M16 Black Rifle Volume I

THE BLACK RIFLE
M16 RETROSPECTIVE
R. Blake Stevens Edward C. Ezell
Edited by R. Blake Stevens
TABLE OF CONTENTS
FOREWORD
Towards the Truth About the M16
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PART I - THE INNOCENCE OF YOUTH

INTRODUCTION
A Famous Historian's Valuable Service
Chapter One
POSTWAR ORIGINS OF T H E SMALL CALIBER, HIGH VELOCITY (SCHV)

CONCEPT
The Hall Study
Experimental Data on a .220 Rifle
The Hitchman Report
Aberdeen's .22 Caliber M2 Carbine
Design and Fabricate a High-Velocity Caliber .22 Cartridge, Modify a Standard M2 Carbine to
Fire the Cartridge, and Evaluate the Weapon/Ammunition Combination
Chapter Two
T H E LIGHTWEIGHT ERA TRULY DAWNS

Homage to the Kurz Patrone
From Airplanes to ArmaLites
The Earliest ArmaLites - the AR-1 and AR-3
The ArmaLite AR-5 Survival Rifle
More on the Armalite Weapons Family
Flashback: The Great Johnson/Garand Controversy of 1940
"Tomorrow's Rifle Today" - The ArmaLite AR-10
Springfield Tests the AR-10
The AR-10's Short, Heady Life in the Fast Lane
Re-Enter the Dutch
Gearing Up for Production - The Gas System Goes on Top
The Early Artillerie-Inrichtingen "Cuba" or Sudan" Model AR-10
The Artillerie-Inrichtingen "Transitional" Model AR-10
Carving the World into Quarters
A Harsh Brush with Reality
The Belt Fed AR-10
Disappointment in South Africa - the Final "NATO" Model AR-10
The Dutch Turn Down the AR-10
Known Purchasers of the Artillerie-Inrichtingen AR-10
Chapter Three
T H E SCHV CONCEPT COMES OF AGE

The Genesis of the Military 5.56mm Projectile
A Note about "Mission Responsibility"
Dr. Carten's First Denial
From Aberdeen to ArmaLite, via a Circuitous Route
The Fateful Range-Requirement Snafu
The First ArmaLite SCHV Weapon - the .222 "Stopette"
ArmaLite's "Scaled-Down" AR-10
The ArmaLite AR-15 in Caliber ".222 Special"
The Winchester .224 Caliber Light Weight Military Rifle
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Winchester Runs Afoul of the Increased Range Requirement

Modifications to the First AR-15s
Dr. Carten's Dilemma
Raising the Stakes - the First-Ever AR-15 Engineering Tests
The Curiously Missing Results of the First Aberdeen AR-15 Trial
The Rain-in-the-Bore Issue
The Infantry Board's Final SCHV Report
Report of Project Nr 2787, Evaluation of Small Caliber High Velocity (SCHV) Rifles
The Great OCO 6.35mm "Shell Game"
Dirty Tricks in the Arctic?
Some Background on the Powell Board
The Caliber .224 Springfield Infantry Rifle
The ".222 Special" Becomes the .223 Remington
The Powell Board's Reversal - The Final Straw for Fairchild
The OCO's Crucial Mistake
Chapter Four
A MID-STREAM CHANGE OF HORSES
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Catch-22
The Air Force's End Run Around the Army
Colt's First Manual - the "Basic Infantry Weapon, AR-15"
Explaining the Action of the AR-15
A Forced Examination of the Colt AR-15
A Test of Rifle, Caliber .223 , AR-15
The Air Force Attempts to Buy the AR-15
Rifle by Colt - Barrel by Winchester
Chapter Five
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FIRST BLOOD
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The OSD, ARPA and Project AGILE

Report of Task 13A, Test of ArmaLite Rifle, AR-15
Down and Dirty - Lethality in Vietnam
The Air Force Adopts the AR-15 and "Cartridge, 5.64mm (.223)"
Chapter Six
Chapter Seven
T H E FATEFUL PLAN TO BANK ON T H E SPIW

The Army Initiates its Famous "One-Time Buy" of AR-15s
The AR-15 Gets a Project Manager
The Formation of the Technical Coordinating Committee (TCC)
Chapter Eight
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T H E ARMY GETS "A LITTLE BIT PREGNANT"

The Hitch Report
The Controversy Deepens
The Army Orders a "Worldwide" Comparison
The Worldwide Trials Part 1 - Tactical
The
Inspector
General's
Illuminating
The Worldwide Trials Part 2 - Technical
Aberdeen's Comparative Evaluation of AR-15 and M14 Rifles
An Ironic Blow from Within
The First Nagging Doubts About Lethality
The Stone Wall Crumbles
T H E FIRST 130 CHANGES TO THE AR-15

Ominous Overlords
Establishing a Caliber .223 Ammunition Base at Frankford Arsenal
The Deja Vu From the Top
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View
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Formalizing the Fiction - The Gilpatrick Directive

The Great Rifling Twist Controversy
The Air Force Blows the Whistle
The Army's Bolt Closure Device
The "Slamfire" Problem
Investigation of Firing Pin Energy and Primer Sensitivity
Down to the Crunch on the "One-Time Buy"
The Army's First Contract (DA-11-199-AMC-508) for M16 and XM16E1 Rifles
The Eleven Pre-Production AR-15 Modifications
Towards a Standardized .223 Cartridge
The Discovery of Fundamental Limitations
Genesis Denied - A Display of Blind Arrogance
Stoner's Last Word
The Self-Manufactured Chamber Pressure Problem
Alternative 1 - Increased Chamber Pressure
Alternative 2 - Reduced Muzzle Velocity
Investigation of Bullet Configuration
"Cartridge, 5.56mm Ball, M193" - the Round Nobody Wanted to Make
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END OF PART I
PART II TENDING A NEST OF VIPERS

Chapter Nine
Chapter Ten
TACKLING T H E CHAMBER PRESSURE PROBLEM T H E HARD WAY
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The Third Alternative - The Search for Alternate Propellants

Olin Bows In
Investigation of Alternate Propellants for Use in 5.56mm Ball Ammunition
The Fateful Approval of Ball Powder
A Voice in the Wilderness
The First M16 and XM16E1 Deliveries
The Hard Way Part 2 - The Cyclic Rate Problem
Investigation of Port-Pressure Limits
The Hard Way Part 3 - The USAF Plate Penetration Problem
Tense Times for the TCC
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T H E FURTHER ADVENTURES OF T H E TCC

A Most Contentious Waiver
The One-Time Buy that "Grew Like Topsy"
First Troop Reports
The Patsy
Keeping Colt's Honest
Final Report of Comparison Test of Rifle, 5.56mm M16
The Hard Way Part 4 - Sole Source with Ball Powder
Chapter Eleven
FROM SAWS TO FIRST DEPLOYMENT

A Brief History of Some Other "Stoner" Designs
The Colt "CAR-15 and CMG-1 Military Weapon System"
The Colt CAR-15 Carbine
The CAR-15 Heavy Assault Rifle
M1
The CAR-15 Heavy Assault Rifle M2 (Belt Fed)
The CAR-15 Submachine Gun
The CAR-15 Survival Rifle
The Colt CMG-1 Machine Gun
The 5.56mm Stoner 63: Strong Competition for Colt's CAR-15 Program
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Time Out for Some Stargazing

The SAWS Study
"Four Alternatives" for the Future - Reaffirming the SPIW
The Decision to Close Springfield Armory
Escalation in Vietnam
The Hard Way Part 5 - More Alternate Propellant Trials
Investigation of Alternate Propellants for Use in 5.56mm Ball and Tracer Ammunition
Chapter Twelve
A TIGER BY T H E TAIL
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Colt's at the Point of No Return

A Field Commander's Call for Arms
The Hard Way Part 6 - The Connection is Confirmed
Effect of Ammunition Variables on Acceptance Testing of XM16E1 Rifles
General Besson Takes a Trip
The Light Strike Problem - Redesigning the "Buffer"
Foul Ball
Colt's Historic Second Contract (DAAF03-66-C-0018) - The One-Time Buy is Dead
The Singapore Caper
Ominous News From the IRUS Program
Early Problems in Vietnam
Chapter Thirteen
THE FIT HITS T H E SHAN

Saved by the Buffer?
Buffer Retrofit Program for M16/XM16E1 Rifles
The P M R Comes Clean
The Unsolved Mystery of CDCEC's Ruptured Cartridge Cases
The Cleanup Begins
Cleaning Materiel for the XM16E1 Rifle
The M16A1 - A Troublesome Standard
The Crossman Report
Onward, Yountless
The Ichord Investigation of the M16 Rifle Program
The Real Problem in Vietnam
Chapter Fourteen
SOME PARALLEL DEVELOPMENTS

The Unburied Ghost of One-in-Fourteen
Twist of Rifle in XM16E1 Barrel
The Watershed SAWS Results - The SPIW is "Reoriented"
Ten Post-Production Changes to the M16/XM16E1
A Last Modification to the Air Force M16
The Rifle According to Colt
[Components Manufactured by Colt's Firearms Division]
Chapter Fifteen
THE GOLDEN AGE OF R&D

The Cream of Colt's CAR-15 System - The Shorty Program
The CAR-15 Commando Becomes the XM177/XM177E1
The XM177E2 - One of the Deadliest Fruits of the War
The XM177E2 is Phased Out
The Thirty-Round Magazine
The 40MM Grenade Launcher Attachment Project
The Early Days
Introducing the Colt
CGL-4
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'A'
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The CGL-4 Becomes the XM148

XM148 Grenade Launcher and Cartridge 40mm Shot XM576
Problems with the XM148 in Vietnam
The XM148 Craps Out
The Army's Grenade Launcher Attachment Development (GLAD) Program
The AAI DBCATA Grenade
The AAI, Philco-Ford and Aero Jet Launchers
The Short-Lived Colt CGL-5
The AAI XM203 Takes the Lead
The Army Adopts the M203
Snipers in Vietnam
Telescopes for the M16A1
The HEL and Sionics Noise and Flash Suppressors
Noise Suppressor Assembly, HEL M4
Noise and Flash Suppressor Assembly MAW-A1
Accuracy Test of the M16 Rifle, With Special Devices
Chapter Sixteen
T H E HARD WAY ONE M O R E TIME

The Ichord Report
The Aftermath
The M16 Rifle Program
The Case Hardness Problem
The Gas Tube Fouling Problem
The Colt "Light Machine Gun 5.56mm CMG-2"
Olin Cops a Plea
The Vindication of Ball Powder
DuPont's Third Try - IMR 8208M Comes On Stream
Some Experimental M16 Gas System Modifications
The Colt Model 703
Turning the Tables in Panama
Vietnam in Retrospect
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END OF PART II
PART III - WARP SPEED AT LAST

Chapter Seventeen T H E GREAT RIGHTS ISSUE - T H E "POLITICS OF P R O C U R E M E N T "
Introduction
Colt's Story
Round One to Colt's
Self-Defense with Regulations - The Army Fights Back
Colt's Best Offer
AWC's Second Attack
Explaining the Delays
An Uneasy Truce - the Disposable Magazine Project
A Fight to the Finish
Agreement at Last?
Chapter Eighteen
BROADENING T H E BLACK RIFLE'S WARTIME PRODUCTION BASE

Colt's on Strike
Back to the Bargaining Table
The Short-Lived GM Hydramatic "Sole Source" Award
Second-Source Production Begins - The GM Hydramatic and H&R Contracts
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Fresh Congressional Concern

Getting What You Pay For
Failures at H&R
Further Contracts With Colt's and GM Hydramatic
Chapter Nineteen
AN EXAMINATION OF THE " E N D R U N " M E T H O D OF RIFLE PROCUREMENT . . .

The "Whiz Kid" Legacy
Colts' Contribution
The TDP's "140 Areas of Potential Interference"
Ten Special Tests at Frankford Arsenal
Special Tests of 5.56mm Ammunition
Springfield's Final Hour
A Last Word on Ball Powder
Change in Nomenclature for Ball Propellant Used in 5.56mm Ammunition
Chapter Twenty
T H R O U G H A GLASS DARKLY
Chapter Twenty one
Chapter Twenty two
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The Fate of the TCC and the P M R

Acronyms Ho: ARSAP; the FRP; and USASASA
The Small Caliber Systems Program
Reflex Sight for Small Arms Weapons
"Microbullet" Cartridge Developments - the 4.32mm XM16E1
The AAI XM70 and the Serial Bullet Rifle Project
The AR-15 in UK Caliber 4.85x49mm
The FABRL Von Karman Bullet and the "Fumer" System
A Glimpse at the Squad Automatic Weapon (SAW) Program -the 6mm M16 and the XM106 .
Gene Stoner Strikes Again - the ARES Future Assault Rifle Concept (FARC)
30mm Multishot Grenade Adapters
The AAI Caseless 5.56mm/4.32mm Advanced Combat Rifle
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OFFSHORE PRODUCTION OF M14 AND M16 RIFLES
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The M16 Consolidates its Position

Chartered Industries of Singapore
The SAR-80 Rifle and the Ultimax 100 LMG
The Model 603-K - Springboard for South Korea
The Daewoo " K " Series
The Philippine 613-P Rifle and 653-P Carbine
Taiwan - Gateway to the Orient
Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Republic of China and the
Government of the United States of America Relating to the License for the Production of
M14 Rifles and M60 Machine Guns
Production Design Data to GRC on 7.62mm Ammunition
The 5.56mm T65 Rifle
M14 Rifle Production in the People's Republic of China
The China North Industries' " C Q 5.56mm Automatic Rifle"
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ENHANCING T H E CAPABILITIES OF T H E M16A1 RIFLE/AMMUNITION SYSTEM .
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The AMTU Points the Way

Accuracy Test, M16 Heavy Barrel
The MTU's National Match M16A1
Other Military "Match" M16Als
Extended-Range 5.56mm Ammunition Developments
Mauser/IWK (NWM) Heavy Bullets
The Davis/Colt 68-grain GX-6235 Bullet
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Ballistic Performance of an Improved Long-Range 5.56mm Bullet (Colt's Design GX-6235) . .

The US Army's XM777: A Short-Lived "Exercise in Interoperability"
The Round of the Future- The Fabrique Nationale (FN) SS109
The M16A1 Rifle Remains the US "Arm of Choice"
Weapons for the Eighties - the NATO Small Arms Trials of 1978-1979
The Marines Examine Four Future Options
The USMC Statement of Requirement
US Navy M16A1 Heavy-Barrel Heat Dissipation Trials
Improved M16A1 Instrumented Tests and Results
Chapter Twenty three T H E THIRD-GENERATION M16
Colt's Improved Open-Bolt HBAR
JSSAP's Product Improvement Program (PIP) Rifle - the "M16A1E1"
M16A1E1 Test Results and Final Report
Adopting the M16A1E1
Twelve Distinctive Features of the M16A2
The Colt 700-Series M16A2 Weapons System
The Critics Attack the M16A2's "Improvements"
The M16A2 Rifle
Further Scrutiny of the Non-Recyclable Burst Device
The Proposed Snodgrass-Tyler Burst Control Device
"Enhancing" the M16A2
The Proposed Kodak Optical Sight System
The Special-Purpose M231 Firing Port Weapon (FPW)
Colt's New Delta HBAR "Countersniper" Rifle
Chapter Twenty four
T H E CANADIAN C7 RIFLE - A REASONED VIEW FROM T H E NORTH

A Look at the Canadian Arsenal
Canada and the "Weapons of the Eighties" NATO Trials
The Small Arms Replacement Program (SARP)
A Comparison Between the C7 and the M16A2
Canadian Production of the C7 Rifle and C8 Carbine
The Leitz "Optical Sight, Small Arms (ELCAN)"
Appendix
ACCESSORIES AND ANCILLARIES
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Magazines
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Bayonets
Early Colt Bayonets
Development and History of the US M7
The American Historical Foundation's Vietnam War Commemorative Bayonet
The New US M9 from Phrobis III
The Stainless-Steel Canadian C7 Bayonet
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Conversion Units and Adaptations

Colt's .22 Rimfire Adapter
Military Conversion Unit Trials - the M261
The US M2 Practice Bolt and M882 Plastic Training Ammunition
The Canadian C10 .22LR Training Rifle
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EPILOGUE
The M16's Finest Hour
The XM4 Carbine
BIBLIOGRAPHY
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Frontispiece
President Kennedy in his White House office, examiming an early Colt AR-15
made circa the ARPA order, December 1961 (fig. 121). His aide, Maj.
Gen. "Ted" Clifton, holds an example of the CIA-developed crossbow. Both
these weapons fuelled the late President's interest in "the problems of combatting
communist insurgency".
2 Foreword
FOREWORD
Towards the Truth about the M16
For several hundred years the basic military battle implement
has been the rifle, at once a powerful symbol of a nation's
might, its maker's skill, and its user's consequent chances of
survival. Ideally, the best of rifles win their own victories in
combat, becoming ever more the very core of hallowed army
tradition. Generally speaking, while Ordnance research in a
well-run modern army is never completed, the more successful
a rifle in design and application the longer its "life", and the
greater the opposition to its change or replacement.
At the time of this writing, the 5.56mm NATO M16A2 rifle
is heir to worldwide acceptance after a quarter-century of US
service, longer than any other US rifle in this century except
the 1903 bolt-action Springfield. Throughout this period however, far from a history of calm acceptance, the M16 has
sparked a curious and constant controversy: curious in that
everyone has an opinion and defends it with great vigor,
whether pro or con; and constant in the veritable flood of
expert pronouncements, from a remarkable variety of sources,
which flows unabated from the popular press.
One might suppose that within these arguments and reams

of paper would repose the truth about the M16: how it grew,
and why; what it is, and what it is not. Paradoxically, such
is not the case: even the basic concepts embodied in this most
controversial of weapons are often misapprehended, still
popularly described in hand-me-down versions of ArmaLite's
original ad-agency hype. In addition the military development
of the M16, as we shall herein discover, has so far remained
a story barely half-told. Outrageous untruths become more
like "gospel" with each retelling in this atmosphere of misinformation, to the point where the true story of the Black
Rifle, as it emerges for the first time in these pages, will quite
likely surprise most readers.
Surprised or not, we hope you enjoy the experience.
R. Blake Stevens
April 24, 1987
Foreword
1. An early British EM-2, made at Enfield Arsenal and used in the first NATO
standardization trials at Fort Benning and Aberdeen Proving Ground in 1950.
Caliber .280/30 (7x43mm); serial no. 14.
QAD (Ord) Pattern Room
2. An early "Lightweight Automatic Rifle" from Fabrique Nationale of Belgium,

shown with a rare array of proposed accessories. Also used at Fort Benning
and Aberdeen in 1950. Caliber .280/30.
6 Introduction
PART I - THE INNOCENCE OF YOUTH

INTRODUCTION
3. The US Ordnance-sponsored T25 rifle shown during an Arctic test, launching

grenades. Chambered for various developmental versions of the US .30 "T65"
cartridge (7.62x47-through-51mm). The Harvey-designed, rear-locking T25

was the US entry in the 1950 trials.
US Army photo
Three important happenings set the stage for our tale,

beginning with the famous international (American, British,
Belgian and Canadian) rifle and ammunition standardization
trials of the fifties. These convened in the United States in the
summer of 1950, at Fort Benning and Aberdeen Proving
Ground, under the watchful eye of the chief of US Army
Ordnance R&D, Col. Rene R. Studler. Here the unorthodox
EM-2 "bullpup" and the forerunner of the FN FAL, both
in caliber .280/30 (7x43mm), were first presented for trial
by the British Armament Design Establishment (ADE) and
Belgium's Fabrique Nationale d'Armes de Guerre (FN). The
American entry was the T25, the proud first fruit of Col.
Studler's pet .30 caliber Light Rifle project. The T25 was
chambered for the developmental US "T65" cartridge, which
although touted as a genuine advance was in reality a prag-
matic compromise with Army traditionalists who saw nothing

wrong with the round which had won World War II. True,
the finalized 7.62x51mm T65E3 was .55" shorter than the
7.62x63mm .30M2, but it was also fatter at the shoulder, and
consequently somewhat harder to feed and extract. Ballistically,
the two were substantially the same.
Meanwhile in Britain, the maxim that the power of the
cartridge is the determining factor in any rifle/ammunition
system had been taken to heart by the designers of the comparatively underpowered .280/30. Consequently, the two "foreign"
entries in the 1950 trials produced significantly lower recoil
energy levels (and therefore improved controllability and troop
acceptability) while still maintaining what the British insisted
was acceptable lethality at all practical combat ranges. By
6 Introduction
4. Actual-size compendium of UK cartridge development, 1948-1953. From left:

1. the short-lived .270 (7x46mm) early Kynoch manufacture, unheadstamped;
2. the UK trials .280/30 (7x43mm) with base compatible with the US "T65'',
resurrected in 1970 for UK trials and headstamped RG 701Z; 3. the UK 7x49mm
"High Velocity", headstamped RG 52 7m/m H.V.; 4. the joint UK/Belgian/
Canadian 7mm '"Compromise'' (7x51mm), headstamped DAC 52; 5. an early
forerunner of the 7.62x51mm NATO, headstamped FN 52. Editor's collection
5. The (actual size) US counterpart to fig. 4. From left: the original "Case,
Cartridge, Light Rifle" (7.62x47mm) loaded with a double-cannelured M2
ball bullet and headstamped FA 45; the Frankford FA-T1 (7.62x49mm) circa
1948-50, headstamped FA * 48; the FA-T1E1, headstamped FA 49; and the
FA-T1E3 (7,62x51mm, the forerunner of the 7.62 NATO), headstamped FA 50.
Editor's collection
comparison, the T65 round produced 40% more muzzle

energy than the .280/30. Not surprisingly, the T25/T65 rifle/
ammunition combination produced the heaviest recoil and was
the hardest to control on full-auto fire.
points of view of the various participants, in Collector Grade's

FAL Series and US Rifle M14.)
In any event, the versatile FN .280 rifle emerged the overall

favorite at the 1950 trials. To Col. Studler this was an unwelcome
fact which altered the direction of the US Light Rifle project,
soon sealing the fate of the luckless T25 and its short-lived
successor the T47. However, it had absolutely no effect on
ballistics: US Ordnance remained firmly wedded to the concept of the full-power infantry cartridge.
Further trials over the next four years saw some very
interesting British, Belgian and Canadian 7mm cartridge and
rifle improvements, but through it all the adamant Americans
would brook no lessening of the power and range criteria they
had set. Finally, after a private, face-saving compromise of
"we'll adopt your cartridge if you adopt our rifle" (which never
came to be), the T65E3 became the standard rifle round for
all of NATO in 1954. (This story is told in detail, from the
As regards our present study, however, these trials serve

mainly to set the stage for subsequent conflict by illustrating
the rock of conviction which stood behind the US full-power
caliber .30 cartridge, against all comers.
Secondly, on a somewhat tamer front, 1950 saw the Remington Arms Company, Inc. of Bridgeport, Connecticut hailed
enthusiastically by America's varmint hunters. In a successful
attempt to plug what was correctly perceived as the marketable gap between the rimmed .22 Hornet and the semirimmed .220 Swift, Remington that year introduced the first
commercial rimless centerfire varmint cartridge. Resembling
a miniature .30-06, the new round was designed by Mr.
Mike Walker of the Remington R&D section, and was called
the .222 Remington. It was in fact a completely new cartridge
from the base up, with case dimensions differing from any
cartridge then in existence. Designed for varmint hunting
inside a range of 250 yards, the flat-shooting .222 Remington
propelled its 50-grain bullet at a muzzle velocity of 3,200 fps.
6 Introduction
A Famous Historian's Valuable Service
Introduction
A third important thread of events began the seemingly

impossible task of knitting the first two; military ammunition
specifications and .22 caliber varmint hunting cartridges;
inextricably together into a volatile and uneasy alliance. In
1950 the Korean war broke out, and Project "Doughboy" was
created at the Army-sponsored Operations Research Office
at Johns Hopkins University.
Formed in 1948 from elements of the wartime Center of
Military History and the Office of Scientific Research and
Development (OSRD), the civilian Operations Research Office
(ORO) was the Army's official acknowledgement of "the
growing role of scientific method" in planning for war in the
atomic age. American troops fighting through the first bitter
winter in Korea were meanwhile experiencing some very serious
reversals. In Project "Doughboy", ORO's director Dr. Ellis
A. Johnson sought documentation which might lead to some
of the reasons why. The celebrated historian Brigadier General
S.L.A. Marshall went to Korea and interviewed the troops,

using the "post-combat critique technique" which he had
pioneered with great success in the Pacific and European theaters
of World War II. The result was the 142-page report OROR-13, Commentary on Infantry Operations and Weapons Usage
in Korea, dated October 27, 1951. General Marshall focussed
on American operations during the winter of 1950-51, which
in his words "were of the period of maximum reverse and
then recovery...[the] Eighth Army experienced its greatest and
most prolonged stress; [and] the conditions peculiar to that
period provide the best opportunity for the clear profiling of
weapons, tactical and leadership values in combat.."
General Marshall found that the exigencies of climate and
terrain made Korea different from either of the main Allied
theaters of World War II, and made even tougher demands
on the infantryman and his weapons:
.. it can be said that in the nature of operations in Korea,

the infantry weapons on our side, including mortars, grenades, and recoilless rifles, must be inflicting in excess
of 50 percent of the enemy losses. This may be a unique
situation in twentieth-century warfare... Recognition of the
enemy, as he comes forward, is most likely to occur at some
distance between 15 and 150 yards..too close and too late
for practical and successful artillery intervention...The

average effective infantry fire with weapons lighter than the
machine gun was consistently less than 200 yards. In no
instance was it established, in the operations brought under
survey, that any significant move by enemy forces had been
stopped and turned by rifle and carbine fire alone at ranges
in excess of that figure.
This graphically-described 200-yard limitation on practical

combat range for infantry small arms fire is of primary interest
to our story, for here at last was some sanction to "peek under
the skirts" of the Army's range requirement: sanction for

experiments that would have previously been denounced by
US Ordnance as heretical.
7. Fig. 1 from S. L. A. Marshall's 1951 ORO report on weapons useage in

Korea, graphically illustrating how ammunition was spent in "An Average
Perimeter Defense".
8 T h e Hall Study
Chapter One
POSTWAR ORIGINS
OF THE SMALL CALIBER,
HIGH VELOCITY (SCHV) CONCEPT
The Hall Study
The first major postwar US study of rifle effectiveness was
ordered by Col. Studler on November 28, 1950, almost before
the smoke had cleared from the first international rifle trials.
Tasked was Donald L. Hall, an engineer at Aberdeen's Ballistics
Research Laboratories (BRL).
The findings of the Hall study were released in March of
1952 as BRL Memorandum Report no. 593, An Effectiveness
Study of the Infantry Rifle. Based on the ongoing international
trials, plus data contained in S. L. A. Marshall's Commentary
and other data from Korea, the study took a decidedly unorthodox approach: it evolved on paper an experimental
series of cartridges, none of which would satisfy the Army's
range and penetration specifications as they then stood, and
compared them to the effectiveness of the standard-issue
.30M2 at ranges up to only 500 yards. This was treading
perilously close to heresy, and Mr. Hall began his report with
a hasty disclaimer:
This report was prepared without regard to present established military characteristics of the Army Field Forces, since
the purpose of research is to provide basic data which may
assist., in developing future requirements... In this study a
family of weapons was considered. The caliber was varied
from .30 to .21 and the weight of the charge was taken to
be 1.0, 0.8, and 0.6-times the charge (53 grains) normally
Hall's calculations revealed that three somewhat interdependent factors governed the effectiveness of a rifle: the
probability that the soldier would hit his target (dependent
on range and muzzle velocity); the ability of the bullet to
8. Fig. 8 from Donald L. Hall's March, 1952 Effectiveness Study of the

Infantry Rifle, entitled "Ballistic Experience in Korea". Extracted from
wound ballistic survey by the US Medical Research and Development Board,
November 1950 to May, 1951.
used in the present standard. .ammunition.. .All bullets were

considered to be homologous to [scaled-down replicas of]
the cal. .30 ball M2 ammunition.
wound (a function of bullet mass, shape and striking velocity); and the weight of rifle and ammunition. As also quoted
in The SPIW - the Deadliest Weapon that Never Was, Hall
concluded:
T h e Hall Study
In general it can be stated that if the combined weight

of rifle and ammunition is fixed at 15 lbs., a man carrying
the cal. .21 rifle would have an expectation of killing about
2 1/2 times as many targets as with the Ml rifle. The range
at which this occurs depends on the amount of charge. The

0.6 charge is most effective at the short ranges because of
the lighter ammunition. The 1.0 charge is most effective at
the longer ranges because of its flatter trajectory.
The report ended with a reasoned plea that while the bulk
of the study was only theoretical, the results were valid and
worthy of serious consideration:
The final curves of relative overall expected number of
kills show that rifles with heavy charges are preferable at
the longer ranges, but those with the lighter charges are
made preferable at the short ranges. It is beyond the scope
of the present report to state which is the optimum rifle,
for this would depend on the most probable combat range.
An indication as to this range may be obtained from a

wound ballistic report from Korea, .the mean range is about
120 yards. From this it might be concluded that a rifle that
is more effective at ranges up to 500 yards should be
favored over one that is more effective at ranges greater than
500 yards.
Hall's last word was that soldiers carrying the smaller caliber,
high velocity rifles in his theoretical family would be simply
"more effective" than troops armed with the Ml, in several
ways. First and most importantly, They possessed "a greater
single-shot kill probability". More hits and kills, therefore,
would result when the weight of combined rifle and ammunition
carried was equal, but when each carried an equal number
of rounds the smaller calibers turned in a double advantage:

more targets killed with a lighter load carried.
With the assistance of the Small Arms Section of Aberdeen's
Development and Proof Services (D&PS), Hall had bolstered
his theoretical conclusions with a most interesting series of
actual firings, described in an addenda to his report as follows:
Experimental Data on a .220 Rifle

During the course of this study a number of conclusions
were questioned because of the fact that the popular commercial .220 Swift rifle is generally felt to be less effective
as a hunting rifle than a .30-06 rifle. Actually the .220 Swift
cannot be reasonably compared with any of the rounds in the
present study, because these rounds all involved scaled-down
versions of the excellent caliber .30 ball M2 bullet, and
therefore have considerably better ballistic characteristics
than the inferior .220 Swift. The .220 Swift has a 48-grain,
soft nose bullet in contrast to the 60-grain cal. .22 bullet,
of the present [theoretical] study, that would be homologous
to the cal. .30 ball M2.
Through the assistance of Col. Studler of the Ordnance
Office, a rifle and 200 rounds of ammunition were acquired
with a bullet shape that was nearly, but not quite homologous
to the cal. .30 ball M2. The homologous cal. .22 bullet
would be a 60-grain bullet having a 7.0 cal. radius tangent
ogive and would be 0.625'' long. The rounds received had a
60 cal. radius tangent ogive, were 0.76" long, and weighed
60 grains. As a result, the experimental ammunition had
a ballistic coefficient of 0.13 (by actual measurements) as
compared to 0.18 (calculated) for the homologous bullet..
The 200 rounds of cal. .220 ammunition were fired
in a special Winchester rifle with a 10" twist to obtain
ballistic, accuracy and penetration data. ..The results of these

tests show..good accuracy and ballistic characteristics. If
the bullet can be designed with a 7.0 caliber ogive, its
ballistic characteristics will be considerably improved, and
its effective range increased about 25%.
An interesting comparison is made in the ability to
penetrate 10 gauge (.137") cold rolled sheet steel. The
experimental cal. .220 round gave complete penetration at
500 yards (or 1,800 fps velocity) and partial penetration at
600 yards (or 1,600 fps). A cal. .30 ball M2 round will
completely penetrate. .at 625 yards (or 1,400 fps) and partially penetrate at 725 yards. I f , however, the cal. . 22 was
made with a 7.0 caliber ogive (so as to give the same form
factor as the cal. .30), the range at which the velocity would
drop below 1,800 fps would be 700 yards, or approximately
equal to the cal. .30..
.. it could be concluded that for the same striking velocity,
thecal. .220 is practically as effective as the cal. .30. This
may be due to the fact that the cal. .220 appeared to tumble
in.. clay at all velocities considered... Furthermore.. since the
cal. .22 will have a higher striking velocity than the cal.
.30, the severity of the wound for a given range should be
much greater for the cal. .22 than for the cal. .30.
1 0 T h e H i t c h m a n Report
The Hitchman Report

In June of 1952, a scant three months after the appearance
of the Hall study, ORO. published its report no. ORO-T-160
entitled Operational Requirements for an Infantry Hand Weapon,
by Norman A. Hitchman. This important document, already
discussed at some length elsewhere in this series, gave new
voice to Hall's politely implied paradox that the true parameters of improved rifle effectiveness lay, by order of the Office,
Chief of Ordnance, "off limits" for study
ORO had also been working on an exhaustive analysis of
combat casualties in past wars. Hitchman correlated this
information with S.L.A. Marshall's terrain/visibility and rifleeffectiveness studies of the bitter winter of the Eighth Army's
"near total defeat" in Korea. He discovered that as things
stood, the best and the worst US marksmen had about an equal
chance of getting a hit in combat. Indeed, while taking fire
from the enemy, a soldier could as easily be hit by a random
shell fragment as by a bullet supposedly "aimed" at him; time
and degree of exposure were the chief variables.
9. Fig. 8 from ORO's June, 1952 Hitchman report, comparing the relative
hit effectiveness of the M1 rifle with (theoretical) Salvo automatic fire for Class
"A" (Korea) and Class "C" (Normandy) terrains. Note that the Salvo-type
weapon offered considerably enhanced hit effectiveness at longer ranges, such
as in the open terrain of western Europe, but neither weapon was as effective
in Korea, where short-range combat was more the norm. Hitchman concluded
that the quest for improved hit probability would best be served by "a small
caliber lightweight weapon with controlled dispersion''.
Hitchman's task was to come up with ways to improve the

hit capability and hit severity of the "man-rifle combination".
He found that this would require nothing less than a reexamination of the nature of the combat rifle:
The ranges at which the rifle is used most frequently in

battle and the ranges within which the greater fraction of
man targets can be seen on the battlefield do not exceed
300 yards.
number of targets hit when aiming on separated man-size

targets.
Within these important battle ranges, the marksmanship

of even expert riflemen is satisfactory, .only up to 100 yards;
beyond 100 yards marksmanship declines sharply, reaching
a low order at 300 yards.
Current models of fully automatic hand weapons..
are valueless from the standpoint of increasing the
The Hitchman report thus confirmed the Hall study's conclusion that a relatively "conventional" small caliber high
velocity rifle offered a number of worthwhile advantages over
To improve hit effectiveness at the ranges not covered satisfactorily. . by men using the M1 (100 to 300 yards), the adoption
of a pattern-dispersion principle in the hand weapon could
partly compensate for human aiming errors and thereby
significantly increase the hits at ranges up to 300 yards.
To meet the actual operational requirements of a general
purpose infantry hand weapon, many possibilities are open
RANGE ( Y D )
Certain of the costly high standards of accuracy observed

in the manufacture of current rifles and ammunition can be
relaxed without significant losses in overall hit effectiveness.
To create militarily acceptable. .damage at common
battle ranges, missiles of smaller caliber than the present
standard .30 cal. can be used without loss in wounding
effects and with substantial logistical and overall military
gains.
the issue M1. Characteristically, this landmark ORO study
went much further than had BRL:
for designs which will give desirable dispersion patterns (and

accompanying increases in hit probability) at the ranges of
interest. Of the possible salvo or volley automatic designs,
the small caliber, lightweight weapon with controlled dispersion characteristics appears to be a promising approach.
(Low recoil of a small caliber weapon facilitates dispersion
control.)
10. An early version of the "Rifle, Lightweight, Cal. .30, T44", built at
Springfield Armory on a lengthened Ml rifle receiver. The T44 succeeded
the T25/T47 as Col. Studler's US contender in the 1952 international
standardization trials. Note the range of proposed accessories, including

the T47-type bayonet (no. 10) with latch in middle of handle.
Throughout its heady and contentious eleven-year history,

the Operations Research Office's outspoken civilian staffers
regularly paid far less heed to Army politics and hallowed tradition than could most employees of Ordnance Corps agencies
like BRL. The Hitchman report was no exception, flying
directly in the face of the Army's continued commitment to
the full-power, selective fire .30 caliber rifle and cartridge.
Project SALVO (1953-1960). This fascinating multi-agency

program contracted for the design and trial of a number of
multiple-barrel Salvo rifles, multiple-bullet cartridges, and
shotshells packed with small steel arrows or "flechettes". The
story divides here, with one branch leading through Project
SALVO to the ORO-sponsored development of the serial
flechette - potentially the most lethal small arms projectile the
world has ever known. This fantastic saga is fully documented
in The SPIW- The Deadliest Weapon that Never Was. The other
path leads to the M16.
All of Hitchman's many recommendations were subsequently explored in the important but essentially long-term
1 0 T h e H i t c h m a n Report
12. An ad for research personnel from the Operations Research Office (ORO).
Reprinted from the November 4, 1960 issue of Science magazine. Ironically,
the booted, belted and goggled soldier-of-the-future carries a selective-fire
7.62mm M14 rifle, which the ORO-sponsored Hitchman report called "valueless. .on separated man-sized targets''.
11. Prototype "Rifle, Lightweight, Cal. .30, FN" serial no. 38, the forerunner
of the US T48, the choice of many as the successor to the US M1. Shown fitted
with the US-designed flash hider, developed at Springfield Armory during
the 1952 standardization trials.
Springfield Armory Ordnance Corps photo dated March 3, 1954
T h e Aberdeen .22 Carbine 15
Aberdeen's .22 Caliber M2 Carbine

As noted, actual .220 high velocity firing trials had already
substantiated Hall's theoretical effectiveness of the small caliber,
high velocity (SCHV) concept. These firings had been performed
by engineer William C. Davis Jr., at Aberdeen's Small Arms
and Aircraft Weapons Section, and the chief of that division,
Mr. G. A. Gustafson. While these ballistic experts were most
impressed with the results they had obtained, not everyone
found this avenue of endeavor so noteworthy. Col. Studler, chief
arbiter of all R&D for small arms Ordnance, had allowed BRL
only 200 of the necessary "near-homologous" bullets. The
implication was clear: the main task at hand for all concerned
was the successful development of a .30 caliber Light Rifle.
Other, less important projects, funded with "leftovers", were
necessarily much more long-term in nature. Plainly, further
head-on effectiveness comparisons showing the .220 "homologous" bullet superior to the .30M2 would be unpopular,
to say the least.
13. The .22 Gustafson Carbine, right side view. Made from a standard M2
Carbine manufactured by the Inland Division of General Motors Corporation
of Dayton, Ohio, serial no. 7125359. Regular 15-round magazine holds only 10
of the shortened .222 Remington rounds. Note the muzzle brake on the front
of the 18'' barrel.
Springfield Armory National Historic Site; photos courtesy Larry L. Ruth
As fate would have it, S.L.A. Marshall had had really harsh
words for only one American weapon in the Korean war, the
caliber .30 (7.62x33mm) M2 Carbine. Indeed, the bitter reports
of its chronic jamming in cold weather and its inability to stop
an oncoming enemy stand out all the more starkly due to the
high praise which officers and men alike heaped onto every
other US arm, especially the Ml rifle. Politically, therefore,
the Carbine's name was mud.
that it is the least effective for all the guns [tested] for ranges
greater than 300 yards.
In the Hall study, the Carbine had not been included due
to a lack of available wound-ballistics data, except to say that
its single shot effectiveness was only about half that of the Ml
rifle at 300 yards. Hall had concluded:
. .the overall effectiveness [of the Carbine] is high at very
close ranges but falls off rapidly for increasing ranges so
To the men at Aberdeen who were convinced of the SCHV's

increased "man-rifle effectiveness", this was very disheartening.
While it was true that, on paper, ORO's futuristic salvo-fired,
pattern-dispersion ideas pushed hand weapon effectiveness to
altogether new heights, at the intended pace of Project SALVO
they would (and did) take a long time to develop. An SCHV
rifle had already been fired, albeit only 200 times, and its
effectiveness advantages were real. It seemed a shame not to
pursue the SCHV idea, simply due to the "politics" surrounding the M1 rifle and its successors.
Mr. Gustafson reasoned that if the Ml rifle was "off limits"

for further comparisons, the Carbine was beneath suspicion.
In fact one of the touted benefits of the caliber .30 Light
Rifle program was that the arm finally chosen would supplant
not only the Ml rifle but the BAR, the M3A1 submachine
gun and the Carbine as well. Therefore, who would object
to a modest attempt to improve the effectiveness of the lowly
Carbine?
The report of Gustafson's study, performed and produced
virtually singlehandedly over a 17-month period, was released
on 29 September, 1953. It makes fascinating reading, and is
excerpted herewith:
T h e Aberdeen .22 Carbine 15
Development and Proof Services

Aberdeen Proving Ground
Maryland
Design and Fabricate a High-Velocity Caliber .22 Cartridge,

Modify a Standard M2 Carbine to Fire the Cartridge,
Evaluate the Weapon-Ammunition Combination
Dates of Program: 13 November 1952 to 21 August 1953
Object
The purpose of the program is to increase the effectiveness
of the M2 Carbine, in both semi- and full-automatic fire,
by adapting it to a high-velocity, small-caliber, cartridge.
Discussion
In April, 1952, Mr. T. F. Colleran, Director of Development and Proof Services, and Col. J. D. Armitage, Chief
of Arms and Ammunition Division at Aberdeen Proving
Ground, granted verbal approval to a project proposed by
the Small Arms and Aircraft Weapons Branch to investigate
the merit of small-caliber, high-velocity cartridges for use
in rifles and Carbines. Col. R. R. Studler, Office Chief of
Ordnance, ORDTS, also gave oral approval to the preliminary
investigation with the understanding that a program would
be authorized by his office if the cartridges proved promising
in the early tests...[Program Authority granted by teletype
no. ORD 12153, 2 June 1953].
Considerable delay was encountered in obtaining suitable
barrel blanks and chambering reamers for making velocity
and pressure barrels. In November, 1952, sketches of "Maximum Cartridge'' and "Minimum Chamber'' were made and
the project was initiated in the Small Arms Branch gunsmith
shop on a spare-time basis because of its low priority.
The caliber .30 Carbine has been regarded with considerable disfavor during the recent fighting in Korea, probably
to some extent because it has been employed tactically as
a rifle rather than as a replacement for the pistol. Perhaps
this general misuse of the Carbine indicates that there is
a real combat requirement for a weapon of the Carbine type.
Battlefield reports indicate that poor functioning, accuracy
and stopping power were charged against this weapon.
It was thought at this station that the complaints against
the Carbine could be eliminated, in the most part, by furnishing a cartridge of high velocity, with resulting flat trajectory,
and good accuracy to afford a high percentage of hits on
a man-size target up to 300 yards. Past experience with
privately-owned lightweight sporting rifles of small caliber
14. Closeup of the muzzle brake on. 22 Gustafson M2 Carbine serial no. 7125359.
and high velocity indicated that the 300-yard criterion for

effective range could probably be met with respect to accuracy and trajectory, and that a good chance for improving
terminal performance over that of the caliber .30 Carbine
cartridge existed..
The poor reputation of the lightweight Carbine for burstfire dispersion is well deserved. The relatively heavy bullet
develops rather severe recoil momentum for burst-fire control,
even at its low velocity. A compensator can contribute very
little toward burst-fire stability because the ratio of mass
of powder gases to bullet mass is small. [With] a lightweight,
high-velocity cartridge,..the bullet muzzle energy can be
about equal to the standard round, yet recoil momentum
be considerably reduced. Also, the heavier powder charge
required to give higher velocities affords more momentum
which can be employed by a compensator to reduce muzzle
movement and recoil.
T h e Aberdeen .22 C a r b i n e 15
Description
of Materiel
The cartridge designed to fire in the modified M2 Carbine,

and the standard caliber .30 Carbine round are compared
below for physical properties:
.30
Cartridge caliber
.22
41
110
13.5
18.0
193
145
1.295
1.320
1.680
1.700
.357
.375
bullet wt (grains)
charge wt (grains)
total wt (grains)
case length (in)
overall length (in)
max diameter (in)
reduced recoil in "muzzle brake" fashion by changing the

direction of expending powder gases. A bipod from a
Browning Automatic Rifle was modified to fit [both] Carbines
in order to evaluate their long-range, burst-fire accuracy
characteristics. The larger diameter, .caliber .22 cartridge
resulted in a reduction of magazine capacity from 15 rounds
of caliber .30 to 10 rounds of caliber .22.
15. Closeup of the bolt face of .22 Carbine no. 7125359. Note the increased
diameter of the cartridge seating area, necessitated by the larger base of the
.222 Remington round.
A standard caliber .30, M2 Carbine was modified to fire

the .22 cartridge by fitting and chambering a commercial
caliber .22 barrel and machining the outside contour to that
of the standard Carbine barrel. It was desired that the caliber
.22 barrel have a bore diameter of .219 inch, a groove
diameter of .224 inch, and rifling of one turn in 16 inches
with uniform, right-hand twist; however the available blanks
..were slightly "tighter" than specified. Other modifications
to the weapon consisted of modifying the bolt face to accommodate the larger cartridge case base and increasing the
strength of the hammer spring. The muzzle was threaded
to accommodate a compensator which was designed to minimize muzzle movement, both upwards and sidewise. It also
Dies for making the caliber .22 Carbine ammunition were

made to fit a Pacific commercial-type hand loading press.
Tools to perform the following operations were made: fulllength resizing of cartridge case, reaming case neck, depriming case, repriming case, bullet seating. Crimping dies
were not made because only un-cannelured commercial bullets
were available. A pressure barrel was made to fit a Universal
receiver. The velocity barrel of the Mann type was made
by fitting a commercial caliber .22 barrel blank to a Springfield M1903 action and turning down the outside barrel
contour to fit the recoiling v-slide of a Frankford Arsenal
machine rest.
All of the machine work on the chambering reamers, cartridge loading dies, proof facility weapons and the test Carbine
was done at the gunsmith shop at the Small Arms and Aircraft
Weapons Branch. Cartridge cases were fabricated by shortening commercial .222 Remington cases to the desired
length. All ammunition assembling was done at the loading
room of the Small arms and Aircraft Weapons Branch.
Procedures
. .Counter-type, electronic chronographs, employing lumiline (photoelectric) indicators, were used for all velocity
measurements.
Ballistic data -were obtained by firing through lumiline

initiators at 28.5 and 785 feet and two make-circuit screens
at 580 and 620 feet from the gun muzzle..
Peak chamber pressures were obtained by use of conventional-type, radial gauges with copper cylinders.
In establishing velocity-pressure relationships of various

propellants, a maximum pressure of 42,000 psi was selected
T h e Aberdeen .22 Carbine
16. Experimental .22 M2 Carbine, serial no. 7548460. Stock cut off at
wrist and holes in forestock (ahead of magazine) for mounting in test fixture;
steel tube attached to operating slide to facilitate measurement of com-
ponent velocities; 24" .22 caliber barrel rifled 1 turn in 16" (with no
front sight) chambered for the shortened .222 Remington round.
because this was considered the highest maximum average

pressure that would be safe to use in the present Carbine
mechanism. The highest velocity obtainable within this limit
was desired.
Carbine, because preliminary trials of accuracy and trajectory indicated that the latter course of fire would be too
"easy" to give a proper evaluation of the caliber .22
Carbine.
The qualification course for the Ml rifle, Course B using

the A target, was chosen rather than the course of fire for the
. .Armor-piercing bullets were made by inserting hardened

steel cores in the commercial-type bullets.
17. Side and top views of the action of Gustafson Carbine serial no. 7548460.
Selective fire mechanism removed. Note the modified and lightened operating slide.
15
T h e Aberdeen .22 C a r b i n e 15
Observations
.. The goal was to obtain at least 3,000 fps muzzle velocity
without exceeding 42,000 psi maximum average breech pressure. This objective, while attained, was only slightly
exceeded..
The mean radial dispersion of the caliber .22 ammunition
was only 28 % at 100 yards and 52 % at 300 yards of that of
the unselected lot of caliber .30 ammunition used in this test
..Dispersion characteristics of the caliber .22 weapon/
ammunition combination were far superior to.. the standard
.30 Carbine up to 300 yards, thus the hit probability is
increased..
The maximum ordinate of the caliber .22 cartridge, over
a range of 300 yards, is 48% and 16% of the caliber .30
Carbine and caliber .45 cartridges, respectively. The flatness
of trajectory of the caliber .22 cartridge increases hit probability on man-size targets under battlefield conditions, because
it makes range estimation errors relatively unimportant and
sight changing, within 300 yards, unnecessary. With standard
Carbine sights set to make the bullet hit the point of aim
at 250 yards, the highest the bullet would rise above the
line of sight would be approximately five inches, and it would
strike about seven inches low at 300 yards. With the standard
caliber .30 Carbine, having the same sight setting, the bullet
would rise approximately 12 inches above the line of sight
and fall about 15 inches low at 300 yards.
Remaining energy of the caliber .22 Carbine is only 164
ft. lb. (59% of that of the caliber .30 Carbine) at 300 yards;
a widely used criterion for fragment lethality is 40 ft. lb.
Preliminary wound-ballistics studies indicate that smallcaliber, high-velocity bullets may have better "killingpower"
than heavier, larger-caliber bullets of equivalent energy,
perhaps because the energy is expended more rapidly when
the [velocity] factor is relatively large and the [mass] is small.
This phenomenon, and quantitative values regarding it, will
be further explored at the Biophysics Laboratory at Army
Chemical Center..
Penetration performance of the caliber .22 bullets, even
with the soft-lead-nose commercial types necessarily employed in this test, was far superior to that of the caliber
.30 Carbine bullets when fired against hard and soft metal
plates. When fired against body armor and helmets, the
performance of the two cartridges was approximately equal.
The higher scores of the caliber .22 Carbine, when fired
in comparison with the M1 rifle over the B course of fire,
indicate that the test weapon/ammunition combination is
capable of delivering effective fire up to 300 yards. The fact
that the Carbine weighs about 60% as much as the Ml rifle
and that each round of ammunition weighs only 35% as much
18. A drawing of the minimum chamber and maximum cartridge for the .22
Gustafson Carbine. Development and Proof Sendees, Aberdeen Proving Ground,
November 13, 1952. Redrawn by Thomas B. Dugelby
as the caliber .30 round, are very important when considering

the number of rounds which can be carried by each rifleman,
especially in rough terrain..
The low energy of free recoil of the caliber .22 Carbine,
especially when fitted with a compensator, makes it much
easier to control in burst fire than are either the caliber .30
Carbine or the caliber .45 submachine gun...Five-shot bursts
[prone, with bipod] from the caliber .22 Carbine averaged
20 inches and 38 inches for 200 and 300 yards, respectively..
data show that these are excellent patterns when compared
to those of a caliber .30 Carbine, fired under the same
conditions, and previous tests of conventional weapons indicate that extremely large targets would be required at these
ranges to contain 5-shot bursts. It is beyond the scope of
this program to evaluate burst-fire effectiveness from the
tactical standpoint, but it is demonstrated that the [22 caliber]
weapon/ammunition combination gives markedly better
burst-fire dispersion patterns than any other foreign, standard or experimental shoulder-fired weapon tested at this
station to date.
The Aberdeen .22 Carbine
assembled cartridge. This. .prevents accidental bullet separation in the weapon.
Good weapon functioning was obtained during the 1,900

rounds fired during this test. The 3 stoppages encountered
in the caliber .22 Carbine were unquestionably caused by
lead shavings from commercial-type bullets... Bullets with
crimping cannelures were not available for this test, however,
such a bullet should be designed.. so that the cartridge case
can be crimped into the cannelure to afford rigidity to the
Bullet
Type
WRA Full Patch
Sisk
Sisk
Sisk
Four velocity uniformity series were fired from the .224

Carbine Mann Barrel. The results are as follows for 20
rounds per load:
Bullet Wt
Powder
Charge Wt
Mean Instrumental
(grains)
35
41
41
41
Type
IMR 4227
IMR 4198
IMR 4227
IMR 4198
and IMR 4227
(grains)
15.8
17.5*
14.3
16
2
Velocity at 78' (fps)

3,019
2,717
2,700
2,866**
* Case capacity.
** Muzzle velocity = 3,022 fps. This is the charge used in other phases of the program.
The "blend" charge was employed because no standard IMR powder had completely suitable
burning characteristics for the new cartridge.
Conclusions
It is concluded that:
The M2 Carbine is capable of good performance when
modified to fire caliber .22, 41 grain bullets to velocities
in excess of 3,000 fps.
The caliber .22 Carbine performance, when compared
with that of the caliber .30, M2 Carbine, was markedly
superior with respect to velocity, trajectory, penetration, and
accuracy in both semi- and full-automatic fire.
The caliber .22 bullets have less striking energy than the
caliber .30 Carbine bullets at all ranges; however, the caliber
.22 has more than enough energy to satisfy present criteria
for lethality to ranges of at least 400 yards.
The extremely good burst-fire dispersion performance, the
light weapon weight, and the high striking energy at close
range, make the caliber .22 Carbine worthy of study as a
replacement for the caliber .45 submachine gun.
The caliber .22 Carbine compares favorably with the M1 rifle
in firing against regulation targets up to a range of 300 yards.
19. A further actual size cartridge comparison. From left: 1. the short-lived,
Harvey-designed .224 Springfield round, unheadstamped (chapter 3); 2. a
hollowpointed .22 Gustafson Carbine round headstamped R - P; 3. a full-patch
.22 Carbine round headstamped WCC 54; 4. Mel Johnson's later ".22 Spitfire"
(a necked-down .30 Carbine case) headstamped R-P .30 Carbine; 5. a standard
WWII .30 Carbine (7.62x33mm) ball M1, headstamped LC 4.
Editor's collection
Recommendation
It is recommended that five caliber .22 Carbines and 20,000
rounds of ammunition be procured and tested at Aberdeen
Proving Ground, in the presence of members from Army
Field Forces, Board No. 3, to learn if ammunition of this

type offers any military advantages over that now employed
in Carbines, rifles or submachine guns.
17
The Aberdeen .22 Carbine 18
As a consequence of Gustafson's work, caliber .22 Carbines

were included in the SALVO I field tried and numerous other
comparative trials of the period. As further discussed in chapter
2, "hands-on" experience gained with the Gustafson Carbine
along with the other experimental SCHV rifle, the ".22 NATO"
T48, proved invaluable in refining the SCHV concepts to the
point of future acceptance by the Infantry Board.
Col. Studler had meanwhile retired, on August 31 1953,
leaving his Light Rifle program in considerable disarray. By
this time, as a further result of the ongoing international trials,
an "Americanized" .30 caliber (7.62x51mm) version of the FN
FAL (fusil automatique lger) called the T48 was in fact general];
favored as the next US service rifle. The US-developed contende
facing the T48 at this point was basically a "product improved'
M1 Garand: a 20-shot selective-fire rifle called the T44.
If the US rifle was the underdog, the US cartridge decidedly

was not. Adoption of the US .30 caliber T65E3 cartridge a
the standard 7.62x51mm NATO rifle round was agreed to in
principle on 15 December 1953, although it took a further eight
months to iron out all the detailed specifications. It was perhaps
the hardest-won and most controversial victory of Col. Studler's
career.
Chapter Two
THE LIGHTWEIGHT ERA

TRULY DAWNS
Following World War II the victorious Allies, particularly
the Americans, purposefully laid the foundations for West
Germany's military rearmament within the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO). The following personal recollections of this period were later prepared by Monsieur Jacques
Michault, a Brussels-based international arms broker:
In the early 1950s, Sidem International S.A., a corporation
based in Belgium, was appointed by the US Army authorities
in Germany to assist with the supply of infantry weapons for
the newly-created German Border Police [Bundesgrenzchutz]
which was to be the forerunner of the future West German
Army. The founder and president of Sidem International, J. S.
Michault moved his headquarters to Bonn, Germany, and
became necessarily involved in the meetings between the
US Army representatives and the German Ordnance officers
responsible for the selection of infantry weapons. Jacques
Michault asked his friend, Col. [Rene] Studler, to come to
Germany to brief German officers on the merits of his
[Studler 's] own brainchild: the new caliber .30 short which was
nothing more than the old US cartridge.. cut down by 1/2"... The
"new " .30 short was to become the NATO cartridge cal. 7.62.
The Germans were, of course, in favor of their own 7.92
Kurz Patrone, developed during World War II for the
Sturmgewehr. They were eventually obliged to opt for the
US caliber .30-06 and later for the NATO cal. 7.62.
In the course of these discussions, Col. Studler and Jacques
Michault became interested in the German developments
in the field of lighter and shorter infantry weapons manufactured and assembled from stamped metal parts and,
possibly, alloys.
Further evidence of Col. Studler's interest in these German
developments may be seen in US Rifle M14, wherein are discussed Cyril Moore's roller-locked T28; John Garand's final
Armory project, the superlight bullpup T31; and the Clarke
20. Nothing New Under the Sun Department: In a desperate attempt to improve
hit capability for the flagging Wehrmacht in 1945, scientists at the Finower
Industry ammunition works (headstamp code cg) revived an idea at least as
old as the Civil War: multiple bullets. Forced to test their designs using mainly
captured Italian gunpowder, the Finower Duplex-bullet trials were conducted
with 7.92x57mm rifle cartridges loaded variously with two regular 7.92mm "S"
bullets; one "S" bullet and one 7.92mm Kurz Patrone ("K") bullet; and
two "K" bullets in tandem. The last gave the best results. The original German
report of February, 1945, translated into English as "German Duplex Bullet
Experiments " lists the "D-Munition" (double ammunition) as effective from
100 to 300 meters, with a muzzle velocity of 536 meters/second (1,758 fps).
Courtesy Daniel W. Kent
19
20
From Airplanes to ArmaLite
21. John Garand 's misunderstood T31, two unfinished handbuilt prototypes
of which constituted his final project for Springfield Armory. The magazine
from the T31 was later chosen for the M14.

Springfield Armory photo dated April 6, 1949
Arms "clamshell" T33; all of which were built and tested under
Ordnance Light Rifle contracts during the early fifties. [The
story of the watershed modifications made to the FN FAL in
support of its short-lived adoption as the NATO-caliber West
German G1 rifle in 1958, is told in Collector Grade's The
Metric FAL],
During a subsequent trip to California, Monsieur Michault
became acquainted with George Sullivan, a self-styled "aero-
nautical engineer and patent attorney" who was working for

Lockheed Aircraft Corp. Michault described what he had
learned in Germany about lighter, cheaper infantry weapons.
In turn Sullivan, a consummate salesman and "politician",
acquainted Michault with the properties of some materials
which were then being developed by the American aircraft
industry; particularly stronger aluminum alloys, fiberglass and
expandable plastics such as were used in the manufacture of
helicopter rotor blades. M. Michault continues the tale:
Together, [Michault and Sullivan] conceived the idea of

an aluminum rifle using a stock of fiberglass constructed
like a helicopter rotor blade and with a straight in-line design
which would require a higher sight. It was suggested that

the sight could be used as a combination of carrying handle
and scope mount. The idea of the AR-10 was born.
From Airplanes to ArmaLites

Yet another chance meeting took place in California during
a 1953 aircraft conference, this time between George Sullivan
and an executive of the Fairchild Engine & Airplane Corporation of Hagerstown, Maryland. Over lunch, Sullivan described
the basic idea of the lightweight rifle with an in-line stock, and
disclosed that he and Michault had already invested jointly
in a machine shop in Hollywood.
As it happened, Fairchild's president, Richard S. Boutelle,
was an avid hunter and "gun nut", and Fairchild was at that
time looking for ways to diversify and expand its aircraft business. On October 1, 1954, discussions between Sullivan and
Boutelle culminated in a mandate for Sullivan to continue his
research as president of the newly formed, California-based
ArmaLite Division of the parent east-coast aircraft company.
Sullivan and his brother-in-law, Charles Dorchester, had
already been working on a bolt-action prototype of what they
touted as a whole new range of fine, truly lightweight sporting

rifles and shotguns. It was envisaged that both the anodized alloy
parts and the foam-filled plastic furniture of such arms could
moreover be offered in any color combination imaginable,
combining with satin-finish or mirror-polished stainless steel to
produce a rainbow of futuristic, superlight arms, all completely
impervious to the elements. Under the 1954 arrangements,
ArmaLite was to build and test the prototypes, which when
perfected would be produced under license elsewhere, as Fairchild's board of directors resolutely opposed the capital outlay
necessary to put ArmaLite into the business of actual volume
production.
For the position of ArmaLite's plant manager, Sullivan
naturally hired his brother-in-law and research assistant,
Charles Dorchester. A former Marine and Army Ordnance
technician named Eugene M. Stoner joined the firm as chief
engineer.
The Earliest ArmaLite
22. Against a background of World-as-their-Oyster, ArmaLite president George

Sullivan (left) and Charles Dorchester proudly display some early products.
From left, Mr. Sullivan holds a proposed .22 caliber pistol version of the civilian
AR-7, and a prototype AR-9 shotgun later marketed as the AR-17 (fig. 24).
Mr. Dorchester holds two AR-5 .22 Hornet caliber survival rifles, one with
a gold anodized finish and the other a 16" barreled civilian model. In the
foreground is one of the three-ever AR-16s, designed by Gene Stoner in caliber
7.62 NATO (figs. 156 and 157).
Photo courtesy Jean Huon
The Earliest ArmaLites - the AR-1 and AR-3

ArmaLite prototype rifles were later given the prefix "AR-",
along with a designating sequential number. The honor of
beginning the series went to the lightweight bolt action rifle
which Sullivan and Dorchester had been developing since preArmaLite days. In its final form, the AR-1 was a bolt-action
rifle chambered for the commercial version of the 7.62 NATO
cartridge, the .308 Winchester. The AR-1 featured an aluminum
Mauser-type receiver and an aluminum barrel fitted with a
steel liner and barrel extension, into which the bolt lugs locked.
This package was bedded in a foam-filled fiberglass stock, to
give an overall weight with scope and sling of less than six
pounds. In concept the AR-1 was described by ArmaLite as
a "parasniper" rifle: a precision-made, lightweight weapon

suitable for various military calibers, either as a top-grade
sporting arm or for special sniper use. As recorded below,
Springfield and Aberdeen later tested one of the very limited
number of AR-1s that were ever made.
Gene Stoner had also brought along a commercial-type .308
caliber, rotary-bolt rifle design he had been working on. This
became the AR-3, the first autoloading ArmaLite, with an
aluminum receiver mounted in a "conventional" drop-heel
fiberglass stock. A great deal was learned from tests of Stoner's
model of the AR-3.
21
22
The ArmaLite AR-5
The ArmaLite AR-5 Survival Rifle
23. Left and right side views of the .22 Hornet caliber ArmaLite AR-5 survival
rifle, called by the Air Force the MA-1. The tip of the stainless steel barrel liner
is just visible at the muzzle of the aluminum barrel jacket. With the exception
of the bright bolt handle and steel (M4) magazine, the metal parts on this
particular AR-5 are red anodized aluminum.
Bob Miller collection, photo by Roy Arnold
ArmaLite's parent firm had a long history of working with

the US Air Force. The personal friendship between Fairchild
president Boutelle and General Curtis LeMay of the Strategic
Air Command, both ardent gun fanciers, was well known.
Indeed, the Fairchild C-82 and C-119 "flying boxcars" were the
first aircraft designed expressly for airborne paratroop operations. It was therefore perhaps not surprising that the first new
weapon actually brought to fruition within the ArmaLite group
was designed by a former USAF survival expert and gunsmith
named Robert Enewold, at the express invitation of General
LeMay. This was the AR-5, a bolt-action, .22 Hornet caliber
rifle whose basic design resembled the earlier stamped-andwelded, wire-stocked H&R M4 survival rifle, even to the point
of using the exact same 4-shot clip.
The magazine was the only "regular" steel part in the AR-5,
however. The receiver and barrel were aluminum alloy, the
latter fitted with a stainless steel liner. The entire rifle, which
weighed only 2 lb. 6 oz., was designed to be disassembled without tools and stowed in hollow compartments inside its own
rather outsized fiberglass-and-foam-plastic stock, which also
held some ammunition and a small basic survival kit comprising
a compass, matches, needles, fish line and hooks. Snapping
the butt cap back in place over the stowed parts turned the
AR-5 into a compact package only 14" long, an easy fit in
the standard Air Force bailout pack. The AR-5 would float
in water, even when assembled. The Air Force purchased 12
AR-5s for evaluation at Stead Air Force Base in Nevada in
the fall of 1955, and after some minor modifications, adopted
it in 1956 as the rifle, survival, MA-1.
More on the ArmaLite Family
More on the ArmaLite Weapons Family
24. The ArmaLite AR-17 2-shot, 12-gauge shotgun. Known as the "golden
gun", all visible metal parts except the triggerguard, bolt and steel barrel
extension/liner are gold-anodized aluminum, with brown plastic furniture.

Bob Miller Collection, photo by Roy Arnold
The prototype of a new 12-gauge automatic shotgun called

the AR-9 was also unveiled in 1955, featuring a daringly light
aluminum barrel and receiver and plastic furniture. In the
AR-9 a rotating, front-locking, multi-lugged bolt locked into
a slender, one-piece steel barrel extension and chamber sleeve,
which was finely threaded into the aluminum barrel. The AR-9
was later produced in limited numbers as the two-shot AR-17.
ArmaLite's most successful commercial arm, the AR-7, had

to wait until the company emerged from under Fairchild's wing
in 1960. Popular with campers and other outdoors people, the
handy .22LR semiauto blowback AR-7 was produced and
marketed for years by ArmaLite and later the Charter Arms
Corp. as the "Explorer", featuring an 8-shot clip and the same
floating, hollow stock plastic idea as the AR-5.
A later military ArmaLite project, the "AR-13 Hypervelocity

Aircraft Gun", apparently never made it off the drawing board.
Meanwhile, although the AR-5 had been officially adopted

as the MA-1, the 12 test guns were, ironically, all the Air Force
25. Closeup of the receiver of the ArmaLite AR-17 "golden gun" showing
the rotary lugs on the bolt, which lock into the steel extension/liner of the
barrel. The AR-17 Junctions on the short-recoil principle.
23
24
The Great Johnson/Garand Controversy
ever purchased. General LeMay was unable to get any further

funding requests approved, the reason being that there were
already sufficient numbers of earlier M4 and M6 survival rifles
in Air Force stores. However, much had been accomplished
for such a short time, and the "success" of the AR-5 had put
ArmaLite on the military map, so to speak.
This, combined with the "know-how" which had accrued
from building and testing the earlier designs, prompted a decision to apply the full force of Gene Stoner's considerable talents
to the original, as-yet unformulated idea for an in-line military
rifle. As a measure of the importance accorded this move by
everyone concerned, no less a personage than the recently
retired Commanding General of the Continental Army Com-
mand (CONARC), Jacob L. Devers, joined the staff of Fairchild

as Military Liason Officer.
As discussed below, the fourth-prototype version of Gene
Stoner's AR-10 was the first to be made in any but one-off
numbers. When it burst upon the scene in 1955, the experience
of first viewing and handling the AR-10's grey alloy metalwork
and foam-filled plastic furniture seemed so utterly without
precedent that for many it simply suspended the critical faculties, leaving nowhere to begin any comparison with ordinary
wood-and-steel rifles. The AR-10 came complete with a very
interesting "family tree", however, and in order to do justice
to this epochal weapon itself we must retrace some steps and
pick up yet another thread of our story.
Flashback:
The Great Johnson/Garand Controversy of 1940
Bitter controversy, denigrations and accusations; investigations
and whiffs of scandal: all these and more have attended the
manufacture and issuance of a number of US Army shoulder
rifles since at least the first Allin conversion of the Springfield
rifled musket in 1865. The whole process seemed about to
begin again when the US adopted the world's first generalissue semi-automatic rifle, the .30-06 (7.62x63mm) M1 Garand:
many minds, military and otherwise, were far from convinced
that the Army had made the right move.
The Ml was adopted in January, 1936. The following month,
the original toolroom model of a new .30-06 short-recoil rifle
mechanism was test fired for the first time. It was the brainchild
of Melvin M. Johnson, Jr., a young man described in a later
American Rifleman article as "a well-heeled Boston lawyer
whose passion was the design of advanced rifles and machine
guns". Johnson, also an officer in the Marine Corps Reserve,
pursued the refinement and contract manufacture of several
prototypes of his rifle with all of the considerable private
resources he could muster. Nor was he hesitant about calling
for help from his fellow officers: in March of 1938 he was
allowed to conduct a week-long field demonstration before the
Infantry Board at Fort Benning, with his rifle "serial no. 1".
For his pains he received the following reminder that the US
already had a rifle:
..until the [Johnson] rifle can be subjected to intensive
test firing, such as has been done with the US Rifle, Ml,
no sound conclusions can be made concerning the ability
of the rifle or its parts to stand up.
26. John Cantius Garand and the M1 rifle, in a National Rifle Association
photo taken at Springfield Armory shortly before his death in 1974. The M1
was the world's first general-issue semi-automatic rifle, and many felt that
it was an impossible design to mass-produce. Mr. Garand here holds "U.S.
Semi-automatic Rifle Caliber .30 M1" serial no. 1, the first of more than six
million which were eventually made.
25 The Great Johnson/Garand Controversy
27. Melvin M. Johnson Jr.'s first working model of his short recoil action,
hand-built in a shop in Boston in 1936.
Photo courtesy Bob Miller
Meanwhile, predictably, Garand's newly adopted rifle was

stumbling through some early "growing pains" and manufacturing hitches. The original gas cylinder, which took off the
gas right in front of the muzzle, was found to be too easily
fouled and in need of modification and retrofit. Professing
himself "alarmed" by what he saw as weaknesses in the Ml,
Johnson presented improved versions of his own rifles later
in 1938 and again in 1939, at Fort Benning. These weapons
were politely tested and duly reported upon, but nobody expressed any desire to see them again. Convinced that the Garand
was a flawed design, Johnson and his partner pulled some
political strings and saw the matter read into the record of
the Senate appropriations subcommittee. What had been
essentially a non-issue escalated rapidly as the Johnson Automatics Trust submitted a 34-page document critical of Ordnance
policies and the delays and costs of Garand production to the
Chief of Ordnance, General Wesson. As the Rifleman noted,
"[Johnson's] comments, fairly or unfairly, intentionally or
unintentionally, made the Army Ordnance officers appear to
be either liars or incompetents."
28. Figs. 7and 8 from US Patent no. 2,094,156 entitled "Firearm" granted to
Melvin M. Johnson Jr. on September 28, 1937. The action is described as
follows: "When the bolt is in the locked position (fig. .8) the locking lugs 19
are in front of the locking abutments 17..and the cam lug 21 is in the recess 23
in the side of the receiver groove... When the cartridge is fired the barrel and
bolt recoil together and..the bolt is rotated to unlocked position by interengagement between the surfaces 24 and 25 of the receiver recess..and the
cam lug 21 on the bolt. By this time the projectile has left the barrel and the
breech pressure has dropped to a value which is little more than sufficient
to retract the bolt to the rearward end of the receiver.. .As the bolt returns to
its forward position it picks up a cartridge from the magazine..and when it
reaches the forward position the pusher 7 cams the bolt into locking position.."
US Patent Office
Unchastened, Johnson appeared again in 1940 before the

Senate subcommittee, which heard him out before deciding
that, with Garands already coming off the assembly line at
Springfield Armory at the rate of 100 per day, their only
practical course was to continue appropriations for the Ml.
In a final desperate move by the Johnson camp, the chairman
of the full Committee on Military Affairs actually presented
a Bill in the Senate to adopt the Johnson rifle as "United States
semiautomatic rifle, M2, caliber .30". The Secretary for War
himself had to recommend against such a move in order to
finally put an end to the Johnson/Garand controversy.
Although never officially adopted, the story of the indefatigable Johnson and his rifle doesn't end there. Due to the exigencies
of World War II, model 1941 Johnson rifles and light machine
guns intended for Dutch East Indies forces saw action with
US Marine Raider and Parachute battalions on Guadalcanal,
and later in Europe with the Canadian-American First Special
Service Force (later dubbed "The Devil's Brigade"). In addition, the Johnson Automatics Trust produced four models of
26
The Great Johnson/Garand Controversy
29. The rotary bolt lugs are clearly shown in Figs. 1, 2 and 3 of Melvin Johnson's
second patent, no. 2,146,743, granted on February 14, 1939. Problems with
friction and "initial extraction" necessitated the extractor "kicker" (part
no. 10) and rollers on the bolt and carrier (nos. 20 and 21) to ride in the
receiver recesses. Note the pivoted ejector (no. 7).
US Patent Office
a 20mm automatic cannon known as the EX-2 for US Navy

trials during the period 1942-1945. None went beyond the
prototype stage, however, and the project was terminated at
the end of the war.
After the war, Melvin M. Johnson Jr. continued his somewhat luckless involvement with military firearms by becoming
a research consultant for the Operations Research Office
(ORO). This led to the development of the Johnson "Spitfire",
a sporting version of the Gustafson .22 caliber Carbine, but
chambered for the necked-down .30 Carbine case (fig. 19 no. 4).
By the middle fifties, Johnson was also acting as the east coast
military rifle consultant and publicist for the parent company
of a small California armaments division called ArmaLite.
30. A much more compact bolt-and-carrier were featured in Johnson's third

patent, no. 2,181,131 of November 1939, entitled "Breech Mechanism".
US Patent Office
31. The first prototype of the 14.5-lb. Johnson .30-06 Light Machine Gun,
offered for military sale in 1938-39. Note the 20-round BAR magazine.
27 The Great Johnson/Garand Controversy
32. From the first edition of the Instruction Manual for the Johnson Light
Machine Gun comes this picture of the Johnson Automatics Manufacturing
Company plant in Cranston, Rhode Island, the "Home of Johnson SemiAutomatic Rifles and Machine Guns".
Photo courtesy Bob Miller
28
The Genesis of the AR-10
"Tomorrow's Rifle Today"

- The Genesis of the ArmaLite AR-10
Along with a diploma from the school of hard knocks, Mel
Johnson brought ArmaLite another contribution of even greater
value. The eight-lugged bolt of Stoner's AR-10, and its method
of locking into the barrel extension, is a direct adaptation of the
design used in Johnson's rifles since his earliest patent of 1937.
appear until two years later in the May-June 1957 issue, coinciding almost to the day with the announcement of the adoption
of the M14 rifle. The similarity of the situation to the beginning
of Johnson's own uphill, ultimately fruitless struggle twenty
years earlier against the Ml could hardly have escaped him).
The outspoken Johnson was also a persuasive and prolific

author, having written numerous articles and several critical,
not to say audacious, histories of modern weaponry. In 1955
he wrote the article excerpted below in praise of the AR-10
for Ordnance magazine. (Rather ironically, the article did not
Characteristically, Johnson's promotional article on the AR-10

began with a sharply critical overview of the recent politics
of Ordnance procurement (the system which had rejected his
own rifle), only then going on to make no secret of the origins
of the AR-10's bolt design:
For over the past twenty years, with few exceptions, there
has been little inventive activity in arms by American industry.
Army Ordnance arsenals have had to carry the brunt of
creation and conception. Industry has performed chiefly
advanced engineering and production.
hue and cry had a major adverse influence upon American

military arms development.
All US ground and aircraft caliber .30 and .50 machine

guns stemmed from John Browning's original 1900 patents,
the US M1911 pistol and M1918 auto-rifle from early Browning
patents, the M1928 submachine gun from Thompson (Payne)
patents, the M1 Carbine of 1941 from Ordnance development
contracts with Winchester, the Ml rifle from 1927-1936
Ordnance development, the M3 submachine gun from
Ordnance World War II origination. (The Johnson weapons
were of 1936-1941 private design.)
About 1934 a special Senate committee investigated US
munitions manufacturers who were charged with promoting
war for profit. This committee was headed by Senator Gerald
P. Nye and counsel for the committee was Alger Hiss. In
my opinion, based on some study, this "munitions-monger"
Johnson thus hailed the AR-10 as the first design ever to
take full advantage of the bolt-to-barrel-extension lockup idea,
wherein the forces of firing are largely confined within these
locked-together parts. Capitalizing on this, Stoner had designed
both the upper and lower receivers of the AR-10 to be fabricated
from light aluminum alloy forgings.
In creating the AR-10, Stoner had married adaptations from
several other arms to the modified Johnson bolt-and-carrier.
As Johnson mentioned, Stoner's gas system utilized a simple
At the same time the Baker Board report on military

aviation recommended full recourse to the American aircraft
industry for competitive development, even stating that the
Government should not build airplanes...
Among the half-dozen divisions of the Fairchild Engine
and Airplane Corporation is ArmaLite of California. ..[which]
has submitted a 7-lb light automatic 20-shot rifle, caliber
7.62mm.. NATO.
The 40-inch Fairchild AR-10 rifle embodies a front-locked,
8-lug, 22.5-degree (Johnson type) turn bolt system, gas pipe
actuated, which localizes maximum circumferential locking
strength of bolt and barrel abutments within minimum space
for minimum weight, especially as compared with the rearlocked T47, FN T48, and frame-locked M1-T20E2-T44.
Therefore, it is practicable in the Fairchild firearm to use
an aluminum receiver-frame and housing, a principal weightcutting design conception.
open pipe, a concept first used in the Swedish Ljungman Gevar
42 and the later French 1944 and 1949 MAS semiautomatic
rifles. In these relatively rudimentary applications, the gas
piston and spring of a conventional gas-impingement system
were replaced by the jet of hot gas itself, which travelled back
through the hollow gas tube and impinged directly onto the
face of the bolt carrier. The kernel of genius in Stoner's gas
system was that the AR-10's gas tube, running along the left
side of the barrel under the handguard, fed the gas through
lined-up ports in the receiver and bolt carrier wall into a
29 The Genesis of the AR-10
34. Figs. 1 through 5 from Eugene M. Stoner 's celebrated US Patent no.
2,951,424, entitled "Gas Operated Bolt and Carrier System". Gas, tapped
at the gas port 41 travels through the "slideably engaged" gas tubes 43 and 42
(thus allowing for expansion as the barrel heated during firing), flows through
the receiver port 39 and connecting port 38 in bolt carrier 36, and enters
the "annular chamber" 37. The bolt carrier is thus pushed rearward, rotating
and unlocking the bolt 25 by action of its projecting lug 34 in the bolt carrier's
helical slot 35.
US Patent Office
chamber formed between the tail of the bolt and the surrounding bolt carrier. This forced the bolt carrier back. After about
1/8" of movement, the port in the carrier no longer lined up
with the port in the receiver, and the further flow of gas was
cut off. The momentum already imparted was sufficient to
keep the bolt carrier moving, which unlocked the bolt by
rotating it, due to a connecting cam pin, thus beginning the
rearward cycle of operation. With the gas cylinder at maximum
size and the bullet long since out of the muzzle, what little
pressure remained was exhausted as a weak " p u f f through
slots in the right side of the bolt carrier. The AR-10, like the
Johnson before it, made no provision for initial extraction,
the bolt not moving back at all until the instant of complete
unlocking.
Stoner's original prototype of the AR-10 was chambered for

the caliber .30M2 (7.62x63mm) cartridge, fed from a 20-round
BAR magazine. It featured a straight, tubular stock and high
sights, much like the 1941 and 1944 Johnson machine guns.
After some study, improvements were decided upon which
resulted in a second AR-10 prototype, completed late in 1955,
in caliber 7.62mm/.308. The change in caliber meant a new
magazine, which was also made of aluminum. Prototype no. 2
had no iron sights, being fitted over the receiver with brackets
mounting a World War II German ZF-4 telescopic sight. Both
these early one-off weapons used conventional steel barrels.
AR-10 prototype no. 3, dubbed the "AR-10A", featured a
4-oz. aluminum "waffle" magazine and a side-mounted
35. ArmaLite's chief small-arms engineer Gene Stoner stands proudly beside
the four evolutionary prototype models of the AR-10. From top: no. 1, in caliber
.30-06, with BAR magazine and Johnson rear sight; no. 2, in caliber 7.62/.308
with telescopic sight; no. 3, the "AR-10A" (fig. 36); and no. 4 the definitive
American AR-10.
Photo credit: Guns Magazine, March 1957 issue
cocking handle attached directly to the bolt carrier. Roughly the

last six inches of the muzzle-end of the steel barrel were perforated and surrounded with a baffled and perforated duralumin
cylinder which acted as a remarkably efficient flash and recoil
reducer. The Sullivan/Michault "trademark" was continued
in the stock, pistol grip and handguard, which were fiberglassreinforced plastic shells filled with rigid plastic foam. The sole
model of the AR-10A was first presented by Gene Stoner,
George Sullivan and General Devers to the Infantry Board
and School at Fort Benning in December, 1955. Throughout a
busy schedule lasting well into the spring of 1956, the AR-10A
performed well before a number of interested audiences,
including CONARC HQ itself at Fort Monroe, Virginia.
For Fairchild, the relentless pace set for the development

of the AR-10 was a calculated gamble with limited funds
and an even more limited chance of success. Through the
fault of no one, ArmaLite's entrance into the lightweight rifle
race had been poorly timed, for even as CONARC expressed
interest in the AR-10, the Ordnance Corps seemed on the verge
of adopting one or the other of the T44 or the T48, both much
more fully-developed weapons already in trials-quantity
production in the US (discussed in US Rifle M14). ArmaLite
was thus doubly "under the gun", forced either to withdraw
altogether or face a dubious future at best with a perfected
AR-10.
Nevertheless, the demonstrations with the AR-10A were a

threefold success. First, CONARC approved the Infantry
Board's recommendation that immediate action be taken by
Ordnance R&D to investigate the military potential of the
AR-10. Of even greater importance, the decision was taken
during the summer of 1956 to share the fruits of ongoing
Project SALVO field trials with ArmaLite, so that they could
begin to investigate the feasibility of a rugged, lightweight
weapon designed expressly for SCHV ammunition. Finally, if
proof was needed that the AR-10A had indeed created a sensation, the Ordnance Corps approached Fairchild with an offer
of direct financial support for future ArmaLite developments,
in exchange for ultimate proprietary rights to the final product.
This offer was refused by the elated directors of the firm, who
were quick to announce expansive plans of their own for the
future of the AR-10.
In a desperate rush to keep up with Fairchild's enthusiastic
press releases, ArmaLite was busy with a small-scale production
run based on a fourth Stoner prototype. For maximum lightness, although apparently against Stoner's advice, the fourth
prototype featured a composite barrel made of a steel barrel
extension threaded to a rifled, high-tensile steel liner, the latter
swaged inside an aluminum casing. This rifle was the forerunner of the definitive American-made AR-10, of which less
than 50 were ever made.
37. Left and right side views of ArmaLite "AR-10B" serial no. 1004, one of
two early prototypes featured in the Springfield Armory trial late in 1956.
Springfield Armory photo, dated December 4, 1956
32
3& AR-10 serial no. 1004 action closeup, right side view. Note the winter
triggerguard and early spring-clip dust cover latch.
Meanwhile, CONARC's request for a military potential

test of the AR-10 rifle had passed through channels to the Office
Chief of Ordnance, and thence on to Springfield Armory, where
it landed on the desk of Lt. Col. Roy E. Rayle, who commanded
the Armory's Research and Development Division.
One of the major sources of reference for US Rifle M14 was an

unpublished manuscript history of the T44 light rifle program
written by Lt. Col. Rayle, entitled Growth of a Rifle, wherein
he recalls the interesting period of the Armory's dealings with
ArmaLite as follows:
.. In the fall of 1956 I received word that the Armory was

to conduct a test of a new light rifle, designated the AR-10,
which had been developed by.. ArmaLite. ..We at the Armory
had not seen this new rifle, but had heard of it being demonstrated at Fort Benning and Fort Monroe. The ArmaLite
engineers had visited us some time earlier, but on other
matters than the entry in the light rifle program. They had
come to discuss new sporting rifle barrels they had been
working on made wholly or partly of aluminum, both for
advice and to see if we were interested in testing one such
weapon. We felt that military rifles fired high energy loads
at such rates that they would not hold up made of aluminum,
even with the latest hard coatings. However we expressed

more interest in a design involving a steel liner with an
aluminum jacket. I had Dr. [Alexander] Hammer review this
design for strength and accuracy on a theoretical basis, considering both heat and pressure. The design was somewhat
similar to other composite designs we had considered. The
design was found feasible, and could save perhaps half a
pound in weight, but the barrel would be more expensive
to make. We expressed interest to the extent of offering to
test such a barrel in a commercial action under an arrangement where we would pay them $1.00 for the rifle, then in
effect test it for them free of charge..
39. AR-10 serial no. 1004 right side view, stock and receiver group disassembled. Note the absence of the bolt carrier key: compare with fig. 53.
40. Left side view of AR-10 no. 1004 upper receiver and barrel group, disassembled. Note the gas tube, mounted along the left side of the fluted aluminum
barrel jacket.
We were soon paid a visit by Mr. Dorchester, designer [!]

of the AR-10, to lay out a plan of tests. This gave us our
first opportunity to examine the [AR-10] rifle in detail. [It]
weighed about 71/2 lbs., being about 1 1/4 lb. lighter than
the T44. The light weight was achieved mainly through use of
a foam-filled plastic stock and a composite steel and aluminum
barrel. More weight was saved by eliminating bayonet and
grenade launcher features. The weapon was gas operated,
with the gas bled back through a tube and introduced to
a space between the rear of the bolt and a bolt carrier, where
gas pressure could supply energy to perform the functions
of unlocking and reloading. The general idea of a gas system
of this type was also incorporated in the T31 rifle, the last
41. Swaging the extruded aluminum jacket onto the early AR-10 's stainless
steel barrel liner.
Photo credit: Guns Magazine, March, 1957
34
42. Exploded view of the trigger group from AR-10 no. 1004. Part of the documentation of Springfield's 1956-57 AR-10 trial.
43. Exploded view of the bolt group from AR-10 no. 1004.
Springfield Armory photo dated December 4, 1956
rifle John Garand worked on before he retired. In order

to reduce the sharper recoil forces that would come from
a lighter rifle firing the NATO cartridge a muzzle brake that
looked something like a small can was used to trap emerging
powder gases. A high front sight was used, and the rear
sight was incorporated in a carrying handle. A 20-round
box magazine was used, and in general, the rifle appeared
to be designed to meet many of the objectives we were seeking
in a new light rifle for the Army. A tentative test program was
drawn up, based on the same type tests used with the T44
and T48 rifles. Mr. Dorchester requested one minor modification to the test and we agreed. Mr. Mel Johnson was
retained by ArmaLite in the capacity of consultant to help
insure the conduct of a fair, impartial test. Mel had severed
his connections with Winchester, and was a free lance consultant at that time.
showed the gas tube warpage had been corrected. Recoil

and muzzle blast were both under excellent control with the
stronger, redesigned unit, although as testing proceeded,
fouling began to occur and flash was no longer properly
suppressed.
Tests under frost conditions and sub-zero temperatures
revealed malfunctions which had not appeared in ambient
testing. Also, we noticed that the rifles left overnight without
complete cleaning had a tendency to freeze up from the effects
of residue on sliding surfaces, and had to be jarred loose.
Testing of two rifles [serial nos. 1002 and 1004] began in

mid December, but was soon stopped due to early failure of
the combination muzzle brake/flash suppressor. Other problem
areas included extractor breakage, sear failure, failure to
feed, pierced primers, stubbed rounds, failure to eject, and
warpage of the gas tube.
Early in January, 1957, the ArmaLite representatives
returned with the modified prototype rifles, ready to resume
tests. The muzzle brake was now made of titanium instead
of duralumin, and the gas tube was made of 4130 alloy steel
instead of stainless steel.
The first day or two we spent checking over the rifles again,
weighing the weapons, having the ArmaLite representatives
go over changes made, and finalizing the test program. We
allocated one rifle [ser. 1002] to durability testing and the
other [ser. 1004] to general performance testing.. [which]
44. A still from an early Fairchild documentary promotional film about the
AR-10. Note the selector lever position SAFE is straight up.
36
45. Pleased with their progress, Charles Dorchester and Gene Stoner examine
AR-10 serial no. 1005 after a successful firing demonstration, while an unidentified admirer scrutinizes the bolt group.
After only a few days of testing we ran into a much more

serious problem. We had not yet reached the most severe part
of the test schedule, when a bullet came out the side of the
barrel just ahead of the hand of the gunner holding the rifle.
Naturally, this stopped the test. Our metallurgists were called
in for investigation of the barrel material. It was learned
that the steel liner, under the aluminum jacket, had been
made of stainless steel, alloy type 416. Our experts advised
that stainless steel of this type might possibly be satisfactory
in a water cooled gun, but for an air cooled barrel operating
over a wide temperature range, it would not have sufficient
transverse strength properties. Furthermore, the high sulphur
content, included to facilitate machining, caused sulphide

stringers to occur where cracks could start and propagate.
They also found that the barrel heat treatment used could
have been improved for this particular application. We had
developed through extensive research, a good military barrel
steel of a chromium-molybdenum-vanadium alloy type, which
withstood rather high barrel temperatures without rupturing.
Stainless steel has very poor hot hardness properties compared to this alloy.
Mr. Dorchester learned of some of the excellent work
Dave Mathewson in New Haven had done for us on the T44,
46. The cover of ArmaLite's original AR-10 brochure, listing Cooper-Macdonald,

Inc. as sales representative. First received at Colt's Product Engineering
Department on May 29, 1959.
Courtesy Bob Miller
38
47. A page from the first ArmaLite AR-10 brochure illustrating ArmaLite's
much-stressed concept of "Four Combat Functions in One Basic Weapon".
One need look no further for the genesis of the multi-versioned Stoner 62/63
and Colt CAR-15 weapons systems (chapter 11). Compare with fig. 50.
so he approached Dave for assistance. Dave had some T44

barrel blanks on hand, and together [he and Stoner] worked
up an all steel barrel design for the AR-10 as light as the
original composite design by the technique of milling long
slots or flutes in the barrel, in effect creating longitudinal
stiffening ribs. By calling in some of his model makers to
work overtime, Dave completed fabrication of the barrels

over a weekend. Early the next week Mr. Dorchester was
back at the Armory with the AR-10s now equippped with the
new barrels and anxious to resume the tests. Before resuming
tests we examined the design in detail, and checked it out
theoretically for strength. Our calculations indicated the
M-1
9.56
WEIGHT OF RIFLE
WEIGHT OF M A G A Z I N E
T-44
T-48
AR-10
8.45
9.47
6.85
.53
.57
.25
F.N.
LENGTH OVERALL
43.06
44.25
44.63
41.25
OPERATING ROD
YES
YES
YES
NO
TYPE OF FIRE
SEMI AUTO
SEMI AUTO
& AUTO
SEMI AUTO
& AUTO
SEMI AUTO
& AUTO
NO
NO
NO
YES
WOOD
WOOD
WOOD
PLASTIC
CARRYING HANDLE
NO
NO
YES
YES
QUICK BARREL C H A N G E (ON LMG)
NO
NO
NO
YES
WINTER TRIGGER
NO
NO
YES
YES
BARREL RADIATOR
NO
NO
NO
YES
DUST COVER
NO
NO
NO
YES
EFFECTIVE MUZZLE BRAKE
NO
NO
NO
YES
YES
YES
NO
YES
C O R R O S I O N RESISTANT METALS
STOCK MATERIAL
FRONT L O C K I N G BOLT
48. The gospel according to ArmaLite: how the AR-10 "stacked up" against
its contemporaries.
49. While AR-10 no. 1004 was having its "pictures taken, no. 1002 was
undergoing "durability" testing. This Springfield photo shows the disastrous barrel failure suffered by AR-10 no. 1002 during the trial. The
long splits in both the steel barrel and its aluminum jacket are clearly
visible. Note the second type (titanium) muzzle brake, as noted in Lt. Col.
Rayle's report.
40
The AR-10's Short, Heady Life
design was safe to fire, and the testing was resumed. This
time the testing was completed without further serious incidents, but a number of malfunctions were recorded. We were
being urged by the Pentagon to complete our report and
send it in, so by the end of February [1957] the report was
finished. The ArmaLite engineers freely expressed their feeling
that they had been rushed into this test prior to a chance
to really work out many of the bugs in the rifle. Apparently

Fairchild could see the Army was on the verge of selecting a
new rifle and felt they should immediately submit the [AR-10]
for Army tests. The report could do little more than record
the various troubles we had experienced, and indicate that
in its present form the rifle was not satisfactory as a military
service rifle.
The AR-10's Short, Heady Life in the Fast Lane

Re-Enter the Dutch
Mention was made earlier of Johnson model 1941 rifles
intended for the Dutch: a Netherlands purchasing commission had been stranded in America by the German invasion
of the low countries in 1940, and had entered into a contract
with the Johnson Automatics Trust to purchase 14,000 of
what became the model 1941 semi-automatic rifle, and 500
light machine guns, for the defense of the Netherlands East
Indies against the Japanese. Some initial deliveries were made,
but Pearl Harbor changed all that: war was declared, and the
US government temporarily froze all armament exports. By
the time these restrictions were eased, the Rising Sun flew over
all of Java and Sumatra, and there were no free Dutch East
Indies forces left to ship to. More Johnson rifles and machine
guns had meanwhile been produced and were awaiting
shipment. These weapons, and all future Johnson production on the Dutch contract, were quickly diverted to the
Marines.
To Fairchild, the US adoption of the M14 rifle in 1957 was

more than a grave disappointment. Caught up in the heady
aftermath of the successful Infantry Board trials, the parent
firm had invested much more heavily than initially intended in
the crash development of the AR-10. Coincidentally, it happened
that negotiations had begun in 1956 between Fairchild and
the Fokker aircraft group of Holland, regarding license to produce a Dutch-designed plane in the US. Fairchild president
Boutelle learned that, although the Dutch Army had been
testing the FAL and other weapons since 1954, no decision
had as yet been made regarding a new Dutch service rifle.
The ArmaLite AR-10 was soon introduced into the discussion,
with the upshot being that in 1957 the long-established Dutch
arsenal Artillerie-Inrichtingen of Zaandam, near Amsterdam,
acquired the worldwide manufacturing rights to the AR-10
rifle. However, the viability of this program hinged very largely
on certain "assurances" that the Dutch military would adopt
the ArmaLite design. As Sidem's Jacques Michault, by this
time back in Europe, recalls:
.. While most of the European countries had already built

prototypes of their [7.62mm NATO rifle] designs, Holland
had not and Hans Jungeling, director of the Dutch arsenal
..negotiated a licensing agreement with Fairchild for production of AR-10 rifles in Holland. This was a breakthrough
for the ArmaLite rifle because Jungeling was convinced
that the Dutch Army would adopt the AR-10 made in their
country..
Artillerie-Inrichtingen invested two and a half million
dollars in the production line for the AR-10 rifle. The installation boasted the first vertical cold forging machine developed
in Austria for the production of rifle barrels..
Gearing up for Production - the Gas System Goes on Top

As a result of the barrel failure during the Springfield trial,
ArmaLite had abandoned all further experiments with "composite" military rifle barrels, and the "final, improved" fourth
prototype version of the US-made AR-10 now featured a conventional steel barrel, fluted under the handguard for maximum
strength and lightness. By this time, a newly-hired ArmaLite
engineer by the name of L. James Sullivan had completed
a final set of toleranced AR-10 production drawings. In the
interests of economical manufacture, Sullivan (no relation to
ArmaLite founder George Sullivan) had redesigned the original

Stoner gas system, relocating the gas tube from the side to
its now-familiar position on top of the barrel. A new part, the
bolt carrier key, was designed to mate with it.
At Artillerie-Inrichtingen, converting the inch-dimensioned
American drawings to the metric system proved more difficult
than expected, requiring several trips to Holland on the part
of the ArmaLite engineers. In addition, the Dutch Army had
50. A dramatically staged "beachhead" photo from the first (and only?) A-I
brochure, showing the AR-10 as manufactured under license by ArtillerieInrichtingen of Hembrug-Zaandam in the Netherlands. Again stressing the
multi-purpose nature of the AR-10, "the modern lightweight combat rifle, .for
today..and tomorrow", is described as "The only weapon in the world to fulfil
all small arms requirements". All four different combat modes of the A-I AR-10
are illustrated: 1. the basic selective-fire infantry rifle; 2. a scope-mounted
sniper rifle; 3. an assault weapon light enough to replace the submachine gun;
4. a grenade launcher. In a dig at the M14's needed gas spindle valve, the
A-I literature proclaimed the AR-10 the only weapon capable of launching
grenades "without the necessity of gas adjustment, thus permitting the use
of ball ammunition immediately.."
42
stipulated that their new rifle should be capable of launching

rifle grenades, which required diameter of 22mm on the
muzzle end of the barrel. Thus came the demise of the "tin
can" muzzle brake and flash hider, hitherto part and parcel
of the AR-10's ability to deliver controllable automatic fire from
a truly lightweight NATO-caliber, rifle.
51. Photo from a September, 1958 trial of A-I AR-10 serial no. 000030,
the first and so-called "Cuba" or "Sudan" model, by the 507th Ordnance
Detachment (Technical Intelligence), located at Detroit Arsenal in Center
Line, Michigan. Note SAFE is still straight up. This model weighed 8 lbs.
6 oz- with full (20 round) magazine.
Detroit Arsenal photo, dated August 11, 1958
52. Another Detroit Arsenal "Tech n' Tell" photo, showing an exploded view
of the early A-I AR-10 "Sudan" model, right side. Note the fluted steel barrel.

