Safety & Environmental Control

TRAINING AND DEVELOPMENT
OPERATIONS TRAINING
MODULE 8670 017

SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL
INDEX
SECTION 1: SAFETY
SECTION
17.1.
17.2.
17.2.1.
17.2.2.
17.2.3.
17.2.4.
17.2.4.a.
17.2.4.b.
17.2.4.c.
17.2.4.d.
17.2.4.e.
17.2.4.f.
17.2.4.g.
17.2.4.h.
17.2.4. i.
17.2.4.j.
17.2.5.
17.2.6.
17.2.7.
17.3.
17.3.1.
17.3.2.
17.3.3.
17.3.4.
17.3.5.
17.3.6.
SUBJECT
PAGE
ORIGINS AND GROWTH OF SAFETY AWARENESS.

MAIN FEATURES OF CURRENT HEALTH AND
SAFETY LEGISLATION.
Health and safety at work.
Company safety policy.
Standards and codes of practice relating to process
operations.
Employers responsibilities for the maintenance of
safety:
Safe place of work.
Safe plant and equipment.
Personal protective equipment.
Fire fighting equipment.
Safe system of work.
Safe methods of processing, handling, storing and
transporting goods.
Reporting and registering of accidents.
Informing and instructing employees.
Training and supervision of employees.
A safety policy review with employer and employee
representatives.
Employees responsibilities.
Relationship with overseas safety policies.
Safety performance standards, specimen.
HAZARD AREA CLASSIFICATION AND METHOD
OF QUANTIFYING HAZARD ANALYSES.
Terms of hazard analyses.
Hazard area classification.
Methods of quantification of hazards.
Logic tree and fault construction.
HAZAN
HAZOP
4
7
SAFETY & ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL
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7
8
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
10
10
10
10
10
11
12
16
16
17
18
19
26
33

SECTION
17.4.
17.4.1.
17.4.2.
17.4.3.
17.4.4.
17.5.
17.6.
17.7.
17.8.
17.8.1.
17.8.2.
17.8.3.
17.8.4.
17.8.5.
17.9.
17.9.1.
17.9.2.
17.9.3.
17.10.
17.10.1.
17.10.2.
17.11.
17.11.1.
17.11.2.
OPERATIONS TRAINING
SUBJECT
THE ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITY OF THE PLANT

MANAGER WITH REGARD TO HAZARDS.
Managing hazards.
Consequences of hazards.
Individual and societal risks.
Counter plotting and risk comparison.
MAJOR CHEMICAL HAZARD SOURCES.
MAJOR HEALTH HAZARDS ASSOCIATED WITH
PROCESS PLANT:
Types of hazards.
The perception of hazards.
Hazard risks and categories.
Possible causes of some occupational diseases.
Electrical and other work accidents.
CONTROLLING CHEMICAL HEALTH HAZARDS:
Sampling and analyses of airborne toxic hazards and
their assessment.
Principle and operation of local exhaust ventilation
systems.
CONTROL OF INDUSTRIAL MAJOR ACCIDENT
HAZARD REGULATIONS. (CIMAH)
Main requirements.
Hazard and local authority. Site and offsite emergency
plan.
Major disaster and the environment, and the causes.
Potential effects on future design operation.
Accident statistics frequency and severity rates.
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR FIRE SAFETY.
Fire types and the properties of flammable materials.
Active and passive fire protection.
Zoning and separation distances.
CHARACTERISTICS OF EXPLOSIONS.
Flame propagation/defrogation.
Protective measures and methods to prevent dust and
vapour cloud explosion.
EMERGENCY PROCEDURE REQUIREMENTS.
Categories of emergencies and major hazard situations.
Elements of an emergency plan.
SECTION
SUBJECT
PAGE
41
42
42
44
46
54
60
65
71
71
71
72
72
73
76
77
82
84
87
91
95
100
100
101
PAGE
17.12.
17.12.
17.12.
17.12.
OPERATIONS TRAINING
MAJOR LEGISLATIVE REQUIREMENTS AND

CONSEQUENT ACTIONS REQUIRED UNDER
COSHH.
Purpose and scope.
Requirements.
Provision of general personal safety.
106
106
106
106
SECTION 2: ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL

17.13.
17.13.1.
17.13.2.
17.13.3.
17.13.4.
17.13.5.
17.13.6.
17.13.7.
17.13.8.
17.13.9.
17.14
17.14.1
17.14.2
17.14.3.
17.14.3a.
17.14.3b.
17.15.
17.15.1
17.15.1a.
17.15.1b.
17.15.1c.
17.15.2
17.15.3.
17.15.3a.
17.15.3b.
17.15.3c.
17.15.3d.
17.15.3e.
POLLUTION IN OIL INDUSTRIES.

