D3 22 636 2008 (Encl. - 14)
D3 22 636 2008 (Encl. - 14)
D3 22 636 2008 (Encl. - 14)
(COMMERCIAL DIVISION)
SUIT NO: D3-22-636-2008
GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT
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Yeap Cheang Teik (Yeap) and Ding Teck Hing (Ding). The Defendant
and Yeap set up the Company as a venture to supply goods
manufactured in Malaysia to Laura Ashley limited, a retailer in the United
Kingdom. The Defendant was one of the Guarantors of the Credit
The Company defaulted in making payments. The Plaintiff then initiated
this action claiming for the following:
i.
payment; and
ii.
The Defendant contends that there are triable issues namely:a) that the Defendant had resigned as a director of the Company and
is therefore not liable;
b) that the there was a variation of the Agreement
which had
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The Defendant, as the director of the Company had duly signed the
Letters of Guarantee and therefore subjected himself to the terms and
conditions of the said Letters of Guarantee. Abdul Malik Ishak,J in Allied
Granite Marble Industries Sdn. Bhd. v. Chin Foong Holdings Sdn.
Bhd. & Ors [2000] 5 CLJ 71 observed that,
In a joint and several guarantees, the creditor is placed in an enviable
position since it can decide as to which of the co-guarantors it wishes to sue
for the recovery of the debt;The creditor too is also at liberty to pursue the
matter further by going after the other guarantors if the debt is not fully paid
up.
The Defendant had conveyed his intention to resign in 2006 but he had
not taken appropriate action to do so. The searches conducted at the
Malaysian Commission of Companies by the Plaintiff on 30.10.2006 and
24.3.2008 show that the Defendant remains as a director of the
Company. Even if he had resigned he is still personally liable under the
Letters of Indemnity which he had duly signed. There is nothing in the
law which stipulates that if a director resign he is not liable for a loan
which he had given a personal guarantee.
In Bank Negara Malaysia v. Mohd Ismail [1992] 1 CLJ 627 the
Supreme Court held that the duty of a Judge does not end as soon as
the fact is asserted by one party, or denied or disputed by the other on
affidavit. The Judge has a duty to reject such assertion or denial if such
assertion or denial is equivocal or lacking in precision or is inconsistent
with undisputed contemporary documents or is inherently improbable.
Under an O.14 application, the duty of a Judge does not end
as soon as a fact is asserted by one party, and denied or disputed
by the other on affidavit. Where such assertion, denial or dispute
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However in this case the issues raised by the Defendant are not issues
which need to go for full trial. In National Company for Foreign Trade
v Kayu Raya Sdn Bhd [1984] 2 MLJ 300, the Federal Court has stated
as follows,
We think it appropriate to remind ourselves once again that in
every application under O.14, the first considerations are (a) whether
the case comes within the order and (b) whether the plaintiff has
satisfied the preliminary requirements for proceeding under O.14.
For the purposes of an application under O.14, the preliminary
requirements (i)
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sgd.
( HASNAH BINTI DATO MOHAMMED HASHIM )
Judicial Commissioner
High Court of Malaya
Kuala Lumpur.
5 July 2010
Counsels:
For the Plaintiff [Pn. Eileen Othman Messrs Benjamin Dawson]
For the Defendant [Pn. Sharlini Messrs Bodipalar Ponnudural De
Silva]