:
53. AR-10 "Sudan" model serial no. 000030, showing the gas system. Note
the gas tube is now positioned on top of the barrel, and the bolt carrier is
fitted with a mating "key" . The spring-clip dust cover latch has given way
to a plunger type. Compare with figs. 39 and 40.
The Artillerie-Inrichtingen "Transitional" Model AR-10
54. Left and right side views of the Dutch second, or "transitional" model
AR-10, serial no. 003837. Note the redesigned grenade-launcher/barrel and
composite wood-and-stamped-metal forend. The "transitional" model was
fitted with a non-fluted barrel, an improved trigger group with an additional
trigger spring, a reworked selector lever with SAFE now forward, and a re-
designed buffer. Weight: 10.11 pounds fully loaded. In a November, 1960 rain
test at Aberdeen Proving Ground, three rifles of this type, serial nos. 004219,
004412 and 004534 firing "Lot FA-14 of Cartridge, Ball, Caliber. 30 T104E1",
suffered three cartridge case "casualties" wherein portions of the rims were
blown o f f , damaging the extractors and firing pins of two rifles.
43
The AR-10's Short, Heady Life 44
55. Right side view of a Dutch "transitional" model AR-10, modified for attachment of a battery-powered infra-red (active) night sight. Note the two-piece
pistol grip, held together by two screws, with small front button built in for
third-finger activation of the infra-red beam.
56. A pair of consecutively-numbered Dutch transitional AR-10s, with bipods.

Above, with bipod open: serial no. 003826. Below, with bipod folded: serial
no. 003825.
57. An experimental "shortie" version of the Dutch transitional model AR-10.

Note the bayonet lug.
Carving the World into Quarters

As noted, Artillerie-Inrichtingen was licensed to make, but
not to sell, the AR-10. Fairchild was so confident of this new
program that they divided the world into four different licensing
areas for marketing the Dutch-made AR-10. Reserving the
US market for itself, Fairchild granted to Sidem International
the exclusive sales rights for western Europe and North Africa.
It transpired that Sam Cummings, the president of the International Armament Corporation (Interarmco) of Alexandria,
Virginia had seen and fired the AR-10 at one of the celebrated,
all-afternoon demonstrations which Fairchild president
Richard Boutelle was fond of staging at his well-equipped farm
near Hagerstown, Maryland (discussed further in chapter 4).
In comparison with his own FG42, Cummings was impressed with the prototype US-built AR-10: he felt it was the
most advanced weapon of its kind he had ever seen. Accordingly, Interarms contracted for and received the AR-10 sales
rights to all of South America, all of Africa south of the
Sahara, and the Scandinavian countries of Norway, Sweden
and Finland.
Exclusive rights to the newly independent countries of excolonial Southeast Asia, each with its own quickly awakening
postwar defense needs, were reserved for the Baltimore-based
agency of Cooper-Macdonald Inc., a name which will figure
largely in the story to come.
A Harsh Brush with Reality

Having a source of production, promotional demonstrations
of the AR-10 began all over the world. Predictably, interest
began to quicken in what the ArmaLite literature promised
was the most modern and versatile shoulder rifle available.
Unfortunately, however, the program was dogged by mishap.
Perhaps this was the combined result of innocent mistakes and
the usual "growing pains" in the manufacturing process itself,
plus a less-than-perfect knowledge of the fiercely competitive,
not to say outrageous, practices which were and still are routinely
resorted to in the "smoky back rooms" of the international
arms cartels in their quest for a lucrative order.
As an example of the first type of problem which ArtillerieInrichtingen faced, M. Michault recalls that after the Austrian
vertical hammer-forge was installed, " T h e first barrels produced turned out to be highly inaccurate and all the rifles had
to be recalled until it was discovered that after the forging
process, the barrels had to be stress-relieved.."
The importance of the second type of problem facing the
fledgling AR-10 is hard to overestimate. A large part of the
"political" side of events attendant upon a nation's adoption
of a new service rifle consists of behind-the-scenes string-pulling
(and worse) where, even as we shall see in the AR-15 story,
real and imagined shortcomings of this or that weapon system
can, by men dedicated (or otherwise convinced), be magnified
out of all proportion to their practical importance. This can,
and very often has, sandbagged the very best of weapons.
58 The 3x25-power telescopic sight for the Dutch AR-10, manufactured by

Delft Optics. Note the knurled, concentric front (windage) and rear (elevation)
adjustment rings. The scope is shown fitted to an early transitional rifle, serial
no. 003701 (with SAFE still straight up).
From a September, 1959 manual entitled "The AR-10 Infantry Rifle" by Staatsbedrijf Artillerie-Inrichtingen,
Hembrug-Zaandam
45
The Belt-Fed AR-10
59. From a later ArmaLite/Fairchild brochure under the heading "Development

in Progress" comes first mention of the belt feed concept as adapted to the
(US-made) AR-10. Compare with fig. 60: note the absence in this mockup
of a "beltway" for ejection of spent links.
60. Gene Stoner firing an early bipod-mounted, belt feed prototype, built from
a Dutch "Sudan" AR-10. Note the non-disintegrating German MG42 belt
in its "beltway", cut through the right side of the receiver below the ejection
port. The articulated ammunition chute feeds the belt from a modified ammunition can.
From the 1957 Fairchild promo film "The ArmaLite AR-10"
61. A serious approach to sustained fire capability was taken in this Dutch belt
feed AR-10, featuring quick-detachable light and heavy barrels, and feeding from
a disintegrating-link belt. Note the perforated, half-round upper "handguard",
firmly attached to the barrel nut, extending from the receiver. This carries
and protects the gas tube, and supports the bipod. A ribbed carrying handle
can be seen folded down on the right side of the barrel.
62. Both ArmaLite and Artillerie-Inrichtingen experimented with the concept

of an extended or "backpack" ammunition supply for the lightweight AR-10.
Pictured here is the second such proposal from the firm of Armament Components, Inc. of Santa Ana, California dated January 4, 1957, for "Design B"
of a "Mechanical Ammunition Supply System for ArmaLite AR-10 Weapon".
63. The basic components of "Design B" of the Mechanical Ammunition

Supply System (MASS). Armament Components, Inc.
47
64. A look inside the Mechanical Ammunition Supply System (MASS). As

required, the user would turn the crank (left) and torque up the rotating transveyor spring, which elevated rounds from the "replaceable ammunition box
assembly" through its coils up into the "one-side feed adapter" inserted into
the AR-10's receiver (right).
48
65. Other means of extending a fixed or tripod-mounted AR-10 's ammunition

supply, as envisaged during the 1957 Armament Components study.
Left, entitled "A tripod-mounted MASS unit and AR-10 weapon".

Right, entitled "Combination MASS/tripod unit for AR-10 weapon"
Disappointment in South Africa - the Final "NATO" Model AR-10
66. The final model of the Artillerie-Inrichtingen AR-10, produced for the South
African NATO-caliber rifle trials in 1960 and later adopted by Portugal. Serial
006038. The "NATO" or Portuguese model AR-10 features the "transitional"
wood half-handguard with its stamped-metal liner protruding up to the gas
block, as well as a unique, forward-latched cocking handle. The long, solid

bar of the earlier cocking piece (fig. 52) has been done away with and now
telescopes within, no longer protruding through the rear of the receiver. Note
the solid boss, added to the lower receiver to seal the opening.
Photo credit: Masami Tokoi
67. The final, Dutch-made "NATO" model AR-10, right side view with open
bipod. After serial production of less than 6,000 rifles, Artillerie-Inrichtingen
abandoned the AR-10 program in 1961 when the Dutch Army adopted the
FN FAL rifle.
Photo credit: Masami Tokoi
Six of the world's newest selective-fire 7.62mm NATO-caliber

shoulder rifles were examined and fired during the winter of
1959-60, in a series of trials sponsored by the government of
the Republic of South Africa. The arms tested were the
C E T M E (the Spanish heir to late second-war German rollerlock technology); the C E T M E ' s new German cousin the G3;
the Danish Madsen Light Automatic Rifle (a Kalashnikov
adaptation); the FN FAL; a new improved model of the Dutchmade AR-10, built specially for the trials and later known as
the " N A T O " model (fig. 66); and the Swiss SIG Model 57
Assault Rifle.
25,000 rifles, plus a lucrative licensing agreement for the

manufacture of many times that number at South Africa's
state-owned A R M S C O R arsenal.
Determined to follow their own racial policies in the face of

growing world sanction, the South Africans were seeking nothing
less than full small arms autonomy with the most modern
weaponry available. Therefore, at stake for the winner of these
important trials was an on-the-spot contract for an initial
To the surprise of few, the intrepid forces of Belgium's

Fabrique Nationale won out overall in the 1960 South African
competition. By this time, of course, the FAL rifle was a fiveyear veteran of successful quantity production. Aside from the
disappointment of the 1957 US adoption of the M14 (itself a
study in "politics"), the history of the FN FAL and its licensed
inch-measurement and metric copies was one of unbroken
successes, wherein the overwhelming majority of the free
world's rapidly modernizing armies had adopted the FAL. By
comparison, virtually every other entrant in the South African
"NATO" trials was barely past the prototype stage. Interestingly,
the AR-10 finished second overall, losing out only to the vastly
more fully-engineered FAL.
The Dutch Turn Down the AR-10

While certainly no mean feat, placing second in South Africa
soon proved to be a left-handed compliment indeed, as FN saw
to it that glowing transcripts of the trials results were made
available to all prospective arms buyers who were still undecided.
Under the weight of such impressive evidence, few defense

ministries were inclined to gamble on the second-best rifle.
Monsieur Michault continues:
..In the meantime, tests were going on with the Dutch

Army and [Artillerie-Inrichtingen's director Hans] Jungeling
was convinced that adoption [of the AR-10] would follow.
It turned out that the Dutch Minister of Defense, who had
a personal grudge against Jungeling, had secretly entered

into an agreement with Fabrique Nationale of Belgium and
the news came like a bombshell: the Dutch Army would
adopt the FAL rifle.
As discussed in The Metric FAL, this the Dutch proceeded

to do, in 1961. Within months of the FAL announcement
Artillerie-Inrichtingen had abandoned the production of the

AR-10 after total production of less than 6,000 rifles.
Known Purchasers of the Artillerie-Inrichtingen AR-10

Country
Est. Qty
Model/Type/Comment
Sales Agency
Cuba
sample - full plastic

handguard, fluted barrel
Interarms
Mexico
sample
Interarms
1
4-6
7,500
sample
sample
These rifles were adopted and
ordered, but never delivered. The
contract was cancelled when a
prototype test rifle blew up
during an endurance test.
Interarms
Interarms
Interarms
200-500
for the Military Cadet Academy
Interarms
special order, in caliber

7.62x39mm
Interarms
Panama
Venezuela
Nicaragua
Nat'l Guard
Guatemala
Finland
6-10
Sudan
1,500-1,800
Portugal
800-1,000
"Cuba" type - full plastic handguard

" N A T O " model, developed for
South African trial. Half-handguard
with perforated metal front end;
latched and telescoping cocking
handle; redesigned trigger group.
In order to improve the margin of safety when launching

grenades, later Artillerie-Inrichtingen barrels were unfluted
and thus heavier. The AR-10 now weighed 10.11 lbs. fully
loaded.
Interarms
Sidem
Meanwhile, back in America, the AR-10 had effectively been

superseded by the events described below. In any case it no longer
offered any weight advantage over "conventional" rifles like the
M14. When the contractual opportunity arose in 1960, Fairchild
also withdrew from the arrangement with Artillerie- Inrichtingen.
The Genesis of the 5.56mm Projectile
Chapter Three
THE SCHV CONCEPT COMES OF AGE

The Genesis of the Military 5.56mm Projectile
68. Some of the multiple-bullet rounds tested during Project SALVO. From
left (actual size): 1. Long-necked .30M2 Triplex (from the July, 1956
SALVO I trials) with three 66-grain bullets, headstamped WRA 56:2. Shortnecked .30M2 (red-tipped) Triplex from SALVO II, headstamped WCC 57:
3. Long-necked .22/.30M2 Triplex, headstamped WRA 57: 4. Long-necked
.22/.30 Light Rifle Triplex, headstamped WCC 54: 5. Green-tipped FAT 127
Duplex, the 2.080" (52mm) long-case version of Dr. Garten's short-lived
6.35mm (.258 caliber) concept, headstamped FA 59: 6. Green-tipped FAT115
Duplex, the 1.880" (48mm) short-case version, headstamped WCC 59.
Editor's collection
As mentioned, the Army had decided to share with Fairchild

the outcome of the SALVO I field trials, wherein over the
summer of 1956 the latest in Duplex and Triplex loads and flechette shotshells (further discussed in The SPIW) had been tested
along with two versions of the S C H V concept: the Gustafson
.22 Carbine firing a 41-grain bullet at 3,125 fps, and a modified
T48 firing a 68-grain .22 caliber bullet from a necked-down
caliber .30 Light Rifle case, at 3,400 fps. This latter bullet had
been designed at Aberdeen in 1954 by Gustafson and Davis in
their quest for the optimum .22 caliber military bullet. Under
Project SALVO contracts, trials quantities of these bullets were
manufactured by the Sierra Bullet Co. of Whittier, California,
to the Aberdeen drawing, and the special cartridge cases were
made up by Olin's Winchester/Western Division.
In recent correspondence with the authors, William C. Davis,

Jr., today a private professional engineer and consultant,
has kindly documented his lengthy involvement in the genesis
and development of what became the 5.56x45mm cartridge.
Few men were closer to the program and fewer were better
qualified to be there, as fewer still possessed Mr. Davis'
encyclopedic knowledge of ballistics and his lucid style of
reportage.
. .That [68-grain] bullet was hardly a ''new design" but

was merely a .22-caliber homologue of the caliber .30 M1
ball bullet that had been developed by Army Ordnance

during the 1920s for use in long-range machinegun fire..
By way of introduction, Mr. Davis hastens to disclaim any

status as the "inventor" of the 68-grain, .22 caliber "Sierra"
bullet:
53
The Genesis of the 5.56mm Projectile 11
In any event, it had soon become apparent to Gustafson and

Davis that a 41-grain bullet in the .22 Carbine cartridge was
"too little", and the 68-grain "Sierra" bullet in the necked-down

.30 Light Rifle case was "too much":
. .Accordingly, we had drafted a letter to [the Office,

Chief of Ordnance] some time in 1955, proposing a
.22-caliber cartridge, employing a boattail bullet of
approximately 55 grains weight, at a muzzle velocity of
approximately 3,300 fps, for use in a rifle substantially
lighter than the T44/M14. We had also proposed a program

to design such a cartridge at Aberdeen, build one experimental automatic "test fixture" (rifle) to fire it, and requested
one-year funding authorization in amount $60,000 for this
project..
A Note About "Mission Responsibility"

By long-established tradition, the specialist responsibilities
and duties attendant on the development of US small arms
weapons and ammunition had been apportioned out to three
basic Ordnance agencies. Springfield Armory was in charge of
the engineering design of the actual weapons, while Frankford
Arsenal had similar responsibilities with regard to the ammunition. Aberdeen's Development and Proof Services was charged
with the engineering testing and evaluation of both ammunition
and weaponry. With this in mind, Mr. Davis notes:
We recognized, incidentally, that this proposal was in fact
quite outside our officially assigned mission responsibilities,
encroaching on [those] of both Frankford Arsenal and Springfield Armory. ..We had, however, had some success in gaining
approval, .for our previous exploratory work [on the .22 Carbine], and we hoped that this indulgence might continue. Our
letter, which was classified CONFIDENTIAL, was accordingly
prepared for the signature of Mr. T. F Colleran, then Director
of the D&PS at Aberdeen, and sent forward some time in 1955.
69. Actual-size, X-ray photographs of .30M2 Triplex rounds nos. 1 and 2,

above, showing the canted bases on the nested second and third bullets (round
no. 2).
Photo courtesy Capt. William Etter
Dr. Carten's First Denial

Frederick H. Carten, Ph.D., had been Col. Studler's civilian
executive for some years before the latter's retirement in 1953.
Bill Davis describes Col. Studler as "above all, a consummate
pragmatist in matters of policy; he believed very sincerely that
the attainment of a worthy goal would justify whatever means
might be necessary to attain it". As for Dr. Carten, he was
"a distinguished technical expert in his own right, but nevertheless a protg of Col. Studler, and his views in matters of
policy were virtually the same as those of Col. Studler".
Known later as "the father of the M14", Dr. Carten was
a staunch advocate of the OCO-sponsored T44 Light Rifle
and its "full-power" cartridge, the 7.62mm NATO round.
Recognizing the growing threat which the audacious SCHV

concepts presented to his infant M14 procurement program,
Dr. Carten did everything in his power to undermine and
terminate any official consideration of them.
It therefore comes as no surprise that no written response was
ever received to Aberdeen's confidential request for continued
S C H V funding. Mr. Davis recalls that they were notified
verbally by Dr. Carten that the request was denied, for the
very valid reason that the activity proposed was not within
Aberdeen's mission responsibility, and that the objectivity of
D&PS as a test agency might be "compromised" by any
further direct participation in materiel design.
The Genesis of the 5.56mm Projectile
71. Front view of the gas block of the Winchester ".22 T65 Duplex" SALVO
rifle, showing the ingenious method of activating the single gas piston from
either barrel.
From Aberdeen to ArmaLite, via a Circuitous Route

In February of 1957, against a background of the imminent
adoption of the M14, Fairchild's General Devers paid a visit to
the Office Chief of Ordnance to pour a little oil on the troubled
wake of the just-concluded and rather disastrous Springfield
Armory trial of AR-10 serial no. 1002. He also asked for, and
received, Fairchild's first official briefing on the results of the
SALVO I S C H V ammunition trials.
Meanwhile, C O N A R C ' s Commanding General Willard

G. Wyman had been most impressed with the ArmaLite concepts which he had witnessed at the 1956 demonstration of
AR-10 prototypes at Fort Monroe. In discussions with Gene
Stoner, General Wyman explained that the Infantry Board,
in following the recommendations of previous SCHV research,
were essentially looking for a .22 caliber rifle with a respectable
55
The Genesis of the 5.56mm Projectile 56
72. The celebrated 68-grain "Sierra" bullet, homologous to the long-range

caliber .30 M1 machine gun bullet of the nineteen twenties, designed at Aberdeen
Proving Ground in 1954 and featuring a 7-caliber tangent radius and a 9

boattail.
Redrawn by Thomas B. Dugelby
hit probability out to 300 yards. As fate would have it, a

copy of the Aberdeen letter requesting funding for and describing the proposed D&PS development of the optimum
55-grain .22 bullet, which Dr. Carten had denied, had some-
how found its way into General Wyman's possession, where

as Bill Davis notes it "served some useful purpose in
formulating the requirements that were given to Gene
Stoner.."
The Fateful Range-Requirement Snafu

On General Wyman's recommendation, the Infantry Board
submitted a formal request for the development of a new SCHV
rifle. The Board themselves had been sold on 300 yards as
a practical combat range, but felt that CONARC, politically,
would look more favorably on a 400-yard requirement. The
decision at Fort Monroe was that 500 yards sounded like a
rounder, easier number to pass muster at the Pentagon. Accordingly, the requirement was finally "cast in concrete" for a six-
pound, selective fire .22 caliber weapon, conventionally stocked,

holding 20 rounds or better. Significantly, the cartridge itself
was not specified, for the simple reason that there wasn't a
totally satisfactory one yet in existence, but it had to be powerful
enough to penetrate a steel helmet, body armor or 10-gauge
(.135") steel with trajectory and accuracy equal to or better
than the Ml rifle, and wounding power equal to or better than
the .30 Carbine, all out to 500 yards.
The First ArmaLite SCHV Weapon - the .222 "Stopette"

The first design ArmaLite presented, apparently in response
to the original 300-yard range criteria, was a short-lived
creation by the designer of the AR-5 called the "Stopette".
It had the required conventional stock, and was chambered
for the standard commercial .222 Remington cartridge. A
few preliminary tests revealed that a lightweight arm of this
type combining a drop-heel, foam-filled fiberglass stock with

a rather high cyclic rate, resulted in unacceptable climb.
Important lessons had been learned about climb and controllability in the AR-10 program: so much so that the decision
was taken at Fairchild to produce an AR-10 "lookalike" to
fire the .222 Remington round.
73. Fig. 105 from US Rifle M14, showing the old Ml, right, and the new
7.62mm NATO M14, officially adopted on May 1, 1957.
US Army photo
ArmaLite's "Scaled-Down" AR-10

In private conversation Gene Stoner has always admitted
that his prime interest has been in developing rifles in 7.62mm
NATO caliber. Indeed, at Fairchild's behest he had by this time
designed the AR-16, expressly with a view to licensed production
in less developed countries where the technology to produce
screw-machine parts and weld them to plain carbon steel
stampings made much more sense than did expensive aluminum alloy forgings. In addition, it appears that Stoner saw
little military potential in the .222 Remington round. Accordingly, the complex job of developing the "scaled-down" AR-10
went to two engineers in ArmaLite's employ at that time,
Robert Fremont, Stoner's chief design assistant, and the
mentioned L. James Sullivan, who had first prepared the
toleranced production drawings for the AR-10 wherein the gas
system had been repositioned to the top of the barrel.
Actually, the term "scaled down" is far too simplistic a
description for the process which produced the AR-15 from the
AR-10. For one thing, all the parameters did not fit the same
"scale". A scale based solely on comparative weights and
sizes of the two cartridges, for example, would indicate a rifle
dramatically lighter and smaller than its NATO forebear.
Other factors were comparatively much nearer being equal,
with the chamber pressure of the finalized M193 5.56mm
cartridge actually 2,000 psi higher than the (50,000 psi) average
for M80 ball.
When the new rifle was tested with commercial .222 Remington ammunition, the in-line stock and heavier recoiling parts
of the new rifle, plus a somewhat lower rate of fire, kept it
so impressively "on target" that Stoner's subsequent short
demonstration before General Wyman led to a business
arrangement being made virtually on the spot. C O N A R C ' s
request to the Army Adjutant General for ten of these new
ArmaLite rifles for Infantry Board trial was dated May 6th,
five days after the announcement of the adoption of the M14.
57
The Genesis of the AR-15 15
74. A very early appearance of one of the first 17 ArmaLite AR-15s. The
caption reads: "On the rifle range, Maj. Eugene M. Lynch instructs Lt.
Col. Robert Vallendorf on how to fire the new ArmaLite AR-10 [!] rifle
now being developed by the Combat Developments Experimentation
Center". Note the plain muzzle and absence of a bayonet lug; the one-piece,
cylindrical fiberglass handguard; the AR-10-style cocking handle and 25-round
magazine.
US Army photo dated March 31, 1958, courtesy Daniel D. Musgrave
Thus, with the AR-10 itself officially out of the running as

the next US rifle, but locked into what Fairchild hoped would
be a proud new worldwide manufacturing arrangement with
Artillerie-Inrichtingen, the focus of ArmaLite's attentions
turned to the .222 caliber rifle, soon dubbed the AR-15. The
fateful genesis of this project, with its cavalier setting of requirements and freedom of ammunition choice, was a model of
informality in sharp contrast to the ponderous rigidity of the
Ordnance Corps' own .30 caliber Light Rifle program. There
were advantages and disadvantages inherent in each of these
methods of development, as time was to make amply evident.
Engineers Fremont and Sullivan made some further modifications before ArmaLite produced these first AR-15s. Taking
advantage of the flat-shooting .222 cartridge, a less expensive
two-position " L " peep sight was fitted into the rear of the
carrying handle portion of the aluminum upper receiver, still
adjustable for windage but without the click-adjust elevation
wheel of the AR-10. Elevation adjustment on the AR-15 was
to be accomplished by means of a threaded front post. The
rifle itself was 37 1/2" overall, with a 20" steel barrel fluted
under the handguard, weighing exactly 6 lbs. with 20 rounds of
ammunition (6.12 lbs. with a full load of 25 rounds). Abandoning once and for all the original Sullivan/Michault trademark
of filling the furniture with plastic foam, the straight stock and
one-piece, cylindrical handguard were simply hollow, fiberglassreinforced plastic shells, the latter lined with a thin aluminum
heat reflector.
General Wyman's request was approved, and the Chief of

Ordnance was directed to procure ten .222 caliber ArmaLite
rifles and 100,000 rounds of ammunition. It appears that
ArmaLite actually made up a total of seventeen such rifles.
75. Left and right side views of ArmaLite AR-15 serial no. 000012, one of the few
of the first series of 17 rifles to remain unmodified. As above, note the plain
muzzle, one-piece cylindrical handguard, and AR-10-style cocking handle.
SAFE is again straight up, as on the early US and Dutch AR-10s.

59
The AR-15 in Caliber ".222 Special"
The ArmaLite AR-15 in Caliber ".222 Special"
76. Box and sample cartridge of Remington's ".222 Special", loaded under
contract for Armalite. Note the Remington 55-grain bullet (fig. 141, no. 2).
The last change made was of much more import. Due to the
surprise increase in the Infantry Board's specified penetration
and trajectory requirements from 300 to 500 yards, ArmaLite
was forced to modify the .222 Remington cartridge. In Gene

Stoner's personal, handwritten historical summary of these
early events, he described this process as follows:
The cartridge development for the .223 was started by

myself in 1957 after a trip to Fort Benning to get the desired
military characteristics. I calculated the needed bullet weight
and muzzle velocity. I then designed the bullet and had it
manufactured by the Sierra Bullet Co. in Whittier, California. This bullet was a 55-grain boattail design with a
jacket thickness of .018 inches. The powder finally selected
was a standard commercial type.
The chamber pressures for this round in the standard .222

case were a little excessive. The obvious conclusion was to
increase the case capacity and to use a different powder.
I contacted Winchester and Remington about loading the
necessary rounds for the test program... The ArmaLite rounds
[were] loaded by Remington, with the bullets furnished..
[and] were designated the ".222 Special".
Gene Stoner is, in the opinion of many, the most gifted firearms designer since John M. Browning. However, in 1958 he
was not, nor indeed has he ever claimed to be, an expert in
ammunition design or ballistics. In designing his bullet, therefore, he quite rightly took full advantage of the work already
done at Aberdeen. On the original ArmaLite drawing of the
"Stoner" bullet, the 7-caliber ogive and 9-degree boattail are
identical to the earlier D&PS 68-grain M1 "homologue". The
only changes made by Stoner were a shortening of the boattail
and the cylindrical bearing length of the bullet to reduce its
weight in conformance with the 55-grain specification; itself
the last legacy of the informal Aberdeen S C H V program
which Dr. Carten had scotched.
Stoner personally delivered the first 10 completed AR-15s,

and 100 magazines, to Fort Benning in March of 1958. Four
were reserved for an extensive Infantry Board field trial, where
they were pitted against shiny new T44E4s from Springfield's
recently completed "simulated mass production" run of 500
rifles. Three of the remaining AR-15s were apportioned out
as demonstrators to other stations, while the final three were
earmarked for Fort Greely, Alaska, where they were to be
further examined and shot under Arctic conditions.
Stoner remained in attendance throughout the Infantry
Board trial. In his words,
The AR-15 in Caliber ".222 Special"
77. Unmachined examples of the earliest production run of AR-15 receiver forgings. The note underneath, from AR-15 designer L. James Sullivan to collector
Bob Miller, reads as follows: "..The enclosed upper and lower receiver forgings
are the first type from a run of 40 sets, ordered in 1959from the Harvey Aluminum Company of Torrance, Ca." Note the die mark and serial number "HA
7075" on the lower receiver tang. Bob Miller collection, photo by Roy Arnold
..This policy was agreed upon beforehand because there

were no instruction manuals or any material for guidance
on these new weapons. I also conducted instruction classes
until everyone concerned with the tests was thoroughly
familiar with the weapon. I was also consulted [regarding

any] repairs or parts to be replaced. This procedure proved
to be of great value to both the Board and myself, and a
great deal of valuable information was gained first hand.
Stoner recalls the actual trials with considerable pride, as

these first AR-15s did very well indeed against the T44E4s,
which in his words had been made at the Armory "with
tender loving care. .they were excellent control weapons. " H e
found the combat firing phase "as rugged a test condition as
I had ever seen..barbed wire strung within 6 inches of the
ground, good and tight, where a rifleman has to go through

these obstacles and he can't baby the rifle if he wants to keep
any skin on himself...The troopers that were firing, at the end
of the day, didn't have any clothes left on them to amount to
anything, and their boots were all torn up in a matter of a
few days."
62
The Winchester .224 Light Weight Rifle
The Winchester .224 Caliber Light Weight Military Rifle
78. The wood-stocked, 5-lb. Winchester caliber .224 Light Weight Military
Rifle serial no. 2, designed by Ralph Clarkson and first presented in 1957.
Photo: Winchester/Western Research Department, New Haven, Connecticut
79. Winchester Light Weight Military Rifle serial no. 2, disassembled. The
resemblance to the M2 Carbine, especially in the bolt, operating slide and
short-stroke gas piston, is unmistakeable.
20 The Winchester .224 Light Weight Rifle
80 Above: action closeup of the World War II Winchester Automatic Rifle (WAR),
designed by Marshall "Carbine" Williams. Caliber .30-06, serial no. 8.
Springfield Armory NHS
Below: action closeup of Winchester .224 Light Weight Military Rifle, serial
no. 2. Note the similarities in safety catch and change lever design, both of
which vary from the pattern of the M2 Carbine.
Meanwhile, to the consternation of Fairchild's board of

directors, ArmaLite was not alone in the development of a
new S C H V rifle. Back in the summer of 1956, C O N A R C
had also invited the Winchester-Western Division of the Olin
Mathieson Chemical Corporation to submit an S C H V rifle
design of their devising, for competitive trial along with the
ArmaLite entry. Winchester lost no time in coming up with
a sleek little rifle, weighing only five pounds with an empty
20-shot magazine, and a fluted steel barrel like the AR-10. It

featured a conventional walnut stock and handguard, and a
short-stroke gas tappet system operating a turning, two-lugged
bolt. In these and many other details it resembled nothing so
much as an improved M2 Carbine, but significantly, great
pains were taken in the Winchester literature to describe the
new arm's lineage without reference to the disgraced Carbine
itself:
..From the very beginning of the development work on

this weapon it was considered of utmost importance that
reliability must not be sacrificed to obtain low weight. As
a consequence a policy decision was taken that the new
Lightweight Rifle was to be designed on the basis of well
proven earlier guns whose field reliability had been established in extensive tests. As a result the best elements were
taken from the Winchester .30 caliber Experimental Light
Rifle, the G30R Semi-Automatic Rifle, the WAR Automatic
Rifle and the .50 caliber Semi-Automatic Anti-Tank Gun,
to serve as a basis for development of the Winchester Lightweight Rifle. Thus the locking system..is essentially the
same as that of the .30 caliber Winchester WAR Automatic
Rifle which has successfully passed extensive field tests
carried out by the Army and the Marine Corps. The short
stroke gas system is derived from a type successfully used
on several proven guns, while the trigger mechanism again
is based on the WAR. .which also had successfully passed
military tests. The bolt design is based on the WAR and
G30R rifles.
Designed by Ralph Clarkson, the first Winchester Light

Weight Military Rifle prototype was successfully demonstrated
at CONARC headquarters on October 25, and at Fort Benning

on November 6, 1957. Winchester/Western had also been given
a relatively free hand in the cartridge design, the only specified

criteria apparently being a .22 centerfire cartridge capable of
propelling a 50 to 55 grain bullet at 3,300 fps. The resulting

round was called the .224 Winchester.
81. Top, side, rear and bottom views of the magazine from Winchester's .224
caliber Light Weight Military Rifle, serial no. 12.
Winchester Runs Afoul

of the Increased Range Requirement
The prototype of the Winchester .224 Light Rifle had been
ready a few months before the first AR-15s. However, in their
determination to "get the drop" on ArmaLite and gain the
prestige of presenting the first rifle, Winchester had been caught
short when the early, informal Infantry Board range requirements were upped to 500 yards. In attempting to pack the
short-necked .224E1 case with more powder, Ralph Clarkson
discovered the same high chamber pressures Gene Stoner had
recorded in his attempt to load a 500-yard capability into the
standard .222 Remington case. (Stoner later estimated the
.224E1 round, in a hot chamber, consistently gave pressures
in the 60,000 psi range: this was about 2,000 psi over what
they were then using as a proof load.) The Winchester entry
was accordingly withdrawn for ballistic improvement, and was
not ready to compete against the AR-15 in the Infantry Board
trials of March 1958.
Winchester's chamber pressure problems led them to the
same decision Stoner had made: they made the case neck a little
longer and used a different powder. Not simply a different lot or
grain size of powder, as Stoner had done, but, interestingly,
82. Factory drawing of the Winchester/Western 53-grain, flat-based .224E2

bullet, showing the cannelure moved forward to enable the (longer-necked)
.224E2 cartridge to seat and feed.
83. Factory drawing of the maximum cartridge and minimum chamber for
the Winchester/Western .224E2.
85. The (actual size) SCHV rounds in contention with Gene Stoner's ".222
Special" (figs. 76 and 141). From left: 1. Earle Harvey's short-lived, unheadstamped ".224 Springfield" round, loaded by Remington and later commercially
marketed as the ". 222 Remington Magnum" ;2. the Winchester/Western ballpowder-loaded .224E1, unheadstamped; 3. the longer-necked IMR-loaded
Winchester .224E2, headstamped WCC 58; and two unheadstamped examples
of Winchester's later SCHV experiments: 4. the rare .224E5 (fig. 86); 5. the
.224E4. Note the larger case size and rebated rim of the .224E5.
Editor's collection
a completely different type of powder; not even their own

product. Remington, a DuPont subsidiary, had dimensioned
both the commercial .222 Remington and ArmaLite's .222
Special cartridges around the properties of one of DuPont's
proprietary Improved Military Rifle (IMR) powders known
as IMR4475. In fact, according to later testimony and the
events related above, Stoner expressly designed the AR-15
around I M R powder. It is interesting to consider Olin here
being "forced" to choose I M R over ball powder in the .224E2,
a round with the same chamber profile as the .222 Special,
while later advocating the fateful switch to ball powder in the
5.56mm cartridge (chapter 9).
Meanwhile, the very heart of the Winchester Light Weight
Military Rifle; the bolt, receiver and magazine; had all been
84. Twenty-round box label for the Winchester .224E2 cartridge, as supplied
for Infantry Board trial in 1958.
Courtesy James Alley
86 A drawing dated April 25, 1963 by Olin engineer D. Whitten, ofthe "Maximum
Cartridge, Winchester .224E5". Independent proof of Frankford Arsenal's
warning that the case volume of the. 223 Remington (or the. 224E2 Winchester)
was "insufficient to accommodate the necessary charge" to consistently meet
the OSD's ballistic criteria with IMR powder (chapter 8). Interestingly, in 1955
Frankford had recommended the .25 Remington cartridge case as the basis
of a successful SCHV round. "About .045" larger" than the .222 Remington
family, the .25 Remington is virtually identical in case diameter to the Winchester
.224E5 shown here.
23 The First AR-15s
built around the original .224"E1" round. Time had flown;

the intended Infantry Board comparison of the two rifles
had already begun, without the Winchester. Expediency
therefore suggested seating the flat-based 53-grain bullets more
deeply into the longer-necked E2 cases, so the cartridge would
still fit and feed in the existing rifle. The .222 Special would
chamber in the Winchester rifle, but it was .090" longer overall, and would not feed up through the magazine well. Hence,
as Stoner recorded, in order that ArmaLite's results could be
compared to later tests with the Winchester rifle, the AR-15
initially had to fire the common but ballistically inferior
.224E2 round:
. .About this time Winchester managed to get a contract

similar to ours on the light rifle program. They demonstrated
a rifle firing a .224E1 round.. loaded with ball powder and..
a 53 grain flat base bullet. The velocity of the Winchester
round was the same as ours, 3,300 fps.
the .224E2 was loaded with the bullet deep in the neck
of the cartridge. This was done to keep the overall length
down to fit their existing gun design...The final results
were that the AR-15 would fire either round, but the
Winchester could only fire the .224 round in the Army test
programs.
After the program was under way I was notified by Winchester that they would have to make some changes in their
round. This change was brought about by the fact that the
ball powder they used would develop too high breech pressures
in a hot chamber. They were forced to switch to an IMR
type powder, and needed more case volume.
Winchester and Armalite agreed on a common cartridge size so that either the Remington loaded [.222 Special]
round or theirs would function in the Armalite rifles. One
problem did exist, however; the Winchester round now called
This made almost all the test results poorer than would
have been..[with] the .222 Special round. ArmaLite's tests
showed that the better bullet design in the .222 Special had
much better penetration at long ranges. Another fact became
apparent later on when it was noted that the Winchester
rounds would lose a considerable number of primer cups in
various adverse tests. In a rain test [of the AR-15] at Aberdeen
the Winchester rounds used had 50% of their primers loosened
in 600 rounds. This test was repeated with the Remington
loaded .222 Special with no cartridge case casualties.
Modifications to the First AR-15s

Thanks in great part to the experience ArmaLite had gained
from the AR-10 program, the March, 1958 Infantry Board
field test had identified only a few relatively minor initial
" b u g s " in the AR-15s. Aside from beefing up the barrel a

little, as discussed below, Stoner records all the changes he
made to several of the first seventeen rifles, as follows:
1. trigger pull reduced to approximately 7 lbs.

2. trigger return action improved
3. single, conical fiberglass handguard replaced with two-piece
removable type, secured with spring-loaded knurled ring
4. rear sight mask increased in size
5. change lever positions changed (originally, SAFE was
straight up; dragging rifle by muzzle could rotate lever to
AUTO).
6. charging handle changed from AR-10 type to a serrated
"triangle" at the rear of the receiver (the old "finger" type,
directly above the bolt carrier key, got too hot on sustained
fire, and also could not be operated while wearing Arctic

gloves)
7. increased clearance in receiver around magazine, for sand,
etc.
8. molded rubber buttcap added to fiberglass stock
9. more clearance allowed around buffer
10.receiver contact surfaces (lands) on bolt carrier reduced
11.dust cover cam added
12.feed ramp altered
13.magazine capacity reduced from 25 to 20 rounds
14.barrel 2 oz. heavier; flash suppressor added to muzzle end
The first AR-15 so modified was tested briefly at Fort Benning

and pronounced fit for safe trial by other interested stations.
Accordingly, to the growing concern of Dr. Carten, modified
AR-15s from this first series of seventeen rifles were soon being
put through their paces all around the country.
several important categories. In three clean starts through the

sand-and-mud simulated combat trials at Kyle range, for
example, whose ruggedness Stoner himself has already described, the AR-15s had fired 3,578 semi-auto shots with an
overall malfunction rate of 6.1 per 1,000 rounds. The handpicked Springfield Armory T44E4s had fired only 2,337 rounds,
but turned in an overall malfunction rate of 16/1,000; nearly
three times that of the developmental AR-15s.
This concern deepened somewhat when the Infantry Board

initially found the AR-15 "superior" to the control rifles in
87. Left side views of the earliest ArmaLite AR-15s in existence, serial nos.
000002 (above) and 000003 (below). (By all reports, serial no. 000001 was
destroyed in testing).
Courtesy Sidem International. Photo credit: Vic Tuff
23 The First AR-15s
23 The First AR-15s
88. A closeup view of the receivers, left side, of the earliest ArmaLite
AR-15s. Although serially numbered earlier than no. 000012 (fig. 75),
various modifications, such as those recommended after the initial Infantry
Board trial in March, 1958 have been made to both weapons. Rifle no.
000002 (above) has an experimental grooved slip ring and hence a two-
piece, demountable forend (mod. no. 3); the new serrated "triangle" charging
handle (mod. no. 6); and altered "type 2" selector markings (SAFE now
forward; mod. no. 5). Rifle no. 000003 (below) has a knurled slip ring
and type 2 selector markings, but retains its original AR-10-style charging
handle.
23 The First AR-15s
89. Closeup of the two receivers, right side view. No. 000002 (above)
with modified charging handle. Both weapons feature woven fiberglass
buttstocks, pistol-grip sling swivel, and the original 25-round magazine.
Faint markings ("L" and counterclockwise arrow) appear on the windage

adjustment knob.
70
The First AR-15s
90. The two charging handles (no. 000003, above; note detent at rear) and
the original chromed bolt assembly.
Dr. Carton's Dilemma

The nine-pound T44E4 "Light Rifle" had by this time
officially been adopted as US Rifle, M14, although massproduced rifles were not due to come on stream until 1960.
..I was not privy to specific information on numbers of
rifles in inventory at that time, but it was said that the number
was insufficient to meet possible mobilization requirements.
If that was true, then it was indeed necessary to procure
additional rifles very soon. No experienced planner would
have concluded that the production of AR-15 rifles could
begin forthwith, notwithstanding the opinions to the contrary
that were expressed years later, by people who had no
experience in such matters. Plans had been laid for the
production of the M14, which was at least a moderate improvement over the Ml rifle, and it used the NATO-standard
7.62mm ammunition, an advantage not to be considered
lightly. To meet immediate requirements, it therefore seemed
necessary to press on with production of the M14, since the
only practicable alternative was to produce additional
quantities of obsolete caliber .30 M1 rifles on the existing
tooling.
Of the practicable choices, the plan to push forward with
production of the M14 was by far the better. Being wise in
From his vantage point at Aberdeen, Bill Davis sympathized

with Dr. Carten's position:
the ways of politics and procurement in Washington, however, Dr. Carten apparently decided that this truthful and
sound logistic argument would not be sufficiently persuasive
in the Congress to prevent the immediate scuttling of the M14
procurement program, if it were acknowledged that still
91. Handguards, serial no. 000003. The heat reflector is made of metal foil
epoxied to the inside of the handguard halves.
71 The First AR-15s
another rifle was already on the horizon. There were then,

even as there are now, some members of the Congress eagerly
awaiting any pretext to justify reductions in military spending,
quite irrespective of the possible consequences. Dr. Carten's

fears concerning the plan to produce the needed rifles were
probably not unfounded..
Raising the Stakes

- The First-Ever AR-15 Engineering Tests
In conjunction with the Infantry Board's "user" trials,
Ordnance mission responsibility included engineering, or
"technical" trials of the fledgling AR-15s. In first presenting
the AR-10 to the Ordnance establishment, Fairchild had found
the basic reaction to their radical new alloy-and-plastic, straightstocked rifle to be one of distrust and skepticism. Indeed, as
recorded above, the Springfield Armory trial had featured a
near-disastrous barrel failure and had concluded that the
AR-10 was "not satisfactory as a military service rifle".
ArmaLite the implacable disfavor of the entire camp of "fullpower" advocates. As if this wasn't enough, Fairchild found that
by engaging the services of the outspoken Mel Johnson they
had unwittingly compounded their problems, for Johnson's
battle to unseat the Ml with his own rifle, while twenty years
old by this time, had waxed very bitter indeed. The Army
remembered. So did Johnson, who, as noted, had lost no time
in "freely expressing" his suspicions that the ArmaLite rifles
were being given every opportunity to fail.
Embracing the SCHV concepts in the .222 Special AR-15

had made an "issue" out of caliber, additionally earning
In any case, Bill Davis describes some interesting preliminary footwork on the part of both the O C O and Fairchild:
..I do recall that there was some maneuvering behind the

scenes about where those [engineering] tests were to be conducted. Dr. Carten's office had reportedly preferred that they
be done at Springfield Armory... [Fairchild 's] (retired) General
Devers. .had reportedly prevailed upon some of his acquaint-
ances in the Pentagon to direct that the tests be conducted at

Aberdeen instead..on the grounds of ArmaLite's perception
that Aberdeen was more to be trusted in the matter of conducting an impartial and objective evaluation. Dr. Carten's
preference for Springfield Armory was thus overruled..
The Curiously Missing Results

of the First Aberdeen AR-15 Trial
The relations between ArmaLite and the Office Chief of
Ordnance, never really amicable, were strained even further by
the AR-15's decisive success in the March 1958 Infantry Board
field trial. This victory was short-lived, however, for despite
General Devers' "string-pulling", Dr. Carten adamantly protected the M14 procurement program.
formed the prescribed engineering and accuracy tests with meticulous care on a vast number of US and foreign small arms.
Bill Davis recalls having first seen an AR-15 when specimens

from the first 17 rifles were sent to Aberdeen for the mentioned
1958 engineering trials. A description of these tests constituted
the elusive Fifty-Seventh Report on Ordnance Project TS2-2015
of February 1959, entitled A Test of Rifle, Caliber .22, AR-15;
Rifle, Lightweight Military, Caliber .224 [Winchester]; and
Pertinent Ammunition, by Laurence F. Moore.
A strong characteristic of most of his reports was the outspoken, not to say fearless, evaluation of a weapon as one with
which America might have to go to war. In this he felt, and
many would agree, that no trial he could devise would approach
the reality of combat: better a fault or inherent weakness should
be discovered sooner rather than later. As can be imagined,
however, when these critical recommendations and conclusions
extended to the basic design as well as the performance of
Ordnance-sponsored weapons, which they very often did,
Moore's uncompromising attitude was not so well appreciated
in the Pentagon offices of the Ordnance Corps.
Excerpts from Mr. Moore's reports have appeared numerous

times in previous Collector Grade books. A top-ranking competitive shooter, Larry Moore was for many years the main civilian
test engineer with the Infantry and Aircraft Weapons Division's
Development and Proof Services (D&PS) at Aberdeen. He per-
With this in mind it is interesting to note that the published

version of Larry Moore's Aberdeen report on the AR-15 and
Winchester .224, as well as two. further trials discussed in
chapter 4, contain none of the usual recommendations or conclusions. Bill Davis explains:
3 The First AR-15s
..when the test directive was received in the Small Arms

Branch at Aberdeen, for which I was then responsible, I
assigned the test to Larry Moore, an engineer of outstanding
competence and unquestioned integrity, and I requested that
I personally be selected as one of the riflemen who would
fire in certain of the tests. I did fire in some of the tests,
and was quite favorably impressed by the performance of
the AR-15s.
I was particularly interested in the AR-15, because it embodied almost precisely the characteristics that G. A. Gustajson
and I had suggested to the Office Chief of Ordnance [1955]..
..the testing done., in 1958 turned out very well for the
AR-15, especially considering its early stage of development.
The results were given in the D&PS report [but] the conclusions and recommendations, which were normally included
in our engineering-test reports, were conspicuously absent...
They were in fact given directly to Dr. Carten's office, but
were omitted from the published report by his direction. Our
conclusion was, in substance, that the AR-15 was an exceptionally promising design, and we found no significant faults
that could not be corrected in the normal course of development...Our recommendation was that development of the
AR-15 proceed, under Army sponsorship.
The Rain-in-the-Bore Issue

During a "supplemental" rain test at Aberdeen, Larry Moore
had reported that the original fluted barrel of an AR-15 had
split when fired with droplets of water in the bore. Dr. Carten
seized upon this as the AR-15's "Achilles' heel", despite the
fact that such barrel failures were not necessarily peculiar to
the AR-15 and were in any event correctable, given a normal
course of engineering development.
In the official record of a developmental process such as
we are discussing, as much damage can be done by not saying
something good as by saying something bad. The story of the
AR-15 and the later M16 certainly has its share of such errors of
omission. As regards the AR-15's barrel splitting due to water
droplets in the bore, one can choose among several official

accounts which differ chiefly in what they left unsaid.
Gene Stoner's own historical notes from this period are
perhaps closest to revealing the truth behind the bluster. As
noted, after the AR-15's barrel failure in the initial Aberdeen
rain test he had made up a new unfluted barrel, slightly heavier
than the original. Aberdeen's tongue-in-cheek conclusion to
him after the supplemental rain test was that "a modified
barrel (2 oz. more) demonstrated a level of safety comparable
to standard rifles". In other words, any rifle barrel light enough
for standard military use would often burst if fired with enough
"water droplets" in the bore.
The Infantry Board's Final SCHV Report

The Infantry Board released its final report after a separate
trial of the Winchester .224E2 in July and a supplemental
trial of the AR-15 in August. During this time the Board's
enthusiastic recommendation that the AR-15 be considered

as a potential replacement for the M14 had been considerably
watered down:
Headquarters
United States Continental Army Command
Fort Monroe, Virginia
September 19, 1958
Report of Project NR 2787,

Evaluation of Small Caliber High Velocity (SCHV) Rifles
[Previous] evaluations were conducted to determine the
potential of a high velocity small caliber rifle to replace the
M14 and M15 rifles. Control for the evaluation consisted
of the M14 rifle using 7.62mm, M59 ball ammunition.
The AR-15 and Winchester rifles were tested with the Winchester .224 round. Remington caliber .222 [Special] was
also fired from the AR-15 in penetration tests.
73 The First AR-15s
Both test weapons were superior to the control weapon in

lightness of weight and ease of handling. The significance of
the weight saving in the rifle/ammunition combination is such
that a soldier with a battle load of 22.39 pounds, including
his weapon and magazines, carries three times as much
ammunition with either SCHV weapon as with the M14
(actually about 650 rounds versus 220 rounds).
The AR-15 was superior to the control weapon and the
Winchester rifle in ease of assembly and disassembly and
reliability under simulated combat conditions.
Both test rifle/ammunition combinations were inferior to
the control rifle. .with regard to penetration and positiondisclosing effects.
92. Bipod mount, affixed to front sight block and not barrel. Note the stud
on top of the ring, intended as a bipod stop.
93. Closeup view of both barrels.

Above: serial no. 000002, caliber .222 Remington Special (.223). Fluted
barrel with no caliber or proof markings. Rifling twist: 1 turn in 12".
In other tests the control and test weapons were about

comparable, except that the sights on the test weapons are
indicated to be inferior to those of the M14 rifle.
Below: serial no. 000003, caliber .222 Remington. Plain barrel, marked with
factory "U" and ". 222" and the Belgian C-in-circle surmounted-by-flaming
bomb (also on chromed bolt carrier), denoting arms proofed in Belgium but
not of Belgian manufacture. Rifling twist: 1 turn in 14".
74
The First AR-15s
Although current testing has pointed up the ArmaLite AR-15

more favorably than the Winchester rifle, both developers
should be given full opportunity to correct the deficiencies
noted in testing and to provide completely modified weapons
for retest as early as possible.
The rain-in-the-bore and "ammunition disintegration/
penetration" deficiencies are major deficiencies.
The deficiency of rain-in-the-bore should be corrected
mechanically, and if possible without resort to a muzzle
protector not a part of the weapon.
This headquarters recommends that:
94. Muzzle ends of the two early barrels. Serial no. 000002 (above) with
experimental flash hider; no. 000003 (below) with improved version flash
hider/grenade launcher.
The AR-15 SCHV rifle failed rain tests at Aberdeen Proving

Ground and at the US Army Infantry Board... The rifle was
badly damaged during supplemental test firing because drops
of water from artificial rain collected in the bore around
and near the cartridge. During the tests at Aberdeen.. it was
revealed that the barrel ruptured during firing when a few
drops of water collected in the bore near the muzzle. The
same results were experienced..in testing the Winchester
rifle. Supplemental rain test of the Winchester by the US
Army Infantry Board was deemed unnecessary in view of
the results determined by Aberdeen...
Pertinent results of evaluation and testing by the US Army

Infantry Board and Aberdeen Proving Ground be released
to the developers of the ArmaLite AR-15 and Winchester
SCHV rifles.
Both developers be encouraged to modify their weapon
to correct all deficiencies enumerated, .and..as a result of
Ordnance testing.
Engineering tests on the modified AR-15 and Winchester
rifles be conducted concurrently with service testing.
..Quantities of [16 each] AR-15 and Winchester rifles..
modified to correct all deficiencies.. be provided at the earliest
possible date to USCONARC for further evaluation and
service test by the US Army Infantry Board and the US Army
Arctic Test Board.
For the Commander
.. Engineering tests conducted at Aberdeen.. indicate that

the rain-in-the-bore deficiency may exist in .25 caliber or
larger weapons. In addition, tests conducted at Aberdeen..
indicate that it is not feasible to correct the deficiency through
partially extracting the cartridge and draining the weapon.
[signed]
William A. Keil
Major, AGC
Asst Adjutant General
The ArmaLite and Winchester rifles have demonstrated

sufficient potential to justify continued development but are
not acceptable for Army use at this time.
The Great OCO 6.35mm "Shell Game"

Meanwhile, from the Office Chief of Ordnance, a gigantic red
herring was drawn across the path of the SCHV proponents:
Dr. Carten announced that the AR-15 should be totally rebuilt
around a new series of .25 caliber (6.35mm) cartridges, "intermediate" between the .223 (5.56mm) and .30 (7.62mm). The
increase in bore size to .258-inch, he said, would be sufficient
to allow water to drain away with less of the "capillary action"
inherent in the smaller-diameter .22-inch bore.
As discussed in The SPIW, Simplex (single bullet) and Duplex

(double-bulleted) versions of both short- and long-cased .258
caliber (6.35mm) cartridges (fig. 68 nos. 5 and 6) were accordingly designed and produced by Frankford Arsenal and Olin's
Winchester/Western Division, and faithfully fired from modified
commercial rifles at several Ordnance test stations in conjunction with ongoing trials of other Project SALVO developmental
bullets and flechettes.
6 The First AR-15s
It appears that the .258 program was indeed conceived and

intended solely to disrupt and thus confound the SCHV camp.
With such a flimsy base in reality it is perhaps not surprising
that the ploy did not work, although it diverted energy and
dollars away from better uses. The .258 cartridge project lasted
about two years before finally revealing itself to be an expensive
evolutionary dead end. Contracts were promised to ArmaLite
for the development of .258 caliber rifles, but never materialized.
Dirty Tricks in the Arctic?

As if to prove the vociferous Mel Johnson right in his constant preoccupation with foul play on the part of the Army,
Gene Stoner soon learned a further lesson in how the Ordnance
Corps took care of its own. He relates the events surrounding
the first Arctic trial of three ArmaLite AR-15s as follows:
I was informed that I would be contacted prior to the Arctic
tests and the same procedure [Stoner allowed to attend to
assist with troop familiarization and weapon repair, as had
been the case at Fort Benning] would be used there. This
was considered to be necessary because no one at the Arctic
Test Board was familiar with the AR-15..
In December [1958] I was contacted at ArmaLite that they
were in need of some spare parts at the Arctic Test Board,
Fort Greely, Alaska. This was the first indication that I had
received of the test having started, and I immediately proceeded to Fort Greely.
Upon arrival I examined the weapons and proceeded to
repair them. My examination showed that the front sights
had been removed from a couple of the weapons and were
loose. (The front sights are retained by taper pins, and there
was never any need for their removal.) One rifle had the
pins driven in from the wrong side and of course was loose,
and the other rifle had ground-down pieces of welding rod
substituted for the missing taper pins. I also found some
other substituted parts that definitely could have caused
malfunctions.
I was informed that the weapons were used in the tests
in the condition that I first saw them. I was also told that
no one familiar with the weapons had given any instruction
on care, firing, etc.
I was given the opportunity to fire one weapon while
dressed in full Arctic clothing. This weapon had been outside
and subjected to low temperature for several days. I fired
400 rounds and had no malfunctions of any kind. I was
impressed by the amount of effort required to handle equipment while in Arctic dress. I was under the impression that
the tests were not concluded and that the problems caused
by the home-made parts would be mentioned and rectified.
At this time I was contacted to proceed to a meeting at
CONARC [headquarters], Fort Monroe, Virginia. Upon
arrival.. I was informed that this meeting was to be conducted
95. Brown molded rubber buttplate (mod. no. 8), the same on both weapons.
No drainage hole in screw.
by [CONARC's Deputy Commanding] General [Herbert B.]

Powell to determine the future policy of shoulder fired
weapons. At this meeting I was asked to give a presentation
on the AR-15 program. During this presentation, General
The .224 Springfield Rifle 7
Powell asked about the Arctic tests. I told him we had some
minor problems, but that they were taken care of.
..months later I found out that the Arctic test report was
read to the Powell Board and [testing] was in fact concluded
when I was at Fort Greely. If I had known this, I surely would

have informed General Powell when I had the opportunity..
The accuracy problems could have been caused by the loose
sights, and the weapon would have performed much better
with the right parts.
Some Background on the Powell Board

The appointment of the Powell Board had been a last
gesture by retiring CONARC Commanding General Wyman,
the man who had initiated the request for the development
of the AR-15 in the first place. Convinced of the AR-15's
merits, he had watched, alarmed, as the O C O relentlessly
harped away at the seriousness of the water-in-the-bore issue
(and, by adroit inference, its uniqueness to rifles of .22
caliber). As CONARC's Deputy Commanding General,
Herbert B. Powell must have concurred in the approval of
the Infantry Board's initial recommendation that the "AR-15

rifle be considered as a potential replacement of the M14 and
M15 rifles". He had since watched as, in a very few months,
not-so-subtle pressures had watered down the Board's statements to the point where both the ArmaLite and Winchester
SCHV rifles were deemed "not acceptable for Army use at
this time". In any event, the Powell Board's initial recommendation was for the purchase of 750 AR-15s for extended
trial.
The Caliber .224 Springfield Infantry Rifle

Meanwhile, as if to prove that Dr. Carten's fears were indeed
well founded, yet a third SCHV rifle and cartridge had been
produced, right under his nose as it were, at Springfield Armory.
The advent of the commercial .222 Remington cartridge
in 1950 had been of particular gratification to Earle Harvey,
the designer of the luckless T25/T47 series of rifles, and his
colleagues at Springfield Armory. An avid shooter and bench
rest enthusiast, Harvey had noted CONARC's burgeoning
interest in the SCHV idea and felt, unofficially, that Springfield's
design group should have a go at it as well.
Harvey had begun the development of the caliber .30 T65
"lightweight" cartridge, in 1944, by cutting a second seating
cannelure in a standard M2 ball bullet and loading it into a
commercial .300 Savage case, to an overall length of 2.8". Now,
a dozen years later, examination of the "too little" of the
Gustafson .22 Carbine and the "too much" of the ".22 NATO"
T48 led Harvey, as had Gene Stoner, to choose the commercial
.222 Remington round as an admirable starting point for an
SCHV cartridge with a 500-yard capability. In Harvey's own
words, "From information on cartridge case design and propellant combustion, I decided to retain the .222 case diameter
at the front of the case body; the shoulder angle of the .222;
to increase the propellant charge; and to increase the bullet
weight to 55 grains."
With muzzle velocity and chamber pressure limits tentatively
set, case drawings were produced for the new cartridge, and
an order given to Remington in 1957 to fabricate an initial
96. Remington's Research Associate S. C. Toulson kindly provides some early

background on the firm's initial involvement in the SCHV cartridge project.
The .224 Springfield Rifle
quantity of 10,000 rounds. As it turned out, only this one

unheadstamped lot of ".224 Springfield" cartridges was ever
produced. Remington reports that after development of a suitable primer, they loaded 9,500 of the new cases with a 55-grain
full metal jacket bullet obtained from Sierra, the same firm
making the initial lot of 3-piece, 55-grain .222 Special bullets

to Gene Stoner's design. Interestingly, the remaining 500 .224
Springfield cases were loaded with Aberdeen's 68-grain, .224
caliber "homologue" of the .30 Ml ball, and were used in
further SCHV lethality test firings by Donald L. Hall at BRL.
97. The short-lived "Caliber .224 Springfield Infantry Rifle" serial no. 1,
top and right side views. Designed by A. J. Lizza.
Speaking of evolutionary dead ends, the .224 Springfield

rifle itself is interesting, if only in that it sprang from a much
higher aspiration than did Dr. Carten's 6.35mm cartridge program. As an unofficial "labor of love" on the part of Albert J.
"Tony" Lizza and his associates on the Armory's rifle design
team, the .224 Springfield project was a perfect chance to correct
all the faults perceived after countless thousands of test-firings
of both the T25 and T44 series of rifles. Before the preliminary
layout of the .224 rifle was begun, Lizza and his team had decided
on a "rotating, front-locking breech bolt in a bolt carrier;
assembly and disassembly through the rear half of the top of
the receiver; double column box magazine; hammer fire
control [a Remington idea, originated in the 1944 T22 rifle
program and discussed in US Rifle M14] with selective semiand full automatic, and a controlled burst capability of four shots
per trigger pull; gas cutoff and expansion system of actuation."
audacious but unsettlingly effective "end run" around normal

Ordnance procurement procedure. He was aghast at the idea
of Springfield Armory, an Ordnance Corps agency, entering
and thus encouraging the .22 rifle competition. Accordingly,
shortly after the initial prototype was completed in mid-1957,
the Armory received firm instructions to terminate its .224 rifle
project and refrain from any further SCHV development work.
Earle Harvey later recalled taking one of the two Springfield

.224 rifles ever built to a SALVO meeting at the Pentagon,
where the off-the-cuff opinion of most of the assembled representatives of the OCO, BRL and Frankford Arsenal was that the
design showed promise and warranted further development.
Of further interest is the fact that the .224 Springfield cartridge did not die out with the rifle. Remington, noting that
no further activity was forthcoming from the Armory on the
.224 project, approached Harvey and asked whether he thought
the Army would have any objection to their loading the round
commercially. The Army could hardly protest after having disowned the program, and Harvey's .224 Springfield cartridge
was produced and marketed successfully for many years as
the ".222 Remington Magnum".
By this time, however, Dr. Carten was already aware of

General Wyman's direct and informal "arrangement" with
ArmaLite, which the good doctor correctly interpreted as an
Regarding the actual performance of the .224 Springfield

rifle, therefore, not much is known. Harvey was able to confirm
that the cartridge as loaded by Remington did in fact have
the desired accuracy, lethality and trajectory characteristics.
Officially, a brief note appended to a 1960 Army Arctic Test
Board report of flechette and 6.35mm Simplex and Duplex
firings is all that remains of a "Cal. .22 (Springfield Armory
design)". All it says is "data not available".
77
The .224 Springfield Rifle 78
98. The .224 Springfield Infantry Rifle disassembled. From the front, note
the M14-type gas cutoff and expansion system, the T25-style operating rod
handle with two bolt carrier contact points (for reduced jarring and vibration),
and Mr. Uzza's "stock and action clamp" trigger guard, the subject of US
Patent no. 2,912,781, described as "a jaw member pivotally mounted to the
trigger housing [and] a trigger guard pivotally mounted to said jaw member
for movement between a closed position encircling the trigger and an open
winter trigger position".
99. Bolt group closeup, from the Springfield Armory .224 caliber Infantry
Rifle. The long, flat action pin is smoothly actuated from both sides by the
double-ended operating rod (fig. 98).

The proliferation of names for the new .222 offshoots
was causing some confusion, particularly between the .222
"Special" and the .222 "Magnum". Therefore, in 1959,
Remington announced that henceforth Stoner's ".222

Special" cartridge would be known as the ".223
Remington".
The Powell Board's Reversal

- the Final Straw for Fairchild
Certainly, as Stoner related, the somewhat questionable
results of the AR-15 Arctic trials may have figured in the Powell
Board's deliberations, but not as much as did the sharp O C O
denouncement of the Board's initially recommended trialsquantities AR-15 purchase as a direct violation of the hardwon 7.62mm NATO cartridge standardization agreement.
Indeed, after perusing, not to say emasculating, the test reports
from the Infantry Board and the D&PS, Dr. Carten announced
his official conclusion that the AR-15 had not demonstrated
sufficient technical merit to support continued consideration
for development by the Army.
By February 1959 it was all over. General Maxwell Taylor,

Chief of Staff of the Army, upheld the Powell Board's final
recommendation that "only the M14 is suitable for Army use".
The aforementioned .258 program was solemnly grafted onto
Project SALVO. Even Winchester, whose .224E2 Light Weight
Military Rifle had been the also-ran in a race that Dr. Carten
now fervently hoped had run its course, was consoled with the
first-ever, 35,000-rifle civilian M14 production contract. Only
Fairchild was left out in the cold completely: as mentioned, the
promised contracts for .258 caliber ArmaLite rifles never
materialized, and General Taylor firmly vetoed any further
Army purchases of .223 caliber AR-15s.
The OCO's Crucial Mistake

Dr. Carten's decision to continue with the M14 procurement
program was logistically sound and, indeed, his only viable
option: having forced NATO to accept the 7.62mm cartridge,
the US could hardly abandon the procurement of a rifle in the
NATO standard caliber. Unfortunately, while the "end" of M14
production was attained, at least temporarily, the
long-term results of the "means", basically two-fold, were
disastrous.
First, as we shall see, when the Secretary of Defense ultimately did show an interest in the AR-15 as a "fully-developed
weapon system" in 1963, no significant engineering development work had been done since 1958. The program's subsequent
litany of ills begins with this one simple fact. Secondly, even
in 1958 it was demonstrably untrue that the AR-15 was devoid
of technical merit, and in so stating Dr. Carten had disregarded
the conclusions and recommendations of his own experts. This
undermined the credibility of the Army's technical services,
polarizing and demoralizing the Ordnance technical community. In the process, ironically, Dr. Carten's own authority was
weakened, thereby contributing to the demise of the Office
Chief of Ordnance itself in 1962.
100. Bobby Macdonald's "old number 4", which he and Gene Stoner took
around the world in the spring of1959. Macdonald later described this ArmaLite rifle to the Ichord subcommittee as "..the finest, most foolproof weapon
I have ever seen in my life". Note the muzzle brake (like no. 000002, fig. 94) ;
the different slip ring arrangement; the type 2 selector lever markings (SAFE
forward), and the bipod.
US Army Infantry Board photo
dated May 27, 1958, courtesy Lee Rutledge
Chapter Four
A MID-STREAM CHANGE OF HORSES

Fairchild's president Richard Boutelle often argued with
the firm's directors on the issue of getting into the gun business
per se, to no avail. Indeed, back in the summer of 1958 with
hopes for AR-10 sales efforts abroad still high and the Army's
enthusiasm for the AR-15 as yet undampened by water-inthe-bore, Boutelle had made an impassioned plea to turn the
ArmaLite plant in California into a real assembly line, to
manufacture the AR-10 and AR-15 themselves. The directors
had again refused to finance such a venture.
As noted earlier, the Baltimore-based firm of CooperMacdonald Inc. represented the Dutch-made AR-10 in Asia.
In fact, Robert W. "Bobby" Macdonald was something of
a specialist in Southeast Asia, having lived and worked there
for a number of years. In addition to the AR-10, CooperMacdonald had since 1948 represented Colt handguns and
later Remington rifles, ammunition and shotguns in that part
of the world.
Meanwhile, Fairchild's aircraft business was in serious financial difficulty, and the parent firm was increasingly unable to
support the significant investment which the AR-15 program
required. Mr. Boutelle accordingly gave Cooper-Macdonald
the added task of finding, for a fee, someone to take on the
job of tooling up and making the AR-15 under license. Bobby
Macdonald naturally mentioned the matter to his friend Fred
Roff, then sales director and later president of Colt's Patent
Fire Arms Manufacturing Co. of Hartford, Connecticut. Roff
Cooper-Macdonald was instrumental in bringing about
agreements between Fairchild Engine and Airplane
Corporation (now known as Fairchild Stratos Corporation) and Fairchild Arms International, Limited pursuant
to which agreements, as thereafter modified and supplemented, Colt received the exclusive license to manufacture
and sell a lightweight automatic rifle sometimes known
as the ArmaLite AR-15 and any variation thereof which
incorporates the ArmaLite gas system as defined and
A further broader definition of "ArmaLite military weapons"
was later agreed upon, as meaning "the ArmaLite AR-10 and
the ArmaLite AR-15 and any variations (e.g., bipod, tripod,
heavy barrel, light machine gun, etc.) thereof incorporating
the ArmaLite gas system.."
was interested, but like most of the other traditional New England
gunmakers, Colt's was facing ever-heavier financial losses in
the dried-up civilian and military markets of the post-Korean
war period. An initial, 20-year "letter of understanding"
between Colt's and Cooper-Macdonald was put on paper as
early as September 22, 1958 regarding "the ArmaLite matter",
but it was some months before any actual money could be
put together.
As Fairchild's need to salvage some of its ArmaLite investment grew keener, Colt's veered ever closer to actual bankruptcy.
The sobering fact was that the manufacturing plant had not
been updated in virtually a century. The firm was at length
purchased by a New York financier for merely the value of
the inventory of firearms already manufactured but still
unassembled.
Ironically, the fined signing of the arrangement between
Colt's new directors and the newly-formed Fairchild Stratos
Corporation coincided almost to the day with General Taylor's
formal veto of further .22 caliber rifle purchases by the Army.
Interestingly, Colt's paid Fairchild Stratos a lump sum of only
$75,000 plus a royalty of 4 1/2% on all future production for
the rights to the AR-15, while for its good offices in putting
the deal together Colt's paid Cooper-Macdonald $250,000 plus
a royalty of 1% on future production. Salient portions of the
Colt/Cooper-Macdonald arrangement, as later read into the
record of the Ichord subcommittee hearings, are as follows:
elaborated by US Patent no. 2,951,424, issued on
September 6, 1960, entitled "Gas-Operated Bolt and
Carrier System".
Colt authorized Cooper-Macdonald to promote the use of
the foregoing weapon as standard equipment for the US
Armed Forces and also to promote [its] sale to foreign
governments and other users, both public and private, within
and without the continental limits of the United States.
The letter which accompanied Colt's first $5,000 "advance"
to Cooper-Macdonald, dated February 19, 1959, ended:
"..Receipt of this check will permit you to immediately take
off for the Far East to start securing the necessary orders to
permit our starting production."
82
Catch .22
In his testimony before the Ichord subcommittee, Bobby

Macdonald later related the events surrounding his introduction
to the AR-15 as follows:
..In the process of getting started to sell the AR-10,
[Fairchild] developed the AR-15. It seems to me that General
Wyman, who was head of CONARC at that time, liked the
idea of the small caliber, high velocity rifle, and. .the ArmaLite division of Fairchild scaled down the AR-10 to fit the
5.56, or .223 as that was originally called.
Mr. Boutelle, at that time president of Fairchild, asked me
to come up to Hagerstown to see the rifle. I went up there
and fell in love with it. So he was about to take off to go to
[Fort] Benning with Stoner for the original Army tests of
the rifle when I decided that the smart thing to do would be
to take both rifles, the bigger caliber and the smaller caliber,
and take it around the world, and shoot it under all kinds
of conditions.
I was especially interested in a rifle for the Southeast Asian
people, one that was light enough for them to carry.
So [in the spring of 1959 Gene Stoner and] I went out
there, and we shot [AR-15 serial no. 000004] in the Philippines, Malaya, Indonesia, Thailand, Burma, India, at that
time, and then Italy... the more I shot it, the better I liked it.
And it seems to be that is the way most everybody in those
days felt about the rifle. The fact of the matter was that having
both calibers, I ended up by giving away 6,000 rounds of
7.62 in the Philippines, because nobody wanted to shoot
[AR-10]. Everybody wanted to shoot the AR-15. So I didn't see
any point in carrying [the 7.62mm ammunition] any further.
But to my knowledge, we fired around 8,000 rounds through
that one rifle in the course of getting to India, and that means
all the Malayans, everybody had a shot with it under all
sorts of conditions. And as I recall, we had exactly one
malfunction, and that was easily traceable to a lip on the
magazine which somebody had bent.
But it was the finest, most foolproof weapon I have ever
seen in my life.
. .Well, when I got back to Singapore I cabled Colt who
had already spent $100,000 tooling up for the AR-10. I cabled
them to stop it and go to full out on the AR-15, because it
was obvious that what everybody else had always thought
about this [7.62mm] NATO round - it was not as good; it
just proved itself with these little people. [Colt's] followed
that advice.
Catch-22
101. Left side view of Colt's .223 caliber "ArmaLite AR-15 Model 01" (Colt
internal model no. 601, the first of the multivarious "600" series), serial
no. 000112. Note the mottled brown "fibrite" furniture and the early steel
"waffle" 20-round magazine (appendix).
Bob Miller collection
photo by Roy Arnold
Colt's completed its first-ever run of 300 "model 01" AR-15

rifles, serial nos. 000101 to 000400, in December of 1959.
Already Bobby Macdonald was doing his part: in his later
Ichord testimony he reported that "..the first [Colt AR-15] rifles
that were ever sold were sold to Malaya, 25 rifles, and they were
shipped under State Department export license 3404 dated
September 30, 1959. The second [23 rifles] went to India under
export license 5893, dated December 15, 1959."
Catch .22
102. Front three-quarter view of an early Colt model 01 serial no. 000145,
showing early prototype bayonet (appendix), bipod, and clip-on grenade
launching sight.
INSET: closeup of the Colt-ArmaLite clip-on grenade launching sight, Colt
part no. 62214.
Further relatively small orders, again usually just enough

rifles to run a meaningful test with a squad of men, were forthcoming from Australia, Burma, and later the Singapore police.
But soon a gigantic paradox became apparent. For many of
the small-statured peoples in Southeast Asia the AR-15 was,
as Bobby Macdonald had anticipated, particularly suited in
almost every way. Indeed, at each and every demonstration
the reaction was invariably and unabashedly favorable. Yet
at least four would-be foreign purchasers, such as the
government of the Philippines, had signed a military assistance
pact with the United States government. This meant that, in
order to qualify for US mutual aid funding, the arms
"purchased" had to be standard US military hardware: M1s,
. .So I got back here and found that nobody had accomplished much, and I made a deal with both Fairchild and Colt
that if they would get out of the way and turn over the whole
business to me, I would make a great effort to try to get
BARs, .45s, Carbines, and so on. The AR-15 was decidedly

not on the shopping list.
Back home in Hartford, the double irony of the situation
was quickly absorbed. With the future quite literally at stake,
Colt's elicited the aid of both Fairchild, who had a direct royalty
interest in future AR-15 production, and Cooper-Macdonald,
no longer limited to a specified territory as they had been with
the AR-10, in a desperate attempt to somehow get the AR-15
into the US military system.
In further testimony before the Ichord subcommittee, Bobby
Macdonald summed up the events which followed his return
from the "world tour" with ArmaLite's AR-15 serial no. 4:
the rifle tested here and adopted by the US government, not
so much to replace the M14, although it was capable of doing
so, but to supply our small-statured allies with this type of
rifle which has very little recoil, as you know.
83
84
The Early Colt AR-15
85 The Early Colt AR-15
103. Skeleton drawings of the AR-15 model 01, from the original Colt manual
entitled "Instructions for the Operation of the Colt ArmaLite AR-15 Automatic
Rifle, Caliber . 223". Courtesy Robert E. Roy
86
The Early Colt AR-15
104. List of Parts, Accessories and Armorer's inspection and repair kit, from
the first Colt manual. The Army soon found that Colt's considered all of these
to be proprietary items which had to be purchased from Colt's.
87 The Early Colt AR-15
The Air Force's End Run Around the Army

As mentioned, a major justification for the Ordnance Corps'
M14 Light Rifle program was that the one new weapon and the
7.62mm NATO round were supposed to replace four weapons
and three different cartridges of the previous small arms
"family"; the Ml rifle, M2 Carbine, M3A1 submachine gun
and the BAR. While the US Air Force had ceased to be an
Army element after World War II, small arms for Air Force
ground personnel were still acquired through Army supply
channels. The Air Force had been offered the M14, but had
pronounced it overly heavy and bulky. Accordingly, SAC-base
security forces around the world were still armed with M2
Carbines, for which, ironically, the Army was no longer stocking

spare parts.
..on the fourth of July [1960], which happened to be

Boutelle's birthday, and every year he had quite a party.
So LeMay was a friend of Boutelle's, and I suggested that

we get together and he have a chance to shoot the rifle as
it was presently manufactured. This is when Colt, .and we
went up there, and I took along three watermelons, and I

put [one] out at 50 yards, and the other at about 150 yards,
and he shot both of them, and as you probably know, the
explosive feature of the bullet takes all the water out of the
watermelon. So he walked up to both of them and put his
hand down in there and picked this stuff up, and I won't
say what he said, but it was quite impressive - he was
impressed. So I asked him "Do you want to shoot the other
one?" He said, "Hell no, let's eat it." So that's the way
we did [it].
The upshot of the demonstration at Boutelle's Maryland

farm was General LeMay's offer to recommend the AR-15
as a potential replacement for the Air Force's ageing M2
Carbines. Macdonald quickly sent LeMay three new Colt
model 01s, which were soon on their way to the Air Force's
main training base at Lackland AFB in Texas, for initial
familiarization.
Sadly, however, for some who gave indispensable service to the

cause of the AR-15, there was no reward. As Bobby Macdonald
later related, "..In the meantime, Colt was taken over by
another group of financiers, and in the course of it they fired all
the people that I had been doing business with...Fairchild also
went through a change in management several times. Based
on this rifle, and the F-27 airplane, Mr. Boutelle got fired.."
His farm was all set up outside Hagerstown, with a sheet

field, trap field, archery, pistol ranges, you name it. It was
beautifully equipped from a shooting angle.
The friendship between Fairchild president Richard Boutelle

and Air Force General Curtis LeMay has already been mentioned in connection with the adoption of the MA-1 survival
rifle. Bobby Macdonald later described to the Ichord subcommittee how, armed with a new business arrangement with
both Colt and ArmaLite, he had written to General LeMay,
by this time the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Air Force, inviting
him to a demonstration of the AR-15:
Colt's First Manual

- the "Basic Infantry Weapon, AR-15"
Looking ahead determinedly to the eventual return of
military interest in the AR-15, Colt's prepared and published a manual "for the information and guidance of
ordnance personnel whose duties involve the use, maintenance and repair of the caliber .223 Basic Infantry
Weapon, AR-15". The Colt manual went on to make some

most enthusiastic claims for the AR-15, "the most modern light
weight combat rifle combining the accuracy of a sniper rifle
with the firepower of a machine gun.." as a virtually maintenance-free weapon:
Disassembly, assembly, cleaning and minor repairs may

be undertaken by anybody.. .An occasional simple cleaning
will keep the weapon functioning, indefinitely. Working parts
can be cleaned by wiping with a cloth. The simplicity of
field cleaning makes it possible to quickly and easily train
a recruit in minimum time.
and maintenance of the Colt AR-15 to an absolute minimum.

Firing of the Colt AR-15 with complete absence of lubricants
in a chemically cleaned condition has in every country where
this test has taken place resulted in a performance far
exceeding any requirements.
. .Corrosion resistant materials facilitate the assembly

and interchangeability of parts and reduce the service
The Colt AR-15 rifle will fire longer without cleaning or

oiling than arty other known rifle.
Explaining the Action of the AR-15
105. A diagram of the AR-15, loaded and ready to fire with selector lever set
to SEMI. Hammer notch engaged with trigger sear.
106. As the trigger is pulled, the hammer is released and rotates forward,
striking the firing pin and firing the chambered cartridge. As the bullet passes
the gas port, gas is routed through the gas tube ana bolt carrier Key, and
into the cylinder formed between the bolt and bolt carrier.
20 The Action of the AR-15
107. Gas pressure in the cylinder drives the bolt carrier to the rear. As this
happens, the bolt cam pin rotates the bolt and disengages the bolt lugs from
the lugs in the barrel extension. The hammer is returned to the cocked position,
and the action spring is compressed. As the bolt and carrier move rearward,
the extractor withdraws the spent cartridge case from the chamber, and the
ejector throws it out the ejection port.
108. The rearward motion of the bolt carrier is arrested by the buffer assembly
in the action spring guide. The compressed action spring then forces the bolt
carrier forward. The face of the bolt picks up the top cartridge from the
magazine, and thrusts it into the chamber.
20 The Action of the AR-15

109. As the bolt lugs enter the barrel extension, the ejector is depressed against
the cartridge case, and the extractor snaps into the extracting groove. During
the final half-inch of the closing stroke, the bolt cam pin moves out of the
receiver guide and rotates the bolt to the locked position. The upper hammer
notch is held by the hook of the disconnect. When the trigger is released,
the trigger spring causes the trigger to return to its normal position, carrying
the disconnect backward, releasing the hammer, which drops from the disconnect to the cocked position on the trigger sear.
DISCONNECT
SPRING
TRIGGER
SPRING
110. Rotating the change lever to AUTO changes the Junction of two key parts.
On the forward or counter-recoil stroke, the automatic sear engages the top
outside hammer notch, holding the hammer in a cocked position. The bolt
carrier, in closing, strikes the upper edge of the automatic sear, rotating it
and releasing the hammer to fire the next round. This cycle will repeat until
the trigger is released or the magazine is empty.
AUTOMATIC
SEAR
Examining the AR-15
111. From Colt's first run of AR-15s: pointing out the "recoil spring guide
on Model 01 serial no. 000300.
A Forced Examination of the Colt AR-15

Meanwhile, in the summer of 1960 just before the famous
4th of July watermelon shoot, Colt's had formally approached
Ordnance R&D with a request for a re-test of the AR-15 they
now designated the model 01. A number of small but significant
improvements had been made in the course of their tooling
up for manufacture, they said, which warranted a further look
on the part of the Army.
Of course, neither Colt's nor ArmaLite possessed anything
like the vast pool of engineering development expertise and
resources which were available at the various Ordnance stations.
Thus, despite the enthusiasm of their first manual, a good part
of Colt's motive was to avail themselves of an otherwise prohibitively expensive full-scale Ordnance engineering evaluation
of their "Basic Infantry Weapon" before they got locked in
to real quantity production.
To their dismay, Colt's soon received a wire back from
Dr. Carten refusing their request, citing as a reason the
lack of any military requirement for such an arm. He was

soon forced to eat his words, however, for a request arrived
at the Pentagon from Lackland Air Force Base, asking
Ordnance to qualify the AR-15 as a potential candidate for
replacement of the Air Force's obsolescent M2 Carbines.
This coincided with a sympathetic ear being given, at the
Congressional level, to the plight of the Colt/ArmaLite camp
and their "unsaleable" products: suddenly some highly
placed people wanted to know about the Ordnance Corps'
boycott of ArmaLite weapons.
A chagrined Dr. Carten was directed to arrange the Air
Force test without delay, to be run at Aberdeen concurrently
with tests on six samples of the AR-10 rifle as made under
license in Holland by Artillerie-Inrichtingen. In fact, it
appears that the whole event had already been adroitly
turned into some first-rate exposure for the AR-15, with the
Ordnance Corps footing the bill:
91
Examining the AR-15 92
112. Retracting the bolt on Colt's AR-15 serial no. 000300. Note the "R" and
clockwise arrow markings on the early Colt rear sight elevation knob.
1960 SEP 12
UNCLAS ORD 10508 FOR D&PS COL DUBIA FROM ORDTS CARTEN
..AR-15 CALIBER .223 RIFLES AND AMMUNITION
WILL BE SUBMITTED TO YOUR STATION IN THE
IMMEDIATE FUTURE BY COOPER-MACDONALD, INC.
REQUEST FINAL ENGINEERING TEST OF THIS WEAPON
BE CONDUCTED DURING THE SAME PERIOD THAT
SIMILAR TESTS ARE BEING CONDUCTED ON THE
AR-10 7.62MM RIFLE. REQUEST AMMUNITION PERFORMANCE TRIALS PREVIOUSLY CONDUCTED WITH
THE AR-15 RIFLES ALSO BE INCLUDED.
REQUEST YOUR STATION MAKE AVAILABLE TO THE

COMPANY FACILITIES FOR DEMONSTRATION OF AR-15
RIFLES TO INTERESTED MILITARY PERSONNEL. DATE
FOR THIS DEMONSTRATION IS TENTATIVELY SET FOR
26 SEPTEMBER 1960. GENERAL LEMAY, DCS, USAF,
AND LT GEN TRUDEAU, CRD, ARE EXPECTED TO
ATTEND, ALONG WITH OTHER REPRESENTATIVES OF
AIR FORCE AND ARMY
Examining the AR-15
113. Comparison of trigger mechanisms. Above: an early ("Cuba/Sudan")

Dutch-made AR-10. Below: Colt model 01 AR-15. Photo courtesy Jean Huon
93
94
Examining the AR-15
114. Colt model 01 AR-15 barrel, gas tube and handguard assemblies.
As noted in chapter 3, the final versions of two other Aberdeen engineering test reports by Larry Moore, one being No.
DPS 101 A Test of Rifle, AR-10 of November 1960 and the other
as discussed below, contain no recommendations or conclusions.
Certainly from Dr. Carten's viewpoint, none were required,
in the absence of any formal Army interest in either arm: he
was simply giving Cooper-Macdonald and the Colt/ArmaLite
people as little encouragement as possible, while providing the

Air Force with a record of tests conducted and leaving any
conclusions up to the trials team at Lackland.
Some of Larry Moore's interesting comments regarding the
three Colt model 01 AR-15s he tested, serial numbers 000614,
000682 and 000835, are reprinted below:

Development and Proof Services
No. DPS 96
A Test of Rifle, Caliber .223, AR-15

November, 1960
Introduction
The AR-15 rifle was previously tested at this station
between 20 March and 21 November 1958. The results of
that test are contained in [the fifty-seventh report on
Ordnance Project TS2-2015; chapter 3]. The rifle tested
previously was an experimental model produced in a limited

quantity. The rifle submitted for this test was mass produced
and it incorporated various minor design changes from the
experimental rifle..
Examining the AR-15
95
115. Closeup of receiver markings of Colt AR-15 serial no. 000614, used in
the Aberdeen "Test of Rifle, Caliber .223, AR-15" September, 1960.
Photo credit: Eric Long, Smithsonian Institution
Abstract
Three rifles were subjected to the light automatic rifle test
and two rifles were subjected to additional accuracy tests.
A total of 24,443 rounds were fired. The AR-15 rifle, which
has a weight of 6.92 pounds when fully loaded and an overall
length of 38.8 inches, fires Cartridge, caliber .223. The average
velocity of the 55-grain bullet at 78 feet was 3,104 fps. In
the 100-yard bench-rest accuracy test the average mean
radius for 10-round targets was 1.5 inches. The average
number of rounds fired semi-automatically in one minute
in the rate-of-aimed-fire test was 84.2 and the average number
of hits obtained on the "E" target at a range of 100 yards
was 77.8 During automatic firing in this test, the average
number of rounds fired was 128 7, and the average number
of hits was 41.3. The average malfunction rate with the rifle
Even in the absence of conclusions and recommendations
it appears from the above that the performance of the 1960
Colt AR-15s, especially in the scoped-accuracy and adverse
condition tests, was little short of phenomenal. Indeed, a
perusal of other standard light rifle tests, such as are to be
found in previous Collector Grade books, will show the above
held normally was 0.25 per hundred rounds. Only ten parts
were broken in firing 18,000 rounds in the endurance test.
One of these parts, an extractor spring, was broken during
disassembly of the extractor. The AR-15 rifle gave nearnormal performance in the unlubricated, dust, extreme-cold
and rain tests, and it completed the mud test. [A modified
rain test was also conducted, wherein the bolt was retracted
slightly with the muzzle held down to facilitate drainage,
before firing]. A cook-off occurred after firing 140 rounds
in 54 seconds, but no cook-off occurred in firing 120 rounds
in 39 seconds. When fired with a telescopic sight from a
bench rest at 100 yards two rifles gave an average mean
radius of 1.1 inches for four 10-shot groups from each rifle
with each of two lots of ammunition.
results superior to most if not all the developmental weapons
of the period, including the Ml and T44E4 "control" rifles.
However, even though Dr. Carten's report to the Chief of R&D
grudgingly summed up the AR-15 as only "reasonably satisfactory", the AR-15 was approved for Air Force trial as
requested.
116. Fig. 9 from Aberdeen's 1960 trial: disassembled view of Colt AR-15 serial
no. 000614.
Aberdeen Proving Ground photo, courtesy James Alley
The Air Force Attempts to Buy the AR-15

There followed a series of USAF firing tests at Lackland,
wherein the AR-15 was shot in comparison with the M2 Carbine
and the M14. Gene Stoner himself proudly recorded that 43% of
the firers qualified as expert with the AR-15 as opposed to only
22% with the M14. This favorable experience, coupled with the
results from Aberdeen, convinced General LeMay that the
AR-15 was indeed the rifle the Air Force was looking for. Accordingly, he requested authority to buy a cumulative total of 80,000
rifles, to be obtained over the period of several years, during
which time the M2 Carbines would be phased out. As it turned
out, this was the beginning of a very happy relationship between
the Air Force and the AR-15, but it took General LeMay three
determined tries to get his purchase request approved.
In the summer of 1961 Deputy Defense Secretary Roswell

Gilpatrick proposed to include 8,500 Colt AR-15 rifles as
part of the Air Force's slice of that year's fiscal "pie",
subject to Congressional approval, but the watchdog subcommittee on D O D appropriations was not convinced that
the Air Force's need was sufficiently pressing to justify another
rifle in the system, and the request was denied. General LeMay
next brought the matter up in a meeting with President
Kennedy that December, after the President had first seen an
AR-15 at a Sea Power demonstration during the fall, but again
with no success.
Meanwhile, "optimum platoon" trials by the Combat

Development Experimentation Center (CDEC) were in progress
at the Hunter-Liggett military reservation, Fort Ord, California.
Early CDEC findings, published after trials with the first
bipod-equipped, ArmaLite-made AR-15s in 1959, had indicated
that a 5- to 7-man squad armed with a light weight, high
velocity rifle like the AR-15 would have a greater hit and kill
potential than eleven men equipped with the M14.
As we shall see, by the time General LeMay's purchase

was finally approved in May of 1962 events in Southeast
Asia had heated up to the point where the original 8,500
Air Force AR-15s formed much the smaller part of a
"package" including over 20,000 rifles for Navy SEAL
teams, some special South Vietnamese Army units and their
US advisors.
Rifle by Colt - Barrel by Winchester

A key figure in the development of the AR-15 at Colt's was
Robert E. Roy, who today is the firm's director of military sales.
Rob Roy recalls that his first job after joining the firm in 1961
was to devise and supervise the installation of .22 caliber barrel
rifling machinery, as prior to that time Colt's had not possessed
the capability to produce rifle-length barrels. In fact, the first

18,000 AR-15 barrels were subcontracted to Winchester, where
they were broach-rifled with a 14" rifling twist. Colt's subsequent barrels were button-rifled, a superior rifling process
which produced more uniform lands and grooves.
99 First Blood
Chapter Five
FIRST BLOOD
When President Kennedy turned down the Air Force's
second AR-15 request in December 1959, the people at Colt's,
by then part of the Fairbanks Whitney conglomerate, were in
dire straits indeed. They had gambled virtually everything on
the AR-15 and, with seemingly every avenue to mass-market
sales at home or abroad effectively blocked, the Firearms
Division was just barely hanging on by the fingernails.
numerous questions concerning the conduct, or worse, the

validity, of the turbulent M14 rifle procurement program. As in
1940, when the Senate appropriations subcommittee had refused
Melvin Johnson's last impassioned appeal in the face of the
100 M1s rolling daily out of Springfield Armory, 1961 seemed
just too far down the road with the M14 to allow the consideration of any other course of action.
Doing everything possible to expose the Ordnance clampdown on the AR-15, Bobby Macdonald kept up a flurry of
letters to well-placed Congressmen and even the Secretary of
Defense himself. By this time, however, the trouble was that
any official cognizance of the AR-15 would automatically beg
At length, the stalemate was broken by the hand of fate.