Gas cleaning (wet and dry cleaning).
Ammonia scrubbing.
Urea dust.
Flue gases from boilers, furnaces, pits and flares.
Hydrocarbon liquids and gases.
Catalyst and promoters.
Sanitary sewer and plant sewers.
Balance water from ships.
Quality control laboratories.
HAZARDOUS WASTE DISPOSAL.
Control of Pollution Act.
Draining to the sea and sea dumping.
- (BOD) biological oxygen demand.
Land fills.
Local water authority.
Planning permission and site licence.
ENVIRONMENTAL SAFETY.
Health and Safety Executive.
Improvement notice.
Prohibition notice.
Fines and imprisonment.
Labeling containers and transportation tankers.
Exposure terms, limits and hazardous effects.
(TLV) threshold limit value.
(MEL) maximum exposure limit.
(OES) occupational exposure standard.
(LTEL) long term exposure limit.
(STEL) short term exposure limit.
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109
109
109
109
109
109
109
110
110
110
111
111
115
116
116
116
117
117
117
117
117
117
118
118
118
119
119
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NOTE: THE CONTENTS OF THIS MANUAL DO NOT SUPERCEDE OR

TAKE THE PLACE OF ANYTHING IN S.O.C. SAFETY MANUALS. ALWAYS
REFER TO THESE MANUALS FOR ANY COMPANY SAFETY RELATED
MATTERS.
SECTION 1: SAFETY
OPERATIONS TRAINING
17.1 ORIGINS AND GROWTH OF SAFETY AWARENESS

INTRODUCTION
Present legislation, which has been designed to protect all industrial activities
capable of generating hazardous situations, has recently passed through several
development stages.
These industrial activities have resulted in the emergence of a new discipline,
embracing safety and reliable technology, pioneered and endorsed by Safety
Institutes.
We must always keep in mind that perfect safety is an unachievable objective, but
we need to access and reduce risk by using qualative and quantative techniques.
Safety awareness has passed the following terms and criteria before reaching the
present modern philosophy
1. The One Bite Dog.
Originally, nothing with regard to safety, was done until something happened to cause
accidents and losses. An investigation was carried out, the reason discovered and
actions taken to prevent the accident from happening again. Later some other accident
occurred, another investigation and so on. Nothing being done to prevent any
accidents until first something happened. i.e. one bite for each problem.
2. Loss Prevention.
The awareness of production losses, equipment failure, higher costs and lower profits
was the first step towards protective motivation, especially on hazardous and costly
plants. This awareness starts with plant integrity and human safety concerns. Proper
linking between human welfare, accident lost time and financial consequences led to
the adoption of safety achievement targets.
3. Targeted Safety Performance.
The use of boards to show the number of accidents in a given time compared to the
targeted number of accidents in that time, where the targeted number is always less
than the number in the previous comparison period, is a useful method of highlighting
the accident occurrence rate.
4. Loss Control Management or Safety Management.
This development focused on individual supervisors, who were responsible for
operating an accident prevention programme and were appointed to be responsible for
all safety aspects within a defined area.
Some aspects involved are:
OPERATIONS TRAINING
The formation of Safety Committees and appointment of Safety

Representatives.
Occupational safety and operator/work interface.
Technical safety, the prevention or predictability of deviation in
hazardous systems.
The need for safety publicity.
5. Systematic Risk Assessment.

This is a process used to analyse actual incidents and reach conclusions to prevent
reoccurrence. The following are typical points raised:
What caused the event?

By what route of mechanism did the deviation or hazardous event
occur?
What should be done to prevent it happening again?
Can the knowledge gained by applied elsewhere?
6. Statistical and Consequence Analysis.

This is a quantitive approach to safety assessment by using mathematical probability
and equipment failure rate to determine the safety aspects of equipment failure. This
has led to established methods and standards for technical and human risk
acceptability levels.
7. Computer Aided Methods for Hazard Level Prediction.
Computers are used to predict the outcome of certain hazardous events, and the effect
on equipment, operators, the public and the environment. Many different accurate
sources of information are required for reliable predictions.
8.
Current Safety Philosophy.
The following are the directions in which progress is being achieved, to varying
extents, ranging from best-recommended practice to proposed targets for future
attainment.
a. The System Boundary Concept.
Every system; plant, machine, operator, etc., should be looked at in the context of its
environment by an imaginary envelope to account for every interaction that may
effect safety.
b. Operability Study and Hazard Analysis.
These are techniques, which attempt to detect and measure potential hazards by
qualitive and quantitive means.
c. Containment At All Costs.
This is sometimes called INTRINSIC SAFETY and is aimed at reducing the impact
on our environment of designed releases, which allow harmful substances to be
released in order to protect their containment from possible catastrophic failure
OPERATIONS TRAINING
d. Alternative Reactants and Process Conditions.

