PSA - NORWAY

Flexible Pipes

Failure modes, inspection, testing and

monitoring

02

Issued for information

18-Dec-2007

JM

RH

01

Issued for client review

07-Sep-2007

JM

RH

00

Issued for internal review

05-Sep-2007

JM

Date

Origin

Rev Reason for issue

JOB

Checked Approved

Authors:

J.Muren
Client:

Client Ref.:

PSA - NORWAY

Trond Sundby

Document no

Classification

Total number of pages

P5996-RPT01-REV02

Open

30 + Appendices

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Rev. No.

02

REVISION LOG
Revision Revision Pages
Description of Change
No.
Date
Affected
02
12.12.07
All
Major update with client comments

Approved

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TABLE OF CONTENTS
(I) FRONT PAGE ................................................................................... 1
(II) REVISION LOG................................................................................. 1
(III) TABLE OF CONTENTS .................................................................... 2
1

INTRODUCTION............................................................................... 3
1.1
1.2

PRACTICES...................................................................................... 8
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
2.5

Proven repair methods ............................................................................. 30

Service life extension ............................................................................... 31

EXPERIENCE TRANSFER............................................................. 32
7.1
7.2

Introduction .............................................................................................. 25
Inspection................................................................................................. 26
Testing ..................................................................................................... 27
Monitoring ................................................................................................ 28
Practical experiences ............................................................................... 28
Emerging inspection technologies ............................................................ 28

REPAIR AND LIFE EXTENSION .................................................... 30

6.1
6.2

General .................................................................................................... 24

FLEXIBLE PIPE INTEGRITY MANAGEMENT ............................... 25

5.1
5.2
5.3
5.4
5.5
5.6

General .................................................................................................... 11
Design & Manufacturing ........................................................................... 13
Transportation .......................................................................................... 15
Installation / recovery ............................................................................... 15
Operation ................................................................................................. 17

FAILURE MODE SUMMARY (BONDED PIPES) ........................... 24

4.1

Standards................................................................................................... 8
Design........................................................................................................ 8
Fabrication ................................................................................................. 9
Transport / Installation.............................................................................. 10
Operation ................................................................................................. 10

FAILURE MODE REVIEW (UN-BONDED PIPES) ......................... 11

3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
3.5

Background ................................................................................................ 3
Historical review ......................................................................................... 3

Standards................................................................................................. 32
Seminars.................................................................................................. 32

REFERENCES................................................................................ 33

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INTRODUCTION

1.1

Background

Date

18-Dec-07

Doc. No.

Rev. No.

02

PSA (Petroleum Safety Authority) - Norway has requested SeaFlex to prepare a report on failure
modes for flexible pipes and the current best practice for inspection, testing and monitoring of these
pipes in context of an integrity management program.
The flexible pipe technology is continuously developing to cope with new challenges in pressure,
temperature and water depth, while experiences from often less demanding long term operations are
gathered. To enable safe operation of both new and exising flexible pipe systems in this framework,
a systematic approach for experience sharing will be of importance. Both the industry in general,
fabricators and the operators will benefit from such experience sharing.
The overall objective of this report is to a give brief introduction to the flexible pipe failure modes
and integrity management activities. The report is based on world wide experience; hence all
information in this report may not be fully applicable for Norwegian offshore sector. As the major
part of flexible pipes in operation in Norwegian offshore sector are un-bonded pipes this will be the
main focus in this report, but a small summary on bonded pipes is included to broaden the report.

1.2

Historical review
In the Norwegian offshore sector, the use of flexible pipes in oil and gas production was initiated in
the late 80s, although the first flexible flowline was installed in the south North Sea already in the
early 70s. The first applications were as static subsea tie in jumpers, dynamic jumpers between fixed
and floating platforms and static risers. A few risers were used in dynamic application for test
production. In the early 90s several project developments in deeper water with floating facilities and
flexible riser systems were kicked off. Today a large amount of the oil and gas production and export
in the Norwegian offshore sector is successfully conveyed through flexible pipes.

Flexible risers have been

one of the key elements
in making commercial
development of several
offshore oil and gas
fields.
Figure 1 shows a photo
of an advanced unbonded flexible riser
construction,
with
external fire protection
layers and 4 tensile
armour layers.

Figure 1-1: Un-bonded flexible pipe (cut by water jet)

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In the early years both bonded and un-bonded flexible pipe designs were used. Later, an increased
number of un-bonded flexible pipe suppliers, increased competition and technology development
have turned the industry more into the use of un-bonded flexible pipes.
Looking back, it is evident that the design and material know-how was limited, and that the
flexible pipe technology was stretched causing failures ahead of the expected service life for several
pipe applications. The suppliers, engineering companies and end users have worked closely together
the last decades establishing improved standards for design and qualification test methodology as
well as improved models and tools for material degradation prediction, global dynamic analysis and
local cross-sectional analysis.
With the previous experience as basis for new designs and deliveries, one should expect less early
stage failures due to the fact that experiences are gathered in a wider and wider area of application.
The failures we are experiencing today are likely caused by the introduction of more demanding
operating conditions.
With respect to flexible riser fatigue, it should be noted that for the Norwegian offshore sector with
close to 200 flexible risers, the average riser has been in service for only about 50% of its intended
service life (typical design service life is 20 or 25 years).
The overall current status of flexible pipes in the Norwegian offshore sector is that this technology
has given cost-effective solutions for a large number of field developments. This is evident through
the still growing use of flexible pipes in the North Sea. Figure 2 shows an estimate of the
accumulated number of dynamic flexible risers, umbilicals and cables in the Norwegian waters from
90s to 2005. Furthermore, there are several hundred kilometres of static flexible flow lines in the
Norwegian sector of the North Sea.

Flexible risers, umbilicals & cables

Connected to floaters in Norway
300

Approx. number [-]

250

200

150

100

50

0
1990

1992

1994

1996

1998
Year

2000

2002

2004

2006

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02

Figure 1-2: Accumulated numbers of dynamic flexible risers, umbilicals and cables in the
Norwegian sector

The trend for the future in Norwegian offshore sector is still an increase in the total number of
flexible pipes in operation, but not with the same rapid growth as seen from 1996 2000. The
number of tie-ins, reconfigurations and new developments is expected to outnumber the
decommissioned risers, at least in the coming 5 years.
The failure rate measured in failures per year in service has been higher for flexible risers than for
rigid risers. From 1995 to 2007, 25 major and 18 minor incidents were reported to PSA. Prior to
1995 there were also failures, but not included in this statistics..