Amid an escalating atmosphere of US armed forces' "advisor"
activity in support of the Army of the Republic of South
Vietnam (ARVN), in Bobby Macdonald's words: "..Finally
we got the ARPA order, December 27, 1961, for 1,000 rifles."
OSD, ARPA and Project AGILE

Among other changes of a generally intellectual nature
ushered in by President Kennedy came fateful new dimensions
of power for the civilian Office of the Secretary of Defense
(OSD). To head this office Kennedy appointed Robert Strange
McNamara, a retired Army Air Force Lieutenant-Colonel
who had been a special consultant to the War Department
during World War II. More recently he had gained visibility
as a senior executive, then president, and finally a director
of the Ford Motor Co. The time, coincidentally, was the very
dawning of the computer age. Secretary McNamara, himself
no stranger to this powerful new analytical "tool", soon sur-
rounded himself with an eager young team of Ph.D. systems

analysts, all implicit believers in the computer's unprecedented
forecasting abilities.
Secretary McNamara had come to power in 1961, and

as is customary, had filled the appointive offices such
as undersecretaries, deputy undersecretaries etc., with
people of his own choosing, who held views entirely in
consonance with his own. Not stopping there, however, he
had greatly expanded the headquarters organizations at
the OSD level, creating many new high-level positions, to
be filled ostensibly with career military and civil servants,
but in fact, .filled mostly by newcomers to the defense
establishment, fresh from Mr. McNamara's previous academic and intellectual environs.. such as the "think tank"
Rand Corporation..
rebuild within the hollow shell a system more in conformity

with his own ideas of management..
McNamara's remedy was not simply to correct the faults

that he perceived in the traditional defense institutions as
he found them, but to destroy the infrastructure itself and
Bill Davis, late of Aberdeen's D&PS, records that he left

Aberdeen in 1959 to take up new duties as the Superintendent
of Frankford Arsenal's newly designated North American
Regional Test Center for NATO small arms ammunition, sited
at Fort Dix, New Jersey. He records the impact, as he saw it,
of Robert McNamara's ascendancy to power as the Secretary
of Defense:
McNamara's contempt for the Ordnance professionals

was undisguised at the less sophisticated lower levels outside
Washington, and its impact was soon felt, as the influence
of his emissaries spread to the technical installations such
as Springfield Armory, Frankford Arsenal and Rock Island.
[These people] had no previous professional experience in
the field of small arms, though some apparently had a bit
of the hobbyist's fascination with the technical aspects of
guns and ammunition. Their qualifications consisted of, and
apparently were limited to, advanced academic degrees,
supreme confidence in their own intellectual superiority,
virtually absolute authority as designated representatives
of OSD, and a degree of arrogance such as I have never
seen before or since.
100
First Blood
118. Left side view of two Delft Optics AR-10-type 3x25-power telescopes (fig.
58) adapted as the "TTL-80" the first AR-15 scope sight. Note the different
types of finish; serial no. 312 (above, dull); and serial no. 141 (below, bright
anodized) in early Colt-made mount (part no. 62215).
Defense policy during the Eisenhower administration had

been based on the rather black-and-white theory of "massive
retaliation", wherein the infantry soldier's future role had been
reduced to one of merely "mopping up" after a nuclear clash.
However, the resulting buildup of atomic bombs made both
East and West increasingly reluctant to test each other's awesome capabilities in an all-out war. The Kennedy team therefore
inherited a world wherein a struggle for world domination
continued, somewhat less cataclysmically but still unabated,
under the nuclear "umbrella". Guerrilla (literally "little war")
and counterinsurgency operations, and the specialized arsenal
of conventional small arms they required, were definitely on
the new list of priorities.
The Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) had been
formed within the Defense Department in 1958, with a
remarkably free-handed mandate to devise and direct "longrange, basic research" for a defense research and engineering
unit, primarily in the ballistic missile arena. ARPA got a new
lease on life and an expansion of mission with the Kennedy
administration's interest in improving US ability to support a
foreign ally in a "limited" war. In the spring of 1961 ARPA's
Project AGILE was approved, to supply ''research and engineering support for the military and paramilitary forces engaged
in or threatened by conflict in remote areas of the world".
ARPA managers proceeded to establish and staff two Combat
Development Test Centers in troubled Indochina; one in Bangkok and the other in Saigon.
Because of the controversy which has surrounded this weapon, particular care was exercised to insure that the tests were
119. Fig. 2-5 from the first USAF manual for the AR-15 rifle, illustrating the
inverted-post reticle of the Dutch TTL-80 scope.
With the "remote areas" of Project AGILE thus defined

as populated by small-statured Southeast Asians, it wasn't long
before the tireless Bobby Macdonald had convinced Col. Richard
Hallock, on loan to the AGILE team from the Army, that the
light, lethal but soft-recoiling AR-15 was just the rifle ARPA
was looking for. By late summer ARPA had officially requested
over 4,000 AR-15s to support a proposed full-scale test of the
AR-15 in conjunction with special US advisor-guided units
of the South Vietnamese Army. This request was denied, on
the grounds that M2 Carbines were just as suitable for smallstatured troops, and were available from storage. Undaunted,
ARPA boiled the whole idea down to what they could afford:
a limited range of tests in Saigon, in October 1961, with ten
Colt AR-15s. The number of rifles might have been small, but
the enthusiastic reaction of the Vietnamese and their American
advisors alike who handled and fired the AR-15s was just as
Bobby Macdonald had predicted.
Armed with these positive results, ARPA re-submitted its
original request, clearly stating that the AR-15s required were
to be used to arm special US advisor units and their Vietnamese
allies only, and were not to be considered as a general issue item
for regular US troops. In December 1961 Secretary of Defense
McNamara approved an ARPA buy of 1,000 rifles, thus saving
Colt's from almost sure financial disaster and also setting the
stage for the most influential yet controversial document so
far in the history of the already controversial AR-15. Indeed,
the project's assistant director was moved to preface the final
AGILE report from ARPA's Vietnam field office as follows:
objective, thorough and adequately documented, and to insure
that valid data and conclusions were derived therefrom...
101 First Blood
Advanced Research Projects Agency

Research and Development Field Unit
31 July, 1962
Report of Task 13A, Test of ArmaLite Rifle, AR-15
The purpose of this test was to determine if the AR-15 rifle

is compatible with the small stature, body configuration and
light weight of the Vietnamese Soldier and to evaluate the
weapon under actual combat conditions in South Vietnam.
At the request of MAAG [Military Assistance Advisory Group],
Vietnam, the scope of the test was expanded to include a

comparison between the AR-15 and the M2 Carbine to determine which is a more suitable replacement for other shoulder
weapons in selected units of the Republic of Vietnam Armed
Forces (RVNAF).
The problem of selecting the most suitable basic weapon

for the Vietnamese soldier is complicated by his small stature
and light weight. The average soldier stands five feet tall
and weighs ninety pounds. Principle US weapons presently
issued to Vietnamese troops include the M1918A2; the
Thompson Sub-Machine Gun, Caliber .45; and the US
Carbine, Caliber .30, Ml.
[Firearms] Manufacturing Company, Hartford, Connecticut.

(Prior to the completion of this report, the US Air Force
adopted the AR-15 as its basic shoulder weapon, replacing
the M2 Carbine, the Browning Automatic Rifle and the M3
Sub-Machine Gun).
Because of its availability and the results of extensive

studies and previous testing by military agencies, the Colt
ArmaLite AR-15 rifle was selected in July, 1961 as the most
suitable weapon for initial tests. This weapon was developed
by the ArmaLite Division of Fairchild Aircraft Corporation
to meet the military characteristics for a lightweight rifle
utilizing the high velocity small caliber principle. It was first
tested by the US Army Infantry Board in 1958. Since then,
the weapon and its ammunition have undergone extensive
engineering and service tests by: Aberdeen Proving Ground;
the Combat Development Experimentation Center, Fort Ord,
California; and the US Air Force at Lackland Air Force Base,
Texas. The rifle, with several modifications resulting from
these tests, is presently being manufactured by Colt's Patent
The extremely mobile type of offensive warfare being

stressed by US Advisors in Vietnam and the small stature
and light weight of the Vietnamese soldier places a high
premium on small, lightweight weapons. In addition, the
Based upon favorable observations of the AR-15 by both

US Advisors and RVNAF Commanders following limited firing
demonstrations conducted in Vietnam during August 1961,
weapons were requested in numbers sufficient to conduct
a full-scale combat evaluation of the AR-15 by selected units
of the RVNAF. In December 1961, the Secretary of Defense
approved the procurement of 1,000 AR-15 rifles, necessary
ammunition, spare parts and accessories for evaluation.
OSD/ARPA negotiated a contract with the firm of CooperMacdonald Inc., of Baltimore, Maryland, for procurement
and air shipment of all materiel. The first shipment was
received on 27 January 1962 and subsequent increments
arrived approximately every three weeks until the contract
was fulfilled on 15 May 1962. Operational evaluation and
testing began on 1 February and terminated on 15 July 1962.
violent short clashes at close ranges which are characteristic

of guerrilla warfare in Vietnam makes it highly desirable
to have a dependable weapon capable of producing a high
rate of accurate and lethal full automatic fire.
102
First Blood
720. Illustrating the controllability of the AR-15 rifle. The bolt is just extracting
round no. 4 of a full-auto burst, yet the muzzle appears steady and in full focus.
From the viewpoint of standardization and simplicity of

training and the resultant long range reduction of the logistics
burden, characteristics of existing weapons were studied to
determine if a single weapon could be found that would meet
the requirements for a basic shoulder weapon for Vietnamese
troops. It is believed that such a weapon should encompass
the following desirable characteristics of individual weapons:
1. The effective range of the M1 rifle.
2. The light weight and small size of the M1 Carbine.
3. The full automatic capability of the BAR.
4. The simplicity of the SMG.
Other highly desirable, if not mandatory, features would
include a bayonet, grenade launching and sniper capability.
103 First Blood
Details of the Combat Evaluation of the AR-15

Selected Vietnamese units which had previously been
engaged in considerable combat were issued AR-15 rifles
and ammunition for use against the Viet Cong.. .[as follows:]
Ammunition
AR-15 Rifles
Unit
7th Infantry Division
100
50,000 rounds
Rangers
100
50,000 rounds
Airborne Brigade
390
195,000 rounds
VN Marines
100
50,000 rounds
VN Special Forces
100
50,000 rounds
Special Battalions
125
120,000 rounds
5th Infantry Division
40
25,000 rounds
Father Hoa
10
10,000 rounds
965
550,000 rounds
Total
Summary of Tests
To accomplish the stated purpose of this test, it was divided
into two parts. One part was a combat evaluation of the AR-15
in which the weapons were issued to specially selected ARVN
units for use in their operations against the Viet Cong. Along
with the rifles and ammunition, Vietnamese Unit Commanders and US Military Advisors were given weapon preference
and operational questionnaires and requested to complete
and return them after training and combat use of the AR-15...
The other part of the test consisted of a comparison
between the AR-15 rifle and the M2 Carbine. Areas in which
the two weapons were compared included: physical

characteristics; ease of disassembly and assembly; marksmanship ability at known distances, semi-automatic and
automatic fire; marksmanship ability at unknown distances,
semi-automatic and automatic fire; ruggedness and durability; adequacy of safety features; effects of open storage
in a tropical environment; ability to penetrate dense brush
and heavy foliage; and, the individual Vietnamese soldier's
preference between the two weapons.
Analysis [of the Combat Evaluation]

Based on the numerical ratings and the comments of US
Advisors and VN Unit Commanders, the AR-15 is the most
desirable weapon for use in Vietnam for the following reasons:
1. Ease of training.
2. Suitable physical characteristics.
3. It is easy to maintain.
4. It is more rugged and durable than present weapons.
5. It imposes the least logistical burden.
6.It is the best weapon for all-around tactical employment.
104
First Blood
7. Its semi-automatic firing accuracy is comparable to that

of the M1 rifle, while its automatic firing accuracy is considered superior to that of the Browning Automatic Rifle.
& Vietnamese troops, Commanders and US Advisors

prefer it to any other weapon presently being used in
Vietnam.
Details of Comparison Test Between the AR-15 and M2 Carbine

Personnel from a Vietnamese company that had just completed advanced individual training were used as test subjects
for most of this comparison. The unit of 180 men was divided
into two groups of 90 men each. Group A received one M2
Carbine per man, while Group B received an AR-15 for each
man. Each group was then given a course of instruction
on their respective weapon. The instruction for each was
identical in time and scope of material covered. Following
this, both groups underwent an identical test program which

consisted of: assembly and disassembly; known distance
firing, both semi-automatic and automatic fire; unknown
distance firing, semi-automatic and automatic fire; bayonet
course; and, infiltration course. This phase lasted for one
week (44 hours). At the end of the first week, the two groups
traded weapons and the course of instruction and the tests
were repeated.
Analysis [of Comparison
Test Results]
Test 1 - Physical Characteristics
Test 4 - Marksmanship Ability, Unknown Distance
The AR-15 and the M2 Carbine are comparable in size

and weight and both are compatible with the light weight
and small stature of the VN soldier. An integral grenade
launcher and telescope mount and an accessory bipod are
included in the weapon weight of the AR-15. These are not
standard items for the M2 Carbine.
The ARVN soldier's ability to deliver accurate semiautomatic fire. .using the AR-15 and the M2 Carbine is comparable. . .the. .ability to deliver accurate automatic fire.. is
greater with the AR-15 than with the M2 Carbine.
Test 2 - Comparative Ease of Disassembly and Assembly
After the first week of firing, seven M2 Carbines were

eliminated from the test. Six of these would not fire automatically because of defective disconnector springs; the other
would not fire at all because of a broken disconnector pin.
In contrast, all AR-15 s functioned properly throughout the
test period.
The AR-15 is simpler and requires less time to disassemble

and assemble for normal field cleaning.
The average Vietnamese soldier can be trained in the disassembly and assembly for field cleaning of the AR-15 in
a shorter time than for the M2 Carbine. This was further
emphasized by the fact that all test subjects had previously
received 12 hours of instruction on the Ml Carbine while
undergoing basic combat training.
Test 3 - Marksmanship Ability, Known Distance
The ability of the ARVN soldier to deliver accurate semiautomatic fire on targets of known range with the AR-15
and the M2 Carbine is comparable. Test participants, as
a group, fired a higher percentage of qualifying scores with
both the AR-15 and the M2 Carbine than they had previously
fired with the M1 rifle.
The ARVN soldier's ability to deliver accurate automatic
fire on targets of known range is far greater with the AR-15
rifle than with the M2 Carbine.
Test 5 - Comparative Ruggedness and Durability
After negotiating the Bayonet Assault Course the second

time, two M2 Carbines were eliminated from the test because
of broken stocks. No AR-15 rifles were damaged.
The AR-15 is considered to be more rugged and durable
than the M2 Carbine under conditions which require prolonged firing.
The AR-15 will stand up to rough handling normally
encountered in combat situations better than the M2
Carbine.
Test 6 - Comparison of the Adequacy of Safety Features
The safety features on the AR-15 and the M2 Carbine are
considered comparable with regard to junction and the ARVN
soldier's ability to understand them.
105 First Blood
121. A model 01 Colt AR-15 from circa the ARPA order, serial no. 001627.
The location of a single selector switch which combines

the Junctions of safety selector and rate of fire selector, on
the left side of the receiver where it is easily accessible to
the thumb, enables the ARVN soldier to get the first round
off faster.. than he can with the M2 Carbine. With the M2
Carbine, he must manipulate the safety selector with his
trigger finger, then return it to the trigger to fire. With the
AR-15 he can keep his finger on the trigger while manipulating
the safety selector with his thumb.
Test 7- Effects of Open Storage in a Tropical Environment
The AR-15 rifle, because it has fewer moving parts,
will Junction more readily than the M2 Carbine after
extended periods of storage in the open under tropical
conditions.
Test 8 - Brush Penetration

The trajectory of the AR-15 bullet is not significantly affected
when fired through dense underbrush at ranges up to 50 meters.
The AR-15 round will penetrate jungle undergrowth equally
as well as the M2 Carbine round at ranges up to 50 meters.
Test 9 - Troop Preference Poll
The majority of the test subjects preferred the AR-15 rifle
to the M2 Carbine in all respects covered by the poll, except
for the sights. Further questioning of the subjects by the test
committee personnel disclosed that this preference was due
to greater familiarity with Carbine-type sights, not because
of an inability to understand the AR-15 sights. This is not
considered a shortcoming of the weapon but a matter of
training and familiarization.
9 First Blood
Conclusions
1. The AR-15 rifle is more compatible with the light weight
and small stature of the Vietnamese soldier than the M1
rifle, the Browning Automatic Rifle, and the Thompson SubMachine Gun.
2. The AR-15 is superior to the M2 Carbine.
4. The AR-15 is capable of replacing any or all of the

shoulder weapons currently being used by the Armed Forces
of the Republic of Vietnam.
5. The AR-15 is considered by both Vietnamese Commanders and US Military Advisors who participated in
the tests as the best "all around" shoulder weapon in
Vietnam.
3. The M2 Carbine lacks the necessary dependability and

versatility for consideration as the basic shoulder weapon
for Vietnamese troops.
Recommendations
It is recommended that:
1. The AR-15 be considered for adoption as the basic
weapon for all RNVAF with a view toward improving effectiveness and simplifying training and weapons/logistics systems.
2. Priority for adoption of the AR-15 be given to those
units which frequently operate in jungle environment for
extended periods because of the significant operational and

logistical advantages accruing to their having the lightest and
most effective weapon/ammunition combination available.
3. The M1 and/or M2 Carbine continue to be issued only
to those individuals who, because of their duty or position,
conjunction effectively with a weapon best suitable for a
defensive role.
The Project AGILE results from the Vietnam field team,

excerpted above, were summed up by ARPA back in Washington as follows:
The suitability of the AR-15 as the basic shoulder weapon
for the Vietnamese has been established. For the type of
conflict now occurring in Vietnam, the weapon was also
found by its users and by MAAG advisors to be superior
in virtually all respects to the M1 rifle, M1 and M2 Carbines,
Thompson Sub-Machine Gun, and Browning Automatic Rifle.
Test data derived from recent Service evaluations of the

AR-15 in the US support the technical conclusions of the
report. The Central Intelligence Agency has conducted
similar tests; it is understood that the results of that
valuation are essentially identical to those contained in
the [above] report...
Down and Dirty - Lethality in Vietnam

In the aftermath of Project AGILE's combat trials came frank
remarks, from American advisors and Vietnamese commanders
alike, in response to questions concerning the terminal effects
of .223 cartridges they had witnessed fired against the Viet Cong.
Some of these comments are reprinted below, beginning

with the ARPA field team's introduction:
..Unit Commanders' and Advisors' remarks concerning the value of the AR-15 in Vietnamese units and its
worth as a combat weapon in the war in South Vietnam
as opposed to existing weapons were also requested.
Generally, the comments were extremely favorable to the

AR-15. All of the comments received are presented below.. in
the form in which they were received.
10 The Air Force Adopts the AR-15
"On 160900 June..one platoon from the 340 [ARVN]

Ranger Company was on an operation..and contacted 3
armed VC in heavily forested jungle. Two VC had carbines,
grenades, mines, and one had a SMG. At a distance of
approximately 15 meters, one Ranger fired an AR-15 full
automatic hitting one VC with 3 rounds with the first burst.
One round in the head took it completely o f f . Another in
the right arm, took it completely o f f , too. One round hit him
in the right side, causing a hole about 5 inches in diameter.
It cannot be determined which round killed the VC but it
can be assumed that any one of the three would have caused
death. The other 2 VC ran, leaving the dead VC with 1
carbine, 1 grenade and 2 mines." (Rangers)
"On 9 June a Ranger Platoon from the 40th Infantry Regt.
was given the mission of ambushing an estimated VC
Company. The details are as follows:
a.
b.
c.
d.
Number of VC killed: 5
Number of AR-15 s employed: 5
Type of engagement: 30-100 meters
Type of wounds:
1. Back wound, which caused the thoracic cavity to explode.

2. Stomach wound, which caused the abdominal cavity
to explode.
3. Buttock wound, which destroyed all tissue of both
buttocks.
4. Chest wound from right to left; destroyed the thoracic
cavity.
5. Heel wound; the projectile entered the bottom of the
right foot causing the leg to split from the foot to the hip.
These deaths were inflicted by the AR-15 and all were

instantaneous except the buttock wound. He lived approximately five minutes."
"..Five VC were hit, all five were body wounds, and all
five killed. Four were probably killing wounds with any
weapon listed, but the fifth was essentially a flesh wound.
The AR-15 made it a fatal wound...The troopers have a
great deal of respect for the weapon and prefer it to all
others. They take excellent care of it."
On 23-24 May. .one company completely equipped with
AR-15 s (87) plus Bn. HQ elements was involved in. .action.
No wounded were captured and all casualties were inflicted
with the AR-15. 27 VC were killed (24 counted by the
advisor) and 25 captured. Grenades were used for the first
time and were very effectively employed at ranges of
100-500 meters. They served as the real artillery support
as we could not get the artillery to fire any closer than
400 meters. About 36 grenades were utilized in the heavy
action, all propelled from the AR-15. The troops are very
enthusiastic about the weapon and treat it with greater
care than usual."
(7th Infantry Division)
On 13 April, a Special Forces team made a raid on a
small village. In the raid, seven VC were killed. Two were
killed by AR-15 fire. Range was 50 meters. One man was
hit in the head; it looked like it exploded. A second man
was hit in the chest, his back was one big hole."
(VN Special Forces)
The Air Force Adopts

the AR-15 and "Cartridge, 5.64mm (.223)"
As mentioned, the first real breakthrough in quantity production orders for the AR-15 came in the summer of 1962, after
nearly three years of slim pickings for Colt's and CooperMacdonald. To Dr. Carten's chagrin, the rifles were intended
not for small-statured Asian allies but for the US Air Force.
A triumphant General LeMay had seen his third request
for AR-15s approved on May 15 1962. Now Chief of Staff of
the Air Force, he proceeded to make his own direct contract
with the relieved and delighted manufacturers for an initial
delivery of 8,500 rifles. As noted in the ARPA report, the AR-15
was thereafter soon officially adopted by the USAF. A second
direct procurement of 19,000 more AR-15s was approved for
the Air Force the following year.
Also as mentioned, the US Navy soon followed the Air Force

lead, ordering a small number of AR-15s to equip its elite
amphibious Sea-Air-Land (SEAL) teams. Remington had
meanwhile submitted the specifications for the .223 cartridge
for registration with the regulatory Sporting Arms and Ammunition Manufacturers' Institute (SAAMI), where the round,
now USAF standard issue, was initially identified as "Cartridge,
5.64mm (.223)".
Despite the best efforts of those still loyal to the 7.62mm
M14, the AR-15 simply refused to go away. Over the summer
of 1962 came a request from the commander of the US advisor
group in Vietnam for 20,000 rifles as a head start on the
implementation of the recommendations of Project AGILE.
108
The Air Force Adopts the AR-15
122. The cover of the first Air Force manual for the AR-15, picturing a Col
model 01.
123. Specifications for the AR-15 rifle from USAF manual 50-12. The .223
cartridge is listed as "previously identified as 5.64mm (.223)".
Weight (pounds)
Rifle without accessories
Empty magazine
Sling
Telescope
Cleaning equipment
Bipod
Bayonet
6.31
.31
.31
.875
.125
.56
.625
Length (inches)
Rifle with flash suppressor
Rifle with bayonet
Barrel
Barrel with flash suppressor
Mechanical
39
44.25
20
21
Features
Rifling. RH, 6 groove, 1 turn in 12"

Bore Maximum
.220 in.
Groove Maximum
.2245 in.
Sight radius
19.937 in.
Trigger pull
Maximum
9.0 lbs.
Minimum
5.0 lbs.
Loading devices
20 round magazine
Method of operation
Gas
Type of mechanism
Rotating b
Method of
feeding
Magazine20 rds. ca
Chamber
pressure
52,000 psi max avera
Cooling
A
Ammunition
Caliber
Type
Firing
5.56 mm (.22
Ball and Trac
Characteristics
Muzzle velocity
( approx. )
3250 ft. per s
Muzzle energy
1328 foot lb
Cyclic rate of fire 7 0 0 / 8 0 0 rds. per m
Maximum rate of fire
Semiautomatic
4 5 / 6 5 rds. per m
Automatic (using 20-round
magazines)
1 5 0 / 2 0 0 rds. per m
Sustained rate of fire 1 2 / 1 5 rds. per m
Maximum effective rate of fire
Semiautomatic
3 0 / 4 0 rds. per m
Automatic
5 0 / 7 0 rds. per m
Maximum range
2833 y
Maximum effective range
500 y
The Hitch Report
Chapter Six
THE ARMY GETS

"A LITTLE BIT PREGNANT"
Also during the summer of 1962, by order of Defense
Secretary McNamara the Ordnance Corps as such ceased
to exist. Its functions were incorporated, along with those
of the other five erstwhile independent Technical Services,
into the new Army Materiel Command (USAMC or AMC).
Ordnance field functions were reorganized on August 1,
first as the US Army Ordnance Weapons Command (OWC),
with headquarters at Rock Island Arsenal in Illinois.
"Ordnance" was soon dropped, changing the acronym to
USAWC; later WECOM. Dr. Fred Carten took up his duties
as the Chief of the Technical Branch of the Research Division

of AMC's new Research, Development and Engineering
Directorate.
By the fall, the M14 procurement program seemed at last
to have overcome its serious initial "growing pains". In
October a third civilian contractor, Thompson Ramo Wooldridge (TRW), joined Winchester, Harrington & Richardson
and Springfield Armory to boost the combined projected M14
production rate to 300,000 rifles per year.
The Hitch Report

Over this same period, as Project AGILE was under way
in Vietnam, ARPA staffers back in Washington had introduced the ubiquitous Bobby Macdonald to others in the
OSD's Systems Analysis Directorate. A demonstration for
all interested OSD personnel was arranged wherein AR-15s
and M14s were fired in comparison with the standard assault
rifle of the communist world, the 7.62x39mm AK47. Within
this framework the AR-15's light weight, low recoil and
controllability on automatic fire appeared particularly
impressive.
A comprehensive OSD study of the history of service rifle

caliber reduction was soon in the works. Starting with the .276
Pedersen round of the nineteen-twenties, OSD analysts worked
their way through the O R O studies and BRL's small caliber,
high velocity (SCHV) reports of the fifties, and concluded with
the results of their own comparison of the .223 caliber AR-15
rifle with the M14 and the AK-47. A report of their findings
was sent to Secretary McNamara on September 27, over the
signature of OSD's Comptroller, Charles Hitch. Abandoning
all pretense that the AR-15 was suitable only for small-statured
Vietnamese, the Hitch report stated:
The study indicates that the AR-15 is decidedly superior

in many of the factors considered. In none of them is the
M14 superior. The report, therefore, concludes that in
combat the AR-15 is the superior weapon. Furthermore, the
available cost data indicate that it is also a cheaper weapon.
Although analyzed less thoroughly, the M14 also appears

somewhat inferior to the M1 rifle of World War 2, and decidedly inferior to the Soviet combat rifle, the AK-47, which,
in turn, was derived from the German "Sturmgewehr" of
World War 2.
The Controversy Deepens

HQ AMC greeted the Project AGILE results with a grudging
admission that the AR-15 did seem a suitable choice for the
Vietnamese. Application beyond that, Dr. Carten repeated,
would run the risk of seriously upsetting America's NATO
standardization agreements concerning the 7.62mm NATO
cartridge.
Defense Secretary McNamara, an initial advocate of the

M14, was alarmed by the conflicting nature of the reports he
was receiving. Both ARPA's Project AGILE and the report
from his own Comptroller claimed that the AR-15 was superior
to the M14. The controversial Hitch report had gone even
further, concluding enthusiastically that the AR-15, the Ml,
109
110
The Army's "Worldwide" Trials
and even the AK-47 were all superior to the M14. Significandy, the Hitch report strongly implied that the "cheaper"
.223 caliber AR-15 was a fully developed weapon system.
McNamara requested the opinion of his Secretary of the Army,
Cyrus Vance, on the relative standings of the three arms in

question. Pointedly, McNamara asked what actions were
contemplated if the Army were to agree with the findings of
the Hitch report.
The Army Orders a "Worldwide" Comparison

Privately, it appears that the Chief of Staff of the Army,
General Wheeler, shared the opinion of Congress that the
Army's function was to use whatever rifles Ordnance (or more
lately AWC) supplied. As for replacing the M14, AWC was
already on the point of soliciting proposals from industry for
the design and manufacture of flechette-and-grenade-firing
SPIW weapons, and had just announced the acceleration of
the SPIW's planned adoption date to June of 1965, only 30
months away.
Nevertheless, when briefed by OSD on the AR-15 rifle that
October, General Wheeler was impressed with the weapon's
capabilities. Before drafting his reply to Secretary Vance,
therefore, he attempted to get as broadly-based a reaction as

possible to the question of the AR-15 versus the M14, from
all levels of the Army. He ordered a comprehensive series of
tactical and technical tests of the comparative merits of the
AR-15, M14 and AK-47 at bases in the US, the Caribbean,
Europe and the Arctic.
President Kennedy had also been briefed on the essential
points in the Hitch report, and had asked McNamara much
the same pointed questions as McNamara had asked Vance.
The upshot was that a deadline was set for General Wheeler's
worldwide investigations, which had only just begun, for
January 31 1963, a scant three months away.
The Worldwide Trials Part 1 - Tactical

Further restructuring of the Ordnance establishment saw
the creation of the Combat Developments Command (CDC),
on an equal level with AMC, to handle the "user" or tactical
side of weapon acceptance trials. Curiously, the Army Infantry
Board, along with its companion "user" unit the Arctic Test
Board, had followed Dr. Carten and the OCO, and now took
orders from AMC Commanding General Frank Besson. This
coupling of erstwhile "user" with "producer" only fueled the
fires which followed.
Dr. Carten and his staff drew up and later evaluated the
tactical test plan for General Wheeler's worldwide trials. These
consisted of seventeen different phases such as known- and
unknown-distance automatic fire, penetration, position-disclosing
effects, bullet deflections and "psychological suppressive
characteristics". However, in an effort to appear impartial, exOrdnance officials were by order of the OSD not allowed to
attend any of the actual trials. On the other hand, Bobby
Macdonald and a Colt field maintenance crew, complete with
a fully-equipped mobile workshop, were in close and constant
attendance at Fort Benning throughout the trials. As it turned
out, they were sorely needed to get any results at all out of
some very poorly turned-out rifles and ammunition.
Many regular Infantry soldiers received their first exposure

to the lightweight AR-15 as firers and observers in these hastilyconducted Army comparison trials. Unfortunately, the very
haste and resultant confusion left precious little time for troop
familiarization with what even Dr. Carten himself later called
"the overwhelming and irrefutable data" which supported the
SCHV concept. Indeed, as a result of routine rotation, the past
history of CONARC's championing of the SCHV idea was
sadly unknown to most of the present members of the Infantry
Board itself. To many, the AR-15 at first glance appeared flimsy
and toylike when compared to an issue M14.
In any event, two months into the trials the whole program had
degenerated into a loud, bitter stalemate, with the proponents
of each rifle accusing the other of bias and outright connivance.
The tests themselves broke down completely, less than one
month from President Kennedy's deadline. With the final
outcome thus in jeopardy, Secretary of the Army Vance was
obliged to prudently "cover his assets". Alarmed as he was,
he perhaps overreacted somewhat, for by ordering a full scale
investigation into the Army's conduct of the trials by the
Inspector General of the Army, which he did, the credibility
of the whole rifle program was indelibly stained.
124. A Colt AR-15 model 01, pictured during the Tactical phase of the Army's
"Worldwide" trials, late in 1962.
The Inspector General's Illuminating View

Through the perspective of the Inspector General's subsequent
report on the matter, the story behind some of the innocentlooking statistics the Army was busily gathering do indeed
make wry reading. For purposes of our story, however, they
are far more than just funny; they reflect the first general
confrontation between two fundamentally different schools of
thought on what a combat rifle should "look like" and do.
In the light of the IG's investigations the vast conceptual gulf
between the AR-15 and the M14 stood revealed for the first time.
While investigating Colt's loud accusation that the Fort

Benning tests were out-and-out "rigged" in favor of the M14,
the IG's team was curtly told by the president of the Infantry
Board that "..I have the authority to modify tests in accordance
with the circumstances." The circumstances in question
revealed not so much deliberate underhandedness as soldiers
doing their duty as they saw it. For example, in the absence of
any official replacement, the test Boards at both Fort Benning
and Fort Greely had adamantly taken as their bible the
112
Military Characteristics (MCs) for rifles as last published

in 1954. Unchanged from the days of the M1 rifle, these
still set range requirements at 800 yards. The Board's
president concluded that, although the AR-15 had shot well
up to 400 meters, "..the average soldier is expected to see
and hit at least a bullseye out to a range of 500 meters...I
felt we needed to continue with the same rifles out to longer
ranges."
The IG investigators also discovered that, not only had the
Infantry Board trials thus favored the M14, but on their own
initiative the Board had developed a more accurate and controllable bipod-and-compensator-equipped "squad automatic"
version called the M14(USAIB), and had even secured
permission from the Department of the Army to record the
performance of this unofficially improved arm in an appendix
to the automatic fire trials results.
fact that most of the M14s in a normal squad were pegged

for semi-auto fire only, CDC had ordered rifles capable of
automatic fire to be fired automatically, thus certainly affecting
the aimed-fire scores of all the AR-15s.
It will be remembered that in 1959, CDEC's year-long
"optimum platoon" trial at Fort Ord had concluded that five
to seven men with AR-15s had a better effectiveness ratio than
11 men armed with the M14. On January 19, a memo from
Secretary Vance himself ordered that CDEC be taken at their
word: "..the CDC test plan [is to] be expanded or modified
in a manner which will afford further evaluation of the conclusions reached in the [1959] CDEC report."
The official " u s e r " test group, the newly-formed Combat

Developments Command (CDC) headquartered at Fort Carson,
Colorado, had deployed "several hundred" AR-15s to all six
of its worldwide testing stations. CDC had issued ammunition
on a per round basis to both M14 and AR-15 test firers, thus
in large part negating the AR-15's main inherent advantage
of more shots per unit of weight. Further, in the face of the
Despite all, however, it appeared that the soldiers' strong

preference for the M14 in the tactical trials was genuine, and
not solely the product of "dirty tricks" or juggling of results.
Having been given so little familiarization with the concepts
behind the basic SCHV idea, their belief that the heavier 7.62
NATO bullet was superior to the little .223 remained unshakeable. This view was perhaps best summed up in a statement
by one of the test officers in response to part of Dr. Carten's
"psychological characteristics" test, wherein the officer had
been asked to record his feelings regarding "the psychological
effect of debris that is deflected by bullet impacts":
. .with [the M14].. in automatic fire, .that hill is just being

chewed up, you.. see splinters, bits and pieces being thrown
around the hill...When you use [the AR-15], being it is a
lighter grain bullet, you do not see this effect in the target
area. This is a factor... It smacks, I think, on whether. .a man
would have confidence in his weapon.
The Worldwide Trials Part 2 - Technical

In further compliance with General Wheeler's order a set
of the standard lightweight rifle tests was scheduled, to compare
the weapons on a more technical level. These had hastily been
2 November, 1962
From: HQ, US Army Test and Evaluation Command
To: Commanding Officer
Subject: Comparative Evaluation of AR-15 (ArmaLite) and
M14 Rifles
Addressees will prepare a summary test plan and estimated funding for phases of the evaluation under their
cognizance ...Phases considered as the responsibility
of [BRL] will be coordinated with [D&PS]...A final.,
plan will be required by 15 November 1962.. initiation of
testing will not await submittal or approval of final detailed
plans.
initiated, under "crash priority", by the following interesting

correspondence:
Coordination to define objectives and avoid duplication

will be effected verbally and by TWX..since time does not
permit letter transmittals.
Tests will be completed and reported to this command by
3 December 1962 for review, consolidation, approval and
transmittal to [US AMC].
Subject evaluation will be performed under crash priority,
utilizing overtime where indicated.
Representation at tests will be kept to a minimum and will
be limited to Army and Government working personnel. Other
requests for representation will be. .coordinated by this
command. Tests should not be influenced or delayed by the
requirements for observers. Participating test personnel will
not discuss results or express opinions relative to the merits
or faults of the subject weapons, but will concern themselves
with objective reporting of data..
113 The Army's "Worldwide" Trials
7 November, 1962
design than the Finnish and should be emphasized in ballistic

evaluation where possible.
From: HQ, US Army Test and Evaluation Command

Representatives of Colt Firearms and Cooper-Macdonald
are encouraged to witness all tests compatible with security
clearance..
To: Commanding Officer

Subject: Comparative Evaluation of AR-15 and M14 Rifles
Plans were approved with additions and changes as follows:
(a) Soviet AK-47 is to be included in test effort. Five weapons
with 5,000 rounds Soviet (immediately available) and 20,000
rounds Finnish ammunition (to be procured) will be provided
this command. Distribution will depend on condition of
weapons. Lethality and accuracy (semi and auto) and limited
penetration tests will take precedence over other evaluation
of this weapon. (Ammunition supply is limited and scope
of tests cannot be as extensive as AR-15, M14 comparisons.)
The Soviet (Polish) ammunition is slightly different in bullet
Other than field stripping, no disassembly of AR-15

weapons used in actual test firings will be permitted without
the personal direction of Colt representatives. Phases..
requiring disassembly evaluations will be conducted with
spare weapons or on completion of all testing..
Comments on lethality at -65oF are desired..
A lethality determination using a modified .223 bullet will
be imposed. The details. .will be transmitted verbally..
Funds have been provided to support current testing
activity in the amount of $125,850.00..
Aberdeen's Comparative Evaluation of AR-15 and M14 Rifles

Five Colt AR-15s; serial numbers 007036, 008002, 008114,
008367 and 008683; and six M14s were subjected to a battery
of seventeen lightweight rifle tests by Aberdeen's Development
Weights
and Proof Services (D&PS) from November 1 to December

5, 1962. Some of the results and comments made in Mr.
George Hendricks' final report are excerpted below:
and Measurements
AR-15 rifle, no. 008367and M14 rifle, no. 894302 (H&R),

were used in this phase. Weights are given in pounds and
measurements in inches.
R ifle
Weights
rifle without magazine or sling
empty magazine
one round of ammunition
magazine capacity (rounds)
rifle with fully loaded magazine
rifle with magazine
and 120 rounds of ammunition
rifle with 120 rounds
loaded in magazines
recoiling parts
stock assembly
pistol grip assembly
handguard assembly
trigger pull (average for five trials)
AR-15
Measurements
Rifle
AR-15
M14
6.35
9.32
0.52
0.29
a0.0248 b0.0541
20
20
7.13
10.93
9.61
16.34
11.04
cO.87
0.60
0.19
e0.65
9.27
1893
d0.90
3.14
-
0.19
6.19
a Cartridge, ball, caliber .223, lot Z191.

b Cartridge, ball, caliber 7.62mm NATO, M80, lot FC-1907.
c weight of action spring not included,
d weight of operating rod spring not included.
e weight is for both right and left handguard assemblies.
overall length (with flash suppressor)

barrel length
sight radius
line of sight above bore
butt to trigger
pitch (from line of bore), degree
line of sight to forward end of comb
line of sight to heel of butt
barrel: rifling
one turn in
number of grooves
firing pin protrusion
M14
388
20.0
al9.8
a2.5
12.9
5
a2.0
a2.0
44.2
22.0
b26.8
b1.1
13.2
4
b2.4
b2.7
14
6
0.029
12
4
0.057
a with sight at factory setting,

b with sight set at 200 meters.
. .The sighting error when firing the AR-15 rifle is expected
to be greater than when firing the M14 rifle because of the
shorter distance between front sight and eye. The distance
between the sights on the AR-15 rifle is only 74 percent of
114
125. Fig. 129 from US Rifle M14 showing the M14 rifle and its range of
accessories as produced at Springfield Armory. The Army took the issue of
M14 rifle maintenance seriously: note the cutaway buttstock (right center)
showing stowage of oil, grease, combination tool, chamber brush and

cleaning rod.
Springfield Armory photo dated August 5, 1961
the distance. .on the M14 rifle. ..It was also observed that the
cylindrical front sight of the AR-15 gave a poorer definition
when used in direct sunlight than a conventional post.. such

as that used on the M14..
Automatic Accuracy
Rifle
Firing
Position
Mean for
Shots Fired
Automatically (a)
AR-15
AR-15
M14
M14
prone
standing
prone
standing
32.6
56.7
65.9
109.4
Test
30-shot Target
Mean from
Center of Target
EV
EH
21.7
37.9
43.8
72.9
42.7
888
93.0
164.1
22.2
42.0
387
63.7
ES
44.5
93.2
981
170.6
a the first shot in each burst is excluded since these are considered
semi-automatically fired shots.
.. The test data show that the AR-15 and M14 rifles have a
low level of effectiveness when fired automatically. The first
shot in each burst is fired in the same manner as a semiautomatically-fired shot. In most bursts the first shot was
the only shot to hit the 5 ring of the "A" target (12 inches
in diameter) and in many bursts, such as when firing the

M14 prone with a sling, the first shot in the burst was the
only one to hit the scoring rings of the complete "A" target...
Firing the M14 rifle automatically from the prone position
may cause headache and bruises on the cheek and jaw..
115 The Army's "Worldwide" Trials
In conclusion, Aberdeen pointed out that direct comparisons between the AR-15 and M14 rifle systems were difficult
to make, due to the very different characteristics of the two
cartridges used. For example, the weight of the caliber .223
ball round was calculated to be only 46% that of the M80 ball
round. Thus, while an empty AR-15 weighed 68% as much
as an empty M14, with 120 rounds loaded in magazines it
weighed only 58% as much.
Aberdeen did report that the AR-15 rifle had a slightly lower
sound pressure level than the M14, both at the firing position
and downrange. In addition they commented on the flatter
trajectory of the .223 bullet over the M80 ball out to 500 yards.
Notwithstanding the fact that 500 yards was the maximum
combat range for which the .223 had been designed, the report
concluded significantly, "Thereafter the M80 ball bullet has
a flatter trajectory."
An Ironic Blow from Within

If the scant time allowance of three months had made difficult
the proper design, performance and evaluation of such an
ambitious schedule of tests, it transpired that the Army was
not alone in feeling the pinch. AR-15 rifles and .223 ammunition for the trials had been ordered on very short notice,
apparently soon overtaxing the relatively modest facilities
devoted to their respective manufacture at Colt's and Remington. Unfortunately, it appeared that some of the rifles and
much of the ammunition had been produced and delivered
with little if any effective quality control.
This added a new note of irony, not to say desperation,
to the proceedings. In contrast to "old number four", which
in Bobby Macdonald's words had performed "flawlessly"
during the whole of his initial 8,000-round demonstration
trip to the Far East for Fairchild in 1959, the Colt AR-15s
which he supplied for the CDC tactical trial in late 1962 were
plagued with a malfunction rate eight times that of the M14
control rifles.
To be fair, it appeared that much of the problem lay with
the ammuniton. Remington had certified to the Commanding
Officer of the Boston Ordnance District that the 428,000
rounds of "Cartridge, Ball, Caliber .223-55 gr M.C." they
had supplied for the trials as lot no. RA-5018 complied with
a stringent series of specifications and tests. Despite this, there
were numerous reports of primers and/or bullets falling out
of cartridges during the tests, either leaving the popped primer
stuck in one of the locking recesses of the barrel extension to
jam the returning bolt, or worse, leaving a spent bullet stuck
in the bore. In the rain test at Aberdeen, for example, the test
officers reported as follows:
The functioning performance for rifles subjected to the

600-round rain test is given below.
Rifle
Malfunctions
AR-15,
no. 8002
Twenty-seven failures to fire, one failure to feed,

and five failures to eject. Twenty-five malfunctions
were caused by separated primers.
AR-15,
no. 8114
Seven failures to fire, and one failure to feed. Seven

malfunctions were caused by separated primers.
AR-15,
no. 8683
Thirty-one failures to fire, 11 failures to feed, three

failures to eject, and two failures of the bolt to remain
to the rear after the last round from the magazine.
Twenty-nine malfunctions were caused by separated
primers.
In contrast to these results, four M14 control rifles had also

fired the rain test, using standard M80 ball ammunition. Two
had completed the test with no malfunctions; one had four;
and the last had one. No primer problems were reported.
Thus, what had initially appeared to be such a great (albeit
to many a blatantly unfair) advantage soon turned into a real

nightmare for the mentioned team of Colt maintenance technicians who had been allowed to attend the trials. Hopping mad
with frustration, Bobby Macdonald dashed off furious letters
to the management of Colt's and Remington, accusing them
of sabotaging his efforts to sell the Army on the AR-15.
116
The first Nagging Doubts About Lethality

Part of Aberdeen's contribution to the worldwide tests had
been the preparation of some special bullets for the Army's
Wound Ballistics Laboratory at Edgewood Arsenal. They had
modified some 55-grain .223 ball bullets of Remington manufacture by cutting approximately 1/4 inch off the nose and
drilling a 3/32-inch-diameter hole about 1/4 inch deep into
the lead core of each bullet.
Edgewood's standard lethality trials consisted of measuring the cavitational and other effects of firing at known
distances into blocks of ballistic gelatin and, where necessary,
anaesthetized goats. They had requested the hollow-pointed
.223 bullets from Aberdeen because, while using the standard
Remington .223 ammunition which Bobby Macdonald had
supplied, they had been unable to duplicate the fantastic,

explosive effects which ARPA had documented in Project
AGILE.
As it turned out, even the hollow-points failed to duplicate
anything like the spectacular effects recorded by the Vietnamese unit commanders and their American advisors, which
had subsequently been taken as fact and much used as propaganda in the OSD campaign to sell the AR-15. It was later
argued that Edgewood's gelatin formula was not of the proper
consistency to replicate human tissue, but in any case such
was the magnitude of the controversy surrounding the worldwide trials and the subsequent IG's investigation that at the
time Edgewood's report was largely ignored.
The Stone Wall Crumbles

Despite the problems and controversies, General Wheeler's
worldwide evaluation was completed by mid-January, 1963.
Stubborn initial insistence that "only the M14 is suitable for
Army use" had subsequently been thoroughly undermined
by the IG's investigation. The Army report finally submitted
to Secretary Vance grudgingly concluded that, after firing
500,000 rounds through each weapon, the AR-15 was judged
to be superior to the M14 with regard to weight, automatic
fire accuracy, and total hit capability. The AR-15's reliability and
night-sighting capability were listed as unsatisfactory, however;
CDC's Commanding General had even summed up his portion
of the tests with the proviso that "I would not standardize the
AR-15 rifle without an expedited improvement program to
correct the unreliability of the rifle-ammunition combination
and the poor night sighting qualities."
Perhaps to avoid the appearance of further bias, the AR-15
was given the benefit of the doubt on the issue of poor functional
reliability. Malfunctions encountered with both rifles and cartridges were assumed to be "readily correctible". Results of
Secretary Vance's tests of a six-man squad armed with AR-15s
versus eleven men with M14s were meanwhile listed as inconclusive. As for the AK-47, the tests had shown it to be
"clearly inferior" within US tactical applications to both
American weapons.
The M14 still remained the Army's overall choice as a

standard semi-automatic rifle, and the M14(USAIB) was
recommended for further development as a suitable squad
automatic. On the other hand, reliability aside, the CDC and
others had confirmed that some units with a special nature
and mission were definitely best served by the AR-15.
Secretary Vance's report to the Secretary of Defense therefore
took the form of the following historic four-point compromise:
1. Starting in fiscal year 1964 (FY64), the Army proposed
the procurement of enough modified M14s like the USAIB
model to provide an automatic rifle capability for all infantry
squads. (First called the M14E2 and later adopted as the
M14A1, this development is discussed in US Rifle M14.)
2. They would also procure between fifty and one hundred
thousand selective-fire AR-15s commercially from Colt's, for issue
to US Army Air Assault, Airborne and Special Forces units.
3. Production of standard M14s in the existing procurement
program would be reduced accordingly.
4. Continuing the SPIW program with a reaffirmed
schedule would produce a truly advanced "follow-on" to
the M14 by the end of FY65; now only two and a half
years away.
The Plan to Bank on the SPIW
Chapter Seven
THE FATEFUL PLAN

TO BANK ON THE SPIW
And so, saving as much face as possible under the circumstances, the Army finally capitulated to the combined forces
of the OSD, the Inspector General, and Bobby Macdonald.
Even though the M14 remained the US Army's semi-automatic
rifle of choice, Defense Secretary McNamara decided that the
time was opportune to face up to the future as envisaged by
his "whiz kid" systems analysts. Their every report said the
same thing: a truly advanced follow-on to both the M14 and
the AR-15 was not only feasible but soon to be a reality.
As discussed in The SPIW, projected flechette performance,
especially lethality, remains a very touchy subject to this day.
Suffice it to say that high theoretical hit probability was a goal
right from the start, and was a product of extremely low recoil
and high rate of fire. This, coupled with the fearful wounds
promised by its tiny flechettes, led to forecasts that once the
SPIW came on stream all standard small arms would be
rendered obsolete. At the end of 1962, AWC's comprehensive
SPIW development program was on track and on time:
Standard 'A' hardware was confidently promised in just two
and a half years.
In the interim, McNamara reasoned, why couldn't the Army
"make do" with the million or so M14s already in existence?
To make the matter even more attractive to a cost-conscious
Congress, the balance of the funding already earmarked for
future M14 rifles could then be applied to acquiring the AR-15s
which the Army now wanted for its Air Assault, Airmobile
and Special Forces units. With the SPIW a seeming certainty,
it appeared both wasteful and unnecessary to procure more
AR-15s or M14s than absolutely necessary to bridge such a
brief span of time.
126. In a desperate attempt to salvage what they might from the abruptly
cancelled M14 program, TRW attempted this conversion of an M14 to .223
caliber.
Neal Smith collection
The contracts then in place were allowed to continue only until

the autumn, notwithstanding that total production of the M14
rifle would thus fall far short of the Army's full requirement. In
consequence of this surprise move, all three civilian M14 producers, H&R, Olin (Winchester) and TRW, found themselves
stuck deeply in the troughs of their respective "learning curves",
with any hope of further recouping their initial investment
abruptly cut off. Contracts for two of the four first-generation
SPIW prototypes were coincidentally and simultaneously
awarded to H&R and Winchester, but the loss of the M14
program was nevertheless a very heavy blow to all concerned.
Secretary of the Army Cyrus Vance summed up the Army's

position before a curious Senate subcommittee with the fateful
remark: "Termination of production of the M14 prior to the
availability of SPIW involved certain risks which, after consideration by the Army, are deemed acceptable."
Accordingly, on January 21, 1963, Secretary McNamara
announced the cancellation of the M14 production program.
127. Top view of the TRW .223 caliber M14, showing attachment of filler block
and modified magazine follower.
117
118
The Army's "One-Time Buy" of AR-15s
12& Closeup of the action, right side, of the TRW .223 M14 conversion. Note the
filler block and modified magazine catch, behind the (painted) AR-15 magazine.
The Army Initiates its Famous

"One-Time Buy" of AR-15s
At the same time as the cancellation of the M14 program,
negotiations were begun with Colt's to supply the Army with
85,000 AR-15s over the following three fiscal years. According
to Secretary McNamara'a timetable, by that time the successful
SPIW candidate would have already been perfected, adopted
and put into production: the 85,000 AR-15s were all the Army
would ever need.
In order to allow an orderly expansion of manufacturing
facilities at the Colt plant, the initial "trickle" delivery was
to be set at just slightly over 2,000 rifles for FY64, after which
it was planned that production should be able to meet demands
of up to 50,000 AR-15s per year.
As noted, AR-15 rifles and .223 ammunition had hitherto

been purchased "off the shelf" directly from the manufacturers
by whichever service or agency had managed to get its purchase
request approved. Thus far there had been no central purchasing
or regulating authority within the military. As with numerous
other limited-issue items, such as revolvers and shotguns, the
military had virtually no control over, or funded interest in, the
specifications of either the AR-15 rifle or its cartridge. However,
on March 11, 1963, soon after approving the Army's one-time
purchase of AR-15s, McNamara in a secret memo to Army
Secretary Vance directed that the four services get together
to draft a set of military specifications for the AR-15 rifle and
the .223 cartridge, with the number and cost of any improvements or modifications to be kept as low as possible.
The AR-15 Gets a Project Manager

The Army had already installed a new system of direct
management for projects needing special attention, such as
the M14 rifle. The following are excerpts from a March 4th
explanatory memo issued by the Commanding General of

Army Materiel Command, outlining the reasons behind Project
Management and the special powers that went with the job:
119 The Army's "One-Time Buy" of AR-15s
129. "For immediate release": a proud publicity photo from Colt's parent
firm, Fairbanks Whitney Corporation, labelled "Colt's Oldest - and Newest
- US Combat Rifles "heralds the Army's announcement of the "one-time buy"
of AR-15 rifles.
Left: a custodian of the Colt museum at the Connecticut State Library in

Hartford holds a 5-shot, .56 caliber revolving musket which Samuel Colt
produced for the US government during the Civil War.
Right: a Colt's assembly employee holds a brand-new, selective fire Colt AR-15.
Project Management has been endorsed by the Secretary

of Defense as a means of reducing materiel lead time. It
has been applied within my command to critical weapons
and items of equipment that collectively account for over
half of the total AMC PEMA and RTD&E funds. The corresponding magnitude of responsibilities assigned to Project
Managers, the radical departure of this new concept from
the Army's traditional way of managing its materiel, and
the compressed time period during which it has been introduced have resulted in a new set of management problems.
project planner and providing both the direction and control

necessary to implement such plans; [also] deal direct with
the OSD, DA staff, CDC, CONARC, field units of the Army
and the other military services [and] act with the complete
assurance that for all activities required to manage and direct
his weapon/item system he is acting for me alone and is
in no way responsible to any functional directorate;
.. I have delegated to each Project Manager my full line

authority to make decisions regarding his particular weapon
and/or items of equipment. In exercising my authority, I
expect that a Project Manager will. .deal on a direct basis
with all contributing elements of AMC, serving as a master
. .The Project Manager will initiate the project plan, the

annual program and budget request, reprogramming actions
and other..changes. .as are necessary to satisfy requirements
that have been set by the Army for its.. materiel... Primarily,
responsibility for the direction and control of major contractors rests with the Project Manager. In the past, contractors
have, on occasion, received different and conflicting instructions from several sources within the Army; henceforth,
120
The Army's "One-Time Buy" of AR-15s
contractors will look only to the Project Manager. .for their

instructions.
I am convinced that the system of vertical management
we have installed will be of great and lasting benefit to the
accomplishment of our mission. Each Project Manager will
be personally considered and approved by me before any
indication of his possible selection is made. It is my intention
to obtain for these positions the highest caliber and most
fully qualified officers that the Army can provide - the leaders
of tomorrow who are preparing that base today.
[signed,]
F.S. Besson, Jr.,
Lieutenant General, USA
Commanding
The "Office of Project Manager for AR-15 Rifle Activities"
was established on March 6 with headquarters at Rock Island
Arsenal, Illinois. After due deliberation, General Besson
appointed Lt. Col. Harold T. Yount as Project Manager, a
capable officer and the son of old family friends. Bill Davis,
still the Superintendent of the NATO North American Regional
Test Center for ammunition, introduces this pivotal character
in our story as follows:
I first met Harold Yount when he was assigned to the Small
Arms Branch, [D&PS], at Aberdeen..in the mid-fifties...I
believe that he was then a captain of Ordnance, soon to
become major. He had a strong avocational interest in small
arms (as did many of us then in that organization), had been
a "Golden Bullet" rifleman in interscholastic marksmanship
competition during his college days, and was still active
in competitive shooting. He was assigned to Aberdeen as
a Proof Officer, directly engaged in the day-to-day testing
of small arms and ammunition, which was the business of
that organization. He was bright, industrious, highly motivated, eager to learn, and professionally competent.
As noted by General Besson, Lt. Col. Yount's "Office of the
AR-15 Project Manager" was established to achieve the earliest
possible acquisition and deployment of the AR-15 system, as
directed by Defense Secretary McNamara. Among the Project
Manager's many duties and responsibilities was the coordination of "product requests" from all the other services and
agencies who had hitherto made their own deals direct with
Colt's and Remington. Another duty, even more important
from the standpoint of our story, was the preparation each
week of a management report, informing HQ AMC of the
significant happenings within the program during the past
week. Fortunately, a complete set of these reports survive.
130. A rare, early Colt model 01 instructional cutaway AR-15. This arm features
the Colt "green stock", which was simply the old brown stock painted green.
121 The Army's "One-Time Buy" of AR-15s
Lt. Col. Yount certainly came to his new powers with a clean
slate, admitting as he later did before the Ichord subcommittee
that he had never set eyes upon an AR-15 prior to being selected
as that program's Project Manager in March of 1963.
The Formation
of The Technical Coordinating Committee (TCC)
The following excerpts from the first few AR-15 Project
Manager's Weekly Reports allow us to pick up the initial threads
of the adventures to which Harold Yount was so speedily

introduced:
AR-15 Rifle: Initial submission

. .The Project Manager visited Springfield Armory on 13
March to coordinate project activities. Springfield. .engineering facilities are currently evaluating correction of
deficiencies as reported by [BRL] and other test results.
Efforts are being directed in the areas of bolt closure, magazine assembly, grenade attachment, and muzzle compensator/
flash hider.
On 14 March, together with representatives of Springfield
Armory, Boston Procurement District, Remington Arms Co.,
and USAMUCOM [the Army Munitions Command at Frankford Arsenal], [we] visited the Colt Patent Fire Arms Mfg.
Co., Hartford, Conn. Colt's engineering staff is currently
working in several design areas of the rifle. The Colt firm
has furnished engineering design data for the rifle to
[MUCOM]. Engineering design data for ammunition has
also been furnished by Remington Arms Co...The above
engineering data is necessary to study and resolve the
present design dimensional incompatibility of the ammogun system.
AR-15 Rifle: [week of] 18-22 March 1963

A meeting was held at [HQ, AWC] on 21 March with Mr.
David Scott, President, Colt's Patent Fire Arms Mfg. Co.,
Inc., and Mr. Kendall Barnes, General Counsel, [AMC].
The purpose of the meeting was to discuss patent rights and
licensing agreements in association with the AR-15 program.

No definite conclusions were reached at the meeting, however,
a new approach to the subject will be discussed with Colt's..
during the week of 25 March.
AR-15 Rifle: [week of] 25-29 March 1963

A series of briefings, starting with USAMC Commanding
Staff and proceeding through R&D, DCSLOG [the Army's
Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics] and the Chief of Staff,
General Wheeler, were presented concerning the recommended procurement program for the AR-15 rifle. Technical
changes to the rifle and relating ammunition program requirements were widely discussed. The recommended procurement
plan was approved in principle, however, certain deficiencies
are to be resolved regarding quantities of rifles and relating

ammunition to be procured.
A joint Technical Coordination meeting was held at Eglin Air
Force Base among representatives from the Air Force, Army
and Industry to exchange views on the technical status of the
AR-15 rifle. Mr. Stoner, the AR-15 rifle designer, participated in
the meeting. This was the first of such joint meetings planned.
AR-15 Rifle: [week of] 8-12 April 1963

TECHNICAL COMMITTEE: A Technical Committee, to
be comprised of Army, Navy, Marine and Air Force representatives is being established to technically coordinate and
decide on matters pertaining to the achievement of a single
standard AR-15 rifle. [The] AR-15 Rifle Project Manager will
chair the committee..
A contract was signed with Remington Arms, Inc., Bridgeport, Connecticut, on 11 April for 600,000 rounds of Cal.
.223 Ball ammunition to support the AR-15 Rifle evaluation

program.
[signed],
Harold W. Yount
Lt Colonel, OrdCorps
AR-15 Project Manager
The First 130 Changes
Chapter Eight
THE FIRST 130 CHANGES

TO THE AR-15
Ominous Overlords
And so, under orders from the Secretary of Defense, the
Army moved to establish the centralized "one-time buy" of
AR-15s for all the services. Nominal control of the whole
procurement package was vested in Lt. Col. Yount, the AR-15
Program Manager and Chairman of the TCC. Significantly,
however, veto power over the TCC's decisions was retained
by Defense Secretary McNamara, who also declined General
Besson's proposed "arm's length" OSD liason with the TCC
through a "Project Manager Staff Officer" (PMSO) stationed
in Washington. To ensure direct OSD participation in the

TCC, Secretary McNamara appointed both his Deputy Assistant Secretary in charge of Weapons Acquisition and Industrial
Readiness, and a program analyst from the OSD's Directorate
of Major Items, Materiel, Installations and Logistics, as
members.
After the formation of the famous Technical Coordination

Committee (ICC), the technical decisions. .were ostensibly
to be made according to some sort of consensus of the Army,
Air Force and Marines... The distinction between the fiction
and the facts about the decision-making process in the
TCC is perhaps one of the greatest ironies in the history
of the M16.
the proceedings of the TCC, although Col. Yount, like a good

soldier, never explicitly said so.
. .while McNamara had charged the TCC with the responsibility for making the technical decisions concerning
the AR-15/M16, he stipulated that the authority to veto those
decisions was reserved to OSD...it was made quite clear
to the Project Manager that OSD had final authority over
Bill Davis, soon to be drawn abruptly into the thick of the

fray, further explains the behind-the-scenes setup of the TCC:
. .a representative of OSD sat..at the meetings of the TCC

. ..[He] was from the office of the OSD Comptroller, the same
office that had prepared the Hitch report, and he made it
quite clear that he represented OSD. The whiz kids who had
directed the technical odyssey of the AR-15 rifle/ammunition
system before McNamara's decision to assign procurement
authority to the Army were still effectively in charge, by virtue
of their delegated veto power, thus retaining their fiercely
guarded authority, while neatly unencumbered by any concomitant responsibility...
Establishing a Caliber .223 Ammunition Base

at Frankford Arsenal
As mentioned, the AR-15 rifle and the .223 Remington cartridge were hitherto procured "off the shelf" with little military
involvement in the setting and checking of standards and
specifications. The TCC therefore quite naturally wanted a
firm "handle" on just exactly what had been purchased up
to date, to assist them in defining the parameters of the future

rifle and cartridge in military terms.
..This situation ended abruptly in March of 1963, when..

Frankford Arsenal was assigned the task of overseeing procurement of [.223] ammuniton.
This was not an enviable position.. .Frankford Arsenal..

had not previously been involved with the .223 ammunition
in any way... I was excused temporarily from most of my
Bill Davis' "comfortably detached" position as Superintendent of the NATO North American Regional Test Center
was soon just a memory:
123
The First 130 Changes 123
other duties, given the ad hoc title of "AR-15 Project

Director" for the commanding officer, and directed by
him to set about the unenviable task of preparing a
technical data package for ammunition procurement
which would satisfy the requirements of the various
users.
..The urgency which characterized early stages of the

program did not allow time for preparation of formal technical reports, and so the documentation, .took the form of
informal Memo Reports, each addressing one particular
aspect of the task. Ten such reports were published within
the first year of this engineering effort, during which some
essential product improvements were effected..
As an example of the scope and value of these Frankford reports, Mr. Davis' Second Memo Report on the AR-15
Rifle/Ammunition System of 17 June 1963 entitled Investigation of Test-Weapon Chamber Configuration, analyzed the
design data which the manufacturers had furnished. This
report confirmed discrepancies between some of Colt's
tolerances for the rifle's chamber, and Remington's specifications for the ammunition. Modifications to correct these
"design dimensional incompatabilities" were taken under
consideration by the TCC, as were a number of other minor
improvements suggested for heat treatment or finish on various parts of the rifle.
Few of the other proposed weapon or ammunition changes

were so smoothly processed. For various reasons neither the
Army nor the Air Force could resist the opportunity to make their
own mark or stamp on the new rifle. Thus, shortly after Lt. Col.
Yount's progress report of March 28 had noted that changes were
being "widely discussed", Secretary McNamara was aghast to
learn that the TCC had tabled over 130 proposed changes to the
rifle/ammunition package. Many were minor and technical in
nature, like those mentioned above, but three main issues soon
emerged. On two of these the Army and Air Force made their
respective stands against the power of the Secretary of Defense
and, where necessary, each other. Neither would budge, thus
holding up the contract award to Colt's for the rest of the year.
The Deja Vu From the Top

Secretary McNamara's 1963 decision to accept the AR-15,
albeit only as a stopgap on the way to the SPIW, proclaimed
final, official recognition of the SCHV concept. (The fact that
five years of M14 production had intervened, five fallow years
as regards AR-15 engineering development, was not his fault.)
Unfortunately, in an ironic reversal of Dr. Carten's fatally
mistaken denial of the AR-15's merits in 1958, the Defense
Department's "coterie of cerebral academics" tended to fulsome
overstatement: it was as if Gene Stoner's "creations" had
sprung, perfected, from the well of genius itself. In this heady
atmosphere, pseudoscience reigned: the gruesome lethality results
of Project AGILE; the Hitch report's enthusiastic inference

that the AR-15 was a fully-developed weapon system; and
Colt's claim that the AR-15 would fire longer without cleaning
than any other rifle; were all eagerly accepted at face value.
McNamara therefore viewed the acquisition of the AR-15 rifle
and ammunition system as a relatively simple process: to him,
the investigations commissioned in good faith by the TCC, particularly the Frankford Arsenal ammunition studies, threatened
to involve the program in a seemingly infinite "universe" of
arcane technical considerations. On June 27, McNamara
ordered the TCC to "keep it simple":
To capitalize on the potential of this weapon for the special

units and to assist in determining the follow-on system to
the M14, the AR-15 should be procured and placed in the
hands of troops at the earliest date. This is to be accom-
plished with the least administrative lead time, and at the

lowest cost for a sound product, and at the most rapid
delivery date.
This McNamara memorandum also confirmed that all proposed modifications to the unified rifle were to be first agreed
upon by all four services, then submitted for OSD approval
before formal announcement by the TCC.
future production were irrevocably set, at OSD insistence,

without a firm appreciation of all the facts. The consequences
of some of the early decisions, involving seemingly miniscule
but unfortunately ill-understood tradeoffs, are examined below.
As we shall see, it was a time when the best possible counsel

would have been none too good to ensure an optimum course
for the AR-15, yet basic specifications which were to affect all
Dr. Carten later commented wryly on one aspect of Secretary

McNamara's personal interest in the AR-15 program. As it
turned out, he was describing the hapless TCC:
.. The overall result of such high level continuous interest is that the technicians spend more time on the
quality of their presentations and briefings than they
do on technical matters and projects suffer accordingly.
There is also a tendency for the average technician to agree

with higher authority since disagreement exposes him to
the intensive, and many times unflattering, scrutiny of the
top echelons.
Formalizing the Fiction - The Gilpatrick Directive

The Project Manager's plight was thus unenviable in the
extreme: he was forced to come to grips with what was really
an exceedingly complex technical situation, under strict and
unrealistic parameters set by the Defense Department. Credit
for the TCC's successes would ultimately be taken elsewhere,
but, "like a good soldier", Lt. Col. Yount was a sitting duck
in the event of failure.
An example of the illusory nature of the TCC's powers and

freedoms came on July 26, with the flow of crucial technical
data on cartridge parameters from Frankford just hitting its
stride. McNamara's Deputy Secretary of Defense, Roswell
Gilpatrick, advised the TCC of even tighter controls in an effort
to hasten and simplify the "one-time buy":
I believe it to be essential that we avoid the cost, delay

and management difficulties of the quality assurance, parts
interchangeability, and acceptance test standards programs
of previous rifle procurement. Special attention will be given
to ensure that the goals established in these technical packages
are realistic from a cost and production viewpoint, do not
exceed practical user requirements, and are developed early

with the manufacturer to avoid conflict between production
inspection standards and acceptance inspection standards.
A deliberate effort should be made to limit interchangeability
requirements to those parts which can be realistically changed
in the field.
This unprecedented OSD involvement in a rifle procurement program, hitherto the prerogative of the Army itself, was
for many an unwelcome affront, and did little within that
community to enhance the popularity of the AR-15. On the
other hand, the Air Force, Navy and Marines, whose opinions
had seldom been sought when Army Ordnance officials had
been in charge of all small arms testing and procurement, were
now able and determined to present their own views.
The Great Rifling Twist Controversy

In the early course of the AR-15/M16 program a number
of great claims were made within OSD concerning the novelty
and genius of Stoner's original designs. Indeed, much of the
later criticism that was heaped upon the Army, and in particular the Project Manager, was for wantonly or perfidiously
tampering with the "already perfected" AR-15 and/or its
ammunition. In the course of this book we will examine the
validity of a number of these issues in detail.
One such was a lengthy dispute over rifling twist. The crux
of this debate concerned the alleged enhancement of bullet
lethality imparted by the "marginal gyroscopic stability"
inherent in the AR-15's original rifling specification of one turn
in 14 inches. Bill Davis, by this time as noted the AR-15 Project
Manager for .223 ammunition at Frankford Arsenal and one
of America's foremost ballistic engineers, fills in some interesting
background to the barrel twist debate:
..I must hasten to add that these specific claims have not
been by Stoner himself, so far as I know, but were made
by his enthusiastic disciples in OSD, and were popularly
accepted by the media and by many self-styled experts who
have written about this matter.
nearly all other "varmint" rifles firing .22 caliber bullets of

about 50 to 55 grains weight. The gyroscopic stability of 55grain "varmint" bullets was quite satisfactory in the 14-inch
twist, and at first thought it might be supposed that the
14-inch twist would impart the same degree of stability to a
55-grain military bullet as well. To perceive that this is not the
case requires an understanding of the role played by the
ratio of axial to transverse moments of inertia in a bullet,
and the effect of a longer ogive and a boattail on this critical
ratio. ..In any event, the 14-inch twist failed to provide sufficient spin for adequate gyroscopic stability of either Stoner's
original bullet, or the M193 bullet designed by Remington.
..As for the 14-inch twist, one theory holds that it was carefully chosen, so as to impart to the carefully designed bullet,
exactly the correct degree of gyroscopic stability to maximize
its lethality. On the other hand, it was hardly without precedent.
Rifles being built by Remington for the .222 Remington commercial cartridge had 14-inch twist of rifling, as indeed did
123
The Air Force Blows the Whistle

While by all accounts the AR-15 performed well in the jungle,
many USAF Strategic Air Command bases were situated in
decidedly less temperate parts of the world. In January 1963,
the USAF had released a report entitled Exterior Ballistics of
the AR-15 Rifle, which described firing tests they had conducted
in a climactic hangar cold chamber at Eglin AFB. These confirmed earlier BRL reports that, in 1-in-14 barrels, Stoner's
professedly marginal bullet stability quite literally wobbled over
the edge of accuracy acceptability, due simply to the increased
density of air at subzero temperatures. Barrels with a twist
of only one turn in twelve inches had solved what the Air Force
saw as essentially a cold-weather accuracy problem affecting the
worldwide acceptability of the AR-15. Through the TCC, they
accordingly recommended that the 1-in-12 twist be adopted as
standard in the new procurement, concluding that "changing
the twist in the barrel does not reduce the lethality of the bullet".
Bullet lethality is of course a tradeoff. Even at normal ambient
temperatures the marginal gyroscopic stability imparted by a
14-inch rifling twist had a detrimental effect on the accuracy

of .223 caliber military bullets. Statistically, therefore, the
slight increase in probability that a hit from a 14-inch twist
barrel would kill (PhK) was more than offset by the increase
in probability of getting a hit in the first place (Ph) with a
more stable, and hence more accurate, bullet from a 12-inchtwist barrel.
The Army's worldwide trials had reported reliability problems, but generally those AR-15s had been stretched well past
their designed range limitations before serious accuracy degradation had shown up. The Army therefore challenged the
rifling change, until further tests of their own corroborated
Air Force results. They then withdrew their objection, and
Secretary McNamara personally approved the change to
l-in-12 rifling on July 26. The following month, the TCC
formally adopted the 12-inch twist modification "without
controversy", although as we shall see the issue was not yet
finally laid to rest.
The Army's Bolt Closure Device

One thing the Army had held on to since the days of the
'03 Springfield was a positive way for the soldier to close the
bolt of his rifle, should the need arise. The Ml had this feature,
as did the Carbine and the M14. One of the main US Ordnance
criticisms of the FN FAL back in the fifties was that it had no such
provision. In any case, the Army would not back down on the
need for a manual bolt closure on the AR-15, and stated its case
with eloquence and determination in this official "position paper":
.. The AR-15 is to be issued to Combat Infantrymen who are

expected to use the weapon under the worst possible conditions
of dust, dirt, mud, and foreign matter affecting both weapon
and cartridges. If the mechanical spring fails to close the bolt
the soldier must have the capability of immediately correcting
the situation without disassembling the rifle.. .Any chance,
no matter how slight, of malfunction in combat due to the
inability to manually close the bolt is unacceptable..
The ability to close the bolt manually on any semiautomatic rifle is considered necessary as an emergency
measure. Neither the Ml or the M14 Field Manual recommends forcible closure of the bolt under normal conditions.
However, FM 23-5 (US Rifle Caliber .30 M1) states..that
in loading a full clip, "you may strike forward on the
operating handle with the heel of the right hand when
necessary to fully close and lock the bolt."
The frequency or infrequency of the type of malfunction

correctable by a manual bolt closure capability is immaterial.
The knowledge among troops that such a malfunction is
merely possible would lower confidence in a weapon lacking
[such] a. .device.
An important side benefit..would be the ability..to

silently chamber a round. This is impossible if the bolt
must always be slammed home under pressure of the
operating spring.
Gene Stoner had initially been given somewhat guru-like

status as an unofficial member of the TCC. At first glance
this was a unique and enviable position but, as he later related,
being this close to the OSD-dominated TCC was in reality

rather frustrating. As regards the bolt closure idea, for example,
Stoner later told the Ichord subcommittee:
131. Closeup of a "green stock" Colt model 01, serial no. 011476, featuring
one of two Springfield Armory versions of a bolt closure device. To close the
bolt, the user pushed in the rear projection with the heel of his hand.
132. "Bolt Closure Device #1 with Dual Latches" - exploded and isometric views. A slot in the top of the receiver was fitted with an angled
cam block (fig. 131) which pushed the flat spring (above) down into contact
with the (modified) bolt carrier. This was the device, if any, that Gene
Stoner recommended.
Springfield Armory photo dated October 14, 1963
128
.. in this bolt closure device that the Army insisted putting

on, I was asked by Colt and some people in the Army my
opinions on this thing and what it would do to the weapon.
There was a lot of thrashing around to come up with a system
that would satisfy the Army and also be compatible with
the weapon. The [Springfield Armory] one I. .thought would
be the least harmful was the one they did not adopt. They
turned around and put this other [Colt] one on.
Stoner went on to say that he had picked the Springfield
Armory design because it required less alteration to the rifle,
and was the easiest to do away with when the Army finally
decided it wasn't worth putting on in the first place. When
asked if he believed the closure device did any actual harm,
Stoner continued:
133. Another "green stock" Colt AR-15 model 01, serial no. 011767, experimentally fitted with a left-handed version of Colt's second bolt closure design.
The Air Force objected strongly to the whole idea of a bolt closure device,
while the Army just as adamantly insisted on it.
.. Well, in my opinion, in all the development - and I tested

this weapon.. in India and Europe and all over the United
States; I was on many testing programs - I never saw an
134. AR-15 model 01, serial no. 013168, with "in-the-white" experimental model
of Colt's right-handed thumb-closer idea.
Rock Island Arsenal collection, photo by Richard S. Smith
instance where it would have done any good.. .under sand

and mud and every type of firing conditions in the world.
I was always afraid of [a bolt closure device] myself, because
when you get a cartridge that won't seat in a rifle and you
deliberately drive it in [to the chamber], usually you are buying

yourself more trouble. The thing that I always thought of was
immediate action. To get that [cartridge] out of there and find
out what the trouble was; rather than jam it in and fire it.
Bill Davis concurred, offering more insight into why the

Army would choose to "make its stand" on such a relatively
minor and indefensible issue as the bolt closure device:
..There are a few circumstances in which a bolt forwardassist device might be useful, to a well trained rifleman who
is able to analyze the situation and use the device judiciously.
Not all troops are very well trained in such matters, however,
and the injudicious use of the forward-assist.. is less likely
to clear a stoppage by immediate action than to turn an
easily clearable stoppage into a virtually unclearable one.
It is my personal opinion that the stubborn stand taken
on this issue by the Army..was provoked by the frustration
that they felt at the impotence to which the TCC had been
reduced by the much-used veto power of OSD, on every issue,
great and small. It was unfortunately a weak issue on which
to take such a symbolic stand..
135. Figs. 2, 3 and 4 from US Patent 3,326,155, granted to F. E. Sturtevant

and assigned to Colt's, entitled "Firearm Having an Auxiliary Bolt Closure
Mechanism". As can be seen, the Air Force was right about the "weight,
Unhappily, the spirit of harmony which had seen all the services
concur on the Air Force's 1-in-12 barrel twist did not extend
to the Army's case for the bolt closure device. In fact the Air
Force, the only service to have already adopted the AR-15,
was understandably dead against the idea, stating in part in
cost and complexity" of the device, the action of which is briefly described
from the four-page, 15-claim patent as follows: "The mechanism 98 is slideably
received within the generally cylindrical side passage 100 of the receiver 12... As
best seen in figs. 3 and 4, the plunger 116 is generally cylindrical and possesses
a longitudinal recess 118 along one side...Pawl 128 comprises a generally
rectangular pawl body portion 132 possessing at its rearward extremity a
slightly tapering rear surface 134 and a transverse aperture 136 through which
extends the pivot pin 130...On the forward end of body portion 132 is a ratchet
contacting and actuating foot 138 which cooperates with the longitudinally
spaced ratchet teeth 140 located on the side of the bolt carrier 52 so as to
136. Two bolt assemblies showing carriers with ratchet teeth on both sides
for bolt closure devices mounted on right side (top; fig. 134) and left side
(bottom; fig. 133).
move the bolt assembly 48 into the battery position. The teeth 140 extend
along the length of carrier 52 a sufficient amount so that they are presented
to the passage 100 regardless of the position of the carrier 52.."
123
its position paper that during more than three years of testing
and operation of the AR-15 rifle under all types of conditions,
the Air Force "has no record of malfunctions that could have
been corrected by the use of a manual bolt closing device".
The Air Force went on to list some other objections, pointing
out that the modification would add to each rifle's weight, cost,
and complexity, and could itself possibly induce other malfunctions. Not to be outdone, the Navy and the Marines also
prepared formal position papers on the bolt closure issue. In
a single paragraph the Navy explained that the device might be
desirable in the event of certain "minor difficulties", but was
not considered essential. In a similar short statement the Marines
found it "non-essential", although if one were developed and
proven to work well, the Marines were willing to consider it,
provided it did not degrade basic rifle performance.
As regards the actual hardware, the addition of such a device
where none had been intended was proving a difficult task
in itself. By the summer of 1963 both Colt's and Springfield
Armory had submitted designs, although initially none seemed
completely satisfactory. Colt's first proposal had been a handle,
attached directly to the bolt carrier, like the prototype AR-10A
(fig. 36). This simply stuck out through a long slot milled in
the upper receiver and reciprocated with the bolt carrier, thus
allowing more dirt than ever to enter the action. Colt's second
design eventually became the now-familiar ratchet-style "button"
working through a modified upper receiver.
As Gene Stoner noted, Springfield had studied the problem
from the standpoint of the least possible modification, and
hence cost. They too had proposed two concepts, the first being
to modify the upper receiver, charging handle and bolt carrier
key, adding only a small spring and plunger to the total number
of existing parts. A second Armory model was also in the
design stage at this time.
Meanwhile, quite aside from the developmental hardware
problems, the debate over the necessity for a bolt closure capability grew hotter. Secretary McNamara's original ground rules
for the TCC had specified four-service agreement on all modifications before they could be adopted, but a resolution to the
bolt closure issue seemed farther away than ever. In September,
the Army's Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
(ACSFOR) informed McNamara that the AR-15 rifle was "an
unsatisfactory weapon for Army procurement and use, based
on a reaffirmation of the essentiality of a manual bolt-closure
capability and in consideration of the inherent risk of inadvertent
fire." The Air Force, for its part, had run its own tests on the
latest bolt closure designs from Colt's and Springfield, concluding that both were "unsatisfactory and unacceptable...it
is recommended that the [TCC] drop further consideration of
both..designs."
On October 12, Secretary Vance reported to McNamara
that the Army still insisted the bolt closure was "mandatory",
while for the Air Force it was "neither necessary nor desirable".
As discussed below, other pressing problems soon overshadowed
the pros and cons of the bolt closure issue, thus forcing a compromise on Secretary McNamara'a original plan of "one rifle"
for all.
The "Slamfire" Problem

This third major problem was different again, if only that
it was nobody's pet project. During the increased "hands-on"
scrutiny being given the AR-15 by all four services, the Air
Force and the Marines had reported that when a cartridge was
single-loaded into the chamber and the bolt release pressed,

their rifles sometimes fired inadvertently. Bill Davis recalls the
mood of the first Washington meeting convened by the TCC
to discuss this problem:
.. When I arrived, I did not recognize any of my acquaintances in the small arms technical community, except a topmanagement official from Remington. This did not greatly
surprise me, as I had been told that "Ordnance people"
were excluded, insofar as possible, from all deliberations
involving the AR-15 and its ammunition. I introduced myself
to the group, and conveyed the assurances of my commanding
officer that the technical resources of Frankford Arsenal
would be at their disposal, and we stood ready to cooperate
in their effort in arty way possible. This opening remark was
met with stony silence, and the meeting got under way.
I soon discovered the topic of conversation would be "high

primers" in the .223 Remington ammunition, the inquisitors
were representatives from OSD, and the accused was the
official from Remington. There were no specimens of ammunition exhibiting "high primers" available for examination,
and the man from Remington reported that their most careful
investigation had disclosed none in the ammunition that they
had inspected. The evidence, it was said, was that AR-15
rifles sometimes fired prematurely upon closure of the bolt.
I ventured to inquire whether any other untoward result of
this premature firing had been reported, and was told that
137. An early Colt model (6)02 (XM16E1) showing the bolt closure and modified
charging handle contour, but still fitted with the early chromed bolt and original
"heavy" firing pin.
there had not. I felt obliged to say, therefore, that "high

primers" could hardly be the cause of the premature firing,
else the rifle would have fired before locking, and the consequences of an unlocked firing could hardly have escaped
attention.
I sensed immediately that my disagreement with the inquisitors was regarded as quite presumptuous, rather as if I had
recited some horrible heresy aloud in church. The conversation
Once the "high primer" idea had been officially ruled out,
there seemed at first glance to be two possible solutions to the
"slamfire" problem: either modify the rifle's firing pin, or the
cartridge primer. (At length, the solution was found in a
contentious combination of both). Right away, however, Colt's,
did turn to other matters, however, leaving the "high primer"

issue ostensibly unresolved. I returned to Frankford.. somewhat
the wiser about who was actually in charge of investigating
the technical problems that were being experienced with the
AR-15 system, the expertise of the investigators, and the
degree of cooperation that I could expect from the emissaries
of OSD. Back at Frankford. .we then set about the investigations
[described below]..
still miffed at the continuing holdups on the production

contract, stated flatly that any modification to the rifle in the
firing pin area would constitute a major redesign program.
The TCC, with Frankford's assistance, therefore concentrated
initially on modifying the sensitivity of the primer:
123
Frankford Arsenal
First Memo Report on AR-15 Rifle/Ammunition System
Investigation of Firing Pin Energy and Primer Sensitivity

4 April, 1963
Background
by the hammer, in the normal manner of firing the AR-15

rifle... A summary of these data follows:
The incidence of premature firing has in some trials been

reported infrequently or not at all, and in other trials with
rather high..[and] undesirable frequency..
Procedures
and Results
. .To determine the energy of the [AR-15 's] firing pin blow
which results accidently from [ten trials of] the inertia of
the pin upon bolt closure..
Indent Depth, Inch:

Average
Maximum
Minimum
Rifle No.
007237
Rifle No.
007249
.0078
.0090
.0065
.0061
.0075
.0045
11
14
8
7
10
4
Firing Pin Energy, Ounces:

Average
Maximum
Minimum
. .assistance was sought from Springfield Armory, who had

made some kinematic studies of the AR-15 cycle. Their timedisplacement curves for the bolt carrier show that its velocity
in the instant of being arrested by impact with the bolt head
is about 12 feet per second. As the mass of the firing pin
is about 163 grains, and its velocity is the same as that of
the. .carrier on impact, it can be calculated that the kinetic
energy of the pin at that instant is about 10 inch ounces..
Indent Depth, Inch:

Average
Maximum
Minimum
Rifle No.
007237
Rifle No.
007249
.0234
.0245
.0225
.0220
.0230
.0210
84
89
80
77
82
72
Hammer-Blow Energy, Ounces:

Average
Maximum
Minimum
. .No equipment is yet available at Frankford Arsenal for

making primer-sensitivity tests on .223 ammunition. However,
[Remington] has made available.. information, which indicates
that the primer used in production of the commercial .223
cartridge is comparable to that used in caliber .30 Carbine
military ammunition. The sensitivity range of the caliber
.30 Carbine primer is from a "none-fire" limit of about
6 inch ounces. .to an "all-fire" limit of about 36 inch ounces,
which are prescribed in military specification requirements.
The tolerances demanded by the manufacturer for the commercial .223 primers are within this range.
Observations
and
Conclusions
It is clear that the matter of firing-pin energy.. should be

related to the. .primer-sensitivity range in the ammunition.
The first question, dealt with above, involves the limit of
primer sensitivity which must be respected to avoid accidental firing. The second. .question involves the other limit
of the primer-sensitivity range, which must be respected to
avoid misfires..
In light of the fact that the AR-15 rifle characteristically

may allow the primer to be struck by a firing-pin blow of
about 10 or 15 inch ounces upon closure of the bolt, it is
clear that the energy threshold of primer functioning should
be safely above this figure to guard against accidental premature firing. Considering that the "none-fire" criterion of
the .223 primer is only about 6 inch ounces, it is somewhat
surprising that premature firing has not been more frequent
...The threshold of energy, below which primers must not
fire, must clearly be above 15 inch ounces for safe and satisfactory use in present AR-15 rifles.
The firing-pin-indent fixture., [was] used to obtain the depth

of indent made by [ten trials of] the firing pin when struck
Wm. C. Davis, Jr..

AR-15 Project Director
The TCC met at Springfield Armory on June 25 to discuss

the results of the Frankford Arsenal primer sensitivity investigation, which had included a discussion of a theoretical primer
which would all fail to fire at a force of 16 inch ounces but
would all fire at 64. When it was learned that such a primer
would produce an inadvertent fire probability in the AR-15
of only "1 in 10 million", a "coordinated Army staff position"
plumped immediately for the 1 in 10 million risk factor, despite
the fact that primers made to the required specifications did
not actually exist.
A compromise of sorts was worked out on paper, and
the two main suppliers of cartridges, Olin and Remington,
were asked to bid on cartridges loaded with primers having
12 to 48 inch ounce none- and all-fire thresholds, to which
Frankford had assigned an estimated 1 in 6,400 probability
of inadvertent fire in the AR-15. Neither contractor would

even bid on the project, stating that trying to produce primers
to such limits was too tricky in large volume, and would lead
to very high lot-to-lot rejection rates. At a further ammunition meeting at Frankford early in September, the Arsenal
staff nevertheless advised the TCC not to relax the 12 to 48
inch ounce limits, at the risk of an unacceptable probability
of inadvertent fire in the AR-15. Remington estimated that
they would have to reject 50% of such primers made, but
gamely agreed to try if the Army would allow the primers
to be accepted or rejected before being loaded, thus preventing
the rejection of an entire lot of ammunition solely on the basis
of faulty primers. Olin estimated they would reject two out
of every three lots of primers made to such limits. Two weeks
later, they revised that figure upwards, to 90%.
Down to the Crunch on the "One-Time Buy"

Meanwhile, with both the "slamfire" problem and the bolt
closure debate still unresolved, the TCC was being forced into
a compromise position due to time constrictions soon to be
imposed by simple economics at Colt's. Not just another arsenal
to be ordered around at will, Colt's was a private company
with a normal, not to say desperate, concern for the "bottom
line". As such, Colt's faced imminent financial ruin as a result
of the government's double stranglehold of delays in domestic
acquisition and embargo on foreign sales. The firm had already
advised the Army that as soon as current obligations (notably
the 1962 Air Force contract for 8,500 rifles) were fulfilled, they
would shut down and dismantle the AR-15 assembly line in
order to reassign both the men and machinery involved to
other, more profitable tasks.
Finally, on October 25, in the face of continued indecision
on the primer sensitivity and firing pin modifications, Defense
Secretary McNamara sent a memo to Army Secretary Vance,
relenting on his hitherto unbending order that all four services
agree on "one rifle". Even at this eleventh hour, he obviously
hoped that the Army would come to its senses over the bolt
closure idea, which he had vigorously opposed:
138. With special primer development holding up the solution to the "slamfire"
problem, Colt's and Springfield Armory undertook an examination of how
to lighten or somehow restrain the AR-15's firing pin. Colt's "No. 2 Design"
was at length chosen as the best approach.
..Since the AR-15 line [at Colt's] now producing Air

Force rifles must close unless immediate action is taken,
you should initiate all planned procurement at once. To
satisfy the disagreement about bolt closure, the requirements of the Air Force should be procured without this
modification. The Army may procure the rifle with the Colt
designed manual bolt closure. In case your field tests,
to be completed by 20 December 1963, indicate a lack

of need for the bolt closure modification, the Army is
authorized to revise its order to the same design being
procured for the Air Force. Likewise, a selection of the bolt
and pin modification to insure against inadvertent fire can
be made as late as one month from contract without significant effect on deliveries.
123
The Army's First Contract (DA-11-199-AMC-508)

for M16 and XM16E1 Rifles
139. The long-awaited moment of signature on the Army's "one-time buy":

Colt Firearms president David C. Scott puts pen to paper on contract "508",
initially worth $13.5 million, while AWC Deputy Commander Brigadier General
Roland T. Anderson looks on.
US Army photo dated November 4, 1963
Contract "508", worth $13.5 million, was thus approved

by the Secretary of Defense on October 25 and finally
awarded to Colt's on November 4th, 1963. Numerous
amendments and upward revisions of the dollar amount and
quantities of rifles involved kept this "one-time b u y " contract in a virtually continuous state of flux. The basic
procurement contract called for 104,000 rifles: 85,000 with

the Colt-designed bolt assist, designated the XM16E1, for the
Army and the Marines at a unit cost of $121.84; and the
remaining 19,000, called simply the M16, for the Air Force
at a flat $112.00 each. The only differences concerned receiver
markings and the bolt assist feature.
The Eleven Pre-Production AR-15 Modifications
PROPERTY
OF
140. Closeup of the receiver markings on a Colt AR-15 model (6)02, the
precursor to the XM16E1, serial no. 021304. Black-impregnated furniture,
redesigned charging handle, 1-in-12 rifling, modified bolt release and "type 2"
flash suppressor.
Eleven basic "improvements" were incorporated into the

existing Colt AR-15 design before M16 production began under
contract "508". These initial changes are listed below, with
a brief explanation of the background of each:
specified that hereafter the stock, handguard and pistol grip

were to be impregnated with a black coloring agent.
1. Black-impregnated furniture
As originally marketed by Colt, the AR-15's "fibrite" furniture was a mottled brown color, wherein the composition of
compressed fibers was clearly visible. Later, these had been
painted green, a rather unsatisfactory process which scratched
or wore off after relatively little use. The one-time buy contract
2. Chamber dimensional change

This resolved the dimensional interferences between chamber
and cartridge, as discussed above.
3. Charging handle redesign
The original, a sort of serrated 45 triangle shape, was found
to be rather difficult to operate under some conditions. The
new T-shaped handle provided a more positive grip.
123
4. Front sling swivel
7. Rifling twist modification
Complaints had been received about the plain metal front

sling swivel, which could rattle noisily. It was henceforth to
be coated with black plastic.
5. Firing pin redesign (fig. 138)
Tightening the twist from 1 turn in 14 to 1 turn in 12 inches

improved bullet stability, and hence accuracy, especially in subzero weather. As mentioned, the great rifling twist controversy
returned to dog the heels of the TCC in the years to come
(chapter 14).
8. Bolt release modification
Finally incorporated as part of the TCC's "field fix" for the

inadvertent fire problem, in conjunction with the adoption of
less sensitive primers. After attempts by Colt's and Springfield
to spring-load or otherwise partly restrain the firing pin, it
was finally agreed to use a Colt idea which simply lightened
the pin's total mass, thereby decreasing the force of its
"bounce" off the primer.
A slight redesign to ensure more positive function and longer

part life.
9. Flash suppressor modification
The distinctively sculptural open prongs of the Colt model
01 were beefed up somewhat, to avoid bending or breakage
during rough handling.
6. Bolt closure device (XM16E1 only; fig. 135)

Having seen so many of the reasoned proposals and conclusions of his technical staff overridden by OSD veto, even the
dutiful Harold Yount later unbent to the point of telling the
Ichord subcommittee that his testing had in fact not justified
the bolt closure device, and that it had been included on the
Army's rifles solely "on the basis of direction". Significantly,
the subcommittee declined to pursue this line of questioning
any further.
10. The original Colt 20-round "waffle" magazines (fig.