This is used whenever possible to replace hazardous materials or process conditions is
possible. It may result in slightly higher costs, but the savings made through better
safety standards will far out weigh the initial costs.
9. Other Safety Criteria and Accident Cost Considerations.
a. Numerical Rating system.
Some authorities and larger companies have a tendency to adopt individual risk
criteria or adopt existing standards to their own requirements and expectations using
numerical rating systems.
b. Maximum Credible Accident.
This is a scenario agreed on for a specific site or work area and representing the worst
possible event that could occur. Its main usefulness is a basis for the optimum siting
of plants and processes in relation to neighbouring facilities.
c. Multiple Fatality (casualty) Accident.
Public reaction is generally much greater to an accident involving multiple deaths
than to the same number of deaths occurring separately.
OPERATIONS TRAINING
17.2 MAIN FEATURES OF CURRENT HEALTH AND SAFETY

LEGISLATION
After numerous accidents, and many years, had been encountered in industry,
different legal actions were announced to compel employers in industry to take the
necessary actions to protect people, equipment, the public and the environment.
All aspects of work, in all places, are taken into consideration in these measures,
which can be enabling or enforcing, to reduce or eliminate the increasing number of
accidents.
Current legislation represents a WORKING MODEL wherein Employer and
Employee have a shared responsibility.
2.1 CONTENTS OF THE HEALTH AND SAFETY AT WORK

REGULATIONS
These Regulations cover the following sections:
1. General duties of employers and employees relating to health, safety
and welfare at work; covering maintenance of the work place, the
safety of its plant systems and avoidance of health risks from contact
with hazardous materials.
2. Duties of employers to other persons, e.g. non-employees, visitors, the
public, etc.
3. Duties relating to the control of premises, including fire precautions
and means of escape.
4. Relates to the emission of noxious or offensive substances into the
atmosphere.
5. Places a duty on those who design, manufacture, import, supply, erect
or install equipment. This is a long and highly important section since
it covers the suitability of ARTICLES FOR USE AT WORK, in the
context of health and safety of employees.
6. Prohibits intentional or reckless interference with or misuse of safety
equipment.
This can take the form of a document. Many employers comply with little more than a
general statement of commitment and intent, but do provide employees with a
personalized safety guide handbook and provide training in emergency procedures.
2.2 COMPANY SAFETY POLICY

The Companys responsibilities for Health and Safety are substantial. This includes
the formation of a written Health and Safety Policy.
This document, which is usually in three sections, should be signed and dated by
the Chairman. It should also be:
Reviewed periodically.
Displayed in a prominent place.
The Health and Safety Policy is made up of:
The general statement.
OPERATIONS TRAINING
The organization.
The arrangements for implementing and monitoring the policy.
A General Statement of Intent.

This should outline in broad terms the organizations overall philosophy in
relationship to the management of health and safety. It should also include reference
to the broad responsibilities of both management and workforce.
Organization, people and their duties.
This part outlines the chain of command in terms of health and safety management.
Who is responsible to whom and for what? How is the accountability fixed so as to
ensure that delegated responsibilities are undertaken? How is the policy
implementation monitored?
Arrangements, Systems and procedures.
This part of the policy deals with the practical arrangements by which the policy
will be effectively implemented. These include:
Safety training.
Safe systems of works.
Machine/area guarding.
Housekeeping.
Safe plant and equipment.
Noise control.
Radiation safety.
Dust control.
Use of toxic materials.
Internal communication/participation.
Utilization of safety committees and representatives.
Fire safety and prevention.
Medical facilities and welfare.
Maintenance of records.
Accident reporting and investigation.
Emergency procedures and workplace monitoring.
All of these points are to be found in the S.O.C. Safety manuals.
2.3 STANDARDS AND CODES OF PRACTICE (relating to process

operations)
The Employer must provide complete and detailed information on all aspects of the
Plant, equipment and materials used. He must also clearly specify, in writing, the
correct and safe operation of the plant and all equipment there included. This must
contain sufficient information regarding hazardous materials; their classification,
correct transportation and handling, storage, preventative measures required and
emergency procedures to deal with any accident that may occur.
There are many different codes of practice, depending on the Country and the
Company in which the operations take place.
OPERATIONS TRAINING
It is vital that the Employee follows the code of practice issued by his employer.
See Sirte Oil Company Safety Manuals for your codes of practice.
In some Countries a FACTORY INSPECTORATE has far reaching powers to
ensure compliance with the code of practice. These powers could ultimately lead to
the shutdown of operations failing to comply with the codes of practice.
2.4 EMPLOYERS RESPONSIBILITIES FOR THE MAINTENANCE