Flexible riser incidents from PSA Norway's CODAM

1995 to 2007 (June)
8
7

Major
Minor

6
5
4
3
2
1
0
1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

Figure 1-3: PSA Norway Riser failure data

By combining the data in figures 1-2 and 1-3 one may calculate an estimate for the failure rate pr
riser in operation for each year. In the figure below, the number of flexible risers has been taken as
0.75 times the estimated total number of flexible risers, umbilicals and cables. Only major incidents
from PSA (CODAM database) are included in the figure below.

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Estimated major incident rate for flexible risers in

operation in Norwegian waters

End-fitting
failures

Carcass
collapse

0,05
0,05

Incident pr riser

0,04
0,04
Real
trend?

0,03
0,03
0,02
0,02
0,01
0,01
0,00
1994

1996

1998

2000

2002

2004

2006

2008

Figure 1-4: Estimated incident rate for flexible risers in Norway

As can be seen from figure 1-4, the trend in reported major riser incidents pr riser in operation is
decreasing. If we look into the data for 1995 and 2000 we can identify the dominating failure modes.
For 1995 we find that this is related to end fitting failures, while for 2000 it is related to carcass
collapse. Both these failure modes are overcome by improved design and revised operational
procedures.
As an experiment we may consider an alternative trend where the years 1995 and 2000 both are
removed. We will then get a trend picture with a small increase in the major incident rate, in stead of
the decreasing trend seen on the previous figure.
Due to limited data it is difficult to predict the trend of incident rate, but a general perception is that
the incident rate of older equipment is higher than for newer equipment. This may also be valid for
flexible risers as a significant number of failure modes are related to exposure time (fatigue, ageing,
wear).

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Estimated major incident rate for flexible risers in

operation in Norwegian waters
0,05
0,045

Incident pr riser

0,04
0,035
More
realistic
trend?

0,03
0,025
0,02
0,015
0,01
0,005
0
1994

1996

1998

2000

2002

2004

2006

Figure 1-5: Alternative trend with incidents from 1995 and 2000 removed

2008

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PRACTICES

2.1

Standards

Date

18-Dec-07

Doc. No.

Rev. No.

02

The governing standards for design, fabrication, installation and operation of flexible pipes are the
API 17J and 17B specifications, ref /1/ and /2/. These specifications are now in the process of being
re-issued as ISO standards, ref /3/ and /4/. The API specification and recommended practices are
widely used and form a solid basis for all design, fabrication and operation of flexible pipes.
Several companies have developed company practices and policies for operation of flexible pipe
systems. By experience, these practices and the implementation of these may vary significantly from
one operator to the other and even between platforms run by the same operator.
For integrity management of risers, DNV is in the process of completing a recommended practice
document that is likely to be widely used by the industry, ref /5/. Other previous initiatives to align
the industry in a common practice for riser integrity management have only been partly successful.
There is a controversy in the fact that the international standards for flexible pipes are well
established, developed over several years, widely used, and still there is a range of riser failures
experienced world wide.
Note that extensive updates to the above mentioned standards are under development in order to
incorporate learnings from the last decade. One should also bear in mind that API 17J have allowed
higher utilization for each new revision.

2.2

Design
There are today three suppliers of un-bonded flexible pipes of larger internal diameters for oil and
gas applications, Technip, Wellstream International and NKT-Flexibles. Common to all suppliers are
a strong centralised design team responsible for cross section development, qualification testing and
development of methods and tools to be used by the in-house engineering teams supporting each pipe
delivery.
When developing a new pipe design the pipe supplier will base this on experiences gained over
several years, detailed analysis and assessments, along with both small scale and full scale testing.
Development of tools and design methods goes hand in hand with testing. A few very successful
joint industry projects have been executed, but the majority of development work is still proprietary,
and a part of the ongoing competition between the suppliers.
The common practice is that the pipe supplier will have a full EPC (Engineering, Procurement and
Construction) responsibility for the pipe delivery, including both detailed cross section design and
global configuration design of the pipe systems. Buoyancy modules, bend stiffeners, clamps and
other ancillaries are often also included in the delivery. The operators refer in contracts to the
international standards, in addition to company specific requirements on functions and interfaces as
well as national regulatory requirements and standards.
If the application of the pipe is outside previous experiences or feedback from operations of similar
pipes recommends changes, a new qualification program is executed. The qualification requirements
are reasonable well defined in API 17J, ref /2/, but still experience shows that introduction of new
materials and solutions should be even more carefully evaluated and tested before brought to the
market.

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By experience, the weakest part of the design loop for flexible pipes is the lack of systematic
feedback from installation, operation, recovery, re-use or damage investigations. Some operators use
the suppliers to nearly all evaluations after procurement of the pipes, while other operators seldom
contact the supplier before the next development project. One reason for these large differences in
practice may come from different company policies on industry competition.

2.3

Fabrication
Fabrication of all un-bonded flexible pipes is done in a few highly specialised sites. The sites have
specialised equipment and machinery for both polymer extrusion and winding of the different
metallic layers. Dedicated areas are also needed for the manual work related to end fitting mounting,
various test facilities, storage and handling.

Figure 2-1: Tensil armour winding machine (Wellstream)

The API specification, ref /2/, sets up stringent requirements to the fabrication of all flexible pipe
layers, the quality control, and the documentation. All flexible pipe manufacturers have established
routines and practices fulfilling the API requirements. At the end of the fabrication process all pipes
are subject to a comprehensive set of tests (FAT). These tests have been designed to reveal a wide
range of possible fabrication defects. Failures related to dynamics or ageing are not covered by the
FAT, but should be covered by design and qualification tests and systematic feedback from
operations.
In a life time perspective it is evident that a continuous focus on QA / QC and documentation in the
fabrication process will create a good basis for further integrity management activities, life extension
projects and possible investigations of failures and incidents experienced in operation. The
continuous QA/QC focus is even more important when the activity level is high.

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2.4

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Rev. No.