406 no. 2) were made of steel, which rapidly corroded. Still
a Colt proprietary item, they were henceforth made of aluminum (fig. 406 no. 3).
11. The old front takedown pin, which held the upper and
lower receivers together, was completely removable, and hence
easily lost. The new design was fitted with a spring-loaded
detent which checked the pin after it was pulled out just far
enough to free the upper receiver.
Towards a Standardized .223 Cartridge

The Discovery of Fundamental Limitations
The Army had ordered a final 600,000 rounds of commercial .223 Remington ammunition back in May 1963, to
support its continuing evaluation of the AR-15/M16 system.
With a view to formulating the Military Characteristics
(MCs) for the planned FY64 ammunition procurement, the
TCC had, as part of the same contract, also acquired
Remington's Technical Data Package (TDP) on the .223

cartridge. This consisted of all the specifications and technical data used in the commercial manufacture of the round.
Over the summer, investigations by Bill Davis' AR-15 team
at Frankford Arsenal revealed some serious discrepancies:
As we found very soon..the claims made for the ballistic

performance of the .223/5.56mm cartridge, by ArmaLite,
Colt, Remington, Stoner, OSD (ARPA) and other vocal proponents of it, had been considerably exaggerated. Examination
of the records at Remington, and testing of samples from
lots of .223 ammunition, .previously produced by Remington,
disclosed that the claimed muzzle velocity of 3,300 fps simply
could not be attained consistently, within the maximum
acceptable chamber pressure of 52,000 psi (radial copper),
using the IMR4475 propellant which had been employed
in the loading. This should not have been very surprising,
because the powder capacity of the cartridge is simply insufficient to accommodate the necessary charge, of an IMR
propellant of suitable relative quickness, to meet those ballistic
requirements. Gustafson and I had examined the question
of the powder capacity required to produce precisely those
ballistics, when we proposed the development of such a
cartridge at Aberdeen in 1955 [chapter 3]. It was our intention to base the experimental cartridge on the commercial
.25 Remington cartridge case, which is larger by about
.045" in body and head diameter than the .222 Remington
family, in order to obtain the necessary powder capacity for
IMR-type propellants in a cartridge that was not undesirably

long...Stoner's design of the cartridge., has inherently insuffi-
cient powder capacity to meet the stated ballistic requirements

when using the powder claimed to be of his own choice..
Genesis Denied - A Display of Blind Arrogance

As we have seen, Gene Stoner originally set out to "design"
a cartridge to satisfy General Wyman's 300-yard range requirement. In his own words he has related that his ".222 Special"
case was simply a lengthened .222 Remington. As an example
of how this and other basic facts were denied credence by
Stoner's OSD disciples, Bill Davis relates an incident he
witnessed at a top-level Washington conference during the M16
controversy:
. .the senior general officer present happened to be speaking
about the origin of the 5.56mm military cartridge, and
commented that it had evolved from the commercial .222
Remington round. At that moment, the OSD man entered
the room, and hearing the general's comments, slammed
down the pile of documents that he was carrying so that
they scattered all over the conference table. He launched
into a tirade of incredible ferocity, to the effect that Gene
Stoner had personally designed the 5.56mm cartridge in its
entirety, and he would countenance no more denigration
of Stoner's efforts by anyone in the Army..
141. Evolution of the .223 cartridge. From left: 1. Gene Stoner's original unheadstamped "stretched" .222 Remington, loaded with his 55-grain bullet,
identified as "Type B" in Frankford Arsenal's Investigation of Bullet
Configuration report of June, 1963; 2. The .222 Remington Special, loaded
with Remington's 55-grain 5.5-caliber tangent ogive bullet (the inferior "Type
A" in the Frankford report), headstamped REM - UMC 222 SPL (fig. 76);
3. A typical M193 5.56mm round, (actually an inert, nickel-cased "Display"
version of Fabrique Nationale's M193 counterpart) headstamped FN 75;
4. An interesting experimental "tapered case" .223 round by Fabrique Nationale,
headstamped FN 68.
Editor's collection
Stoner's Last Word

Davis hastens to add that he does not suggest Stoner himself
was behind this exceedingly unfortunate blind reverence for
the .223 cartridge, nor that he would have condoned it.
In the final paragraph of his own personal, handwritten

history of these events, prepared as background information
for Bobby Macdonald in 1964, Gene Stoner seems to concur:
. .The .223 round is still being loaded to the original specifications I gave them in 1957. I have had several conferences
with Remington in the past years on improving this round,
but they seem to be reluctant to change anything. I believe
that a great deal could be done to this round to improve
its military characteristics. It is inconceivable to me that
the first attempt would result in the best combination of bullet

weight, powder, primer, case design, etc.
yours truly,
E. M. S.
The Self-Manufactured Chamber Pressure Problem

At Remington, meeting the .223 "design goals" had not
presented much of a problem up to this point because DuPont's
proprietary IMR4475 powder was being produced in vast
quantities for contract loading of 7.62mm NATO ammunition,
and Remington could hitherto afford to "pick and choose"
among powder lots to meet the very tight .223 pressure/velocity
specifications. Olin had meanwhile picked up the 7.62 NATO
contract, however, and was of course loading with their own

proprietary ball powder.
OSD refused to give credence to Frankford's warning that
over the long haul the .223 cartridge was incapable of meeting
the stated design goals when using any and every lot of
IMR4475 powder. The Gilpatrick directive had proclaimed
123
138
that the AR-15 was already a fully developed system, and

therefore the Defense Department insisted that the TCC adopt
the original commercial design goals as unalterable military
performance requirements.
Bill Davis explains the three choices available under these

circumstances:
. .Given this fundamental limitation of the cartridge design,

there remained but three possible alternatives, which were: (1)
increase the acceptable chamber pressure; (2) reduce the
required muzzle velocity; or (3) find a propellant of greater
specific energy and/or higher gravimetric density so that a

heavier charge could be accommodated within the limited
case capacity. None of these was especially attractive, but
there were nevertheless some grounds for choice among them.
Alternative 1 - Increased Chamber Pressure

Increasing the allowable chamber pressure was the
least desirable. The expected adverse consequence..is
an increase in the liklihood of expanded case heads and
primer pockets, and consequently "dropped" primers
which can jam the mechanism. This is especially likely if
the ammunition is wet or oily. There were already complaints of "dropped" primers in the AR-15, both in simulated rain tests at Aberdeen in 1960 [chapter 6], and in
the field under rainy conditions. The strength of the relatively small case head was clearly marginal at the chamber
pressures [already] being developed. The resistance of the

case head to expansion is a function of the case-head
diameter and the tensile strength of the material. The casehead diameter, as "designed" by Stoner, obviously could
not be increased. It was questionable whether the problem
could be solved by imposing.. more stringent metallurgical
requirements on the case material. .and in any event that
is imprudent practice in the design of military ammunition
which must be produced in great quantities during times
of emergency.
Alternative 2 - Reduced Muzzle Velocity

[This]. .was more feasible. The reduction of a few percent in
the muzzle velocity would have relatively little effect on lethality
of the bullet in any event, and if coupled with a bullet of more
favorable aerodynamic design, the lethality at the longer

ranges (where the velocity is inevitably reduced and the difference is thus more critical) could actually have been enhanced..
This gives rise to the extremely interesting topic of optim u m bullet configuration. In the course of AR-15 testing
at Frankford it was noted that commercial .223 cartridges
had over the years been procured and issued with at least
two types of bullets. As Bill Davis points out, velocity is

indeed part of the lethality equation but it is terminal velocity
- the speed of the bullet when it reaches the target - that
counts:
Frankford Arsenal
Third Report on AR-15 Rifle/Ammunition System
Investigation
of Bullet
Configuration
18 June 1963
Introduction
It appears that bullets of several different shapes have been
made by various manufacturers at various times, and used
to some extent in ammunition for the AR-15 rifle...
The two types of bullets which were available for testing
were.. "Type A".. taken from cartridges manufactured by the

Remington Arms Company. .and contained in various lots of
.223 ammunition procured under government contracts..."Type B" were
. .from the firm of Sierra Bullets, Whittier, California...
139 The First 130 Changes
TYPE A BLUNT
142. A drawing from Frankford's Investigation of Bullet Configuration
report. Stoner's original "Type B" (below and fig. 141 no. 1) features
the same ogive and boattail as the 1954 Frankford Arsenal 68-grain, . 22
TYPE B BLUNT
TYPE A SHARP
caliber Ml ball homologue (fig. 72). Tests showed the easier-to-make
Remington "Type A" (above) to have "a less favorable aerodynamic
shape".
TYPE B SHARP
Each cartridge. .was fired over a 300-yard range indoors.

Measurements were made of instrumental velocity at 40 feet..
and. .875 feet from the muzzle, and time-of-flight was measured
over 835 feet...A barrel having a 12-inch twist was used
for this firing.
The data..were reduced..to yield ballistic coefficients...

form factors [and] mplat [the small flat on the very tip of
the bullet] diameters.
The Type A bullets had generally "blunter" points than

the Type B bullets...The Type B [Stoner] bullet resembles
in its salient features some successful military bullets of other
types. The [same] 7-caIiber ogive and 9 boat-tail are employed
in the .30 caliber M72 Match bullet...A 68-grain caliber
.22 bullet homologous with the M1 Ball was designed and
tested experimentally, with good success, in 1954 at Aberdeen
...The configuration of the Type B bullet tested for this report
differs from these other bullets only in that the overall length is
reduced somewhat to achieve the desired weight of 55 grains.
As might be expected from their differences in shape, the
Type B bullets had very significantly higher ballistic coefficients (less drag) than did the Type A...The accuracy..was
nearly the same when both were fired from barrels having
a 12-inch twist, .and was in both cases very satisfactory by
3 T h e First 130 Changes
comparison
applied to
government
exceed 2.0
to the. .performance requirement which has been

commercial .223 ammunition obtained under
contracts [average MR (mean radius) not to
inches at 200 yards].
b. If Type A bullets were loaded to the present nominal

muzzle velocity of 3,270 fps, and Type B bullets were loaded
so as to produce the same impact velocity at 300 yards,
then the muzzle velocity of the Type B bullets could be
reduced by 154 fps, to a level of 3,116 fps.
.. it appears that the 12-inch twist of rifling affords a small

advantage as regards aerodynamic drag...The practical
significance of differences in aerodynamic drag of Type A
and Type B bullets is clear from the following considerations.
If Type B bullets were loaded to the present nominal

muzzle velocity of 3,270 fps, and Type A bullets were required
to produce the same impact velocity at 300 yards, the muzzle
velocity for the Type A bullets would be 3,426 fps, which
is an increase of 156 fps above present levels; this is, of
course, not attainable with the present design parameters
of the cartridge.
a. If both..bullets were loaded to a nominal muzzle velocity

of 3,270 fps (corresponding approximately to 3,250 fps
instrumental at 15 feet), then the remaining velocity of Type
B bullets would be about 130 fps the greater at 100 yards,
and about 185 fps the greater at 500 yards.
Bullet
Type
Muzzle
The following tabular data.. illustrates the foregoing considerations, and gives additional data at other ranges.
Impact Velocities, feet per second

100 yds 200 yds 300 yds 400 yds
500 yds
Type A
Type B
3,270
3,270
2,984
2,944
2,540
2,633
2,211
2,341
1,908
2,068
1,627
1,814
Type A
Type B
3,270
3,116
2,894
2,797
2,540
2,494
2,211
2,211
1,908
1,948
1,627
1,701
Type A
Type B
3,426
3,270
3,043
2,944
2,680
2,633
2,341
2,341
2,028
2,068
1,738
1,814
Observations
The muzzle velocities of bullets are frequently discussed as if they represented the principal index of relative
terminal effectiveness, and great importance is sometimes
attached to these numbers per se...Less commonly
appreciated is the fact that impact velocities, and not
muzzle velocities, are the more significant as regards
terminal effect...In the case of .223 ammunition, the
retardation near the muzzle is nearly 4 feet per second in
each yard of range. It is obvious, therefore, that a change
of 50 fps in muzzle velocity..is equivalent to a difference
of about 12 yards in range. However, the difference in

impact velocities ascribable to the difference in drag
between Type A and Type B bullets..is equivalent to a
difference of about 40 yards in range, at. .approximately
300 yards. The use of bullets having efficient aerodynamic
shape is of significant importance because their superior
exterior-ballistic properties allow lower muzzle velocities
without sacrifice of terminal effects, and thereby facilitate
solution of the interior-ballistic problem of maintaining safe
chamber pressures in loading.
Conclusions
The Type B bullets evaluated..have significantly better
exterior-ballistic properties than have the Type A bullets,
with which latter type the system evaluation has largely been
conducted to date.
The use of bullets having a more favorable aero-
dynamic shape (such as Type B) would allow a reduction

of 50 fps in muzzle velocity, thereby reducing the probability of interior-ballistic problems which might arise in
large-scale loading of .223 ammunition, and [would] still
provide higher impact velocities at 100 yards and all
greater ranges.
It appears that Remington had not been able to mass-produce

acceptably accurate bullets to Stoner's original drawing, due
to the marginal stability problem in the 14" twist, as discussed
above. Accordingly, they had redesigned the 7-caliber ogive
bullet, giving it a shorter boattail and a shorter and "fatter"

(5.5-caliber radius) ogive.
..It was clearly a necessary measure, given the fundamental problem of marginal stability inherent in Stoner's
choice of the 14" twist with his chosen bullet configuration.
[As noted above] the changes had the concomitant effect
of increasing aerodynamic drag, however... Furthermore, the
improvement in gyroscopic stability was not enough, as [the
subsequent change to 1-in-12] made clear.
warning him that any further discussion of the matter

between Remington and the Army would be regarded with
great disfavor by OSD. Remington.. apparently decided
thereupon that discretion was the better part of valor in
this delicate matter, and no further cooperation was
received officially from them in the matter of bullet design
and twist of rifling.
.. I inquired into the reasons for the changes, and found

they had been made rather quietly by Remington, for
reasons that Remington officially declined to disclose to
the Army...The reluctance on the part of Remington to
discuss the matter was said..to have resulted from a
telephone call to a Remington top-management official,
by an officer who claimed to represent the OSD position,
..From information I was able to gather at the time, it

appeared that most of the partisan advocates of the AR-15
system in the great controversy were unaware that the .223
ammunition being manufactured by Remington did not
actually contain bullets corresponding to Stoner's original
design, until the comparisons made at Frankford.. in early
1963 [above] revealed the difference..
Bill Davis comments further on this quiet switch from

Stoner's "original" bullet to the 55-grain Remington design:
"Cartridge, 5.56mm Ball, M193"

- The Round Nobody Wanted to Make
The reversion to a bullet akin to Stoner's "Type B" (above)
was Bill Davis' personal choice as a solution to problem of the
.223's inherent inability to meet the cast-in-concrete pressure/
velocity requirements with IMR4475 propellant, in volume
production. He accordingly recommended this course of action
to Lt. Col. Yount, who readily agreed and presented the idea,
along with Frankford's supporting documentation, to the TCC.
Here it was summarily vetoed by the OSD representative, who
declared that this proposal, which would have avoided the
chamber pressure problem altogether with even better resulting
bullet lethality, had "insufficient merit to justify a reevaluation".
"Cartridge, 5.56mm Ball, M193" was officially adopted on
September 27, 1963. Unfortunately, Frankford's reasoned
advice had been disregarded on three counts. First, the M193

specified the inferior "Type A" Remington bullet over the
more aerodynamic and hence more lethal original. Secondly,
having made this crucial decision, there could be no reduction
in muzzle velocity, in order "not to degrade the lethality of
the [Remington] bullet". Finally, the TCC was guaranteed
a host of future headaches by the reaffirmation of IMR4475
as the only approved propellant, and the 52,000 psi ceiling on
allowable average chamber pressure limits.
All three approved commercial ammunition manufacturers
promptly declined offers to bid on the M193 round as defined
by the specifications. To quote from the PMR's significant
action report of 16-20 September:
The FY64 ammunition procurement program has been

suspended because ammunition manufacturers have stated
that under the present state-of-the-art, American industry
cannot manufacture ammunition within the limits imposed

by Army staff.
Over the new year, with deliveries of the first M16 and
XM16E1 rifles just a few months away, the FY64 ammunition requirement rose to 132 million rounds. The stalemate
persisted, with all three approved commercial manufacturers, Remington, Olin Mathieson (Winchester/Western)
and the Federal Cartridge Co., still refusing to bid. The

13-17 J a n u a r y 1964 P M R ' s report describes a compromise
which, although it permitted the manufacture of the necessary
"Specification Verification Quantity", did not solve the
problem:
..As a result of review of [specifications] for procurement of M193 Ball Ammunition, commercial. .producers
advised that certain prescribed requirements. .could not
be met.
This solution was to increase allowable average chamber

pressure from 52,000 psi to 53,000 psi, and for retest only,
to increase allowable individual round chamber pressure
from 58,000 psi to 60,000 psi.
The project manager discussed this problem with the

services involved and formulated a solution which was
presented to three of the cartridge producers and the
propellant producer in a meeting at Frankford Arsenal
on. .17 January.
All producers reacted favorably with respect to the first

procurement of one million rounds, but the propellant manufacturer would not make a firm committment on being able to
meet the specifications for the 131,000,000 round procurement to follow.
Thus the "solution" was temporary at best, amounting merely to a waiver on the first million rounds, but leaving
the actual specified pressure limits for future production
untouched. Significantly, upon completion of their 500,000round portion of the Specification Verification Quantity,
Remington withdrew I M R 4475 from use as a propellant
for 5.56mm ammunition.
As we have just begun to explore, the design of an automatic

firearm is somewhat like a miniature, speeded-up model of a
universe wherein bodies interact within units of time measured
in micro- and milliseconds, but are nevertheless linked in a
chain of cause-and-effect relationships with the inexorability
of planets orbiting a sun.
Other methods of curing the self-generated chamber

pressure problem were sought and eventually found, but at
a cost which the Army would later be forced to admit was
too high.
Further to this cosmic analogy, the eminent British biologist

and scientist J. B. S. Haldane, in a paraphrase of Gertrude Stein,
once commented on his suspicion that the universe is "not only
queerer than we suppose but queerer than we can suppose."
As we shall see, these were fateful words indeed for the TCC.
END OF PART I
The Search for Alternate Propellants
PART II - TENDING A NEST OF VIPERS

Chapter Nine
TACKLING THE
CHAMBER PRESSURE PROBLEM
THE HARD WAY
A series of fruitless meetings, held throughout the early
part of January 1964, failed to solve the impasse created by
the OSD's adamant restrictions on allowable average chamber
pressure. Remington and Olin had finally agreed to split
the one-million-round Specification Verification Quantity
to be loaded under the P M R ' s waiver, each signing up to

supply 500,000 rounds by April at the latest. However, no firm
bids had as yet been received for the FY64 procurement of
M193 ball ammunition, which had now risen to 164 million
rounds.
The Third Alternative

- The Search for Alternate Propellants
Continuing the discussion of the three alternatives to the
chamber pressure problem, Bill Davis notes:
..Of the three physically possible alternatives, the first
[higher chamber pressure] was manifestly undesirable, and
the second [use of the "Type B" bullet] was summarily foreclosed by OSD. The only remaining one was to seek another
propellant for use in .223/5.56mm ammunition., and the
search for an alternate propellant was thus unavoidable..
With ammunition production stalemated and initial M16/
XM16E1 rifle deliveries now only two months away, it appeared
that one or another of the M193's specifications would simply
have to give way. As noted in the following report, however,
Frankford was already setting up a careful study of the "third
alternative". They requested permission to buy outright and
then test 25,000-round lots from each and every interested

supplier, loaded with whatever propellant the supplier
recommended, in an all-out effort to find a solution to what
was now out in the open as "the unsatisfactory velocity/pressure
relationship" exhibited by IMR4475. The P M R recorded
swift T C C agreement to this proposal, announcing, "..If one
or more alternate types of propellant are selected, .contractual
changes instead of specification changes will be considered."
In the ensuing response from industry, three candidate
powders were put forward. DuPont, who had already announced
the withdrawal of its original IMR4475, suggested another
proprietary powder, CR8136. The Hercules Powder Company
offered its HPC-10. Then Olin's Associated Products Operations, located in East Alton, Illinois, learned of the program
and recommended their proprietary "ball" powder WC846.
Olin Bows In
Curiously, the TCC balked at even allowing Olin's doublebase ball powder into the trials. Instead the issue was referred to
AMC's Director of Research and Engineering, with the recom-
mendation that Olin contact that office directly and restate

their case in writing. This Olin promptly did, on January 21,
in the following oiled introduction to their WC846:
143
The Search for Alternate Propellants 144
. .Our basic request is that of being permitted to participate

in the competitive procurement of propellant required for
FY64 production of the 5.56mm cartridge. We recognize that
the only propellant currently approved by the Army is single
base extruded propellant, and we further recognize that the
approval of an alternate propellant will necessarily entail
an evaluation by Frankford Arsenal. However, we feel that
in this instance, the amount of evaluation needed to demonstrate acceptability is relatively minor..
We are proposing WC846 BALL POWDER as an alternate
propellant for the 5.56mm cartridge and are prepared to
guarantee its compliance with applicable ballistic, physical
and economical specifications without waivers. To support
our contention. .we offer the following facts:
1. More than 550 production lots of WC846 totalling over
12,000,000 pounds have been produced to date for the 7.62mm
cartridge, and its basic acceptability as a propellant type
is well established. Thus, in considering this propellant for
the 5.56mm cartridge, it would appear sound to forego those
evaluations normally conducted to ascertain chemical and
ballistic stability, shelf life, and similar long term properties.
143. Above: the green-tipped 7.62x51mm M198 Duplex round, adopted on May 7,
1964, shown loaded with Olin's WC846 ball powder. Note the dispersioninducing 9 cant on the base of the lower bullet.
Below: the M80 lead-core ball version of the 7.62 NATO, loaded with DuPont 's
IMR4475.
American Ordnance Association
2. We are currently supplying WC846 to Remington Arms

Company for loading 5.56mm ammunition under an Air Force
contract. An initial pilot lot and at least one production lot..
have been accepted by the Air Force. [In] the. .certification
on the initial WC846 lot produced.. ballistic performance
is well within the specifications and.. the average [chamber]
pressure level is well below the maximum permitted and will
require no increase in..specification as is the case with extruded single base propellant... half of this 40,000 pound lot
was supplied for 5.56mm loading and half for 7.62mm loading.
3. In discussions with Frankford Arsenal personnel. .the
only areas of performance where reservations were expressed
were in regard to muzzle flash and fouling. We agree that
these are two performance characteristics which would have
to be examined prior to qualification..
It would appear that a review of all available test data
and possibly some limited tests of a confirmatory nature
would establish that WC846 is entirely acceptable for the
Olin's proprietary ball powder was indeed by all accounts

a remarkably satisfactory military propellant. For years there
had been no attempt to segregate ball-powder cartridges from
cartridges loaded with I M R powder, and both had been routinely
intermingled and fired in all the Army's .30 caliber shoulder
rifles and light machine guns with virtually indistinguishable
results. In fact, such overwhelmingly favorable evidence as Olin
submitted to A M C seems to beg the question of why the TCC
5.56mm cartridge and may, in fact, offer significant product

improvements.. .We will appreciate your immediate consideration of our request..
didn't accept their offer in the first place. In any event, permission was swiftly granted for Olin to participate in the upcoming
cartridge/propellant examinations.
In order to insure as much basic uniformity as possible, the
powder manufacturers agreed to ship their propellants in bulk to
Remington, where all three of the 25,000-round test lots were
loaded: one with DuPont's newly recommended CR8136; the
second with Olin's WC846 ball powder; and the third with
Hercules' HPC-10. The loaded cartridges were then shipped to
Frankford Arsenal for the comparative study, where a control
lot loaded with DuPont's original IMR4475 had meanwhile
been procured.
145
The ground-breaking report of this first study on alternate

5.56mm propellants was prepared by Frankford's chemical
engineer C. E. Schindler and the project director, Bill Davis.
Excerpts are as follows:
Tenth Memo Report on AR-15 Rifle Ammunition System
Investigation of Alternate Propellants

For Use in 5.56mm M193 Ball Ammunition
15 May, 1964
Introduction
The commercial caliber .223 ball ammunition..[made]
before commencement of military participation in
the. .program was either entirely, or at least preponderantly,
loaded with IMR4475 propellant. The stated ballistics of the
commercial ball cartridge included a nominal mean velocity
of 3,250+/-30 fps and a mean chamber pressure not to exceed
52,000 psi. Examination of the manufacturer's test reports,
and the ballistic testing of some samples.. led to the observation [that] "while these ballistics are attainable, the.. required
velocity has. .allowed a very small margin below the maximum
permissible chamber pressure for most lots of ammunition.
For large-scale production of military ammunition.. a somewhat more conservative margin should be maintained between
the typical chamber pressure of production lots and the
maximum level permitted." It was recommended..that
consideration be given to a reduction in muzzle velocity
(which would permit lower chamber pressure) and concomitant adoption of an alternate bullet having improved
aerodynamic design. ..This recommendation was not approved
however.
Subsequent development confirmed..that, whereas the
stated commercial ballistic requirements frequently were
met by individual lots. .occasionally the requirements were
not met [with IMR4475]. It appeared that consistent compliance . .would demand very close control of lot-to-lot
variables, especially. .the velocity/pressure relationship of
the propellant.
Description
. .The samples of propellant were confirmed to be of types
which have shown satisfactory storage-stability in previous
experience, which was a condition for their inclusion, inasmuch as urgency precluded conducting long-term storage
tests within this program...A general description of the
propellants..is as follows:
In the absence of arty manufacturing experience under

government cognizance, it could not be established whether
the latitude allowed between the design capability and the
stated ballistic requirements. .was sufficient to permit economical mass production.
..[Thus]. .the liklihood that some change in the design of
the commercial .223 cartridge might be required if the stated
commercial ballistic requirements (now adopted as military
requirements) were to be met consistently, in large-scale
production...Accordingly, Frankford Arsenal immediately
sought and was granted permission to commence on a highpriority basis a product-improvement effort to find means
of improving the velocity-pressure relationship of the 5.56mm
Ball cartridge.
The task. .was to find a propellant (or propellants) which
would allow..the required velocity of 3,250 fps at a chamber
pressure substantially less than that produced by IMR4475...
any [such] propellants should be not significantly inferior
to IMR4475 in. .smoke, flash, fouling, barrel erosion, storage
stability, or performance at environmental extremes..
The foregoing requirements were made known to the three
US producers of small-arms propellant, who were each
invited to make available for purchase a test quantity of
twenty-five thousand (25,000)..Ball cartridges...Frankford..
purchased the test samples as agreed..
of Material
a. IMR4475:
This propellant is the type originally used in..commercial .223 ammunitio

Rifle] (IMR) which has been in use for about thirty years,
without fundamental changes...Propellants of this type are
single-base (nitrocellulose), tubular grain, and employ DNT

(dinitrotoluene) as a deterrent coating to control the rate
of burning... In cartridges such as the caliber .30, for which
the ballistic requirements are quite conservative in consideration of the cartridge-case capacity, propellants of lMR
type have given very satisfactory service for many years...
The..sample containing IMR4475 was included..for purposes
of direct comparison and control in evaluating performance
of the proposed alternate[s]..
T =
IMS
144. Typical pressure-time curves, chamber and gas port, for the 5.56mm
M193 Ball cartridge.
Above: Lot TW-18205, loaded with Dupont 's third try at an acceptable 5.56mm
IMR propellant, 8208M (chapter 11).
Below: Lot LC-SP-556, loaded with WC846 ball powder.
Frankford Arsenal, redrawn by Thomas B. Dugelby
b. CR8136:
.. recommended by. .DuPont. .[this] is a single-base, tubulargrain propellant, differing fundamentally from IMR types
in that the deterrent coating is methyl-centralite instead of
dinitrotoluene...The improved coating..reduces the flame
temperature (and thus the barrel erosion), and affords somewhat better control of burning rate (and thus better control
over velocity/pressure ratios)..
c. WC846:
This..was recommended by..Olin Mathieson...It is a
double-base
(nitrocellulose/nitroglycerine) propellant,
commonly called "ball powder" (produced by spherical
graining and subsequent rolling for adjustment of web), with
a deterrent coating of dibutylphthalate. The preponderance
of 7.62mm NATO ammunition of US Ball and Tracer types
have been loaded with WC846...In cartridges of comparatively small capacity, the high density of ball propellant
permits the accommodation of comparatively heavy charge
weights, thus allowing rather wide latitude for adjustment of
burning rate, and consequently for improvement of velocity/
pressure ratio..
This..is a double-base, tubular-grain propellant...Such

propellants have.. in the past been rather disadvantageous
in regard to bore erosion...At temperatures approaching
-65 F, the tendency has been for mean chamber pressures
to increase considerably..so that individual shots sometimes
developed excessive pressure..
Velocity and Pressure Tests

Each test series. .consisted of 20 rounds. Two different
barrels were used wider each test condition with each sample..
Normal ambient condition: [Grand Averages, corrected]..
ammunition.. conditioned and fired at +70F.
IMR4475 CR8136 WC846 HPC-10
Velocity, fps @ 15 feet
3,225
3,205
3,224
3,244
Chamber pressure, psi
54,000
48,300
48,800
52,400
Port pressure, psi
14,400
14,800
15,400
15,200
Observations
. .All of the test samples were superior to the control sample
as regards pressure/velocity relationship at normal ambient
temperature, although it would appear (from previous ex-
perience with 5.56mm ammunition) that the pressure/velocity

relationship of this particular.. sample of lMR4475 was less
favorable than is usual for that type of propellant..
Conclusions
The cartridge samples representing CR8136 and WC846
propellant indicate that propellants of these types are satisfactory for use in 5.56mm M193 ball ammunition, and can
afford substantial advantage over IMR4475 as regards
velocity/pressure relationship.
The..HPC-10 propellant..is not suitable..because the

chamber pressures developed, especially at..-65F, are
excessive.
Recommendations
It is recommended that propellant types CR8136 and
WC846 be approved for use as permissible alternates to
IMR4475 in the loading of 5.56mm M193 ball ammunition.
Other portions of Frankford's 5.56mm alternate powder
tests concerned such parameters as flash, erosion and fouling.
No significant problems were revealed, at least as far as these
various avenues were explored. Gas port pressure, for example,

soon to stand revealed as a crucially important parameter, had
been duly recorded with the prophetic proviso that:
..There are as yet no very soundly established portpressure criteria for the AR-15 (M16) rifle...It might be
expected, however, that the slower-burning propellants (such
as CR8136 and WC846), which are required to improve the
velocity/chamber-pressure relationship, would give in the

long-run experience a slightly higher port-pressure level than
that of IMR4475.
The Fateful Approval of Ball Powder

Meanwhile, the T C C had announced the awarding of a
purchase order to Olin Mathieson's Winchester/Western
Division for 13,000 rounds of 5.56mm XM197 High Pressure
Test Ammunition (HPT) on February 3: at least here, ironically, there was no problem in meeting the pressure specifications. Also in February, with the Frankford alternative
powder report still two months away and IMR4475 still the
only powder officially approved for Army 5.56mm cartridge
loading, all three cartridge manufacturers had placed tentative
bids on a total of 150 million rounds of M193 ball, which, as
noted in a Feb. 4 memorandum for record from the Project
Manager:
. .Of the 150 million total, 131 million rounds, .are for the
Army, and 19 million rounds, .are for the Air Force.. .Quick
analysis shows that none of the bidders bid on the full Army
FY64 requirement, and that even the total of all three bids
does not meet the Army requirement. Without having full
information.. no conclusion can be drawn as to what course

of action will be taken...However, since there is only a
5 million round shortage apparent, it is believed that no
significant problem exists.
This rather shaky arrangement had collapsed completely in

March, when as mentioned Remington/DuPont, close to delivery
on its half of the million-round Specification Verification

Quantity loaded under waiver, withdrew IMR4475 from further
147
use in 5.56mm ammunition, thus leaving the entire program

high and dry without any qualified propellant whatever. Fortunately, a month later the Frankford trial had come through
in favor of the two alternate propellants, DuPont's CR8136
and Olin's WC846. These were approved for loading in M193
cartridges on April 28, 1964.
Having apparently solved the chamber pressure problem
by direct appeal to the powdermakers, the TCC moved

swiftly to revive the flagging negotiations with the three
cartridge producers, Olin, Remington and the Federal Cartridge Co. Deliveries of M193 rounds loaded with these two
new propellants were scheduled to run from June 1964 through
to March, 1965. Initially, Remington elected to load with its
proprietary CR8136, while the other two contractees chose
Olin's WC846.
A Voice in the Wilderness

The TCC's approval of alternate propellants and less sensitive
primers for the M193 cartridge had so far been done in a
vaccuum, as it were, without the time or budget for extensive
firing trials of actual XM16E1s, which in any case did not yet
exist in quantity. In fact, the only test of the rifle and new
ammunition as a system had been the fouling test run concurrently with the barrel erosion portion of Frankford's alternate
powder trials themselves, wherein 6,000 rounds from each of
the four test lots had been fired from each of two new, clean
AR-15s. No stoppages or malfunctions had been reported as
attributable to any of the four propellants.
Perhaps the air of "whiz kid" confidence exhibited by Gene
..he asked me my opinion after the fact. In other words,

this was rather an odd meeting. He asked me to meet him
and I did, and I looked at the [new] technical data package
and he said, what is your opinion, and I said, I would advise
against it, because...All of our experience was with the other
cartridge, with the other propellant, and I [don't] quite see
changing. .without an awful lot of testing before..
Stoner's disciples in O S D had been shaken somewhat by

Frankford's discoveries of inherent design faults in the "fullydeveloped" .223 round. In any event Stoner, who was by this
time employed by Cadillac Gage and attempting to interest
the Army in the Stoner system, had not been consulted about
the M193 primer and propellant modifications. When advised
of them he was deeply concerned that, regardless of the pros
and cons, the changes had been made without first ensuring
their long-run compatibility with real rifles.
Testifying later before the Ichord subcommittee, Stoner told of
a meeting which had taken place during the summer of 1964 with
the T C C ' s Frank Vee, of the OSD's Comptroller's office:
I asked, so what is going to happen, and he said, well,

they already decided this is the way they are going to go..
I said, so why are you asking me now, and he said, "I
would have felt better if you had approved the package."
And I said, well, now we both don 'l feel so good.
Regarding the change in primer sensitivity, Stoner went on:

. .We had another thing that happened on the Marine Corps
test...We had some inadvertent firings of the weapon due
to the primer...We were using a commercial primer. .which is
relatively soft and sensitive, and the Marines. .would singleload the weapon. They would put a round in the chamber
and let the bolt go home by pushing the. .bolt catch, and the
inertia of the firing pin would fire the weapon sometimes..
were a couple of solutions. Either desensitize the primer,

make it out of a thick material, or lighten up the firing pin. ..I
recommended.. lightening up the firing pin because.. if you
desensitized the primer too much it could cause failures to
fire in the field [which ironically did happen, especially in
Stoner machine guns].
It was a very low frequency, but it did happen. So, of

course, they wanted something done about it, and..there
And.. in this technical data package they decreased the

sensitivity of the primer at the same time they. .put the ball
propellant in. So these were the two things I objected to..
As far as O S D was concerned, the all's-well-that-ends-well

outcome to the chamber pressure problem, accomplished without any degradation in the M193's muzzle velocity and hence
lethality, was hailed as a victory. Furthermore, the approval
of two sources of propellant meant that for the first time the
program was in conformance with the Army's stated policy
of always having more than one powder approved for a given
cartridge, in the event of a military emergency or hitch in
First Rifle Deliveries
production. Generally speaking, in any procurement situation

the Army tried to avoid what was known as a "sole source"
relationship, except, of course, where regulations forbade it,

such as in the case of a "one-time buy".
The First M16 and XM16E1 Deliveries
145. The Army's first XM16E1s, being inspected at Colt's before being delivered
in March of 1964.
Despite warnings from Gene Stoner and Frankford Arsenal

that more testing was needed, the first M193 ammunition production crisis was declared successfully surmounted, and not a
moment too soon: the rifles were arriving. Lt. Col. fount's significant action report for the week of 9-13 March 1964 records
that 20 XM16Els had been delivered to T E C O M for use in a
comparison test with first-generation SPIW prototypes. In conjunction with their ongoing combat effectiveness trial of various
"muzzle brake compensators", T E C O M had requested that
five of the 20 XM16Els be equipped with the latest compensator
design from Springfield Armory, plus Colt's newly-developed
two-round-burst device. A second five rifles were fitted with
the muzzle brake/compensator only, and the remaining ten
were supplied as is, "with no added devices".
The first true M16, meaning the first rifle procured for
the Air Force under the combined four-Service "one-time
b u y " (contract "508"), was presented by Colt's to USAF
Major General E. J. Gibson at a ceremony at the historic
Hartford plant on March 30. The next day the Air Force took
delivery, on schedule, of their first lot of 300 rifles and concurrent spare parts. By early May, the P M R was able to report
that "..cumulative acceptances are now 1,800 rifles with applicable spare parts, which equals contract schedule through
April."
As for the XM16E1, the significant action report for the week
of 25-29 May 1964 recorded:
149
First Rifle Deliveries 150
146. Top and bottom views of some of the Springfield Armory experimental
muzzle brake/compensators being tested by TECOM in early 1964, in conjunction with the newly-arrived
XM16E1s.
Springfield Armory NHS
A specially famished XM16E1 rifle representing the first

rifle for Army under the FY64 contract was presented to
General Wheeler [the Army's Chief of Staff] in his office
on 26 May..by Mr. Paul Benke, President of Colt's. The
new developments by Colt's, which are related to the AR-15
rifle, were also shown to General Wheeler. He showed special
interest in the Colt developed 40mm grenade launcher
and stated that the Army had a definite requirement for such
an item.
147. Top and bottom views of yet another Springfield Armory experimental
muzzle brake/compensator.
(This first news of "new developments by Colt's" refers to

the CAR-15 and CMG-1 weapons systems, discussed in chapter
11. The idea of an auxiliary grenade launcher for the M16 was
an interesting offshoot of the SPIW program, and is further
discussed in chapter 15).
First Rifle Deliveries
By the end of May the Army had accepted the first 200
XM16Els, and deliveries of new rifles to both the Army
(XM16Els, with bolt closers) and the Air Force (M16s) was
on schedule in accordance with the contract.
The Hard Way Part 2 - The Cyclic Rate Problem

Meanwhile, it transpired that some of the ammunition loaded
for the Air Force with WC846 ball powder, mentioned earlier
in Olin's letter to AMC, had been routinely shipped to Colt's
to be used along with existing stockpiles loaded with IMR4475,
in support of ongoing XM16E1 acceptance tests. The following
Minutes of the T C C ' s proceedings, which significandy did
not merit mention in the P M R ' s weekly action report for this
period, were later read into the record of the Ichord subcommittee hearings:
At the meeting of 24-25 March 1964, Colt's.. reported that
not all weapons could meet the cyclic-rate requirement of
650 to 850 rounds per minute. In a sample of 10 rifles tested
by Colt's with two lots of ammunition, six rifles exceeded
850 [rpm] when fired with ball-propellant ammunition, and
one rifle exceeded this limit when fired with. .IMR propellant.
Colt's stated that the initial delivery of 300 weapons..had
been selected (from a larger number of weapons available)
so as to deliver only weapons which met the prescribed cyclic
rate. However, this selection process could obviously not
continue, since deliveries could not be made if a large frac-
148. A one-piece, molded plastic buttgroup-and-lower receiver unit, one of many

experimental "what-if?" one-offs which Colt's has produced over the years
of the M16 program. This one didn 't stand up satisfactorily to military tests.
tion of the rifles were to be rejected for exceeding 850 [rpm].

Colt's asked for an increase in the upper limit of cyclic rate
to 900 rounds per minute.
No increase in allowable malfunctions was requested. .at
this time, because it was not recognized that an increase in
cyclic rate from 850.. to 900 [rpm] would cause an increase
in frequency of malfunctions.
Bill Davis comments on the inevitability of this cyclic rate

variation, given the alteration of other parameters in the chain:
.. it is an elementary principle that, if the area under the
pressure-travel curve of the bullet (which governs the muzzle
velocity) must remain the same, while the maximum ordinate
(peak pressure) of that curve must be reduced, the ordinates
(pressures) at other points under the curve manifestly must
be increased. Whether the port pressure, which affects the
cyclic rate of fire, would be intolerably increased could not
be foreseen, because there was, quite astonishingly, no information whatsoever available on the limits of port pressure
at which the AR-15 was designed to operate. [We] found,
to our great surprise, that neither Stoner, nor ArmaLite,
nor Colt's, nor Remington, nor ARPA, nor anyone else had
ever measured the port pressure of .223 ammunition, or
given any consideration of its effect on cyclic rate..
The cyclic rate problem erupted so quickly that the T C C

was forced to grant a temporary waiver allowing the higher
rate: the only other choice was to halt the program and face
Colt's with the news that 6 out of every 10 of their new
XM16E1s were unacceptable to the Army, due simply to the
propellant being used in the test ammunition.
not apply so much to the Air Force, who had already set the
M16's acceptable upper cyclic rate limit at 900 rpm.) The TCC
doled out the waiver on a month-to-month basis throughout
the summer of 1964, thereby buying themselves some time
to assess the powder-related cyclic rate phenomenon.
Accordingly, Colt's was granted a 50-rpm waiver on the

upper cyclic rate limit, effective with April's production run.
This allowed the government's in-house inspectors to accept
XM16E1 rifles firing as high as 900 rpm. (The problem did
Meanwhile, with only the T C C ' s month-to-month waiver

holding the XM16E1 production program together, Colt's had
naturally wanted some fast and significantly independent answers
to help them assess their position. On April 17, Colt's Senior
Product Engineer F. E. Sturtevant submitted an internal
151
company report entitled Chamber and Gas Port Pressures Ball Powder vs. IMR Powder, wherein were recorded the
results, by the prestigious H. P. White Laboratories, of an
examination of the first shipment Colt's had received of
cartridges containing WC846 powder. T h e study found that
the ball powder produced gas port pressures in the neighborhood of 500 psi higher than the original IMR4475, and
that it delivered more heat to the gas tube. T h e report noted

that Frankford had recorded the same higher port pressures
in its 1963 alternate propellant study, which Mr. Sturtevant
confirmed as "the first known measurements of port pressure,
so far as I know".
..Quite obviously, the port pressure is higher with the

ball powder than with the IMR.. used in all .223 cartridges
previously..
In my opinion, the slightly higher port pressure of the
ball powder is in no way harmful to the AR-15 rifle. The
slightly increased energy imparted to the bolt carrier, may

make certain a full stroke and impact on the end of the
receiver extension. This does not always occur with the
present ammunition. Such increased stroke will improve the
functioning of the bolt catch as well as assist in a quicker
"break in" of the rifle.
In the light of future events, not only was Mr. Sturtevant's

opinion wrong, but his last words were exceedingly ill-chosen.
As the problems multiplied, despite Colt's assurances,

Frankford's message to the T C C grew sharper:
The Colt internal report concluded:
Frankford Arsenal
Eleventh Memo Report on AR-15 Rifle/Ammunition System
Investigation
of Port-Pressure Limits
12 June 1964
Introduction
..It was pointed out [in the fourth memo report "Investigation of Gas-Port Pressures in .223 Ammunition" dated
19 June 1963] that gas-port pressure is undoubtedly an
important parameter of ammunition design for the AR-15
(M16-type) rifle, and ought to be controlled. As the lots
[of commercial .223 ammunition, loaded with IMR4475]
tested had reportedly been satisfactory, .and their port
pressures were observed to be typically near 15,000 psi,
limits were recommended tentatively and somewhat arbi-
trarily at 15,000 +/- 2,000 psi. This range of pressures,

based originally on engineering judgement and very little
direct evidence, has in subsequent experience proven
reasonably consistent with.. acceptable functioning and
..ballistics. ..However, as was pointed out. .a definitive and
specific testing program is required to establish the portpressure limits which the.. weapon can tolerate without
serious impairment of functioning or durability.
Observations
..cyclic rate depends heavily upon port pressure at very
low.. levels, but the degree of dependency diminishes with
increasing level of port pressure. ..At levels above the present
minimum.. (13,000 psi), the cyclic rate does not change very
drastically, and it appears that the change is not significant
above 14,000 or 15,000 psi.
rates..with ammunition having normal port pressure are

somewhat higher than the typical value (750 rpm) implied
by the rifle-acceptance criteria. In the Minutes of the [TCC]
Meeting of 24-25 March.. it is stated that the Army acceptance
criteria. .are 650-850 rpm, and the USAF criteria allow an
upper limit of 900 rpm..
Insofar as the two.. rifles [serial nos. 033042 and 034729]

used in the test are representative of the type, the cyclic
As regards the upper limit for acceptable cyclic rate, it

appears that 850 rpm may frequently be exceeded, and that
900 rpm may be exceeded at least occasionally with certain

clean, well lubricated weapons, when using normal ammunition lots having port pressure above 14,000 psi. Whether
or not cyclic rates above 850 rpm (or 900 rpm) are disadvantageous cannot be established from this experiment.
If such rates are disadvantageous, then some modification
of the weapon seems necessary to diminish its cyclic rate
when firing normal ammunition. If such rates are not disadvantageous, the re-examination of the upper-limit criteria
for rifle acceptance seems necessary.
..the maximum port pressure attainable with a casecapacity charge [of WC846] was about 16,200 psi... This test
gives no indication that port pressures up to 17,000 psi
would impair the reliability of weapon functioning. Any
disadvantage. .would seem to depend on whether the endurance of the weapon is significantly impaired in consequence
of greater energy of recoiling parts. Kinematic records of
the bolt in recoil would yield some useful data. .as would
also of course the results of extended endurance testing.
However, such tests of the weapon are beyond the scope
of this effort and of this report.
As regards minimum. .criteria for loading, this limited

experiment demonstrates, .that port pressures below about
10,000 psi must be avoided. ..As regards maximum tolerable
port pressure, this test gives no basis for judgement..
..In the final analysis, the tests required to establish

tolerable port-pressure limits for the AR-15 are weapon
tests..
As noted, Frankford Arsenal had already begun to record

AR-15 gas port pressures before the emergence of the cyclic
rate problem. Unfortunately, however, in the absence of any
weapon-endurance tests or at least a thorough kinematic
analysis of the M16's recoiling parts when subjected to the
higher cyclic rates being produced by ball propellant, there
was no way of determining the long-term effects of higher
port pressures. In more or less secret defiance of the Gilpatrick

directive, both Springfield and Frankford were doing what
they could, the latter facility having designed and built an
"unofficial" port pressure gauge as early as J u n e of 1963.
However, throughout this crucial period of ammunition
changes and early rifle deliveries, no such testing was officially
funded.
The Hard Way Part 3

- The USAF Plate Penetration Problem
In the midst of these initial port pressure/cyclic rate investigations, it suddenly appeared that Olin had spoken too soon in
declaring that the Air Force had already accepted ball-powder
M193 ammunition. Lt. Col. Yount's significant action report

of 20-24 April heralded yet another unforeseen result of the
switch in propellants:
Initial production sample of cartridge, 5.56mm, M193,

tested and submitted by Olin Mathieson against the USAF
requirement..has been rejected by the government at the
contractor's plant since it failed to meet the [Air Force's
500-yard] plate penetration requirement..
At the option of the contractor this ammunition was shipped

to Frankford Arsenal on 16 April for final pre-production
lot testing. Frankford. .was verbally informed by Ogden Air
Material Area that the deviation would not be approved by
the USAF.
For some background on this latest problem, the TCC turned

to Frankford's fifth memo report on the AR-15 rifle/ammunition
system, dated September 1963, wherein the long-suffering
Arsenal staff had already discovered that the Air Force's plate
penetration requirement was apparently more traditional than
practical:
. .A plate penetration requirement was contained originally

in specification MIL-C-9963 (USAF) dated 24 January 1963
entitled: "Cartridge, 5.64 millimeter Ball MLU-26/P." This..
was as follows:
with a hardness of Rockwell B55 to B90) at a range of

500 yds."
"3.13 Penetration. The bullet..shall pass completely

through 10 gauge (.135 in. ) mild steel plate (SAE 1010-1020
The plate-penetration requirement has been included in

the specification for 5.56mm (.223) probably because of the
precedent of a similar inclusion in specifications for 7.62mm
M80 ammunition...In retrospect, it appears doubtful that
[it] is justified. The weight, materials, construction, shape,

and instrumental velocity of the bullet are stipulated within
rather close limits. .and these parameters essentially imply
the penetration characteristics within rather close limits
also. Within these other stipulated parameters, there is
very little latitude for adjustment by means of which the

.. manufacturer could affect the plate-penetration characteristics, [which] are..largely implicit in the cartridge
design, and superfluous as a criterion for acceptance of
ammunition..
Ending with another plug for the more-lethal "Type B"

bullet, the Frankford report concluded that, within the rigid
specifications the T C C had already set, the bullet's penetration performance per se was essentially beyond any
manufacturers' control. Since all the bullets tested would
consistently penetrate the 10-gauge plate at 450 yards, the
recommendation was that the Air Force "re-evaluate" its
500-yard requirement.
Accordingly, after some further face-saving penetration tests

run jointly with the Army at Frankford, the Air Force reduced
its plate penetration requirement to 450 yards. The PMR's
significant action report for the week of 1-5 June, 1964 records
that Olin's pre-production engineering sample of M193 ball
ammunition "passed the revised Air Force penetration requirement...Initial delivery in the month of J u n e is anticipated in
accordance with the contract."
Tense Times for the TCC

Frankford continued to urge the initiation of some solid,
long-term test program with M16/XM16E1 rifles and M193
ammunition as a system; previously a normal and very necessary
part of any Ordnance-sponsored small arms program. However,
the Gilpatrick directive had specifically directed the T C C to
avoid the "cost, delay and..difficulties" of acceptance test standards in procuring the "fully-developed" AR-15/M16 system.
Thus the sad fact was that the TCC was forced to wear
blinkers, not to say blindfolds, and became increasingly
enmeshed in the "crisis management" of problems which
could not possibly be foreseen or heralded, but which simply
erupted with no warning.
Further Adventures
Chapter Ten
THE FURTHER ADVENTURES

OF THE TCC
Thus the weapon/ammuniton system comprising the M16/
XM16E1 rifle firing M193 ball ammunition now differed in
several significant respects from the erstwhile "fully developed"
AR-15 firing Remington .223 cartridges loaded with IMR4475
propellant, commercial primers and "Type B" bullets. In
addition, as noted, the allowable "leeway" between the average
and maximum chamber pressure limits in M193 ammunition
was much narrower than usual for a mass-produced military
small arms cartridge.
XM16Els first became available for issue during the spring
of 1964. By May 8 the P M R had recorded cumulative acceptances of 1,800 rifles. Meanwhile, steps had been taken to begin
the procurement of all the ancillaries, accessories and training
aids necessary to support the issue of the new system. Here
too the T C C were forced to comply with OSD, where Colt's
assertions that the AR-15 needed minimal maintenance still
held sway. Directed to keep the program as simple and inexpensive as possible, the T C C turned in a disastrously poor track
record as "housekeepers", especially with regard to cleaning
equipment and maintenance instructions for the XM16E1.
Nevertheless, to continue the space analogy concerning the
M16's "universe", the program had successfully "lifted off",
problems and all, with the T C C as the crew but with O S D
at the controls.
With the rifle and cartridge designs finally locked up and in
production, Secretary McNamara's attention was soon drawn
elsewhere. The M16/XM16E1 rifle and the M193 cartridge
were now supply items, and as such fell back into the purview
of Lt. Col. Yount's patron, General Frank S. Besson. Surely
one of the busiest men in the Pentagon, the Commanding
General of the entire Army Materiel Command (AMC) had
a great deal more on his plate than just the one-time procurement of a paltry few thousand rifles. Increasingly, however,
General Besson was obliged to lend his considerable weight

to the faltering M16 project, in order to keep it from sagging
seriously off course.
It began innocently enough in May 1964, when the Project
Manager's weekly significant action reports began carrying
a section headed "Continuing Problems". The TCC had
formed a "New Materiel Introductory Team" to introduce
the new rifles to the special troop units for whom they had
been procured. As part of the presentation, the team wanted
to include a five- to seven-minute tactical briefing on the use
of the M16 in the field. A debate had dragged on throughout
the month with both C O N A R C and the Combat Developments Command (CDC) stubbornly disclaiming responsibility
for the preparation of such a document. In the process, for
all his special powers, the P M R was reduced to the role of
hapless observer. The first of many curt notes in General
Besson's peremptory handwriting is scrawled across his copy
of the action report for the week of May 18-22, reading:
"Whose job do we think it is ?...I still believe tactical employment
(doctrine) is C D C business, but I don't propose to make an
issue of it...[Go and] get a proper source designated."
In early June, amid news that the Federal Cartridge Company
had defaulted on its first 200,000-round M193 ammunition
contract, the P M R reported that work has been stopped on
the development of blank ammunition and a BFA (blank firing
adapter) for troop training, because " n o RDT&E funds are
currently authorized for this project...Since the blank round
and BFA are considered a joint development for technical
reasons, the delay of the BFA..also causes a delay in the blank
round.." General Besson's blunt pencil cuts impatiently
through the bureaucratic fog: " I t is ridiculous to buy 80,000
rifles and not get the necessary accessories. Get this off dead
center - let me know if you can't get an early decision."
A Most Contentious Waiver

In the week of 3-7 August, with Colt's delivering XM16Els
on schedule, General Besson again revealed his concern for
the state of the M16 program by pencilling across the P M R ' s

neatly typed production figures, " H o w many [rifles] are in
155
Further Adventures 156
149. A proud Special Forces trooper in the spring of 1964, displaying his brandnew XM16E1.
the hands of troops and what are we doing to follow up on

troop experience?" Lt. Col. Yount did not reply, but he did
do something else that month which somehow didn't rate
mention in his significant action reports.
It will be remembered that, ever since the first delivery of
ball-powder test cartridges to Colt's in April and the subsequent
eruption of the cyclic rate problem, XM16Els had been produced under a month-to-month, 50-rpm waiver on the Army's
upper cyclic rate limit. Even though the Air Force had already
set their upper limit at 900 rpm and to date were reporting
no problems, the T C C had refused to grant Colt's request
for a standing cyclic rate waiver on the Army's XM16Els. The
main duty of the Project Manager Rifles, the expedited supply
of XM16E1 rifles to the field, was thus on shaky ground indeed.
The concept of waivers of knowingly degrading some
parameter of a system in order to proceed with production
is utilized literally hundreds of times over the full course
of a typical military procurement program. In order to ensure
Further Adventures
150. Above: a Colt factory "cutaway" of an AR-15 (XM16E1) model 02.

Compare with fig. 130.
Below: a later (XM16E1) cutaway with bolt closure device.
XM16E1 deliveries, the Project Manager gambled that the

increased cyclic rate produced by the ball powder in the "preponderance" of the ammunition already in the field was indeed
only a technical problem. As soon as cartridges loaded with
DuPont's CR8136 became available from Remington in August,
he ordered a quantity of them shipped to Colt's, exclusively
for use in XM16E1 acceptance testing. As Frankford had

noted, one characteristic of CR8136 was that it produced consistently lower port pressures (by about 800 psi) than did
WC846. Sure enough at Colt's, the cyclic rates dropped back
into the 650-850 slot. The month-by-month 900 rpm waiver
was thereupon quietly allowed to expire.
The One-Time Buy that "Grew Like Topsy"

Throughout the summer of 1964, with the TCC's XM16E1
Introductory Team being greeted "with great enthusiasm"
in Germany and France as well as at home, the complexity
and size of the FY64 procurement contract grew steadily. (For
the week of August 31 - September 4, the P M R had noted
"Based on an urgent special requirement, 600 rifles from August
production were diverted to the Far East.") On October 30,
when Colt's again advised that they were nearing the end of
production on the FY64 contract, the T C C saved the day by
invoking the contract option clause for the seventeenth time,
adding "33,500 M16 rifles for the Air Force, 240 M16 rifles
for the Navy and 82 M16 rifles for the Coast Guard, and
$517,000 worth of spare parts." This hiked the original $13.5
million contract with Colt's to $17,994,694.23.
First Troop Reports

General Besson had continued to press for the earliest
possible troop reaction to the new rifles. T h e 5th Special
Forces Airborne Group of the 1st Special Forces at Fort
Bragg had submitted the first-ever monthly field report on

their new XM16Els, dated September 4th. Gauges, tools,
manuals and rifle racks were listed as being "in short supply",
157
158
The Patsy
and the initial issue of "Rod, Cleaning, M11" was immediately singled out as being too flimsy and easily broken, even
in normal use. Other than that, on the whole the new rifles
appeared to have been very favorably received. One Special
Forces suggestion, which went unheeded by the T C C at great

later expense, recommended that "some type brush be
adopted to clean the space between the bolt locking lugs and
chamber, in barrel extension."
The Patsy
151. The 23.9-Ib. Harrington & Richardson SPIW, designed to fire three
flechettes
with each shot from the Dardick "5.6x57mm triple-bore Tround". Aside from
missing the ten-pound weight limit by a considerable margin, the ungainly

H&R SPIW was dismissed upon initial examination as unsafe to shoot.
152 The Olin (Winchester) SPIW, chambered for the XM144 flechette cartridge
(fig. 153). Note the three-shot, "blow-forward" grenade launcher, later
adapted to the second-generation Springfield SPIW (fig. 217). WinchesterWestern Research Department photo
As related in detail in The SPIW, the "phase I" SPIW

weapon and flechette ammunition trials at Aberdeen and Fort
Benning had been running concurrently with the events described above, from April 1964 to the middle of August. The
SPIW master plan still called for the successful candidate
SPIW system to be type classified Standard 'A' by J u n e 30,
1965. Unsettlingly, however, the results of "phase I" ranged

from the abysmally poor (H&R) through varying degrees of
unsatisfactory (Winchester; Springfield; AAI).
Paradoxically the latter two, which at length were chosen
for further development, already worked well enough, when
159 The Patsy
they worked at all, to exhibit some truly bizarre characteristics.

Indeed, to anyone versed in firearms, witnessing the awesome
(if sporadic) phenomenon of the ungainly 1964 SPIWs in
action, the handwriting was clearly on the wall: perfecting the
SPIW as a viable military weapon system would require a
development program orders of magnitude beyond anything
ever previously attempted.
However, the official attitude was unfortunately one of
"unwarranted optimism" that the SPIW could quickly be
brought to fruition. At a meeting between General Besson and
the Commanding General of Rock Island Arsenal, Roland
B. Anderson, the matter was taken under advisement. Finally,
it was decided: who better to put the program back on its feet
and oversee the SPIW through to Standard 'A' status than
the man who was doing such a good job with the AR-15?
Lt. Col. Yount's title was still, officially, "Project Manager,
AR-15". On October 7, with all the gravity befitting the situation, it was formally changed to "Project Manager, Rifles".
Along with the slight change in title came an expanded new
charter of duties, which included complete responsibility for
the already dubious future of the entire SPIW program.
153. Cutaway closeup view of the 5.56x44mm XM144 single flechette cartridge,
developed at Frankford Arsenal for (smoothbore) fire from the first-generation
Springfield and Winchester SPIWs and the short-lived "Universal Machine Gun"
(designed by A. L. Montana and built, in prototype only, at Springfield Armory).
Left: teflon-coated sabot assembly.
Center: as loaded with the AAI standard flechette and sabot. Note the small
primer pocket, for Frankford's special "Primer, Miniature, FA T186E1".
Right: a practice "blunt" flechette. Antipersonnel flechettes were carefully
ground to a very fine point.
154. Springfield Armory (14.5-lb.) first-generation SPIW. In the words of

its designer, the adamant requirement for a 10-lb. weapon carrying 60
point-target flechettes plus three 40mm grenades made the SPIW "the
first of the programs to be doomed from the start by ridiculous specifications".

Springfield Armory photo dated March 30, 1965
160
The Patsy
155. The AAI Corporation's first-generation SPIW, chambered for the 5.6x53mm
AAI XM110 flechette round (muzzle velocity 4,820 fps; chamber pressure
59,000 psi). This early 5-lb. (point-target version only) AAI SPIW fired 2,400
rpm three-round bursts from a 60-round drum magazine.
Keeping Colt's Honest

Also concurrent with the first issue of the M16/XM16E1
and the phase I SPIW trials, Aberdeen had begun an ongoing
program sponsored by AWC, of performing the standard
series of light rifle tests on production rifles from Colt's.
An extrapolation from George Hendricks' final report of trials

of five new M16s using M193 ammunition made by Remington (lot RA 5027, loaded with CR8136 propellant) reveals
the following:
Rifle
ser. no.
Total number of
rounds fired
040048
040219
040250
040284
040297
1,457
2,708
1,465
6,020
6,602
18,252
Interestingly, no XM16Els were featured, possibly
because at the time of these tests there was no Army Technical manual in existence for the XM16E1. The D&PS test
officers were accordingly supplied with a copy of the USAF

TO 11W3-5-5-1 "for interim use". Excerpts from the report
are as follows:
Further Adventures
Development
and
Proof Services
Final Report of Comparison Test of Rifle, 5.56mm M16

October, 1964
Report No
DPS-1471
Objective
The purpose of this test was to determine if productionline samples of M16 rifles would comply with performance
specifications; to detect any design, manufacturing, or
inspection deficiencies; and to determine the accuracy
and the ability of the rifle to function when subjected to
automatic-fire roles and under various adverse conditions.
The test was conducted between 26 May and 14 September

1964..
The riflemen employed in this test each hold a current
National Rifle Association Master classification in highpower rifle competition.
Findings
It was found that:
In the machine-rest accuracy test [three 10-shot groups
from each of five rifles at 91.4 meters], the average extreme
spread of the groups ranged from 2.6 to 3.6 inches.
The average extreme spread of groups fired from benchrest
at 100 meters was 3.6 inches compared to 3.5 inches when
fired from a machine rest at 100 yards using the same rifles.
In.. 3-round-burst automatic accuracy at 25 meters from
the standing position, the average extreme spread for all
shots was 117.2 inches. The average extreme spread for the
first shot in each group (aimed shots) was 2.4 inches.
In. .5-round-burst automatic accuracy at 25 meters from
the standing position, 9% of all shots missed the 20-foothigh by 12-foot-wide target.
In.. 3- and 5-round burst automatic accuracy at 50 meters
from the prone position, without the use of artificial support,
the average extreme spread was 89.6 and 101.9 inches
respectively.
In firing 3- and 5-round burst. .from the hip at 25 meters at
an E target, 90 rounds were fired, in 3-round bursts, resulting
in 19 hits. A total of 150 rounds was fired in 5-round bursts
and 32 hits were obtained.
In the combat accuracy test [100 yards] the average extreme
spread was 4.0 inches [from three 10-shot groups from a
benchrest and two 10-shot groups prone with sling].
In the rate-of-aimed fire test [as many aimed shots as

possible at an E target from 100 yards in one minute],
automatic fire, compared to semiautomatic fire, resulted in
a reduction of the average number of hits obtained by 39.6
per minute, although there was a 14.6 increase in the average
number of shots fired per minute.
In the reliability test where cleaning and lubrication. .was
deliberately curtailed, 16 of the 19 malfunctions occurred
after firing more than 1,000 rounds without cleaning and
lubrication. This type of maintenance is usually performed
after each 1,000 rounds of firing. The effect of lack of cleaning
and lubrication on functioning indicates that firing should
not be continued beyond 1,000 rounds before the rifle is
cleaned and lubricated..
More efficient cleaning of the rifle could be accomplished
if special brushes were provided for cleaning particular
areas such as the chamber, the locking lugs in the barrel
extension, and the inside of the bolt carrier where carbon
accumulation occurs.
Satisfactory function was obtained in the following adverse
conditions tests:
Extreme cold, -65 F
Unlubricated
Interchange
Mud
Dust
161
Further Adventures 162
In the [600-round] rain test, 13 failures to fire occurred [all in

the last 100 rounds]. Several pieces of brass from a punched-out
primer lodged on the firing pin and caused the malfunctions.
After being subjected to +125 F and 90% relative humidity for approximately 18 hours, the cam pin rusted and
caused extreme difficulty in opening the bolt..
Conclusions
With the exception of one rifle which failed to meet
performance specifications because of excessive failures
to fire semiautomatically, all of the rifles tested met those
performance requirements outlined in SAPD-253..
In the automatic accuracy and adverse conditions

testing (no performance criterea delineated in SAPD-253)
no significant design or operational deficiencies were
encountered..
Recommendations
It is recommended that:
Adequate cleaning equipment..accompany the rifles.
Consideration be given to excluding the 5-round-burst

automatic-accuracy firing from the standing position from
future comparison test plans..
Consideration be given to incorporating into SAPD- 253

lubrication requirements for the rifles as described
[above].
A total of only 18,000 rounds fired (all from the same

manufacturer) was hardly the sort of exhaustive testing
Frankford was urging, but it sufficed to highlight the fact
that the M16 rifle needed thorough cleaning at least every
1,000 rounds in order to function reliably.
Unfortunately, however, despite Aberdeen's reinforcement

of the Special Forces' earlier request for such specific items as
chamber brushes, the TCC continued to ignore the whole issue
of adequate maintenance equipment for the M16/XM16E1.
This state of affairs was severely compounded by the events
discussed below.
The Hard Way Part 4 - Sole Source with Ball Powder

In December 1964, Remington again advised the Army of
their inability to stay within the average upper chamber pressure
limit when loading M193 ball ammunition. Even though
CR8136 propellant more consistently conformed to specifications than had IMR4475, DuPont had found that they could
not guarantee chamber pressures within the tight average upper
limit in lot-to-lot production. Consequently, CR8136 too was
being withdrawn. Remington requested that they be allowed to
continue loading in response to their contract, but with WC846
ball powder they would obtain from Olin's powdermaking plant
in East Alton, Illinois. The T C C agreed to this proposal.
With all three cartridge manufacturers thus loading M193
ammunition with Olin WC846, the T C C was ironically right
back to the sole source position on propellant which it had

so recently and triumphantly overcome in the case of DuPont's
original IMR4475. The only differences were that WC846 was
known to cause higher gas-port pressures and cyclic rates in
M16 rifles, and also seemed to contribute more fouling. As
yet, none of these anomalies had much weight of evidence
attached to it.
Despite the fact that all M193 ammunition produced for
the field was now loaded with WC846 ball powder, XM16E1
acceptance testing continued at Colt's with stockpiled Remington cartridges loaded with CR8136, until these ran out in the
spring of 1965.
26 Other "Stoner" Designs
Chapter Eleven
FROM SAWS TO FIRST DEPLOYMENT

A Brief History of Some Other "Stoner" Designs
156. The NATO-caliber AR-16, designed for ArmaLite by Gene Stoner. Hinged
for quick takedown like the FN FAL (and the AR-15), the short-lived AR-16
was capable of launching rifle grenades as shown "without modification or
attachments" and was fitted with click-adjustable night sights. The AR-16
with its folding stock was first introduced to the Ordnance Tank Automotive
Command as a candidate rifle for the Tank Corps. In a letter to the unit's
Commanding General at Detroit Arsenal, ArmaLite's then-president Charles

H. Dorchester praised the AR-16 as "a very substantial advance in the stateof-the-art of small arms, primarily, as reflected in the extremely low cost of
tooling and unit production. ..The savings have been made by the extensive
use of [26] sheet metal stampings and automatic screw machine parts".
ArmaLite, Inc. photo, courtesy Thomas B. Dugelby
15 7. ArmaLite AR-16 right side view, stock folded for overall length of only 27".
The 7.62mm AR-16 weighed 8.75 lbs. and had a 15" barrel. Introduced (in
June of 1961) when the M14 was still the "rifle to beat", ArmaLite estimated
that AR-16 tooling would cost 20% of that needed for the M14, and that AR-16s
costing $50 each could be in production "at a rate of 10,000 per month"
within a year.
164
Other "Stoner" Designs
Gene Stoner had meanwhile not been idle. Indeed, innovative designs of his were the source of some fairly constant
competition to the M16 over the whole course of the program.
Significantly, Stoner's originals were all in 7.62 NATO caliber:
the AR-10; the AR-16, which he designed in the mid-fifties
in cooperation with ArmaLite project engineer Arthur Miller;
and the Stoner 62.
Interestingly, each of these was the source of an important
5.56mm "spinoff" wherein the original was scaled down by
other engineers, generally with only a modicum of involvement
by Stoner himself. First, as we have seen, the AR-10 became,
at Fairchild's behest, the AR-15. Then, after Stoner's departure
from ArmaLite, Arthur Miller became chief engineer there
on a project to scale down the stamped-metal AR-16 into the
5.56mm AR-18. Finally the Stoner 62, which utilized lessons
learned in all Stoner's earlier designs, was "projectized" by
the Cadillac Gage Co. of Warren, Michigan, and redesigned by
the erstwhile ArmaLite engineering team of L. James Sullivan
and Robert Fremont into the 5.56mm Stoner 63 and 63A
systems, expressly for the Marine Corps.
All these weapons were built around the multilugged Johnson/
Stoner bolt, but with Stoner's patented gas system assigned
to Colt's, the latter designs were perforce fitted with conventional piston-operated gas impingement systems.
NELSON M. LYNDE, J K .
MAJOR G E N E R A L . U.S.A.
COMMANDING
158. Despite problems with their bulky M14s and the hype from ArmaLite,
the Tank Command remained, officially, Not Interested in the AR-16. It appears
that only three AR-16s were ever made.
159. The ArmaLite .223 caliber AR-18, right side view with stock folded.
Designed by Arthur Miller after Stoner's departure from Armalite. Compare
with fig. 157.
160. A 1964 USAF cold-weather trial of ArmaLite AR-18 serial no. 002. At
this and other trials the AR-18 was judged "in an unfinished state of design".
Photo credit: Larry Stevens
161. Gene Stoner's first design for Cadillac Gage Company, called the Stoner 62,
pictured here in the "Standard Auto Rifle" mode. Caliber 7.62mm NATO.
166
Other "Stoner" Designs
168
Colt's CAR-15/CMG-1 System
163. On a mission against the Viet Cong: an American advisor armed with
an M16 rifle (note the early steel magazine) and his small-statured ARVN
unit, who carry US M1 Garands.

Wide World photo, courtesy Colt's Inc. Firearms Division
The Colt
"CAR-15 and CMG-1 5.56mm Military Weapons System"
Colt's realized that, just as the AR-15 had so audaciously
challenged the M14, other competitive weapons would threaten
the M16/XM16El's relatively vulnerable "toehold" of limited
adoption. An extensive Colt research and development (R&D)
program was therefore undertaken to diversify the basic AR-15
(M16), with a view to offering the military as many interesting
and practical M16-type weapons as possible.
After trials with a few one-off "what-if?" models, Colt's
focussed on seven basic versions of the M16: the standard M16
rifle, both as issued and also fitted with a Colt-developed 40mm
grenade launcher attachment; a carbine with a 15" barrel;
two heavy-barrel, bipod-supported "M-1" (clip fed) and " M - 2 "
(belt fed) heavy assault rifles; a submachine gun with a 10"
barrel and collapsible stock; and a no-frills survived rifle. In

addition, in response to the threat presented by the versatile
Stoner system, discussed below, Colt's hastily countered with
four versions of a brand-new and extremely short-lived machine
gun called the CMG-1.
Aside from limited purchases of 100 to 150 M-1 heavy assault
rifles for trials during the upcoming SAWS program, the
military was cool to most of Colt's CAR-15 Military Weapons
System, and only a handful of carbines, M-2 belt-fed assault
rifles and survival rifles were ever produced. However, the
short-barreled submachine gun and the 40mm grenade
launcher attachment did undergo considerable further development. These are discussed in detail in chapter 15.
164. First and second edition catalogs describing Colt's "CAR-15 and CMG-1,
5.56mm Military Weapons System" .The lower "Second Edition" from May,
1965 was later described by a Colt designer as "very optimistic".
169
Colt's CAR-15/CMG-1 System 170
COLT CAR-15 WEAPONS SYSTEM
COMMON COMPONENTS CHART

Heavy
Assault
Rifle
AR-15
( M-16 )
Carbine
Heavy
Assault
Rifle
M-1
Lower Receiver
Bolt
Bolt Carrier
Receiver Extension
Extractor
U p p e r Receiver
Ejector
Barrel
Part N a m e
M-2
SubMachine
Gun
SubMachine
Gun
Survival
XM-16E1
Disconnector
Front Sight
Rear Sight
X
X
Gas T u b e
Automatic Sear
Hand Guard
Hammer
Pistol Grip
Trigger
Trigger G u a r d
X
X
Bolt Stop
Heavy
Assault
Rifle
M-2
Magazine Catch
Heavy
Assault
Rifle
M-1
Action Spring Guide
Carbine
AR-15
( M-16 )
XM-16E1
Action Spring
Magazine
Part N a m e
Survival
X
X
Butt Stock
Charging Handle
X
X
* X ' s represent A R - 1 5 parts used.
COLT CMG-1 WEAPONS SYSTEM

COMMON COMPONENTS CHART
Part Name
Tripod
Bipod
Solonoid
Vehicle
Part N a m e
Tripod
Bipod
Solonoid
Vehicle
Receiver
Pistol Grip Fire Control
Barrel
Solenoid Fire Control
Feed Cover
Back Plate
Feed Tray
Butt Stock
X **
X**
Bolt
Action Spring
Bolt Carrier
Charging Handle
Extractor
Bipod
X**
X**
Ejector
Tripod
X**
X**
X
X
X
X
X
* X ' s represent common parts.

** B a s i c m a c h i n e g u n will accept bipod, tripod or butt stock.
165.
Colt's Common Components Chart for the CAR-15 and CMG-1 systems.
The Colt CAR-15 Carbine
166. Factory prototype CAR-15 Carbine, with a shorter handguard, a 16"

barrel and a modified, 4-position selector mechanism.
Selector markings for
AUTO and SEMI have been milled out, and now read AUTO up, SEMI rear,
and "2 Shot" burst, down.
167. In developing the short-barreled Carbine and SMG versions of the

CAR-15, Colt's soon discovered that shortening the handguard (and gas
tube) required some "accommodation" : the gas port diameter had to be
opened right up to the same as the internal diameter of the gas tube itself
(.110"); and this lightened "Bolt Carrier for Short Version" was produced
and tested, both in "shorties" and heavy-barrel machine guns. Compare
with fig. 182.
US Army Weapons Command photo dated August 6, 1964
168. Left and right side views of the official 15 "barreled CAR-15 Carbine,
the Colt model (6)05B (Burst). As on the prototype (fig. 166) the change
lever positions are reoriented (AUTO up and SEMI rear), but with down
now marked BURST. The 34 1/4", 5.8-lb. Carbine was offered without
success for use "where stowage is a problem, e. g.,

and aircraft" . Note (below) the upper receiver, which
made from a blanked but not machined-out XM16E1
QAD
tanks, armored cars,

appears to have been
forging.
(Ord) Pattern Room
171
169. Cover of Colt's instruction manual for its two- and three-shot burst devices,
available on all models of the CAR-15 system.
170. Dedicated components of the Colt burst control mechanism.

Left, top to bottom: sear; selector lever; decal with new selector markings.
Center, top to bottom: hammer spring; hammer; hammer cam (2-shot, left;
3-shot, right); hammer clutch spring.
Right, top to bottom: burst disconnect; semi disconnect; 2 (standard) disconnect springs; disconnect auxiliary spring; trigger.
171. Closeup of three burst device hammer cams. From top: experimental
"once-around" 6-shot; 3-shot; 2-shot.
The CAR-I5 Heavy Assault Rifle M1
172. The Colt CAR-15 HBAR "Heavy Assault Rifle M1". Weighing over a pound
more than the 6.5-lb. M16/XM16E1, the M1 was variously fitted with a regular
Colt "clothespin" bipod, a modified BAR bipod as shown here, or adapted for
the M2 rifle bipod (fig. 173). This example, serial no. 039950, bears "AR-15 /
Cal. 223" export markings.
173. Colt's model 606B (Burst) HBAR M1, fitted at the muzzle with an adapter
for the M2 rifle bipod. The Army originally bought less than 200 HBAR M1s,
mainly for use during the SAWS trials, although improved, open-bolt M16
HBARs are alive and well today (chapter 23).
The CAR-15 Heavy Assault Rifle M2 (Belt Fed)
174. An in-the-white prototype belt-feed upper receiver mounted on a modified

model 02 AR-15 lower. Note the early bayonet (appendix), the feed slot, and
the vertical actuator, which functions through a long cam slot in the modified
bolt carrier (fig. 182, top).
175. Colt designer Rob Roy firing the original, regular-barreled belt-feed rifle
shown in fig. 174. Note the three circled empties, and the links of the disintegrating belt exiting through the link ejection port.
176. Receiver closeup of a modified Colt model 02 rifle adapted to belt

Note the link guide (vertical projection) in the link ejection port, visible through
the feed opening, and the added 2 SHOT burst capability.
177. Colt belt-feed M2 HBAR, left side view with smaller (50-round) ammunition box.
178. Right side view of Colt's "CAR-15 Heavy Assault Rifle M2", officially
listed as weighing 83 lbs. (without bipod or 120-round ammunition box, shown
here). Note the "link chute", which channeled the spent links into a compartment in the right-hand side of the ammunition box. The Project Manager
noted that a belt feed AR-15 was sent to Springfield Armory on November 10, 1964,
to be evaluated as helicopter door armament. Less than 20 were ever made.
179. Three-quarter rear closeup view of another belt-feed HBAR M2, fitted
with Colt's first offering of round (interchangeable) handguards (fig. 207)
and the 50-round ammunition box.
180. Further receiver closeup of fig. 179. Note the rounded slot cut in the
center portion of each Colt link, designed to mate with the link guide (fig. 176)
and keep the links from twisting and jamming the action.
181.Closeup of an experimental,
"handleless" upper receiver designed for
belt feed. Note the vertical slot and guideway (right) through which the sliding
feed actuator is cammed up and down by the long slot in the bolt carrier
(fig. 182).
182. Components of the Colt belt-feed system used in the M2 HBAR.

Above: bolt assembly (note the longitudinal belt feed actuating cam slot and
lightened rear diameter of carrier).
Center, from left: belt feed actuator; magazine box demounting pin (secures center
"dummy magazine" mounting projection of magazine box, below, to belt feed
mechanism); belt feed mechanism, installed down through magazine well
of specially modified upper (fig. 181) and lower (fig. 176) receivers. Protrudes
below magazine well to accept magazine box and (note hole) demounting pin.
The CAR-IS Submachine Gun
Two one-off, prototype CAR-15 submachine guns from the Colt model
both with 10 "barrels and ' 'bobbed" bayonet lugs and pistol grips.
Above: early Colt (model 01) AR-15 featuring (from front) early standard flash
suppressor; handmade front handguard retainer holding standard handguard
shortened from front; early charging handle; handmade prototype extendable
buttstock (fig. 184).
Below: later M16 with handmade rear handguard retainer and handguard
shortened from rear. Note "production" model of extendable buttstock.
184. Figs. 1, 2 and 3 from US Patent no. 3,267,601, granted to Robert E. Roy
and assigned to Colt's, entitled "Adjustable Length Buttstock". Not completely
satisfactory, as it required the addition of a guide rod (22) and in any case
the stock, operated by the lever (18), only changed the rifle's length by 2.7".
Further development of the CAR-15 SMG is discussed in chapter 15.
185. Another one-off, toolroom model of the CAR-15 submachine gun, made from
AR-15 serial no. 014864, featuring the plain (model 02) flash suppressor on a
10" barrel. No bayonet lug; export markings; early steel " w a f f l e " magazine;
standard pistol grip and extendable buttstock.
The CAR-15 Survival Rifle
186. Right side view of two CAR-15 survival rifles (Colt model 608).
Above: note the unique funnel-type flash hider and distinctive round handguard,
the "bobbed" pistol grip and non-adjustable metal stock.
187. The Colt CAR-15 survival rifle as disassembled for stowage, along with
80 rounds of ammunition in 4 magazines, in the standard aviator's seat pack.
10" barrel, 29" overall length. Weight: 4.75 lbs. without magazine. Not adopted:
estimates at Colt's are that less than 10 Survival Rifles were ever made.
Below: a later model featuring the first type of Colt's "noise and flash suppressor" (chapter 15), slightly longer pistol grip, and plastic-coated buttstock.
CAR-15 Survival Rifle (Disassembled for Stowage)
179
The Colt CMG-1 Machine Gun
188. The short-lived Colt CMG-1, in the 12.5-lb. 15.67kg "Tripod Mounted
Medium Machine Gun" version. Made extensively from sheet metal stampings,
the CMG-1 was designed to feed belted 5.56mm ammunition from either side of
189. The other three proposed versions of the CMG-1 machine gun, as featured
in the second edition of Colt's "CAR-15 and CMG-1'' catalog (fig. 164). The
designer noted that these seemingly ready-to-shoot CMG-1s "existed only
in the minds of the advertisers".
Above: the 11.5-lb. /5.22 kg "Bipod Mounted Light Machine Gun", " s p e c i f i cally intended for use by assault troops".
Center: the buttless "Vehicle Mounted" version, " f o r use on wheeled or
tracked vehicles as a defensive weapon or in support of infantry units".
Below: the "Solenoid Operated Fixed Machine Gun" produced " f o r use in
helicopters and fixed wing aircraft".
the receiver, and fire from an open bolt. Bate of fire: 650 rpm. Only two or three
CMG-1s were ever built. The first prototype featured an M16 bolt and gas tube,
while the others were each built on different experimental gas (piston) systems.
13 The Stoner 63
The 5.56mm Stoner 63:

Strong Competition for Colt's CAR-15 Program
On the whole, M16s had so far done rather poorly in
US Marine Corps testing. In fact, the issue of M16 rifles to
USMC units was viewed within the Corps as undesirable,
there were no 5.56mm light machine guns or indeed any
other support weapons officially available, and the net result
would be to force yet another caliber into an already complex
supply system.
Taking a leaf from Fairchild's book, the Cadillac Gage

Company had in the early sixties made an attractive offer of
employment to a Marine Colonel soon due for retirement,
who during the latter part of his military career had convinced
the Corps' Commandant, General Wallace Greene, of the
advantages of a one-gun "family" for Marine use. Of course,
Colt's had already presented their seven-version (six variations
190. Comparison drawing and list of specifications for the Stoner 62 and 63
weapons systems.
Cadillac Gage Company
182
The Stoner 63
191. Gene Stoner in late 1963, demonstrating the rifle version of an early woodstocked prototype of the .223 caliber Stoner 63 at Camp Grayling, Michigan.
US Army Detroit Arsenal photo
The Stoner 63
192. Firing the wood-stocked Stoner 63 prototype in the medium machine

gun version at Camp Grayling. Note the General's "expedient" earplugs.
plus the M16 rifle) CAR-15 series, but these were seen as
"dedicated" individual configurations. The Marines apparently
had in mind a more versatile system based on common, interchangeable sub-assemblies.
As for Cadillac Gage, it should come as no surprise that the

scaled-down, 5.56mm version of Stoner's original 7.62 NATO
model of 1962, called the Stoner 63, was an instant hit with
General Greene and indeed fit the Marine specification perfectly.
Time Out For Some Stargazing

By November of 1964 the furor created by the Marine demand
for the Stoner system, which the Army was doing its best to
ignore on the grounds that modified M16s would be a preferable alternative, had caught Defense Secretary McNamara's
ear, and reverberated back down to the Army Chief of Staff.
At OSD level the pandemonium over the pros and cons of

bolt assists, rifling twists and the ideosyncracies of various
gunpowders was well remembered: certainly now that the M16
was adopted and in production, no "alternate" weapon
purchases were contemplated.
183
193. The complete 5.56mm Stoner 63 system, as favored for adoption by the
US Marine Corps, and tested in the SAWS study. The Stoner system boasted
over 80% parts commonality among all its versions.
184
The Stoner 63
The Stoner 63
On the other hand, the M16 rifles coming into the system
were almost exclusively for the use of the Air Force and other
special airmobile units. For the Army, the XM16E1 was by
definition just a stopgap until the SPIW became ready for
issue, an event that had already begun to recede into the evermore-distant future. The basic weapons available for
general issue to the Army and the Marine Corps still comprised the NATO-caliber M14 rifle and M60 machine gun.
With some decision obviously necessary in the dispute between the Army and the Marines over the Stoner system,
it seemed as good a time as any to examine future small arms
options in general.
The SAWS Study

For General Harold K. Johnson, the Army's newly appointed
Chief of Staff, it was time to "completely re-evaluate our small
arms weapons program, starting with a review of doctrine.."
In response to ever-louder Marine allegations that the Army

had "a closed mind" on the issue of the Stoner system, General
Johnson opined:
..I am hopeful that the Marine Corps will subscribe

to this approach, will monitor the efforts as they habitually do, and will not attempt to precipitate an early
decision which could prejudice the future combat effective-
ness of both the Army and Marine Corps. General Greene

has given me oral assurance that he does not intend to
pursue a course of action that diverges from that of the
Army at this point.
Thus began the elaborate "Small-Arms Weapons Systems"

(SAWS) study, the implementation of which General Johnson
entrusted to the Combat Developments Command (CDC).
Over the next fifteen months, six major series of SAWS tests
were performed in the US, the Arctic, Europe and the Caribbean on a number of weapons including the M14, light- and
194. The rifle version of the improved, 5.56mm Stoner 63A1 system. By
1970 the Stoner system as used in the SAW trials had been narrowed down
to three improved versions: the XM22E1 Rifle (above): the XM23 Carbine:
and the XM207 Belt Fed Machine Gun. A further improvement to this
last, called the XM207E1, was adopted as limited standard by the

Navy SEALs as the "Machine Gun, MK23 MOD 0".
US Army Rock Island Arsenal photograph dated August 25,
US
1971
185
186
The SAWS Study
195. Circuitous Route Department: the Nederlandsche Wapen-en Munitiefabriek

De Kruithoorn N.V. (NWM) of s 'Hertogenbosh, Holland, a subsidiary of the
German Mauser - IWK arms and munitions conglomerate, obtained in 1957
the world-wide rights to the Spanish CETME rifle, heir and embodiment of
late-World-War-II German roller-lock technology. The rights to the CETME
were sold to the West Germans in 1960, and the Heckler & Koch NATO-caliber
G3 rifle was the result. With the burgeoning popularity of the .223 cartridge,
it wasn't long before H&K introduced a 5.56mm version of its roller-locked
" f a m i l y " called the HK33.
Pictured above are left and right views of a "laundered" HK33 called
the "T223", sponsored by Harrington & Richardson and entered in the
trials.
196. Receiver closeup of the 5.56mm caliber HK33, disguised as the " H & R
T223" for the SAWS trials. Note the selector markings: "Safe: S.A; F.A".
197.
Closeup of receiver markings of the laundered "H&R T223".
heavy-barreled versions of the XM16E1, various developmental

SPIW prototypes, the Stoner 63, the Soviet AK-47, a scaleddown 5.56mm version of the Heckler & Koch roller-locked
G3 (the "T223", presented by H&R), and the Army's M60,
M73 and M37 machine guns. As further discussed below and
in The SPIW, the December 1966 final report of the SAWS

study ran to over thirty volumes.
If nothing else, the SAWS exercises adroitly deferred any decision on the Stoner/M16 controversy for the following two years.
"Four Alternatives" for the Future

- Reaffirming the SPIW
Also in November, AMC's Commanding General Frank
Besson had queried the PMR as to a possible future termination
date for the recently expanded yet essentially temporary
"Project Management Office for Rifles". In his reply, classified
"Secret" as were most communications dealing with the
Project
SPIW, Lt. Col. Yount presented four possible scenarios based

on what the SAWS study might ultimately recommend. Significantly, the Army's current .30 caliber inventory formed the
backbone of three of these, while all roads save the unlikely total
regression "back to the .30 caliber" ultimately led to the SPIW:
Curtailment/Termination
Study
3 December 1964
..Specific plans for Project Office termination have not
been developed. A number of decisions must be made pertaining to the Army Rifle Program before definite plans..
could be prepared.
To develop specific plans, the Army Rifle Program should
be considered from four alternatives.
Alternative 1 - The Army is currently undertaking [the

SAWS] study to determine the direction the Army will follow
to select the ultimate.. rifle... It is anticipated this rifle study
will be complete and decisions made for paths to follow by
1 July 1966. Assuming the decision is made..to select the
M14 as the best obtainable rifle, production could possibly
be initiated in six (6) months. After approximately eighteen
188
The SAWS Study
(18) months 'production. .the. .Program, .would lend itself to

turning the item back to commodity management and deprojectizing the Project Management Office for Rifles [PMO].
This..is based on the assumption the Army would utilize
current rifle assets, including XM16E1, M14, M1, and BAR
to arrive at the total required Army rifle asset strength.
Alternative 2 - Assuming the decision is made..to select
the XM16E1 rifle as the interim rifle system prior to production of the SPIW as the ultimate rifle system. Production of the XM16E1 could be initiated shortly after the
decision is reached, and the required Army rifle asset
strength could be reached by February 1967utilizing current
rifle assets. Since the XM16E1 is currently in production,
this portion of the Rifle PMO. .could be dropped, .however,
the PMO would continue..to monitor development and
production of the SPIW.
Alternative 3 - Assuming the decision is made. .to select
the Stoner or some other weapon as the interim rifle system
The significant choice of words ("will" or "would" when
describing the SPIW timetable, instead of "could") also reflect
the Army's foregone conclusion to proceed with the SPIW.
Meanwhile, as noted in Col. Yount's 4th Alternative, the
P M O was trying manfully to get the SPIW program back on
Headquarters
prior to SPIW production.. .Again utilizing current rifle assets,

the required Army rifle asset strength could be reached by
late 1967 and this phase. .could be. .picked up by Commodity
Management in early 1968. Here again, the PMO would
continue., to manage the SPIW program.
Alternative 4 - Assuming the decision is reached..to select
the SPIW as the ultimate rifle system. A thirty-five (35) month
[SPIW] research and development program is currently
being staffed by the Department of the Army.. .This phase
is scheduled for completion in November 1967 and will be
followed by a facility tooling period of one year; thereafter
will follow a twenty-four (24) month pilot line production
of 11,000 weapons. The initial production for troop use will
begin in December 1970 and 195,000 weapons should be
delivered in the first twelve (12) months ' commercial production run. Replacing all current rifles with the SPIW would
entail nearly seven years additional production.. .Under this
alternative it would appear advisable to retain the SPIW
under Project Managership until FY1973..
track with a 35-month, "second generation" plan. Following
an early "second generation" SPIW briefing at Fort Benning,
the Commandant of the Army Infantry School described the
crucial role which the Project Manager Rifles played for the
Infantry, at the same time taking a few swipes at some of the
SPIW's more glaring problem areas:
United States Army Infantry School

Fort Benning, Georgia
10 February 1965
Dear General Besson:

As part of our continuing program to keep abreast of critical
weapon developments, I was most pleased to have Lieutenant
Colonel Harold W Yount, your Project Manager for Rifles,
and several of his technical advisors visit Fort Benning last
week and bring us up-to-date on the status and progress
of the Special Purpose Individual Weapon (SPIW).
This get-together. .was successful beyond our own expectations. It clarified the problems which must be overcome and
gave us an appreciation of the types of trade-offs that may

have to be considered. Our "experts", on the other hand,
had the opportunity to express and explain our strong
feelings concerning the development of the combination,
flechette point fire and multi-shot area fire, weapon.
Our meeting served to underscore the tremendous importance which we attach to this particular Project Manager.. .Of
all the Army's project managers, he is the most important
to the Infantry. All the resources at Fort Benning are available to insure his successful development of the SPIW..
The Decision to Close Springfield Armory

In presenting the fruits of a twenty-month, high-level study
of the US Army Arsenal system at a November 1964 press
conference, Defense Secretary McNamara announced "95
actions to consolidate, reduce or discontinue Defense Department activities in the United States and overseas". One of the
actions thus announced was the decision to close Springfield
Armory: in the name of "cost-effectiveness" the Defense

Department had "examined its Arsenal System and identified
additional excess capacity that is no longer needed".
The 174-year-old "National Armory at Springfield, Massachusetts" was the very hub of the country's military small arms
Escalationin
Vietnam
189
engineering development system. Inasmuch as power corrupts,

it was a measure of Springfield's importance that over the years
it had become a bastion of hidebound bureaucracy and
blinkered traditionalism. As such, it stood aloof and in rankling
opposition to Secretary McNamara's oft-professed credo to
"use deliberate analysis to force alternative programs to the
surface, and then to make explicit choices among them".
With the M16/XM16E1 and the recently re-directed SPIW
programs standing as successful examples of his "better mousetrap", Secretary McNamara resolutely capped a full year of
vociferous opposition from Springfield's many boosters on
November 16, 1965, with the statement that "The long-term
retention of the Springfield Armory for the acquisition of small
arms weapons and weapons systems is neither necessary nor
desirable." This was in the face of the fact that, in addition
to its various engineering test programs in support of the M16/
XM16E1 and the recently-ordered "second generation"
Armory SPIW, Springfield was deeply involved in supporting
specialized airmobile warfare in Vietnam. Almost all of the
early helicopter armament systems were developed at the
Armory.
Nevertheless, by order of the Secretary of Defense the
Armory was wound down to a final termination date of April,
1968, whereupon the Armory's small arms R&D facility was
to be transferred to Rock Island Arsenal in Illinois.
198. A somewhat epigrammatic Springfield Armory retrospective entitled

"Evolution of Rifle and Ammunition
Development".
Intended as a graphic
"statement of worth" but ignored by Secretary McNamara in his November 1964
Armory
termination
announcement.
Escalation in Vietnam
In March of 1965, exactly a year after Colt's had begun
initial deliveries, XM16E1 rifles were deployed with the 173rd
Airborne Division, officially the first US combat troops deployed
in Vietnam.
Emergency orders for small quantities of rifles had meanwhile been keeping Lt. Col. Yount busy juggling his monthly
delivery schedules. A sampling from the PMR's weekly significant action reports for the period leading up to the first
"official" deployment reads as follows:
Project:
Rifles [week of] 14-18 December 1964
Project:
Rifles [week of] 22-26 February 1965
Two priority overseas requirements were received this week:

315 rifles for Air Force, and 3,146 XM16E1 rifles for Army..
By telephone, 23 February, USAF transmitted an urgent

requirement (priority 02) for 3,022 M16 rifles for shipment
overseas..
Project:
Rifles [week of] 28-31 December 1964
Project: Rifles [week of] 1-5 March 1965