OF SAFETY.
An Employers general duties are to ensure so far as is REASONABLY
PRACTICABLE the health, safety and welfare of all his or her Employees and
others by providing the following:
a. A Safe Place of Work.
A safe place of work is a place where work can be conducted in a safe and healthy
manner. It should have a safe means of entry and access. The Employee should be
able to carry out his duties in the knowledge that all that is possible has been done to
ensure his safety and well being. It is also the duty of the Employer to provide
adequate Medical or First Aid facilities appropriate to the type of operations being
carried out and the number of persons employed.
b. Safe Plant and Equipment.
The Plant on which the work is carried out should be well maintained; all
equipment must be maintained as per manufactures recommendations. All guards,
fences, screens, etc must be fixed in their proper place. Adequate signs and warning
notices should be clearly displayed to inform the workforce about all potential hazards
and other relevant points.
c. Personal Protective Equipment.
It is the duty of the Employer to supply, and the Employee to use, all necessary
protective equipment that may be required to carry out the duties on the Plant. This
protective equipment must be maintained in good clean, working condition and
repaired or renewed as required.
d. Fire Fighting Equipment.
It is the duty of the Employer to provide, and maintain in good working order, firefighting equipment appropriate to the operations being carried out on his Plant. This
may range from a simple fire extinguisher for use in a shop, to a full fire service as
found in a petro-chemical complex.
e. Safe System of Work.
It is the duty of the Employer to provide systems to ensure the work can be carried
out safely. These include written procedures for all Plant operations and a Work
Permit System. It is important that the Employees fully understand and follow
correctly all systems provided by the Employer.
f. Safe Methods of Processing, Handling, Storing and Transporting Goods.
It is the duty of the Employer to:
OPERATIONS TRAINING
a. To provide written procedures for all process operations.

b. To provide safe and protected siting for the storage of all materials.
c. To provide adequate, clear identification for all materials.
d. To provide adequate mechanical handling systems for the movement of heavy or
awkward goods
g. Reporting and Investigation of Accidents.
The Employer should initiate a procedure for the reporting, recording and
investigation of all accidents. The procedures should be published so that all
Employees are aware of them. They should be continually monitored to ensure that
they are being complied with.
h. Informing and Instructing Employees.
The Employer should ensure that all Employees are kept fully informed at all times
on any matter that concerns their Safety, Health or Welfare. This should be carried
out, as soon as is practically possible when any changes are to take place. It may take
the form of written circulars, which all employees should be required to acknowledge,
or it may take the form of personal instruction.
i. Training and Supervision of Employees.
It is the duty of the Employer to ensure that all Employees are given adequate
Training before they are allowed to carry out any of the Plant operations, whether this
is in process, material handling or movement, or in fact in any job. The Employer
should also ensure that the Employees are properly supervised at all times by a
suitably qualified supervisor. All Employees should be made aware of the chain of
command within the Company Organization.
j. Safety Policy Review.
No matter how comprehensive and good a safety Policy may be, unless it is
regularly reviewed and up-dated to take into consideration modifications and changes,
it will soon be out of date and worthless. It is therefore the duty of the Employer to
ensure that suitably qualified personnel undertake regular reviews of the Policy and
that all Employees are made fully aware of all changes if and when they occur.
2.5 EMPLOYEES RESPONSIBILITIES

Employees have to ensure that they do not endanger themselves or anyone else
who may be affected by their work activities.
Not only that, they have to cooperate with their Employers in meeting the
requirements of Health and Safety at work. Employees must not misuse anything that
has been provided in the interests of health and safety.
The following illustrate situations or actions, which could be considered as NOT
COMPLYING with Health and Safety rules.
Not Showing Reasonable Care.
Leaving obstacles in walkways over which fellow workers could trip. Involving
them in injuries that could affect their working and social hours.
Non-Cooperation With Employers.
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An Employee who repeatedly refuses to wear goggles while handling corrosive

liquids.
Misuse Or Interference With Equipment Provided.
The removal of machine guards or the failure to follow the laid down procedures
when operating plant equipment.
The Health and Safety Rules also require Employees to:
Follow all Health and Safety instructions.
Report dangerous situations.
2.6 RELATIONSHIP WITH OVERSEAS SAFETY POLICIES

Health and Safety standards are advancing all of the time. As individual countries
and companies form larger units or associations, i.e. the Association of African Unity,
there will be a standardisation of the Health and Safety Policies. The good points from
one place will be learned and adopted by the others and the lessons learned from
unfortunate accidents will be communicated to all.
Throughout the world many organizations are dedicated to the improvement of Health
and Safety standards, e.g. National Fire Protection Association (NFPA), American
Association for Testing Materials (ASTM). The results and recommendations from
these bodies are an important aid to the improvement of the Health and Safety
standards in individual operations and it is therefore very important that all companies
study and learn from the activities of others.
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2.7 SAFETY PERFORMANCE STANDARDS (SPECIMEN)
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17.3 HAZARD AREA CLASSIFICATION AND METHOD OF