02

Transport / Installation
The transportation and installation of flexible pipes are often performed by the installation contractor
as a part of a broader EPCI contract. Alternatively the flexible pipes are procured from the fabricator
and delivered to the installation contractor as Company supplied items. The transportation and
installation procedures will generally not be influenced significantly by the contractual split of
responsibilities.
Due to the heavy reels with flexible pipes, the installation vessel often makes several trips to a shore
base to load pipe reels on larger projects. The reels will often be lifted by separate heavy lift cranes,
if not loaded on the fabrication sites.
The pipe installation operation is controlled through a tensioner unit over a lay tower or over a chute
on the vessel side, aft or through a moon-pool. The installation will also include handling of end
fittings, bend- stiffeners and restrictors, clamps and buoyancy modules. The correct and efficient
handling and installation of ancillary equipment will need special attention to reduce risk and to
optimise schedule.
Pipe installation, handling and related installation equipment have improved significantly over the
last 15 years. This has lead to reduced risk for installation incidents and delays.

2.5

Operation
The practise for operation of flexible pipes varies enormously between geographical regions,
operators, and between the different field development solutions. Even between two floaters operated
by the same company we have experienced significant variations in routines, practices and tools for
follow up of flexible pipes in operation.
If we limit the view to the Norwegian offshore sector we still see variations between operators and
vessels, but in general we can say that there is overall good focus on the integrity of flexible pipes.
Often the focus on integrity issues are related to experienced incidents or difficulties, even though
some operators are more proactive and set up good flexible pipe integrity management routines based
on assessment of risk rather than experienced problems.
The knowledge related to failure modes and integrity management for flexible pipes have developed
continuously over the last 15 years. If the operator shall maintain an acceptable risk level of the
flexible pipes, seen in relation to the total experience gained by the industry, it is required to facilitate
an active experience transfer both within the operator organisation and with fellow operators. As the
experience is gathered the flexible pipe integrity management programs have to be updated.
In a historical perspective we have seen large development since the first flexible pipes in operation,
that once a year was inspected by a busy ROV to the current best practice where the flexible pipe
operational data is continuously monitored.

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FAILURE MODE REVIEW (UN-BONDED PIPES)

3.1

General

Rev. No.

02

The number of potential failure modes for a multilayer structure such as a flexible pipe is high.
However, the number of different failure modes experienced in operation is more limited. API 17B
RP, ref. /1/, lists and describes all of the most probable failure modes and defects for a flexible pipe.
The use of this reference is highly recommended to get a complete overview.

Table 3-1. Failure modes for un-bonded flexible pipes, ref /1/

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A good source for data covering flexible riser failures and incidents experienced in the North Sea is
the UKOOA guidance note on monitoring methods and integrity assurance for un-bonded flexible
pipe from 2002, ref. /6/. The report is based on collected data from a relatively large number of field
developments covering both the UK sector and the Norwegian sector of the North Sea. Even though
the report does not cover all of the installed flexible risers in the North Sea, it gives a good overview
of the different failure modes and incidents experienced.
The figure below summarises the main data covering failure modes seen in operation from the
UKOOA work.
It should be noted that a number of the failures are caused by operation outside design limits and that
some of the failure modes in the data set have been resolved by the industry
In addition to the data covering the operational phase, the study reported 26 incidents during
installation and commissioning with the following main incidents:

External sheath damage

58%

Flooded annulus

19%

Riser operational failures

(UK+Norway), UKOOA
14

12

Occurances
Loss of integrity

10

Figure 3-1: UKOOA statistics on flexible pipe failures

Carcass collapse

J-tuibe pressure
sheath

Pipe blockage

End fitting leak

Flooded annulus

Vent valve blockage

Armour wire
corrosion

External sheath

Ancillary devices

PVDF pull-out

Nylon ageing

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3.2

Date

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18-Dec-07

Rev. No.

02

Design & Manufacturing

Some early problems were related to the steel armor interaction at the end fitting interface that for
pipes in dynamic applications could lead to fatigue failure of the armor layers followed by pressure
barrier failure and leaks. Changes in the termination procedures have resolved this problem (these
early failures are not covered in fig 3-1.)
The ageing properties and temperature limitations of PA-11 led to the introduction of plasticized Poly
Vinyl Di Fluoride, PVDF, plastic as pressure barrier material for high temperature service. The
plasticizer was needed for the extrusion process. Multilayer designs, with sacrificial layers, were used
for dynamic service due to the stress concentration sensitivity of the PVDF material.
Early PVDF risers contributed with a major share of flexible riser failures in the Norwegian sector of
the North Sea. The first structural failures of PVDF risers were pull-out of the pressure barrier from
the end fitting sealing. In order to maintain the anchoring of the PVDF layer when the plasticizer was
extracted during service, extensive research and development work were initiated resulting in revised
termination procedures, improved designs and new PVDF materials with significantly less
plasticizer. Pull out of revised PVDF termination designs has not been reported, but cracking due to
thermal cycling has been reported from testing.
Recent structural failures of PVDF risers are caused by pressure build up between the multiple,
PVDF layers followed by collapse of the pipe bore during de-pressurisation resulting in leaks for
risers in gas injection service as well as for a few production risers with high GOR.

Figure 3-2: Example Detailed engineering study of carcass stress

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02

Smooth bore (no carcass) flexible pipe designs with an extruded anti collapse layer between the
pressure armor and inner tension armor layers, have experienced several failures due to pressure
build up between the pressure barrier and the anti collapse layer. The pressure build up may be
caused by diffusion from the bore or small leaks in the end fitting sealing or pressure barrier. This is
more of a design weakness, and the pros and cons of a smooth bore pipe versus a rough bore pipe
have to be evaluated on a case to case basis.
As design procedures, analysis tools and methods have improved, the failures directly related to
design are reduced, but as known parameters are optimised the relative importance of the unknown
will increase. This paradox should make the designers of flexible pipe keep a general awareness.
There is a small risk for failures related to incomplete or inaccurate design basis, or errors in the
design work itself. Errors in the design work are in the majority of cases revealed through checks
performed by the operator or a 3rd party engaged for design verification. Experience transfer is a key
contributor to an error free design track record.
One failure mode that appears still to be linked to design issues is blockage of annulus vent systems.
Some end fitting designs could be improved to enable long term unrestricted flow in the vent system.
It is vital for continuous improvements in design tools, methods and processes that all in-service
experienced anomalies or failures related to design and manufacturing of flexible pipes are reported
back to the manufacturer.
Another issue is indirect failures on interfacing equipment, as e.g. hub failures due to loads from
flexible pipes. This should be kept in mind during design, installation, commissioning and operation.