Navy has notified the Project Manager, informally, of a
priority requirement for 500 of either M16 or XM16E1 rifles..
Project:
Rifles [week of] 18-22 January 1965
A priority 04 MIPR was received from Navy for 50 additional M16 rifles..
. .An additional [Air Force] priority requirement for shipment of 6,463 M16 rifles has been received.. .Whereas Army
production could defer to the Air Force higher priority
requirement, receivers for the Army rifles are different, and
the availability of receivers for Air Force rifles is the limiting
factor on production.
190
More Propellant Trials
Project: Rifles [week of] 29 March - 2 April 1965

..The Project Manager..is awaiting response from the
Navy to his offer to substitute M16 or XM16E1 rifles for the
1,000 caliber .30, M2 Carbines which cannot be made available to fill the Navy's requisition..
The Hand Way Part 5 - More Alternate Propellant Trials

By the early summer of 1965, Colt's had run out of CR8136loaded test cartridges and had been shipped a fresh supply,
this time loaded with the only powder available, WC846. In
May and June they reported new problems in staying within
the Army's upper cyclic rate limit of 850 rpm on acceptance
testing, and again requested a standing waiver to 900 rpm.
The TCC refused, and a standoff occurred: Colt's suspended
production of XM16Els and henceforth would make only
M16s, which the Air Force would accept with cyclic rates up
to 900 rpm.
The TCC contacted the nation's powdermakers and requested
test lots of new powders, with a view to further acceptance
Fifteenth Memo Report on XM16E1
trials at Frankford. DuPont, having withdrawn its first two

offerings, submitted yet another I M R type, and Hercules had
improved its HPC-10. Significantly, Olin declined to enter
any new propellant, stating that WC846 ball powder was as
good as they could make it without a protracted and very
expensive enhancement program. Since most of the ammunition loaded after the beginning of 1965 contained WC846,
it was included in the Frankford study as the "control".
Excerpts from the report of the new trials, issued over the
signature of C. E. Schindler, Chief of the Propellants and
Pyrotechnics Branch of Frankford Arsenal, are as follows:
(or AR-15) Rifle/Ammunition System
Investigation of Alternate Propellants

For Use in 5.56mm Ball and Tracer Ammunition
September 1965
Introduction
In April 1964, a similar program.. resulted in recommending for approval propellant types DuPont CR8136
and Olin WC846. Production experience.. later indicated
the need for evaluating new propellants which might
offer a more favorable pressure-velocity relationship..
In February 1965, DuPont and Hercules were contacted..

regarding a proposed test program. .[and] both concurred...
In June of 1965, Olin formally declined participation by
concluding that significant improvements in the performance
of their WC846 propellant could not be accomplished
without a major effort..
Test Material
The test material consisted of three samples of approximately 20,000 cartridges each containing respectively
DuPont EX8028, Hercules HPC-11 and Olin WC846..
DuPont
EX8208-4
EX8208..has a normal IMR-base grain composition (single
base, tubular, extruded) and is coated with a polymer type

deterrent (ethylene dimethacrylate). Chemically this propellant corresponds to IMR8138-M, which is approved for
7.62mm Ball, M80, ammunition. The grain size, however,
corresponds to CR8136, a single-base propellant currently
approved for..M193 ammunition...The sample lot..was
assembled by the Remington Arms Co.
191 More Propellant Trials
Hercules
HPC-11
Olin
WC846
WC846..has a double-base grain composition having a

spherical appearance (ball) and uses dibutylphthalete as the
deterrent coating. The preponderance of 5.56mm Ball M193
ammunition has been loaded with WC846 propellant in the
last two years. For this reason, WC846 was selected as the control. .The sample. .was assembled by the Remington Arms Co.
HPC-11..has a double base grain composition (tubularextruded) and uses ethyl centralite as the deterrent coating
. ..The sample lot. .was assembled by the Federal Cartridge
Corporation.
Reference
Ammunition
..As there is no government-loaded reference ammunition

of this caliber to be used as a ballistic standard..commercial
reference ammunition was employed for that purpose. The

lot used was RA 55-5-R containing WC846 propellant.
Velocity and Pressure Tests

Normal Ambient
(+70F):
EX8208
HPC-11 WC846
Velocity, fps at 15 feet

Average (corrected)
3,235
3,227
3,230
Chamber Pressure, psi

Average (corrected)
44,000
47,200
43,300
Port Pressure, psi

Average (corrected)
15,700
14,300
15,500
Fouling
EX8208: No stoppages attributable to visible fouling...
Only a moderate amount of fouling appeared on the bolt
assembly area after the initial 1,500-round firing and after
each subsequent 1,000-round cycle during the 6,000 round
erosion test.
HPC-11: . .without any stoppages attributable to visible
fouling... HPC-11 caused the least amount of fouling, .of the

three propellants tested.
WC846:. .failures to eject occurred repeatedly after 1,100
rounds in one weapon. These stoppages were attributable
to excessive fouling in the bolt mechanism... it was obvious
that WC846 caused considerably more fouling.. in the bolt
assembly area than did either of the other test propellants.
Gas Tube Fouling

Examination of the weapons used during the Erosion test
indicated that though HPC-11 gave the least amount of visible
fouling in the bolt assembly area, the gas tube was becoming
increasingly constricted. This constriction appeared to
correspond to large numbers of gun stoppages occurring,

of the type normally associated with short-recoil and low
operating energy in general. A comparison of the changes
in the gas tubes inside diameters is tabulated below:
192
More Propellant Trials
Propellant
EX8208
Rifle No.
HPC-11
WC846
141102
141161
141320
142265
142396
142926
0.116
0.116
0.116
0.116
0.116
0.110
0.116
0.113
0.113
0.116
0.113
0.104
0.116
0.093
0.093
0.081
0.078
0.099
0.116
0.078
0.078
0.063
0.073
0.099
0.116
0.116
0.116
0.113
0.113
0.099
0.116
0.113
0.113
0.113
0.113
0.106
Internal dia.,
inches
New Rifles
at 1,500 rounds
at 2,500 rounds
at 4,500 rounds
at 5,500 rounds
at 6,000 rounds
Propellant
Alternation
To determine if there was any significant effect on weapon

function... three 700-round cycles were fired. For each cycle, the
Rounds fired
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
1,000
1,100
1,200
1,300
1,400
1,500
1,600
1,700
1,800
1,900
2,000
2,100
propellant was alternated every 100 rounds. ..The weapon was

cleaned after each 700-round cycle. The tabulated results follow:
Propellant
HPC-11
EX8208
WC846
EX8208
HPC-11
WC846
HPC-11
EX8208
WC846
HPC-11
WC846
EX8208
HPC-11
EX8208
WC846
HPC-11
EX8208
HPC-11
WC846
EX8208
WC846
Cyclic rate
742
875
841
890
765
905
758
880
905
772
905
833
754
818
875
734
853
853
821
773
The average cyclic rate for each propellant is as follows:

EX8208 854
HPC-11 756
WC846 880
Only one malfunction occurred during this test. This was
a "failure to fire" with HPC-11 during the [third cycle, above].
193 More Propellant Trials
Observations
Engineering tests designed to evaluate commercial product
types, such as this..program, can evaluate such types only
to the degree that the..samples used actually represented
the respective types.. .It is essential that propellant producers
control the raw materials and processes.. so that subsequent
lots are not significantly degraded from the sample found
satisfactory..
The control propellant (WC846) gave the greatest
amount of visible accumulation of residue in the bolt
assembly area.. .Though WC846 meets current acceptance criteria for fouling, it appears to be marginal in this
regard after between 1,000 and 1,500 rounds without
cleaning; WC846 loaded cartridges will cause stoppages attributable to excessive fouling in the bolt
mechanism..
None of the [acceptable] test propellants appears capable
of consistently meeting the current XM16E1 rifle cyclic rate
requirement of 750+/-100 [rpm]..
Conclusions
..EX8208 propellant. .is suitable for use in 5.56mm Ball
M193 and Tracer M196 ammunition and affords a substantial
advantage over the currently approved CR8136.
The control propellant, WC846 though otherwise satisfactory, does produce quantities of fouling.. sufficient to affect
weapon function if the weapon is not cleaned after firing
a maximum of 1,000 cartridges.
HPC-11..cannot be considered suitable for use at this time.
Recommendations
That..EX8208 be approved for use in..Ball M193 and
Tracer M196 ammunition.
That current approval for use of CR8136 in the same type
ammunition be withdrawn.
That current approval of IMR4475 propellant for use in
the 5.56mm Tracer M196 cartridge be withdrawn.
The TCC was thus forced to authorize yet another marginally

acceptable propellant in order to break the "M16s-only" stalemate at Colt's, and to silence the critics of their previous "sole
source" position with regard to Olin's WC846. The ball powder
in the preponderance of the ammunition destined for Vietnam
was again found to produce fouling. This time the warning was
even clearer: WC846 could stop a brand-new XM16E1 cold, anytime after 1,000 rounds had been fired without proper cleaning.
That Hercules Powder Company be encouraged to

expedite their efforts to overcome the "low operating
energy" problem of HPC-11 and thus permit future
approval..
That. .Olin. .be encouraged to modify their WC846 propellant so as to reduce the quantity of fouling deposits normally
produced in the XM16E1 rifle..
Ammunition loaded with DuPont's third propellant type,

EX8208, did not start to come into the system until June of
1966. Until that time, WC846 was the only qualified propellant
for loading 5.56mm cartridges.
The stage was set for the massive US military buildup in
Vietnam, which was soon to begin.
A Tiger by the Tail
Chapter Twelve
A TIGER BY THE TAIL

Reaction from troops in training, while important, was obviously not the same thing as how the M16/XM16Els were faring
in actual combat. General Besson was intensely interested in
initial reactions from the 101st and 82nd Airborne Divisions
and the Special Forces for more than just reasons of good
management: the Vice Chief of Staff himself had "lit a fire"
under General Besson for the same information. It was with
great relief, therefore, that in April 1965 AMC could in all good
conscience pass on word of the first month's "almost unanimously favorable" combat reports from these special units.
The relief was short-lived, however. For one thing, as the
Project Manager reported, the TCC's M16 Introductory plan
was soon going slightly awry:
Project: Rifles [week of] 24-28 May 1965

Teletype messages from both USARPAC and USARSO
denied theater clearance for visit of the XM16E1 Rifle Technical Assistance Team. USARO stated that there were no
supply or maintenance problems with this weapon. USARPAC
stated that in view of the Field Commanders ' Report being

submitted quarterly, a visit of the team was considered
unnecessary. However, none of these quarterly reports have
been received to date from Vietnam..
As far as American fighting experience went, the terrain

and climate of South Vietnam resembled nothing so much
as the Pacific islands and jungles of World War II. As discussed in US Rifle M14, the initial and powerful "groundswell" behind the idea of a general-issue selective fire rifle
had originated in the sudden, sharp actions of the Pacific
campaign.
It is evident that General Besson truly believed the selectivefire M16 to be the best available US weapon for jungle and ricepaddy warfare, so much so that in his April report he warned
the Vice Chief of Staff of what he saw as a "potential flare-up"
from regular soldiers armed with semi-auto M14s who had a
chance to become acquainted with the merits of the XM16E1.
In Vietnam around the end of 1965, US forces first engaged

disciplined, regular troops of the North Vietnamese Army in
the bloody battles of la Drang. The enemy's "arm of choice"
was the AK47. General Wheeler's "worldwide" trials had
shown the AK to be "clearly inferior" to US weapons, and
most US soldiers at that time had shown a preference for the
M14 over the then-AR-15. But that was 1962 and peacetime,
and this was 1965 and counting. America was at war in the
jungle, again.
However, as glimpsed above in the PMR's Four Alternatives, the Army had no intention of replacing its .30 caliber
inventory at this time. The duration of the American presence
in Vietnam was as yet uncertain, and moreover the SAWS
trials were still running their course: until their conclusion,
still over a year away, everyone had more or less agreed on
maintaining the small-arms status quo.
As early as the first month of deployment, however, as was
pointed out over the signature of the PMR's Washington-based
Staff Officer (PMSO) Lt. Col. Robert C. Engle, there were
some loose ends:
Project: Rifles [week of] 15-19 March 1965

Repair Parts for XM16E1 Rifles: Since M16/XM16E1
rifle production by Colt's is scheduled to end in December 1965, the question of future repair parts support has
arisen. Colt's has proprietary rights on manufacture of
the rifle and components, and necessary repair parts
will have to be procured from Colt's on a sole source

basis... Regardless of the Army's decision concerning the
disposition of the Army's XM16E1 rifle inventory, we are
committed to support this weapon for the USAF on an
indefinite basis..
195
A Tiger by the Tail
spend more money for any new weapons but to use the
current supply of M14s.
The M14 was a very inadequate weapon for use in jungle
fighting since it was incapable of getting off a three-round
burst without losing the last round... The AR-15 was a perfect
application for this purpose and was recognized by Westmoreland and all his staff..
By refusing to allow Colt's to ship rifles anywhere throughout the world, although they had outstanding contracts with
letters of credit. .McNamara was able to tell the American
public that every rifle coming off the Colt line was going
to the soldiers in Vietnam. Colt at that time was working
on a one-shift basis. It was an extremely political situation.
Members of the Congress became actively involved. The
Army Staff was trying to get the 100,000 rifles that Westmoreland had requested in September. .which General Besson..
supported but couldn't get approval from the Chief of Staff
or the Secretary of Defense. After many discussions with
Army personnel in Washington and with Congressional staffs,

I wrote fin October 1965] to Brigadier General Jack Crowley,
an old acquaintance, who was then the J-4 for General
Westmoreland and advised him that effective the following
January [Colt's] would stop producing rifles for the Army
and he was fighting a war without any support.. .General
Crowley. .gave my letter to General Westmoreland, .and [it]
was the basis for. .Westmoreland's discussion with a Senator
from the Armed Services Committee who visited Vietnam
in December.. .Westmoreland said there were a number of
things he was unable to obtain and the Senator said he would
see what he could do. [He] went out to the Air Force radio,
bypassing Army command channels, called Senator Russell,
the Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee and
told him the story. Senator Russell in turn called Secretary
McNamara and said "buy 100,000 rifles today, or I'm
releasing the story to the press." That was December 7th.
I received a call that date to be in Rock Island to sign a
contract and if I didn't get there they would sign it without
me. I didn't get there because of a snow storm in Chicago.
They signed it and I signed it the next day.
Six months into the war the P M R reported "first news"

of a phenomenon which had already been noted by Springfield
Armory in its 1956 trial of the ArmaLite AR-10 (chapter 2):
Project: Rifles [week of] 2-6 August 1965

XM16E1 rifle: Informal reports have been received
that some problem may exist with "freezing" of the bolt
and bolt carrier, .under climatic conditions encountered
in Vietnam... The result of freezing is that the bolt cannot
be opened manually. Change 3 to the XM16E1 Technical
Manual, published 1 May 1965, officially implemented

improved cleaning procedures. However, to preclude the
freezing problem.. .a technical investigation of the asserted
problem was initiated ...Upon completion..corrective
action will be taken..
The Hard Way Part 6 - The Connection Is Confirmed

Meanwhile, as noted, DuPont's second I M R propellant
offering had not lived up to expectations. Even though it
was more uniform than the original IMR4475, DuPont could
not guarantee that every lot of CR8136 would meet the tight
average upper chamber pressure limit set by the Defense
Department. Faced with the prospect of occasionally scrapping an entire lot of otherwise acceptable gunpowder,
Remington had chosen to withdraw CR8136 in December
of 1964. Remington had subsequently fulfilled its contractual
commitments by loading with Olin's WC846 ball powder.
This meant that all through the first eighteen months of the
war in Vietnam, Olin's WC846 was the only qualified

propellant for the M193 round.
In May of 1964 Bill Davis, the AR-15 Project Manager for
ammunition at Frankford Arsenal, temporarily joined Colt's
Firearms Division with the title of XM16E1 Engineering Project
Manager. In this capacity he brought a wealth of invaluable
experience to bear on Colt's share of the program's problems. In
the process he irrefutably confirmed some obvious connections
between ammunition type and rifle performance which the
Project Manager's Office, intent on supplying rifles to the field,
was still trying resolutely to ignore:
197
A Tiger by the Tail 198
Colt Industries Inc

Colt's Firearms Division
Effect of Ammunition Variables on Acceptance Testing of X M 1 6 E 1 Rifles

(First Partial Report)
November 8, 1965
Introduction
The prescribed cyclic rate of fire for the XM16E1 rifle is
650 to 850 rds/min, based on the average rate measured
during a 20-round continuous burst. The parameters affecting
rate of fire have been adjusted, in design of the rifle, so
as to give a typical rate of 750 rds/min..
change from ammunition employing tubular-grain propellant to ammunition employing spherical grain (ball)
propellant..
The purpose of this first report is to present.. the
results of a typical experiment. .to ascertain the magnitude of the.. effect in a random sample of 52 production
weapons.
During testing of production rifles, a marked change

in the cyclic rate was observed to correspond with a
Procedure
following the first. In half of the rifles, Lot RA5060 was
fired first, and in the remaining rifles this firing order
was reversed... because it has been observed that, if two
bursts are fired in rapid succession, the cyclic rate of the
second burst is characteristically somewhat higher... This
..change, which occurs irrespectively of the ammunition
variables, could thus be separated from the. .comparison
to be made.
The 52 rifles were chosen at random from regular production. Two lots of M193 ball ammunition were used:
Lot RA5060 containing [CR8136] propellant, and Lot
RA5135 containing [WC846] ball propellant.
..Each rifle was fired in two 20-round bursts. One
type of ammunition was fired in the first burst, and the
other type was fired in the second burst, immediately
Results
Rifles 1 - 26
(Lot 5060 fired first)
Average rate, rds/min
Fraction exceeding
850 rds/min
Lot 5060 Lot 5135 Difference

[CR8136] [WC846]
739
878
20/26
755
846
11/26
135
Rifles 27 - 52
(Lot 5135 fired first)
Average rate, rds/min
Fraction exceeding
850 rds/min
92
A Tiger by the Tail
. .Using [CR8136], both the mean cyclic rate and the standard deviation among rifles are. .within the permissible limits
of 650-850 rds/min.. .the statistical probability of exceeding
these limits..is acceptably small.
In the case of [WC846].. both the mean cyclic rate and
the standard deviation..are significantly increased..
Aside from the consideration of rejecting rifles, .on grounds
of cyclic rate...it is a matter of common experience that
stresses are increased on reciprocating parts, and other parts

subjected to impact loads, in any automatic weapon in which
the cyclic rate is appreciably increased. It has been observed,
and is to be expected from the mechanics of the problem, that
fatigue failures of the bolt in the XM16E1 are somewhat more
frequent when the cyclic rate.. is significantly increased. The
nature of the failure is, fortunately, not hazardous, but it necessitates somewhat more frequent replacement of bolts. ..There
are also certain malfunctions which occur more frequently
when the timing of the gun cycle is materially speeded up..
Conclusions
There is a clearly significant change in typical cyclic-rate
performance of XM16E1 rifles, associated with a change
in ammunition.. [where] different types of propellant were
employed.
Weapons which readily meet the present cyclic-rate
requirement when using [CR8136J will frequently fail. .when
using [WC846]...For weapons such as those used in this
experiment, none are likely to fail with [CR8136], whereas
more than half are likely to fail with [WC846].
The difference in cyclic rate produced by ammunition differences is such that no controls which might be
Thus the "bottom line" of Colt's Ammunition Variables
report was that the cyclic rate of virtually all new XM16Els
was acceptable when tested with IMR-type powder, but that
over half of these same rifles would exceed the limit and therefore be rejected if tested with ball propellant.
Other data was soon presented to support this conclusion.
Ongoing SAWS reliability testing that same month had revealed
"an unusually high number" of malfunctions. The P M O
could pinpoint no known cause, although investigations were
ordered. This general attitude of not looking for trouble, adopted
by the Project Manager in order to safeguard the scheduled
exercised over manufacture of XM16E1 rifles could guarantee compliance.. the upper limit must be extended.. to 1,000
rds/min to accommodate ammunition of both types.
The increase in cyclic rate..can be expected to reduce
the endurance of certain parts (notably the bolt), and to
increase the frequency of certain malfunctions (notably the
failure of the bolt to latch rearward when magazine is
empty)... a quantitative assessment of these effects is not
yet available, because many thousands of rounds are necessary for rendering a statistically sound judgement on parts
life and malfunction rate..
deliveries of rifles to the field, was nevertheless to have most

unfortunate repercussions.
Later in November, the Combat Developments Command's
Experimentation Center (CDCEC) reported encountering
excessive cyclic rates, high malfunction rates and fouling when
using 5.56mm ammunition loaded with ball powder during
their portion of the SAWS trials. Again the obvious connection
was stressed in CDCEC's report, but as the following excerpts
show, Lt. Col. Yount persisted, in his orderly way, to deal with
individual problems in isolation, and then only to the extent
that was absolutely necessary:
Project: Rifles [week of] 20-24 December 1965

The.. investigation, .at Frankford Arsenal on 13 December..
[is] a result of the high malfunction rate obtained, .during
the SAWS Reliability test of XM16E1 rifles using. .ball propel-
lant. The purpose of the test is to determine the cause of

the malfunction and. .action required to provide a reliable..
weapons system.
199
200 A Tiger by the Tail
The preliminary observations made during firing of 36,000

rounds.. (50% [WC846] 50% [CR8136]) in six tests is as
follows:
tions indicate more fouling when using ball propellant.

No malfunctions attributable to fouling have been experienced in this test.
1. A difference in characteristics, .can be observed. A significantly higher cyclic rate is obtained with ball propellant.
(75 -130 rpm).
4. There is no immediate requirement for remedial

action for the existing weapon/ammunition system currently in the field. However, there is a need to identify
the technical problems related to the isolation of the
interior ballistic differences, (IMR vs ball propellants) and
to the modification of ammunition specifications to insure
comparable performance with all approved propellant
types..
2. There is an indication that cyclic rate is related to

certain malfunctions.
3. Further observations are needed before conclusions
can be reached regarding fouling; however, observa-
General Besson Takes a Trip

Over the 1966 New Year the Commanding General of AMC
took a trip to Vietnam to see for himself, among other things,
just how the XM16E1 rifle was performing in combat. Significantly, he carried with him several hundred ruptured cartridge
case extractors - 200 "of commercial design" and a further 200
designed for the 7.62 NATO case but modified for the smaller
General Besson embarked on his overseas trip with the

PMR's final synopsis of Frankford's 36,000-round ball/IMR
trial ringing in his ears:
..As noted in the last report, the preliminary findings..

indicate that any problems involved with the use of WC846
ball propellant are of a technical nature and should not be

of concern to field units.
The increasing body of evidence linking ball powder to high

cyclic rate and its attendant adversities came, ironically, on
the very eve of the sharp step-up in production which answered
General Westmoreland's call from Vietnam for 100,000 new
XM16E1s. As the P M R reported for the week of 13-17 December
1965, "Colt's..has been requested to take any necessary action
to accelerate production to a full production basis to meet

greatly increased demand." All the available evidence on the
ball powder problem was examined at the TCC's regularly
scheduled meeting on 12-13 January 1966, where it was decided
that, while warranting "correction", the stoppage rates were
not high enough to be unacceptable in the field.
5.56mm rim, there being no such item available through AMC

supply channels.
The Light Strike Problem - Redesigning the "Buffer"

While it was not as widely discussed, yet another problem
inherent in the "fully developed" AR-15 had been discovered
as early as 1963: misfires sometimes occurred, frequently during
automatic fire, irrespective of the type of propellant used. Bill

Davis explains:
.. I obtained some information from [Springfield Armory]

on the closing velocity of the AR-15 bolt during our
investigation at Frankford. .of the so-called "slamfire"
problem [chapter 8] When I went to Colt's.. I found
that they had, by then, also done some kinematic studies,
which revealed that the cause of the misfires was the
rebounding of the bolt carrier (which contains the firing
pin) from its hard impact on the barrel extension, at the
end of the counter-recoil stroke of the reciprocating parts.
The timing of the carrier rebound, under certain conditions of weapon support, was such that it coincided
with the falling of the hammer, and the bolt carrier
was thus somewhat out-of-battery when the hammer
struck. In that event, if the carrier was out of battery
by more than about .020", the energy of the hammer
was dissipated in driving the carrier forward, and was
then insufficient to fire the primer.
A Tiger by the Tail
Rob Roy, a key figure in the M16 project at Colt's, recalls

that the 'light strike" problem had been particularly bothersome during the development of the M1 and belt-fed M2
heavy-barrel (HBAR) versions of the CAR-15 system, so much
so that prototypes of a number of different designs of "buffer"
assemblies (officially called the "action spring guide assembly")
were made up and tested, in an effort to reduce the carrier
rebound.
The original AR-15 "action spring guide" had been designed
to provide the required buffering action by means of a series
of bevelled "Edgewater ring springs", which "gave" slightly
when compressed. Interestingly enough, there had already
been one modification to this component in July 1964, when
Colt's had shortened its overall length by 3/32" in an attempt
.. [They] did not work very well under the best of conditions,
and often not at all under combat conditions in Southeast
Asia..
In theory, the ring springs employed by Stoner were
supposed to absorb the energy of the recoilling parts by a
wedge-like principle, implemented by a series of male conical
surfaces which mated with corresponding female surfaces,
thus compressing diametrically the male cones and expanding
the female cones upon axial compression of the assembly.
The angle of the cones was calculated to be such that..they
almost, but not quite, remained in their state of axial compression after impact of the recoilling parts upon the buffer..
200. The components of the original AR-15 buffer, showing the "Edgewater
ring springs" which were supposed to "give" on compression as described
in the text.
Drawing by Thomas B. Dugelby
to correct the chronic problem of last-round bolt catch failures

when firing ammunition loaded with ball propellant.
Bill Davis comments further on a Colt analysis of the Edgewater ring springs:
The flaw in this application.. in a combat rifle was that
the coefficient of friction. .was not always the same, being
dependent upon the degree of lubrication and/or contamination of the mating surfaces by oil, dust, mud or other such
elements...If .too low, then the assembly acted much as an
unrestricted spring and fed too much of the recoil energy
back into the counter-recoil cycle. If the surfaces were contaminated by abrasive materials..then the fictional forces
were too high, the ring springs failed to recover at all, and
the assembly remained set in its state of full axial compression
after the first impact, greatly increasing the impact load on
the bottom of the tube, and thus transmitting the severe
impact to..the rifle..in every subsequent cycle..
201. Fig. 3 from US Patent no. 3,977,296, Stanley D. Silsby's "Hydraulic Buffer
Assembly for Automatic.. Firearm" one of several attempts to solve the "light
strike" problem. In this design, the hydraulic damping action is briefly described
as follows: "When the piston 74 is moved inwardly toward the depressed position
..hydraulic fluid flows from chamber 92 to chamber 90 via the orifice 94...
Releasing the inward force on the piston 74, results the seal pushing hydraulic
fluid (under the urging of spring 84) through the orifice 94 from the chamber
90 to the chamber 92.." Not adopted.
US Patent Office
At length the problem was solved by a new buffer designed

by Colt's Chief Product Engineer, Foster Sturtevant. It was
about three times heavier than the old guide, and replaced
the troublesome aluminum ring springs with a polyurethane
"bumper" on the end of the buffer tube to absorb recoil energy
instead of feeding it back into the counter-recoiling parts, plus
a series of five sliding internal weights separated by butyl
rubber discs, whose purpose was to dampen bolt carrier rebound
at the end of the counter-recoil stroke.
202. Another Colt model shop experiment: a solid nylon buffer, drilled out
and fitted with a spring-loaded metal weight. As with the Silsby hydraulic
buffer, this design was not entirely successful in damping bolt carrier "bounce"
and thus solving the HBAR "light strike" problem.
201
203. Figs. 2 through 6 from US Patent no. 3,366,011 granted to Colt's

Chief Product Engineer, Foster E. Sturtevant, self-explanatorily entitled
"Buffer Assembly Having a Plurality of Inertial Masses Acting in Delayed
Sequence to Oppose Bolt Rebound" A production-engineered version of
Sturtevant's buffer (fig. 204) was adopted and installed in all new rifles
beginning in December, 1966. The Army later reported that a retrofit program had replaced all the old "action spring guides" in service by the late
fall of 1967.
204. Above: the original AR-15 "action spring guide", cutaway to show the
internal "Edgewater ring springs".
Below: Colt's new buffer, which happily solved both the HBAR "light strike"
problem and the ball-powder-induced cyclic rate problem. Introduced in
December, 1966.
In the rifle, the new buffer did and did not do several things.
First, because of the random position assumed at the end of
each shot by the loosely-fitting internal weights and discs which
comprised a large portion of the buffer's mass, the effect of the
buffer's added weight on the rifle's "dwell time" or bolt-opening
cycle was negligible.
also greatly reduced the incidence of the bolt catch failing

to latch the bolt to the rear on firing the last round of a
magazine. On the counter-recoil stroke, the weights and
discs, pushed rearward inside the buffer body by the forward acceleration, "cascaded" forward when the carrier
impacted against the barrel extension, in Bill Davis'
words "imparting their individual momenta in turn" to the
carrier, thus effectively damping or "killing" the carrier
rebound.
Secondly, as mentioned, the polyurethane bumper

cushioned the rearward impact of the recoiling parts, which
A Tiger by the Tail
Finally, the polyurethane bumper introduced a new phenomenon all its own: during burst fire, due to its low "coefficient
of restitution", it retained some compression for the duration
of the cycle, tending to become more resilient and thus cause
the cyclic rate to progressively speed up: the longer the burst,
the faster its cyclic rate.
As a happy aside, however, it was noted that in curing the
HBAR light strike problem the heavier buffer also reduced
the overall cyclic rate to the point of acceptability even when
firing cartridges loaded with ball powder. At the January 1966
meeting Colt's introduced the new buffer to the TCC, proposing
it as an across-the-board replacement for the old "recoil spring
guide". The TCC welcomed the idea with enthusiasm, and
ordered twelve new buffers made up for trial.
Springfield Armory ran a test of the new buffer from 13 April

to 6 May 1966, concluding stubbornly that M16 performance
using the new buffer and firing ball propellant, while now
within the 850 rpm cyclic rate specification, was not as good
as past recorded performance using the old action spring guide
and firing ammunition loaded with IMR CR8136. In any case,
the new buffer was subsequently adopted, first coming on
stream in December 1966.
In a later statement, the Army explained the wisdom of
replacing the buffer as a solution to the ball powder/cyclic rate
problem as "modifying the rifle, rather than..altering ammunition specifications and, as a result, possibly degrading
performance."
Foul Ball
With ball powder's characteristically heavier chamber fouling
well documented but as yet unlinked to any major problems,
the Project Manager reasoned that as soon as the new buffers
were approved and introduced, the high cyclic rate problem
would disappear, in effect leaving ball powder with a clean
slate. Therefore, as later recorded in the February 1968 Appraisal
of the M16 Rifle Program by the Director of Defense Research
and Engineering (DDR&E), in order to ensure continued rifle
acceptance and delivery, Lt. Col. Yount took it upon himself
to pronounce the ball powder issue quietly closed:
..The Project Manager was responsible for furnishing
Colt's with test ammunition. The cyclic rate phenomenon
having been identified as a rifle-ammunition problem, which
Colt's and the Committee expected to solve with a new buffer,
the Project Manager decided to forego the use of WC846
for acceptance testing. He located all remaining lots of IMR
[CR]8136-loaded ammunition and had them shipped to
Colt's for use in future [XM16E1] testing. The effect was a
de facto waiver of the Army's upper cyclic rate limit. The
Air Force waiver to 900 rpm was still in effect. From March
1965 through September 1966 some 99 million rounds of
M16 ammunition were consumed in Vietnam, 89 million of
which were loaded with WC846, the balance with IMR
[CR]8136...
Once again the P M R did not immediately inform General
Besson of his actions. This fact was made obvious by the latter's
comments pencilled on his copy of the significant action report
for the week of 11-15 April 1966. Beside the announcement
that the qualification of EX8208-4 (DuPont's third try at an
acceptable 5.56mm propellant) would soon result in "competitive
205. From US Patent no. 3,564,950, granted to John K. Jorczak and David
A. Behrendt and assigned to Colt's, entitled "Cartridge Case Extractor Tool".
Note the proposed pistol grip trap, below, for stowage.
US Patent Office
203
procurement", General Besson had written "What about

[EX8208's] performance? What are we doing about the
problem of fouling and high cyclic rate?"
In a special reply to AMC headquarters, the P M O admitted

that ball powder did result in increased fouling, "but not to
an unacceptable degree."
Colt's Historic Second Contract (DAAF03-66-C-0018)

- The "One-Time Buy" is Dead
206. Signing the historic second contract ("0018") in June of 1966 Left, seated:
Colt's vice-president of marketing, William Goldbach. Center, signing: fire-
arms Division president Paul Benke. Far right, standing: military sales manager
James B. Hall.
Since its reluctant acquisition in FY64, the Army had

stuck resolutely to the idea that the XM16E1 was a "onetime buy" item for use by special units, and even then only
until the SPIW became available. Maintaining this position
had become increasingly difficult for a number of reasons.
For one thing, as Lt. Col. Engle had pointed out, the USAF
had officially adopted the M16 in a long-term program which
the Army was committed to support. As for the Army itself,
temporizing had resulted in a fits-and-starts approach to the
XM16E1, a fact made very evident in the conduct of contract
"508". In its lifetime, officially listed as from November 1963
to 24 January 1966, the "one-time b u y " contract more than
doubled in dollar value as a total of fifteen "add-ons"
increased the number of rifles from the original 104,000 to

201,045.
This whole game was up in December 1965. General Westmoreland's victorious call for 100,000 new XM16E1s was the
first incontrovertible crack in the concrete of the "one-time
buy" philosophy.
Coincidentally, the July 1965 Air Force order for 36,682
M16s, which the P M R had estimated "should extend Colt's
production through April 1966" had done just that. Certainly
when that time did arrive, there was no more talk at Colt's
of termination plans:
A Tiger by the Tail
207. Colt's first attempt at a handguard made of interchangeable, rounded

top-and-bottom halves, circa 1965-66. Note the round front bracket. Although
less bulky than the non-interchangeable left-and-right handguards (top), the

idea was not generally adopted until the M16A2 program (chapter 22).
Project: Rifles [week of] 28 March - 1 April 1966

M16/XM16E1 rifle program: Program authority has been
received to proceed with the procurement of 403,905 XM16E1
rifles as reflected in the January FY66 budget supplement.
In addition, a teletype Military Interdepartmental Purchase
Request (MIPR) for 15,372. .XM16E1 rifles has been received
from the Marine Corps. This will bring the total procurement
action to 419,277..rifles, as follows:
Contract "0018" was duly signed in June 1966. It was historymaking for several reasons, one being that its very existence
meant the end of the blinkered "one-time buy" mentality
regarding the M16. Also, it was with the September 1966 issue of
new XM16E1s made under contract "0018" to regular US Army
units in Vietnam that the real troubles began, as we shall see.
Army
VN MAP
213,405 (100,000 of this amount is currently

on letter contract)
114,000 [Military Assistance Plan]
Marine Corps 91,872 (76,500 contained in FY66. .Budget

Supplement)
Total
419,277
Meanwhile, as regards the contract, here as before "add-ons"

were frequently employed. Contract "0018" was amended a
total of 256 times during its lifetime, which was from June
1966 to a final ahead-of-schedule delivery of 13,360 rifles (down
from a peak of 45,000 per month at Colt's on this contract
alone) in January 1969.
Contract "0018" was later summed up by AWC's Cost and

Economic Information Division in their Procurement History
and Analysis of M16 Rifle of August 1971 as follows:
..A negotiated contract based upon a firm-fixed price
(FFP) was signed with Colt's Inc. on 16 June 1966for a
price of $45,035,407.50. This definitized contract was Mod.
13 of letter contract dated 6 December 1965.
..This contract was for the procurement of 403,905 each
XM16E1 rifles with seven (7) twenty round aluminum magazine assemblies and bipod.
..Modifications to the contract increased the contract
price by $46,646,752.35 to a total of $91,682,159.88 while
increasing the quantity of rifles from 403,905 to 836,810..
The Singapore Caper

In the midst of the issue of XM16E1s to US Army maneuver
units operating in Vietnam, Colt's received permission from the
State Department to export 20,300 rifles, (18,000 commercially-
marked AR-15s identical to the Air Force's selective fire M16,

and 2,300 HBAR [heavy barrel] AR-15s), to the government
of the Republic of Singapore. Having split away from the newly-
205
formed Federation of Malaysia in mid-1965, the prosperous citystate of Singapore subsequently instituted its own defense policies.
Representatives of the Singapore Armed Forces had then come
calling at Colt's for some of the rifles which were well remembered from the days of Bobby Macdonald's world tour.
The Defense Department had long held the view diat "openended" foreign sales of the AR-15 were "not in the best interest
of the United States". (At Colt's, this position was viewed as
an unfair and unnatural stranglehold on their proprietary
product. Indeed, as Colt executive James B. Hall noted above
in his remarks about General Westmoreland's 100,000 rifles,
it was "an extremely political situation"). Ignoring the Defense
Department's objections, the Office of Munitions Control in
the State Department decided that in this case "the purchase
fulfilled a normal requirement for the Republic of Singapore
and was in our national interest". They accordingly approved
the export license without bothering to inform the Army.
At this time Colt's was producing XM16E1 rifles in response
to contract "0018", which called for them to reach a rate of
25,000 units per month by December 1966. Colt's proposed
to increase this quota to 27,500 rifles per month, thereby
spreading the $3,415,333.18 Singapore order over an 18-month
period from March 1967 to September 1968 without any disruption of regular Army delivery schedules. Although Defense
officials later closed ranks around the position that they were
then accepting all the rifles the system could absorb, the Army
was as we shall see already examining detailed plans to secure
the manufacturing rights to the design of the rifle and establish
a second source of supply, all with a determined view to yet
another massive increase in production.
This essential contradiction mystified several Congressmen,

including Missouri Democrat Richard Ichord and Illinois
Republican Paul Findley. (Indeed, during the course of the
later Ichord subcommittee investigation, after fruitlessly
putting numerous pointed questions to Dr. Robert Brooks,
the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Logistics, Mr. Ichord
commented that "..there certainly seems to be a defect in the
procedures. I would think that a rifle that apparently was in
great demand by our Armed Forces in South Vietnam - that
it would be of the greatest importance that D O D have an
intense interest in such a sale, even greater than the State
Department".)
Others also had an intense interest in the AR-15. By June
of 1965 there were 19,750 "Free World" troops allied with
the US and ARVN soldiers in Vietnam, including the 1st
Battalion of the Royal Australian Regiment, an ANZAC
battalion and Thai, Philippine and ROK (Republic of Korea)
forces. The latter three were armed with American Ml rifles.
As soon as news of the Singapore sale became known, the
Koreans bitterly and graphically denounced it, feeling with
much justification that if there were any "spare" M16s, they
wanted to be fighting with them, and not watching them be
sold elsewhere.
Ironically, after all this furor Colt's delivered only some
3,000 to 3,500 US-built rifles on the Singapore contract. In
February 1967, the government of Singapore negotiated an
agreement with Colt's that permitted the licensed production
of 150,000 M16 rifles in Singapore itself. This is discussed
in chapter 21.
Ominous News from the IRUS Program

Meanwhile, the US Army Combat Developments Command
(CDC) had announced its new Infantry Rifle Unit Study
(IRUS). This field project was an offshoot of the ongoing SAWS
program, wherein XM16E1s, SPIWs, and other types of small
caliber weapons were compared in simulated combat environments at CDC's Experimentation Center (CDCEC) at Fort
Ord, California. The Project Manager listed in his weekly
report for 25-29 April 1966 some of CDC's "specific materiel
requirements" as including "14 AAI SPIW weapon systems

plus 150,000 rounds of [XM645] SPIW ammunition.."
After a briefing on the IRUS project in April, General Besson
had queried the (newly-promoted) Col. Y o u n t ' s oft-used weekly
wrapup "There are no continuing problems to report" by asking
uneasily, "Is everybody happy? CDCEC didn't seem to be."
By June, the IRUS program had run into a serious difficulty:
Project: Rifles [week of] 6-10 June 1966

M16/XM16E1 Program: A malfunction of a XM16E1
rifle/5.56mm ammunition system occurred on 3 June, .during
the IRUS program. It was reported that a cartridge casehead had ruptured resulting in extensive damage to the
weapon and minor injury to the shooter. This is the third such
incident reported since the inception of the M16/XM16E1

rifle program...On-site investigation. .was conducted. .by..
Frankford Arsenal, the ammunition contractor (Federal
Cartridge Co.), and the PMO.
A Tiger by the Tail
Regarding the rifle in question, it was found that, while

"severely damaged", the bolt-to-barrel-extension lockup had
withstood the force of what appeared to be an overpressure
explosion. No fault could be found with the weapon or personnel involved, but further use of Federal Cartridge Co.'s entire
offending lot FC1830 of M193 ammunition was immediately
suspended, along with the next complete lot in sequence,
FC1831. Frankford proceeded to investigate and write up a
report on the ammunition from the cartridge case hardness
standpoint, yet another parameter which had been ignored
by the TCC up to this time. Indeed, as early as 1964 Frankford
had warned that case hardness was "a significant factor in
AR-15 functioning", and had recommended the establishment
of 5.56mm case hardness specifications and controls. True to
his mandate, however, Col. Yount had pragmatically decided

that in the absence of any related malfunction reports there
was no need to establish such controls.
That might have been the end of it, except the same thing
happened again for a fourth time on July 8th. Again the rifle
held together and the shooter was not seriously injured, and
again the ammunition lot, this time Remington's lot no. 5189,
was suspended. In spite of General Besson's pencilled "Don't
spare any effort to get at the solution to this problem" the
subsequent investigation, discussed in chapter 13, ultimately
failed to discover the cause of these first in a series of occasional
5.56mm blowups which have inexplicably occurred over the
past two decades.
Early Problems in Vietnam

Fresh from a June 24 meeting at Fort Benning, General
Besson fired off a terse memo to Col. Yount:
Vietnam returnees complained of separation of rims on
extraction. What do we know about this?
There is no recorded reply. Throughout the summer of
1966, as new XM16Els were being issued to all the US Army's
maneuver battalions in Vietnam, the PMR's weekly significant
action reports all concluded the same way: "There are no

continuing problems to report."
207
208
The Fit Hits the Shan
208. The general-issue X M 1 6 E 1 amid the "unbelievable" combat conditions of

Vietnam. Note the cleaning rod, taped onto the rear rifle leaning against the tree.
209 The Fit Hits the Shan
Chapter Thirteen
THE FIT HITS THE SHAN

..There is no doubt that some arms..failed to function
when fired rapidly which was due to the softness of the
.. shell casing... Powder residue, gases and grease did foul
the receivers. The..steel, expanding rapidly upon heating,
literally welded the empty shell cases to the chamber. When
ejection was attempted, the extractor cut through the.. rim
of the shell or jumped the rim entirely. The employment
of a ramrod was the only sensible aid to be used in
As it happens, these bitter words are not about Vietnam.
They are excerpted from the excellent booklet The TrapDoor Springfield in the Service, by Col. Philip M. Shockley,
and are describing events of over 100 years ago concerning
the 1873 Springfield trap-door carbine and the soft, coppercased .45-70 cartridges of that era. In the fall of 1966, their
coincidental and sadly timeless ring of truth would have
dislodging the shell and cleaning rods were [in short

supply]. Prying the shell out..was a slow procedure...
Recommended remedial action was almost pathetic.. .To
attempt to close the..breech on a shell casing which the
extractor had jumped was a "recruit trick" which only
served to further impair the already sprung extractor and
further jam the shell casing. And jamming, if one can
accept the contemporary comments, was constant..
brought cold comfort indeed to a very busy Col. Y o u n t .
As mentioned, the first XM16E1 rifles made under the new
FY66 contract ("0018") had begun to arrive in Vietnam during
the summer of 1966, with issue to all US Army maneuver units
being completed by late fall. Almost immediately the troops
were reporting excessive stoppages and malfunctions:
Project: Rifles [week of] 3-7 October, 1966

M16/XM16E1 rifle program: A letter from the Commanding Officer of the 1st Battalion, 2nd Infantry, 1st
Infantry Division indicates that his unit has experienced
many problems with the XM16E1 rifle. ..Telephonic reports
from Vietnam indicate that these rifle problems are
prevalent in other units..to the extent that confidence

in the weapon is being degraded. This office is formulating plans to send representatives of the [PMO],
WECOM and Colt's Inc., to Vietnam to resolve the
problems..
Project: Rifles [week of] 10-14 October 1966

M16/XM16E1 rifle: In response to request from this
office reference stoppages and malfunctions being experienced on the XM16E1 rifle by subordinate units in
USARV, [General Westmoreland] officially requested technical assistance... The message also indicated the existence
of a training and maintenance problem, and requested a
team be sent to Vietnam to conduct a training program and
to initiate an inspection and maintenance program. [Lt.
In testimony before the Ichord subcommittee in the House

of Representatives the following summer, Col. Yount recalled
Col. Underwood, Col. Yount's assistant and leader of the

team] departed for Vietnam 13 October; with the remainder
of the six-man team (three representing [the PMO and
WECOM] and three representing Colt's Inc.) to depart
on/about 20 October. Necessary repair parts and tools will
accompany the team. The anticipated duration of the visit
is approximately 30 - 45 days.
the events of the next few weeks:
Following Col. Yount's return to Rock Island on 29 November, there was a significant addition to his usual "There are
no continuing problems to report". Henceforth certain of the
PMR's weekly significant action reports carried the following
footnote:
No secondary distribution will be made at the project
manager level or in-house AMC activities. The report must
not be reproduced, filed, or referenced in any official correspondence. Only the originating PM and the SA-PM, HQ
USAMC may retain file copies of the report. All other copies
will be destroyed within 10 days of receipt.
210. The final step: a good going-over with some LSA and that non-standard
shaving brush, useless as regards the critical chamber/barrel extension area.
Black Star photo by James Pickerell
209. With his helmet as a catchall, a GI cleans his XM16E1 as best he can.
Note the shaving brush next to the oil can on the driver's seat.
Black Star photo by James Pickerell
..[Lt. Col. Underwood] called me on the telephone and

told me that he would advise me to come over here and see
this for myself, because when he came home he didn't think
he would be able to convince me of the conditions, of the
various things that we would have to do to correct the
situation..
..So I did see a number of weapons over in Vietnam. I
talked with the various commanders there, including General
Westmoreland, and was trying to get a feel on what was
happening over there. And it appeared at that time that the
majority of the trouble [concerned] a lack of proper maintenance and cleaning. However, there were some product
improvements that might be made that would assist the
soldiers in the field so that [the XM16E1] would not be so
difficult to maintain..
One of Colt's three experts in the P M O team sent to Vietnam was Kanemitsu " K o n i " Ito, a decorated veteran of the
Korean war who before joining Colt's had been a US Army
test officer for twelve years, mostly with the Arctic Test Board
in Alaska. As such he had been familiar with the AR-15 since
Gene Stoner's first presentation at Fort Greely back in 1956.
All in all Mr. Ito made three trips to Vietnam, finding

the weapons, especially the first time, in an "unbelievable"
state of repair. Especially on this first trip, he confirmed the
dearth of cleaning materials and proper information regarding maintenance. He later described his findings to the Ichord
subcommittee:
.. During the first trip.. I was shocked. I never had seen

equipment with such poor maintenance.
how. Many of them said they were never taught the maintenance of this rifle, or had not seen this rifle until they
had arrived in Vietnam.
We did our utmost at every base camp, giving classes

in first, second and third echelon. We travelled throughout every portion of Vietnam, except the Marines [who
didn't as yet have any XM16E1s "in-country"] and Air
Force [who continued to report excellent performance
from their M16s]..
.. I asked to look at [one] squad's rifles. Some you could

not see daylight through the barrel. The barrels were
rusted, and the chambers were rusty and pitted. ..I asked
what the platoon had done upon their return [from patrol],
oh, [the squad leader] said, we rested until the next one.
..I spoke to many enlisted personnel as to why they

did not maintain their rifles. Some of them didn't know
I said, "No, I mean what did you do to clean the rifle ?"
He said, "Nothing".
Saved by the Buffer?

Lt. Col. Underwood had also confirmed that while in Vietnam
his team had examined numerous rifles wherein the "ring
springs" of the old-style recoil spring guide were wedged tightly
together, the assembly behaving exactly as if it were made of
solid aluminum. Happily, Colt's new buffer came on stream
as standard equipment in all new rifles beginning with the

18,400 XM16Els manufactured in the latter part of December
1966. At the same time, a retrofit program was begun, at an
agreed price of $2.75 apiece, to replace the old "recoil spring
guides" in all existing rifles. A later P M R report summed up:
Buffer Retrofit Program for M16/XM16E1 Rifles

11 August 1967
Total rifles produced with old buffer
(includes all services)
Known losses through Mar 67
357,935 (to December 1966)
Total for Retrofit

New Buffers already on procurement
356,180
222,692
Balance needed to complete retrofit
133,488
1,755
The Army later announced that the buffer retrofit program

had been successfully completed by late fall, 1967.
WC846 were fired in rifles fitted with new buffers for an

average malfunction rate of only 0.25/1,000 rounds.
Meanwhile, acceptance test records at Colt's began to bear

out the efficacy of the new buffer. Under the terms of contract
"0018", one rifle chosen at random out of every 10,000-rifle lot
was routinely subjected to a 6,000-round endurance/acceptance
test. From May to December of 1966, 91,000 rounds loaded
with CR8136 had been fired in rifles with old buffers, with
an overall malfunction rate of 0.49 per 1,000 rounds. From
December 1966 to June 1967, 102,000 rounds loaded with
Nevertheless, the new buffer was seen by many as nothing

more than a belated and expensive Army "field fix" for the
too-high cyclic rates produced by ball powder. As we have seen,
this was decidedly not the whole truth, but the story persisted:
OSD saw potential embarrassment in any discussion of the
main reason for the buffer redesign, which was the carrier
rebound/light strike problem inherent in the original "fully
developed" recoil spring guide.
211
The Fit Hits the Shan 212
211. Left: closeup of the barrel extension and chamber from a "problematic"
XM16E1 returned from Vietnam for study. Note the dark, corroded chamber wall.
Right: a new XM16E1 following a 10,000-round WECOM endurance trial in
October, 1966. Note that although the receiver, barrel extension and handguard
slip ring are all caked liberally with powder residues, the chamber walls appear
comparatively clean and shiny.
The PMR Comes Clean

In December 1966, as soon as the tale could be told without
compromising the XM16E1 acceptance rate, Col. Yount informed General Besson that acceptance testing at Colt's had
for the last seven months been done exclusively with ammunition loaded with I M R CR8136 propellant. As expected, the
immediate reply from AMC headquarters was an order to

reintroduce ball-powder test ammunition as quickly as possible.
By that time all of Colt's new rifles were fitted with the heavier
buffer, which corrected the unacceptably high cyclic rates produced by ball powder's higher port pressures.
The Unsolved Mystery

of CDCEC's Ruptured Cartridge Cases
Frankford and Rock Island Arsenals had meanwhile
been busy trying to duplicate C D C E C ' s summer 1966
reports of blown cases, which as mentioned had occurred
at Fort Ord during the IRUS program. The following is

the P M R ' s interesting account of the enigma which still
remained:
Project: Rifles [week of] 19-23 December 1966

.. Exhaustive tests of all ammunition characteristics were
conducted and these were supplemented with theoretical
studies of interior-ballistic parameters, spectrochemical
analysis of combustion residue in the ruptured cartridge
cases, and metallurgical examination of the ammunition
metal parts and related weapon parts. None of these tests
indicated any possible cause for the reported malfunctions
or gave any clue as to their explanation.
It is also well known that bore obstructions can cause

chamber pressures of sufficient magnitude to rupture the
head of a cartridge case. One report has been received from
USARV where an attempt was made to fire a tracer cartridge
with a cleaning rod in the bore.. .USARV also reported [that]
four weapons "blew up" during a firefight which occurred
immediately following the fording of a deep stream. ..In each
of these incidents, the weapon damage was similar to that
observed at CDCEC..
A series of tests was conducted where attempts were made

to simulate the malfunctions observed at CDCEC. Propellants
were varied in type and amount; primers were altered in
composition and pellet weight; various firing conditions were
imposed; etc...it was found that the malfunction could be
reproduced only through the use of a clearly unsuitable
propellant type such as pistol, .or shotshell powder, but there
is no evidence or reason to suspect that propellants of this
type were involved in the CDCEC malfunctions.
The study concluded that the malfunctions reported by

CDCEC must be attributed to abnormally high pressures,
the cause of which remains unknown and cannot be established from the evidence presently available.. .An extensive
survey of CONUS Army and Air Force installations revealed
that no other instances of this malfunction have been
recorded in firing of 55,259,900 ball, .and 1,292,400 tracer
cartridges..
As mentioned in chapter 12 these incidents were the first in

a series of fortunately very isolated cases which have occurred,
and remain unexplained, over the past twenty years. The pressures attained are usually in excess of 125,000 psi, yet a 5.56mm
case packed full of its regular powder does not even qualify
as a standard proof load. (To attain the stipulated proof pressure
of 70,000 psi, issue proof rounds are loaded with a hefty charge
of Unique pistol powder.) Conversely, a round without much
or any powder charge could lodge its bullet as an obstruction
which might well cause a blowup on firing the next round,
but in the unexplained overpressure incidents there is generally
no evidence of rings or bulges in the barrel!
The Cleanup Begins

Col. Yount and his staff were quite busy over the 1967 New
Year holiday. The following excerpts from a special memorandum
prepared at General Besson's request provide an indication of
the status of 5.56mm cleaning equipment in Vietnam, six months
after general issue of the XM16E1 rifle system had begun:
212. Three key tools in the fight to keep the XM16E1s functioning in the field.
Above: the long-awaited Chamber Brush, first shipped to Vietnam in late 1966
with monthly production accelerating to 120,000/month. However, as noted by
Col. Crossman, this "critical" item was still in short supply in June of1967.
Center: the improved .22 caliber Bore Brush. Production accelerated to
280,000/month in April, 1967.
Below: the Swab Holder (all fit the new, 4-section M11E3 Cleaning Rod.
213
Cleaning Materiel for the XM16E1 Rifle

13 January 1967
..In general, status of each item is:
Swabs: ..urgent requirement for 55,000 packages and
monthly requirement for 18,650 packages.. .Contractor will
deliver 12,000 packages per week beginning 15 February.
Immediate problem resolved.
Brush, bore: ..urgent requirement of 23,000 exists, with
monthly requirement of 12,000. Thirty-five thousand (35,000)
will be shipped in January... In April, production will accelerate
to 280,000 per month until total requirements are satisfied..
Chamber brush: ..urgent requirement for 38,000 exists

with monthly requirement of 25,000. Ninety thousand (90,000)
will be shipped this month, and 120,000 a month thereafter
until total requirements are met..
Cleaning rod: ..urgent requirement for 48,187. .with monthly
requirement of 12,000...31,000 will be shipped in January..
39,000 in February, and 22,000 in March.
Every possible expediting action is being taken to provide
the XM16E1 rifle cleaning items to USARV.
213. The hastily-issued, playing card-sized M16 Rifle Maintenance Card: a

much heavier emphasis on rifle cleaning and maintainance than Colt's had
originally recommended (chapter 4). Actual size.
Despite these tardy efforts to come to grips with the issue

of XM16E1 maintenance, it appears that by this time Col.
Y o u n t was some distance from his superiors' good graces. His
significant action report for the week of 16-20 January 1967
contained only the words "A negative report is submitted for

this period." This was apparently too much for General Besson,
whose pencilled scrawl to Col. Yount's attention ended, "You
are long overdue in getting this situation in hand".
The M16A1 - A Troublesome Standard 'A'

Amid this state of affairs, the XM16E1 rifle was officially
type classified as Standard 'A' by the Department of the
Army on 28 February, 1967, henceforth to be known as
" U S Rifle, 5.56mm, M16A1". Traditionally, dropping the
earlier ' T ' (Test) or current ' X ' (Experimental) designation signalled the US Army's final acceptance of a fullyengineered item, ready for issue. Ironically, in the case
of the M16A1 rifle, the occasion was greeted by the P M R ' s
March 13-17 report of ongoing investigations into problems
uncovered in Vietnam under the following seven topic

headings:
1. alternate propellants
2. high cyclic rate
3. chamber corrosion
4. barrel twist
5. fouling experience
6. tracer requirements
7. product improvements
The Crossman Report

As discussed below, the Ichord congressional subcommittee
began its much-publicized investigation into the conduct of
the M16 rifle program in May of 1967. One of the subcommittee's first requirements was a reliable, independent report on
conditions as they actually existed in the combat zones. To
this end Col. E. B. " J i m " Crossman, recently retired and
hitherto very much involved in Army weapon and ammunition
programs, was requested to go to Vietnam and report back
to the subcommittee.
Col. Crossman's Report of Investigation of M16 Rifle in
Combat, dated 16 June 1967, was a record of discussions with
over 250 men in both Army and Marine units scattered widely
across Vietnam. About 50% of these had encountered serious
malfunctions with their XM16E1s. Col. Crossman estimated
that approximately 90% of these malfunctions were failures
to extract, surely as serious a problem in 1967 as it had been
in 1873. Although time did not allow a detailed comparison
An immediate investigation be conducted of ammunition
design, ammunition manufacture, rifle design, rifle manufacture, and maintenance in the field in Vietnam in order to
determine the cause of, and the cure for, failures to extract.
of the M16's malfunctioning rate with that of the M14 rifle,

the general feeling was that the M14 was markedly superior
in reliability. Even with its extra weight and recoil, about 50%
of the men questioned said that they would prefer the M14.
Regarding the M16, there had been relatively few failures to
feed, but there were many reports of a stuck or frozen selector
lever. Col. Crossman reported that while he saw no shortage of
general cleaning and preserving equipment, many individuals
were lacking the "critical" .22 caliber cleaning rod and chamber
brush. Interestingly, very few cases of rusty chambers were
found. As regards lubrication, Col. Crossman noted many
different methods in use, but reported that none could be
correlated with malfunctions. In addition, "..It was not possible
to correlate ammunition make or type with malfunctions."
The June 1967 Crossman report to the Ichord subcommittee
ended with the sweeping recommendation that:
..Consideration be given to permitting the combat
soldier in Vietnam to choose the M16 or the M14
rifle.
Onward, Yountless
And so, in spite of repeated urgings from General Besson
and from the field, and a full year after setting out to arm
all US maneuver units in Vietnam with XM16E1/M16A1
rifles, the maintenance situation was by all accounts still
woefully inadequate. Particularly sad was the shortage of
5.56mm cleaning rods and the fact that chamber brushes had
only appeared as an item of issue the previous March and
were still in short supply. In addition, some of the changes
introduced into the rifle/ammunition system since the TCC

took over in 1963 were now known to have produced or
contributed to further problems, which the lack of maintenance could only exacerbate. Worse still was the growing
fear that, as Col. Crossman implied, the chronic (90% of
all malfunctions) failure-to-extract problem could not be
wholly attributed to lack of maintenance or indeed to any
one single cause.
215
In sum, after four years of TCC "improvement", the rifle

that Bobby Macdonald had taken around the world to universal
acclaim now stood, in Col. Crossman's opinion, in need of a
complete overhaul both in design and method of manufacture.
In the popular view this state of affairs was the fault of the
Army, the service members of the TCC, and in particular the
Project Manager. However, in Bill Davis' personal assessment,
the initial, mistaken assumption on the part of OSD in 1963
that the AR-15 could be procured in quantity with little or
no further engineering development was the root of the
problem.:
.. While Stoner's design was excellent, there had been no
significant engineering development of it before 1958, notwithstanding the various subsequent claims to the contrary.
Indeed none of the parties who had custody of the design
before 1958, or. .afterward until its procurement was undertaken by the Army in 1963, had the facilities required for
an adequate program of engineering development and necessary testing. In fact they had little appreciation of the necessity
for adequate engineering development and testing of military
weapons, as was demonstrated by some of the absurdities
uttered years later, and duly applauded, in testimony during
the congressional investigation..
Shooting watermelons at a picnic does not constitute adequate engineering testing, and a round-the-world junket to
present sales demonstrations to the military aides of various
potentates does not establish that a weapon system has been
adequately developed for serious military deployment.
On July 25 1967, the project manager who had only two
years earlier been hailed as "the most important..to the
Infantry" described his current status to the Ichord subcommittee as "Casual en route to Korea at the present time.."
214. To bring the absolute necessity of proper rifle maintenance home to the
troops, the famous comic artist Will Eisner, of Mad Magazine fame, was
pressed into service to illustrate several editions of this down-home style M16A1
Operation and Preventive Maintenance booklet (DA Pam 750-30). On page 1,
("how to STRIP your baby"), the M16A1 is described as "your dearest next
o'skin - bar none!"
The Ichord Investigation of the M16 Rifle Program

On May 3 1967, one month before the announcement of
Col. Yount's demise as Project Manager Rifles, the chairman
of the US House of Representatives Armed Services Committee
had appointed Richard Ichord to chair a special three-man subcommittee, the purpose of which was "to make inquiry into the
development, production, distribution and sale of M16 rifles".
The other two members were Congressmen Speedy O. Long
and William Bray. The Ichord subcommittee hearings began on
May 15 and lasted throughout the summer of 1967, ultimately
amassing nearly 600 pages of fine-print testimony. Ironically,
as Bill Davis remarks, "The purpose of the hearings was considerably subverted by efforts of those who had, in fact, been largely
responsible for the problems that were under investigation".
Throughout the inquiry, the Army maintained with as

much dignity as possible that there had indeed been a coherent
plan behind the history of the M16's development. This was
done without explicit mention of the OSD "direction" which
had vetoed a multitude of technical recommendations from
Springfield and Frankford Arsenal. Nor was it mentioned that,
on many of these issues, the P M R had personally favored the
advice of his technical advisors. Bill Davis, who after a year
or so at Colt's was once more "a member of Col. Yount's
s t a f f , was present during much of the Ichord investigation.
He remembers:
To his considerable credit, Col. Yount behaved with honor

under the accusations that were levelled against him during
the M16 investigations, even those which he obviously knew
to be unjust. So indeed did. .General Besson, conduct himself
most honorably... At the sacrifice of his own professional
reputation, Col. Yount did not plead the extenuating circumstances that had attended certain decisions for which he
was being criticized, nor did he publicly disclose the obstacles
that had so frequently been placed in his path by higher

authority...His subsequent portrayal as an unmitigated
knave or a fool, by those who pass judgement based on
superficial evidence and the benefit of hindsight, does deeply
offend my sense of justice. He was assigned a truly formidable task, to carry out under difficulties that would have
been insurmountable for a man of less remarkable energy
and resilience..
That the subcommittee did indeed suspect Col. Yount of

being a "knave or a fool" is amply evident in the following
scathing excerpt from the hearings:
Mr. Ichord [to Col. Yount]:. .We have evidence and are
advised by our experts.. that the ball propellant, which you
apparently speak so highly of, does have an adverse effect
upon the operation of the M16 rifle. It speeded up the cyclic
rate. It is dirtier burning...When we are also advised that
the Army was cautioned against making this change from IMR
to ball propellant.. .Naturally, we would be quite concerned.
Apparently you aren't so concerned. I don't understand

your explanation. I just haven't been able to understand
you - but perhaps you haven't offered the information in
words that I can understand.
Col. Yount did not reply. During the Ichord hearings he

staunchly continued to tell as much of the truth as he could
without casting the blame upwards, with sad results as, inexorably, the Army and he himself became ever more deeply
and openly suspected of perfidy, not to say villainous chicanery.
For example, Col. Yount did himself no favor at all by stating,
truthfully, that the new buffer had been introduced "as a result
of the SAWS study", wherein as we have seen the light strike

problem had first shown up in full-auto HBAR firing trials.
Another unfortunate but quite truthful remark, that the predominance of ball powder in the field had merely been "coincidental" to the sharp increase in malfunction rates which had
followed the first general issue of old-buffered XM16E1s in
Vietnam in the summer of 1966, was again misapprehended.
Would you care to say something?
The Real Problem in Vietnam

Sadly, the key problems in the M16's "universe", as this
study has attempted to reveal, required a rather high degree
of specialized technical knowledge in order to be understood.
The subcommittee's members, Congressmen all, were not
ballistic experts, although sometimes one or another of them
tried to be, with the overall result that the hearings were easily
led astray from the key issues. As Col. Crossman had reported,
90% of the malfunctions in Vietnam were failures to extract

the fired cartridge case. These sometimes remained tightly
stuck in the chamber after firing, and had to be dislodged with
a cleaning rod or actually pried out of the chamber. The subcommittee was therefore quite naturally interested in all aspects
of the extraction problem, and questioned several witnesses
on the issue. Gene Stoner himself testified that
..the cyclic rate, if it is excessive, will tend to open a

weapon too soon when there is considerable pressure in the
chamber. This means -
words, your bolt is trying to open at higher speeds, so you

have an aggravated condition where the cartridge is tending
to stick in there a little longer or a little harder, and you
are also giving it a harder jerk by driving the bolt faster.
Mr. Bray: What would that do, if you tried to open it with
pressure too quick?
Mr. Stoner: Well, the cartridge tends to stick - under high
residual pressure in the barrel, and of course with this toosoon action you also have a higher bolt velocity. In other
Mr. Bray: Then a faster rate of fire could cause that

situation?
Mr. Stoner: That is probably one of the worst conditions
you can get, by increasing the cyclic rate.
217
However, Stoner's clear inference was accepted by the subcommittee and the extraction failures in Vietnam were also
popularly ascribed to the higher cyclic rates produced by the
Army's perfidious introduction of ball powder. This unfortunately succeeded in diverting suspicion away from a much
more plausible cause of the malfunctions, which was lax casehardness specifications compounded by chamber corrosion.
Chrome-plating of the bore and chamber in all new US
military small arms had been a specifically stated requirement
of the Ordnance Corps since about 1957 (discussed in US Rifle
M14). This policy had been set forth in OTCMs (Minutes of the
Ordnance Technical Committee) in consequence of experiences
with rusty chambers and bores in the South Pacific during
World War II. Unfortunately, however, at the outset of the
M16 program the technology to produce chromed .22 caliber
barrels simply did not exist. Early in the program Springfield
Armory had recommended to the TCC that efforts begin forthwith to develop processes for chrome-plating the bores and
chambers of M16 barrels. Reportedly acting on the advice of
Gene Stoner, who claimed that the AR-15 bore and chamber
needed no further improvement, OSD vetoed the Springfield
recommendation. Had this proposal not succumbed to yet
another Department of Defense "direction", the most serious
problems experienced with the M16 rifles in Southeast Asia
might well have been avoided, and it would not have been
necessary to retrofit so many rifles a few years later with
chrome-chambered (and still later fully-chromed) barrels.
The closest thing to an admission of any mishandling in
the ball powder issue came in an official statement which the
Army presented to the subcommittee on July 27 1967:
215. Featuring cheap paper and abysmally cloudy illustrations, the first
Vietnamese-language edition of US FM 23-9 (January 1965) on the XM16E1
rifle was issued to ARVN forces under the date October 25, 1966.
The extraction failures Gene Stoner was describing were

those attributable to the early opening of the bolt, wherein
the basic cause is that residual chamber pressure is still too
high, and the case walls are still expanded elastically and sticking to the walls of the chamber. However, this residual pressure
is completely gone within a few milliseconds after firing, and
cannot possibly hamper efforts to extract the case after that
time. Failures to extract which are actually due to early opening
of the bolt can easily be cleared by a subsequent manual cycling
of the mechanism, barring a complete rim shear by the
extractor. (Given cartridge cases of acceptable hardness, rim
shears very seldom occur in the M16, due to its relatively weak
extractor spring).
Failures to extract which required that the case be pounded
out of the chamber by a cleaning rod, seconds or minutes after
firing, were certainly not due to the early opening of the bolt.
From the vantage point of retrospect, it has sometimes

been suggested that the peculiar behavior of ball propellant
in the M16 system should have been predicted. There was,
in fact, no evidence in 1963 that the cyclic rate of the M16
would be greatly affected by the choice of propellant, provided that port pressures were controlled [which they were
not] as they had been in the M14 and other 7.62 millimeter
[gas cutoff and expansion] systems which accommodate both
ball and extruded propellants. Furthermore, there was no
evidence at that time to indicate that an increase of 10
percent to 15 percent in cyclic rate of fire would cause a
serious increase in frequency of malfunctions.
Had the Army anticipated these developments, it is most
unlikely that the course chosen in January, 1964, would have
been the same. A decision to reduce the velocity requirement,
and continue loading IMR4475 propellant would probably
have been made instead, and the development of alternate
propellants could have been pursued more deliberately.
As we have seen, however, Frankford Arsenal's first report

in its study of the AR-15 rifle/ammunition system was dated
4 April 1963, so the very limited amount of evidence allowed
under Secretary McNamara's "keep it simple" policy had
begun to accrue by then. Also, throughout that period Frankford and Gene Stoner had repeatedly called for traditional,
ongoing compatability trials of the rifle-and-ammunition,
especially after one or the other was modified. Under the
constraints of the Gilpatrick directive and subsequent OSD

"direction", however, the Project Manager had been forced
to be pragmatic and, "in the absence of malfunction reports",
ignore these and other warnings.
[the] cyclic rate, the higher it gets, of course, it is going to

wear all the parts in a weapon, all the moving parts, because
your impact loads go up, it is an energy function...the loads
go up by the square of the velocity. If the velocity went up
twice as fast, it isn't twice the load, it is at least four times

as much. In other words, you don't put a little more load
on them. You put twice as much [load] on them by running
the cyclic rate up a couple hundred rounds a minute.
In August, Mr. Ichord politely thanked the many witnesses

who had appeared to testily before them, and the subcommittee
then retired behind closed doors to prepare a final report. When
this document appeared in October 1967, it concluded that grave

mismanagement, errors of judgement and lack of responsibility had
characterized the Army's handling of the entire M16 program.
Regarding the effect of a cyclic rate increase of 10 to

15 percent on parts breakage, Gene Stoner told the subcommittee:
219
Some Parallel Develomnents
Chapter Fourteen
SOME PARALLEL DEVELOPMENTS

The Unburied Ghost of One-in-Fourteen
In 1966, the still-contentious lethality/accuracy tradeoff inherent in the 1963 change from a 14" twist of rifling to 1 turn
in 12" (chapter 8) sparked a new, year-long investigation:
Project: Rifles [week of] 24-28 October 1966

Twist of Rifle in XM16E1 barrel: Colt's Inc. has been
asked to estimate impact and time required for implementing
the directive to revert to a 1 in 14 inch twist XM16E1 barrel.
Mr. Goldbach, Vice President for Military Products, expressed very serious concern regarding the decision to revert
...Colt's previous experience with the 14 inch twist was
unfavorable. On the basis of approximately 25,000 rifles,
Colt's found that more than 10% of the barrels failed to

meet the prescribed accuracy requirements in firing tests;
even though the required dimensions and tolerances were
met in manufacture. They anticipate significant impact on
detail of rifles if 1:14 inch twist is again to be required, unless
accuracy requirements for acceptance testing were considerably relaxed at the same time..
To General Besson, who was growing increasingly concerned

about the problem-plagued M16 program, this announcement
had appeared "inconsistent..What does BRL say?"
On November 17 the P M O replied with a special memorandum, which General Besson proceeded to scribble all over:
Twist of Rifle in XM16E1 Barrel

.. BRL.. tends to.. support.. Colt's contention that a significant impact on the rifle program could be expected if the
1:14 inch twist is required unless considerable relaxation
of the accuracy requirements..is authorized.
The BRL report [Recommended Twist Rate for AR-15
Rifle, 6 September 1963] points out that:
- Round-to-round dispersion, as a Junction of temperature
and twist rate, is greater for the 1:14... [and] even greater
at colder temperatures.
- The 1:12 twist yields equivalent or higher hit probabilities
than the 1:14. .for all ranges, temperatures and aiming errors.
[Here the first of General Besson's comments reads: "But
less kills per hit and maybe less kills per shot. The 1:12
doesn't tumble as easily as 1:14"]
What. .BRL does not consider (and this is the point Colt's
is trying to make) is the greater difficulty they encountered
when mass producing 1:14 twist barrels. [General Besson's
"Why?" went unanswered.] These barrels, when tested
against 1:12 twist, did not prove to be superior as far as
accuracy is concerned. [G.B. : "Never will be..You have to
relax cold weather accuracies if you go to 1:14 - and all
other accuracies as well."]
At the time of its adoption in 1963, the AR-15 (XM16E1)
was scheduled for use by Strategic and Special Forces,
in particular, who might be required to fight anywhere
in the world, without regard for climate. If [the XM16E1]
is made STD-A, as recently directed by the Chief of Staff,
Army, the worldwide performance criteria become all the
more important.
221
222
The Watershed SAWS Results
After a few pointed reminders from General Besson,

Col. Yount had reported just a few days after the official
type classification of the M16A1 on February 28 1967, that
the TCC had reaffirmed the 1:12 twist, but had called for
some additional lethality testing. Accordingly, 1,000 barrels
were ordered from Colt's with a 1:14 twist, for use in a
comparison trial with 1,000 brand new M16Als fitted with
1:12 barrels. This was supposed to take place in July 1967,
but Colt's was on strike for some time during that period,
which also saw Col. Yount relieved of his duties as Project
Manager.
Weekly significant action reports on the rifle project subsequently appeared over the signature of Lt. Col. Robert C.
Engle, formerly the Washington-based PMSO, who had been
appointed Acting P M R the previous month:
Project: Rifles [week of] 4-8 September 1967

Barrel twist: A report dated 25 August 1957, entitled
"Parameters Affecting Bullet Stability".. summarized progress
to date on various engineering investigations, .which will provide the data necessary for a final decision on the barrel twist
...One aspect..involves..the amount of increase in lethality

which could be expected by reducing the stability of the bullet,
[Here General Besson intervenes again: "Won't this also
affect accuracy - seems to me we are chasing our tail. ."]..
Bill Davis remembers the interesting events surrounding

the actual trial of the special 2,000 rifles:
. .years after the Air Force representatives in the TCC had
prevailed in their insistence upon the 12" twist, and the
change had been incorporated in all production, the OSD
protagonists resurrected the question and gained sufficient
support to demand another full-scale test involving production rifles.
Production of rifle barrels at Colt's was temporarily
suspended to retool the barrel line and produce 1,000 barrels
having 14" twist, by exactly the same production methods
being used for the standard barrels having 12" twist. One
thousand new rifles were equipped with these barrels. There
were 500 rifles having 12" twist set aside from production
immediately preceding the test rifles, and 500 more from
production immediately following the test rifles, after the
barrel line had been retooled again for the 12" twist. Three
different lots of M193 ammunition were selected for the tests,
of which one lot represented the most accurate lot available
in current inventory, one represented the least accurate. .and
one represented as nearly as possible the typical accuracy

of production M193 ammunition..
[Engineers James Ackley and Charles Fagg] from the
Project Manager's staff [were] sent to witness the testing
at Colt's. There were three ten-shot groups fired for accuracy
with each of the 1,000 test rifles, and three groups with each
of the 1,000 control rifles, under identical conditions of
testing. The barrels were then sent to Aberdeen, .for confirmation that their critical dimensions were as specified.
Two barrels, as I recall, were incorrectly marked as having
14" twist, and were found in fact to have 12" twist instead,
having apparently been mismarked inadvertently at Colt's.
Otherwise, everything was found to be in accordance with
the test plan.
The average extreme spread for the 998 rifles having 12"
twist was 3.6 inches at 100 meters, while that of the 1,002 rifles
having 14" twist was 7.2 inches, or exactly 100% greater.

- the SPIW is "Reoriented"
The two-year, worldwide SAWS program and its many
convoluted offshoots, it will be remembered, had been
running since December 1964, providing along with much
other data the first ominous reports of chronic XM16E1
malfunctions. During its portion of the SAWS test, the
US Army Test and Evaluation Command ( T E C O M ) had

recorded an unacceptably high overall malfunction rate
of 10.6/1,000 rounds. As if foretelling Col. Crossman's
damning report to the Ichord subcommittee, T E C O M had
concluded:
The relative low level of functional reliability of the

XM16E1 rifle in these tests is not considered representative
of the normal performance which can be expected from
this weapon, which has been demonstrated in past tests,
but is considered to indicate a need for improvement in

quality control in weapon manufacture and for investigation
of the effects of ammunition upon weapon functioning.
223 The Watershed SAWS Results
216. The AAI "SPIW Weapons Family" circa early 1966. From left: prototype belt fed LMG (note early square-section muzzle brake); prototype
"bullpup" SPIW Carbine; second-generation SPIW rifle, caliber 5.6mm
XM645, fitted with a single-shot DBCATA grenade launcher (chapter 15);

second-generation SPIW rifle (point-fire only), on bipod.
Courtesy AAI Corporation
As another example of the variety of tests performed during

SAWS, the following excerpts are from the final report of
C D C E C ' s mentioned IRUS Field Experiment, wherein had

occurred the first of the still-baffling ruptured cartridge cases:
. .Held experimentation was conducted to determine the

relative effectiveness of rifle and machinegun squads armed
with US 7.62mm, Soviet 7.62mm, Colt 5.56mm and Stoner
5.56mm weapons..
Rifle squads equipped only with Colt automatic rifles

appear superior to all other squads evaluated in overall
effectiveness..
Squads armed with low impulse 5.56mm weapons were

superior to squads armed with 7.62mm weapons in target
effects, sustainability of effects, and overall effectiveness.
Duplex ball ammunition was generally superior to Simplex
ball ammunition at close ranges..
Rifle squads armed with Colt weapons and.. squads armed
with Stoner weapons are approximately equal in effect.
[However] because of the lighter system weight and related
advantages in sustainability, rifle squads armed with Colt
weapons are superior..
In yet another ironic twist, the Army's XM16E1 problems

in Vietnam had coincidentally erupted at the very same time
as the long-awaited results of SAWS were first released.
Although the final, thirty-volume report was not "official"
until December, by August of 1966 Col. Yount was already
briefing some A M C general officers and others on the status
of the SAWS activities, which foretold the impending and
severely embarrassing collapse of the SPIW program and,
in consequence, a much heavier reliance on the 5.56mm
M16/XM16E1 rifle system.
By October 1966 the Army's then Chief of Staff General
Johnson, who had only months earlier been seriously weighing
the pros and cons of issuing American troops in Vietnam with
Hypotheses that high muzzle impulse weapons are superior

to low muzzle impulse weapons at longer ranges (300 to
550 meters) are not supported.
Hypotheses that lightweight rifles with high sights and
straight stocks, such as the M16A1, are inferior or inadequate
in pointing fire are not supported.
A squad equipped only with M14 rifles is superior to a
squad equipped with any other single US 7.62mm weapon,
or combination of these weapons.
mothballed M1s rather than buying more XM16E1s, informally

advised Secretary McNamara that it was the Army's intention
to replace "the caliber .30 weapons in the inventory as soon
as possible and to replace the M14 and M14A1 rifles, the
objective being a single-family weapons inventory of the Colt
[XM16E1] individual weapons and, for the present, the M60
machinegun".
By December 17, 1966 it was official. Secretary of the Army
Resor informed McNamara that "the XM16E1 rifle is generally
superior for Army use [and] the current SPIW program is
unlikely to result in a satisfactory weapon as early as previously
forecast. Based on experimental findings, it is likely that some
minor changes in the M16 system are justified. These include
224
217. A wood-stocked prototype of the short-lived, second-generation Springfield Armory SPIW, caliber 5.6mm XM216 (fig. 218 no. 4) fitted with a
later version of the Winchester "blow-forward" grenade launcher (fig. 152).
One of Springfield's last development projects, due to Secretary McNamara's

Armory closure order.
218. A compendium of (actual size) single-flechette SPIW cartridges. From left:

1. AAI first-generation 5.6x53mm XM110, unheadstamped; 2. Frankford/
Springfield first-generation 5.6x44mm XM144, headstamped WCC 63; 3. AAI
second-generation 5.6x57mm XM645, case made in Canada under Ordnance
contract and headstamped IVI71: 4. Frankford/Springfield second-generation
5.6x44mm XM216, unheadstamped; 5. experimental AAI SPIW pistol flechette
cartridge, made from a cut down XM110 case and headstamped WCC 64;
6 standard AAI flechette-and-sabot loaded in a 5.56x45mm M193 case, headstamped REM-UMC 223.
Editor's collection
219. A size comparison. From left: the 5.56x45mm M193 ball; the 5.6x57mm
XM645 saboted single flechette; and the 7.62x51mm NATO M80 ball.
use of a different powder grain in the cartridge and a change

in the barrel twist..The Stoner family of 5.56mm weapons has
some attractive features, but no effectiveness advantages that
might warrant adoption by the Army at this time".
subsequent about-face regarding the M16. As Dr. Carten later

put it, "SAWS..was the decisive factor leading to the Army
adoption on 23 February 1967 of the XM16E1 as the M16A1."
As also noted, Colt's new production contract ("0018") had
already been officially "definitized" in June 1966.
As further discussed in The SPIW, the SPIW program was

at this point face-savingly "reoriented" back to a status of
"exploratory development".
As noted, the SAWS field experiments had provided the
Army with an ironclad two-year excuse for temporizing on
the issue of a main battle rifle. The watershed SAWS conclusions were accordingly hailed as the main rationale for the
As discussed in chapter 17, the SAWS decision also led to

a rekindled interest in an old, old bone of contention that had
dogged the Army's dealings with the Colt company since the
first military involvement with the AR-15 back in 1963; namely,
the manufacturing rights to Colt's proprietary M16/M16A1
rifle.
225 The Watershed SAWS Results
Ten Post-Production Changes to the M16/XM16E1
220. M16A1: a late lower receiver group, partially stripped. Note the postproduction changes from top left: the lightened firing pin, parkerized bolt-
and-carrier and new firing pin retaining pin (compare with fig. 137); and
new buffer.
Eleven basic improvements had been built into the one-time

buy (contract "508") before production had begun on the
M16/XM16E1 rifle (chapter 8). All additional purchases of rifles
and proprietary accessories up to December 1965 had been
officially classed as "add-ons" to that initial contract. Indeed,
even after General Westmoreland's successful call for 100,000
new XM16E1s, "definitization" of contract "0018" took a
further six months (due mainly to the complications of the
rights issue).
1967, the total number of RTAs had risen to 159 on both

contracts. In further testimony, Col. Yount identified the
following ten major engineering changes to the M16/XM16E1
as "modifications which significantly improved the weapon":
During this period, a number of further modifications were

made to the rifle. In fact, the Korea-bound Col. Yount informed
the Ichord subcommittee in July 1967 that during the hectic life
of contract "508", 129 Requests for Technical Action (RTAs)
had been received, of which 123 had been approved. By June 30,
2. bolt hardness specification revised, to provide improved

bolt life. An improvement, no doubt; but as Bill Davis first
pointed out in Colt's Ammunition Variables report (chapter 12),
necessary only after the higher cyclic rates began to increase
stress and accelerate wear on this critical component.
1. gas tube material changed to stainless steel, to eliminate

corrosion and rusting in the original tube. (When asked to
admit that the old tube was more apt to corrode, Col. Yount
stoutly held that it was merely "less corrosion resistant").
226
the effects of, in Col. Yount's words, its "slamming into the
lower receiver". (Colt's later reported that in April 1966 they
had also increased the load on the bolt catch spring, in order
to overcome bolt catch-related malfunctions which "had not
been noticed as a problem prior to the introduction of ball
propellant").
6. disconnector redesigned, again to better accommodate
the added shock resulting from higher cyclic rates.
7. a protective boss added to the lower receiver, around the
magazine catch. This was in response to complaints of the
catch sometimes being pressed in by heavy brush, and the
magazine dropping out.
8. the new buffer, introduced in December 1966 as a replacement for the temperamental "action spring guide assembly",
designed to dampen bolt carrier bounce and prevent misfires
due to light strikes. At the same time, it slowed down the high
ball-powder cyclic rates.
221. Second and third type flash suppressors.

Above: type 2.
Below: the improved "birdcage" model (post-production change no. 9), introduced in January 1967.
3. bolt carrier key finish altered from electrolyzed to chromeplated interior/parkerized exterior.
4. firing pin retaining pin - changed from a machining to
"a less expensive and more durable" cotter pin.
5. bolt catch redesigned; a "field fix" for bolt catch problems
engendered by the higher cyclic rates brought about by ball
powder. The catch body was made wider in order to reduce
9. a new flash suppressor, the third basic type since the days
of the Colt model 01, approved in September 1966. Known as
the "birdcage" model, its ringed muzzle end did away with the
problem of catching the old design's prongs in vines, tall grasses
and brush. In addition, the "birdcage" suppressor channeled
less rainwater into the bore than had the open-ended prongs.
This item was built into all new production beginning in
January, 1967.
10.Significantly, another modification to the bolt, wherein
it was shot-peened to increase its fatigue life and thereby its
service life.
Unfortunately, the chrome-plated chamber had not even
been approved until 26 May 1967, and thus did not figure
in the list of changes to contract "508" or indeed its successor, "0018".
A Last Modification to the Air Force M16

On 9 August 1967 the Air Force reported that they had 136,506
M16 rifles on inventory, and that all their units fighting in Vietnam were now M16-equipped. One of the last modifications to
the M16 had been Air Force acceptance of the serrated M16A1
bolt carrier, which although useless per se in the M16 did have
the decided advantage of eliminating plain, un-serrated carriers
as an item of manufacture and issue. Thus was solved the
problem of plain carriers inadvertently turning up in M16A1s.
222. The barrel, swivels and front sight block of this dummy training rifle
(clearly marked "M16A1 serial 604005") are the only metal parts: the rest
is molded, one-piece plastic.

In his testimony before the Ichord subcommittee, the thenpresident of Colt's Paul Benke was asked to discuss the "126
parts" that made up the XM16E1 rifle, from the standpoint of
who made what. Mr. Benke told the Congressmen that Colt's
themselves only made the ten most important of the 126 parts
in-house, the rest being obtained from subcontractors and
variously only heat-treated, finished, or coated at Colt's before
being inspected and assembled. Of the ten major Colt-made
parts, Mr. Benke went on:
..We manufacture all of these parts from raw materials,
and perform all the operations on them from either barstock,
forging or castings as the case may be..
Colt's vice-president of manufacturing, William Goldbach,
continued:
Actually the 10 parts that we do manufacture..include
possibly 65 percent of the total labor input in..hours into
the rifle, so 10 parts don't appear to be a great number.. but
the other 116..are minor...The major parts are produced
by Colt.
The following list was inserted into the record of the Ichord
transcript as "exhibit C of the technical data sales and patent
license agreement, dated June 30, 1967". Interestingly, the list
also includes the Colt-made components of the Army and Air
Force submachine gun versions (discussed in chapter 15) and
illustrates the exponential proliferation of components that
resulted when just these two basic models were compounded
by the Army-only bolt closure device:
223. A rack of ten brand-new M16A1s at Colt's, awaiting shipment to Vietnam.

Colt photo by Ed Guinan
227
The Rifle According to Colt 228
[Components Manufactured by Colt's Firearms Division]

M16, M16A1, XM177, and XM177E2
Part name
Bolt
Bolt carrier (M16 and XM177)
Bolt carrier (M16A1 and XM177E2)
Bolt carrier key
Extractor
Receiver extension (M16 and M16A1)
Receiver extension (XM177 and XM177E2)
Barrel extension
Front sight (M16 and M16A1)
Front sight (XM177 and XM177E2)
Barrel (M16 and M16A1)
Barrel (XM177 and XM177E2)
Barrel and barrel extension assembly (M16 and M16A1)
Barrel and barrel extension assembly (XM177 and XM177E2)
Upper receiver (M16 and XM177)
Upper receiver (M16A1)
Upper receiver (XM177E2)
Charging handle
Present part number

61538
61544
62274
61547
61562
61574
62356
61575
62068
62375
62181
62363
62180
62362
62306
62278
XM7306
62288
The Shorty Program
229
Chapter Fifteen
THE GOLDEN AGE OF R&D

The Cream of Colt's CAR-15 System - The Shorty Program
224. Further evolution of the CAR-15 submachine gun.