QUANTIFYING HAZARD ANALYSIS
3.1 TERMS USED IN HAZARD ANALYSIS
The following terms are frequently used in documents referring to Hazard Analysis:
HAZARD A state or condition having the potential to cause a deviation
from uniform or intended behaviour, which in turn, may result in damage to
people, property or the environment.
RISK The time related or location related likelihood of a hazard actually
resulting in an undesired event.
SOCIETAL RISK The risk to a group of people exposed to a major hazard.
RESIDUAL RISK The element of risk remaining after all economical
acceptable improvements have been made.
UPPER/LOWER FLAMMABLE LIMIT The concentration of a
flammable substance in the air or oxygen, above or below which,
respectively, combustion will not be sustained.
THRESHOLD EXPOSURE LIMITS These limits are specified to a time
related human exposure to a toxic substance. They are used to regulate the
proximity of workers to materials of known toxic affects.
TOXICITY The ability of a toxic substance, when absorbed by living tissue
to cause injury or destroy life.
CARCINOGEN A substance capable of causing cancer.
DISPERSION The mode of integration and dilution, usually in the
environment, when a hazardous fluid is discharged.
PLUME A gas cloud resulting from continuous release.
HAZARD ANALYSIS Further and quantitive assessment of identified
hazards with examination of size, frequency and consequences. If a hazard
cannot be eradicated, then the level of risk must be assessed.
SAFETY/HAZARD REVIEW/SURVEY This implies site assessment
standard, but more often confined to a search for potential hazards.
PROBABILITY A dimensionless number from 0 to 1 representing;
1. The probability of a particular outcome from a specific
event.
2. The probability of a particular state or condition existing at
a specified time.
RELIABILITY Is the probability of a system response upon demand at the
required point in time under defined conditions.
FREQUENCY The number of occurrences of a specified event over a time
period of interest.
APPROVED Applied to equipment approved for use in specified hazardous
areas.
FLAMEPROOF Applied to an enclosure for electrical apparatus that will
withstand an internal explosion of vapour or gas which may enter it through
16
OPERATIONS TRAINING
openings in the enclosure without suffering damage or communicating the

ignition to the external flammable atmosphere for which environment is
designed.
INTRINSICALLY SAFE Applied to apparatus, circuits and systems
which may be installed in a hazardous area but are incapable, under
prescribed conditions, of causing the ignition of a given gas or vapour.
PRESSURE A method of safeguarding whereby air or inert gas, in an
enclosed space, is maintained at a pressure sufficient to prevent ingress of the
surrounding atmosphere, which may be flammable.
PURGING A method of safeguarding whereby a flow of air or inert gas is
maintained through an enclosed space in sufficient quantity to prevent or
reduce any hazard which, in the absence of the purge, could arise.
SOURCE OF HAZARD Any point from which flammable material may be
released so as to create a flammable atmosphere.
TOTALLY ENCLOSED Applied to electrical apparatus within an
enclosure, which is so constructed that risk of entry of a flammable
atmosphere, which may surround it for a short period, is small.
3.2 HAZARD AREA CLASSIFICATION

As in most spheres, there are never enough resources to remove every hazard at once.
Resources used in an effort to eliminate or reduce one hazard will not then be
available to reduce the levels of other hazards, which may be equally important. If the
principle of tolerable risk can be accepted, the available resources can be utilized in
the design of process plants and procedures so that the agreed level of risk is not
exceeded. In electrical area classification, a certain small risk of fire and explosion is
accepted, and, having decided what this risk can be, the protection provided for
electrical equipment should be such that this risk is not exceeded.
CODES OF PRACTICE
Codes of practice, which define and regulate the use of electrical equipment, have
been issued by a variety of authorities and companies. For the most part, these codes
are similar and, although their use is not mandatory, their adoption should ensure that
remaining hazards are minimized.
Usually these codes define ZONES, which have different degrees of hazard and are
as follows in accordance with the current standard:
ZONE 0: One in which a flammable atmosphere is continuously present, or present
for long periods of time (typically 1000 hours per year). The vapour space of a closed
process vessel or storage tank is an example of this zone.
ZONE 1: One in which a flammable atmosphere is likely to occur during normal
operation (typically 10 to 1000 hours per year).
ZONE 3: One in which a flammable atmosphere is not likely to occur during normal
operation, but occurs either during abnormal operation, or for a short duration,
(typically 10 hours per year). This usually means that a Zone 2 must be a freely
vented situation.
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NON-HAZARDOUS An area, which cannot be classified as Zone 0, 1 or

2.
NORMAL As applied to operating conditions, means the actual situation,
taking into account the design and maintenance standard and the usual
operating practices employed.
ABNORMAL Does not refer to catastrophic situations, but to events which
occur frequently and are usually of short duration.
By inference, any location, which is not a hazardous area, is a safe area, but many
authorities prefer the use of NON-HAZARDOUS AREA. Care is needed when
interpreting references to hazard zones from overseas, as different countries use
different numbers to classify the different zones. This is most important when
purchasing foreign equipment care must be taken to ensure the equipment
classification from the vendor meets the requirements of the purchaser.
3.3. METHODS OF QUANTIFICATION OF HAZARDS

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF HAZARD QUANTIFICATION
There can be no ABSOLUTE scale of measuring hazard frequencies, only
methods striving to achieve scales of COMPARISON, either one hazard with another
or each with a criterion or target level, deemed by experience or historical record to
represent an upper acceptable limit. At least by this mans, available resources of
manpower and finance can be channeled to give priority to the more serious risks.
See Figure 1, following:
FIGURE 1
THE MAIN OBJECTIVE OF HAZAN TO REDUCE HAZARD FREQUENCIES
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TO OR BELOW THE CRITERION OR TARGET RATE.