Figure 3-3: Example on design recommendations by API, ref /1/

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3.3

Date

Doc. No.

18-Dec-07

Rev. No.

02

Transportation
The flexible pipes are, with few exemptions were carousels are applied, transported on large reels
from the fabrication facilities to the installation site or a mobilisation base near the installation site.
The reels are lifted by large onshore or floating cranes.
Failures during lift and sea transportation
are not commented further in this
document.
The failures experienced during
transportation are related to packing,
preservation and seafastening. For long
term transportation and storage careful
preservation and packing may be needed
to protect the flexible pipe and end
fittings against sunlight exposure and
corrosion of seal surfaces.

Figure 3-4: Flexible pipe transportation / installation reel (NKT)

If the pipes are water filled and the transport is taking place in artic areas, one should carefully
evaluate the effect of ice formation in the riser bore. This may be of a special concern if pipes are
pressure tested or pigged shortly after transport.
On a few occasions flexible pipes have caught fire during cutting of seafastening. This have had
major consequences for the operators field development, as replacing several risers may be very time
consuming, even without the need for engineering.
The external sheath of the flexible pipes is vulnerable to dropped objects and small impacts from
cargo lifted by cranes during hectic mobilisation work. Damaged external sheath may directly lead to
pipe failure if the external sheath damage is located in an unfavourable position, and not repaired
prior to installation.

3.4

Installation / recovery
During installation or recovery (for re-use) operation several failure modes may be trigged by
unintended minor incidents, errors in procedures, equipment anomalies or lack of precise adherence
to procedures. After some initial failures during installation operations, major improvements are now
implemented resulting in less installation failures.

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Figure 3-5: Flexible pipe installation (Technip)

The most common failure during installation is through thickness damages to the external sheath.
Early experiences shows external sheath failures of up to 10% of installed risers. If these damages are
small and located close to the pipe ends, there may not be an integrity problem for the pipe.
However, each case has to be investigated separately to evaluate the consequence of the damage,
possibility and need for repair etc. If the external sheath damage is in the splash zone where the
cathodic protection system have limited or no effect, and the access to oxygen is good, major
corrosion damages can appear quickly and pipe integrity will be in danger.
Another failure mode experienced during installation operations is over-bending and unlocking of the
pressure armour. This may eventually lead to pipe failure when the pipe is exposed to high pressure,
as during a pressure test, or during long term operation with high temperature and lower pressure.
The unlocking may also progress and damage large sections of the pipe leading to loss of integrity
even without high pressure or temperature.
Over bending combined with high hydrostatic pressure (deep water) and compression have lead to
failures of the tensile armour wires by overstressing or wire buckling. This failure mode, which is
only applicable for deepwater, is referred to as lateral buckling.
Failures may also be experienced when installing ancillary equipment such as clamps, bend limiters
or buoyancy modules. Often the external sheath is endangered if the procedures are not carefully
adhered to. During clamp attachment the pipe may be squeezed too much if creep effects are not fully
taken into account during procedure development or the procedure is not strictly followed.
Damaging interference with neighbouring risers has been experienced during installation and
recovery of flexible pipes. The consequences have been damages to the external sheath, loss of
subsea anchor position / integrity and loss of buoyancy modules. Careful planning, training and
execution are required to prevent such failures, especially during replacement operations on floaters
with several risers and mooring lines.
Failures have been experienced with pipe clamps where the highly pre-stressed and anode protected
bolts have cracked due to hydrogen embrittlement

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02

As explained above, installation damages are in the range from small external sheath scratches to
structural damages requiring shore repairs or scrapping of the pipe.
Minor external sheath damages discovered prior to submerging the damage location into the sea,
including limited through sheath thickness damages, can normally be repaired by flexible pipe
technicians onboard the installation vessel.
The main problem is related to undetected installation and handling damages causing later failure or
seawater flooded pipe annulus possibly resulting in reduced service life.
The recommended preventive efforts to avoid installation related damages include well designed
handling and installation equipment, protection of sharp edges and snagging points in the handling
route and detailed laying procedures supported by analyses and offshore personnel familiarization.
Any deviation to installation procedures should be properly addressed, processed and accepted prior
to implementation. The pipe external sheath must be closely visually inspected just prior to
deployment into the sea. Any anomalies should be reported, processed and repaired according to the
manufacturers damage assessment and repair guidelines prior to deployment

3.5

Operation

3.5.1

Fatigue
All the materials used in the flexible riser cross section may be subject to mechanical fatigue.
Normally, this is in focus only for steel components, but when investigating progression of damages
within the flexible pipe cross section one should have in mind the effect of temperature cycle induced
fatigue in PVDF. Fatigue in polymers is normally not regarded as a fundamental failure mode for unbonded flexible pipes, see section 3.1.
The carcass is made by cold forming thin steel ribbons into an interlocked flexible structure.
Normally this structure will only see limited stress cycles and be more exposed to erosion or
corrosion in case of sand or undesired chemicals in the well stream. Carcass fatigue has been
experienced due to inaccuracies in the fabrication or load conditions changing the carcass
performance. Recent experiences indicate that the carcass may see significant stress levels when the
flexible riser is interacting with arch structures. Normally a fatigue crack in the carcass should not
lead to loss of integrity for the flexible pipe, but this has been experienced. A complex interaction
with the other cross section layers is needed for the damage to progress into a pipe failure, but the
experience so far is that a failed carcass over time may progress further into a pipe failure.
Fatigue in tensile and pressure armour has been experienced in accelerated prototype testing and is
currently no significant contributor to pipe failures in operation. Based on analysis performed in the
design, fatigue failures are unlikely as the oldest flexible risers in operation in Norwegian waters are
just above 10 years.
However, as the design analysis of most risers installed have assumed dry annulus environment there
may be some risers that will experience less fatigue life than previously expected. Experience shows
that nearly all production risers will fill up the riser annulus with condensed water. Differences will
be seen due to different pressure barrier materials, well fluid, temperature etc.