Above: the first-issue model; an XM16E1 with a 10" barrel and Colt's first
type of noise suppressor, and the extendable buttstock. These early suppressors
had a tight exit hole (for maximum effect) which, in conjunction with higher
muzzle velocities (from the 10" barrels) led to heavy barrel coppering and
tracer bullet failures (fig. 272).
Below: the final model, marked "XM177E2" (Colt model 629). Longer (second
type) Colt noise and flash suppressor (fig. 230) on 11 1/2" barrel, round
handguards, canted slip ring, and plastic-coated, telescoping buttstock.
As discussed in chapter 11, by the time production had

begun on the FY64 "one-time buy" of M16/XM16Els, Colt's
had optimistically worked up a seven-version "CAR-15 [Colt
Automatic Rifle] Infantry Weapons System" of six different
versions plus a rifle/grenade launcher combination, all based
on the AR-15/M16 rifle. Most of these never made it beyond
the handbuilt prototype stage, but, as noted, 100 to 150 of
Colt's clip-fed, heavy-barrel " M l " Assault Rifle had been

featured in the SAWS program. By early 1966, the Army was
also showing considerable interest in the 10" barreled submachine gun.
Colt submachine guns: Program authority was received

this week for procurement of 2,050 Colt submachine guns.
It is intended to procure these items on a letter contract with
anticipated award by 15 March 1966. Initial deliveries are

scheduled for September 1966 with completion scheduled
in November 1966.
First official notice of the CAR-15 submachine gun appeared

in the following PMR's significant action report:
The Shorty Program 230
Later in February 1966, then-Lt. Col. Yount announced that

the US Army Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
(ACSFOR) had increased the requirement by 765 more Colt
"Commandos", the first official use of this nomenclature. The
contract with Colt's for 2,815 CAR-15 "Commando model"
submachine guns was accordingly signed on 28 June 1966.
After successfully completing a standard Engineering Design
Test at Aberdeen, wherein Colt's regular pronged flash suppressor was evaluated on the short barrel for "noise level, flash,
durability, reliability and accuracy", initial shipments of what
had by then become known simply as the "CAR-15" were
still on track for September. However, a problem developed,
due to the blast and fireball which accompanied every shot
out of the 10" barrel:
Project: rifles [week of] 22-26 August 1966

CAR-15 submachine gun: [TECOM] safety certification
is being withheld pending a retest of noise level measurements.
Retesting is due to inconsistencies revealed during examination of initial test data..
225. The cover of the early Rock Island Arsenal POMM for the "Submachine
Gun, 5.56mm, CAR-15", dated September, 1966. The manual lists the muzzle
velocity from the CAR-15's 10" barrel as 2,650 fps.
226. The second official name for the "CAR-15": the "Commando"
(Colt model 609), with the longer noise and flash suppressor (fig. 230)
mounted on a 10" barrel. This weapon has an (added) Colt burst control
kit and a (later) 30-round magazine. Note the "PROPERTY OF U. S. GOVT"

markings.
The Shorty Program
227 Fig. 1 from US Patent no. 3,348,328, entitled "Adjustable Buttstock", Rob
Roy's second such (fig. 184). Much simpler in concept and execution, the stock
telescopes around the recoil spring tube and its added lower rail, shortening the
overall length with stock extended (31.25") to 28".
US Patent Office
The CAR-15 Commando Becomes the XM177/XM177E1

A test of "one tool-room model" of Colt's "latest configuration" CAR-15 in September featured for the first time
a special Colt "noise and flash suppressor", developed in
an attempt to reduce the signature of the CAR-15 to the
level of the standard rifle. Deliveries began on 7 November,
with the shipment of "1190 sub-machine guns and 85% total

repair parts". The next mention in the Project Manager's
report for the week of 23-27 January 1967 established official type designation of the CAR-15 Commando for the first
time:
CAR-15 submachine gun: The Type Designator SUBMACHINE GUN, 5.56mm. XM177 (Air Force Version) and
XM177E1 (Army Version) has tentatively been assigned to

the CAR-15 SMG.
The XM177E2 - One of the Deadliest Fruits of the War

Improvements to the XM177/XM177E1 included an additional 1.5 inches of barrel length which, when mated with a
redesigned Colt noise and flash suppressor, offered the best
possible trade-off between versatility and increased noise and

flash. Col. Yount reported:
Project: rifles [week of] 17-21 April 1967

XM177/XM177E1 submachine gun: Consistent with
improvements made. .a new designator, XM177E2, has been
assigned to the current model.
Contractual actions are in process to procure 510 each

XM177E2 submachine guns with concurrent repair parts for
the Studies and Observation Group, Vietnam [MAC-SOG],
Delivery date is anticipated by 30 September..
231
228. Left side view of two rare toolroom "shorties" from Colt's.
Above: Colt model 610B (Burst) fitted with the late type noise and flash suppressor on a standard 10" barrel. Note the unusual ribbed handguard slip ring.
The early telescoping buttstock is not plastic coated.
Below: non-U.S. Property-marked Colt "Commando" with experimental
finned 10" barrel.
229. Right side view of two more experimentals from the Colt model shop.
Above: an M16A1 fitted with an unusual 11" heavy barrel.
Below: final 11 1/2" barrel configuration as used on the XM177E2.
230. Cutaway view of Colt's longer, second-type noise and flash suppressor,
which featured a larger exit hole and an added flash suppressor. When new, this
device reduced the muzzle blast and report from the XM177E2's short barrel to
roughly that of a standard rifle. Accumulated bullet particles and other debris
would clog the suppressor, raising noise levels.
231. Closeup of the later USAF version of the telescoping-stock "shortie":

the bolt-closerless XM177 (Colt model 649). Barrel length: 14" overall,
including suppressor. Note the Air Force marking "GAU", standing for
"Gun, Automatic".
Smithsonian Institution collection
232. Right side view of two typical Army XM177E2s, with stock extended (above)
and telescoped (below). Note the Ordnance acceptance mark, stamped in paint
on the receiver, and the late-style M16A1 protective boss around the magazine
catch, modification no. 7 of the Ten Post-Production Changes (chapter 14).
However, problems dogged the XM177E2:
Project: rifles [week of] 8-12 July 1968

Submachine gun 5.56mm, XM177E2: ..The cyclic
rates of the test weapons showed large variations within
a burst. The noise/flash suppressor lost its effectiveness
due to clogging as firing progressed, and the ball bullets
showed unusually large yaw on some occasions apparently
owing to the effect of the.. suppressor. Tracer cartridges,
regardless of the propellant loading were incompatible
(The Delrin charging handle latch mentioned above
had been experimentally developed after Colt's started
noticing yet another problem, that of the charging handle
unlatching [malfunction code C H U ] during the 1966
Frankford Arsenal ball/IMR ammunition trials. Colt's had
again recorded that "Prior to the introduction of ball pro-
with the weapon due to severe yaw and some projectile

breakup.
USATECOM recommended further development of the
buffer and noise/flash suppressor and that the [experimental]
Delrin charging handle latch be considered unacceptable.
The handles showed structural failure at -65E.
pellant, C H U s had not been noted as a problem". The high
C H U malfunction rate led to Colt's making some changes
to the regular metal charging handle latch [RTA-0018-4, 11
May 1966] and the charging handle latch spring [RTA-0018-5,
25 May 1966]. The Delrin latch idea was not adopted.)
233. Left side view of an XM177E2, modified by members of the Royal Australian
Regiment (wood handguard) for use in Vietnam.
Photo courtesy Ian Skennerton
234. Closeup of receiver of the Royal Australian Regiment's wood-handguard

"shortie", marked "PROPERTY OF U. S. GOVT. / XM16E1".
The XM177E2 is Phased Out

It was announced in the weekly P M R report for 11-15
November 1968 that Colt's had estimated a complete ballistic/
kinematic study of the XM177E2 would take six months and
cost $400,000. While extremely popular with the SEALs,
Special Forces, LRRPs and other units to whom the XM177E2
had been issued, the 11.5" barrel's necessary limitations in
range and accuracy finally caught up with the shorty program.
The last mention in the PMR's reports came in late December,
1968, when an in-process review of "design characteristics"
recommended that the XM177E2 be reoriented to a 29-month,
$635,000 R&D program. This recommendation was ignored
and, concurrent with the winding down of the US presence in
Vietnam after 1970, the "Commandos" went out of production.
In the mid-seventies the Treasury Department's regulatory
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (BATF) decided
that the XM177E2's noise and flash suppressor (fig. 230) was
a true silencer under the law. This, coupled with a Carteradministration decision prohibiting export sales of silencers
was the last straw, as it meant that Colt's could not sell the
XM177E2 abroad.
After the war, as part of the recommencement of production
of civilian semi-auto AR-15s, the XM177E2 was transmogrified
into several special, suppressor-less full-auto "CAR-15" models
with 11 1/2, 14 1/2 and 16" barrels for law enforcement sale
only, as well as a legal 16"barreled semi-auto model featuring
the XM177E2's telescoping buttstock called the "Colt Sporter
Carbine", for civilian sale.
Militarily, after successful trials during the early eighties, Army
and Marine Corps acceptance of Colt's new "shorty" version,
called the XM4, appears imminent at the time of this writing
(February 1987).
The Thirty-Round Magazine
235. Right side view of a Colt model 616, the CAR-15 "Heavy Assault Rifle M1"
circa July 1966, with regular M2 rifle bipod mounted on adapter (fig. 173).
Note the early 30-round, fully curved magazine (fig. 406 type 4).
Concurrent with the " s h o r t y " program, the Combat

Developments Command (CDC) first established a requirement for a 30-round magazine for the M16/M16A1 in
January 1966. All subsequent production at Colt's on
contract "0018" was supposed to be so equipped, espe..the shorter the magazine is, the less necessity there is
for a curved magazine, and vice versa.. .a 30-round [Stoner
System] magazine is. .curved. .and a curved magazine is the
only system where you can get ideal feeding conditions through
cially the
guns.
newly-ordered
"Commando"
submachine
Gene Stoner had explained the basics of extended-capacity

magazine design to the Ichord subcommittee as follows:
the full complement of the magazine, because the ammunition
is slightly tapered and this follows the natural curve. If you
laid the cartridges out on a table, this would be the arc,
if you stacked them up, that they would go.
Grenade Launcher Attachments
Despite the numerous modifications to which the original

AR-15 had been subjected, the dimensions of the magazine well
area had remained untouched since the earliest days, and it was
soon found that it was not so simple to design an extendedcapacity magazine for the M16A1. Colt's first 30-round M16A1
magazines were curved in an unbroken arc (fig. 406 no. 4),
but a problem awaited them upon their trials issue: they simply
would not fit into the magazine wells of many existing AR-15s/
M16/XM16E1s.
recorded that a product improvement test was "suspended

due to deficiencies found in the magazines. Colt's Inc., is again
reviewing the design and is scheduled to resubmit.."
In March 1966 Col. Yount reported that due to Colt's "inability

to provide an operable 30 round magazine", the first few
months' production of "Commandos" were to be issued with
regular 20-rounders. However, the other problems of the next
sixteen months somewhat overshadowed the magazine project.
In July 1967 Lt. Col. Engle, the acting Project Manager,
The design finally chosen, Colt's "firearm box magazine

with straight end and intermediate arctuate portions" was the
best possible compromise, built somewhat along the lines of
the World War II 30-round M2 Carbine magazine. However,
it was 1969 before 30-round magazines first became available
for issue:
It appeared that the front of the magazine well of the rifle

itself had not been too closely gauged or controlled in previous
manufacture. In Gene Stoner's words "..at the time we didn't
know better..I wish it [the capability to accept a fully-curved
magazine] had been put into the M16 rifle.."
Project: rifles [week of] 10-14 June 1968

30-round magazine: Colt's Inc., has signed a contract
to produce 1,000 30-round magazines to be used in an initial
production test. Delivery is anticipated in 6 1/2 months. A
technical data package will be furnished by Colt's under
the terms of this contract at no cost to the government. This

initial quantity. .will be produced on hard tooling, so that
immediately following the successful conclusion of the. .test,
mass production may be initiated.
The 40MM Grenade Launcher Attachment Project
236. XM16E1 shown ready to fire an Energa-type rifle grenade. At Staff level, this
concept of launching bulky grenades by means of dedicated grenade-blank cart-
ridges was seen as counterproductive to standardized use of the M79/40mm

grenade system, for which the SPIW program had already produced several
"promising" launcher attachments.
The Early Days

As discussed at length in The SPIW, one of the main design
advantages so expensively sought in that program was the capability of firing both "point-fire" flechettes and "area-fire" grenades from the same weapon. Although the SPIW itself did not
materialize, the point-and-area-fire idea itself still offered tremendous increases in "man-weapon effectiveness". Early in the
rifle program the concept was accordingly grafted onto the AR-15
as "a low-risk, high-payoff" bequest from the failing SPIW:
Project: AR-15 rifle [week of] 27-31 May 1963

Grenade launcher: Work has been initiated to mount a
SPIW type 40mm grenade launcher on the AR-15. This
launcher will be the quick detachable type capable of firing
the ammunition currently used by the Launcher Grenade

M79. This launcher should be available for demonstration
firing by 30 June 1963.
237
Grenade Launcher Attachments 238
252 Rob Roy's first model of an admirably simple, single-shot 40mm grenade
launcher attachment for the AR-15. It was not adopted.
Above: left side view; sliding barrel and breech cover closed.
Below: right side view; sliding barrel forward for loading.
Apparently the bolt closure debate and the "slamfire" problem

kept everyone too busy over the summer of 1963 for them to
attend to the development of the launcher. The next mention of
the project did not come until November, when Lt. Col. Yount
noted that CDC had furnished advance notice of their draft
SDR (Small Development Requirement) for an AR-15 grenade

launcher development project. After that, not much progress
was made until the following spring, when the P M R reported
a problem with funding:
Project: AR-15 rifle [week of] 25-29 May 1964

Grenade launcher:. .The AMC Deputy Comptroller stated
that RTD&E funds are needed for this development. Since
there are no RTD&Efunds for the AR-15 program and no rifle
funding in FY65 budget, it appears necessary (in keeping
with the urgency of this project) to fund the development. .as

a separate task under the SPIW program. No further action
can be taken by the project manager. .pending. .approval and
funding.
Introducing the Colt CGL-4

As noted in chapter 9, during the last week of May 1964 a
"specially furnished XM16E1 rifle representing the first rifle for
the Army under the FY64 contract" had been presented by
Colt's to the Army's Chief of Staff, General Wheeler. At that
time Colt's new CAR-15 series was also unveiled for General
Wheeler, who "showed special interest in the Colt..40mm
grenade launcher and stated that the Army had a definite
requirement for such an item".
The following month it was momentously decided that it
was unnecessary to design brand new launchers for the AR-15

when there were several types already under development in
the SPIW program, and the draft SDR was accordingly cancelled. The P M R noted that AMC had been directed "to
proceed to engineer the most suitable single-shot launcher from
the SPIW program to adopt it to use with the XM16E1 rifle.
Springfield Armory is being directed to select the launcher
and adapt it.." In response to a written note from General
Besson, stating "Let's get an independent review of the selection", an interesting followup memorandum continued,
..The Project Manager proposes to submit to TECOM,

for test, at least two successful, complete, single-shot
launchers, which are readily available. A third launcher
designed by Springfield Armory is being considered for
inclusion. The two successful launchers to be tested are the
Ford Motor Company model which was used with the
Springfield Armory SPIW prototype and the model designed
by Colt's [then known as the CGL-4],
Another Springfield Armory launcher was considered and

rejected in early design stages as having basic faults and
insufficient advantages to pursue to completion. Still another
single-shot launcher, designed by Aircraft Armaments for use
with their SPIW prototype, is reported to have good possibilities, but has been rejected from current consideration, because
it will not fire standard 40mm grenades, and thus involves
ammunition development as well as launcher development..
238 An Army XM16E1 with Colt CGL-4 launcher disassembled, showing

components. Note the early handguard.
Springfield Armory photo dated November 10, 1964.
239. Fig. 1 from US Patent no. 3,279,114, entitled "Grenade Launcher", granted
to K. R. Lewis and Robert E. Roy and assigned to Colt's for the CGL-4. To cock:
"the button 194 is pulled rearwardly causing firing pin 164 to move rearwardly
. .[causing] the sear [to] drop onto ramp 182..the. .button may be released
with the firing pin 164 remaining cocked." To fire: ". .push against the outer
ledge 232 of the safety hinge 219. The hinge will resistingly move out of the
way.. thus exposing the button 218 for actuation of the sear 200 to effect release
of firing pin 164".
US Patent Office
239
The Aircraft Armaments, Inc. (AAI) SPIW launcher mentioned above was designed around AAI's revolutionary
DBCATA (Disposable Barrel and Cartridge Area Target
Ammunition), which is discussed at length in The SPIW. While
it is true the DBCATA was not compatible with standard
M79-type 40x46mm SR grenades, each DBCATA round had
the distinct advantage of being, in effect, its own launcher,
doing away with most of the bulk and weight of a separate
launcher altogether. Only a simple base-plate was required,
onto which each thick-walled, internally-rifled DBCATA cartridge was clipped prior to firing.
In any event, the Colt CGL-4, firing standard M79-type

40mm grenades, was chosen as the most promising launcher
for attachment to the M16/XM16E1. A contract was signed
in March 1965 to procure 30 of these Colt launchers for
Engineering and Service tests. Unfortunately, as we shall see,
the CGL-4 was a complicated design: as is so often the case
with weapons rushed to completion in wartime, a litany of
chronic problems was to dog the complex CGL-4 throughout
its short life. These difficulties commenced soon after the
tests began:
Project: rifles [week of] 10-14 May 1965

Grenade launcher attachment: Air Force began tests of
40mm, detachable [Colt] launchers on 12 May. .at Lackland
Air Force Base. Some trouble was encountered due to weak
extractor springs, and Colt's is now rushing new ones to
both Air Force and Army test sites. One launcher housing
broke apparently due to foreign material in the breech. This..

is being investigated to determine whether a modification
of the housing is necessary for added strength. Tests at
Aberdeen and Fort Benning are scheduled to start next week
upon completion of safety certification.
The CGL-4 Becomes the XM148
240. Right side view of M16A1 serial no. 886104, fitted with a cutaway
version of Colt's later, "improved" model of the CGL-4, which was assigned
the military designation XM148. Note the vented handguard. The 3-lb.
XM148 launched standard 40mm grenades at a rate of 12 rounds per minute,

producing a muzzle velocity of 240 fps from its 10" barrel.
Smithsonian Institution collection
An omimous note introduced the first use of the CGL-4's

new Army designation, the "XM148":
Project: rifles [week of] 31 May - 4 June

40mm Grenade launcher attachment: ET/ST of the 40mm
Grenade launcher XM148 has been suspended due to croaking
in critical areas of two of the hand cast aluminum housings.
Future launcher development and test activity will hinge on
what can be done to provide adequate housings. This problem

will be coordinated with Air Force in view of their intense
interest in this program, and a decision reached after review
of the factors which caused the breakage.
Safety
\
?
B - Trigger and C o c k i n g Lever
C 241. Details of the complex sighting, safety and trigger systems of the XM148,
from an early combined services tech manual (TM 9-1005-249-14; T.O.
11W3-5-5-1; NAVWEP O. P. 3333) dated June 15, 1964. Over 34,000 XM148
Sight
launcher attachments were produced before the design was abandoned as

unsatisfactory.
241
By the following week, the grenade launcher project had been

bumped right up to the top of Lt. Col. Yount's significant
action report:
40mm Grenade launcher attachment: Engineering and
Service tests are still under suspension due to cracking of
launcher housings. Investigation revealed grain structure
problems as a result of casting technique and alloy composi-
tion. Colt's has agreed to replace all housing castings with

ones of a different alloy at no cost to the government and
to reassemble all launchers when the new castings, with
improved strength, are ready..
Safety re-certification of launchers fitted with the new castings

was completed in the fall of 1965, and testing continued with
the P M R noting hopefully in mid-October "Review of test
results on 30 September indicates deficiencies found in testing
can apparently be corrected."
attachment should look like and do, Lt. Col. Yount put together
some numbers on "a firm operational requirement" for the
XM148. The US Air Force, eager to field the new launchers,
submitted an interdepartmental request (MIPR) in midDecember for 7,000 XM148s.
Meanwhile, in spite of differences of opinion between the

Army Staff and Headquarters of the Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) as to just what a grenade launcher
Early in the new year the P M R prepared the following

special memorandum for General Besson on the status of the
project:
XM148 Grenade Launcher and Cartridge 40mm Shot XM576

2 February 1966
. .limited Production quantity of 10,500 [XM148 launchers]
for the Army was granted on 3 January 1966. ..This figure
was based on requirement information furnished by
COMUSMACV.
A cartridge 40mm shot XM576 (shotgun type) is currently being developed.. .Delivery of a safety certified
interim round with an effective range of 35 meters is
scheduled..
Before manufacture began in earnest Colt's had to tool up,

and the Army proceeded to test a small number of initial
production XM148 launchers as a final, standard precaution.
A quantity of 25 was agreed upon, which for the first time
were to feature a stronger housing made from a subcontracted
aluminum forging. Over the summer a further hitch developed
when the forging dies cracked and had to be remade. Meanwhile, Lt. Col. Yount announced on 29 June, the day following
the signing of the contract for 2,815 Colt "Commando"
CAR-15 sub-machine guns, that Colt's had "signed the contract
for 19,236 XM148 Grenade Launchers." Immediately, another
problem appeared. The subcontractor for the XM148 housing
forging, Kaiser Aluminum of Erie, Pennsylvania, was also
working on the " D X rated 904 Fuze Body Program" for the
Air Force's 750-lb. bomb, which had a higher priority than
did the grenade launcher forgings, and which utilized the same
production equipment.
In response to a pencilled "hastener" from General Besson,
AMC's Director of Procurement and Production, Col. Woolwine, explained the forging delay problem, in the process introducing yet another:
242. Fig. 5-3 from TM 9-1005-249-14: supply and transport of 40mm grenades
for the M79 and XM148.
The DX rated Fuze Body for the M904 Fuze, 7501b. Bomb
and the barrel forging for the XM148 Grenade Launcher
are competing for the insufficient production capacity of the
Kaiser Aluminum Company. Since the. .fuze takes precedence
over the. .launcher, the production of barrel forgings had
to give way for two months. Available forgings will permit
assembly of the first 1,500 launchers.
.. The first 25.. launchers accepted in July have failed the IPT
(Initial Production Test) due to failure of the sight to hold
position. Corrective measures are being investigated with
Colt's. However, this will delay acceptances and may become
a controlling factor, outweighing the forging shortage. A solution to this problem is not currently available. ..schedules have
been adjusted to show completion of the current order for
19,236 units by June instead of February, 1967.
This in turn prompted an exasperated General Besson to

scrawl: "I can't see how a loose sight can take 4 months to
solve."
reworked, and "the inadvertent fire deficiency which caused

the second suspension" of the IPT was also overcome. In
September, T E C O M pronounced the XM148 "suitable for
field issue when restricted to operating temperatures of -25F
to +155F", but it seems Col. Yount jumped the gun somewhat
in reporting first issue of the XM148: "Initial shipment,
representing September's production, of between 750 to 1,000
launchers will be made prior to 10 October 1966".
On 8 August the Project Manager announced that the

Initial Production Test had indeed been suspended, due to
"movement of the sight during firing of launcher and/or rifle".
The launchers and sights were returned to Colt's for "corrective
action", and the tests held in abeyance until "Colt's demonstrates that the deficiency has been corrected". The sights were
Alas, it was not to be so easy after all:
XM148 Grenade launcher; To overcome a marginal risk

of misfires which existed in the launchers tested during the
IPT, Colt's Inc., redesigned the launcher firing pin and
spring. Evaluation of the improved firing pin and spring is
presently in progress at Springfield Armory..
SPIW Program: Representatives ofAAl Corporation will

brief the Project Manager. .on 21 October on the results of the
feasibility study of combining the Disposable Barrel Cartridge
Area Target Ammunition (DBCATA) with existing standard
rifles, and redesigning the M79 to fire DBCATA rounds..
Here General Besson again intervenes, "Seems to me work

should be on XM148 rather that M79..What can we do about
the sight?"
but got little applause from General Besson. Unfortunately,

the first issue of XM148s coincided with Lt. Col. Underwood's
return from Vietnam, where the Army was experiencing grave
loss of confidence in the XM16E1:
At last Col. Yount was able to announce delivery to the field,
Project: rifles [week of] 12-16 December 1966

XM148 Grenade launcher: The first shipment to Vietnam
of 1,764 launchers plus repair parts was made on 15
December 1966 ..A new equipment training team consisting
of two Weapons Command maintenance technicians and two
representatives from Colt's, Inc., has been organized... The

team will depart for Vietnam on/about 15 January.. [General
Besson's pencil interrupts: "They should have been there
to meet the plane!"]
Problems with the XM148 in Vietnam

By the end of January 1967 Colt's was well ahead of its
scheduled XM148 deliveries, having produced a total of 10,862
launchers. The following month the launcher assistance team
returned from Vietnam, whence the early word was that the
XM148s were performing well under combat conditions, and

although "some improvements" had been suggested, "the
tactical advantage of both the point fire and area fire system
was highly endorsed". This situation was short-lived, however:
243
Project: rifles [week of] 13-17 March 1967

XM148 Grenade launcher: ..Preliminary reports from
Vietnam indicate three potential problem areas with the
XM148:
- sight mount: numerous parts make it difficult to repair
at the organizational level and its location on the weapon
causes it to snag on brush or clothing.
corrective action: present efforts to develop a new sight
will eliminate the problems..
- cocking: too much force is required to cock the
weapon.
corrective action: Colt's is prepared to submit an RTA

on an improved sear which they contend will reduce the
cocking force from 30 lbs. to 20 lbs. It is doubtful that further
reductions could be made without a complete redesign of
the firing mechanism.
- trigger: numerous parts made assembly and disassembly
difficult..
corrective action: Colt's is..working on a possible solution, but no corrective action has been taken to date. A major
redesign of the trigger and firing mechanism may be required
to bring about significant improvements in this area..
Problems with the sights continued to dog the launcher

project:

XM148 Grenade launcher: The.. sight development program continues to have difficulties.. .A Colt design error on
the cam angle of the elevation brackets originally caused
excessive deflection and range errors.. .After resumption of
firing, the deflection errors at 350 - 400 meters persisted...
Should the Analytical Lab [at Aberdeen] determine that the
sight contains a design deficiency, Colt's will require one

or two weeks to make the necessary corrections.. .The overall
impact of this slippage is that the new sights cannot be
adapted on current grenade launcher production.. .the new
sight should be available for production in FY68 buy of
XM148 grenade launchers..
The XM148 Craps Out

The following month a three-man team, including Colt's
" K o n i " Ito, was again sent to Vietnam at the request of HQ,
USARV, to assist with chronic problems being experienced
with XM148s in the field; namely, the sights, which were im-
properly calibrated, bulky and easily knocked off their "zero";

the excessive force necessary to cock the device; and the complicated trigger mechanism which made field servicing a nightmare. The team's efforts soon proved to be in vain, however:
Project: rifles [week of] 8-12 May 1967

XM148 Grenade launcher: A telephone call from
the XM148..Technical Assistance Team presently in
Vietnam has given preliminary information on the
ACTIV evaluation of the XM148.. .The. .evaluation is as
follows:
- The XM148.. is unsatisfactory for use in the Vietnam
environment.
- They are recommending the XM148 be withdrawn from

troops and replaced with the M79 launcher.
- They recommend a vigorous program, .to develop a new
launcher with the same principle as the XM148 (i.e. mounting
directly on the rifle)..
- In consideration of the above stated facts, future plans
are in doubt..
The GLAD Program
The Army's Grenade Launcher Attachment

Development (GLAD) Program
For Colt's, the failure of their proprietary XM148 in the field
was a severe embarrassment. Col. Yount reported in June 1967
that the firm was "crashing the design of modifications to the
XM148 in an attempt to meet, on a retrofit basis, the require-
ments implied in the ACTIV report". But Colt's had lost the
initiative, and meanwhile the grenade launcher project had
become a lull-fledged program: the Army had formally let it be
known that they were "in the market" for a new launcher design:

Grenade launcher: Response from private industry concerning the projected industry briefing (for development of
conventional launcher) to be held at Rock Island on 18 July
1967, has been favorable. Of the 17 firms contacted, seven
have formally indicated their interest. These were AAI Corporation, Harvey Aluminum, Aero Jet General, Aeronutronic
Division - Ford Motor Company, United Aircraft, Chrysler
Corporation, and Colt's..
The AAI DBCATA Grenade

AAI Corporation (formerly Aircraft Armaments Inc.) had
by this time developed several different single-shot, pump-type
and "harmonica" semi-automatic 40mm launchers as part
of the SPIW program, as well as inventing and producing the
serial flechette itself, and the launcherless DBCATA grenade
(fig. 243).
Earlier in July the acting PMR, Lt. Col. Engle, had recorded
AAI's entry into the single-shot launcher attachment program
as follows:
. .AAI, a potential contractor, visited this office informally,
concerning their concept for the pump-action, single-shot,
conventional launcher which had been shown to General
Besson. [They] had a wooden mock-up of an exterior configuration only. There were no functioning internal parts.
When asked about delivery schedules, the contractor's representative stated that they could probably handcraft one to
four tool-mom models suitable for firing in about six months.
He further stated that test hardware suitable for TECOM
evaluation testing (about 10 to 20 prototypes only) with
drawings would take about one year... It is believed that the..
estimated delivery schedule was an unofficial, but honest,
engineering appraisal. Past experience with this particular
firm usually indicates that their forecasts are more likely
to be optimistic than conservative as to time-frame..
243. The AAI DBCATA round, sectioned. As discussed in The SPIW, the
DBCATA concept did away with most of the weight and bulk of a standard
launcher attachment. The thick, rifled walls of each round were sufficient
to contain the forces of firing the (standard M406 HE) 40mm projectile.
Left: before firing. Note the folded cup seal.
Right: after firing. Note the rifled walls and the expanded cup seal, which
contained the propellant gases and gave the DBCATA the added advantage of
being smokeless and flashless. Note also the piston primer, protruding from the
(rimless) base of the thick-walled DBCATA case. Muzzle velocity: 245 fps.
Maximum range: 400 meters.
245
The GLAD Program 246
244. The AAI DBCATA, while not adopted for reasons of cost and noninterchangeability with the M79, was certainly one of the best of the many
incredibly ingenious ideas put forth during the two decades of the SPIW
program. In this diagrammatic view of the semiautomatic DBCATA system
as featured on an early AAI SPIW, note the (rimless) rounds held by the simple
coiling band of the follower spring. With the proper selector lever position
engaged, pulling the SPIW's regular trigger (another SPIW specification)
moved a linkage which forced the DBCATA trigger rod against the primary sear,
releasing the firing pin and firing the round. The cup seal (fig. 243) expanded
to contain the (smokeless and flashless) explosion, while the piston primer
propelled the firing pin strongly rearward. The teeth on the firing pin passed
over the teeth on the (spring-loaded) ejector catch on this rearward stroke,
but as the firing pin spring reasserted itself, the teeth made contact and the
final forward movement of the firing pin (before being caught in the cocked
position by the sear) propelled the ejector forward, ejecting the spent DBCATA
case straight ahead. The ejector spring then took over, returning the ejector
to its resting position, while the ejector cam cleverly avoided any further contact
between the two sets of teeth.
First use of the acronym GLAD came in the middle

of September 1967, by which time the program had progressed to the point of contract awards to three firms;
AAI, Philco-Ford's Aeronutronics Division, and A e r o j e t
General.
Ironically for Colt's, the week of the three new contract

announcements coincided with a final word in the PMR's
report on the XM148s still in Vietnam, which constituted "the
majority" of an already-delivered 27,400 XM148s, against a
contracted total order of 34,076:
The ACTIV (Army Concept Team in Vietnam] evaluation and subsequent ACSFOR concurrence has stated
the XM148 ..was unsatisfactory for combat deployment
in Vietnam. An ACSFOR message to USARV requested
information concerning employment of the XM148 in
various alternate roles, such as base camp defense, etc.

USARV has responded they have no requirement for the
XM148..in Vietnam. Therefore, disposition instructions
of launchers currently in Vietnam are currently being
requested..
245. Right side view of an M16A1 rifle equipped for single shot launch of AAI's
revolutionary Disposable Barrel and Cartridge Area Target Ammunition
(DBCATA).
Above: DBCATA launcher assembled to rifle.
Below: DBCATA grenade clipped onto launcher plate.
246. AAI (single shot) DBCATA launcher attachment for M16/M16A1 rifle,
disassembled.
The AAI, Philco-Ford and Aero Jet Launchers
247. The short-lived "delayed-blowback, inertia-lock" grenade launcher

attachment (GLAD) for the M16A1, designed and submitted by Aero-Jet
General Corporation. After watching a demonstration of some first-generation
SPIW prototypes, Colt engineer Rob Roy had been moved to comment that
the combination of point- and area-fire capability in the same weapon was,
from the human engineering standpoint, "the poorest thing imaginable". It
seemed the M16A1 was faring little better, at least at the hands of Aero-Jet
General.
248. Left and right side views of the equally short-lived "pivot action" grenade
launcher attachment (GLAD) for the M16A1, developed and submitted by the
Aeronutronics Division of Philco-Ford Corporation. The single-shot device

pivoted either way for loading.
As had been the case in the SPIW program, each of

the new firms was allowed to take a different approach
to the design of their 40mm grenade launcher. In Lt. Col.
Engle's words, AAI proposed a "conventional pump action
concept", Philco-Ford a "pivot action concept", and Aero

Jet a "delayed blow-back inertia-lock concept". Delivery
of prototypes for the Engineering Design Test was set for
1 May 1968.
The Short-Lived Colt CGL-5
249. Colt's last-minute CGL-5, which they hoped would save the day after the
acute embarrassment of the failed XM148. US Patent no. 3,507,067 was granted
to Colt engineer Henry A. Into for the CGL-5, described as a "Grenade launcher
Having a Rotatable Forwardly Sliding Barrel and Removable Firing Mechanism"
While Colt's presented the double-action CGL-5 as a great improvement over

its predecessor, AMC had already been favorably impressed by the AAI "pump"
launcher (fig. 250).
The first P M R report of 1968 announced a last-minute

attempt by Colt's to get back into the running by offering
the government 20 examples of an improved " C G L - 5 "
launcher free of charge. Lt. Col. Engle reported "considerable discussion" concerning the Colt proposal, but
in the end it was decided that the CGL-5 did not offer the
potential which had already been displayed by other
launchers in the program. With " n o particular advantages
and with proprietary rights to consider", Colt's offer was
declined.
The AAI XM203 Takes the Lead

Testing began on schedule with 20 prototypes each from
AAI and Philco-Ford's Aeronutronics Division on 1 May 1968.
By July, Lt. Col. Engle reported that the AAI pump launcher
was well in the lead:
The pre-IPR (in-process review), .was conducted at Hqs,
AMC on 8 July 1968 The AMC position..is to continue AAI
pump launcher into Phase II of the GLAD Development
Program; to continue the development of the Aeronutronics
battle sight; to develop..a ''prism-type" sight and a ''sliding
scale, post-type" sight; and to conduct troop acceptance
tests.. immediately after successful ET/ST and prior to type
classification as standard..
The AAI pump launcher was soon "unanimously selected
based on superior performance and predicted lower cost in
production", and a letter contract was awarded on 2 August.
By early November the AAI design had become the second
grenade launcher to be officially awarded an XM number:
250. A prototype of the AAI-designed, single-shot 40mm "pump" launcher,

undergoing trial during the GLAD program. Note the serial number, "AA22".
The AAI launcher was by far the most logical and versatile design submitted,
and held the loaded weight of the combination weapon (20 rounds of M193
ball and one M406 grenade) to 11 lbs.
251. Demonstrating its versatility, AAI pump launcher prototype serial

no. AA21 is here shown mounted on an XM177E2, with AAI quadrant sight
mounted on rifle carrying handle. Overall length (with stock telescoped):
29.75". Note the early, fully curved 30-round rifle magazine (fig. 406
no. 4).
Courtesy Lt. Col. Frank Conway
Project: rifles [week of] 4-8 November 1968

GLAD (XM203)
sights to Fort Benning 4 November.
Contractual action to procure 500 each grenade

launchers for SEA test will be formalized week of 10
November.. .AAI Corporation delivered six. .of their two
prism sight design and four, .of their improved quadrant
A wooden mockup of a stock to which the XM203 can

be attached for use as a separate weapon system without
the rifle has been completed by AAI..
The Army Adopts the M203
252. Right side view of the M16A1/M203 combination, showing the barrel
forward and a grenade being inserted. Extraction takes place on the forward
stroke of the manually-operated barrel, and as it is closed on a fresh round

the mechanism is automatically cocked. Note the special front swivel and
the raised battlesight, mounted on the special handguard.
253. Cutaway demonstration model of the AAI M203 grenade launcher attachment (GLAD).
With the AAI "wooden mockup" dying what appears to

have been a natural death, a design freeze was placed on the
XM203 launcher itself early in December 1968, and there
followed a hurried authorization for AAI to build 600 XM203
launcher attachments equipped with the AAI battle sight for
extended tests in Vietnam. Production of the successful AAI
M203 design began in 1969. Thus had passed a full six years
since the grenade launcher attachment project began as an
offshoot of the SPIW program.
AAI Corporation was and remains essentially a research
and development company, like Fairchild's ArmaLite Division
had been. As such AAI was not really equipped for the mass
manufacture of its brainchildren. Ironically, once the M203
was adopted, AAI's circular twin-arrow logo was supplanted
by that of Colt's prancing horse. Colt's received all subsequent
production contracts, and by the end of 1986 had manufactured
more than 250,000 M203 grenade launchers.
254. Cover of M203 Operator's Manual from Colt Industries. Colt's has
produced over 250,000 M203s.
252
Snipers in Vietnam
As discussed in US Rifle M14, a semi-official program to equip
and train Snipers was hastily put in place during the period
1966 to the end of US involvement in the war. Beginning with
M14 rifles fitted at Rock Island Arsenal with World War IIvintage M84 scope sights, the Army's sniper rifle evolved into
the Marksmanship Training Unit's glass-bedded and accurized
version of the National Match M14, called first the "M14
(MTU-NM)". The M T U further improved the system with
the newly-developed Leatherwood/Redfield 3-9x Adjustable
Ranging Telescope (AR TEL) and, where possible, one of the
noise and flash suppressors discussed below. This unorthodox
but highly effective M14 "package" was officially designated
the M21 in 1972.
In some cases it made sense to adapt the ideas coming out
of the various units' in-country Sniper-Instructor programs
to the M16A1. As with the development of the M21, the largely
"ad hoc" unofficial M16A1 enhancement projects waxed and
waned, reflecting first the buildup and then the de-escalation
of the war:
Project:
rifles [week of] 28 June - 2 July 1965
Infra-red weapons sight: Units equipped with the XM16E1
rifle are presently unable to mount the standard infra-red
weapons sight on the.. rifle. Until such time as a mounting
bracket is available, these units have retained M14 rifles for
use with the infra-red weapons sight. On 25 June the Project
Manager Rifles [Lt. Col. Yount] and the Project Manager
Night Vision mutually agreed that the development and procurement for a mounting bracket would be handled by the
255. An American Sniper-instructor scanning the Mekong Delta through the

3-9x Leatherwood/Redfield automatic ranging telescope (AR Tel) mounted
on his glass-bedded M21 (US Rifle M14).
US Army photo courtesy Peter Senich
A full year to develop a mounting bracket was too much

for General Besson, whose pencilled "Get together with
PM Night Vision and revise this estimate had the desired
effect: "..As a result of expedited effort the mounting brackets
are to be in the hands of troops by 10 September 1965".

General Besson followed up again on this with "Make sure
they are airlifted to Vietnam and make sure, .units are not
lost in theater".
Project Manager Night Vision. In order to cope with the

immediate situation, a prototype bracket, .will be provided
to these units by the Third Quarter FY66.

As noted, Col. Yount had had curiously little to report upon
his return from Vietnam, whence he had gone in response
to Lt. Col. Underwood's telephone message regarding the
"unbelievable" condition of the rifles there. One thing he did
mention upon his return in late November 1966 was that some
troops and officers interviewed had expressed a need for telescopic sights and mounts for their XM16Els. This had resulted
in an order from General Nelson M. Lynde to the P M R to
take charge and "serve as the central focal point for..required

actions on rifle scopes and mounts within AWC".
Accordingly, four months later Col. Yount reported "384
of Colt's Realist telescopes [fig. 265] to be mounted on M16A1
rifles..arrived in-country on 15 March 1967. The telescopes
will be evaluated by..USARV in conjunction with the 125
accurized M14 rifles/M84 telescopes which were shipped from
253 Telescopes for the M16A1
256. Colt's model 655 "High Profile" Sniper version of the M16A1 with a
later Leatherwood/Realist 3-9x ranging telescope mounted on the carrying
handle, and fitted with a Sionics noise and flash suppressor (discussed below).
Courtesy the late John (Jack) Fernlund
257. Left and right side views of Colt's model 656 Sniper Rifle, with Leatherwood/
Realist telescope sight mounted on a special, handleless upper receiver. Lower
receiver appears unmodified (serial no. 575527). Note the Sionics suppressor,
the heavy barrel, and the modified (hooded) front sight and gas block.
Rock Island Arsenal on 25 March". By November 1967, a

full year after Col. Yount's trip to Vietnam and the initiation
of the scope project, the new P M R reported that the full
requirement had been met:
Telescopic Sight Program: USARV has acknowledged
receipt of all sight items requested. The following items have
been provided:
364 - Colt's Realist telescopes (for M16A1 rifles)
352 - M84 telescopes (for M16A1 and M14 rifles)
425 - M1C mounts (for M14 rifle)
425 - prototype bases (for M14 rifle)
100 - modified Weaver bases and rings (for M16A1 rifle)
258. The still-later Leatherwood ART-II scope (discussed in US Rifle M14)

in ART quick-detach mount, on the Leatherwood M16 base.
254
Noise and Flash Suppressors
The HEL and Sionics Noise and Flash Suppressors
259. The Human Engineering Laboratories (HEL) M4 noise suppressor, attached

to an M16A1 rifle. The red label on the buttstock reads "CAUTION THIS
IS NOT A SILENT WEAPON".
Coincidentally, Col. Yount's last weekly report as Project

Manager Rifles in J u n e 1967 also included the announcement that USARV had submitted an E N S U R E requirement for a large quantity of "silencers" for mounting on
the M16A1 rifle, of a type developed by the Army's H u m a n
Engineering Laboratories [HEL] at Aberdeen Proving
Ground.
Human
As further discussed US Rifle M14, the H E L and the later

Sionics devices were not true silencers but "noise and flash
suppressors". As such, they were not designed or intended
to actually "silence" a weapon, but only to confuse or deceive
the enemy in his attempt to locate the firer of a shot by sound
or muzzle flash. The HEL device and the theory behind it
were described as follows:
Engineering Laboratories
Interim Operation and Maintenance Manual
Noise Suppressor Assembly, HEL M4

For Use with Rifle, 5.56mm M16A1
Description
260. Cutaway sketch of the HEL M4 suppressor.
The noise suppressor assembly, HEL M4.. consists of a

steel cylinder and separate rear support with three mounting
screws. The entire assembly is 12 inches long and weighs
1.8 pounds. A phosphate coating on all exposed parts gives
protection from rust. The suppressor has no moving parts

and, once installed on the M16A1, becomes a permanent part
of the weapon and should not be removed. If not abused,
the suppressor should last the lifetime of the rifle.
255 Noise and Flash Suppressors
Purpose
The M4 suppressor is a device designed to deceive persons
forward of the firer as to the true location of the firer.
Use of the Suppressor

The M4 noise suppressor is designed to be used only on
a specially modified M16A1 [modification described below].
No attempt should be made to adapt the M4 suppressor to
any other weapon or to attach it to an unmodified M16A1
rifle.
Use of Other Attachments

The XM3 bipod assembly may be used..in the normal
manner when the M4..has been properly installed.
The M7 bayonet knife cannot be used with the M4..
suppressor.
Supply
No components of the M4 suppressor assembly or
modified parts of the M16A1 rifle are available through
normal supply channels and none are intended to be
supplied as spare parts in the field. Initially a number of
additional gas deflectors have been furnished to using units.
261. Fig. 3 from the HEL manual on the M4 suppressor, captioned "Actual
Photograph of Rifle Firing"
Causes of Noise
When the M16A1 rifle is fired, the noise which can be
heard actually comes from two distinct sources. Both occur
so close together in time that the resulting sounds are often
heard together as one noise. The two sources may be called
muzzle noise and ballistic crack..
Muzzle noise is heard when the gases, produced by the
burning of the propellant, reach the end of the muzzle. These
gases, under extremely high pressure in the barrel, break

out into the atmosphere behind the bullet.
Ballistic crack is caused by the supersonic speed of the
bullet. Just as a jet plane breaking the sound barrier creates
a "sonic boom", so the 5.56mm bullet driven faster than
the speed of sound causes its own much smaller "sonic
boom".
Action of the M4 Noise Suppressor

The M4.. suppressor is effective only in reducing muzzle
noise, since it does not affect the supersonic speed of the
projectile.
The M4.. reduces muzzle noise by containing within the
suppressor the gases which cause the noise and allowing
them to enter the atmosphere at a slower rate than usual.
The large black cloud and pressure front shown in figure

261 are not produced.
The M16A1 equipped with the M4.. is not a silent weapon.
The operation of the rifle and the ballistic crack are clearly
audible.
Effects of Firing
..Muzzle velocity and cyclic rate are approximately the
same, although recoil is much less with the M4 suppressor.
First Round Muzzle Flash

With the M4 suppressor-equipped M16A1 rifle, muzzle
flash will occur any time there is oxygen in the suppressor.
The flash is comparable to that from any standard M16A1
and consists of burning particles of carbon and propellant,
some of which may be large enough to emerge as sparklers.
An M16A1 rifle equipped with M4 noise suppressor which
has not been fired for 10 minutes can be expected to exhibit
the muzzle flash described above for the first round. Some
of
the
gases..will remain within the compartments of the., suppressor
for about 10 minutes. These are inert gases which will not
support combustion and, since they have dispelled the
oxygen which was in the suppressor, each successive round
will not flash.
Checking
262. Fig. 4 from the HEL manual: "People Tend to Locate a Sound Source
Perpendicular to the Sound Wave They Hear".
the Modifications
Bolt carrier: To handle the higher gas pressures within

the weapon and to maintain the proper cyclic rate, a gas
pressure relief port has been added to the bolt carrier (figure
263). The modified bolt carrier is intended only for use with
the M4 noise suppressor. If the modified bolt carrier is
assembled into a standard M16A1 rifle, the weapon will not
function automatically.
Use of the M4 Noise Suppressor for Deception

Human beings determine the source of any noise by a
sound locating process using both ears. Whether we are able
to locate any sound depends in part on the loudness and
duration of the sound and how attentive we are during that
duration. In locating the source of hostile fire, most soldiers
are alerted by the ballistic crack and locate the source by
the subsequent muzzle noise (in a similar manner to the
"Crack and Thump" technique taught in the US Army).
However, with the M4..suppressor installed, the muzzle
noise or "thump" is not heard. Persons who try to locate
the position of the firer from the ballistic crack alone usually
choose a direction perpendicular to the sound wave they
hear. Therefore, as shown in figure 262, persons forward of
the firer will either be confused as to the firer's location
or they will locate it incorrectly. Persons to the rear of the
firer's positon should be able to locate it accurately.
Gas deflector: To deflect escaping gases from the firer's

eye, a gas deflector is clip-mounted onto the charging handle
of the rifle (figure 264). The deflector does not interfere with
the operation of the charging handle.
Col. Alvin C. Isaacs had succeeded the acting PMR, Lt. Col.
Engle, in September 1967. In December, Col. Isaacs reported
on the status of the suppressor project as follows:
Noise Suppressor HEL M4 (ENSURE #77)

The first production quantity of 120 suppressors has been
completed. The planned production of 100 per week until
the total 1,080 requirement has been suspended pending an
evaluation of the 120 by USARV. HEL has formed a New
Equipment Introductory Team and will depart for Vietnam
on 3 January 1968.
Modified Bolt C a r r i e r
265. Standard (above) and modified (below) M16A1 rifle bolt assemblies, showing
necessary "gas pressure relief port" in the bolt carrier used with HEL M4
suppressor, in order to "handle the higher gas pressures within the weapon."
The HEL manual states that the dedicated bolt "is intended only for use with
the M4...If the modified bolt is assembled into a standard M16A1 rifle, the
weapon will not function automatically".
264. The HEL M4 gas deflector, necessary "To deflect escaping gases from
the firer's eye".
Above: method of clip-mounting the gas deflector onto the charging handle.
Below: the gas deflector installed.
The report of an Infantry Board trial in April 1968 spoke

of chronic double-feeding and other malfunctions when firing
with M4-equipped M16A1s, although it was admitted that the
functional history of the weapons prior to installation of the
suppressors was unknown.
In any event, Col. Isaacs announced in June that there were
two new entrants in the running:
Noise
Suppressor Requirement
(ENSURE #77)
Two (2) new silencer devices have been introduced for

testing. One from Sionics, Inc., Atlanta, Georgia (Noise and
Flash Assembly MAW-A1) and a newly developed device by
Frankford Arsenal will be tested in addition to the present
HEL M4 device. This is a comparative test at Fort Benning,
to be conducted during 17 June through 19 July 1968... The
Project Manager has requested TECOM to expedite this test
as rapidly as possible...The device for introduction into
USARV for their evaluation will be selected immediately
thereafter.
The Sionics (Studies in Operational Negation of Insurgency
and Counter-Subversion) device was much the same in appearance as the HEL M4, but significantly required no modification
to the rifle, other than the usual removal of the rifle's flash suppressor before installation. The Sionics MAW-A1 and its design
philosophy were described in the following unsolicited proposal:
265. Right side view of a Colt M16 rifle fitted with the MAW-A1, the 5.56mm
version of the Sionics noise and flash suppressor, and the Colt/Realist 3x
telescope sight. Note the remains of the milled-off bolt closure device housing
on the rifle's receiver. This rifle was probably made during the "standoff"
over the ball powder/cyclic rate problem (chapter 12), wherein the Army refused
to accept XM16E1s averaging over 850 rpm on a 20-round burst. Until the
issue was resolved, Colt's produced only M16s, which the Air Force would
accept up to 900 rpm.
Sionics
Noise and Flash Suppressor Assembly MAW-A1

For Use With Rifle, 5.56mm M16A1
. .No US Armed Service has ever employed gun or rifle
noise suppressors except on extremely limited basis, usually
for covert or clandestine operations. The need for such a
device, however, has never been as great as exists today..
reduce muzzle flash to such an extent that it is invisible to

the naked eye on the darkest night at a similar distance from
the weapon..
Combat operations in Vietnam have clearly shown that in

counterinsurgency warfare the enemy must be denied every
possible means of target acquisition. This is particularly
true in nighttime perimeter defense and is simply a matter
of life or death for long-range patrols, isolated units, and
downed airmen.
A thorough analysis of prior art in the field of suppressor

development combined with the original ideas of Mr. Mitchell
L. WerBell, the company's chief of research and development,
produced a new approach to.. sound and flash suppression.
Advice of the company's patent attorneys indicated that new
and novel inventions had been achieved and applications
for US Patent were filed under serial no. 700,239.
To be completely effective a suppressor must reduce muzzle

blast, or "thump", to an inaudible level within hand grenade
range from the firing position. It must also eliminate or
Intensive research and development on the M16A1 suppressor began in early 1967. Subsequently approximately
75 experimental models were fabricated and tested..
Characteristics
of Sionics Suppressor MAW-A1
Weight is approximately 1 1/4 pounds employing 4130A

annealed steel outer tube. This material will be designated
for the first limited production units.
The device is completely interchangeable on any standard

unmodified M16A1 rifle without assembly adjustments for
centering or alignment.
The MAW-A1 has a total length of 13 inches (tube 11

3/4 inches) and projects 9 inches beyond rifle muzzle,
including muzzle threaded portion of the suppressor.
Center of gravity of the loaded weapon is moved forward
2 1/2 inches..
Assembly and disassembly each require approximately

15-20 seconds without special tools.
Tests to destruction, or failure of the rifle barrel, indicate

the proposed suppressor has a life at least equal to that of
the M16A1 barrel.
Accuracy of the weapon is not adversely affected and tight

patterns are similar for the rifle both with and without
suppressor installed.
No gas shields are required on the rifle.

The cyclic rate of the weapon is not affected.
Muzzle flash, after first shot, is invisible at considerably

less than 30 meters down range on a dark night.
Muzzle noise or "thump" is inaudible at distances beyond
25-30 meters down range from gun muzzle.
It is not believed that any spare parts will be required
due to wear; however, Teflon bushings (one per unit) can
be lost in assembly or disassembly and plastic muzzle sealing
caps, an accessory, will require resupply in the field if useage
proves the need and usefulness of this item.
By early July, with the Fort Benning comparisons under way,
one of the new Frankford devices which used porous aluminum
as its sound-baffling medium exploded on automatic burst fire
during the safety test, but the P M R noted that an alternate
Frankford development, "utilizing the Maxim principle of
noise suppression", was still in contention.
As for the MAW-A1, Fort Benning reported a problem with
the early Teflon bushing:
266. Two views of the markings on the Sionics MAW-A1 suppressor.
. .A plastic bushing component of the Sionics, Inc., device

melted during safety test when the weapon temperature
reached approximately 1,000 degrees. Sionics. .has submitted
a redesigned bushing of the same plastic material designed

to ensure more complete gas obturation..
The firing portion of the Infantry Board trial with the HEL
M4 and Sionics MAW-A1 suppressors took place at Fort Benning in August, under the expert guidance of then-Major
Francis B. Conway, the Officer Commanding the M T U and

the guiding hand behind the M21 sniper rifle program. The
following are excerpts from Major Conway's report:
Accuracy Test of the M16 Rifle; With Special Devices

Objective
To determine if the noise suppressor device[s] affixed to
the M16 rifle affects its inherent accuracy.
Scope
The test items have been undergoing extensive heat and
reliability tests by the Infantry Board. Items were submitted
Description
for evaluation by Sionics of Atlanta, Georgia, the Human

Engineering Laboratory and Frankford Arsenal.
of Materiel
1. six each M16 rifles w/six each types of noise suppressors.

2. Bench rest w/sand bags (Parks Range).
3. "A" target centers.
4. 3X Weaver scope..
260
Noise and Flash Suppressors
Conduct of Test
The two rifles which showed the best accuracy at 100m were
fired at 300 meters range with noise suppressor and with normal flash suppressor.. .Two each ten shot groups were fired...
Three members of the Marksmanship Unit did the firing..
All groups were fired from the bench rest, rifle hand held on
sand bags. Three each ten shot groups were fired from each of
the six rifles with noise suppressor attached and then repeated
with the normal flash suppressor, at 100 meters range.
Findings
Rifle no. 1090045 was withdrawn from the test. This rifle
could not be zeroed to remain on paper (24 inch square)
at 100m with noise suppressor or flash suppressor.
Rifle no. 1091260 was the only rifle submitted for test that
would fire less than a 4 inch extreme spread at 100m with
the normal flash suppressor.
Rifle no. 1094114 with [Sionics] device showed a decided

improvement of accuracy at 300 meters.
[The Sionics MAW-A1] was the only test device which
improved the rifle's accuracy at both ranges fired..
Rifle no. 822778 with [HEL M4] device and rifle no. 1094114
with [Sionics MAW-A1] showed a decided improvement of
accuracy at 100m over that shown with flash suppressor.
The heat and reliability testing has caused excessive carbon buildup on the barrel and muzzle to the point
where some suppressors are not aligned with the axis of
the bore.
Rifle no. 822778, with [HEL M4], showed a decrease of

accuracy at 300 meters.
The inner tubes of the test devices are limited for bullet
clearance due to carbon buildup..
Following the tests, with Sionics busily making more improvements to their MAW-A1, Col. Isaacs' office had gone
ahead with the issue of a modified H E L suppressor called the

M4A, which had been announced in mid-August:
Project: rifles [week of] 9-13 September 1968

Noise Suppressor (ENSURE #77): The 100 [HEL M4A]
noise suppressors shipped from APG 5 September 1968 have
been received by USARV Total on hand in USARV is now 120.

USAHEL is proceeding on manufacture of remaining 960.
The money came through the following month:

Noise Suppressor (ENSURE #77):
Funds totaling $42,673 were issued to procure 960 suppressors through HEL (Edgewood Arsenal). Delivery of the
total quantity is scheduled for 31 December 1968. This office

will proceed with the procurement plan in anticipation of
favorable USARV evaluation..
The Project Manager's anticipatory actions were confirmed

in November:
Noise Suppressors for M16A1 Rifle (ENSURE #77):
USARV has indicated acceptance of remaining quantity of
960 each [HEL M4A] suppressors. ..Results of test are that
suppressors are satisfactory. Advantages include: Reduction
of muzzle noise by fifty percent; reduction of enemy capability
to pin-point a firer from the front; and significant reduction of muzzle flash . Disadvantages include: Suppressor
causes weapon to heat up rapidly under full-automatic
fire; additional weight of suppressor is a handicap when
moving through swamp or heavy jungle; excess carbon
builds up in barrel and firing chamber; with suppressor

attached maintenance of the weapon is more difficult;
some cases of foreign objects hitting the firer's eyes
were reported; and the sonic crack generated by the bullet

speed alerts an enemy even when muzzle noise is undetectable. .
Despite the versatility and enhanced accuracy offered by the

Sionics unit, not nearly as many were purchased. A "Bailment
Agreement" was reached in 1969 which allowed the Army the
use of 20 Sionics MAW-A1s on loan for extensive trial in Vietnam. In May of that year, Sionics' president Fred Brown explained
some final improvements which had been made to the design:
After extensive tests at both Fort Benning and the Sionics

Lab from July 1,1968 to December 1, 1968, Sionics felt that
several improvements were mandatory for the MAW-A1. The
tests involving life expectance of the units as they were
engineered at the time proved unsatisfactory to our
expectations and as a result, Sionics decided to make major
engineering improvements to the MAW-A1 so that it could
withstand virtually any physical abuse imaginable, including
This report went on to list the changes, which included
a much higher reliance on 303 stainless steel, and a new
bushing made from naval brass instead of Teflon. The heat
of sustained firing had been found to destroy the temper of
the pressure relief valve spring, even when made of special
North American Rockwell temper-retaining Inconel, and
..Even though there

where a rifleman in the
extreme heat of loading
fully automatic without
are only very rare occasions

field would be able to stand the
and firing 200 or more rounds
interruption, Sionics feels that
overheating, gas erosion and to improve its efficiency..

..Reviewing the data from the destruct tests, Sionics
deemed it mandatory to remove all internal aluminum parts
and replace them with a more suitable material that was
capable of withstanding the extreme heat and gas erosion
that was encountered with sustained firing of the M16 in
fully automatic mode.
the mechanical valve design itself was at length changed to

one with no moving parts.
Mr. Brown rather dryly summed up the improvements to
the MAW-A1, necessitated chiefly by the rigorous "fire to
destruction" tests to which the Army had zealously subjected
the Sionics suppressor, as follows:
its present unit is capable of this type treatment. If the
occasion should arise, we recommend only that the unit
should be checked afterwards to make sure that all
internal parts are tight.
The Ichord Report
Chapter Sixteen
THE HARD WAY ONE MORE TIME

The Ichord Report
Unaware of the history of Defense Department "direction",
the October 1967 report of the Ichord investigation castigated
Army and Defense officials in a series of 31 critical findings,
which even the DOD's Defense Research & Engineering
(DDR&E) rebuttal of February 1968 entitled Appraisal of the
M16 Rifle Program summarized into fourteen "major areas"
for comment. The DDR&E report was itself a product of the
"intense review" which swept like a minor whirlwind through
the Army's own house in the wake of the Ichord report.
The subcommittee members themselves had, during the
course of the hearings, gone to Vietnam to interview troops
and inspect the maintenance procedures and equipment actually
being issued. They found, as had Col. Crossman, that both
the Army and Marines were experiencing problems with their
XM16E1 rifles, the most serious being the failure to extract.
In this regard the subcommittee stated flatly that "the major
contributor to malfunctions experienced in Vietnam was
ammunition loaded with ball propellant". (To this the DDR&E

Appraisal somewhat lamely riposted "When adequate attention
was given to care and cleaning of the rifle, the malfunction
rate dropped significantly, thus indicating that improper
cleaning was a principal contributor.")
This only corroborated the subcommittee's next findings,
which were that "proper care and cleaning are of the utmost
importance", and yet "shortages of cleaning equipment, lack of
proper training and instructions contributed to the excessive
malfunction rate..", and therefore "various levels of command.,
have been negligent in failing to provide..cleaning material and
..instructions." Further, on the issue of propellants, the change
from I M R to ball powder was found to be "not justified or
supported by test data", which as we have seen was true
enough, as far as it went: interestingly, the reason suggested
by the subcommittee for the adoption of ball powder in the
first place had nothing to do with gunpowder per se:
..the sole-source position enjoyed by Olin Mathieson on

ball propellants for many years and their close relationship
with the Army may have influenced the decisionmakers..
As for the rifle, the subcommittee found that "the AR-15/M16

rifle as initially developed was an excellent and reliable weapon",
which "at the insistence of the Army" had been subjected to
a number of modifications, certain of which were "unnecessary
and unsupported by test data", while others "were made
necessary only after ball propellant was adopted for 5.56mm
ammunition."
Three modifications in particular were singled out; the first
two, the bolt closure device and the chrome chamber, as having
increased the unit cost of the rifle "substantially". (As mentioned the chrome chamber, expensive as it was, had belatedly
been adopted on 26 May 1967 as the only sure way of reducing
chamber corrosion and its attendant failures to extract, and
was just barely being introduced at the time the Ichord report
was written. Ironically, by the time new barrels were ready
for issue, weapon maintenance had long since been accorded
a high priority, and the extraction problems in Vietnam had
virtually ceased). The third modification, the one-in-twelve
rifling pitch, "decreased [the rifle's] performance characteristics". In general, "corrective action on deficiencies
reported and product improvement of the weapon have been
unnecessarily delayed".
To the members of the subcommittee, the most damning
evidence of all concerned the use of IMR-loaded test ammunition while the preponderance of the cartridges in Vietnam were
loaded with ball propellant:
263
The Ichord Report 264
..That officials in the Department of the Army were aware

of the adverse effect of ball propellant. .as early as March
1964. .yet continued to accept. .thousands of rifles that were
not subjected to acceptance or endurance tests using the
ammunition of greatest density in the field..
..That the rifle project manager, the administrative contracting officer, the members of the Technical Coordinating
The Ichord report went on to point an accusatory finger at a

number of other facets of the program, such as the increased
fouling produced by ball powder, and the fact that there was
no guarantee that the modifications being introduced in an
effort to reduce malfunctions in Vietnam, such as the new
buffer and chrome chamber, would actually work.
Committee, and others as high in authority as the Assistant

Secretary of Defense for Installations and Logistics knowingly accepted M16 rifles that would not pass the approved
acceptance test..
..That the failure on the part of..the Army to cause action
to be taken to correct the deficiencies of the 5.56mm
ammunition borders on criminal negligence.
One of the subcommittee's final recommendations (number

25) was that '"a thorough review be undertaken of the Army's
system of development, production, and introduction of a new
weapon into the inventory" in order to determine if the M16
program was a typical example of how the Army operated,

for, " T h e manner in which the Army rifle program has been
managed is unbelievable. The existing command structure was
either inadequate or inoperative. The division of responsibility
makes it almost impossible to pinpoint responsibility when
mistakes are made.." The allegations of criminal negligence
and "unbelievable" program management went unanswered
in the DDR&E Appraisal: paradoxically by this time the only
alternative, the truth, would quite likely have been popularly
interpreted as a further Army attempt to avoid its just desserts.
267. Above: sectioned plain steel barrel, showing chamber corrosion.

Below: sectioned barrel with chrome chamber. Such barrels are identified by a stamped letter "C" approximately 1 7/8" from muzzle face.
Attempts were made at Rock Island to develop a procedure to retrofit

unserviceable barrels with the new chrome chamber, but this plan was later
abandoned.
The Aftermath
Over the 1968 new year period, ironically just as the field
malfunction problems finally started to fade away, the Army
faced the full force of adverse popular opinion resulting from
the un-pulled punches of the Ichord report. While the Army
had weathered rougher storms, the gravity of the situation

seemed evident in the Army's quick and thorough compliance
with the subcommittee's call for a complete review of the rifle
program:
The Aftermath
Department of the Army

Office of the Chief of Staff
November 8 1967
Memorandum for:
Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel
Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics
Comptroller of the Army
Chief of Research and Development
Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development

The Inspector General
Chief of Information
Chief of Military History
Chief, US Army Audit Agency
Subject: The M16 Rifle Program

The Chief of Staff has directed an intensive review of Army
management practices related to the evaluation and adoption
of product improvement modifications to the M16A1 rifle/
ammunition system. The review will determine whether there
are general deficiencies in the Army's management of the small
arms program. ..The principle subject areas of inquiry are:
The product improvement modifications. .and the justification therefor.
The adequacy of test procedures to detect the occurrence

and the persistence of problem areas..
The adequacy of regulations and policy on directive
statements..
The scope and adequacy of the Army training program..
with particular emphasis on individual maintenance training..
The adequacy of the organizational structure..
The effects of fouling..

The development of propellants..with emphasis on the
functioning of the M16A1..
The procurement history of the AR-15/XM16E1/M16A1

weapon system..
The Case Hardness Problem

The Chief of the Technical Evaluation Branch of AMC's
RRD&E Directorate was still none other than the erstwhile
"father of the M14", Dr. Frederick H. Carten, who, as we
have seen, had been deliberately excluded from the decisionmaking process in the M16 program, ironically due to OSD
disfavor over the way Ordnance had handled the procurement
of the M14.
Nevertheless, as one of those ordered to respond to the Chief
of Staff s "intense review", Dr. Carten certainly came in for
his share of last laughs.
Dr. Carten's 1970 report to the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel,

itself one of the series of "shake-ups" which reverberated
through the defense establishment in the wake of the Ichord
report, was entitled The M16 Rifle - A Case History. In his eagerness to be heard at last, and with the benefit of hindsight, Dr.
Carten's Case History consisted largely of scathing but not
entirely fair criticisms. For example, cartridge case hardness was
mentioned earlier as a parameter that had heretofore been virtually ignored: lately everyone had been far too busy trying to
figure out just what was really behind the baffling failures to
extract in Vietnam. Dr. Carten felt that there was a connection:
..It was not until October 1964 that Frankford Arsenal

identified case hardness as a significant factor in AR-15
weapon functioning. Frankford recommended procedures for
establishing case hardness patterns. The Project Manager
stated that in the absence of malfunction reports [and, as

we have seen, securely under the heel of the OSD's Gilpatrick
directive], there was no need to establish hardness pattern
control. In 1966 with new ammunition producers coming
265
266
The Colt CMG-2
into the picture, the Project Manager recognized the need for
controls, and in September 1966 Frankford began an intensive
study to develop the required data. Held complaints on case
extraction difficulties resulted in a firm decision to establish
case hardness controls in August 1967with the manufacturers
being given six months to adjust their production lines.

This laxity in quality control of cartridge case production
undoubtedly contributed to weapon-system malfunctions in
the field.
The Gas Tube Fouling Problem

It was by this time well known that ball powder produced
more visible fouling than did IMR, but as yet no real link
had been established between the fouling and any malfunction
problems in the field, provided of course that the weapons were
kept properly cleaned.
Warming to his task, Dr. Carten recalled a chilly incident
which had occurred in the fall of 1967. During a routine 6,000round endurance/acceptance test at Colt's, a rifle "became
sluggish and ceased firing" due to a buildup of fouling products
in the M16's Achilles' heel, the long, "uncleanable" gas tube.
This had not occurred in any previous endurance testing with
ball powder, and a careful examination concluded that there
was a very unusually high percentage of calcium carbonate
in the particular lot of WC846 which had been used in the

test. A two-year series of test firings at Frankford Arsenal
corroborated the fact that production lots of ball propellant
rarely approached the maximum allowable 1.0% calcium carbonate content, and that the relatively high percentage in the
test lot was indeed an isolated case. In any event, on September
29 1969 the allowable maximum calcium carbonate content
in ball powder was reduced to 0.25%.
Even though no credible evidence was ever presented to link
calcium carbonate with the failures experienced in the field,
in 1967 this disturbing news had further fuelled the fires of
debate over the increasingly confusing issue of powder for
5.56mm cartridges.
The Colt "Light Machine Gun 5.56mm CMG-2"
268. The Colt CMG-2, partially stripped. Note the detachable barrel and
the Johnson/Stoner bolt, mounted in a sturdy BAR-like gas piston which rides
on an AR-18-type double guide rod/operating spring assembly. The CMG-2
had no cocking handle per se; the operator simply unlatched the pistol grip
("fire control group") by means of its latch lever and thrust it first forward,
(latching the sear into the rear of the gas piston/bolt carrier assembly) and
then back, repositioning the pistol grip for firing and leaving the bolt assembly
cocked on the sear.
267 The Colt CMG-2
269. Front view of the Colt "Light Machine Gun 5.56mm CMG-2" circa 1967,
fitted with 150-round drum-type ammunition box and standard M2 rifle bipod.
The interesting CMG-2 is described in the text.
Courtesy Robert E. Roy, Colt Firearms Division
Recognizing the need for a versatile light machine gun to

provide increased fire support for combat units in the field,
during the period 1967-1969 Colt's Military Arms Division
introduced a successor to the short-lived CMG-1, the equally
short-lived CMG-2, which in their words combined "the most
practical trade-off of design parameters to obtain the required
durability and sustainability of operation".
Feeding ammunition linked in standard M13 links from a
150-shot drum, and supported by a standard M14-type M2
bipod, the CMG-2 was designed to fire the extended-range
Colt 68-grain GX-6235 bullet (discussed in chapter 22). In
order to stabilize this heavier bullet the CMG-2's quick-change
barrel was rifled with one turn in 8 7/8 inches. Several other
interesting features of the CMG-2 were described in the Colt

brochure. To begin with, the CMG-2 was cocked and charged
by depressing the latch lever at the rear of the trigger housing
and sliding the pistol grip or "fire control group" forward and
then back. The extractor, always a potential source of trouble
in any weapon design, was in the CMG-2 not a moving part
at all but simply a machined groove in the face of the bolt.
In addition, the CMG-2 featured a firing pin with a striker
point at each end, which provided "foolproof assembly and
extended service life".
In spite of the novelty of the CMG-2, the design met with
little success, and only prototype quantities were produced
before the project was abandoned.
268
The Colt CMG-2
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
Butt Stock
Hydraulic Fluid
Buffer Housing
Buffer Plunger
Receiver
R e a r Sight Base
L a t e r a l Adjustment Knob
R e a r Sight Leaf
R e a r Sight A p e r a t u r e
Elevation Adjustment Knob
Feed T r a y Cover Latch
Feed T r a y Cover
C a r r y i n g Handle
B a r r e l Latch
Barrel
Front Sight
Gas Expansion C h a m b e r
Gas P o r t
Gas Exhaust P o r t
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
Gas Cylinder
Gas Piston
Grip Plunger
Grip
Bolt C a r r i e r
B a r r e l Socket
Feed T r a y
C a r t r i d g e Guide
Guide Rod (2 req'd)
Ejector
Bolt Assembly
F i r i n g Pin
Cam Follower Pin
Cam Follower
Sear
Trigger
Main Assembly Latch
T r i g g e r Mechanism Latch
Driving Spring (2 req'd)
270. A Colt factory cutaway drawing of the CMG-2, with parts list. Note the
double-ended firing pin. The CMG-2 was demonstrated (to little avail) in the
SAW trials and in Asia, around the time of the emergence of the Ultimax 100
(chapter 21).
271. Right side view of one of the very few prototypes ever built of a shortbarreled "Assault Machine Gun" CMG-2, serial no. 003. Used in the US Navy
SEAL team trials in the late 1960s which resulted in the adoption of the Stoner
"MG MK23 MOD 0". Note the absence of a cocking handle slot in either
side of the CMG-2's receiver (fig. 268).
Yet More Powder Trials
Olin Cops a Plea

Yet another reaction to the Ichord report had followed smartly
on the heels of that document's release in October, 1967. Professedly stung to the quick by the subcommittee's "criticism
of the choice of powder used" in 5.56mm cartridges, Olin's
vice president and general manager of the Winchester/Western
Division, W.L. Wallace, replied to the Ichord charges with an
.. The standard WC846 powder for these [5.56mm] cartridges
has met every government specification. All 5.56mm cartridges
loaded by Olin have consistently met every established
government specification. The powder and ammunition specifications were established by the Army, and their suitability
for the M16 rifle can be determined and commented on only
by the Army. As the [Ichord] report points out, [ball] powder
was neither designed nor developed with this rifle in mind.
272. Fig. 5 from Frankford Arsenal's Ten Special Tests (chapter 19), a comparison between types of ammunition (ball; tracer; ball-and-IMR propellant) and
rates of fire. Each of 12 rifles, all with chrome chambers, fired 600 rounds
per day (six firing M193 ball and six firing M196 tracer) for 10 days under
all test conditions.
impassioned, two-page press release. Amid much historical

background, concluding with the fact that Olin considered the
ball powder process "an exemplary example of the working
of the free enterprise system at its best", Mr. Wallace made
it quite clear that Olin was willing to accept none of the responsibility for the use of ball powder in the M16:
The functioning of the M16 rifle depends on a gas system
design which is entirely different from that of any other automatic weapon in the world. The several peculiar characteristics of this system might well call for unusual specifications
of powder and cartridges. Olin has not been involved in
the development of M16 cartridge specifications and so has
no direct information on the subject..
Above, left to right: ball; tracer; ball-and-tracer. All cartridges loaded with
WC846 (ball) propellant.
Below, left to right: ball; tracer; ball-and-tracer. All cartridges loaded with
IMR 8208M propellant.
269
Yet More Powder Trials 270
Olin's previous willingness to supply all the ball powder the

Army would buy is a matter of record: the apparent reversal
of this position prompted the following reply to Olin from
Major General Frank G. White, the Commanding General

of M U C O M , the Army Munitions Command at Dover,
New Jersey:
b. Olin's 1967 position [above]: ". .might well call for
unusual specifications.."
Dear Mr. Wallace:

Thank you for your letter dated October 19, 1967 which
forwarded a copy of your press release. .on the M16 rifle and
5.56mm ammunition. A careful reading.. has raised a question
in our minds as to whether or not there has been a change
in your corporation's position on the suitability of WC846
propellant for 5.56mm ammunition..
The following extracts illustrate the apparent change in
your company's position:
The final responsibility for determining the suitability

of WC846 propellant for 5.56mm ammunition rests with
the Army, as your press release noted. However, if Olin
as the developer and manufacturer of WC846 propellant
is no longer confident that this propellant "is entirely
acceptable for the 5.56mm cartridge" then the Army must
certainly give that fact the most careful consideration..
a. Olin's 1964 position [from Olin's introductory letter,

reprinted in chapter 9]: "We are proposing WC846 BALL
POWDER.."
Olin's Mr. Wallace did an admirable job of avoiding the
unmistakable horns of the dilemma he had just created,
persisting:
Dear General White:
cartridge and the M16, given the peculiar and special problems posed by the M16's novel gas system..
This is in reply to your letter of 14 November 1967, in

which you asked for clarification of Olin's position on the
suitability of WC846 propellant. ..We are pleased to respond..
and are of the opinion that there is no discrepancy between
our two statements quoted in your letter.
We believe that WC846. .meets and has met all of the existing specifications established by the Army for the 5.56mm
cartridge... In fact, speaking now as loaders, we have yet
to see any other powder which will consistently meet the
existing specifications in production.
The question raised by [the Ichord] report and Olin's news
release is whether or not the Army's cartridge specifications,
as presently defined, provide a suitable match of the 5.56
..It is our considered technical opinion that there are

serious inherent weaknesses in the present M16 gas system
which make the gun highly likely to malfunction in a number
of types of field conditions, and which make functioning of
the gun unusually susceptible to otherwise insignificant
variations in powder, priming and loading..
.. it is now evident that there may be some special problems
in the M16 connected with dumping spent powder gas over
the incoming cartridges before they enter the chamber. We
have not been able to make any visible improvement in the
burning characteristics of WC846 in the M16, and it is a
fact that Ball Powder characteristically yields a higher level
of unburned solids than IMR..
The Vindication of Ball Powder

The surprising upshot of this exchange was complete capitulation on the part of the Army in the face of the determined
Olin attack, which it must be admitted did have reason on
its side. As recorded in the PMR's 13-17 November 1967

significant action report,
Yet More Powder Trials 34
..It was agreed and endorsed by General White that no

defensible technical reason now exists for favoring IMR over
ball propellant. It was agreed that preferential shipment of
IMR to Vietnam implies a superiority which in turn infers

that IMR should be used exclusively. This cannot now be
supported against those who might challenge it.
At this point, in a 25 November reply to an earlier situation

report from General Besson, the Chief of Staff General Johnson
himself intervened with a Solomon-like decision:
.. The loading of 5.56mm ammunition with both IMR 8208M
and WC846 propellants is approved until such time as testing
conclusively proves or disproves that WC846.. is a cause of
the malfunctions.
Any recommendation to reduce the nominal velocity

requirement for M193 cartridges by 50 feet per second
must be supported by detailed documentation and testing
data..
DuPont's Third Try - IMR 8208M Comes on Stream

8208M was the new name for DuPont's EX8208-4, already
described in Frankford's Investigation of Alternate Propellants
report (chapter 11). Unfortunately, in the new "climate" of
the M16A1, where everything possible had been done to accommodate the idiosyncracies of Olin's ball powder, 8208M faced
a decidedly checkered career.
Everything began well enough, it seemed, with an exclusive
contract to load M196 tracer ammunition with 8208M propellant. This situation was due, ironically, to severe problems
which had been encountered with ball-powder-loaded tracers.
"Surging", or the erratic cyclic rate of a mixed ball-tracer
magazine, was relatively minor, but heavy barrel coppering
had also been reported. This phenomenon resulted in many
more unserviceable barrels than expected and, especially in
the short-barreled XM177E2, quickly reduced the bore diameter to the point where the hollow-based and therefore more
vulnerable tracer jackets simply disintegrated, with consequent
keyholing and abrupt degradation of accuracy and power:
Project:
rifles [week of] 4-8 December 1967
Cartridge Tracer M196, 5.56mm: Propellant WC846 is
no longer authorized for loading cartridge tracer M196. .and
is being deleted from the TDP. [Frankford] has requested
APSA to discontinue loading of any tracer rounds at [Lake
City and Twin Cities]. Shipments of M196 tracer in support of
SEA are restricted to those lots which contain IMR propellant.
273. Fig. 1 from Frankford's Ten Tests report, showing total defective flight
vs. temperature for different (ball and IMR propellant) loadings of the M196
tracer cartridge. In the trial, 5 lots of WC846 and one lot of IMR 8208M,
were fired from six new M16A1s which had been heat-conditioned for six hours
at 155F, at paper targets at 25 meters range.
Some Experimental M16 Gas System Modifications

Another interesting offshoot of the ball/IMR controversy
was a series of short-lived investigations at Colt's, Rock Island,
and coincidentally Olin's Winchester/Western Division, to
develop a new gas system for the M16. Olin's contract was
to modify and test 25 new M16A1s with their design of topmounted, standard-type gas impingement system.
272
The Colt Model 703
The P M R reported in May 1968 that in-house testing of

the modified gas system at Winchester had been completed:
"The limited Winchester tests indicate that the modified rifles
performed about equally to the current M16 rifles used as

control weapons. Ten (10) prototype rifles with the modified
gas system have been shipped to RIA for government tests."
The Colt Model 703
274. The first prototype of Colt's gas piston-operated "model 703", built from
a new upper receiver and gas piston system on a standard M16A1 lower receiver.
Shown ready to fire in the sling-mounted, waist-level position. Note the fullcurved 30-round magazine. (Compare with fig. 275: visible changes in the
later model center on the front sight/gas block). Colt's originally introduced
this version to the Army as the "M16A2", a term which, along with the Coltdesignated "700 series" model nos., was later reserved for a more auspicious
purpose (chapter 23).
275. Left and right side views of a later prototype Colt model 703. Note (above)
the adjustable, three-position gas regulator, much like that of the Stoner XM22E1
(fig. 194); the redesigned handguards; the 4-position burst selector; and the
through-the-butt sling slot.
The Panama Trials
276. The Colt model 703, partially stripped. Note the (quick-detachable) snapclips on the upper handguard; the gas piston, particularly its interface with
the bolt carrier (the vertical projection extends upward to contact the charging
handle); and the butt trap in the stock for stowage of cleaning equipment.
Turning the Tables in Panama

Meanwhile, in response to the Ichord subcommittee's call
for a thorough and objective weapons test by an independent
organization, another exhaustive trial of the M16A1's "operational reliability" had been ordered. On 13 November 1967,
the Defense Department's Weapons Systems Evaluation Group
(WSEG) was assigned as Executive Agent in charge of this
major effort. WSEG was responsible for the preparation of the
test plan, the overall direction and conduct of the trials themselves, and the subsequent preparation of a final report.
The WSEG tests were rather secretive, but it is clear that
they were elaborately designed, with the assistance of the inde..No tests, other than the SAWS troop tests and limited
user evaluation in 1962, have been conducted by the U.S.
Army Tropic Test Center. On the other hand since production
pendent, non-profit Army-funded Institute for Defense Analyses

(IDA), to simulate conditions of jungle combat. IDA was one of
the many government-sponsored "think tanks" which followed
the demise of the Johns Hopkins-based Operations Research
Office (ORO).
Fort Sherman, in the Panama Canal Zone, was chosen as
having environmental conditions most closely approximating
those in Vietnam. As Dr. Carten pointed out, this represented
virtually the first time that specific consideration had been
given to Vietnam's tropical environment in the entire history
of the M16 program:
began in March 1964, the M16 has been used in combat
exclusively in a tropic environment..
273
The Panama Trials 274
Fifteen days of firings took place in January 1968,

ploying 522 Marine troops using M16A1 rifles with
buffers and both chromed and unchromed chambers,
firing ammunition loaded with both ball and I M R
emnew
and
pro-
pellant. The M14 was fired as a control weapon.

Remington's new IMR8208-loaded ammuniton was not
favorably received:
Project: rifles [week of] 29 January - 2 February 1968

5.56mm Ammunition: Based on preliminary information from the Marine Corps test in Panama, indicating higher malfunction rates for IMR-loaded ball
ammunition, the Defense Department..has directed the
following:
- Loading of 5.56mm ball cartridges with IMR8208 will
be immediately suspended until further notice.
The final report of the Panama trials, WSEG Report 124 dated
February 1968, concluded that the M16A1 with ball propellant
was more reliable than the same weapon firing I M R powder.
The M16Als "approached but did not equal" the reliability
of the M14 control rifles. The M16Als equipped with chrome
chambers gave, as expected, fewer failures to extract.
WSEG's Panama trials proved beyond a doubt that reliability
problems in new-buffered M16A1 rifles could not be ascribed
to the use of ball propellant. This outcome had evidently not
been foreseen by Defense officials, with the result that while
the M16A1 was declared acceptable for combat, the test report
itself was promptly classified and exempted by OSD ruling
from the normal provisions for automatic downgrading of
classification. It is ironic that the most significant investigation
of the "ball powder problem", itself perhaps the only really
constructive result of the Ichord hearings, has never been made
public.
- All shipments of 5.56mm ball cartridges loaded with

IMR propellant to overseas adressees will be stopped and
suspended for use in CONUS except for training.
- Determine those lot numbers of ammunition loaded
with IMR propellant; famish these lot numbers to USARV
immediately.
The above does not apply to tracer ammunition..
With the results kept secret, the only real measurable upshot
of the Panama trials was that the Army was once again in a
sole-source position on propellant, ironically not with one but
two sole sources: one for M193 ball, and one for M196 tracer.
By this time the situation was stabilizing under fresh leadership in the Project Manager's Office. With the establishment
of full-time P M R liason offices in Vietnam and at Frankford
Arsenal, introduction of the new buffer and better cleaning
equipment and instructions, and the introduction of the chrome
chamber and more uniform cartridge case hardness specifications, rifle maintenance problems in Vietnam ceased to be
an issue. In sum, it appears that the "no-holds-barred" Ichord
investigation yielded little other than some biased, not to say
rabid, anti-Army publicity and its consequent effects upon the
respective professional careers of some of the protagonists.
Who better, perhaps, to place the XM16El's record in Vietnam in a proper perspective than retired Brigadier General
S. L. A. Marshall, whose hard-hitting "combat critiques" on
the Korean war were, as we have seen, a foundation-stone of
the entire light rifle program. General Marshall had been

quoted on the subject of the M16 rifle, somewhat out of context
perhaps, from a newspaper article as part of Colt's submission
to the Ichord subcommittee:
..There is no other rifle available to the fighting line

of the US that will serve the present purpose more adequately. On that point there should be no doubt whatever.
It is not a perfect rifle. There is none such, and try as
we will, we will not find one in the future. That point
aside, the M16 is better suited to the conditions under

which our infantry must fight in Vietnam than the Ml rifle
or the Carbine of the Second World War and Korea would
be, and the M16 is generally more adaptable to the tactical
problem than today's M14.
The sheer practicalities of the issue therefore, decreed the

M16. But what of the malfunctions? Perhaps here too were
reasons to look askance at the unprecedented presence of the

media in Vietnam, for, according to General Marshall:
.. Though blocks and stoppages occur there have been only

two operations in which the percentages of such failures war-
ranted the raise of eyebrows. In the worst instance the record

was still better than with the Carbine in Korea.
END OF PART II
275
The Great Rights Issue
PART III WARP SPEED AT LAST

Chapter
Seventeen
THE GREAT RIGHTS ISSUE THE "POLITICS OF PROCUREMENT"

Introduction
Meetings between David Scott, then the president of Colt's,
and Kendall Barnes, General Counsel for the Army Materiel
Command, had first begun within two weeks of the formation of
the Project Manager's Office back in March 1963. The meetings
were to discuss "patent rights and licensing agreements in assoYou will recall in earlier discussions with Mr. Scott.. that
we received estimates from him as to the costs and/or
conditions of an unrestricted license for manufacture [of the
AR-15] by other sources: also you recall..that Colt was
required to pay Fairchild 15% royalty on all repair parts
purchased from Colt.
I talked with Mr. Barnes. .and we have agreed that when
negotiations begin for the FY64 buy of the AR-15 with Colt,
ciation with the AR-15 rifle program". Apparently some informal

talks had already been held on the subject, which had led the
Deputy Commanding General of Army Weapons Command,
Roland B. Anderson, to believe that the matter was well in hand.
In early July 1963 he directed Ltd. Col. Yount as follows:
that we will include in the negotiations:
-a government option to purchase the rights and tech data
package from Colt at an agreed upon price or other consideration.
-that we will negotiate out, what we consider to be
exorbitant, the 15% royalty paid to Fairchild..
Colt's Story
Colt's had already released "selected" drawings and specifications to the Army. However, they had invested a great deal
of the firm's own money in their "gamble" on the AR-15,
which they were not about to throw away if at all possible.

As later summed up by Paul Benke, Mr. Scott's successor as
president of Colt's, during the Ichord hearings in 1967,
. .Our firearms division, .acquired the design and exclusive

right to manufacture and market..the AR-15 on January 7
1959. We paid $325,000 to Fairchild Stratos and other parties
[as noted earlier, Fairchild received only a paltry $75,000
of this money; the remaining $250,000 went to CooperMacdonald] for these proprietary rights and guaranteed a
royalty on sales against a minimum annual payment if no
sales were made.
What we bought was not a saleable rifle, but a design,

a concept, and an opportunity. In fact, at the time of our
rights acquisition, the AR-15 had a record of rejection by
the Army. If the AR-15 had been at the stage of development
attractive to any weapons purchaser at the time we could
not have bought the.. rights at that price - nor in our opinion,
for 20 times that price.
277
278
Colt's view was that the 104,000 rifles involved in the

FY64 "one-time b u y " procurement just wasn't a strong
enough incentive to include the rights in any negotiations.
Accordingly in September 1963, Mr. Scott formally advised
the Army that "Should the sum total of requirements. .exceed
500,000 units, we will at that time consider licensing other
sources of production and providing manufacturing knowhow to them." Meanwhile, he wrote, "Colt's does not intend
or propose as a part of or in conjunction with the present
procurement of 104,000 rifles to sell or license all or
any portion of its proprietary rights to the United States
government."
Round One to Colt's

The matter was taken up with Paul Ignatius, the Assistant
Secretary of the Army for Installations and Logistics (I&L),
on October 3. He attempted to defuse an embarrassing standoff by setting the record straight: despite General Anderson's
assertions, only he, Ignatius, had been responsible for insisting
that the rights provision be built into the negotiations. The
Defense Department had in fact already approved a one-time,
sole-source procurement from Colt's. Mr. Ignatius had included
the "rights clause" automatically, he said, because of the
Army's usual practice of avoiding sole-source relationships with
suppliers. He well understood, he went on, the reluctance of
Colt's to discuss rights along with such a small number of rifles.
Therefore, Secretary Ignatius recommended that "we should

amend the RFQ) [Request for Quotation] to delete the requirement regarding "Technical Data Package" for the fiscal year
1964 procurement and that negotiations should be continued
with Colt after the award to obtain proprietary rights in the
event of a possible future requirement.." The Commanding
General of Weapons Command, Nelson M. Lynde, felt this
was an unfortunate choice, as "it would be very difficult to
negotiate the rights necessary for competitive procurement in
the future", but the decision had been made. The October
1967 Ichord report, which itself appeared only a scant three
months after final settlement of the rights issue, agreed with
General Lynde about Secretary Ignatius' FY64 decision:
It is obvious that the Government never fully recovered

from the Army's failure to push through an agreement to
obtain the rights in 1963 at the time of the first large military
procurement...Unquestionably, the Government was in its
best bargaining position at that time and lost the
advantage.. .there appeared to be no particular urgency to

this procurement; it was considered to be a one-time buy,
even though at least two Army studies indicated a possible
requirement of well over 500,000 AR-15 rifles during the next
5 years..
Self-Defense with Regulations - The Army Fights Back

On this issue of "lost advantage", the Army chose to defend
itself by quoting D O D regulations, which stated that prior to
purchase of technical data and rights, a determination was

required, "upon a documented record", that:
-there is a clear need for reprocurement of the item, components or process to which the technical data pertains;
-anticipated net savings in reprocurement will exceed the

acquisition cost of the technical data and the rights therein.
In the Army's view, these requirements had not been met

until General Westmoreland's call for 100,000 XM16Els in
December, 1965.
all of which they viewed as proprietary products. As can be

imagined, this concept of ownership, fiercely defended on
the one side and hotly debated on the other, became the
source of much friction between Colt's and the government.
Even today, two decades after the "resolution" of the issue
in July 1967, it still affects Colt's relationship with the
US Army.
As noted, contract " 5 0 8 " had been duly put in place over
the 1964 New Year. Under its original terms, Colt's supplied
the rifle, bipod and case, bayonet, and 20-round magazine,
Colt's Best Offer

A breakthrough of sorts occurred in the rights issue in
October 1964, when at an informal meeting Colt's verbally
presented the Army with four different proposals. The first
of these established a price of $5,400,000 for the TDP, plus

a continuing 5% royalty on production, against which Colt's
would give back $10 for every rifle ordered or delivered. The
279 The Great Rights Issue
other three proposals were variations on this cash-plus-royalty

theme, but the first one was the most favorable from the
Army's standpoint. In effect, it meant that at such time as
the Army had purchased 540,000 rifles, Colt's would have
given all the money back, with the net cost to the government
being only the 5% royalty, which it will be remembered Colt's
still had to share with Fairchild.
In any event the Army refused all four offers, an exceedingly

unfortunate and expensive decision which they later defended
on the grounds that no indications had then existed of an ultimate need for that many rifles. (The Ichord report challenged
this, citing Army studies extant at the time which indicated
that the AR-15 would likely be procured in quantity through
at least 1968).
AWC's Second Attack

Nothing much happened to resolve the uneasy rights stalemate throughout the following two-year period of add-ons to
contract "508". Then, as the Army's FY66 procurement grew
from 100,000 rifles to over 400,000, General Anderson seized
the moment and recommended the transferral of the rights
issue to his Weapons Command, where it would be discussed
as part of any new rifle order. Colt's again refused to negotiate
under these circumstances, hinting broadly that further slowdowns and unforeseen hitches in the delivery of badly needed
rifles might result if General Anderson persisted in linking the
rights with the purchase, which Colt's saw as "a violation of
D O D directives".
Nevertheless, during the early months of 1966 the Army in
desperation decided to "tighten the screws". General Anderson
asked Lt. Col. Yount to formulate a unilateral plan to establish
a second source of M16/XM16E1 production. The P M R ' s
"Flash Report" of February 11 envisaged using Colt's as the
prime contractor in conjunction with one or other of the former
producers of the M14 - TRW, H&R, or Olin/Winchester.
However, the lead time needed to establish such a venture from
ground zero was very optimistically estimated at 13 months
to first delivery, a schedule that Lt. Col. Yount warned was
" a n ambitious program which has never been achieved by
any prior rifle producer".
increasing numbers of rifles being "added o n " to contract

"508". During 1966 Colt's single-shift production escalated
from the previous 8,000 rifles per month to 25,000. Weighing
this proven capability against the Project Manager's 13-month
"second source" proposal, Secretary McNamara decided that
the rifles needed for Vietnam could be procured quicker "by
concentrating on that one company", a decision later defended
as part of the Army's commitment to the "status quo" extant
throughout the period of the SAWS program. (Official recognition of full commitment to the M16 did not come until
December 1966, after the release of the SAWS study report).
Accordingly, Secretary Ignatius again directed the Army to
"back off" in its attempt to include the rights as part of the
new contract.
Henceforth, as Col. Yount noted on 19 May 1966, two
separate negotiations were to be conducted, "one for the supply
contract for XM16E1 rifles and the other for the technical data
package and patent rights." Significantly, this compromise led
almost immediately to the finalization of contract "0018" in
June, which contained for the first time a provision binding
Colt's to negotiate "in good faith" so that the government
could obtain "an irrevocable, nonexclusive license to manufacture, or cause to be manufactured, Colt's AR-15
rifles...[with] the negotiations..to be completed on or before
December 1, 1966."
Beginning in December 1965 Colt's production rate had

begun a year-long period of expansion in response to the ever-
Explaining the Delays

Congressman Ichord later asked General Anderson why
the Army just didn't take the rights, and then let Colt's sue
for grievances in the Court of Claims, as was the patentee's
"sole remedy" under the US Code. However, as D O D representatives correctly pointed out, both cost and risk were involved.
Notwithstanding the fact that the Comptroller General of the
United States himself had determined that "the ownership
of a patent should not be a deterrent to Federal procurement
on a competitive basis", such an action as Mr. Ichord envisaged would be tantamount to the nationalization of private
property, and would surely sour the Army's relationship

with hundreds of other private-sector contractors who
demanded respect for their proprietary rights. More specifically, there was the question of what the court might
ultimately allow Colt's, given all the facts of such a case. There
was also the cost to the government of further development
once the plans to the weapon had been wrested from Colt's
grasp, and the risk of going astray in that development.
Certainly no help would be forthcoming from the erstwhile
proprietor.
80
An Uneasy Truce - the Disposable Magazine Project

Even after contract "0018" was in place, there remained
a great deal of friction and sometimes open animosity regarding various embodiments of Colt's "proprietary rights".
One such example was the case of the Army's proposed

"disposable" magazine for the XM16E1:

XM16E1 rifle program: Colt's Inc. denied a request
for the use of their drawings to develop disposable magazines. WECOM R&D is considering performing reverse
engineering on the present magazines and rifles to obtain

the required dimensional data.
It appeared that short of actually stealing Colt's drawings,

the Army's only real recourse in the event of such a refusal
was, as Col. Yount suggested, to a process called "reverse
engineering". That is, the Army engineers could record the
measurements of as large a sampling as possible of the part or
item in question, in the hope that a full set of both "maximum"
and " m i n i m u m " allowable dimensions and tolerances would
be represented within the sample and thus obtained. Reverse

engineering was a risky, time-consuming and expensive process
at best.
Prior to the inquiry.. requesting release of a set of "sanitized" drawings...we..anticipated that Colt's might deny [it].
. .despite the term used by Col. Yount, this is not truly

"reverse engineering". That involves duplicating an existing
structure, while here we are merely getting dimensions from
an existing structure in order to mate something different
with it.
The problem comes in getting the "mating" dimensions

between the magazine and the receiver. This, and the related
tolerances, were all that we desired..
A M C ' s General Counsel, Kendall Barnes, explained the

problem further in a reply to General Besson's pencilled
" W h a t do we do?":
This plan has now been altered to having a single contractor prepare a set of drawings of the rifle magazine
well and feed control dimensions derived from a physical
inspection of a sample of 50 to 100 rifles provided the
contractor..
Incidentally, Colt's refusal to furnish the necessary drawings was not motivated solely by a desire to further entrench
its sole-source position on this rifle. [Colt 's] is of the opinion
that furnishing even "sanitized" drawings of the type we
requested would constitute a sub-license under the terms
of its license from Fairchild.
The issue of such sub-licenses was indeed one of Colt's continuing worries for, under the terms of the initial Colt/Fairchild
agreement, Colt's was liable for royalty payments to Fairchild
on all production, regardless of who did the manufacturing.
Furthermore, as a result of the fully-curved 30-round magazine

development program the wide variances in magazine/receiver
dimensions were well known, and constituted a source of considerable embarrassment to Colt's management.
A Fight to the Finish

Meanwhile, despite the December 1966 deadline built into
contract "0018", production rights negotiations dragged on
well into 1967. In April, a short-lived plan was devised whereby
Colt's themselves would establish a second manufacturing line.
This was costed-out by the PM's office for comparison with both
the existing sole-source arrangement and a full-scale reverse
engineering proposal. This latter plan was pursued virtually
right up to the day of final agreement, with Col. Yount finally
recording "Notification received on 27 April indicated that

the. .agreement is imminent for the rights to this [M16/XM16E1]
family, therefore, the reverse engineering RFPs [request for
proposal] will not be used."
Colt's Inc., has indicated complete refusal to enter into

a contract for the Technical Data Package [TDP] which
contains a "Liquidated Damages" clause.. .or penalty for
late delivery of the TDP..
of a signed contract even if the penalty clause [$8,333.34

"liquidated damages" for each calendar day of nondelivery, or $250,000.20 per calendar month] is removed.
Further, due to Colt's apprehension on the specifics of the
contract, Colt's will probably require more time.. so that
a complete understanding..may be reached..
Colt's.. remains very adamant that it will probably take

at least six months time to deliver the TDP after receipt
The following month it appeared that Col. Yount had

spoken too soon:
277. Left and right side views of a (Colt model 639) submachine gun (the
export model of the XM177E2), serial no. 9560079. Fitted with an 11.5" barrel
and (third type) "birdcage" flash suppressor. Stock extended (above) and
retracted (below).
278. Left side view of a late Colt model 653 M16A1 Carbine (14.5" barrel)
serial no. 9279755, partially stripped. Overall length (stock retracted): 29.8"
(76cm). Weight, with loaded 30-round magazine: 6.9 lbs. Note the compact
"shortie" buffer.
282
279. Truly United? A scene at the US Army exhibit at the New York World's
Fair, showing Colt Firearms Division president Paul Benke testing his skill
with one of two modified, light-beam-emitting M16Als, set up to illuminate
the target when a bull's eye was scored. Looking on is the Army's head of
exhibit operations, Col. Lloyd S. Sullivan.
Agreement at Last?
Letter contracts for the manufacturing rights and the T D P
of both the M16/XM16E1 rifle and the XM177/XM177E1 submachine gun were signed on June 30, 1967, thus finally providing
the government with the documentation necessary to open the
bidding for a second source of supply. Ironically, the terms
finally agreed upon were much the same as had been contained
in Colt's first verbal proposal back in October 1964, except
now the $4,500,000 cash payment was no longer subject to any
per-rifle rebate, and the royalty was increased to 5 1/2% on
all future weapons and repair parts purchased by the govern-
ment. In addition, regardless of any subsequent second-source

arrangements, the Army agreed to contract for 27,500 rifles
per month from Colt's on a sole-source basis, which guaranteed
the production of an additional 632,500 Colt-made rifles through
April 1970.
Announcement of the final signing of the rights agreement
formed part of the Project Manager Rifle's significant action
report for the week of 26-30 J u n e 1967, the first such report
not bearing the signature of Col. Yount as project manager.
Wartime Production
Chapter Eighteen
BROADENING THE BLACK RIFLE'S

WARTIME PRODUCTION BASE
Colt's On Strike
The employees of Colt's had greeted the news of government
acquisition of the manufacturing rights to the M16A1 rifle by
going out on what became a two-month strike. This was especially worrisome to the harried new acting P M R because, as
noted, spare parts (especially barrels) were in short supply in

mid-1967 Vietnam, due to wear, rusting and fouling (largely
from tracer bullets) on a scale far greater than expected. Lt.
Col. Engle noted:
. .Accelerated production of rifles during June 1967 offset

the effect on rifle production for the first two weeks in July,
which was previously scheduled for employee vacations.
Since there are also some weapons in government stocks,
the primary impact of the work stoppage is in spare barrel
assemblies. The CG, US Army Weapons Command has
recommended. .that the Department of the Army seek a TaftHartley injunction based on the critical need for barrel
assemblies and an anticipated shortage of M16A1 rifles after
15 August 1967. Colt's barrel production at 4,000 per month
has become insufficient to meet demands. Projected demands
are estimated to reach 11,800 barrels per month..
Back to the Bargaining Table

Throughout the fall of 1967 the Project Manager Rifles was
thus faced with a number of major problems (to say nothing
of the SPIW program). These included getting the " b u g s "
out of the M16A1's TDP, procuring enough new rifles to meet
the accelerating demands of the war, and maintaining the rifles
already in service, fitted as they were with what Dr. Carten was
soon to call "non-interchangeable parts of unknown quality".