Figure 1 illustrates this philosophy; risk D would merit more priority treatment
whereas risk B would be at an acceptable level.
AVAILABLE QUANTIFYING METHODS.
These are such as the INSTANTANEOUS FRACTIONAL ANNUAL LOSS
(IFAL) technique and FAILURE MODE AND EFFECT ANALYSIS (FMEA).
The IFAL is defined as the expected average annual loss of an operation, expressed as
a fraction of the value at risk, and therefore combines both the probability and
consequence elements of a hazard. Three factors need to be calculated; the inherent
process hazards, the engineering quality and the management quality.
FMEA examines the behaviour and interaction of the individual components in a
plant or installation to enable the consequences of their failure upon the safety of the
operation to be assessed. The method requires the assignment of probabilities of
events, derived from plant records and experience, on the basis of actual plant
circumstances.
THE TOP EVENT APPROACH.
However, whilst all of the above methods have been devised and are widely used
to fulfill certain needs either for specified hazard categories such as fires, explosions
and toxic risks, or to assess particular installations of specific processes character or
environment, they do not address the path or paths by which an identified deviation,
sometimes called the TOP EVENT, advisedly the product of a HAZOP study, can
arise and the succession of events that can lead to it and which are capable of being
quantified in terms of probability and frequency. Thus, the frequency of the top
event represents the objective of a hazard analysis, leaving the consequences of it
to be the subject of further planning as may be required.
Figure 2, next page, depicts the requirements and steps of a hazard analysis,
incorporating all the ingredients, which have been mentioned.
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FIGURE 2
THE STRUCTURE OF A HAZARD ANALYSIS
THE DERIVATION OF ACCEPTABLE CRITERIA AND TARGETS.
When injury is unlikely we can compare the annual cost of preventing an accident
with the average annual cost of the accident.
Suppose an accident will cause $1 M worth of damage and it is estimated to occur
once in 1000 years. The average cost then, is $1000 per year and so it is worth
spending $1000 per year, but not more, to prevent it.
Figure 3 is a simple illustration of the principle of cost/benefit analysis, which is
applied to justify the extra cost of minimizing the chance of a particular operating
deviation occurring. It involves human reliability but the operator, in this instance,
would not be at risk. The vessel is provided for allowing the separation of a small
proportion of water from petroleum and collecting it in the sump. Operators are
instructed to drain the sump every four hours until the interface between the petrol
and the water falls below the sight glass level. However, people tend to forget and
visual measurement is not easy. The petrol is intended for use in a process where the
presence of water could damage an expensive catalyst to the extent of a cost per
incident of $100000: on the basis of historical operator reliability data, it is considered
20
OPERATIONS TRAINING
that this might happen once every 10 years or with a frequency F = 0.1 yr-1.
Consequently, two levels of improved protection are examined.
The first consists of an alarm activated by a high liquid interface level but still
requires an operator action to respond, cancel the alarm and drain the sump; the
second incorporates a trip device with the alarm.
The trip isolates the motor drive of the pump and activates an alarm. In this situation
the operator becomes responsible for halting production rather than for a much more
expensive oversight.
The risk criterion in this case is the annual expenditure limit or target.
FIGURE 3
COST/BENEFIT ANALYSIS FOR PETROL/WATER SEPARATION
For an estimated frequency of water carry-out incident of 0.1 yr-1, and assuming a 1%
probability of alarm failure and a 9% probability of operator failure to respond, water
carry over frequency will be reduced to 0.1 (1% + 9%) = 0.01 yr -1. If both alarm and
trip are fitted, frequency becomes 0.1 x 1% = 0.001 yr-1.
For an incident cost of $100000 every ten years.
Annual cost = $100000 at 10% = $10000 for sight glass fitted only.
Annual cost = $100000 at 1% = $1000 for alarm fitted.
Annual cost = $100000 at 0.1% = $100 for alarm and trip fitted.
This method could be used for all accidents if we could put a value on injuries and
life, but there is no generally agreed figure. So, instead, we set a frequency target. For
example, in fixing the height of handrails round a place of work, the law does not ask
us to compare the cost of fitting them with the value of the lives of the people who
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OPERATIONS TRAINING
would otherwise fall off. It fixes a height for the handrails, the chance of falling over
which, though not zero, is so small that we are justified in ignoring it. Similarly we fix
a height or level for the risk to life.
RISKS TO EMPLOYEES THE FATAL ACCIDENT RATE (FAR).
A widely used target for the risk to life of Employees is the FATAL ACCIDENT
RATE (FAR).
This is the number of fatal accidents in a group of 1000 men in a working lifetime,
8
10 hours, i.e. 50 years x 50 weeks yr-1 x 40 hrs wk-1 x 1000 men = 100000000 hours.
For example, for weekly paid employees in the chemical industry the FAR = 4 (the
same as the average for all activities covered by the U.K. Factories Act. This is made
up from:
ordinary industrial risks = 2
(e.g. falling from scaffolding or getting run over on site)
and
chemical risks = 2
(e.g. fire, toxic release or spillage of corrosive chemical)
If we are sure that we have identified all the chemical risks attached to a particular
job, we say the man doing the job should not be exposed to a FAR for these chemical
risks greater than 2. it would be necessary to reduce, as far as a matter of priority, any
such risks on new or existing plants to at least this level.
It would be wrong to spend resources on reducing the risk to people who are
already exposed to below average risks. Instead priority should be given to those
risks, which are above average.
If it is assumed that thee are, on average, 5 specific chemical risks present in a
given working environment then the FAR for each specific risk will be 2/5 = 0.4
fatalities per 108 hours worked if an individual chemical risk is considered on its own.
This is the normally accepted practice whilst accepting that the probability of owing
ones demise to two or even more coincidental causes is very low indeed.
This figure of 0.4 is equivalent to a target of 0.4 8670
= 3 10-5
108
fatalities per employee year or one fatality for every 33000-man years for an 8 hour
day or shift. This target figure was generated by, and is currently in use in, one very
large chemical manufacturing company and there is evidence of its use elsewhere
despite the fact that the average FAR over a 10 year period of 4 fatalities/108 hrs
across the whole U.K. industry is known to be much higher than in some chemical
activity areas wherein the progressive improvement of safe working is accorded high
priority.
Note: 8670 hours is equivalent to 365 days.
However, for comparison, here are some published FARs for a number of industries
and occupations:
FAR/108 hrs
Chemical industry (USA)
3
Medical Practitioners and Radiologists
6
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OPERATIONS TRAINING
Deep Sea Fishing