3.5.2

Corrosion
If the external sheath is damaged, the armour wires in the pipe will be exposed to seawater. The wires
will corrode if not efficiently protected by anodes in the vicinity. For flexible pipes with damages in
the external sheath, some O2 corrosion is observed, even when the pipe ends are connected to anodes.
This is believed to be related to a possible problem of protecting shielded steel a certain distance
away from the damage where the steel is not directly exposed to seawater.

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02

Technip have studied the effect of corrosion protection (-850mV) of shielded steel in a test, ref /11/.
The test concludes that steel wires in the vicinity of a damage external sheet area should be
sufficiently protected against O2 corrosion. The partial pressure of O2 seems to fall quicker than the
potential from the CP system along the pipe annulus away from the damage area. However, based on
observed corrosion on other flexible pipes, it is reason to believe that the good effect of CP system
further along the annulus (away from the external sheath damage) is very dependant upon high CP
potential.
For external sheath damages in the waterline area where the effect of anodes is limited, several
examples on significant O2 corrosion have been observed, some with dramatic pipe failures.

Figure 3-6: Armour wire corrosion due to external sheath damage (Statoil)
CO2 will diffuse from the pipe bore to the annulus if bore content include CO2. The partial pressure
of CO2 in the annulus will vary along the riser. The NORSOK standard M506, ref /10/ presents
methodology and a calculation sheet for CO2 corrosion. This NORSOK standard is limited to partial
pressure of CO2 above 0.1bar. The corrosion rate for CO2 partial pressure above 0.1 is higher than
0.1mm/year for any temperature between 10 and 60 degC and pH between 3.5 and 6.5. This indicates
that CO2 corrosion may be a problem for flexible pipes with water filled annulus, however
experience from dissections of damaged flexible pipes has concluded with very limited CO2
corrosion compared to estimates based on NORSOK 506 for the tension armours of flexible risers
and flowlines. CO2 corrosion may be a long term problem for dynamically exposed risers due to
reduced fatigue capacity in annulus environments with moderate to high CO2 partial pressure.

3.5.3

Collapse
There are two different collapse scenarios that have been experienced by flexible pipes, collapse of
internal pressure liner in smooth bore pipes, and carcass and pressure liner collapse in rough bore
pipes.
Pressure liner collapse in smooth bore pipes is often seen on water injection pipes when vacuum is
reached in the bore due to dynamic flow effects during shut down. There may be several ways to
prevent this, but these compensating measures will often lead to operational restrictions. Both
adjusted valve closing sequences, vacuum breakers and vacuum in the flexible pipe annulus may be
viable options. The pressure sheath will eventually crack after a number of repeated collapses.

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Carcass collapse in flexible pipes with multi layer PVDF pressure sheath has been experienced
several times. The collapse is caused by an external pressure exceeding the capacity of the carcass. If
the carcass has an initial damage or ovalization the collapse capacity may be dramatically reduced.
The actual collapse capacity will be influenced by several factors: Geometry at the damage area,
differential pressure, and 3D stiffness / load effects caused by the vicinity of the end fitting or
clamps.
Preventive measures may be operational limits, restrictions in pressure relief gradients or design
changes on the carcass.
Operation of a pipe with a fully or partially collapsed carcass may be possible for a short time, but
movement of the pressure sheath will after some time lead to failure, if pressure or temperature is
cycled. In addition, the lack of internal support may lead to failures in other layers; all dependants
upon the cross section design.
Recent experiences have shown that carcass collapse due to pressure build up between pressure
sheath layers may be more likely when the pipe is exposed to loads from interfacing structures that
lead to initial ovalization of the carcass. Such interfacing structures may be curved sections, bend
stiffeners, clamps, guide tubes or arches.

Figure 3-7: Collapsed carcass (Hydro)

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3.5.4

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Hydrogen embrittlement
Hydrogen embrittlement is known to cause failure of highly loaded high strength steel components
protected by nearby anodes. Failures have been experienced in subsea equipment and ancillary
equipment for flexible risers. No confirmed hydrogen embrittlement failures of flexible pipe armour
wires are known, although some unexpected wire failures have been seen.
Hydrogen embrittlement of high strength armour wires could be disregarded as a primary failure
mode, but connected to other initial failures, e.g. effects that give local stress concentration such
failures may be seen.
Even if the material do not get brittle seawater, CP and high strength steel may give hydrogen
production and a significantly reduced fatigue life, for dynamic applications.

3.5.5

Impacts
Local impacts from dropped objects, fishing equipment or equipment used during nearby marine
operations may give a range of serious damages to the flexible pipe. Most commonly experienced
failure mode from impacts is damages to the external sheath and subsequent local armour wire
corrosion.
More severe impacts may lead to damages to tensile armour wires, unlocking of pressure armour
layers or carcass ovalization, potentially leading to a total pipe failure.
A general recommendation: If outer sheath damages expose the armour to seawater and CP, the
exposure time should be limited.

3.5.6

Pigging
Smooth bore flexible pipes are often used in water injection systems. This design is significantly
more sensitive to pigging damages. Pressure sheath damage due to pigging has occurred resulting in
system shut down and riser replacement.
Carcass damages may result from pigging with erroneous pigs in flexible pipes. The carcass damage
may develop into a carcass failure in dynamically loaded pipes.

3.5.7

Ageing
The early operational temperature limitations were not conservative and problems were experienced
with ageing of the PA 11 plastic material (nylon) when used as pressure barrier. Operation outside
humidity and related temperature limits has occurred causing reduced service life and riser
replacement. The ageing causes embrittlement and cracking of the pressure barrier.
In order to establish safe operational limits for PA-11 pressure barriers, research and development
work were initiated, resulting in revised ageing curves. The API 17TR2, ref /12/ gives reasonable
correlation between predicted and actual ageing of PA-11. Test coupons machined from actual
flexible riser structures installed in gas injection and oil production lines and retrieved for testing
have partly verified good correlation between actual degradation and the API 17TR2 predictions
when the curve for pH 4 is applied.
Recent research shows that the ageing of PA-11 is more complicated than assumed in API TR
17TR2, even though adherence to the recommendations in API TR 17TR2 seems to be giving a
significant reduction of ageing damages. More research is needed to establish more refined, less
conservative and practical recommendations.

