific exceptions (Rule 130, Sec. 24).