Coal Mining
Construction Workers
35
40
67
Although the target, in its most unstable form of 3 x 10-5 fatalities per man-year,
relates to the chemical industry, the same mode of derivation is available to other
industries using similar evidence of risk character and frequency. Similarly, target
frequencies for TOP EVENTS such as equipment failures and containment losses can
be determined from historical and plant data, often of world wide origin, although
much more economically acceptable levels than one occurrence every 33000 years
must prevail since, obviously, not every occurrence results in a fatality or even a
human injury! This argument may be underwritten by considering the outcome of a
specimen occurrence capable of causing death or injury.
DETERMINATION OF THE MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE FREQUENCY FOR
A HAZARD TO OCCUR.
Using the criteria laid down for risks to employees and to the general public, it is
now possible to calculate the maximum allowable frequency for a hazard to occur for
each of these cases. Figure 4 is a LOGIC TREE for a fatal accident.
this figure is the same as the risk level attributed to naturally

occurring hazards such as lightning.
FIGURE 4
DETERMINATION OF MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE FREQUENCY FOR A
HAZARD TO OCCUR.
You will see that answers are derived not only from the FREQUENCY with which
a hazard occurs but also on the PROBABILITY that the person in the highest risk
category is killed. From such a logic tree the target hazard rate may be found. If risks
to both employees and the general public are present then the lower frequency rate
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OPERATIONS TRAINING
must be taken as the target. (AND implies that the actual incident and the respective
probabilities must occur simultaneously).
EXAMPLE OF DEATH PROBABILITY DETERMINATION FOR A TOXIC
GAS RELEASE AT GROUND LEVEL DUE TO EQUIPMENT FAILURE.
A circular area around the point of release would normally be at risk, but only a
sector within this area would be affected by a particular release depending on the
wind direction.
Probability of death, PD, is then given by:
PD = PP PS PE PK
Where PP = probability that person at greatest risk would be in general area likely
to be affected.
PS = probability that person is in the actual sector affected by the particular
incident (i.e. downwind).
PE = probability that person does not leave or is not evacuated from affected
sector in time.
PK = probability that the person would die if not evacuated.
It is not suggested that data is readily available to amplify this reasoning: the
example serves to illustrate the factors which influence the level of risk to which a
person would be exposed in these circumstances.
CAUSE AND FAULT TREE CONSTRUCTION.
Returning to the earlier topic of TOP EVENT, the likely hood of which hazardous
occurrence we require to analyse and quantify, figure 5 (following page), shows a
generic layout for a CAUSE or FAULT tree.
= single events or coincidences of events capable of leading to the hazardous