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Ageing of the external sheath due to UV-exposure may be a long term problem even if this is not
reported to be a significant problem today. Ageing of anti wear tape used between the armor layers
may be a problem for pipes operating with high temperature, especially if the annulus is filled by
condensed water diffused from the pipe bore, or filled by breaches in the external sheath.
Failures due to ageing of other polymer materials used in the flexible pipes are rarely seen compared
to the PA-11 / Nylon failures. Adherence to the recommendations in API 17J/B is important if ageing
problems should be avoided.
Failure due to material hydrolysis of bend stiffeners made of polyurethane has been experienced.
Changes in type of polyurethane material used and increased knowledge of temperature limitations
appear to have solved this problem.

3.5.8

Erosion
Sand in the production flow may lead to erosion of the carcass. Erosion is normally not a problem as
long as operational limits to sand amount and flow velocities are adhered to.
Another related issue is internal pipe damages due to hydrates. Hydrates created in the flexible pipe
or in interfacing pipes systems flowing into the flexible pipes may lead to severe damages to the
carcass and subsequent pipe leak.

3.5.9

Buckling / over bending / wire disordering

Flexible pipes may buckle in case of compression loads over a certain limit. For static seabed lines
protected by trenching and / or rock dumping special considerations must be made to avoid buckling.
In the extreme event, buckling loads may lead to pipe over bending and wire disordering (bird
caging). For static flowlines this failure mode has been experienced.
The different buckling modes seen in flexible pipes:
Lateral buckling due to over stress: For a deep water pipe with an intact external sheath, the high
frictional forces efficiently restrain the wires from moving until the critical curvature is reached. If
exposed to axial compression combined with bending, the locked or fixed tensile armor wires
could be exposed to compressive stresses above yield and hence fail by overstress.
Lateral buckling due to elastic instability: For a pipe with damaged external sheath exposed to axial
compression combined with bending, the radial movement will be restrained by the high strength
tapes, but lateral movement could occur with little resistance. Hence, in this case, lateral buckling
due to elastic instability could occur. Excessive lateral wire movements could also lead to
overstressing if reached before elastic instability occurs.
New test methodology has been developed to test pipe designs and calibrate analytical tools for
lateral buckling.
Radial buckling: If the pipe is exposed to true wall compression, the helically laid tension armor
wires will try to move in the radial direction possibly leading to wire buckling and significant
disorganization of the wires. This effect has also been known to happen during manufacturing. Radial
buckling is often referred to as bird caging. However, for a pipe with intact external sheath, any
radial movement of the wires will be efficiently restrained by the hydrostatic pressure acting on the
external sheath. In case of a damaged external sheath, high strength tape layers applied outside the
outer tensile armor layer will restrain the radial movement of the wires. Hence, for a properly
designed flexible riser with or without intact external sheath, bird caging should not be an issue.

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3.5.10 Wear
Flexible pipes in dynamic applications may be subject to wear between the steel armour layers. As
these layers have been designed and tested to sustain normal wear loads, shortcomings in the design
or changes in interface loads have to be present before wear develops into a failure.
Recent experiences with highly dynamic flexible risers installed in guide tubes, over subsea arches or
through bending stiffeners have shown clear indications of excessive wear. Only on a few occasions
have this wear lead to rapid degradation of pipe integrity. Geometry, surface roughness, and material
selection seem to be important factors.

3.5.11 Vibrations in Gas Pipes

High frequency vibrations have been observed in gas export and gas injection systems. The
vibrations are believed to originate from the carcass where a vortex shedding process takes place as
the gas flows over the carcass cavities. The phenomenon is currently not fully understood, however
parameters including carcass geometry, gas velocity, gas pressure and gas composition affect the
vortex shedding process and thereby the vibrations. The presence of acoustic amplifiers in the
connecting steel piping is also believed to play an important role.
In one existing system, fatigue failure of topside piping has occurred and topside piping
modifications were required in order to continue safe operation. In another system the subsea riser
base was retrieved, modified and reinstalled due to components being identified as critical with
regard to fatigue loading based on measured vibrations. Some systems experiencing vibrations
continue to operate after stress checks by strain gauges have verified that the vibrations do not
introduce unacceptable stress levels. It should also be noted that besides fatigue related problems,
noise and increased flow resistance resulting from these vibrations have also been identified as a
problem for some installations.
New projects planning gas export and/or injection through flexible risers address the potential
vibration problem by implementing requirements on the flexible pipe and/or that interfacing piping
systems shall not be fatigue sensitive with respect to potential vibrations. Acoustic dampeners or
silencers are also being considered.

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3.5.12 Annulus environment

The flexible pipe annulus is empty at
delivery, with exception of small amounts of
lubrication used during the manufacturing
process. Empty or dry annulus was the basis
for fatigue and service life analysis of flexible
risers for many years. However, in service
experience in recent years has shown that in
many cases this is not the case. Experience
shows that many production risers fill up
gradually with diffused and condensed liquid
after some time. The filling time varies
significantly with temperature, water cut and
pressure barrier material and thickness.
The annulus of flexible pipes can be partly or
fully flooded due to a range of other events.
Below are listed the most typical effects that
all have been experienced in the North Sea:

Figure 3-8: Burst external sheath due to blocked vent system.

Leaking or missing annulus vent plugs in end fittings

Installation damages of external sheaths

Burst external sheath due to blocked annuli vent system, see Figure 3-8

Flooding from other topside systems connected to the annuli vent systems
Several operators are using annulus testing actively as part of their in-service integrity management
programs combined with periodic inspections of annuli vent system status to track and document the
long term status of the pipes. Several projects are initiated on development of armouring wire SNcurves representative to the observed annulus environments, along with development of more
accurate diffusion models for flexible pipes. This will enable periodic reassessment of residual
service life for critical risers based on true annulus environment, representative SN-curves and
recorded operational conditions.

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FAILURE MODE SUMMARY (BONDED PIPES)

4.1

General

Rev. No.

02

The potential failure modes for a bonded flexible pipe are not very different from the failure modes
for un-bonded pipes. API 17B RP, ref. /1/, lists and describes all of the most probable failure modes
and defects. The use of this reference is highly recommended to get a complete overview.