Of the initial list of 26 firms interested in becoming the
M16Al's second source of production, 20 attended the
pre-solicitation conference on October 3. The Project
Manager's report noted:
..nine firms made the $1,000 bid deposit to receive the

initial TDP and two M16A1 rifles. Those firms making bid
deposits are as follows:
4. General Motors, Hydramatic Division
5. Harrington & Richardson, Inc.
6. Physical Sciences Corporation, subsidiary of Friden
1. Aeronutronics Division of Philco-Ford
2. FTS Corporation, Denver, Colorado
7. Stetson Ross Mfg. Co., Seattle, Washington
3. General Electric, Springfield [Armory] Massachusetts
8. Olin-Mathieson, Winchester Division
operation
9. ZD Products, El Segundo, California
283
Wartime Production 284
By the end of the year this list had altered slightly:
Project: rifles [week of] 18-22 December 1967

..Twelve firms initially made bid deposits for receipt of
Technical Data Package. Eight..remain interested in this
production:
Physical Sciences Corporation

General Motors (Hydramatic Division)
Harrington & Richardson
Four firms have withdrawn:
Bauer Ordnance Company

Kaiser Jeep Corporation
Cadillac Gage Company
Maremont Corporation
Stetson Ross Mfg. Company
Olin-Mathieson
General Electric (Springfield Division)
Philco-Ford Corporation
Z-D Products
The Short-Lived GM Hydramatic "Sole Source" Award

Secretary McNamara approved the Army's plans to expand
production in early March of 1968. In a surprise move which
seemed to sweep aside all the work being done by the newly-
appointed "Source Selection Board", which was carefully

screening all the interested firms to ensure satisfactory contract
performance, Col. Engle reported:
. .The following actions will be taken for expansion of the

rifle base:
3. A sole source award to Hydramatic Division of

General Motors Corporation at a maximum schedule to
be negotiated and to level off at a rate of 25,000 per month.
A letter order contract for a one year buy of approximately
162,000 rifles is anticipated with first deliveries in January
1969, and to reach a maximum production rate of 25,000
rifles per month in October 1969.
1. Maximum expansion of Colt's to level off at 50,000 per

month. This will require approximately 107,000 additional
rifles to be funded in FY68.
2. Expansion of the second source now in progress of
selection to provide a maximum feasible buildup and levelling off at 25,000 rifles per month.
These plans soon gave way, however:

M16/M16A1 Rifle Procurement: The previous plans for
expansion of a second source and establishment of a third
source have been rescinded. In lieu thereof and in order to
gain maximum accelerated production, a decision has been
made that all contractors who submitted an acceptable technical proposal will be invited to begin intensive negotiations
leading to the selection of two sources to reach a multi-shift
rate of 25,000 per month each as fast as possible..
Second-Source Production Begins

- The GM Hydramatic and H&R Contracts
Letter contracts were awarded on 19 April to G M C ' s
Hydramatic Division of Ypsilanti, Michigan, and Harrington
& Richardson, Inc., of Worcester, Massachusetts, with initial
deliveries scheduled for February, 1969. The two contracts,

Hydramatic's DAAF03-68-C-0048 and H&R's DAAF03-68C-0045, were definitized in December 1968, each for a total of
Wartime Production
240,000 M16A1 rifles. As an indication of the Army's pressing

need for new rifles, each contractor was scheduled to reach
maximum output of 25,000 rifles per month by November,
1969. Interestingly, when that time arrived, a recommendation
made by the Project Manager had been approved, and "the

requirements to make available the facilities, tooling and test
equipment required for production of the XM177/XM177E2"
had been deleted from both second-source contracts.
Fresh Congressional Concern

The Ichord report had stated bluntly that four years was
altogether too long a time for the government to take to acquire
Colt's TDP, or at least to establish a second source of procurement for the M16A1. Ironically, however, as soon as the Army
announced the GM and H & R second-source contracts, fresh
congressional rumblings were heard. This time the concerns
focussed on both the Army's choice of contractors and the price
they were to be paid.
Senator George McGovern, for one, had the "facts" before
him: Colt's was making the M16A1 for $104, while H & R had
been granted $250 per rifle (including apportioned tooling
costs), and G M ' s Hydramatic Division was to receive $316
apiece. These new prices seemed outrageously high. True, aside
from the earlier M39 20mm cannon project, Hydramatic was
a newcomer to the small arms production field and thus had
a costly "learning curve" to underwrite, but H&R had a long
and well-documented history of marginal quality performance
in its manufacture of Ml, T48 and M14 rifles. Furthermore,
several of the unsuccessful bidders noted above were work-needy

defense contractors with considerable small-arms experience.
For example, the Maine-based Saco-Lowell Shops, a division of
the Maremont Corporation, produced the successful 7.62mm
M60 machine gun, and the Cadillac Gage Corporation had
developed the Stoner weapons system. Saco-Lowell's bid, for
one, while higher than Colt's, was lower than GM's.
In the spring of 1968 this renewed congressional interest
in rifle procurement led the chairman of the Senate Preparedness Subcommittee, Senator John Stennis, to appoint a Special
M16 Rifle Subcommittee chaired by Senator Howard Cannon.
In the House of Representatives, the Ichord Subcommittee
on the M16 Rifle Program was also directed to resume its
activites. Both bodies zeroed in on a fresh examination of the
Army's second source awards.
Back at Rock Island, the Project Manager, Col. Isaacs,
reported:
Project: rifles [week of] 27-31 May, 1968

.. Brigadier General Shaw, USMC Ret., and Mr. Neal of
the Stennis subcommittee visited Colt's on 28 May..H&R
and Maremont on 29 May..and GMC-Hydramatic and
Cadillac Gage on 31 May. ..The purpose of the visit was to

examine facilities and gather information from the successful
and unsuccessful bidders..
The Army responded to this renewed criticism by opening

the books on its "standard method" of contract award, which
in this case had begun with the appointment of the mentioned
Source Selection Board comprising 65 men knowledgeable
in one or another phase of military small-arms manufacture
and procurement. The Board had subsequently evaluated all
the prospective contractors on the three crucial issues of
managerial capability, technical expertise, and financial
competence.
upshot was that only GM and H & R were judged capable of

rising swiftly and reliably to the challenge of volume production
on the Army's desperately-needed rifles.
The Army's newly-accelerated production schedules were

announced in August: Col. Isaacs recorded that " I n order
to meet contractual requirements, the government must buy
933,000 M16 rifles in FY69". In the light of this the Board
"re-evaluated" its findings before passing them on to an
Advisory Council of "senior officers and civilians'', where the
The Cannon subcommittee released its final report in September, summarizing the Army's second source awards as a
"most inept performance". On a visit to the Hydramatic plant,
for example, the subcommittee discovered that the Advisory
Council had approved G M ' s proposal to construct the requisite
test range facility in the rafters above the manufacturing floor
itself, notwithstanding such serious drawbacks as noise, possible
danger from ricochets, and the hazards of eventual lead
poisoning in the plant below due to the inevitable sifting down
of highly toxic powder and primer gases and residues. Senator
Cannon, with a twist of irony, was prompted to opine that
such a range "promises to be a unique facility indeed".
285
Getting What You Pay For

Congressional nit-picking aside, it soon became apparent
that G M ' s Hydramatic Division was earning its extra pay by
instituting quality production in record time. As the Project
Manager noted approvingly,
Project:
rifles [week of] 14-18 October 1968
M16 Production Team: ..Progress at GMC continues
at a rapid pace. No problem is anticipated in meeting the
in-house schedule. H&R will require continued close watching
and the addition of four (4) Walter Kidde experts, a more
positive approach is already evident. Inspection and engineering assistance has been provided by the government to
ensure H&R progress..
The following week, Col. Isaacs recorded that the Assistant
Secretary of Defense (I&L), the Assistant Secretary of the
Army (I&L), the Commanding General of AWC, Roland B.
Anderson "and other senior officials" had visited the three
M16A1 contractors, and described the results of the trip as
follows:
Colt's is on schedule for their buildup to 50,000 rifles
per month..
280. Closeup of receiver markings on a typical M16A1 as manufactured by

the Hydramatic Division of General Motors Corporation. Note serial no. (28th
rifle in GM's assigned serial no. range, which began at no. 3,000,000).
H&R has shown marked improvement. In-house build

schedule for 500 in December is unchanged. H&R successfully fired four (4) rifles which they fabricated.
GMC: Excellent progress with a promise to deliver. .ahead

of schedule. GMC has produced two (2) weapons, one of
which was fired during the visit. Both weapons have met
all functional requirements..
By October 28 a General Motors endurance rifle had fired

10,000 rounds with only one extractor spring failure at 4,800
rounds. The Project Manager's weekly report concluded with
the ominous news that union members at the Tri-Ordinate
Corporation, suppliers of heavy automatic machine tools to
all three M16A1 producers, had voted to go out on strike. While

later called off, at the time this threatened serious setbacks
and delays at both Colt's and H&R. G M ' s Hydramatic Division on the other hand, erstwhile builders of the M39 20mm
Automatic Cannon, demonstrated some original thinking:
Project: rifles [week of] 4-8 November 1968

. .Action has been taken to eliminate any slippage in delivery
of M16A1 rifles due to lack of production machines by author-
izing Hydramatic to contract with Tri-Ordinate for final assembly and shipment of machines from subcontractor plants..
Failures at H&R
By the time of contract definitization in December, GM had
offered 100 rifles to the government for acceptance, two weeks
ahead of a similar first quantity from H&R. Indeed, it appeared

that H & R was by no means yet "out of the woods":
Project:
rifles [week of] 9-13 December 1968
Weapon Tests Failure, H & R :
Two (2) weapons have failed the 6,000 round endurance
requirements. The first failure was attributed to a fractured
bolt assembly. An investigation to determine the exact cause
is being conducted by the contractor, with assistance provided
by WECOM and MUCOM personnel. The contractor's preliminary determination indicates dimensional error introduced
during the chrome plating of the chamber. Correction of
this action is being developed.
The second weapon exceeded the allowable malfunctions
for "Failure to Chamber". The contractor is presently
investigating to determine the causes.
281. Closeup of receiver markings on a typical M16A1 of Harrington & Richardson

manufacture. Note the lion-in-circle trademark and H&R serial no. range,
which began at no. 2,000,000.
282. Colt's "M16A1 5.56mm Weapons System" as it had evolved circa 1970.
Further Contracts with Colt's and GM Hydramatic

Also in 1968, the Army exercised two contract options to
procure over 700,000 additional M16Als from Colt's. The
second of these, letter contract DAAF03-C-69-0068 for 313,413
rifles, was the final placement necessary to fulfill the FY69 rifle
requirement. For the week of 9-13 December Col. Isaacs
recorded that priorities had been established at Colt's in the
following order: "First - rifles in accordance with contract
schedule; second - repair parts as scheduled by the contracts;
and third - any excess production in the form of rifles up to

a maximum of 50,000 per month".
The US Army Weapons Command's Procurement History
and Analysis of M16 Rifle (document no. AMSWE-PPE-72-01,
dated 2 August 1971) summed up the latter history of the warswollen 5.56mm rifle contract awards through to the thenpresent as follows:
. .Colt's Inc. was selected as the primary supplier of M16/
M16A1 rifles because of their previous experience as a supplier
and the inability of the government to have second and third
sources available so soon after the Technical Data Package
had been negotiated.
Letter contracts DAAP03-68-C-0061 [awarded June 1968]
and DAAP03-69-C-0021 [awarded October 1968] were
modified to be one contract and the definitized modification
PZ67 of DAAF03-69-C-0021 (FFP) was signed November
1969 for 740,803 M16A1 rifles and 1,000 M16 rifles...
Modification to the contract decreased the total price from
$77,138,882.00 to $75,984,623.45 by changing configuration
on 135,001 rifles from M16A1 to M16..
..Request for Proposal [RFP] DAAF03-69-R-0039 went
to the three suppliers of the M16A1 for bids on FY70 and
FY71 rifle buys. Colt's Inc., Harrington & Richardson, Inc.,
and General Motors Corporation, Hydramatic Division all
responded..
283. Figs. 1 to 4 from US Patent no. 3,618,248, granted to Henry A. Into and
John Jorczak, entitled "Buttstock Assembly with a Latchable Door for a Compartment Formed Therein". Finally, cleaning materials for the M16A1 had
a home right inside the rifle.
US Patent Office
H&R and GMC had been set up as second and third

source suppliers for the purpose of making this contract
competitive... The [July 1969] award.. to the two lowest bidders
was justified because it was "in the interest of National
Defense that the Industrial Mobilization Bases established..
be kept in operation, to keep two existing lines and specialized personnel in an active status." Each contractor
submitted prices for 40,000.. 30,000.. and 20,000 weapons
per month..
284. Late-style sectioned M16A1 barrel circa 1971-72, showing the chromeplated bore and chamber. Identified by stamped letter "B" about 1 7/8"
from muzzle face, or marked "Chrome Bore".
285. The new buttstock trap, showing the late M11E3 (4-section) cleaning rod,
chamber and bore brushes, and 2-oz. plastic bottle of LSA.
Contracts were signed with Colt's Inc. and Hydramatic..

on the basis of their original proposals. Colt's was awarded
a contract [DAAF03-70-C-0001] for 458,435 M16A1 rifles
at a cost of $41,158,294.30. GMC was awarded a contract
[DAAF03-70-C-0002] for 229,217 M16A1 rifles at a cost of
$23,783,555.92. ..[H&R] were experiencing delivery problems
286. Illustration from Depot Maintenance Work Requirement (DMWR)

9-1005-249, showing authorized method of indicating overhaul to an M16A1,
with markings, about the size of those in the maker's legend on the left side
of the receiver, permanently applied before refinishing and showing month,
year and Agency performing overhaul.
on their [original] contract and evidently felt that the 20,000

units. .would be more advantageous to them..
This was the first contract for the M16 rifle in which
bidding was competitive..
Further Examination
Chapter Nineteen
AN EXAMINATION
OF THE "END RUN"
METHOD OF RIFLE PROCUREMENT
Competitive procurement of the M16/M16A1 rifle and its
ball, blank and tracer cartridges comprised by this time a vast
and complex "universe" indeed, due to the many forces which

had indirectly but powerfully influenced the program.
The "Whiz Kid" Legacy

Gene Stoner himself has pointed out that the AR-15 and
especially his ".222 Special" cartridge were really just first
attempts, and likely not the best possible designs in every detail.
As we have seen, this was subsequently proven to be true,
although the first examination at Aberdeen in 1958 confirmed
that the system possessed no significant faults which could not
have been corrected, given a normal course of development.
Dr. Fred Carten's "means to an e n d " denial of the AR-15's
merits in 1958, followed by exaggerated O S D claims after its
resurrection as a "fully developed" weapon system in 1963, set
the AR-15 procurement project up for real trouble. Both of these
courses led, ironically, to the same pass: the virtual prohibition of
a normal course of engineering development, before and after the
Army was ordered to make the "one-time buy" procurement.
In addition, warnings that the cartridge was inherently

incapable of consistently meeting some of the stated "design
goals" went unheeded by OSD, who then insisted that the
Technical Coordinating Committee adopt these goals as
inalterable requirements. The O S D veto of Frankford's
proposal to revert to a more lethal bullet (chapter 8) forced
a switch in propellant. While this satisfied the chamber
pressure/velocity requirement, it led to further complications
in the rifle itself. These in turn engendered the whole series
of "fixes'' (harder bolts, stiffer extractor springs, new buffers,
new magazine catches) which the Ichord report had so criticized. However, by the time the Army finally got a firm grip
on the rifle's Technical Data Package in 1968, the M16Al's
field malfunction rate was consistently below 1 per 1,000
rounds.
Colts' Contribution
Colt's too had reason to lament the lack of a standard
Ordnance-sponsored engineering development program. They
had uncovered the "tip of the iceberg" during the 30-round
magazine project, wherein was confirmed the limited degree
of interchangeability which existed in the rifle/magazine interface of many (nobody could really tell how many) rifles, already
government-inspected and in the field. As witness their reluctance
to participate in the Army's "disposable" magazine program,

it appeared that they were loath to share the full extent of this
and other dimensional problems with the Army until the very
last possible moment. Indeed, under the terms of the rights
agreement Colt's had insisted on doling out the T D P to the
Army in portions, from J u n e to December of 1967.
291
Further Examination 292
The TDP's "140 Areas of Potential Interference"

Once the drawings and documents were all in hand the
Army had contracted for an independent study of tolerance
relationships in the M16 rifle. In the words of Dr. Carten's

"Blue Ribbon" report:
In February 1968 Comprehensive Designers, Inc. (CDI)

reviewed the package and uncovered some 140 areas of
potential interference. The corrective actions recommended by CDI were undertaken in conjunction with
Colt, and the new rifle producers were alerted to the
changes..
..The production of large quantities of rifles without a

government technical data package, while in consonance
with the Gilpatrick directive [chapter 8], has undoubtedly
resulted in the introduction into the supply system of large
numbers of weapons with non-interchangeable components
of unknown quality.
Ten Special Tests at Frankford Arsenal

With the T D P in hand, the Army was finally equipped to
undertake the first genuine examination of all the planets in the
M16's universe, in a series of tests significantly not prompted
by any particular problem per se but designed to get at the
technological truth once and for all regarding the specialized

behavior of the M16's "unique" gas system. Equally important,
the Army wanted to know more about the exact state of the
nation's existing inventory of Colt-made M16/M16A1 rifles:
United States Army

Frankford Arsenal
Special
Tests
of 5.56mm Ammunition
February 1968
An M16A1 Rifle System Test Coordinating Team was established at Frankford Arsenal by the direction of the Commanding
General, US Army Munitions Command. .to. .Frankford Arsenal, 15 November 1967.. to conduct special tests as assigned.
These special tests are. .designed to provide the Project
Manager with operational data of the M16/M16A1 Rifle
Systems under a variety of conditions and with emphasis on
comparison of performance between the two current types
of propellants loaded into 5.56mm ammunition.
The scope of the tests encompassed verification of a

bursting bullet problem in tracer ammunition loaded with
WC846 propellant.. ; further definition of areas of fouling
and their effects on weapon performance [and] investigation of reported extraction difficulties... The conduct of
these tests expended a total of approximately 420,000
rounds (ball plus tracer cartridges loaded with WC846 and
IMR types of propellant) and utilized [150] new M16A1
rifles.
The following are some of the salient findings of Frankford's

ten tests, beginning with a dimensional survey of the 150 new
rifles:
A Dimensional Survey of M16A1 Rifles Used for Frankford Arsenal Tests

. .A dimensional survey was made on these [150] rifles prior
to their use in any of the tests. Since all rifles were committed..
it was necessary to conduct the survey in the brief period

between receipt of the rifles and commencement of testing..
Further Examination
Chamber
dimensions
[All 150 rifles were measured at points shown in figure 287.

Results are summarized as follows:]
Reference point
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
Percent out
of tolerance
Specified dimension No. rifles out

(inches)
of tolerance
0.3553+
0.254 +
0.255 +
0.3769+
0.2265+
1.5520+
1.7720+
0.002
0.002
0.002
0.002
0.002
0.006
0.006
21
29
67
113
5
42
45
14.4
19.9
46.0
77.5
3.4
29.2
31.2
287. Chamber dimension drawing from Frankford Arsenal's "Ten Tests"
Dimensions,
5.56mm M193 Ball Cartridge
[As a point of reference, the specified dimensions of the

M193 ball cartridge (figure 288) are as follows:]
Reference point
Specified dimension
(inches)
0.045 - 0.007
1.500 - 0.006
0.3325- 0.007
0.008 - 0.008
2.260 - 0.025
0.378 - 0.007
C
D
E
F
293
Dimensions, Propellant Gas Tube and Bolt Key

[figure 289; dimensions in inches:]
Reference point
Average
Maximum
Minimum
A
B
C
D
E
Bolt key
0.1151
0.1793
0.1703
0.1799
0.1798
0.1804
0.1200
0.1800
0.1720
0.1807
0.1803
0.1810
0.1090
0.1780
0.1687
0.1795
0.1795
0.1800
289. Gas tube and bolt carrier key, showing location of dimensions measured.
290. Bolt rotation variations measured during Frankford's "Ten Tests" showing
bolt travel for both locking (above) and unlocking (below).
291. Chart from Frankford's "Ten Tests" showing bolt carrier cavity peak
pressure histograms.
Above: ammunition lot TW-18205 (IMR 8208M).
Below: ammunition lot TW-18224 (WC846 ball propellant).
Further Examination
Determination of Extent and Effects of Residue in the Gas Transmission Tube of the M16A1 Rifle
..The producer of the M16A1 rifle reported the following
to the Project Manager.. :
3. That ammunition lot TW-18179 (IMR 8208M propellant)

is excessively "dirty" and could be expected to cause weapon
stoppage.
1. That ammunition lot RA-5317 (WC846 propellant) caused

excessive fouling in an M16A1 rifle gas tube which resulted
in numerous weapon malfunctions and the rejection of a
group of rifles.
..The [test] procedure was to block the chamber end of

the barrel and time the flow of a known volume of air through
the gas tube.
2. That ammunition lot RA-5244 (WC846 propellant) produced no such problems.
The firing of the rifles was accomplished in the manner

specified in SAPD-2538. Endurance Tests. The five rifles..
are tabulated below.
292. X-ray photograph of M16A1 test rifle gas tubes, showing fouling buildup
after 2,000 rounds of M193 ball ammunition. Note that fouling produced by
ball powder (WC846) is most noticeable and is concentrated near gas tube
inlet (above 3 examples) while buildup from IMR 8208M propellant is less
noticeable and occurs farther down the tubes, closer to the tube bend (below
3 examples).
Rifle serial
and status
Cartridge
lot no.
858816 (new)
850119 (new)
850965 (new)
848235 (new)
872132 (failed
at Colt's)
RA-5244
RA-5318
RA-5317
RA-5317
TW-18179
Propellant
type
..X-ray examination of the gas tubes very clearly shows

fouling deposits in the tubes. There appears to be good
agreement between air flow measurements and the visual
appearance in X-rays of the amount of fouling. Gas tubes
from rifles firing. .WC846 propellant show fouling residue
on both sides of the gas tube inlet and extending rearward for
one-and-a-half to three inches...8208M-loaded cartridges
[produce] fouling buildup further down the gas tube (toward
key end) in the region of tube bend..
WC846
WC846
WC846
WC846
8208M
Air flow measurements (sec)

Start 3,000 rds 6,000 rds
113.3
114.0
116.3
112.4
118.9
1185
132.0
134.0
120.5
124.0
124.0
167.0
141.5
121.0
130.0
tests. Extended firing., (beyond 6,000 rounds) indicates that

increased gas tube fouling does lead to short recoil and
weapon stoppage.
There was no indication of excessive fouling of the gas
tube from.. lot RA-5317 as alleged by Colt's Rifle [872132],
which failed similar testing at Colt's, performed satisfactorily with this lot of ammunition..
Although the residue buildup in the gas tubes of all rifles

steadily increased, there was no corresponding increase in
weapon malfunction during the 6,000 round portion of these
..There were no differences in results of sufficient significance to indicate that any one of the propellant lots
might be more likely to induce weapon fouling than any
other lot..
Further, long-term testing involving simulated fouling of

M16A1 gas tubes was undertaken, as it was admitted that the
relationship of residue accumulation to actual system performance remained unknown.
295
Springfield's Final Hour
To
Savanna
Aberdeen
C a m p McCoy
Gen E l e c t r i c
Colts
Sa co
Nortronics
Kanaar
Action
TOTAL
FROM ROCK ISLAND

Hrs
Miles
77
1 1/2
832
6
221
5 1/2
7 1/2
1359
1087
5 3/4
1232
7 3/4
6
1147
5 1/4
865
4 1/4
911
7731
49 1/2
Mode
GOV
Air
GOV
Air
Air
Air
Air
Air
Air
Air 96.2%
GOV 3.8%
To
Quabbin
Aberdeen
Camp Edwards
Gen Electric
Colts
Saco
Nortronics
Kanaar
Action
TOTAL
FROM SPRINGFIELD ARMORY

Miles
Hrs
3/4
27
309
6 1/4
140
3
202
5
26
1/2
200
4 1/4
103
2
243
4 1/4
4
230
1480
30
Mode
GOV
GOV
GOV
GOV
GOV
GOV
GOV
GOV
GOT
G O V 100%
293. In a last-ditch snipe at Secretary McNamara's closure order, the "Report

of Springfield Armory for the Retention of Mission.." included this map showing
the relative proximity of the Armory ("The Hub of Weapons Technology") to the
main industrial contractors and military test facilities of the day. It was ignored.
As a result of Secretary McNamara's adamant closure order,

discussed in chapter 11, Springfield Armory had perforce played
a diminishing role in the Army's small arms affairs as the date
of that station's permanent dismantlement drew nearer. The
final moment came on schedule, in April 1968. Before the
closure announcement, Springfield had supported a civilservice small arms R&D department some 480-strong. As part
of the post-Armory relocations Secretary McNamara had
ordered this "facility" transferred to Weapons Command
Headquarters at Rock Island Arsenal, but had reckoned without the people. Angered and frustrated by what appeared to
them the senseless destruction of the very core of the nation's
small arms engineering development capability, only twenty
- 4 % - of the R&D staff could be persuaded to make the long
trek west to Illinois: the rest chose early retirement or

disappeared into other jobs, mainly in the Springfield area.
The loss of the civilian R&D engineering team goes a
long way toward explaining why (aside from Colt's fierce
protection of its proprietary rights) the development of all
sorts of really useful peripheral devices for the M16, i.e. openbolt conversions, grenade launchers, noise and flash suppressors, short barrels and extended-capacity magazines,
proceeded at such a snail's pace. Suddenly there were precious few qualified R&D people left from the erstwhile pool
of specialized small arms expertise which had been destroyed
forever. To this day, US small arms R&D has not recovered
from the loss of Springfield Armory.
Further Examination
A Last Word on Ball Powder

Throughout the ball powder controversy Olin insisted that
no improvements could be made to their proprietary propellant
WC846, as it was already as good as they could make it. As we
have seen, in answer to an allegation made in the October 1967
Ichord report, Olin immediately and emphatically disassociated
itself from any share of blame or culpability in the selection
and use of ball powder in the 5.56mm program.
Sixteenth Memo Report on M16A1
Here too, however, as with the rifle, events had indirectly

served to selectively modify ball powder, to the occasional
detriment of the rifle/ammunition system as a whole. Speaking once again from Frankford Arsenal, Bill Davis explains
some curiously variable results which Colt's had recorded
over the years when testing rifles with different lots of ballpowder cartridges:
(AR-15) Rifle/Ammunition System
Change in Nomenclature for Ball Propellant Used in 5.56mm Ammunition

10 February 1970
Ball propellant approved for use in 5.56mm ammunition
since April 1964 has been identified as WC846 and has been
produced in accordance with Drawing #B10534784.. [It] has
also been used for even a longer period of time in the loading of 7.62mm cartridges. Producers..however, have been
"tailoring" this type propellant. .to assure compliance with
the ballistic requirements of the specific type and family of
cartridges involved. Subtle changes in tolerances of percent
deterrent and in grain geometry have been implemented over
the years to allow., sufficient latitude to produce WC846 for
both 7.62mm and 5.56mm cartridges within the limits of the
same drawing. In effect, WC846. .produced for 5.56mm..
constituted that fraction of propellant at one end of the
drawing tolerance limit and WC846 "tailored" for 7.62mm..
was confined somewhat to the chemical and physical characteristics of the opposite end of the tolerance limit.
Occasionally, cartridge producers, to accommodate
changes in production schedules, would interchange these
two subtly different WC846 propellants and load or attempt
to load a type or caliber of cartridge for which the propellant
lot was not specifically "tailored" or tested by the propellant
producer. These activities frequently resulted in marginal

cartridge ballistic performance and even, on some occasions,
ballistic failures..
In 1969, a major investigation into the causes of M16 rifle
gas-tube fouling was concluded [chapter 16] The major
cause of gas-tube fouling was found to be the presence of
excessive amounts of residual calcium carbonate, a constituent of WC846.. left over from an acid-neutralization step
in the manufacturing process. The recommended solution..
was to reduce the permissible..level from 1.0..to 0.25%
maximum. This change was implemented. .on 29 September
1969 and currently applies to WC846. .whether it be
"tailored" for 7.62mm or 5.56mm cartridge loading.
For the aforementioned reasons, Frankford Arsenal and
Olin Corporation (sole producer/contractor for ball propellant) mutually agreed, during January 1970,..that ball
propellant for 7.62mm cartridges should continue to be
identified as WC846 and ball propellant "tailored" for
5.56mm cartridges should be given another designation
(WC844)..
297
Through a Glass Darkly 20
294. Above: the AAIXM19 serial flechette rifle (SFR), with new 50-round
box magazine. Caliber 5.6x5 7mm XM645 (fig. 218 no. 3). This 1969 contract
was the first award of an official "XM" number to a SPIW candidate.
Below: M16A1 rifle with 20-round magazine. By this time the M16A1 was
Standard 'A' for US troops everywhere in the world except the European theater.
Whatever other problems attended the SPIW it was a fact of physics that firing
a 10-grain flechette, instead of a heavier bullet, produced far less recoil impulse
and hence less dispersion in the critical mean spread of a 3-round burst.
Investigations into rifle design parameters by the Human Engineering Labs
(HEL) yielded the following interesting comparison of the typical recoil impulse
of several standard weapons:
7.62 NATO M14: 2.65 lb. sec.

.30 M2 Carbine: 1.18 lb. sec.
5.56mm M16 (with muzzle brake): 1.16 lb. sec.
4.32mm M16: 0.84 lb. sec.
AAI SPIW (no muzzle brake): 0.65 lb. sec.
AAI SPIW (with muzzle brake): 0.39 lb. sec.
Through a Glass Darkly
Chapter Twenty
THROUGH A GLASS DARKLY

The Fate of the TCC and the PMR
With the T D P in hand the "bugs" were exorcised once and
for all from the M16A1's tolerancing drawings. With secondsource contracts in place to prove the point, production of the
M16A1 soon ceased to be a viewed as a developmental project.
In a first move toward recognition of this change in status,
the benighted Technical Coordinating Committee (TCC) was
dissolved on August 27, 1968.
By the end of the year, definitized contracts were in place
at Colt's, Hydramatic and H&R. On 2 J a n u a r y 1969 the
Project Manager's Office announced the acceptance of the
first second-source deliveries: G M , 356 rifles; H&R, 107. As
noted, the XM177E2 had been "reoriented" into what soon
became oblivion, and the requirement for its production had
been deleted from both second-source contracts at Col.
Isaacs' suggestion.
..The rifle program encompasses the..M16 rifle family of
weapons; XM203 grenade launcher components; and
ammunition peculiar to these weapons systems until type
classified "A". After the ammunition is type classified "A",
By the middle of 1969 a plan to disestablish the Office of

the Project Manager had been drawn up, whereunder the
"residual" staff of 26 civilians (down from a high of 43), ten
officers and two enlisted men were to be redistributed within
W E C O M . In November 1969, Lt. Col. Rex Wing succeeded
Col. Isaacs in a job that itself had only a short time to run.
The first change was outwardly very subtle: the Office of the
Project Manager, Rifles ceased to exist and in its place was
created the Office of the Product Manager, Rifles.
At the same time it was tacitly admitted that since the demise
of Springfield Armory, Rock Island's research and development
capability had been less than adequate. Somewhat belatedly, it
was also admitted that hitherto the P M R had had far too much
on his plate. Thus, General Order number 82, signed in April
1970 by Major General Leo B. Jones, the Chief of Staff of the
Army, spelled out Lt. Col. Wing's new mission as follows:
the Product Manager retains overall responsibility for gun/
ammunition compatability and participates in and approves
design changes in ammunition which affect military, technical
or operational characteristics of the weapon systems..
Acronyms Ho: ARSAP; the FRP; and USASASA

Significantly, there was no longer any mention of the SPIW
or any other "drawing-board" concept as part of Lt. Col.
Wing's responsibilities. In August 1968 the Army Chief of Staff
had created a new R&D management agency called the US
Army Small Arms Systems Agency (USASASA), headquartered at Aberdeen Proving Ground, to oversee these futuristic
concepts. USASASA's mission was to take over all other "individual hand-held and crew-served ground weapons" up to .60
caliber, in the process assuming management authority of
ARSAP, the Army Small Arms Program.
main projects within USASASA's Future Rifle Program

(FRP). The F R P also embraced the SBR, or serial bullet
rifle, built by AAI in caliber .17 (4.32mm); and proposed by
General Electric's Weapons Development Department (situated in a leased facility at the now-defunct Springfield
Armory) as a resurrection of the second-generation Springfield SPIW. In addition, several other agencies, both civilian
and military, conducted research programs under Defense
Department R&D contracts into multiflechette and caseless
cartridges.
Formed in January 1968 by order of the Chief of Staff,

ARSAP divided up ongoing projects into time-slots: immediate,
interim, near-future and long-term. ARSAP's long-term portion
was designated the Future Rifle Program. The AAI XM19
SPIW became the serial flechette rifle (SFR); only one of four
After an exemplary and cost-conscious tenure as Product

Manager, Lt. Col. Wing was highly recommended for future
challenges worthy of his managerial talents and, on 3 August
1971, the Office of Product Manager, M16 Series Rifles was
discontinued by General Order number 229.
299
295. Join If You Can't Beat 'Em Department: an interesting, 10-year "M16/
flechette" feasibility study for Frankford Arsenal by Colt's Technik Incorporated
research division of Jericho, New York revealed that saboted flechettes, developed
for smoothbore barrels, actually gave less dispersion from the M193 case
(fig. 218 no. 6) when fired through regular rifled M16 barrels. As part of their
February, 1971 report entitled "Flechettes Fired Through Rifled Barrels",
Technik submitted a drawing of an improved sabot design (above, with standardized AAI design below) which gave even more impressive results.
The Small Caliber Systems Program

By the mid-seventies USASASA's "overview" program had
been renamed the Small Caliber Systems Program, within
which the Future Rifle Program (FRP) was just one of many
avenues of approach to the ideal personal weapon of the future.
In the words of a 1975 briefing held at Frankford Arsenal, the
ambitious Small Caliber Systems Program embraced "systems
up to and including 15mm...hand guns, rifles, shotguns, grenade
launchers, individual and crew served machine guns and subcaliber training devices". Several of these interesting developments are discussed below. Many were short-lived, regardless
of merit, for the urgent need for new and specialized weaponry
collapsed with the end of US involvement with the Vietnam
war in 1973.
296. Not to be outdone, AAI later countered with a 1978 proposal for yet another
"Improved Sabot Flechette Seal Assembly" to be made from injection-molded,
glass-filled nylon, which AAI claimed would do away with the SPIW's problematical sabot "stripper" and provide positive separation by "ram-air
pressure" as air entered the pressure cavity shown. Not adopted.
Reflex Sight for Small Arms Weapons

A Frankford Arsenal M16 sight enhancement program was
begun in 1967 as US troops in Vietnam stressed the need for
a sight which, in the words of a status report presented at the
mentioned 1975 Aberdeen briefing, "enabled [the user] to
engage targets under twilight conditions, (dawn/dusk), where
he could see the target but could not see his sights".
By 1975, Frankford reported that of an original field of some

sixty sight systems evaluated, five concepts were tested further
and of these, two had emerged which offered "significant
improvements". The first of these attached to the rifle's standard
iron sights and provided a larger or highlighted rear aperture
and a front blade or dot painted with a self-illuminating drop
of promethium. The second was the reflex sight, a "lightweight, optical sight without magnification (unity power), that
offers an increase in hit probability and a decrease in response
time to engage a target."
The unit-power reflex sight idea was certainly not new: the
bullpup British EM-1 and EM-2 rifles were so fitted back in
the late nineteen forties. The main advantage of such a sighting
system as Frankford saw it was that "..improved performance
is due to simplicity in aiming small arms with a reflex sight.
When the target is viewed through the sight, alignment of the
aiming point [reticle pattern] in the sight and the target is all
that is required".
297. This diagram of the "System Acquisition Cycle" for the Small Caliber
Systems Program was presented to the "DOD Gun Panel" as part of a Frankford
Arsenal briefing on March 5, 1975. showing. The "identification and advancement of new technologies" was to be accomplished under the conceptual (62)
program element, with more advanced concepts moving through the range
of elements to full-scale deployment.
298. One of the sixty-odd sighting systems evaluated in the Frankford Arsenal
sight enhancement project of 1967-75. The British "Singlepoint" sight was
originally developed in 1968 for UK trial on L1A1 rifles. Not a true see-through
sight, the Singlepoint offered improved target acquisition and hit capability
by projecting a bright red aiming dot onto the target, which was viewed with
both eyes open.
300. The Oxford "sight and gyro stabilizer" still another device tested in
the early stages of the Frankford Arsenal sight enhancement program.
299. Another sight system evaluated at Frankford, called the Rickert sight.
Like the civilian Nydar shotgun sight, this presented a reflected reticle on
a ground-glass screen.
301. Designed by Robert E. Snodgrass, who also built and tested the "Product
Improved" M14 prototypes at Rock Island Arsenal (US Rifle M14), these
night sights were fully adjustable for windage and elevation, with a 3/8" rear
aperture and a 3/4" front aiming tube.
302. A diagram of the Reflex Collimator Sight (RCS), developed jointly by

Frankford's Fire Control Laboratory and AAl Corporation. An example of
a program falling into the "6.3 area" (the advanced conceptual program
element) of Frankford's Systems Acquisition Cycle (fig. 297). The Infantry Board
conducted a six-month trial of 25 improved RCS models in mid-1975, wherein
28 rifles fired 66,230 rounds of ammunition. The RCS was not adopted.
303. The final RCS reticle design, which was projected as an illuminated,
inverted yellow "Y" onto the target. Not adopted.
The report continued with the history of Frankford's reflex

sight project:
Six (6) prototype reflex sights were fabricated inhouse and submitted for MPT at Fort Benning, GA. Tests
were completed in May 1973 and results showed significant improvements in Ph [hit probability] with the
reflex sight over the standard iron and promethium sights.
Ph increases on the order of 30% were obtained and as
high as 50%... Noted during these tests was the fact that
all shooters could use the same zero setting on the sight
as opposed to individual settings required for iron sights.
In addition, the zero setting of the reflex sight did not

move during the entire four (4) months of firing tests.
Based on user recommendations resulting from the
MPT, variations of the reticle patterns were designed.
Additionally, three beam splitter colors were selected
...The final configuration of the reticle pattern is the
inverted Y [fig. 303] and the color chosen was yellow..
The report ended by noting that tests of 25 new reflex sights

featuring the finalized yellow reticle were still ongoing at Frank-
ford and Fort Benning, but to date it appears that the project
has made no further progress.
304. An example of blending the fruits of two programs together in the

search for enhanced hit probability (Ph). Here a reflex collimator sight
(RCS) is mounted on a modified M16A1, rebarreled to fire the "full bore"
Frankford Arsenal 4.32x45mm (.17 caliber) "micro-bullet" cartridge
(fig. 306 no. 2). Note, from the front: the "cylindrical muzzle brake
compensator" (fig. 305); the "bobbed" gas block and carrying handle;
the reflex collimator sight (RCS) attached to the flat top of the receiver.
"Microbullet" Cartridge Developments - the 4.32mm XM16E1

The 4.32x45mm (.17 caliber) development was part and
parcel of the mentioned serial bullet rifle (SBR) project. The
SBR was essentially an attempt to equal or approach the low
recoil impulse (and hence the lethally tight mean burst spread)
of the SPIW, or serial flechette rifle (SFR), while doing away
with the extremely expensive and sometimes erratic serial
flechette cartridge.
In mid-1965, six specially modified XM16E1 rifles had been
ordered from Colt's in support of an ongoing Ordnance evaluation of the 4.32x45mm cartridge. By this time, two basic "microbullet" approaches were being examined. The first, which
could be fired from a regular 5.56mm M16, utilized the standard
M193 case and a saboted 28-grain 4.32mm bullet (fig. 306
no. 3). The second or "fullbore" approach featured the same
4.32mm bullet in a necked-down 5.56mm case (fig. 306 no.
2) and was fired from a micro-bore barrel: hence the special
4.32mm XM16Els from Colt's.
305. The HEL experimental "cylindrical muzzle brake compensator" developed

to produce the lowest possible recoil signature from the 28-grain, 4.32mm bullet.
In order to learn as much as possible from the six-rifle test,

the first two of the special XM16Els were ordered with buttonrifled 4.32mm barrels dimensioned in accordance with drawing
FA32712 (fig. 307) and were equipped with Colt 2- or 3-shot
burst control devices. The next two had the same barrels but
no burst control capability, while the final two were needed
to support a micro-bore chrome-plating investigation at Springfield Armory, and were ordered with slightly oversized barrels
and a supply of rifled-but-not-chambered blanks.
Severe barrel erosion and bullet disintegration dogged the
4.32mm project. In addition, a successful 4.32mm tracer bullet
proved particulary elusive. Nevertheless, the considerable theoretical advantages of a bulleted, burst-fire, low-recoil-impulse
weapon have kept the micro-bore idea alive and viable to
this day.
306. Further (actual size) cartridge development. All but no. 5 are based on the
standard 5.56mm (M193) cartridge case. From left: 1. one of several types of
3.5mm micro-bullet designs from Fabrique Nationale, headstamped FN 73;
2. Frankford Arsenal 4.32x45.6mm (caliber .17) "full bore" ball, headstamped
FA 73; 3. the "saboted .17", which was designed to offer the .17's specialized,
lower recoil signature (fig. 294) interchangeably with regular 5.56mm loads
in standard M16s, headstamped LC 72; 4. UK 4.85x49mm tracer (red tip),
headstamped RG [Radway Green] 77485; 5. the 6x44.5mm XM732, one of
several experimental cartridges developed for the SAW program, with olivegreen lacquered steel case headstamped FA 73.
Author's collection
307. Frankford Arsenal drawing no. FA32712 dated August 18, 1965, entitled
"Rifling for Cal. 17 Weapon". 6-groove rifling, right hand twist; one turn
in 8". This program was plagued with severe barrel erosion and loss of bullet
"integrity".
303
308. Labelled 20-round box of primed 4.32mm cases, made up by Remington

for Frankford Arsenal under AMC contract.
309. Frankford Arsenal display card from a 1967 project investigating incendiary bullet loads. From left: 1. cal. .30 (9-grain incendiary charge);
2. 5.56mm (3-grain charge); 3. SPIW flechette (1-grain charge); 4.32mm
(1-grain charge).
The AAI XM70 and the Serial Bullet Rifle (SBR) Project
310. The SPIW's "last gasp": the no-frills AAI XM70. Only one prototype
was submitted, in May of 1974. The XM70 fired the XM645 flechette cartridge
from an open bolt position, full auto or 3-round burst fire only. Note the reflex
collimator sight and 30-round box magazine.
As discussed in The SPIW, the AAI X M 7 0 was a one-off,

last-ditch effort to revive the flagging SPIW program with a
"simplified serial-fire rifle". The XM70 fired the AAI XM645
flechette cartridge from an open bolt only, in either a semiauto or three-round burst mode.
dispersion-minimizing muzzle device (fig 305), the report

noted that the X M 7 0 "was found to be unserviceable after
six trigger pulls [burst fire] per subject at 800 rpm. Therefore,
all the 800 rpm modified SPIW [XM70] data are based on
six pulls rather than 10 in all other cases.."
In October 1974 the only X M 7 0 ever built was shot, alongside two of the modified 4.32mm XM16Els, in a "Dispersion
Versus Cyclic R a t e " test sponsored by the Army's H u m a n
Engineering Labs (HEL) at Aberdeen. While the XM70 turned
in a respectable impulse level when tested with HEL's special
With the demise of the XM645 serial flechette cartridge

the short-lived X M 7 0 was superseded by the 4.32mm AAI
serial bullet rifle (SBR), itself a fleeting development on the
way to the firms' current, multi-level involvement in future
rifle concepts.
311. The partially-stripped, 4.32mm prototype of the AAI serial bullet rifle
(SBR), first unveiled at a Fort Benning conference in May of 1977. The
10-lb., clip-fed AAI SBR featured a unique, two-mode firing system (semi
auto and 3-round burst only) wherein the firing pin was hammer-actuated
for semi auto fire and the first round of a burst, but the firing pin was
locked open (fixed firing pin) for rounds two and three of the burst. Note
the reflex collimator sight and sturdy, time-proven gas piston/operating
rod.
The AR-15 in UK Caliber 4.85x49mm
312. Left and right side views of a Colt model 01 AR-15 rifle, rebarreled at
Enfield Arsenal to caliber 4.85x49mm (fig. 306no. 4) in support of UK ammunition experiments. QAD (Ord) Pattern Room, photo by Thomas B. Dugelby
As discussed at length in Collector Grade's Modern Military

Bullpup Rifles, a late-sixties British cartridge enhancement
program had led to the development of a unique UK 4.85x
49mm infantry round. Both a selective-fire AR-15 and a
Stoner 63 belt-fed light machine gun were converted at
Enfield Arsenal to fire 4.85mm ammunition, in initial support
of a program designed to replace the British Army's ageing
7.62mm L1A1 rifles with a new bullpup 4.85mm Individual
and Light Support Weapon (IW/LSW) system.

This and other unilateral programs within the NATO alliance
threatened the hard-won concept of cartridge standardization,
and led to the "Weapons for the Eighties" NATO trials in
1978-79 (chapter 22). These in turn confirmed the FN SS109
version of the 5.56x45mm as the second NATO caliber, and
put an end to UK 4.85mm development.
305
313. Fig. 1 from a British Army manual dated November 1976, entitled
"Individual Weapon - Sectional Arrangement". Caliber 4.85mm. Both left(XL68E2) and right-hand ejection (XL64E5) models were made. These
UK bullpups were derived from the ArmaLite AR-18, and feature gas im-
pingement operation of an 8-lug bolt-and-carrier system. Note the emergency iron sights (nos. 9 and 13) on top of the excellent Sight Unit Small
Arms Trilux (SUSAT) optic sight (discussed in Modern Military Bullpup
Rifles).
The FABRL Von Karman Bullet and the "Fumer" System

Along with the reflex sight, the other concept being studied
circa FY75 under "identification and advancement of new
technologies" (area 6.2, fig. 297) was a joint Frankford Arsenal/
BRL investigation of the long-range role of enhanced 5.56mm
weapons. A 2-phase plan began with a BRL compendium of
projectile shapes, from which was selected the " A R 2 artillery
shape [fig. 314, center] scaled down to 5.56mm". The sharp
point was too hard to manufacture, so a compromise resulted
in the "Von K a r m a n " bullet which approximated the drag
characteristics of the AR2 but was one caliber shorter with
a blunter point. It was determined that 15 grains of propellant,
launching the 32-grain Von Karman bullet at 3,250 fps, would
produce a trajectory identical to that of the 55-grain M193,
yet would reduce the recoil impulse from 1.2 lb. sec. to 0.8
lb. sec. The smaller powder charge paved the way for an experimental, shorter aluminum case, and the 87-grain "lowimpulse" 5.56mm cartridge was born (fig. 315). FABRL results
indicated that this new concept would "offer a 60% improvement in average Pi [probability of incapacitation] between 0
and 500 meters".
The second phase coupled "fumer" technology into the study.
As the 1975 briefing to the " D O D Gun Panel" explained,
The fumer phenomenon is an approach to reducing projectile base drag by injecting heat and/or mass behind the base
of the bullet. ..A projectile has three drag components; wave
drag, skin drag, and base drag. The base drag is the result
of a low pressure, "dead air region" behind the base of
314. Left: standard 55-grain M193 bullet for comparison.

Center: the AR2 artillery shape scaled down to 5.56mm.
Right: the 32-grain Von Karman bullet.
the bullet. The injection of heat and/or mass.. increases the

pressure and approaches an equilibrium state, thereby reducing the base drug component. This effect is similar, but more
pronounced than that achieved with tracer ammunition.
FABRL found that, even though the Von Karman bullet

was "low drag", its base drag component was a significant
63% of the total. Calculations were that by adding fumer
technology, the base drag of the Von Karman bullet could be
reduced by 75%, thus halving the overall drag.
Robert J. McHugh of the Small Caliber Ammunition Division concluded the " D O D Gun Panel" briefing on this shortlived but interesting ammunition enhancement study with the
following statement of results:
As a result of this analysis we have determined that a
new machine gun system employing this 87 grain cartridge
would offer effectiveness comparable with the M60 machine
gun based on the SAW tactical scenarios. This fumer effect,
applied in the rifle role, would further increase the effectiveness gain from 60% to 70%.
315. Left: the standard 5.56mm M193 round. Total weight: 175 grains.
Right: the proposed 87-grain FABRL "low-impulse" round.
A Glimpse at the Squad Automatic Weapon (SAW) Program

- the 6mm M16 and the XM106
316 A rare photo showing an M16A1 rifle converted to fire 6mm XM732 ammunition (fig. 306 no. 5) in support of the SAW program. Note the flash suppressor
from the Rodman SAW, the XM235 (fig. 317) and the receiver and magazine,
which have been cut in half and extended to accommodate the longer overall
length of the XM732 round.
Rock Island Arsenal photo dated August 27, 1974
The mid-sixties Small Arms Weapons Systems (SAWS) study

proved that the heavy-bullet 5.56mm loads being produced
for Colt, Cadillac Gage (IWK), FN and others were capable
of considerably enhanced long-range performance. When
teamed with belt-fed weapons such as the Stoner 63A L M G
or Colt's CMG-2, the results were sufficiently rewarding to
launch a major new US investigation called the Squad Automatic Weapon (SAW) Program. While easily the subject
of an entire book in itself, the SAW program yielded some
interesting M16 versions worthy of brief notice here. The SAW
program led to the adoption of the FN Minimi as the US
M249 in 1982.
307
317. The story of the SAW program and its many extremely interesting weapon
designs could fill a book as big as this one. This is a prototype of the
XM235 machine gun, called the Rodman SAW as it was developed by the
General Thomas J. Rodman Laboratory at Rock Island Arsenal. The receiver
is marked "Gun Machine 6mm XM Rodman Labs SN 0005" and is essentially
318. The ammunition box from the Rodman XM235 SAW, showing the belted
XM732 6mm cartridges (fig. 306 no.5).
Rock Island Arsenal photo dated February 26, 1974
a stamped, sheet-metal shell: the Rodman's bolt assembly rides on dual,

interchangeable top-and-bottom gas piston/guide rod systems. The 22.6-lb.
XM235 fired belted 6mm ammunition from a 200-round ammunition box,
shown behind the pistol grip.
Rock Island Arsenal photo dated December 3, 1973
319. The experimental XM106, another development of the SAW program.

The short-lived XM106 was in response to a Marine requirement for
extended-fire capability in the Colt M16 HBAR, and featured a quick-change

barrel capability.
Photo courtesy Jean Huon
320. Right hand view of the prototype of the XM106, showing barrel and upper
receiver groups disassembled. Note the forward-mounted front sight, and the
bipod mounting point above front pistol grip.
309
Gene Stoner Strikes Again - the ARES Future Assault Rifle Concept (FARC)
321. The ARES 5.56mm FARC-2 assault rifle. Note from front: muzzle brake/
compensator; folded bipod/handguard; automatic, spring-loaded dust cover;
plastic 30-round magazine; reflex collimator sight.
A 1973 development contract to Gene Stoner's new firm,

ARES Inc., of Port Clinton, Ohio, led to the design, development and fabrication of a "state-of-the-art" 5.56mm assault
rifle called the "FARC-2". The prototype fired over 4,000
rounds during a test at Rock Island Arsenal in the summer
of 1974, with encouraging results. ARES thereupon produced

two prototypes of an improved version called the FARC-3
which was subsequently tested. Despite a number of novel
features, the FARC fell victim to post-Vietnam war funding
cuts and was discontinued in 1978.
322. US Army Armament Research & Development Command (ARRADCOM)

trial of the improved ARES FARC-3, fitted with a metal Stoner 63A magazine.
Compare with fig. 321: note how the operating rod handle cams the springloaded dust cover open with each shot.
30mm Multishot Grenade Adapters
323. Comparison photo of 30mm and 40mm grenades. The short-lived

30mm program was an attempt to reduce the weight and bulk of grenades
(and their launcher attachments) for the M16A1 and other weapons.
Rock Island Arsenal photo dated June 6, 1974
As we have seen, the idea of a grenade launcher/M16

combination led to the G L A D Program and the subsequent
adoption of the single-shot, 40mm M203 (chapter 15). Meanwhile, one of the most persistent stumbling blocks throughout
the SPIW program was that, in addition to 60 point-target
flechettes, the SPIW was supposed to carry and launch three
grenades, semi-automatically. Numerous attempts were
made to "live with" this ludicrous requirement and a number of extremely ingenious designs were brought forth in the
process, but the weight and girth of the standard M79-type
40mm grenade made a three-shot launcher attachment a

virtual impossibility, especially from the "human engineering"
standpoint.
In 1972 the Army contracted with the Ordnance Division
of the Honeywell Corporation of Hopkins, Minnesota, for the
development of a smaller, 30mm grenade, which would permit
the use of a more practical launcher. AAI, among others,
produced a number of single-shot and semi-auto launcher
attachments for the M16 and the XM19 SPIW.
324. Right side view of modified M16A1 rifle fitted with the HEL 30mm multishot
grenade launcher prototype. Note the modified gas block, and the cross-bolt
selector through the receiver. This allowed GL operation from the rifle's trigger.
Rock Island Arsenal photo dated April 6, 1976
311
By 1978 the H u m a n Engineering Labs (HEL) had also

developed a 30mm multishot launcher, weighing 4.5 lbs., for
attachment to the M16A1 rifle. A preliminary operation and
maintenance manual was subsequently prepared, and the
12-lb. "package" was given a "user conceptual evaluation"
by the Army Infantry Board (USAIB) at Fort Benning. The
30mm project was abandoned soon afterward.
325. A dramatic front view:

Left: standard M16A1 fitted with an M203 pump-action, single shot 40mm
grenade launcher attachment.
Right: modified M16A1 fitted with HEL multishot 30mm GL prototype, serial
no. 5. The blow-forward HEL device, tested as a prototype only, carried and
launched four 30mm grenades semiautomatically.
Rock Island Arsenal photo dated April 27, 1976
326. Fig. 2 from the Preliminary Operation and Maintenance manual for
the blow-forward 30mm HEL multishot GL, entitled "Field-stripped view
of GL" : Note the turned-down rifle barrel. The manual identifies 22 dedicated
GL components.
328. Right side view of cross-bolt selector in GL mode.
327. Loading the four-shot HEL 30mm GL. Two rounds were first inserted
in the (2-round) forward portion of the magazine, shown. Closing and latching
the magazine automatically pushed one grenade back into the rear (1-round)
magazine. Pushing the charging lever (of the blow-forward launcher) forward
and allowing it to snap back chambered the rear round, and replaced it in
the rear magazine with the round remaining in the forward magazine. The
empty forward magazine was then recharged with two more rounds.
329. Oiling the firing pin and sear of the HEL 30mm GL. Note the rifle
markings "M-16A1".
The AAI Caseless 5.56mm/4.32mm Advanced Combat Rifle (ACR)

The innovative Heckler & Koch bullpup G11 rifle and its
Dynamit Nobel 4.7x21mm caseless cartridge are discussed in
Modern Military Bullpup Rifles. Even though cook-off and other
problems caused the withdrawal of the G11 from the 1978-79
NATO trials, H&K persevered with the project. In September
1982 the US Army Research and Development Command
(ARDC) Fire Control and Small Caliber Weapon System Lab
at Dover, New Jersey awarded two 25-month contracts, one

to H&K and the other to AAI Corporation, for the exploratory
development of an Advanced Combat Rifle (ACR).
The AAI ACR featured a unique, gas-operated firing pin
which produced three differently timed modes of fire: openbolt 3-round burst at 2,000 rpm; open-bolt full auto at 600
313
330. Frankford Arsenal cartridge display panels, circa 1969.

Above: three views of a double-primed, experimental 5.56mm caseless cartridge, 1.5" in length and weighing 82.5 grains, which produced the same muzzle
velocity as the M193 (3,250 fps). Note, from the top: complete round; sectioned
Below: the same three views of a caseless SPIW cartridge, firing the standard
saboted flechette. Due to the flechette's light weight (8-10 grains) the round
only weighed 40 grains overall. The muzzle velocity is not listed, but if it
were to approximate that of the "standard" XM19 SPIW round, the XM645,
it would be around 4,800 fps.
round; components of round (with two back-to-back primers). The caseless

program was begun at Frankford in 1967.
331. The two types of (interchangeable) caseless ammunition for the AAI ACR,
showing complete and disassembled rounds. As the 4.32mm "sabot-bullet"
leaves the 5.56mm bore, the gas-sealing sabot disintegrates into the four
sections shown on the black card.
332. The AAI ACR, right side view, showing a few of the "heavy-bullet"
5.56mm loads (left) and some 4.32mm "sabot-bullet" rounds (right).
The ACR drew heavily on experience gained during the XM19 and XM70
SPIW programs. Note the complex, tritium-illuminated "AAI Optical Sight

with 3x Telescope Attached".
Inset: the proposed bullpup configuration of the AAI ACR.
rpm; and closed-bolt semi-automatic. Like the G11, the AAI

ACR was also built around a caseless cartridge, developed by
the Hercules Powder Co. The AAI ACR fired either a full-bore
70-grain 5.56mm "heavy bullet" or a 28-grain saboted 4.32mm
version, from disposable plastic magazines. To provide as much
protection as possible for the compressed-powder cartridges,
the 36-round magazines were factory pre-loaded and fitted
with a cap seal, which was automatically broken and discarded
by the action of inserting the magazine into the rifle. Both
a 31.7-inch bullpup and a regular 7.9-lb. rifle version were

offered, with AAI claiming "at least a 100% increase" in hit
probability for their A C R over the M16, at ranges up to 600
meters.
Testing and evaluation of these weapons and their later offshoots, plus other investigations into every conceivable area
of offensive and defensive military "interdiction", continues
to this day.
333. Where Will It All End Department: a Rock Island Arsenal photo dated
September 8, 1971, entitled enigmatically "Rifle, M16".
315
334. An AAI advertisement for the caseless ACR, which shot both 5.56mm
"heavy-bullet" and 4.32mm "sabot-bullet" cartridges.
AAI Corporation
Offshore Production
Chapter Twenty one
OFFSHORE PRODUCTION
OF M14 AND M16 RIFLES
The M16 Consolidates its Position
Meanwhile, despite all the brave attempts to unseat the M16
with "future" rifles, by the early seventies the M16A1 had settled
firmly into the role of the world's most reliable and effective
combat tool. As we have seen, the US government had perforce
perfected the M16 in a wartime program of developmental attention and retrofit worth many millions of dollars, the end result
being that by the end of the Vietnam war, the M16A1 was
simply the most tested and most reliable 5.56mm rifle on the
market. More than ever, it seemed, the black rifle had considerable "sex appeal". As summed up at an April 1971 ARPA
Small Arms Conference by Dr. W. C. Pettijohn, author of
numerous studies on the analysis of small arms effectiveness:
The M16 has proven itself to be a superior rifle and has

been accepted as such on a worldwide basis. It also has
potential for mass production in the event of an emergency.
There are no weapons currently that can be considered a
competitor. Government efforts to develop a successor will

proceed slowly. The conference forecasts six to eight million
M16 rifles being produced during the next ten year period
at a cost of two to three billion [dollars].
Active, direct American military involvement in the Vietnam war ended in 1973. Later Defense Intelligence Agency
estimates were that among much other ordnance, the USsupported Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) and
the Cambodian Army had been forced to abandon roughly
946,000 serviceable AR-15, M16, XM16E1 and M16A1 rifles
to the victorious North Vietnamese Army (NVA). In the
mid-1980s, when many of these weapons began to appear on
the international small arms black market, the M16 became
the most widely distributed 5.56mm rifle in the world.
After the Vietnam war was over Colt's had a reliable, battleproven rifle in the M16A1, and they wanted to sell it abroad.
They subsequently found some of their best markets by emulating Belgium's Fabrique Nationale, who for years has offered
expensive, but guaranteed, step-by-step licensed-production
programs. With a proven "winner" in the M16A1, Colt's
found that a number of foreign countries wanted to build their
own versions, under license, in their own factories.
Chartered Industries of Singapore

The first such overseas customer was the Republic of
Singapore. As discussed in chapter 12, soon after becoming
independent from the Federated States of Malaysia, Singapore
had been at least partially successful in its controversial bid
to contract for the supply of Colt-made model 614s (the export
version of the standard USAF M16, which in Colt parlance
was known as the model 604), and HBAR "M1s".
In 1967, a fully-integrated group of locally-owned and operated
companies was incorporated under the name Chartered
Industries of Singapore Private Limited (CIS) to meet the citystate's own defense needs. In 1970, with major technical assistance from Colt personnel residing in Singapore,
CIS's Small Arms Weapons Group undertook the manufacture and assembly of the M16 under license from Colt's. Over
the ensuing ten years, nearly 200,000 M16-type rifles (without
bolt assist; known at Colt's as the model 614-S) were produced.
At least 30,000 of these were sold, with US State Department
permission, to Thailand.
319
Offshore Production 320
335. Colt factory drawing, dated July 29, 1969 of the markings authorized
for the 200,000 M16 rifles (Colt model 614-S) manufactured under license
by Chartered Industries of Singapore.
The SAR-80 Rifle and the Ultimax 100 LMG

The expertise thus gained enabled CIS to seek its own fortune.
In a gambit to circumvent US State Department control of
the M16 technology, the CIS Small Arms Weapons Group
subsequently fielded two 5.56mm weapons of its own. These
were the SAR-80 rifle, which evolved from the stamped-metal
ArmaLite/Sterling AR-18, and the excellent Ultimax 100 light
machine gun. Both of these weapons feature conventional gas
(impingement) piston operation of the familiar 8-lugged Stoner/

Johnson bolt. Many experts agree that the Ultimax 100 is the
finest 5.56mm light machine gun in the world today. Interestingly, it was designed for CIS by L. James Sullivan, Gene
Stoner's old teammate and the engineer who, as mentioned,
had been a major figure in two historic "scaledowns"; the
AR-15 for ArmaLite and the Stoner 63 at Cadillac Gage.
336 An early production model of Chartered Industries' 7 5-lb. (3.4 Kg), 5.56mm
SAR-80, a copy of the ArmaLite AR-18. The SAR-80 is available with fixed
or folding buttstock.
337. Closeup of right side of late model (redesigned pistol grip; ambidextrous
magazine catch) SAR-80, showing receiver markings.
Photo courtesy Peter Kokalis
338. Like the AR-18, the SAR-80 receiver hinges up for disassembling. The
similarity of bolt and operating rod/spring assemblies is obvious here.
339. The state-of-the-art in 5.56mm light machine guns: the Ultimax 100,
designed (on the revolutionary "constant recoil" principle) for Chartered
Industries by L. James Sullivan in 1979. Note the familiar 8-lugged bolt, ready
to begin a burst of controllable, open-bolt, full-auto-only fire from the 100round drum magazine.
The Model 603-K - Springboard for South Korea

Another staunch US ally in Asia, the Republic of South
Korea was a target for "most favored" American assistance.
The R O K troops who fought in support of the US and ARVN
in Vietnam really admired the M16 rifle, and thus there was
popular support for Korean adoption of this weapon. Unlike
the other licensees, and indeed Colt's itself, all of whom relied
heavily on sub-contractors for most of the rifle's components,
the plant built with US aid in Pusan was truly self-contained.
Every part of the rifle was made in-house, from the receiver
forgings and barrels to springs, pins, castings and plastic furniture. Another division of Colt Industries, the Pratt & Whitney
Small Tools Division, even equipped a companion factory to
make the required cutting tools for the main rifle plant, which
was originally known as Pusan Arsenal.
The Koreans favored the Army M16A1 (Colt model 603) with
the bolt forward assist feature, so the rifle they manufactured
under license from Colt's became known as the model 603-K.
Offshore Production
340. Left and right side views of receiver markings used on licensed production
of the South Korean M16A1 (Colt model 603-K). Note "K" serial no. range.
The Daewoo "K" Series

Operational control of the complex facility known as Pusan
Arsenal was tranferred to Pusan's Daewoo Precision Industries,
Ltd. in January 1983. Subsequently, and for the same reason
that had motivated CIS in Singapore, Daewoo introduced its
own series of 5.56mm weapons, again highly derivative of the
M16 and other successful modern designs. The K1 and later
K1A1 carbines use an M16-type gas tube, carrier key and bolt
341. The Daewoo "K" series of weapons. From the top: the K2 rifle (with
aftermarket silencer) with 8-lugged, M16A1-type bolt functioned by Kalashnikovstyle gas piston/operating rod; two 10"- barrel K1s, with suppressors patterned
after the XM177E2 SMG (top K1 also fitted with aftermarket silencer); the
later K1A1 carbine with rubber-coated, telescoping stock extended.
323
(with a receiver-mounted ejector working through a slot in

the bolt face), but the bolt carrier itself is a modified AR-18
type: a short, thick (rounded) block reciprocating on an easilydismounted twin guide rod/recoil spring assembly. The K2
rifle combines the M16-type bolt with a sturdy Kalashnikovpattern gas piston/operating rod, while the K3 light machine
gun is patterned generally after the FN Minimi.
342. Closeup of receiver markings on the Daewoo "K" series.
Above: the military K1 with four-position selector, marked in English and Korean.
Note the resemblance to the M16 lower receiver, especially in the magazine
well area.
Below: the civilian-type, semi-auto-only K1A1. Note the takedown button, directly
behind the rear sight.
The Philippine 613-P Rifle and 653-P Carbine
343. Left and right side views of receiver markings used on licensed production
Phillippine M16A1 rifles and carbines (Colt models 613-P and 653-P). Note
the "RP" serial no. range.
The Philippine Army also preferred the M16A1 version and

purchased nearly 50,000 Colt model 613s (the export version of
Colt's model 603, the standard bolt-assist M16A1) prior to 1967.
These rifles saw considerable use in the Philippine government's
ongoing campaign against Muslim rebels and communist
insurgents. In 1967 the Elisco Tool Company of Manila, which
incidently today owns the legal remnants of ArmaLite, undertook to manufacture two versions of the M16A1 rifle under
license from Colt's. These were the model 613-P standard rifle
and a carbine, fitted with the XM177E2's collapsible buttstock
and a 14 1/2-inch barrel, called the model 653-P. Many of these
weapons have been seen in television coverage of the Aquino
revolution.
Offshore Production
Taiwan - Gateway to the Orient

Another purchaser of approximately 50,000 Colt model
613s was the government of the Republic of China on Taiwan,
presumably with licensed production in mind as had been
the case with the other aid recipients. This precedent had
Memorandum
been first established early in 1967, when the US and the

Chinese Republic on Taiwan had entered into a solemn
License Agreement regarding the M14 rifle and M60
machine gun, as follows:
of Understanding
between
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA

and
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

RELATING TO THE LICENCE
FOR THE PRODUCTION OF
M14 RIFLES AND M60 MACHINE GUNS
[23 January 1967]
. .As requested by the government of the Republic of China,
herinafter referred to as the GRC, the GRC will establish
facilities in-country within the next two years with the capability to produce the M14 rifle and the M60 machine gun
at an annual rate of 6,000 each M14 rifles and 1,200 each
M60 machine guns on a single shift (8 hours per day) basis.
It is estimated that the GRC will expend in the United
States on a dependable undertaking basis approximately
US$4 million for tools, components, materiel, documentation,
technical assistance, and assemblies..during the period
[FY67] through [FY69]
..The GRC will take all necessary steps to ensure that
any classified information furnished by the United States
Government, hereinafter referred to as the USG, for the
purpose of this program will not be supplied to any third
party or otherwise compromised..
For the purpose of the production. .of M14 rifles and M60
machine guns under the terms of this Memorandum, .and
under the authority of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. .and
Section 414 of the Mutual Security Act of 1954..the USG
will furnish to the GRC (without cost other than for reproduction and handling) Engineering Drawings, Specifications,
Production Data, and other Technical Data..
344. Early and late styles of receiver markings on the US government-licensed

production of "Type 57" M14 rifles by the Republic of China on Taiwan.
Left: old style markings, reading, top to bottom: "Rifle 7.62 57shiki (type)";
"Made in Republic of China (ROC)"; circle trademark of ROC 60th Arsenal;
serial no. (000001 to 048655).
Right: first rifle with new style markings: "Rifle 7.62"; "Type 57 Made in
ROC"; 60th Arsenal trademark; serial no. (beginning with 048666).
325
This authorization does not in any way constitute a

license to make, use or sell the. .proprietary rights. .which
may be described in the documentation... The USG agrees
to interpose no objection to the duplication by the GRC
for the purpose of production of M14 rifles and M60
machine guns, of any special tooling and industrial
facilities now used., in the manufacture of such items... If
requested, the USG will sell to the GRC, to the extent
available, USG-owned surplus production equipment
and machine tools [from the defunct H&R M14 production

line].
. .It is the intent. .that items produced, .will be interchangeable logistically with items produced by or for the USG..
..Items manufactured..will be identified by appropriate
markings and designations to distinguish their source of
origin or manufacture..
The Taiwanese were then given not only know-how and

machinery to produce the weapons, but also the ammunition:
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense

Memorandum for the Director of International Logistics..
PRODUCTION DESIGN DATA TO GRC ON 7.62mm AMMUNITION
30 January 1967
Reference is made to the US-GRC Logistical Support
License Arrangement on production of the M14 rifle and
M60 machine gun, dated 23 January 1967.
ized to provide production, design data to GRC on the

7.62mm ammunition as requested..subject to industry approval where required. Reimbursement will be limited to
reproduction cost of data and any technical assistance
requested by GRC.
As an adjunct to the above Arrangement, you are author-
The 5.56mm T65 Rifle
345. Partially-stripped view of the 5.56mm Taiwanese T65. Note from top:
M16 charging handle, new upper handguard; AR-18-type gas piston assembly
and M16 bolt assembly sans carrier key; M16-type (bolt closerless) receiver
with flip-up rear sight "hump" and no carrying handle; cast-aluminum M16A1type lower receiver with different contour to lower buttstock.
Offshore Production
The Taiwanese also moved on to an ambitious 5.56mm

manufacturing program of their own with the most derivative
design of any discussed so far - the T65. Manufactured by the
Hsing-Ho Arsenal in Kao-hsiung, the T65 is an exact, late-
model M16 "lookalike" except for a standard impingementtype gas piston, and no built-in carrying handle. The Republic
of China's Marines, Special Forces and Military Police have
adopted the T65 to replace their older NATO-caliber Type 57s.
M14 Rifle Production in the People's Republic of China
346. Closeup of receiver markings on some typical M14 rifles. From left: 1.
genuine US M14, manufactured as part of Springfield Armory's third order for
70,500 rifles, dated March, 1961 (US Rifle M14); 2. Republic of China Type 57
rifle (fig. 344); 3, 4 and 5: mainland Chinese "M14s" made by North China
Industries (Norinco) of Beijing. Note the 8 (!) digit serials on nos. 3 and 4. Clumsy
woodwork, but with metal generally better finished than the ROC Type 57.
Somehow, by the early 1970s, the megalithic China North

Industries Corporation (Norinco) of Beijing (Peking) had also
gathered sufficient technical data to turn out what is by all
accounts a very creditable copy of the M14 rifle. Norinco is
truly a vast and surprisingly enterprising state-owned conglomerate of manufactories, which produces virtually every
conceivable item of military field ordnance from pyrotechnics
to self-propelled howitzers, including ammunition in every
basic caliber of consequence from .22 long rifle to large-bore
mortar bombs and cannon rounds. On the hardware side,

among many other things Norinco makes sporting and military
versions of the T T 3 3 Tokarev (Type 51 and 54) and Makarov
(Type 59) pistol, as well as the PPS43 (Type 43) and PPSh41
(Type 50) submachine gun, the AK-47/AKM (Type 56 and
later variants) assault rifle; light, medium and heavy machine
guns in calibers 7.62x39mm, 7.62x54R and 12.7x108mm; and
an automatic cannon in caliber 14.5x114mm. And that's just
the small arms.
327
Approximately 100,000 Red Chinese M14s were made up,

so the story goes, marked " M 1 4 " as illustrated, to arm a
communist uprising in the Philippines which never took place.
All were apparently fitted for selective fire and chambered for
the regular 7.62x51mm NATO cartridge, also made by Norinco
using the same distinctive, copper-washed steel that China uses
in its East bloc cartridge cases, but bearing, confusingly, British
NATO headstamps!
Norinco also produced a semi-auto sporting version of

the M14 called the model 305, in two versions: "Type I"
with standard stock and flash suppressor, and "Type I I "
featuring a full-pistol-grip stock and a recoil stabilizer akin
to those developed by the US Army Infantry Board and
adopted as the short-lived M14A1 (US Rifle M14).
The China North Industries'

"CQ 5.56mm Automatic Rifle"
347. The China North Industries' "CQ 5.56mm Automatic Rifle", left side
view. The selective-fire CQ weighs 7.5 lbs. (3.4 kg) fully loaded, and was
designed for M193-type ammunition, with a 1-in-12 rifling twist.
" C Q " is a transliteration of "16" in Chinese: a direct, blatant

and unauthorized copy of the M16A1 rifle. The " C Q " rifles are
selective fire, with a right hand rifling twist of 1 turn in 12 inches.
Apparently thus far Norinco only makes the regular 20-round
magazine. The " C Q " has all the features of its US counterpart,
including the bolt forward assist. The only immediately apparent
differences are a distinctively curved and decorated plastic
pistol grip and a round, finger-grooved handguard. All the
plastic furniture has a grey, rather than black, appearance.
A semi-auto sporting version of the " C Q " is also offered,

called the Norinco model 311.
The Norinco 5.56mm ball round (Type " C J " ; headstamp
JS + 2 numerals) features a 55-grain bullet like the M193
with a listed muzzle velocity (V25) of 965 meters per second
(3,166 fps).
Enhancing the M16Al's Capabilities
Chapter Twenty two
ENHANCING THE CAPABILITIES

OF THE M16A1
RIFLE/AMMUNITION SYSTEM
348. A drawing showing official Army "Recommended Battle Sight Zeroing Range
and Projectile Trajectory" for the M16A1 rifle firing M193 ball ammunition,
with an average muzzle velocity of 3,171 ft. (966.5 m) per sec. Note that a
250-meter zero results in a shot 5" high at 150m, and 27" low at 400m.
The AMTU Points the Way

Back home in the early seventies, with M16A1 reliability
problems just a memory, a number of studies were being made
to address the performance capabilities of the 5.56mm system.
In a trailblazing test, run at Fort Benning by the USAMTU's

T&E Section, three standard and three heavy-barreled M16s,
all fitted with Weaver V-4.5 telescope sights, were pitted against
329
Enhancing the M16A1's Capabilities 330
349. Three views of a special, experimental M16A1, designed by the Human

Engineering Labs (HEL) for faster target acquisition. Note the highlighted,
full-length sighting groove. Used in the SAW trials.
three MTU-accurized M14s fitted with the Leatherwood/

Redfield "AR-Tel" adjustable ranging telescope (US Rifle M14).
All three "M14 ( M T U - N M ) s " had previously passed the
M T U ' s accuracy standard of a 6.0-inch extreme spread at
300 meters.
A series of bench rest firings at 100 and 300 meters corroborated earlier SAWS study results, indicating clearly that
accuracy in the M16, especially past 300 meters, would improve
as a result of the introduction of a stiffer barrel, heavier bullet
and faster rifling twist:
[US Army Marksmanship Training Unit, Fort Benning, Georgia]

ACCURACY TEST, M16 HEAVY BARREL
12 August 1969
. .a representative of Colt's. .asked for [USAMTU] assistance in testing the M16 heavy barrel for accuracy..
[one] phase of the test was. .firing the [three] heavy barrels
..and..three standard issue M16 rifles..at 300 meters for
accuracy. Results [in inches] are as follows:
Ammunition
EV
EH
ES
LC12444
6.8
7.1
5.6
7.6
7.4
5.1
82
86
60
65
6.7
7.6
LC 12444
8.6
7.0
9.9
8.5
10.5
12.4
7.5
10.1
13.1
12.8
10.2
12.0
LC 12045
4.8
3.9
6.4
3.7
4.4
7.3
5.3
5.1
87
5.0
5.1
6.4
Heavy barrel
wpn. no.
1
2
3
average
light barrel
wpn. no.
4
5
6
average
[M14 "MTU-NM"]
wpn. no.
7
8
9
average
Conclusions
The use of sling tension on the heavy M16 barrel does
not greatly detract from its accuracy and does not affect
point of impact on the target.
The heavy M16 barrel is superior to the light. .barrel for
accuracy..
racy and maintains the necessary accuracy for sniping up

to 900 meters range. Previous trajectory tests have shown
a decided drop of the 55 grain [5.56mm] bullet after passing
300 meters range. If the use of the M16 is contemplated at
ranges greater than 300 meters in a sniping role, research
should be conducted for a heavier bullet and faster twist
barrel combination..
..The M14 rifle shows a superiority over the M16 for accu-
The MTU's National Match M16A1

In February 1972 the U S A M T U prepared a lesson outline
designed to acquaint all Army M T U personnel with the rationale and ongoing development of a National Match configuration
of the M16A1 rifle. While it was admitted that "currently, no
known configuration can compete with other National Match
rifles over the National Match course", the M16A1 had been
the standard US combat rifle for worldwide use since 1968,
and as such it had been added to the rulebook for National

Trophy matches. In January 1971 the Commanding General
of C O N A R C had ordered all major commands to provide at
least one M16A1 rifle team for participation in the US Army
championships.
..It is highly possible that the M16A1 rifle will become

the only service rifle authorized for use by the All Army Team
in the National Matches.
The M16A1 rifle has been adopted as the Standard Service

Rifle. It will be used at all levels of Army competition. As
manufactured, the rifle is rugged and reliable when given
The outline continued:
331
350. The Rock Island Arsenal version of the M16AI National Match Rifle,
showing rifle assembled (below) and altered components (above).
Rock Island Arsenal photo dated January 1972, courtesy Lou Woll
Enhancing the M16A1's Capabilities
standard maintenance. Accuracy, particularly at ranges exceeding 300 yards, is not currently competitive with other National
Match rifles. Your Army commanders are going to look to
you to provide the modifications necessary to field the most
accurate M16s possible for the next All Army championships.
You are familiar with the work done on the National Match
rifles in the past [US Rifle M14]. We must now apply our
knowledge and experience to field a National Match M16A1.
The applicable National Match rules and regulations, as
specified in AR 920-30, were next dissected:
. .We can use the M16 or M16A1 as issued or modified.
We can use the AR-15 as sold commercially. Also we may use
combinations of. .components to field a National Match rifle.
In order to allow civilian use on a relatively unrestricted
basis, the AR-15 lower receiver must be used. Specifically,
civilians cannot be issued a weapon which was manufactured
having full automatic capability, regardless of subsequent
modification to remove the full automatic capability.
. .The most desirable approach is the AR-15 lower receiver
...The next best approach is to use a "stop plate" currently
being manufactured by Rock Island Arsenal. The "stop
plate" is economical and easy to install..
As the stock is currently manufactured, it is too short for
a great many shooters in the prone position. The NBPRP
recognizes this fact and lengthening of the stock will be
allowed. Approximately 1 1/2" increase.. gives a comfortable
feel in all positions.
351. RIA modifications to M16A1 NM front sight bracket to accept M14 front
sight, showing metal removal from A to A'.
Inset: closeup of M14 front sight pad, sawn from M14 flash suppressor, dimensioned as shown and silver-soldered to center of prepared surface.
.. M14 front [and rear sights have] provided the best results
to date. A complete description and instructions for installing
the M14 sight[s] are provided... We have obtained a maximum
sight radius of 21 1/4 inches with M14 rear sight [which]
gives 1 inch per click at 100 yards. We have found that the
M14 front sight must be reduced in width by 1/3 to provide
the most desirable sight picture..
352. Modification to RIA M16A1 NM upper receiver to accept M14 rear

sight base.
333
. We have experimented with the internal trigger assembly

in several ways to improve functioning. These are:
Added steel bushings to increase the receiver pivot pin
diameter to .250 inches in order to reduce vertical and
lateral movement between upper and lower receiver.
Hone the release sear's engagement surface to eliminate
trigger creep. The hammer notch was filled with silver solder
and recut to provide the best possible sear engagement
surface.
Removed disconnector and cut away full auto cam on the
mode of fire selector switch to eliminate full auto capability.
This action provides semi-auto fire only regardless of.
position of selector.
Added a trigger stop in front of the trigger to reduce trigger
over-travel. This stop is positioned through the bottom of
the trigger housing and protrudes up into the trigger housing
to reduce downward movement of the trigger bar... A 6/32
screw with lock nut was used.
Removed the trigger return spring and replaced it with
a recoil spring placed over the trigger stop which provides
faster return of the trigger bar into engagement with the
hammer notch.
In order to reduce wear between the aluminum receiver
and trigger and hammer pivot pins, external bushings were
added to the standard pivot pins. The bushings were fabricated from 1/4-28 hexhead cap screws, heads were reduced
to .322" diameter and slotted for a screwdriver. The interior
face of the resultant bushing must not protrude past the
interior face of the trigger housing... Receiver wall appears
to be approx. .090".
..In addition, two heavy barrel versions of the M16 have
been tested by the USAMTU. This barrel is standard length,
with increased diameter and weighs approximately one
pound more than the standard barrel. One version has a
1-9 twist. The other has the standard 1-12 twist.
353. Manufacturing dimensions for an M14-type rear sight base, screwed to

RIA-modified M16A1 NM upper receiver (fig. 350) and fitted with standard
components of an M14 rear sight.
The M T U noted a "significant increase" in accuracy provided by the experimental heavy barrel with the one-in-nine
twist, and concluded that, although the M16A1-NM as described and illustrated was "significantly more accurate" than
the standard issue rifle, there was much ground to cover (in
more ways than one) before the M16 could compete against
M21s and National Match M1s in the full course of fire.
All the modifications discussed above have resulted in

better shooter satisfaction with the feel and handling characteristics of the rifle..
However, tests of the modified rifles, using both issue and

handloaded ammunition with bullets weighing from 52 to 70
grains, confirmed that faster-twist rifling and heavier barrels
and bullets would further enhance the 5.56mm's accuracy and
range capability.
Other Military "Match" M16A1s
354. Left side view of a Match M16A1 rifle built in the US Naval Academy
armory shop at Annapolis, Maryland. Note, from front: redesigned, inthe-white flash suppressor on heavy barrel; Redfield Olympic rear sight
in special bracket on modified upper receiver; trigger stop adjustment nut

(in front of trigger); lengthened buttstock.
NRA photo courtesy Joseph Roberts, Jr.
355. Closeup view of the right side of receiver of the US Navy Match M16A1,
showing the "shaved" carrying handle and the method of attaching the Redfield
Olympic rear sight. Note the hole, exposing the trigger bar, for easy adjustment
of trigger stop.
335
Enhancing the M16Al's Capabilities 336
356. Closeup of forward section of Navy Match M16A1 (above) compared with
an early model 01 AR-15. The two holes in the standard M16 sight block were
filled with silver solder, the block was slotted front-to-rear, and a new blade sight
was inserted, approximating the shape and width of the M14 NM front sight blade
(.062"). Note the Match rifle's heavy barrel, necessitating the "opened-up"
front sight block.
NRA photo courtesy Joseph Robert, Jr.
357. Further development of the Navy Match rifle, wherein the upper receiver
survived as the basis for this USMC development at Quantico, Virginia.
Ten rifles were built with full, non-tapered 24" Hart heavy barrels (1-in-10
twist) free-floated within a new, one-piece handguard-and-barrel nut assembly,
made from seamless metal tubing silver-soldered to a specially constructed
barrel nut. Installed with a special spanner, the hollow handguard did not
contact the barrel forward of the barrel nut, thus eliminating any downward
force on the barrel caused by tight sling pressure. Note the reworked trigger
and hammer pivot pins, and the lengthened stock.
358. A prototype Match rifle built in 1971 by Rodman Laboratories at Rock

Island Arsenal. To take further advantage of the free-floating barrel concept
(and the M16 gas system's inherently low barrel bending moment) a longer
sight radius was provided and the carrying handle was removed, thus making
the arm targetscope-adaptable. Note the dummy flash suppressor, used
as the pedestal for the Redfield Olympic aperture front sight; the "bobbed"
gas block; the scope blocks added to the tubular metal handguard/barrel nut
assembly; and the Redfield International rear sight mounted on a special rail
affixed to the receiver.
NRA photo courtesy Joseph Roberts Jr.
Extended-Range 5.56mm Ammunition Developments
359. A further (actual size) cartridge compendium of improved, extendedrange 5.56mm ammunition (compare with figs. 85 and 141). From left:
1. 55-grain M193 ball (nickel-cased dummy of the FN version, the SS92)
for comparison, headstamped FN 78; 2. black-tipped, 63-grain tungsten-core
AP from NWM (for Stoner machine gun contract circa the SAWS study)
headstamped NWM 5,56 67; 3. 77-grain IWK heavy ball, headstamped K
5,56x45 Y IWK; 4. (Black-tipped) Colt special heavy-ball loading,
headstamped REM-UMC 223; 5. Colt's 68-grain GX-6235 bullet, headstamped
FC69; 6. green-tipped Olin/ Winchester "Penetrator" 62-grain (4.02-gram)

bullet, headstamped WCC 84 (fig. 362); 7. black-tipped, 55-grain US XM777
ball, headstamped LC 77; & orange-tipped XM778 tracer, headstamped LC 77;
9. green-tipped 61.7-grain (4-gram) FN SS109, headstamped FN 79; 10. US
M855 (SS109 counterpart), headstamped LC. 81. ; 11. 63.5-grain Canadian
C77 ball, headstamped IVI [NATO crossed-circle] 85; 12. copper-washed
Canadian C83 proof round (M193 bullet), headstamped same as no. 11.
Editor's collection
Arguably the most valuable result of the American SAWS

program (1964-66) had been the credibility which those eighteen
months of field trials had ultimately bestowed on the 5.56x45mm
cartridge in a longer-range, "light support weapon" role. Aside
from the Colt HBARs, just about the only weapon in the world
available to establish such credibility at that time had been
the Stoner 63 and 63A systems. Indeed, as we have seen, the

SAWS trials came about in the first place largely as a result
of the Marines' championing the Stoner over the multiplicity
of weapons and calibers they were then using, which, they had
argued, would only be increased by their adoption of the
XM16E1 rifle.
Mauser/IWK (NWM) Heavy Bullets

The first thing the SAWS L M G firings had proved was that
the M193 lead-core ball version of the 5.56 round just didn't
have enough " p u n c h " to fulfil a real support role beyond
normal combat ranges. Ballistic enhancement programs, based
on the overall dimensions of the M193 round, were therefore
begun both at home and abroad during the period of the
SAWS trials.
In support of continuing squad automatic trials with Stoner
weapons, Cadillac Gage contracted with the German arms
and munitions giant Mauser - Industrie Werke Karlsruhe AG
(IWK) and its Dutch-based subsidiary, Nederlandsche Wapenen Munitiefabriek De Kruithoorn N.V. (NWM) for several
lots of heavy-bullet ammunition. A series of four bullets was
announced in January 1967: a "hard-core" AP with a tungsten

carbide core, designed for a regular 1-in-12" rifling twist and
supplied in boxes of 40 rounds at a reported cost of $2.90 per
round (fig. 359 no. 2); a 700-meter-range tracer; a training
blank; and a heavy 5.0-gram (77-grain) steel-jacketed leadcore ball round (fig. 359 no. 3), which required a rifling twist
of one turn in 200mm (7.8 inches) to stabilize and produce
acceptable accuracy. The 77-grain bullet left the muzzle at
2,722 fps (compared with the 55-grain M193's 3,263 fps in
a barrel having one turn in 305mm or 12 inches). However,
while the M193 "went subsonic" after about 600 meters' flight,
the I W K ammunition was listed as "lethal to 1,000 meters".
In a most impressive penetration test through one-inch soft
pine boards, I W K claimed the following astounding results:
337
361. Under date of January 23,1967 IWK announced the results of comparative
tests of M193, 7.62 NATO and the IWK-developed heavy ball bullets (fig. 360).
Included was this chart, entitled "Comparison of velocities for ranges from
0 - 500m". As Bill Davis had argued earlier, concentrating on muzzle velocity
could be misleading!
360. Dimensioned factory drawing of the 1977 Mauser/IWK 77-grain, steeljacketed lead-core ball round (left) showing comparative length of bullet and
depth of seating with M193 (right).
5.56x45mm M193 - 10 boards

7.62x51mm NATO - 16 boards
5.56x45mm I W K - 46 boards
In a move reminiscent of Fairchild's late-fifties scheme to

produce the AR-10 at Artillerie-Inrichtingen, Cadillac Gage
granted worldwide manufacturing and sales rights to the Stoner
63A1 weapons system to N W M of Holland in 1965. A "production preparation branch" was established at N W M which
turned out about 12,000 barrels, but "offshore" interest in
the Stoner system did not amount to adoption, and the NWM
weapon and IWK heavy-bullet ammunition programs lapsed
into obscurity. Most of the 3,000 Stoners ever made came from
Cadillac Gage.
The Davis/Colt 68-grain GX-6235 Bullet

Mr. Davis comments informatively on some relative characteristics of several 5.56mm bullets, beginning with Stoner's
adaptation of Frankford's .22 homologue of the caliber .30
Ml ball (fig. 72), and including a description of a 68-grain
secant ogive design first made up in 1965 at Colt's (fig. 359

no. 5). Interestingly, this bullet looks remarkably similar to
the FN SS109/US M855 (fig. 359 no. 9), later adopted by all
of NATO:
..As an aside here, it should be mentioned that [Stoner 's]

supposedly sophisticated bullet design. .had in fact a rather
naive error in its application to that particular cartridge.
The allowable protrusion of the bullet, which is the difference
between the design length of the cartridge case and the design
length of the loaded round, was somewhat less than the axial
length of the 7-caliber tangent ogive. The crimping cannelure
of the bullet was therefore actually located somewhat ahead
of the cylindrical bearing surface, encroaching slightly on

the ogive. Though the encroachment was small and hardly
noticeable except in an analysis of the drawing dimensions,
it could readily have been avoided by any experienced
ammunition designer, and certainly is not in accordance
with the best design practice for small-arms bullets. In the
68-grain boattail bullet designed somewhat later at Colt's
for use in their proposed long-range round..this problem
of limited bullet protrusion inherent in the design of the

5.56mm cartridge was avoided by use of a 10-caliber secant
ogive of reduced axial length, which allowed crimping of
the case mouth into a cannelure located properly on the
cylindrical bourrelet, but did not degrade the aerodynamic
drag characteristics of the bullet. A similar solution to this
problem is found in the Belgian SS109 and US M855 longrange 5.56mm bullets, which in fact bear striking resemblance to the 68-grain long-range bullet proposed by Colt's
in 1965.
During the course of development of Colt's long-range round
a series of comparative firings were conducted, with the
68-grain Davis/Colt long-range bullet stacked up against the
regular M193 ball. In the process, even some 7.62 NATO performance figures were surpassed. Based on firings of his heavier
bullet in a 20-inch barrel with a one-in-nine-inch twist, Mr.
Davis commented on the results of his experiments in the
following report:
362. A picture from an Olin brochure describing the merits of the green-tipped
Winchester "Penetrator" bullet (left). Designed like the SS109 (right) with a steel
noseplug behind a small airspace (fig. 363), the 62-grain (4.02-gram) Winchester
bullet is here shown as giving full penetration of an SAE1010 hot-rolled 10mm
steel plate (from an M16A2 rifle at a range of 240 meters at 0 obliquity),
while the "leading competitor's cartridge" gave only partial penetration.
Colt's Inc.
Firearms
Division
Ballistic Performance of an Improved Long-Range 5.56mm Bullet

(Colt's Design GX-6235)
Remaining Velocities vs. Range [Ft/sec]
Range
(yards)
0
100
300
500
1,000
1,500
Striking Energies vs. Range [Ft/lbs]
5.56mm
55-gr. M193
5.56mm
68-gr. EXP
7.62mm
M80 ball
3,270
2,894
2,211
1,627
895
672
2,900
2,660
2,212
1,798
1,076
869
2,809
2,585
2,167
1,790
1,048
856
Range
(yards)
0
100
300
500
1,000
1,500
5.56mm
55 gr. M193
1,305
1,022
596
323
98
55
..The striking energy of the 7.62mm M80 is much greater

at all ranges than that of any bullet which can be fired from
the present 5.56mm cartridge [because] the muzzle-energy
level is essentially proportional to the weight of the
propellant charge..
While these Colt bullets gave excellent results in 1-in-9twist barrels, they apparently produced very heavy fouling
in 1-in-sevens.
5.56mm
68-gr. EXP
1,269
1,068
738
488
175
114
7.62mm
M80 ball
2,625
2,223
1,562
1,066
365
244
339
The US Army's XM777: A Short-Lived "Exercise in Interoperability"

There was ample proof that the heavier 5.56mm bullets,
while still not equalling the 7.62x51mm in terms of energy,
were far superior to the M193 with regard to range and terminal
velocity. The only problem was their instability, and hence
inaccuracy, when fired through the 1-in-12 rifling twist of the
standard M16/M16A1 rifle. As a compromise measure, the US
developed the XM777 - a 3.53-gram (55-grain), composite
steel-nosed, lead-cored (black tipped) "penetrator" bullet with

the exact external dimensions of the M193 (fig. 359 no. 7),
and a tracer companion, the orange-tipped XM778 (fig. 359
no. 8). If nothing else, the compromise XM777 proved that
the l-in-12 rifling twist of existing M16s was incompatible with
any serious attempt to enhance long-range 5.56mm lethality
and penetration. The project was soon abandoned.
The Round of the Future - The Fabrique Nationale (FN) SS109
363. From an FN report dated October 1980 entitled "Improved Ammunition

5,56x45".
Left; the 4-gram (61.7-grain) SS109 ball bullet, which (except at FN) has proven
to be a difficult round to manufacture. Note the tiny, unlabelled airspace ahead
of the steel core.
Center: the 4-gram P112 AP.