Table 3-2. Failure modes for bonded flexible pipes, ref /1/

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FLEXIBLE PIPE INTEGRITY MANAGEMENT

5.1

Introduction

Rev. No.

02

Every field development should develop a field specific Integrity Management Strategy based on a
risk assessment in accordance with a recognized guideline. Reference is given to /1/, /5/, /6/ and /7/
for details on flexible pipe monitoring methods and integrity management.

Figure 5-1: Key steps in developing riser integrity management, ref /5/
Experiences with implementation of riser integrity management programmes, on several floating
production units shows improved performance, less failures and improved quality in decision
processes related to operation of the riser system. The whole process related to riser integrity
management will reduce the related risk significantly.

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The operational activities in the riser integrity management program may be differentiated in 3
categories, inspection, testing and monitoring. The results from these activities should be seen in
context with the original design documentation, new assessments and relevant experiences from
similar applications.
The operator should focus on awareness of operating design limitations of flexible pipes in service
during training of process technicians and operator personnel.
Finally, it should be pointed out that the hand-over of a project from the development phase to the
operational phase is very important. Likewise, feedback and experiences from the operational phase
should be transferred back to benefit new developments.
The major challenges for the integrity management program are:

To establish a broad program covering the whole flexible pipe system and related interfacing
equipment and systems

Continuous follow up and documentation of all planned and un-planned activities related to
the flexible pipe system and the integrity management program

Efficient collection and long term storage of relevant process data, and data from inspection,
testing and monitoring, and efficient retrieval of such data for each riser, flowline or
component

Efficient and precise assessment and analysis of information from a variety of sources, and
regular update of the status of the flexible pipe system

Experience transfer internally and externally and subsequent, optimising of the integrity
management program to reflect areas of increased or reduced importance, or new areas that
need focus
In general, it is experienced that a comprehensive integrity management program will identify
degradation processes early and give opportunities for early action and prevention of accidents. One
should anyway be aware of the fact that new failure modes for flexible pipes are discovered and a
general awareness is required to prevent accidents.

5.2

Inspection
The most common inspection method in use for flexible pipes is general visual inspection by ROV.
With some additional planning and prioritizing one could focus the ROV inspections on critical
components and areas. Inspection methods currently in use for flexible pipes in operation offshore
are:

Subsea ROV general and close visual inspection

Deck level manual general and close visual inspection

Climber close visual inspection (above water)

Internal remote camera inspection
Risk based evaluations will enable focused inspection programmes targeting specific areas with
inspection activities that will contribute significantly to reduced risk.

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The figure below shows an example from a guide made for the ROV pilots performing close visual
inspection on a flexible riser system in the North Sea. The guide is linked to the online riser integrity
management plan and the yearly inspection program. The guide has contributed to increased value of
the ROV time spent for inspection.

Figure 5-2: Guidance for close visual inspection (Hydro)

5.3

Testing
The relatively large number of cases with flooded annuli has resulted in extensive use of annulus
testing. Normal practice today is to perform an annulus test shortly after installation to establish
reference values. This annulus test will also uncover any major through thickness damages to the
external sheath and any problems with vent ports and valves. There after, periodic annulus free
volume testing is performed in order to determine status and to track long-term trends.
Testing methods currently in use for flexible pipes in operation offshore are:

Pipe pressure testing after installation, modifications, repair etc.

Annulus vent function testing in order to detect blocked or malfunctioning vent valves, vent
ports or problems with the vent system pipe work

Annulus vacuum or pressure testing to identify intact external sheath and estimate liquid
content

Annulus gas sampling and analysis to identify annulus environment and possible corrosion
processes

Age testing of polymer coupons exposed to production and/or injection flow

Bore fluid composition test to reveal content of CO2 and H2S etc.

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5.4

Date

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02

Monitoring
Monitoring of pressure, temperature and flow is performed as part of the process and well control
system. The same instruments may be used actively for monitoring in a flexible riser integrity
management context. Monitoring methods currently in use for flexible pipes in operation offshore
are:

Pipe bore pressure monitoring, pressure drop between subsea and topside sensors and
pressure gradients / cycles

Pipe bore temperature monitoring, temperature gradients / cycles

Annulus vent flow pressure and flow monitoring

Environmental load monitoring and / or floater motion and offset monitoring

Bore flow rate, especially in relation to pressure drops

5.5

Practical experiences
After implementation of Riser Integrity Management programs on more than 10 floating production
facilities in North Sea and West Africa some practical experiences may be highlighted:

Simple and robust instrument solutions should be aimed for, preferably using instruments
needed for day to day operation of process system as these will be maintained regularly.

Be aware of the fact that many risers fatigue life is documented for a low operational
pressure. New fatigue evaluations will be needed if pressure is increased to e.g. design
pressure.

Visual inspection of sea surface in direction of subsea lines may be very important. This
might seem trivial, but has led to the detection of subsea riser leaks on several occasions.

Do not underestimate the importance of frequent visual above sea-level inspection of riser
departure angle, individual spacing and configuration in general (if applicable). Compare
with reference photographs taken shortly after installation.

Monitor subsea and topside differential pressures, including alarm limit settings, in order to
detect bore collapse, hydrate formation or other anomalies.

Target the ROV inspections to critical areas on critical risers, in addition to the general visual
inspections recording marine growth and external sheath damages.

Performance of regular annulus vent system checks, annulus free volume tests and annulus
gas sampling will together with temperature and pressure monitoring give a very good status
on riser condition and may often enable actions to prevent pipe failure.

5.6

Emerging inspection technologies

Development is ongoing aiming at efficient internal inspection techniques as well as external
radiographic techniques. Both efforts aim at giving quality information on the condition of the steel
and polymer layers in the pipe.

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Successful pilot inspections have been performed with eddy current internal inspection probes, but
currently these probes are limited to inspecting the inner magnetic metallic layer. Hence, the system
may not be used for armour inspections in pipes with magnetic, or semi magnetic, steel in the
carcass, e.g. SS304. Further improvement is necessary to enable this technique to be widely used for
condition monitoring.

Figure 5-3: Pipe defect identified by eddy current (Force)

Work has been going on for a few years on radiographic tools for inspection of topside end fittings
on flexible risers. Successful demonstration of the technology is performed but no commercial
service is available. This is related to the current lack of industry demand.