Right: the 4.134-gram (63.8-grain) L110 tracer.
Courtesy Fabrique Nationale Herstal
The M193 version of the 5.56x45mm round was produced

and sold by FN as the SS92, with a standard-weight 3.56-gram
(55-grain) lead core bullet. By the mid-seventies, however, FN's
Ballistic Research and Development Department had perfected
its own longer and heavier 4-gram (61.7-grain) "semi-armor
piercing" design, featuring a steel nose-piece atop a lead core.

Like the earlier Mauser/IWK and Colt designs, the SS109,
especially its super-long tracer version the L110 (fig. 363),
required a faster rifling twist (FN recommended 1 turn in 7
inches) in order to stabilize.
The M16A1 Rifle Remains the US "Arm of Choice"

By 1980, in addition to US and other "future rifle" development, conventional 5.56x45mm rifles and light machine guns
were springing up all over the free world. This was not only
as a result of the US mutual aid programs in Southeast Asia
(chapter 21) and elsewhere, but independently. Spain was testing
its C E T M E model L and Lo rifles and the A M E L I machine

gun (a scaled-down MG3 lookalike); West Germany was looking
at Heckler & Koch's HK33 rifle and HK13 machine gun; in
Belgium FN had produced the short-lived CAL and later FNC
rifles and the clip-or-belt-fed Minimi machine gun; Italy's
"special operations" forces used Beretta's model 70 rifle;

France had adopted the bullpup FA-MAS; Israel had adopted
the IMI-made Galil; a licensed-production version of the
ArmaLite AR-18 was in production at Sterling Armament in
England (and had also been produced by Howa Machinery
in Japan); and the Austrian Federal Army had adopted the
bullpup Steyr AUG.
In spite of all these new 5.56mm weapons, many of which
incidentally were built around the Stoner/Johnson 8-lug bolt
design, the M16A1 remained the US choice for further improvement. In December 1982 a Fort Benning-based resident
systems development contractor discussed the rationale behind
a product-improvement program (PIP) for the M16A1 rifle
in a memorandum for record:
. .Since its adoption as the standard service rifle, the M16
has been subjected to considerable criticism concerning its
reliability and performance capabilities. Early in the research
effort, it became obvious that a serious detriment to an
effective rifle marksmanship program was a general lack of
confidence in the M16A1 rifle. Therefore, a detailed evaluation of M16A1 performance was conducted to determine
adequacy, peculiarities, etc. The findings clearly indicated
that the M16A1 was an adequate combat rifle..
364. A very graphic correlation of the effect of rifling twist on bullet type,
entitled "Precision of Ammunitions" compares the SS109 (triangles) with
the M193 (circles).
Courtesy Fabrique Nationale Herstal
Weapons for the Eighties

- the NATO Small Arms Trials of 1978-1979
It will be remembered that the first acrimonious international
standardization talks, begun in 1946 among the nations of the
victorious "Atlantic Alliance", had succeeded only in a rather
forced agreement on the US 7.62x51mm cartridge; try as they
might, no common rifle could be found that all could, or
would, agree on.
By the late sixties these agreements had expired, and two
disturbingly divergent trends had become obvious within the
NATO community. First, regardless of its superior striking
energy, the 7.62x51mm round had been abandoned in "individual weapon" development. Second, despite the veritable
spate of new rifles and squad automatics chambered for it,
the 5.56x45mm cartridge, at least the US M193 version, was
decidedly not everybody's "cup of tea". As mentioned in
chapter 20, at least two NATO nations were by the late seventies
pursuing unique and individual design programs aimed at
superseding, not to say obsoleting, the American 5.56mm
round: Germany with its joint Heckler & Koch -Dynamit
Nobel 4.7x21mm OH (ohne hulse, or caseless) Gewehr 11, and
Britain with the 4.85x49mm Enfield bullpup XL64 series

(recently adopted as the 5.56x45mm L85A1).
In this Tower of Babel atmosphere, the ironically-acronymed
NATO Small Arms Test and Control Commission (TCC) could
see the danger of losing the commonality so painfully gained
in the earlier 7.62 NATO round. Even though the 7.62's time
had obviously come as a viable rifle or "individual weapon"
(IW) cartridge worthy of further development, virtually all
NATO medium machine guns were chambered for it.
The answer was found in a new series of NATO small arms
trials, aimed at establishing a second smaller and lighter standard infantry caliber before the various member countries each
stepped out with its own non-standard cartridge. A secondary
goal, that of establishing a new standard NATO rifle, was also
hopefully included even though the odds of its attainment
appeared even steeper than they had been in 1946. Nevertheless
there were strong economic, industrial and political
considerations attendant upon the trials, and competition
among the eleven participating nations was keen.
341
The salient weapons and cartridges featured in the

NATO trials were as follows:
Country
Belgium
Ammunition
7.62
5.56
5.56
5.56
Rifle (IW)
NATO (SS77)
SS92
SS109
SS109
1977-1980
L M G (LSW)
Remarks
MAG-58
control L M G (7.62mm)
FNC
MINIMI
France
5.56 (M193)
FA-MAS
Germany
7.62 NATO
7.62 NATO
caseless 4.7x21mm
G3
Netherlands
5.56 (M193)
MN1
(Israeli Galil)
United Kingdom
4.85x49mm
4.85x49mm
4.85x49mm
4.85x49mm
XL64E5
XL68E2
right hand ejection

left hand ejection
right hand ejection
left hand ejection
5.56 M193
5.56 XM777/
5.56 XM855
M16A1
XM778
(SS109 equivalent)
United States
control rifle (7.62)

MG3e
G11
XL65E4
XL69E1
Engineering tests were performed at Bourges in France

(machine guns) and Meppen in Germany (rifles). Ammunition
testing was done at the U K ' s Cold Meece facility, formerly
Swynnerton, in northern England, while Canada hosted the
Arctic portion of the military trials at CFB Shilo in Manitoba.
The rest of the military trials were conducted at the West
German Hammelburg Infantry School.
Ammunition
type
Bullet
weight
control rifle (5.56)
As for the ammunition, it was soon clear that the M193 could
be, indeed had been, superseded. Again as part of the legacy
of the American SAWS/SAW trials, the two characteristics which
observers took stock of most were long-range accuracy and penetration. The various types of "improved" 5.56x45mm cartridges
(and others of even smaller bore) were unprecedentedly effective
at ranges far beyond the once-heretical 300 or even 500 meters:
Rifling twist
(1 turn in)
inches
mm
Penetration
(meters)
NATO plate
US helmet
grams
grains
SS77
(FN 7.62mm)
9.33
144
12
305
620
800
M193
(US 5.56mm)
3.56
55
12
305
400
515
SS109
(FN 5.56mm)
4.00
61.7
178
640
1,300
XM777
(US 5.56mm)
3.53
54.5
12
305
410
820
..As a result of this..technical and military programme, 5.56mm has been adopted as second standard
NATO calibre for small arms and the Belgian SS109
ammunition has been selected as a basis for standardization of ammunition for the second NATO calibre for small
arms.
Thus the improved characteristics of the heavier bullet used

in the SS109 and its American counterpart the XM855 allowed
full pursuit of NATO's stated goal for the "post-1980 family"
of small arms - a two-caliber system based on each member
nation's preferred 5.56x45mm individual weapon (IW) and

light support weapon (LSW), backed up by medium support
weapons (MSWs) in caliber 7.62x51mm.
The Marines Examine Four Future Options

the reintroduction of the M14 rifle, while the second advocated
the retention of the M16A1 as it then was. Neither idea was met
with any great enthusiasm. The third suggestion was to review
as many other currently available military weapons as possible
in the hope of finding a clearly superior successor to the M16A1.
After a quick whip-round of the free world's offerings, this
search was abandoned as "disappointing". The focus then
concentrated on the fourth option, improving the M16A1.
In September 1979, with Vietnam already a six-year-old

memory, a strategy meeting was held at USMC headquarters.
The purpose was to examine ways to improve the status and
effectiveness of the Marines' three-caliber inventory, which
then consisted of 5.56mm M16Als, 7.62 NATO M60s and
.30M2 Browning machine guns (still in use on some Marine
tanks). After some discussion, it was decided to limit the investigation to four possible avenues of approach. The first proposed
The USMC Statement of Requirement

- a bullet with better accuracy at 800 meters and the capability
to penetrate all known helmets and body armor at ranges of
800 meters.
In the absence of any similar enthusiasm from the Army,

whose inventory of M16A1s was still quite substantial, the
Marines began unilateral negotiations with Colt's in January
1980, contracting for the supply of three rifles modified in
accordance with the USMC's primary requirements. Encouraged by NATO's acknowledgement of the enhanced range
capability of the FN SS109/XM855 bullet design, the Marines
later formalized their requirements as follows:
- a rifle with more durable plastic parts and barrel which

will take a beating during bayonet training and extended field
exercises.
- the replacement of the lull automatic capability with a burst
mode which fires a maximum of three rounds with each pull
of the trigger.
- a sight adjustable to 800 meters.
US Navy M16A1 Heavy-Barrel Heat Dissipation Trials

Having received two special test rifles from Colt's in the
summer of 1980, the Naval Surface Weapons Center (NSWC)
at Dahlgren, Virginia conducted a series of tests to assess the
heat dissipation and dispersion characteristics of Colt's heavy

barrels and two types of new handguards and heat shields.
Excerpts from the NSWC's final report are as follows:
Improved M16A1 Rifle Instrumented Tests and Results

20 August 1980
Background
The M16A1 assault rifle.. is currently the standard service
weapon in use by the US military.. .During its years of service
life, several aspects of the weapon's design and performance
characteristics have come under criticism from users. ..The
shape and individual natures of the left and right handguards
and
Introduction
detract from the performance of the rifle during sustained
fire and cause logistical problems when the handguards must
be replaced. In addition, the physical strength of the barrel
and buttstock.. sometimes prove inadequate.. in the field, and
bent barrels and cracked buttstocks result.
343
365. From the August, 1980 1-in-12 heavy-barrel trials conducted at the
Naval Surface Weapons Center, Dahlgren, Virginia. Top two rifles (serial
nos. 4833958 and 4833992) are fitted with heavy barrels (note the difference
in handguard ventilation holes); bottom two (serial nos. 4833967and 788939)

are standard M16A1s.
Photo courtesy Fred Willis
In an attempt to alleviate some of these difficulties..

Colt Firearms has proposed several changes in..configuration. .. These modifications include.. interchangeable handguards (upper and lower). .purportedly having
improved heat shielding characteristics and increased
mechanical strength, and ..a strengthened barrel with
thicker walls. Two experimental weapons having these
characteristics were assembled by Colt Industries and

presented to the Marine Corps for their perusal and
comment..
Results
..experimental guns..each weigh approximately 1.3
pounds more than a standard weapon. Because this weight
has been added to the barrel, the center of gravity., is
slightly forward.. .This forward shift...positions the c. g.
more nearly equally distant from the right and left hands
when the weapon is held in firing position, and is
responsible for the somewhat improved handling qualities
of the experimental guns..
..All parts in the actions of all four test weapons..were

standard M16A1 configuration. ..Twist of rifling: all 4 weapons
- 1 turn in 12 inches.
and Discussion
Long range dispersion [test]:
. .consisted of firing each weapon at a target located 200
yards downrange... Each weapon was mounted in a machine
rest [figure 366] during firing. Two groups of 20 rounds each
were fired from each weapon.. .Each group was measured [by
finding].. x = length in inches of one horizontal side of a
rectangle enclosing 90% of the pattern [and] y = length. .of
one vertical side..

X
9.40
16.50
14.15
15.10
Maximum
handguard
Temperature (F)
Automatic fire
strengthened barrel, av.
standard barrel, av.
strengthened barrel [and]

round (test) handguard
112
standard barrel [and]

handguard
194
strengthened barrel with

standard handguard
164
standard barrel with round

(test) handguard
121
Semiautomatic fire
4.0
7.20
strengthened barrel, av.

standard barrel, av.
4.25
7.25
Barrel surface temperature measurements:

Thermocouples were mounted on the..handguards
as shown... Each weapon was fired in 25-round bursts
with 1 minute cooling between bursts to a total of 300
rounds.
Total [stoppages] - 3.. in 5,743 rounds = 1,914 rds/stoppage.
366. One of the heavy-barrel M16A1s "wired" for heat-dissipation trials, during
the US Navy trial of August, 1980.
Photo courtesy Fred Willis
Conclusions:
Experimental weapons.. shot smaller patterns at both [70and 200-yard] test ranges.. .the difference in dispersion was
due largely to the stiffer barrels..
Barrel surfaces..remained cooler..due to the extra steel

in the experimental gun barrel tubes. Data also indicate
a difference between.. location of the hottest area of the
345
barrel during firing. This information should be used in

finalizing barrel design to locate, if possible, the hottest
barrel region in an area not covered by the handguards.
figuration [figure 365] from a logistics point of view; the

tests also indicated that they are equally effective in heat
absorption..
The experimental handguards and heat shields.. represent significant improvement..in dissipating heat and
protecting the shooter's hand. The. .full hole patterns in
each half are preferable to the other experimental con-
It was generally agreed by all shooters participating.. that

experimental weapons..were overall somewhat easier to
handle and point, .and that there were no significant differences in ease of control during fully automatic fire..
The NSWC recommended that the experimental rifles be

field evaluated, and that if any future tests proposed the
lightening of the new barrels by 1/2 pound or more, these
should be "fully weighed against accompanying losses in heat

absorption characteristics and decreases in barrel stiffness
and strength".
The Third-Generation M16
Chapter Twenty three
THE THIRD-GENERATION M16

Colt's Improved Open-Bolt HBAR
367. The latest model of Colt's HBAR M16, which fires from an open bolt.
Note, from the front: M60 bipod; lightened gas/front sight block somewhat
reminiscent of the short-lived Colt M703 (fig. 274); new square-section hand-
guard for greater heat dissipation, with front pistol grip and carrying handle;
click-adjustable (windage and elevation) rear sight, mounted in modified upper
receiver; lengthened buttstock.
JSSAP's Product Improvement Program ("PIP") Rifle

- the "M16A1E1"
Tests with the Marines' four rifles aroused the interest of
the management committee of the Joint Services Small Arms
Program (JSSAP), who at the time were persevering through
a long and acrimonious series of trials designed to select a new
service pistol. JSSAP approved a joint-service rifle program
and ordered 50 Product Improvement Program (PIP) M16Als
from Colt's for delivery in November 1981.
JSSAP tasked the U S M C Firepower Division at Quantico,
Virginia to oversee the Marine portion of the trial of the new
rifles. Accordingly, the Marines conducted a modified operational test (MOT) from 23 November to 11 December 1981
using 30 of the PIP rifles and 30 standard-issue M16Als, and
employing 20 Marines and 10 soldiers from the 197th Infantry
Brigade at Fort Benning. For identification purposes, the PIP
rifles were designated the "M16A1E1".
The result of these Marine tests was a most favorable assessment of the PIP rifle. The final report listed a number of the
M16A1E1's advantages as follows:
347
The Third-Generation M16 348
368 Above: standard M16A1.

Below: One of the first 50 Product Improved (PIP) rifles, called the "M16A1E1",
ordered in 1981 by the Marines for trials with the USMC Firepower Division
at Quantico, Virginia.
The Marines had been agitating for years for a common-caliber weapon
system: as we have seen, their persistence had provided the impetus, not
to say the necessity, for the SAWS (Small Arms Weapons Systems) and later
SAW (Squad Automatic Weapon) trials, wherein was developed the USMCsponsored, removable-barrel XM106 (fig. 319). Thanks to intensive, parallel
research done in the improved HBAR program (fig. 367), Colt's was ready
when the Marines came calling for product improved (PIP) rifles. The first
M16A1E1 rifles were delivered just 14 days from placement of order.
[USMC Firepower Division, Quantico,
Virginia]
M16A1E1 TEST RESULTS AND FINAL REPORT

21 May 1982
[Advantages:]
- Ease of training (handling and sight movement). [The
Marines are trained to engage targets beyond combat ranges
by adjusting their sights, rather than by "holding over"]
- Increased effectiveness at long ranges (more hits, better
accuracy, and greater penetration). [The Marines are virtually
the only fighting force in the world who still train individual
riflemen to engage targets past 300 meters],
- Improved handling characteristics and durability in
hand-to-hand close combat.
- Reduced barrel jump and muzzle climb during automatic

and rapid fire.
- Improved sighting characteristics providing quick target
acquisition for moving targets and better detection of targets
in low light conditions at close ranges..
- Increased ammunition conservation and more effective
use of ammunition with [3-round] burst control device..
- Can use NATO type improved ammunition (XM855)
which provides increased performance and penetration at
long ranges.
369. Right side view of early M16A1E1 rifle. Not yet fitted with the spent case
deflector "lump" on the receiver (fig. 371).
370. Closeup of receiver markings of the early M16A1E1, made up on "M-16A1"

lower receiver serial no. 4704772. Standard M16A1 pistol grip. Note modified
markings on the (3-position) selector: AUTO is replaced with BURST.
349
Adopting the M16A1E1

The product-improved (PIP) "M16A1E1" was officially type
classified the M16A2 in September 1982, and adopted as
Standard 'A' in November 1983. As noted, the singular impetus
provided to the PIP program was from the Marines, who due
to "declining inventories" of M16Als had already ordered
76,000 of the new rifles. In acknowledgement of the Marine
contribution, Colt's presented M16A2 serial no. "0001 U S M C "
to Marine Maj. Gen. William G. Carson on March 14, 1984.
The specially-marked rifle was intended to symbolize the first
M16A2 off the line, although by that time the Marine Corps'
M T U at Quantico had already accepted the first 1,500 rifles

for use in Divisional Matches.
As noted, the Army, although the senior service, had a much
less critical inventory problem, and consequently had less
interest in the PIP program's recommendations: the Army
did not contract for any appreciable number of M16A2s until
1986. In the face of this less-than enthusiastic Army attitude,
at the same ceremony Colt's presented M16A2 serial no. "0001
USA" to the Army's representative of the Chief of Staff.
371. Right side view of early production M16A2 rifle. What appears to be a
massively heavier barrel is controversially heavy in its front section only
(fig. 374). Note the prototype spent case deflector, attached to receiver.
Twelve Distinctive Features of the M16A2

Although the 7-pound M16A1 and the 7.9-pound M16A2
rifles look much the same at first glance, enough changes
have been made to render the M16A2, in the words of one
report on the subject, "for all intents and purposes, a different
weapon".
Starting from the front end, the major changes in the M16A2
over its predecessor are as follows:
1. The flash suppressor is now also a muzzle brake. This
fourth iteration of a muzzle device for the M16 rifle originated as a Canadian design, produced during the lateseventies NATO trials. The bottom two slots in the "birdcage" suppressor have been eliminated, thus forcing more
gas upward through the remaining slots and aiding in keeping
the muzzle down on burst fire. It also lessens the problem
of water running into the bore off the channeling slot-edges,
and doesn't kick up a blast of sand when fired from the prone
position.
2. The barrel is heavier and, as noted by the Marines, suitable
for use with the new, heavier-bullet M855 ammunition. The rifling twist has been tightened from the old 1-in-12 to FN's recommended 1 turn in 7 inches, and, in a move perhaps just a little
wiser than many have credited, the extra six ounces of weight
have been put right where the Navy had recommended: "..if
possible, the hottest barrel region..not covered by the handguards". The official reason for retaining the old contour under
the handguards is to allow the continued use, without modification, of the M203 grenade launcher. In addition to contractor's
identification and proof mark, the new barrels are marked "5.56
NATO 1/7" on the top center of the stiffened front portion.
3. The front sight is a square post, adjustable for elevation.
372. Closeup of receiver markings on early production version of the M16A2

rifle (8-million-series serial nos.) This is no. 8000031. Note the new, fingergrooved pistol grip.
4. The results of the Navy heavy-barrel firings were taken

directly to heart in the design of the new handguards. These
identical, and therefore interchangeable, ribbed top-and-bottom
halves are much stronger and feature better heat dissipation
than the old non-interchangeable left and right sides.
5. The circumference of the slip-ring or "delta ring" which
secures the handguards at the receiver end has been canted
for a better grip.
6. The upper receiver has been strengthened in the area
surrounding its front attachment point with the lower receiver,
and also features a distinctive, integral fired case deflector in
the receiver wall behind the ejection port.
7. The rear sight has been completely redesigned. Its 1.75mm
long range aperture is adjustable for windage and elevation,
with a maximum range setting of 800 meters. A flip-up 5mm
battle aperture is provided for ranges of 0 - 200 meters.
373. Closeup of selector markings on production M16A2 rifle.
351
374. A comparison of the major external dimensions of three barrels.

Above: standard M16A1.
Center: typical Colt HBAR.
Below: the controversial "heavy-front" M16A2, with under-the-handguard

dimensions virtually identical to the M16A1 (above), to allow use of M203
grenade launcher.
Drawing by Thomas B. Dugelby
8. The forward assist thumbpiece, hitherto a ridged L-shape,

now ends in a simpler-to-manufacture round button.
feature to replace full-automatic fire has been incorporated

in most models of the M16A2 "family".
9. The pistol grip is made from stronger nylon with sharp

checkering on the sides and a distinctive "swell" below the
middle-finger position.
11. The stock is made from foam-filled, super-tough nylon,

said to be ten to twelve times stronger than the old fibrite stock,
and is 5/8" longer.
10. The change lever positions now read SAFE, SEMI and
BURST: the Marine recommendation of a three-round burst
12. The buttplate is squared and heavily checkered, and features

a redesigned, easier-opening door to the internal storage cavity.
375. Closeup views of the M16A2 rear sight, showing early windage knob (above).
Note the 1.75 mm long-range aperture and elevation set for 500 meters (arrow,
below). Sight can be flipped forward to reveal 5mm battle-range aperture.
35
The Colt 700-Series M16A2 Weapons Family
376. The Colt M16A2 Weapons Family as it originally appeared. From the top:
1. The M16A2 rifle (Colt model 711).
2. The M16A2 Carbine (Colt model 723, with lightweight barrel and injectionmolded plastic buttstock).
3. The M16A2 "Commando" (Colt model 733).
4. The M16A2 HBAR (Colt model 741).
5. DOD was adamant that every M16-type rifle in the inventory should be
capable of accepting the M203 grenade launcher attachment. Thus the uneasy
compromise with the front-heavy barrel (fig. 374).
Courtesy Colt's Firearms Division
377 Closeup views of both sides of the receiver of a later M16A2 "Commando".
Note the selector markings on both sides and the newer, chamfered rear sight
windage knob (fig. 375).
356
The Colt 700-Series M16A2
As noted throughout this book, AR-15/M16 rifles had been

assigned internal Colt (600-series, except for the short-lived,
gas-pistoned model 703) model numbers since the inception
of the program with the model (6)01. This was done mainly to
ensure positive identification in the factory, due to the plethora
of models with different features and/or markings Colt's
produced.
Banking heavily on its future success and popularity, Colt's
developed a complete M16A2 weapons family, the third since
the CAR-15 system of the sixties. Perhaps as a measure of its
departure from its predecessors, Colt's assigned new (700
series) model numbers to the new family:
Model
Description
701
Colt production version of the M16A2,

described above.
703
An earlier, inadvertent use of the 700-series

denominator (figs. 274-276). In an attempt
to dramatize the differences in the model
703, Colt's had unofficially and fleetingly
dubbed it the "M16A2". The M16A1 PIP
program, described above, put the gaspistoned Colt M703/"M16A2" firmly back
on the shelf.
711
Same as the M16A2 except fitted with

standard M16A1 sights and regular-weight
M16A1 barrel.
723
The M16A2 "Carbine", fitted with a

lightweight 14.5" barrel, M16A1 sights and
telescoping (XM177E2-type) buttstock.
Weight: 7 pounds.
733
M16A2 "Commando" version with 11.5"

barrel, M16A1 sights, telescoping buttstock
and standard M16A2 flash
suppressor/muzzle brake.
741
M16A2 " H B A R " : a magazine-fed, heavybarrel squad automatic. Weighs just over
10 pounds.
715
Canadian Armed Forces rifle version of the

M16A2, called in Canada the Rifle, C7.
Discussed below.
725
Canadian Armed Forces carbine version of

the M16A2, the C8.
The Critics Attack the M16A2's "Improvements"

The upshot of the PIP program, as we have seen, was to
transform the M16A1 assault rifle, with its stated maximum
range of 460 meters, into a full-scale, all-terrain main battle
rifle with considerably improved range capabilities. As mentioned, during the 1978-1979 NATO trials the 5.56mm SS109
bullet had defeated the 3.5mm-thick NATO soft steel plate
at 640 meters, a German helmet at 1,150 meters, and a US
helmet at 1,300 meters; in every case better performance than
with the 7.62 NATO round!
[Mellonics
Systems
Memorandum
However, the criticisms and pronounced variations of

opinion which have always surrounded the M16 continued
to dog the heels of the M16A2. In an after-the-fact riposte
to the list of "advantages" which the Marines had published following their tests of the PIP rifles, the Armysponsored, Fort Benning-based Mellonics Systems Group
argued powerfully and at length against virtually each and
every modification:
Development]
for Record
The M16A2 Rifle

..The [USMC list of advantages of the M16A1E1 rifle
(chapter 22)] represents the objective and subjective evaluation of Marine Corps personnel.. .To provide a balanced
view, an additional analysis has been conducted from the
point of view of Army training. It is not surprising that a
different list of findings emerged. In fact, most.. are in the
form of a disadvantage or shortcoming.. .Also interesting

to note is that there is very little direct conflict between items
on the [USMC] list and the items listed below.
- The M16A2 does not have a sight setting for.. 25 meters,
where zeroing and most practice firing occurs..
Attacks on the M16A2
- The M16A2 does not have a setting for battlesight zero,

i.e. 250 meters..
- ..the 5mm aperture used for 0-200 meters is probably
too large and the 1 3/4mm aperture used for 300-800 meters
is probably too small..
- The M16A2 sighting system is too complex..
- The M16A2 has less combat capability due to the elimination of full automatic fire [which] enhances the ability..to
clear and defend buildings, to conduct final assaults on
enemy positions, to defend against an enemy final assault,
to conduct [or] react to an..ambush, to engage an enemy
helicopter or fast-moving vehicle, etc. While the Marines
claim greater accuracy and conservation of ammunition for
the 3-round burst control, no data were generated during
the [M16A1E1] test to support these contentions and no supportive data are known to exist...To be given very serious
consideration is the fact that the burst control requires nine
(9) new parts in the lower receiver..
..One of the reasons we acquired the M16 was because
soldiers in combat felt they were being outgunned by an enemy
armed with a full automatic AK-47...The psychological impact
of full automatic fire can often make the difference in the
unit's perception of how effective their fire is... It has been
well established that, during World War II and Korea, up
to 85% of soldiers failed to fire their semi-automatic
weapons during some enemy contacts. In Vietnam, armed
with a full automatic weapon, almost all soldiers returned
fire. While much of the Vietnam firing was "wasted", i.e.
it didn 't hit anybody, it was a rare exception when individuals
or units got into trouble because they had expended all of
their available ammunition.
..The soldiers in Vietnam were not trained to employ rifle
fire effectively. But it was not a one-bullet-for-one-kill environment. Most firing was directed at unseen targets.. .Whether
or not the full automatic rifle really made any difference,
soldiers thought it did.. .We must also carefully consider the
fact that all potential enemies we will face have individual
weapons with full automatic capabilities.
Further criticisms were voiced, centering mainly around the

fast one-in-seven rifling twist of the M16A2's barrel. It was
disclosed that the 1-in-7 had been chosen mainly because the
longer, 64-grain bullet of the tracer version of the SS109 (called
by FN the L110 and in the US the XM856) required a onein-seven twist in order to stabilize properly. Such a twist had
been therefore specified in the newly-adopted US 5.56mm
Squad Automatic Weapon (SAW), the M249 (FN Minimi).
A somewhat slower one-in-nine twist (such as had been used
in the PIP and M T U trials) was belatedly advocated for the
.. During the limited research we have conducted in automatic fire - experimenting with burst size, various holding
positions, etc. - we are finding that three-round bursts may
not be the optimum burst size. In the majority of bipodsupported automatic rifle.. positions, firing up to five and
ten round bursts, the third round will many times find the
limit of the group size with subsequent rounds moving back
in toward and around the initial aiming point..
..It also is important to note that the..three-round burst
control on the M16A2 does not recycle, i.e., if one or two
rounds are fired because the trigger is not held long enough,
a magazine change is required, or in the event of a stoppage
for any other reason, the next pull of the trigger will not
result in a three-round burst, but will result in [the remaining]
one or two shots being fired. In other words, even when
the burst control is properly working, it may result in the
firing of one, two, or three shots..
There are two primary arguments for the three-round burst
control - it is more accurate and it conserves ammunition.
The first claim.. is not true. The second.. is not supported
by data.. .the first three rounds of a five-round burst will
strike the same place as the rounds from a three-round burst
.. since the the third round departs the barrel before the fourth
round is fired. As for conserving ammunition, a thirty-round
burst will result in..expenditure..in a little less than 2 1/2
seconds, and ten 3-round bursts can result in. .expenditure..
in five seconds..
- The M16A2 "heavy barrel" is heavy in the wrong place.
The problem with the M16A1 [was] a temporary bending of
the barrel. .from the stress of various firing positions causing
bullet strike to vary, e.g., the difference between a bipod
firing position and a position using a hasty sling will change
the strike of the bullet at 300 meters by three or four feet
or more. The "bending" takes place between the receiver
and the sling swivel/bayonet stud. The M16A2 barrel is
"heavy" only from the sling swivel to the muzzle - where
it can have no effect on the bending problem..
- the new ammunition (XM855) cannot be fired in the
current rifle (M16A1).
M16A2, a compromise which would have improved its performance with the hundreds of millions of rounds of stockpiled
M193 ammunition.
The fast twist was also an instant candidate for two traditional bugbears of such barrels, fouling and erosion. The Marines
had conducted only a limited, 6,000-round endurance and
accuracy trial with their M16A1E1s, and the poor results turned
in by the PIP rifles were largely attributed to "growing pains"
in the fledgling XM855 ammunition production program.
357
Attacks on the M16A2 358
However, they were sobering to contemplate:

Rifle
Ammunition
Group Extreme Spread (cm)

Start
3,600
rounds
6,000
rounds
M16Als, but would not pass through 14 of the 30 M16AlEls.

An investigation showed that the offending barrels were straight
enough, but each contained sufficient jacket-metal and powder
fouling to stop the gauge.
The Marines had noted that, upon completion of the test,

a standard barrel straightness gauge went through 29 of the 30
In addition, there was the standard issue M261 .22 rimfire

conversion unit, designed by Mr. John Foote and produced
for military training use by Saco Defense Systems Inc., of Saco,
Maine. The soft-lead bullets of the standard . 2 2 L R were
designed for a slow one-in-sixteen twist. On this issue the
Mellonics report summed up:
..While there are many problems associated with firing

the .22 bullet through the M16A1, fouling being one of
them, it is an acceptable training alternative. It may not
be possible to fire the .22 long rifle cartridge through the

M16A2 barrel without excessive loss of accuracy or excessive
fouling [fig. 438]..
M16A1
M193
19.03
18.73
17.73
M16A2
XM855
27.43
31.23
62.23
Further Scrutiny of the Non-Recyclable Burst Device

As mentioned, the Marines were using their new M16A2s
competitively. The reason for this sudden interest among
Marine target shooters was noted somewhat dryly by Marine
Maj. R. N. Jepperson in his October 1984 Marine Gazette

article entitled "How Good is the Finest Service Rifle?":
..Interest in the M16A2 among Marine Corps competitive

shooters increased greatly when it was announced that the
1984 divisional matches would be fired with the new weapon.
The 1984 U S M C matches began as ordered, amid a
flurry of attempts at some sensible zeroing instructions for
the new sights which could be retraced if necessary. Mean-
while, Maj. Jepperson's interesting article reported on a

brand-new phenomenon introduced by the M16A2's nonrecyclable burst device:
. .My soaring optimism waned on the first day of firing,

however, as I discovered a startling characteristic: three different trigger weights. This was something that news releases
had not mentioned. Because of the burst control function
of the trigger, the sear operates on a rotating cam device.
The cam makes a complete rotation once for every three
shots. Trigger weight gets progressively heavier for each shot
until the cycle is finished..
Trigger Weights on 10 M16A2s
..To get around this difficulty many. .competitors. .chose to

''dry fire" two times after every slow-fire shot...This method
was cumbersome, and time-consuming, and created occasional confusion - did I dry fire twice or three times? While..
acceptable during the slow fire stages, there was no escape
during rapid fire. You simply had to be ready when the trigger
squeeze was started in case it was lighter than anticipated..
Rifle
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Stages
1
7.5
80
80
9.5
7.5
7.5
80
80
85
80
10.0
9.5
10.5
11.5
10.0
11.5
12.5
11.0
10.0
10.5
9.0
10.0
11.0
10.0
10.5
U.5
U.5
Attacks on the M16A2
The Proposed Snodgrass/Tyler Burst Control Device
378. It Can Be Done Department: figs. 1 and 4 from US Patent no. 4,004,496
entitled "M16A1 Burst Control", granted in 1977to Robert E. Snodgrass and
Michael N. Tyler. The patent's abstract reads "An automatically recyclable
burst control mechanism.. responsive to trigger action to actuate automatic

recycling of the burst control mechanism to its initial position, independent
of the number of rounds fired in each..burst".
US Patent Office
359
360

As noted, the modifications built into the M16A2 were largely
USMC preferences. The Army waited until the spring of 1986
to announce a procurement contract with Colt Industries for
100,176 M16A2 rifles, at a unit cost of $479.16. Meanwhile,
plans were begun in 1985 to "enhance" the M16A2 before
any large numbers of them were produced for Army inventory.
Initially, the enhancement program had furthered earlier
research which centered around the removal of the rifle's
familiar carrying handle and replacing the standard iron sights
with a reflex sight mounted directly on the top of the receiver

(chapter 20). Colt's made up 50 "enhanced" rifles for trials.
The excellent British Sight Unit, Small Arms, Trilux (the
SUSAT; discussed in Modern Military Bullpup Rifles) and other
telescopes and sighting systems were experimented with, all
designed to offer the soldier a single point of aim. The night
sights and non-magnifying collimator reflex sights (chapter
20) were also reviewed, but at the time of this writing no final
decision has yet been made on the Army's M16A2 enhancement program.
The Proposed Kodak Optical Sight System
379. Closeups of a civilian AR-15 (model SP1), fitted with experimental Kodak
3.5x Optical Sight.
Left: late model sight in Colt-adopted ARMS scope base.
Right: earlier model sight fitted with Kodak's 12-oz., slide-on "Night Adapter"
with lithium-powered image intensifier, capable of presenting a 2x2-meter
target area at ranges up to 500 meters. Note the early mount, which gave
way to the ARMS design (above). Kodak has developed a unique insert-molding
technique which imbeds polished but not edge-trued lenses, properly positioned, within the plastic body of the unit itself, thus dramatically reducing
the cost of quality military optics.
The Special-Purpose M231 Firing Port Weapon (FPW)

During World War II it was painfully discovered that troops
inside armored personnel carriers were vulnerable to close-in
attack while inside their vehicles. The Germans even developed
a modified MP44 Sturmgewehr featuring a curved barrel attachment called a krummerlauf which in conjunction with a periscopic
sight allowed troops inside armored vehicles to bring small-arms
fire to bear on anyone approaching the perimeter of the vehicle.
In May 1974, after a development/operational test of

three candidate weapons (the M3A1 submachine gun,
an M16A1 modified at Rock Island Arsenal, and a modified German 5.56mm HK33) the decision was taken to
continue development of the Rock Island M16A1 at the
Army's then-titled Research and Development Command
The M231 FPW
380. Three prototypes of the M231. Note different designs of firing port
mounting points.
Above: right side view of "Firing Port Candidate" with 11" barrel and selective
fire from open bolt.
RIA photo dated July 12, 1974.
Center: right side view of "MICV/Firing Port Weapon XM231" with 11" barrel
and selective fire from open bolt.
RIA photo dated October 6, 1975.
Below: left side view of later XM231 built on "M-16A1" serial no. 5048448 Note
selector markings: SAFE and AUTO only.
RIA photo dated April 1, 1976.
361
The M231 FPW 362
381. A later prototype of the XM231 Firing Port weapon. Note the flip-up
front sight; the short handguard; and the telescoping stock: all attempts to
keep the weapon as versatile as possible in support of the short-lived "combat

emergency mode" concept.
RIA photo dated October 18, 1976
(ARRADCOM) in Dover, New Jersey. This weapon, subsequently christened the XM231, initially featured a short,
heavy (11") barrel and internal changes which allowed
selective fire from the open-bolt position, with a cyclic rate
of 1,050 rpm.
Further changes led to the adoption of the full-auto-only

M231, and a contract was signed with Colt's for the production
of 27,000 FPWs as part of the standardization of the M2
Bradley Fighting Vehicle (BFV) in 1979. The finalized M231
is described as follows:
382. Field stripped view of the M231 as initially standardized in 1969. Note,
from front: standard "birdcage" suppressor on 15.6" barrel: finalized IFB
ball-mount "collar, barrel"; short plastic handguard and absence of any
front sight; modified carrier for open-bolt fire; short buffer and 3 nesting
recoil springs; recoil spring guide and telescoping buttstock.
The M231 FPW
overall length: 28.5 inches (723.9 mm)

weight: 8.5 lbs (3.8 kg) without magazine
barrel length: 15.6 inches (396 mm)
rifling: 1 turn in 12 inches
cyclic rate: 1,100 - 1,200 rpm
mode of operation: open-bolt fire; full automatic only
ammunition: M196 tracer only
As originally standardized, the M231 featured a collapsible
wire buttstock much like that of the M3A1 submachine gun,
for use in the last-ditch, off-vehicle "combat emergency"
mode. Latterly this feature has been done away with. As noted
in a late correction to TM 9-1005-309-10:
The M231 FPWs will be fielded without buttstocks. TMs
that accompany the FPWs will show the weapon with a buttstock, so don't think that your weapons are incomplete when
you receive them...The weapon can be dangerous and ineffective when removed from a BFV. Without the buttstock, the
muzzle climb..is difficult to control...The weapon is not
authorized for off-vehicle use during training.
Sixty-five percent of the M231 consists of standard M16A1
components. Other than the special barrel and quick-release
collar, most modifications are internal. The hammer has been
done away with, and the bolt carrier is modified with gas
exhaust ports on the right side and a bent on the underside
to allow it to catch and hold on the sear in the open position.
When the trigger is pulled, the bolt and carrier go forward,
stripping, chambering and locking on a round. A striker then
impacts the floating firing pin, firing the round and beginning
the action cycle. A redesigned return spring and buffer group,
only 4.65" long, features three nested coil springs around a
central guide rod.
383. A look inside the Bradley IFV, showing an M231 installed in ball-mounted
firing port hole, and another in reserve (above). Photo courtesy Bob Faris
The M231 attaches quickly to the ball swivel mount in any

of the BFV's six firing ports (fig. 383) and is intended for use
exclusively with M196 tracer cartridges. The gunner aligns
the weapon on the target without the use of sights by observing
the bullets' trace and point of impact.
363
The M231 FPW 364
384. Fig. 10 from TM 9-1005-309-23&P (Organizational and Direct Support

Maintenance Manual for the M231): exploded view of lower receiver and
extension, showing part numbers.
Inset: part names for components of open-bolt firing system, with part numbers
as used in this and the next illustration.
385. Assembling the M231's lower receiver. (Refer to table, inset in fig. 384).
Left: assembling trigger, trigger extension, pivot pin retainer (plate with selector
markings), and change lever.
Right: assembling sear, helical sear spring, and their pins.
Part no.
(fig. 384)
Part
name
Part no.
(fig. 385)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
pivot pin retainer

selector lever
helical sear spring
sear
trigger extension
helical torsion spring
trigger
straight head pin
16
17
18
19
12
13
14
15,20,21
Colt's New Delta HBAR "Countersniper" Rifle

386. The latest member of the M16A2 family to be introduced at time of writing:
Colt's new 11-lb.-loaded "Delta" HBAR "countersniper" rifle. Full heavy
20" barrel; factory-tuned action; Tasco rubber-armored 3-9x telescopic sight
(with duplex crosshair reticle) in zero-returning ARMS quick-detachable base
(fig. 379), designed by Richard Swan and recently adopted by Colt for all
M16/scope interfaces; and ambidextrous black plastic cheekpiece. Note the
cutout in the front of the bolt-on cheekpiece, for charging handle clearance.
Photo courtesy John M. Miller
366
The Canadian Arsenal
387. Above: Canadian Arsenals Limited (CAL) 7.62 NATO caliber C1A1 rifle,
left side view. The standard Canadian service rifle from 1955 to 1984.
Editor's collection
Below early selective fire "Rifle Auto 7.62 mm FN C2", the heavy-barrel, selective
fire, light automatic weapon version of the C1. Note the fold-down handguard/
bipod and 30-round magazine. The story of these arms is told in North
American FALs.
367 The Canadian Arsenal
Chapter Twenty four
THE CANADIAN C7 RIFLE - A

REASONED VIEW FROM THE NORTH
A Look at the Canadian Arsenal
At the time of the 1978-79 NATO trials, the existing Canadian
Forces small arms arsenal was listed under the following alphanumeric descriptors:
C1 (and C1A1): the inch-measurement FN FAL rifle in
caliber 7.62 NATO, as made during the '50s and '60s by the
now-defunct Small Arms Division of Canadian Arsenals
Limited (CAL) in Mississauga (Long Branch) Ontario. (The
history, development and specifications of the C1/C1A1 rifle
are described in detail in Collector Grade's North American
FALs). Adopted in 1955; superseded in 1984 by the events
described below.
C4: the Canadian No.4 Mk.1* .303 bolt-action rifle (LeeEnfield), still used by Ranger and cadet units.
C5: a modified M1919A4 7.62x63mm (.30-06) Browning
machine gun, converted in Canada to fire belted 7.62mm
NATO ammunition.
C3: basically a commercial British-made, Parker-Hale

1200TX bolt-action rifle, in caliber 7.62 NATO. Used with
telescopic or micrometer iron sights as a sniper rifle.
C6: the Belgian-made FN MAG (mitrailleuse a gaz), caliber

7.62mm NATO. Purchased by Canada in 1984 in four versions
for use in and around the Canadian-adopted Leopard tank.
Two models were equipped with bipod, buttstock and pistol
grip: the infantry version with a flash eliminator and the "turret
mounted" configuration with a plain muzzle. The two other
versions were purchased without butt or bipod; one being
mounted coaxially with the Leopard's main gun, and the other
an ARV version with a special adjustable gas system.
With the demise of the Small Arms Division of Canadian

Arsenals Limited (CAL) in June of 1976, the private-sector
firm Diemaco, Incorporated of Kitchener, Ontario contracted
with the Canadian government to establish a facility to support
the existing small arms inventory, described above, and to provide the necessary engineering backup and eventual production
facilities if and when it was decided to replace the existing
weapons with a new family of small arms.
C2 (and C2A1): basically the same as above only fitted for

selective fire and featuring a heavy barrel, 1,000-meter sights
and a folding handguard/bipod. The Canadian squad automatic weapon from 1955 to 1986.
Canada and the "Weapons of the Eighties" NATO Trials

While fielding no new weapons or ammunition of its own,
Canada had conducted the low temperature and climate
evaluation portion of the 1978-79 NATO trials. This included
complete responsibility for a major two-month Winter Trial
of all competing weapons (average daily temperature -35
Celsius) during early 1979. Additionally, 37 examples of each
of the weapon types listed in chapter 22 were provided to the

Canadian government for study in a series of summer and
winter military trials plus endurance, precision and adversecondition tests. The Canadians found that the 5.56mm entries
were generally more accurate than their existing 7.62mm
weapons.
368
The Canadian C7 Rifle
With the H&K caseless G-11 withdrawn due to cook-off

problems, and the British "bullpup" 4.85x49mm XL series
losing points due to its non-standard caliber and appearance,
the contest narrowed to a comparison between the Belgian
FNC and the US M16A1. (The Dutch MN1, while also
firing the 5.56mm cartridge and described as an Israeli
Galil, was in reality little more than a "laundered" AK-47

and as such was deemed unsuitable politically.) The result
was that while both the M16A1 and the FNC featured equivalent hit probability, the M16A1 was significantly more
reliable and was the overall preference of the troops involved
in the trials.
The Small Arms Replacement Program (SARP)
388. First-off C7 rifle, serial no. 85AA00001, from initial run of 21 pre-production
weapons. Presented to Commander Force Mobile Command Lt. Gen. C. H.
Belzile, CMM, CD on November 12, 1985. Type 2 receiver markings (fig. 389).
Courtesy Small Arms Replacement Program (SARP) Ottawa
With the 1980 NATO adoption of the 5.56x45mm in the

Belgian SS109 version (or equivalent, such as the American
XM855), the Canadian government granted a $1.7M contract
to Diemaco in February 1983 for a small arms replacement
program (SARP) to supersede Canada'a ageing arsenal of

7.62mm rifles and squad automatics with new weapons in
5.56mm caliber. Thus the above list of descriptors was added
to, as follows:
C7: the Canadian version of the Colt M16A2, but with some
differences, as described below. The government contracted
for 79,935 C7 rifles.
Accordingly, the Canadians rounded out their new family of

small arms by purchasing 6,500 slightly modified examples
of the FN Minimi (mini-mitrailleuse) light machine guns from
Fabrique Nationale. Interestingly, the C9's flash suppressor
began as the same 5-slotted Canadian design already adopted
in both the US M16A2 and the Canadian C7, but with the
further omission of the topmost gas slot in order to minimize
flash signature and consequent night vision degradation. These
special flash suppressors were manufactured in Canada and
shipped to FN Herstal for final assembly.
C8: a carbine version of the C7, of which 1,565 were ordered.

The C8 is fitted with an XM177E2-style collapsible buttstock
and weighs 1.3 pounds (.6 kg) less than the C7. With its stock
telescoped, it is 29 cm (11.5") shorter overall. The C8 boasts
86% parts commonality with the C7 rifle.
C9: As mentioned, the NATO guidelines for the '80s called
for individual and light support weapons (IWs and LSWs) in
the same "second" caliber, backed up by medium weapons
in 7.62 NATO. This plan was fully supported by the results
turned in by the FN SS109 version of the 5.56x45mm cartridge.
A mutual arrangement exists whereby Diemaco manufactures some return receives some other M249 (Minimi)
components from FN's US operation FN Manufacturing, Inc.
(FNMI) of Columbia, South Carolina.)
369 The Canadian C7 Rifle
389. Three types of receiver markings used so far on the Canadian C7 Rifles
and C8 Carbines.
Type 1: initial style proposed for C7 Rifle and C8 Carbine; not adopted.
Type 2: markings on Colt-made C8 trials receiver (Colt model 725), serial no.
84AB00010. Note standard "Colt's Firearms Division" maker's legend (right).
Type 3: current style; adopted. Note Diemaco logo and selector markings
S, R, AUTO.
In addition to these new weapons, the February 1983 contract

called for the supply of 470,570 nylon 30-round C7/C8/C9
magazines, 51,975 blank-firing adaptors and bayonets for the
rifles, all to be produced in Canada.
A Comparison Between the C7 and the M16A2

As noted, the C7 is essentially a Colt M16A2 with some
modifications and omissions. It is officially described as follows:
length overall: 100 cm (40")
weight, loaded (30 rounds): 3.8 kg (8.4 lbs)
caliber: 5.56mm NATO
rifling: 6 grooves, right hand; 1 turn in 17.8cm (7")
muzzle velocity: 920 m/sec (3,018 fps)
barrel: the C7 shares the controversial "heavy-in-the-wrongplace" profile of the M16A2; more controversial in Canada
perhaps even than in the US as the Canadians do not use the
M203 grenade launcher, and thus the official US reason for
retaining the M16A1 dimensions under the handguards of the
M16A2 does not apply. In fact, Canada actually proposed a
more conventional heavy barrel profile and applied for a design
concession on the M16A2 barrel contour, which Colt's refused
to grant. The C7's hammer-forged barrel also shares the tight
1-in-7 rifling twist, necessary to stabilize the Canadian version
of the NATO-adopted SS109 bullet, called the C77.
cyclic rate 700-940 rds/min

effective range: 400 meters
maximum range: 600 meters.
Beginning at the front end, the chief differences between
the two weapons are as follows:
sights: like the M16A2, the C7 front sight is described as a

"square prism on a threaded base", but in view of the 400meter (600 meter maximum) Canadian range requirement
the M16A2's "complex" 800-meter rear sight was considered
unnecessary. Consequently, the C7 features a standard 2mmand 5mm-aperture M16A1-type flip sight.
370
390. Left and right side views of an interesting cutaway instructional C7 rifle
(Colt model 715). Type 2 receiver markings (fig. 389).
firing mode: Canada's only other selfloading rifle, the C1/

C1A1, was predominantly issued as a semi-automatic during
the whole of its thirty-odd years of service, and Canadian
Forces doctrine stressed semi-auto fire only except under
"special circumstances". Full-auto fire discipline was considered to be "a function of training, and not accomplished by
some add-on device or gadget". Therefore the M16A2's 3-round
burst device, already viewed as more expensive and less reliable
than the standard selective fire mechanism, was deemed "not
required". Canadian-made C7 and C8 selector markings read
S, R and AUTO.
magazine: Canada will build no 20-shot magazines, and
has standardized on a fifth-generation, Canadian-made nylon
30-round magazine. Another outcome of the 1978-1979 NATO
trials was the standardization of the interface of the M16A1's
30-round magazine for all 5.56mm IWs and magazine-fed
LSWs henceforth adopted within the organization. The nylon
30-round C7 magazine will consequently fit all such weapons:
the C7, the C8 and the C9 (M249; Minimi); the British L85A1,
the M16 family, and so on.
391. C7 and C8 barrels are made on this government-supplied, state-of-the-art

hammer forge from GFM of Austria, the only one of its kind in Canada. This
powerful machine takes a carefully honed, smoothbore "blank" (below) and
exerts tons of pressure on the outside surface in a continuous and extremely
rapid multi-hammering process, drawing the blank out roughly one-and-a-half
times its original length and cold-forging it down around a hardened mandrel.
The mandrel, about six inches long, is perfectly formed in the shape of the
chamber, leed and the first few inches of rifling. Concentrating initially on
the rifling section, the blank is slowly rotated as it is hammered, the mandrel
being simultaneously withdrawn until the end of the blank approaches, whereupon the mandrel stops while the hammers continue, thus cold-forming the
complete bore and chamber configuration all in one pass.
Courtesy Small Arms Replacement Project (SARP) Ottawa
buttstock: another commendable tradition that has survived

in the Canadian forces for many years, in an effort to best
"tailor" rifles to their variously-sized users, has been the
availability of different buttstock lengths. Canadian No.4 rifle
buttstocks were produced in long (L), normal (N), short (S)
and bantam (B) lengths; and the C1A1 was available fitted with
extra-long (XL), long (L), normal (N) and short (S) stocks.
Noting that the M16A2 featured a stock 5/8" longer than that
of the old M16A1, Canada followed suit but stipulated that
an optional 1/2" spacer be made available, so that the C7 will
continue the tradition of user-variable buttstock lengths.
butt trap: the C7 will use a modified door developed by
Colt's which can be more readily opened than that of either
the M16A1 or the A2.
392. Canadian Forces 5.56mm C7 rifle and C9 (FN Minimi) light machine gun,
with equipment. Type 3 receiver markings (fig. 389). Note the ammunition supply
packaging: 30-round Canadian-made nylon magazines are charged from
plastic 10-round charging clips pre-loaded in 60-round bandolier (foreground);

para-droppable crate holds 20 bandoliers (1,200 rounds) of C77 ball ammunition. Note Canadian stainless-steel bayonet (fig. 429).
393. Canadian Forces trials C8 Carbine (type 2 receiver markings). Used

exclusively by tank and armored personnel carrier (APC) crews, the C8 is
here surrounded with associated equipment.
372
Canadian Production of the C7 Rifle and C8 Carbine

In order to commence manufacture of the C7, once all the
details regarding the rifle's configuration and the production
licence had been thrashed out, a number of rifles and carbines
were initially made up to the Canadian pattern at Colt's in
Hartford, designated models 715 and 725 respectively. Ironically, here the Canadians found an extra item on the bill from
Colt's: a fee to "re-engineer" the receiver back to the old A1
fixed-rear-sight configuration!
After the Colt-made 715s and 725s had passed Canadian
acceptance trials, a five-phase plan was instituted which designated five stages of increasing Canadian content in the manufacturing process. During these phases, components of nonCanadian manufacture are supplied by Colt's.
395. As a pari of Diemaco's licensed production contract with Colt's, the

Canadian firm was granted manufacturing and export rights to the C7 rifle in
Southeast Asia: hardly an unexplored market by the 1980s, as we have seen.
Nevertheless in May, 1986 Diemaco did prepare this short-lived proposal for
the supply of Canadian-built C7 rifles, modified to suit, to the New Zealand
Armed Forces. (New Zealand has since followed the Australian lead in adopting
the Austrian-designed Steyr AUG rifle [Modern Military Bullpup Rifles],
and the FN Minimi).
Courtesy Diemaco, Inc.
394. Markings on C7 rifle barrel: C MP 5.56 NATO 1/7.
Diemaco delivered pre-production "phase 1" rifles on

schedule in August 1985, which successfully passed acceptance.
Production deliveries to selected units were scheduled to begin
in March 1986, against a continuing program designed to
retire the last C1A1s in mid-1992.
The fifth phase, 100% Canadian production, is supposed
to be in place and operating by March of 1988, and at the
point of this writing (July 1986) it is understood that Diemaco
is well ahead of this schedule. Eventually, Diemaco will manufacture 17 critical components in-house and sub-contract (in
Canada) for the rest of the parts of the C7/C8 weapon system.
396 A Colt trials model 715 rifle, modified in Canada for low-scope mounting.
Canada initially tested a number of sight-enhancement devices for its new
5.56mm weapons which did not require weapon modification. These included
standard Colt/Realist 3- and 4-power telescopes; a 1-power, battery-powered,
front-sight-mounted holographic dot projector (the "H.R.S.100"); the "Hiteye
1500", a 1.5-power, ring-reticle telescopic sight, also mounted in the carrying
handle; and tritium-filled iron sights. A later Diemaco "enhancement" program
examined a number of sighting systems fitted to this Canadian-designed handleless upper receiver (fig. 397).
397. Above: Diemaco's modified, handleless upper receiver, with a Canadiandesigned scope base bonded on to provide a "universal interface channel",
allowing the use of any telescope by means of a simple adapter plate.
Below: If the universal handleless receiver "flew" (which to date it hasn't),
Diemaco foresaw its manufacture from "scratch" in this proposed machined
forging.
Courtesy Diemaco, Inc.
374
The Leitz "Optical Sight, Small Arms (ELCAN)"
398. A Colt-made M16A1, purchased for Canadian trials before the C7program
began, shown fitted with the "Optical Sight, Small Arms (ELCAN)", a lowmounted, day-night telescope from Ernst Leitz (Canada) Ltd., of Midland,
Ontario. Note rifle test-serial no. "203".
399. Closeup of the Leitz ELCAN 3.5-power day-night telescope. As with

the British SUIT and SUSAT, all the adjustments to the ELCAN sight are
in the mount, which quick-attaches to the machined "universal" interface
on the receiver. The design of the ELCAN shown here is described as a direct
evolution of the "Unisight", proposed in 1956 for use with the C1 rifle
(North American FALs, p. 151). The Elcan weighs 430 grams, is permanently
sealed with dry nitrogen, has a 7 field of view, and is range-adjustable from
0-1000 meters. It has no moving parts and features a built-in tritium light
source, which illuminates the tip of its vertical post reticle.
Courtesy Ernst Leitz (Canada) Ltd.
400. Right side view of a Canadian-trials FN Minimi, fitted with the ELCAN
scope sight on a specially modified base, fitted to the top cover.
401. Actual-size comparison of military rifle and machine gun cartridges.

From left: 1. the Russian model 1891 7.62x54mm rimmed (still the East
bloc MMG and sniper rifle cartridge); 2. 7.62x51mm NATO; 3. Russian
402. In significantly broad terminology the October, 1980 agreement on the

"second standard" NATO caliber (chapter 22) called the Belgian SS109 bullet
"the basis" for standardization. For reasons of "face" and variables in
manufacturing practices, each member country was encouraged to develop
its own version of the basic design. (As noted, mass-producing a successful
approximation of the SS109 bullet outside of Belgium has proven exceedingly
tricky, and both Canada and the US have purchased vast numbers of FN-made
SS109 bullets to support ongoing 5.56mm rifle and light machine gun familiarization programs).
Above, left: 61.7-grain SS109 FN ball.
Above, right: 63.5-grain XC77 "ball model 1", an early Canadian attempt
to equal the NATO performance parameters.
Below, left: 63.8-grain L110 (FN tracer).
Below, right: 64.0-grain Canadian XC78 tracer.
7.62x39mm M43 (AKM and RPK cartridge); 4. Russian 5.45x39mm

(AK74 cartridge).
76
404. An IVI 7.62 NATO cartridge box labelled enigmatically "Test lot 6 -Duplex"
contained several cartridges bulleted as shown, with a 5.56-type lead-covered
ball bullet snugly inserted into a hollow-nosed 7.62. (Scale in mm).
Courtesy Capt. William Etter
403. Box labels for Canadian 5.56mm ammunition, manufactured by Les Industries Valcartier Inc. (IVI), of Courcelette, Quebec.
Above: M193 ball, produced by IVI for trial and use in regular M16A1s during
Canada's "switchover" from 7.62mm to 5.56mm.
Below: C83 high-pressure proof (fig. 359 no. 12).
405. The Canadian Forces ' Section Cleaning Kit, issued at Section level in
support of C7 rifles and C9 light machine guns.
Contents, left side: swabs (2 packets of 100); utility brush; pipe cleaners;
4-section cleaning rod; carrier key/gas tube brush; C9 sight adjustment key;
chamber brush; cleaning rod handle.
Right side: bore brushes; C9 front sight "T-tool"; C7 front sight adjustment
tool; plastic bottle of CLP.
END OF PART III
Appendix
Appendix
ACCESSORIES AND ANCILLARIES

Magazines
Literally hundreds of magazine feed systems have been
developed over the course of the M16 program. The most
406 Above, from left: 1. original ArmaLite 25-round; 2. early Colt steel " w a f f l e "
20-round; 3. Colt aluminum 20-round.
typical, as well as a few of the myriad military "one-offs" and

failed Colt experiments, are shown here.
Below: 4. early, fully-curved Colt 30-round; 5. standard Colt 30-rounder with

"straight end and intermediate arctuate portions" (fig. 418).
Bob Faris collection
377
Appendix 378
407. The comparative size of 8 rounds of .30M2 in an M1 Garand clip, and

20 rounds of M193 ammunition in magazine type 3.
408. Three styles of markings on 20-round magazine bases of Colt manufacture.

Left and center: magazines type 3 (fig. 406).
Right: magazine type 2.
409. Steel 20-round magazine (type 2) with "piggyback" adapter/floorplate

installed, the ball of which locks together with another similarly equipped
magazine to provide a quick-change, 40-round package (fig. 410).
Photo courtesy Steve Kemp
Appendix
410. Two 20-round magazines attached in a "piggyback" 40-round package.

411. Magazine for instructional cutaway rifle, showing positioning and feeding
of cartridges.
412. 20-round magazine for M200 blank ammunition. A fillet in the from reduces
the internal length, thus accommodating the shorter blank rounds but not
live cartridges.
413. Experimental plastic 20-round magazine, with molded-in steel feed lips
and magazine catch. Not adopted.
414. A vinyl plastic pouch, issued to US soldiers in Vietnam. A loaded 20-round

M16A1 magazine was inserted from below and the metal tab end (bottom)
was folded and crimped, thus keeping the magazine and its cartridges dry and
clean. Once used and discarded, it was hoped that the safe-conduct message
(center, printed in Vietnamese) would be spotted and used by defecting enemy
troops.
415. One of several disposable plastic magazines developed for the M16 (see
fig. 416).
379
416. Fig. 1 from US Patent no. 3,453,762 granted to Colt engineer Robert D.
Fremont (co-designer of the 5.56mm Stoner 63), entitled "Disposable Magazine
Having a Protective Cover and Follower Retaining Means". Colt's refusal
to provide dimensions for the Army's disposable magazine (chapter 17) spurred
this "in-house" development. Not adopted.
US Patent Office
417. Figs. 1 through 5 from US Patent 3,482,322 granted to Colt's Kanemitsu

(Koni) Ito, entitled "Method of Preventing Malfunction of a Magazine Type
Firearm and Gage for Conducting Same". Hailed at first as a method of weeding
out dented or defective 20-round magazines, this ingenious block was designed
to check every critical dimension. Enthusiasm waned when it was discovered
that some magazines which failed inspection worked well, while others which
passed would jam.
US Patent Office
418. Fig. 1 from US Patent 3,440,751 granted to Colt's Robert D. Fremont,

entitled "Firearm Box Magazine with Straight End and Intermediate Arctuate
Portions". While not as desirable as a fully-curved magazine (fig. 406 type 4),
the Fremont design proved the only workable way to provide a 30-round magazine
capacity for the variously-dimensioned magazine wells of all the AR-15/M16/
M16A1 rifles in military service (chapter 15).
US Patent Office
419. Colt's "proprietary" 30-round magazine, introduced in 1969 after a 3-year

development program (chapter 15).
Rock Island Arsenal photo dated December 2, 1969
Appendix
420. A prototype of an experimental 50-round magazine developed for the

M16 rifle by the Naval Weapons Laboratory at Dahlgren, Virginia.
421. An early GAPCO nylon 30-round magazine. Numerous styles and models
of all-plastic magazines have been developed for the M16, the most successful
being the Canadian pattern (figs. 392 and 422).
422. Three iterations of nylon magazine made to Canadian pattern and leading
to the adoption of "470,570 units" of a finalized and improved version of
no. 1 (left) by the Canadian Forces for the C7/C8/C9 weapons system.
Bayonets
423. Left side view of Colt XM16E1 rifle fitted with Colt's (proprietary) bipod
and first prototype green-plastic-handled military bayonet (fig. 424 no. 3).
Note the metal rivets. Less than 20 of these were made.
381
Appendix 382
Early Colt Bayonets
424. A compendium of four early Colt-marked bayonets for the AR-15/M16.

From top: 1. one-line-address brown-handle prototype.
2: Colt/ArmaLite-marked green-handled prototype, Colt part no. 62082.
3: original green-handled prototype with rivetted 2-pc. handle. Less than 20
of these were made, in the Colt model shop, with blades obtained from a small
commercial contractor in West Haven, Connecticut.
4. the forerunner of the military M7. Same Colt logo as no. 2, above,
but faintly marked around front of muzzle ring "Made in W. Germany".
Made (with and without lower crossguard) by Eickhorn of Solingen for Colt's
in support of the Singapore order (chapter 12).
Initially considered proprietary by Colt's, the AR-15/M16

bayonet was the only such item ever produced by the firm.
It was also the first item of issue "broken o u t " by the Army.
Colt's continued to contract out for "proprietary" bayonets of their design (fig. 424 no. 4) to support overseas
orders.
Development and History of the US M7

A short program of military engineering development
at Springfield Armory led to US adoption of the "Knife,
Bayonet, M 7 " :
Appendix
Project:
rifles [week of] 24-28 February, 1964
Knife, Bayonet, M7: A contract was awarded to Columbus Milpar and Mfg. Co., Columbus, Ohio, for Bayonet
Knives on 25 February 1964, with initial delivery scheduled
on or before 9 June 1964.
The majority of M7 bayonets used in Vietnam were produced under a government contract with Bauer Industries of
Ohio, makers of tank armor and gun turrets. The Imperial
Shrade Corp. of Providence, Rhode Island has been the prime
contractor of M7 bayonets since 1970.
425. The US "Bayonet Knife M7" showing names of components. Internally,

the Eickhorn bayonet (fig. 424 no. 4) is similar but not exactly the same.
The American Historical Foundation's Vietnam War Commemorative Bayonet
426. Four versions of a recent, tenth-anniversary Vietnam War commemorative bayonet, designed by B. J. Weber and manufactured by Imperial Schrade
for the American Historical Foundation of Richmond, Virginia. Limited editions
of 2,500 of each pattern feature varied motifs of "snakes, dragons, bamboo

and flames".
Courtesy American Historical Foundation
383
427. The Vietnam commemorative bayonets are subjected to the same set of
tests each M7 must pass before being accepted by the military. Three of these
are shown here:
Left: hydraulic cylinders apply upward pressure to prove bayonet's secure
attachment to (slave) bayonet stud.
Center: with first 1 1/2" of blade gripped in vice, handle must return to center
after being deflected over a 2 1/2" arc.
Right: steel plate containing maple block is dropped onto blade tip with 28ft-lbs.
of energy. Bayonet must withstand force "without fracture, permanent deformation or loosening of parts".
Courtesy American Historical Foundation
The New US M9 from Phrobis III
428. Three views of the new "Multi Purpose Bayonet System M9" (MPBS)
designed by Phrobis III Ltd., of Oceanside, California. An initial $15.6M contract
for the manufacture of 315,600 M9s (under license by Buck Knives of El Cajon,
California) was awarded by the Army Armament, Munitions and Chemical
Command (ARMCOM) in October, 1986 The M9 MPBS weighs 1.76 lbs. (with
Zytel scabbard and rear-mounted whetstone) and features a 7" blade made
of glass-bead-blasted 425 stainless steel, a black-oxided crossguard, and a
grooved-and-knurled handle also made of high-impact Zytel.
Courtesy MGySgt James W. Maddock
Appendix
The Stainless-Steel Canadian C7 Bayonet
429. The C7 bayonet, 70,000 of which are being manufactured for the Canadian
Forces under a $1.7M contract by Nella Cutlery Service of Stoney Creek,
Ontario. The C7 is built to the German Eickhorn pattern (under a technologytransfer agreement with Imperial Schrade) and features a sandblasted stainless
steel blade and a velcro-fastened plastic scabbard.
430. Closeup of the markings on the Canadian C7 bayonet.

Photo courtesy Robert J. Dynes
Conversion Units and Adaptations

Colt's .22 Rimfire Adapter
431. Colt's blowback .22LR conversion kit for the AR-15/M16.

385
Appendix 386
432. Fig. lfrom US Patent 3,771,415, granted to Henry A. Into and Richard L.
Costello and assigned to Colt's, entitled "Rifle Conversion Assembly".
US Patent Office
Military Conversion Unit Trials - the M261
433. From a military trial of conversion units:

Left: Colt's .22LR conversion (fig. 431).
Right: Military Armament Corp. conversion unit, designed by Max Atchisson.
Center: prototype USAF conversion kit, designed by MSgt. Julius Jurek at

Lang ley AFB, Virginia and labelled simply "prototype".
Rock Island Arsenal photo dated October 11, 1973
Appendix
434. The choice for adoption as a US military training aid narrows down.
Left: Atchisson conversion unit from Military Armament Corp. (MAC).
Right: prototype of the conversion unit designed by John Foote for US
Armament Corp. which became the M261. Note the machined magazine
adapter.
435. The finalized version of the Foote conversion unit (fig. 434) became
the M261 rimfire adapter kit. Saco Defense Systems Division of Maremont
Corporation of Saco, Maine produced over 63,000 M261 kits under a $4.9M
contract. The M261's 10-shot magazine adapter is installed without
Left: positioning adapter and depressing into magazine.
modification or tools into the regular 30-round M16A1 magazine.

Right: hooking adapter under magazine lips and sliding into position.
387
Appendix 388
The US M2 Practice Bolt and M882 Plastic Training Ammunition
436. In a later approach to short-range training, the Army and Marine Corps
adopted the blowback "M2 Practice Bolt" designed to fire M862 Plastic
Training Ammunition (maximum range: 250 meters). Note the absence of the
bolt carrier key.
437. Due to the straight-blowback method of operation of the M2 Practice
Bolt, the limited-range, blue-plastic-bulleted M862 training ammunition produced considerable breech flash when fired. To prevent shooters from being hit
in the face by ejected cases or burning propellant, rifles used in training were
equipped with a bolt-on cartridge deflector, as shown here.
The Canadian C10 .22LR Training Rifle
438. The adoption of the M16A2, with its fast-twist (1-in-7") rifling, meant the
end of any training adaptations using .22LR conversion kits. Canadian experiments proved that soft-lead .22LR bullets were severely deformed (and produced
excessive lead fouling) when fired from fast-twist barrels such as the 1-in-7 C7 rifle.
Left: recovered .22LR bullets, fired from a barrel with a (standard .22LR)
1-in-16" rifling twist.
Right: recovered .22LR bullets, fired from a 1-in-7" twist C7 rifle barrel.
Courtesy Diemaco, Incorporated
Appendix
440. Markings on the proposed C10 .22LR training rifle from Diemaco, Inc. :
22LR TW 1/16.
439. Left side closeup view of the proposed semi-auto-only C10 training rifle,
developed under Canadian Armed Forces contract by Diemaco, Inc. of Kitchener,
Ontario. Weight: 7.6 lbs. Caliber .22LR, magazine capacity 15 rounds. 20.4"
barrel with 6-groove rifling, right-hand twist, 1 turn in 16". Straight blowback
operation. Sights have been modified for optimum accuracy at 30 and 100meter ranges (front C7post reduced to 0.052" width, rear C7 aperture reduced
to 0.050" diameter). The (dedicated) C10 shares 83% parts commonality with
the selective-fire C7, incorporating 14 new and 7 modified parts.
Courtesy Diemaco, Incorporated
389
Epilogue
EPILOGUE
The M16 s Finest Hour
This retrospective is necessarily limited by its publication
date, but, as time will no doubt continue to prove, the M16's
finest hour is NOW. This situation shows every sign of lasting
until the end of the century, despite government-sponsored
Advanced Combat Rifle (and even newer) caseless cartridge
and flechette programs wherein prototype development has

reached an impressively advanced state.
As proof of the ongoing nature of the M16 program, we
present some illustrations received literally at the moment of
going to press from Colt's Military Sales Division.
The XM4 Carbine
441. Left and right side views of a special Colt M16A2 Carbine made for
Abu Dhabi (Colt model 727), shown fitted (via a modified mount) with an M203
grenade launcher. The model 727 features a 14.5" heavy barrel and both
AUTO and BURST capability. Colt's is quite enthusiastic about the model 727
because, unlike the XM177E2, the user gives up very little indeed in terms of
accuracy and velocity to gain the versatility of this impressive "package".
The 727 is a decided improvement over the light barreled model 723, and
Colt's is moving towards standardizing the new version.
At the time of writing, Colt's has produced between 30 and 40 examples
of a new US military trials version of the Abu Dhabi Carbine, officially called
the XM4.
391
Bibliography
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Books
EM-2 Concept and Design - A Rifle Ahead of its Time by Thomas B. Dugelby. Collector Grade Publications, Toronto, Ont., 1980.
German 7.9mm Military Ammunition, 1888 - 1945 by Daniel W. Kent. Private printing, Ann Arbor, Mi., 1973.
Le M16 by Jean Huon. Editions Crepin-Leblond, Paris, France, 1983.
Modern Military Bullpup Rifles by T. B. Dugelby. Collector Grade Publications, Toronto, Ont., 1984.
North American FALs - NATO's Search for a Standard Rifle by R. Blake Stevens. Collector Grade Publications, Toronto, Ont., 1979.
Small Arms Today by Edward Clinton Ezell. Stackpole Books, Harrisburg, Pa., 1984.
The Great Rifle Controversy by Edward Clinton Ezell. Stackpole Books, Harrisburg, Pa., 1984.
The Metric FAL - The Free World's Right Arm by R. Blake Stevens and Jean E. Van Rutten. Collector Grade Publications,
Toronto, Ont., 1981.
The SPIW - The Deadliest Weapon that Never Was by R. Blake Stevens and Edward C. Ezell. Collector Grade Publications,
Toronto, Ont., 1985.
UK and Commonwealth FALs - Volume Two of the FAL Series by R. Blake Stevens. Collector Grade Publications, Toronto, Ont., 1980.
Revised and reprinted, 1987.
US Rifle M14 - From John Garand to the M21 by R. Blake Stevens. Collector Grade Publications, Toronto, Ont., 1983.
Reports and Monographs

Ezell, Edward C.: The Death of the Arsenal System?. Paper on the Decision to Close Springfield Armory, presented to the Organization
of American Historians, April 18, 1968.
Michault, Jacques S.: Development of the M16 Rifle. 3-pg. monograph.
Nonte, George C.: Philco-Ford's 40mm Grenade Launcher. 2-pg. draft article, undated.
Rayle, Lt. Col. Roy E.: Growth of a Rifle. Unpublished manuscript, dated July, 1961.
Stoner, Eugene M.: AR-15/M16 Data, History and Development 12-pg. monograph, dated April 18, 1964.
US Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C.:
Hearings Before the Special Subcommittee on the M16 Rifle Program[the Ichord Hearings], dated May through August, 1967.
Report on the M16 Rifle Program[the Ichord Report]. October, 1967.
393
394
Bibliography
Technical Reports - US Military Agencies

Aberdeen Proving Ground, Md.
Ballistic Research Laboratories (BRL):
A Comparison of Proposed Small Arms Weapons Systems. Memorandum Report No. 1139, dated April, 1958.
A Kinematic Evaluation of the AR-18 Rifle, Cal. 0.223 by Richard F. Cronin, dated February, 1965.
Accuracy of Rifle Fire: SPIW, M16A1, M14. Memorandum Report No. 1919, dated March, 1968.
An Effectiveness Study of the Infantry Rifle by Donald L. Hall. Memorandum Report No. 593, dated March, 1952.
Penetration of an Experimental .22 Cal. Bullet in Gelatin. Memorandum Report No. 1109, dated October, 1957.
Provisional Probabilities of Incapacitation by a Caliber 0.30 Rifle-Bullet, BallM2. Memorandum Report No. 949, dated December, 1955.
Development and Proof Services:
A Test of Rifle, Caliber 7.62mm, AR-10 by L. F. Moore. Report No. DPS No. 101, dated November, 1960.
A Test of Rifle, Caliber .223, AR-15 by L. F. Moore. Report No. DPS-96, dated November, 1960.
A Test of SALVO Rifle Material by L. F. Moore. Fortieth Report on Ordnance Corps Project No. TS1-2, dated September, 1957.
Comparative Evaluation of AR-15 and M14 Rifles by G. E. Hendricks. December, 1962.
Comparison Test of Rifle, 5.56mm, M16 by J. A. Tolen. Report No. DPS-1471, dated October, 1964.
Design and Fabricate a High-Velocity Caliber .22 Cartridge, Modify a Standard M2 Carbine to Fire the Cartridge, and Evaluate
the Weapon-Ammunition Combination by G. A. Gustafson. Twenty-fifth Report on Project TS1-2, dated September 29, 1953.
Test Analysis and Operations Office:
Improved Performance of Ammunition for the M16 Rifle by G. A. Gustafson, dated April 1, 1966.
Human Engineering Laboratory (HEL):
Dispersion Versus Cyclic Rate Test of 4.32mm Cartridge by Orest Zubal. Technical Note 8-74, dated October, 1974.
Noise Suppressor Assembly, HEL M4 for Use with Rifle, 5.56mm, M16A1. Interim Operation and Maintenance Manual.
Preliminary Operation and Maintenance Manual for the 30mm Multi-Shot Grenade Launcher (Rifle Mounted for Conceptual Testing
on a Modified M16A1) by M. Mark Brauer and Richard J. Carter. Technical Note 5-78, dated June, 1978.
Summary of Studies Conducted with the AR-15 by James P. Torre, Jr. Technical Note 2-63, dated January, 1963.
Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA), Arlington, Va.
Test ofArmaLite Rifle, AR-15. Report of Task No. 13A, dated July 31, 1962.
Bibliography
Army Arctic Test Board, Fort Greely, Ak.

Evaluation of Single Flechette and. 635-MM Simplex and Duplex Ammunition. Project No. ATB 3-270, dated May 7, 1960.
Army Armament Command, Rock Island, II.
Laboratory Posture Report FY 1974.
System Assessment for the 5.56mm Rifle M16A1, dated January 20, 1975.
Army Armament Materiel Readiness Command, Rock Island, II.
Firing Port Submachine Gun 5.56mm XM231 Operator's Manual (TM 9-1005-309-10) dated April, 1979.
Small Arms Weapons Systems (SAWS) Directorate, Gen. Thomas J. Rodman Laboratory:
Gun, Machine; 6.00mm, XM235 Preliminary Operators and Organizational Maintenance Manual dated July 1, 1974.
Army Concept Team in Vietnam (ACTIV)
XM203 Grenade Launcher Attachment Development. Final Report of ACTIV Project No. ACG-14/69I dated September 15, 1969.
Army Infantry Board, Fort Benning, Ga.
Evaluation of .30 Caliber Duplex Ammunition. Report of Project No. 2853, dated August 17, 1959.
Army Materiel Command Research, Development and Engineering Directorate
The M16 Rifle - A Case History A Report for the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel. By Dr. Frederick H. Carten, undated, circa 1970.
Army Weapons Command, Rock Island, II.
Annual Historical Summary. July 1, 1962 to June 30, 1963 (Fiscal Year 1963).
M16 Rifle Negotiation - Definitization of a Letter Contract. Case Study of period April-November, 1969.
Procurement History and Analysis of M16 Rifle. AMSWE-PPE-72-01, dated August 2, 1971.
Submachine Gun, 5.56mm, XM177E2 Preliminary Operation and Maintenance Manual (POMM 9-1005-294-14/1) dated July, 1967.
Continental Army Command, Fort Monroe, Va.
Evaluation of Small Caliber High Velocity (SCHV) Rifles. Report of Project No. 2787, dated September 19, 1958.
Defense Research and Engineering Directorate, Washington, D. C.
An Appraisal of the M16 Rifle Program, dated February, 1968.
Department of the Army Technical Manuals
Submachine Gun, 5.56mm: Port, Firing, M231 Operator's Manual (TM 9-1005-309-10) dated October 26, 1982.
Submachine Gun, 5.56mm: Port, Firing, M231 Organizational and Direct Support Maintenance Manual (TM 9-1005-309-23&P)
dated March, 1983.
395
396
Bibliography
Frankford Arsenal, Philadelphia, Pa.

Compilation of..Memo Reports on 5.56mm AR-15/M16Rifle/Ammunition System. Various authors and reports from 1963-1970. Report
No. 6027 dated April, 1972.
Historical Summaries 1956-FY 1972. Various historians.
Special Tests of 5.56mm Ammunition. Ten special tests; various authors. Dated February, 1968.
Office, Chief of Ordnance, Washington, D.C.
Technical Information Reports (TIR):
No. 4: Development of Weapons for the Defeat of Personnel. December, 1954.
No. 4-4-7B51(l): Development of 40-MM Grenade Launcher, M79 (XM79). April, 1961.
Secretaries of the Army, Navy and Air Force
Rifle, 5.56mm, M16 and Rifle, 5.56mm, XM16E1 Operation, Maintenance, Repair and Replacement Parts (TM 9-1005-249-14/T.O.
11W3-5-5-1/NAVWEP O.P. 3333) dated June 15, 1964.
Springfield Armory, Springfield, Ma.
Chromium Plating of Caliber .22 Barrel Bores. Report No. SA-TR1-7011, dated June 10, 1957.
Feasibility Study of a Caliber .222, Salvo Type Shoulder Rifle by C. F. Packard and D. C. Fletcher. Report No. SA-TR11-3100,
dated May 10, 1959.
Technical Intelligence (507th Ordnance Detachment), Detroit Arsenal, Center Line, Mi.
Preliminary Report on Rifle, Cal. 7.62mm, Model ARdO (Netherlands). File No. 507-1-58 dated September 25, 1958.
US Air Force
Systems Command Directorate of Armament Development, Eglin Air Force Base, Fl.:
Exterior Ballistics of the AR-15 Rifle by Robert W. Cross. ASD Report No. ASD-TDR-63-2 datedjanuary, 1963.
Limited Range Test of the M16 Rifle with Eight Types of Rifle and Hand Grenades by Dewey E. Calfee, dated January, 1965.
USAF Marksmanship School:
Evaluation of AR-18 Rifle by MSgt. Louis J. Willing, Gunsmith Division. Project No. 43-70, dated June, 1970.
US General Accounting Office
Development and Cost of the Army's Special Purpose Individual Weapon System by the Comptroller General of the United States.
No. B-167638, dated May 7, 1970.
USMC Naval Surface Weapons Center, Dahlgren, Va.
Improved M16A1 Rifle Instrumented Tests and Results dated August 20, 1980.
Bibliography
Technical Reports - Civilian Contractors

AAI Corporation, Cockeysville, Md.
Weapons & Ordnance Systems Development Programs. Confidential Report No. ER-5406, dated August, 1968.
Final Report - Design and Develop a Simplified Serial Flechette Rifle. Report No. ER-7896, dated May, 1974.
Proposal for the Development of Improved Small Arms Flechette Ammunition. Report No. ER-9481, dated June, 1978.
Armament Components, Inc., Santa Ana, Ca.
Mechanical Ammunition Supply System for Clip-Fed Weapons by V. Bobkowski. Report No. 1-57, dated January 4, 1957.
Mechanical Ammunition Supply System ("MASS") [for AR-10 Automatic Weapon] by V. Bobkowski. Report No. 2-57,
dated January 4, 1957.
Colt's Inc., Hartford, Ct.
Ballistic Performance of an Improved Long-Range 5.56mm Bullet (Colt's Design GX-6235), undated.
Chamber and Gas Port Pressures by F. E. Sturtevant, dated April 17, 1964.
Company Confidential - 1966 SPIW Weapons by Robert E. Roy, dated November 2, 1966.
Effect of Ammunition Variables on Acceptance testing of XM16E1 Rifles by William C. Davis, dated November 8, 1965.
Modification Kit for Two and Three Round Burst Control, undated.
Test of 5.56mm Plastic Training Cartridges from Dynamit-Nobel-Genschow by William C. Davis, dated September 30, 1965.
Military Weapons Division:
Introduction to Colt's Military Weapons [M16 Rifle, Carbine, Commando Submachine Gun and CMG-2 Light Machine Gun];
undated.
Light Machine Gun 5.56mm CMG-2, undated.
Entwicklungsanstalt Mauser-IWK, Germany
Cartridge Cal. 5,56x45, an IWK Development by L. Six, dated January 23, 1967.
Fabrique Nationale Herstal, Belgium
Improved Ammunition 5,56x45. FN Report No. TW7, dated October, 1980.
Fairchild Engine and Airplane Corporation, Hagerstown, Md.
The ArmaLite Weapons System by William G. Key, undated (circa 1956).
Franklin Institute Research Laboratories, Philadelphia, Pa.
Proceedings of the 7th Symposium on Explosives and Pyrotechnics. September 8-9, 1971.
397
398
Bibliography
General Electric Company

Armament Department, Burlington, Vt.:
Proposal for Development of a Special Purpose Individual Weapon. MPB-618(50)270 February 24, 1970.
Chemical Materials Department, Pittsfield, Ma.:
Concept and Feasibility Study for a Disposable Magazine with XM16E1, 5.56mm Rifle, dated November 30, 1966.
Mellonics Systems Development, Fort Benning, Ga.
The M16A2 Rifle. Memorandum for Record dated December 15, 1982.
Olin Industries Arms and Ammunition Division, New Haven, Ct.
Summary and Recommendations - Multiple Flechette Weapon System Development Contract. Contract No. DAAF03-70-C-0012
dated October 26, 1970 (revised February 1, 1971).
Olin Mathieson Chemical Corporation, Winchester-Western Division, New Haven, Ct.
Winchester Light Weight Military Rifle Caliber .224, dated May 1, 1958.
Operations Research Office (ORO), Johns Hopkins University
Operational Requirements for an Infantry Hand Weapon by Norman A. Hitchman. Report No. O R O T-160 dated June 19, 1952.
Optimum Duplex Spread. Staff Paper No. ORO-SP-4, dated June, 1959.
Optimum Dispersion for Gaussian Salvo. Staff Paper No. ORO-SP-24, dated June, 1959.
Phrobis III Ltd., Oceanside, Ca.
Multi Purpose Bayonet System (MPBS), M9. Operator's Manual, undated.
Sionics, Atlanta, Ga.
Noise and Flash Suppressor Assembly MAW-1 for Use with Rifle, 5.56mm, M16A1. Unsolicited Proposal No. S4-100, undated.
Technik, Incorporated, Jericho, N.Y.
Feasibility Study of Flechette Fired from Rifled Barrel. TR No. 71-1 (for Frankford Arsenal), dated February, 1971.
Patents
Pertinent Patents are described as fully as space permits in the text. Any further research enquiries should be addressed to:
US Department of Commerce
Patent and Trademark Office
Washington, D. C. 20231
USA
[Effective October 5, 1985] the fee for a US Patent reprint (by number) is US $1.50.
Bibliography
Some Other Interesting Patents from the SCHV/Salvo/SPIW Programs:

No. 2,811,901: Method and Apparatus for Sabot Removal. (Irwin R. Barr), November 5, 1957.
No. 2,939,395: Sabot for High Velocity Projectile. (Irwin R. Barr), June 7, 1960.
No. 3,123,927: Combined Support and Chambering Guide for Magazine-Fed Cartridges with Fragile Projectiles [Grenades],
(D. L. Katz), March 10, 1964.
No. 3,146,673: Means for Indexing Multiprojectile Cartridges Into Firing Alignment in a Multibore Gun. (Frederick P. Reed),
September 1, 1964.
No. 3,148,472: Subcaliber Projectile and Sabot for High Velocity Firearms. (E. N. Hegge and J. P. McDonough), September 15, 1964.
No. 3,152,513: Firing Mechanism with Burst Control. (R. H. Colby), October 13, 1963.
No. 3,160,063: Operating Mechanism for SALVO-Type Guns. (R. F. Magardo and Donald C. Dadmun), December 8, 1964.
No. 3,166,983: Differential Gas System for Gas-Operated Firearms. (Albert J. Lizza), January 26, 1965.
No. 3,187,632: Projectile Dispersion Device for Firearms. (Earle M. Harvey), June 8, 1965.
Magazines and Periodicals

American Firearms Industry:
" T h e M16 Will Be Obsolete" by R. A. Lesmeister. November, 1985.
American Rifleman:
"Melvin Johnson and His Rifle" by Robert L. Lamoreaux and Melvin Johnson III. April (part one) and May (part two), 1984.
"New Survival Weapon" [AR-5] by George C. Sullivan. January, 1957.
" T h e .223 Rem." by Finn Aagaard. December, 1985.
Armed Forces Journal:
" T h e Army's Small Arms Systems Agency [USASASA]" by James D. Hessman and Joseph Volz. November, 1969.
Army Times:
"Light Rifle Offered for Army Test" [A.R-10A], October 20, 1956.
Cibles:
"L'historique du M16" by Jean Huon. February, 1986.
Defense Attache:
"SAR 80: Singapore's Assault Rifle" by Irvine Cohen. Vol. 2, 1982.
399
400
Bibliography
Gun Digest:
"The M16A2: New World Standard for Infantry Rifles" by C. E. Harris. 1986.
Guns Magazine:
"Is This the Next G. I. Rifle?" [AR-10] by Eugene Jaderquist. March, 1957.
Gun World:
"AR-16: A Note to NATO" by Jack Lewis. September, 1962.
"Futuristic Firearms for Tomorrow's Infantry" by Bob Zwirtz. Undated, circa 1969.
Infantry:
"The M16 Rifle - Bad Reputation, Good performance" by Art Osborne. Sept-Oct, 1981.
"The Rifle Squad's Artillery" by Maj. Charles R. Baker. Sept-Oct, 1969.
"Rifle Marksmanship" by Lt. Col. Barney K. Neal, Jr., and Capt. St. Elmo P. Tyner II. Sept-Oct, 1969.
International Defense Review:
"NATO Evaluation of Small Arms - Ammunition and Weapons for the Post-1980 Period" by Edward C. Ezell. August, 1979.
National Defense:
"Army Tests Candidate Sniper Rifles" by L. F. Moore. Nov-Dec, 1979.
Ordnance:
"A New Automatic Rifle" [AR-10] by Melvin M. Johnson, Jr. May-June, 1957.
"The Black Rifle" by Col. Rex D. Wing. Mar-Apr, 1971.
The Rifle Magazine:
"A Different History of the .222 Mag." by Edward C. Ezell, Ph.D. Mar-Apr, 1970.
"SPIW: Origin and Development of the Army's Undelivered Super Rifle" by Edward C. Ezell. Mar-Apr, 1969.
"SPIW: A New History" by Irwin R. Barr. 1969.
Shooting Times:
"First Report: The Army's SPIW Ammo" by Frederick Earl Cameron (Robert E. Roy). August, 1969.
Soldier of Fortune:
"Army Wants M16A3" by Peter G. Kokalis. January, 1985.
"Made in Taiwan" [the T65 Rifle] by Peter G. Kokalis. August, 1984.

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THE BLACK RIFLE

PART I - THE INNOCENCE OF YOUTH

POSTWAR ORIGINS OF T H E SMALL CALIBER, HIGH VELOCITY (SCHV)

T H E LIGHTWEIGHT ERA TRULY DAWNS

T H E SCHV CONCEPT COMES OF AGE

Winchester Runs Afoul of the Increased Range Requirement

A MID-STREAM CHANGE OF HORSES

The OSD, ARPA and Project AGILE

T H E FATEFUL PLAN TO BANK ON T H E SPIW

T H E ARMY GETS "A LITTLE BIT PREGNANT"

T H E FIRST 130 CHANGES TO THE AR-15

Formalizing the Fiction - The Gilpatrick Directive

PART II TENDING A NEST OF VIPERS

TACKLING T H E CHAMBER PRESSURE PROBLEM T H E HARD WAY

The Third Alternative - The Search for Alternate Propellants

T H E FURTHER ADVENTURES OF T H E TCC

FROM SAWS TO FIRST DEPLOYMENT

Time Out for Some Stargazing

Colt's at the Point of No Return

THE FIT HITS T H E SHAN

SOME PARALLEL DEVELOPMENTS

THE GOLDEN AGE OF R&D

The CGL-4 Becomes the XM148

T H E HARD WAY ONE M O R E TIME

PART III - WARP SPEED AT LAST

BROADENING T H E BLACK RIFLE'S WARTIME PRODUCTION BASE

Fresh Congressional Concern

AN EXAMINATION OF THE " E N D R U N " M E T H O D OF RIFLE PROCUREMENT . . .

Chapter Twenty one

Chapter Twenty two

The Fate of the TCC and the P M R

OFFSHORE PRODUCTION OF M14 AND M16 RIFLES

The M16 Consolidates its Position

ENHANCING T H E CAPABILITIES OF T H E M16A1 RIFLE/AMMUNITION SYSTEM .

The AMTU Points the Way

Ballistic Performance of an Improved Long-Range 5.56mm Bullet (Colt's Design GX-6235) . .

T H E CANADIAN C7 RIFLE - A REASONED VIEW FROM T H E NORTH

ACCESSORIES AND ANCILLARIES

Conversion Units and Adaptations

One might suppose that within these arguments and reams

2. An early "Lightweight Automatic Rifle" from Fabrique Nationale of Belgium,

PART I - THE INNOCENCE OF YOUTH

3. The US Ordnance-sponsored T25 rifle shown during an Arctic test, launching

cartridge (7.62x47-through-51mm). The Harvey-designed, rear-locking T25

Three important happenings set the stage for our tale,

matic compromise with Army traditionalists who saw nothing

4. Actual-size compendium of UK cartridge development, 1948-1953. From left:

comparison, the T65 round produced 40% more muzzle

points of view of the various participants, in Collector Grade's

In any event, the versatile FN .280 rifle emerged the overall

As regards our present study, however, these trials serve

A Famous Historian's Valuable Service

A third important thread of events began the seemingly

S.L.A. Marshall went to Korea and interviewed the troops,

.. it can be said that in the nature of operations in Korea,

for practical and successful artillery intervention...The

This graphically-described 200-yard limitation on practical

the skirts" of the Army's range requirement: sanction for

7. Fig. 1 from S. L. A. Marshall's 1951 ORO report on weapons useage in