Figure 5-4: X-ray computer tomography image of flexble riser (Tom-X)

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REPAIR AND LIFE EXTENSION

6.1

Proven repair methods

Rev. No.

02

There are only a limited numbers of proven repair methods for flexible pipes. The methods that have
been successfully used over the last years are:

Dry repair of external sheath damages by plastic welding and replacement sheath sections

Dry repair of external sheath damages by stainless steel clamps

Wet installation of a variety of external sheath repair clamps by ROV or divers

Wet installation of a rigid steel clamp to strengthen pipe and seal of the external sheath by
divers

Wet installation/casting of plastic clamp to seal off external sheath damages

Disconnection, retrieval and dry re-termination of end fittings

Re-establishing of annulus vent by drilling new vent access in the end fitting, epoxy filling
ports or through the external sheath
Every repair job will need a special assessment and possible analysis to evaluate the repair and the
integrity of the pipe. Often the pipe operational life is reduced and preparations for a pipe
replacement have to be initiated.
The left picture below shows a relatively small through thickness damage to a flexible riser
discovered by a routine ROV inspection. This damage was located in a section of the pipe with small
dynamic movements, and after a thorough damage assessment including re-analyses of service life, it
was concluded that the pipe had sufficient residual service life provided that the damaged area was
sealed off preventing circulation of seawater. The two pictures to the right show testing of the ROV
installable soft clamp and the as installed clamp, respectively.

Figure 6-1: External sheath through thickness scratch sealed off by ROV installed soft clamp.

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6.2

Date

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18-Dec-07

Rev. No.

02

Service life extension

Several pipes that have suffered some kind of minor damage, unexpected change in annulus
condition or planned major change in operating conditions will have a reduced operational life if the
original design life analysis should be the basis.
Operators therefore frequently requests pipe suppliers or riser consultancy companies to perform
service life extension studies. The analysis methods and requirements for documentation of a
possible extended service life are established with basis in API 17J/B, ref /1/ and /2/. In Norway one
should also refer to the NPD document Information Duty Regulations, section 5 and 6, where
specific requirements are listed for an application for service life extension.
One major challenge is to determine the technical status for the pipe and the possible extreme or long
term loadings that the flexible pipe has seen. Therefore comprehensive studies of all information
from production non-conformances to as-installed reports, and production pressure and temperature
records have to be performed. For operational periods with missing information a common
assumption is that the pipe has been operated at design pressure and temperature. This may be very
conservative, but may be the only safe assumption in case of lacking data.
As delivery time and cost of flexible pipes are high there may be significant value in a used riser that
can be documented to be safe for some years of additional operation.
Based on experience from several service life extension projects the following recommendations are
highlighted:

Keep track off all documentation for every specific riser through out the full life span,
including: design, fabrication, installation, inspection and operation.

Keep a log of the usage of the flexible pipe, re-termination, repairs, movement and changes
etc. If the pipe is moved to another location keep all documentation from previous sites

Keep all time traces of temperature and pressure relevant for each specific flexible pipe

Keep a log of bore composition and changes over time

Keep a log of chemical usage in the flexible pipe, synchronized in time such that temperature
may be estimated together with use of e.g. methanol
If all this information is present the day the operator will evaluate a possible service life extension,
the probability of a successful assessment is significantly increased.

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EXPERIENCE TRANSFER

7.1

Standards

Date

18-Dec-07

Doc. No.

Rev. No.

02

Nearly all work related to flexible pipes are today based on the two API documents 17J and 17B, ref
/1/ and /2/ (and possibly the equivalent ISO documents in the future). The importance of these
documents is reflected in discussions with the pipe suppliers that explain that virtually all contracts of
today refer to these API documents.
Most operators have over the last years made company specific specifications. The experience
colleted in these documents should be transferred into updated revisions of the international
standards.
The maintenance of existing standards and recommended practices will be the best way to get the
industry experience transferred to all involved stake holders in flexible pipe business, but update and
revision of such documents are time consuming. A broader range of forums should be used for
experience gathering and transfer.

7.2

Seminars
The different company policies on shearing information may pose real challenges for experience
transfer. Suppliers of flexible pipes are working in a very competitive environment and need to focus
on technology development and competitive advantages. On another level this is also valid for the
operators that are competing on cost effective developments and operational solutions.
One viable way of experience sharing seems to be through seminars and conferences that focus on
technology developments and new solutions. For more safety critical experiences there may be a
need for the authorities to play a more significant role in gathering and sharing information.

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Rev. No.

02

REFERENCES
/1/

API RP 17B, Recommended Practice for Flexible Pipe , Edition: 3, 01-Mar-2002

/2/

API 17J, Specification for Un-bonded Flexible Pipe, Edition: 2, 01-Jul-2000 (add. 2002)

/3/

ISO 13628-2, Design and operation of subsea production systems -- Part 2: Un-bonded flexible
pipe systems for subsea and marine applications, Edition: 2, 2006-07-12

/4/

ISO 13628-11, Design and operation of subsea production systems -- Part 11: Flexible pipe
systems for subsea and marine applications, Edition: 1, Not published yet

/5/

DNV-RP-F206, Recommended practice for Riser Integrety Management, Draft, Not published
yet

/6/

UKOOA Guidance Note on Monitoring Methods and Integrity Assurance for Un-bonded
Flexible Pipe. Doc No. 2-1-4-221/GN01 October 2002

/7/

Bondevik J. O. SeaFlex as, Lunde S. Norsk Hydro ASA, Haakonsen R. SeaFlex Riser
Technology Inc. Annulus testing for condition assessment and monitoring of flexible pipes.
OMAE 2004-51431, Vancouver, Canada

/8/

Bondevik J. O. SeaFlex as, Haakonsen R. SeaFlex Riser Technology Inc. Deep water operation
of flexible pipes, lessons learnt from the North Sea, DOT 2004

/9/

Patric OBrien MCS, Flexible pipe integrity and design Current Issues, SUT, October 2005

/10/ NORSOK M-506 rev2, june 2005, CO2 corroison rate calculation model
/11/ Technip paper, Cathodic protection beneath thick external coating on flexible pipeline
/12/ API TR 17TR2, The Ageing of PA-11 in Flexible Pipes, June 2003
/13/ PSA Information Duty Regulations 3. september 2001