incident.
FIGURE 5
FAULT TREE FOR THE OCCURRENCE OF A HAZARDOUS INCIDENT
(GENERAL PRINCIPLES)
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OPERATIONS TRAINING
Cause and fault trees are identical in form and layout, the former being checked for
its logic qualitatively before the necessary figures of probabilities and frequency are
added to produce the completed FAULT TREE.
By this means it can determine from which source the main contribution(s) to the
hazard originate(s).
Fault trees can be drawn from top to bottom with the hazardous TOP EVENT at the
top, or from left to right, with the hazardous Top Event on the left hand side.
In fault tree construction, LOGIC GATES are used to interconnect the events, and
the fundamental logic gates used are the OR and the AND gates. The OR gates
describe a situation where the output event will exist if ONE or MORE of the input
events exist.
OR
output
event
input
events
Here any one of the three input events will give rise to the output event.
The AND gate describes a situation where the output event requires the
simultaneous existence of all input events.
AND
output
event
input
events
Here both events must coexist in order to achieve the out put event.
Although the arrows correctly depict the directions in which the successive events
occur, we obviously have to construct the tree in the reverse manner, identifying
progressively each preceding event or deviation, which causes the next one to occur. It
is vitally important to proceed with care, one small step at a time, in order not to
overlook possible events within the logical progression.
Otherwise, of course, once quantified, the top event is likely to be attributed a
misleading calculated frequency. Unlike the HAZOP technique, which cannot
guarantee the identification of every conceivable deviation within a system, a cause
tree must be substantially correct. It is invariably a task for an experienced analyst
rather than for a team and, consequently, it is advisable to have the cause tree logic
checked by another competent person before any figures are added.
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OPERATIONS TRAINING
EXAMPLE OF CAUSE TREE.

Figure 6 is a simple example of a CAUSE TREE for a ventilation system based on
two electrically driven fans. The hazard to be considered is NO VENTILATION.
FIGURE 6
CAUSE TREE FOR A VENTILATION SYSTEM
Most cause trees are much more complex that this because of the presence of
protective systems, either hardware or operator action. Sometimes it is of help first to
draw a tree without the protective systems and then introduce these as a second step.
This example usefully portrays the evidence of a COMMON CAUSE, no power,
and COMMON MODE faults, in both fans, although the latter need not necessarily
be the same for each fan. These are points worth looking for in attempted in all
attempted constructions.
3.5 HAZAN
DEFINITION OF TERMS USED
HAZARD RATE
- the rate at which hazards occur.
PROTECTIVE SYSTEM
- a device which is installed to stop the hazard

occurring.
DEMAND RATE
- the rate at which a protective device is required to take

action.
26

FAILURE
OPERATIONS TRAINING
- when a protective device is incapable of carrying out

its duty.
There are two types:
FAIL SAFE: the failure in the protective device causes
it to operate and shut down the section. Hence one
knows at once that the protective device has a fault.
FAIL TO DANGER: the protective device can no

longer carry out its duty due to a fault but this fault is
not revealed until either the protective device is called
upon to act, when it will not, or the protective device is
tested.
PROOF TESTING
- a method of checking to ensure that a protective
system
is in full working order.
FRACTIONAL DEAD TIME - this is the fraction of the total time that the protective
device is in the failed state and is a measure of the
probability of its failure to provide the design intended
protection.
Points to Note
If the fractional dead time is zero, then the hazard rate would be zero.
If the fractional dead time is unity, then the hazard rate would equal the demand rate.
For other cases:
Hazard rate = Demand rate Fractional Dead Time
Or H = D.fdt
where H= Hazard rate, D = Demand, fdt = fractional dead time
In order to reduce the fractional dead time of a protective device, proof testing is
carried out to reveal faults so that they can be repaired.
Consider a protective device where unrevealed FAIL TO DANGER faults occur F
times per year.
2T
3T
4T
5T
6T
time
Suppose the protective device is proof tested at intervals of T years, then there will be
periods, shown shaded, when the device gives no protection. If we assume that, on
average, any failure will occur half way through a proof test period then, on average,
fractional dead time,
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OPERATIONS TRAINING
Fdt = 1/2F.T
In practice, of course, faults are considered to occur randomly.
This expression will only apply if
Hence
F.T. << 1
Hazard Rate
H = D F.T.
But this is only valid if
D T <<1
If this is not the case, then

HF
1 exp
DT
2
If no proof testing is carried out, but repairs are made if the hazard occurs, i.e. if a
demand shows the protective device to have failed,
Then
H = FD
F+D
CALCULATIONS ON HAZARD RATES
A process gas is compressed by a blower into an intermediate process vessel.
low flow trip
solenoid
valve
blower
process
vessel
press =
> 1 at
orifice
plate
The low flow trip consists of an orifice plate, DP cell, pressure switch, solenoid valve
and shut down valve. The protective system is to prevent a back flow of process gas
through the blower should the blower fail. If the blower fails once a year how often
will a back flow of gas occur
a. Without proof testing?
b. With two-monthly proof testing?
The fail to danger faults of the components making up the protective device is:
Orifice plate
Faults/year
0.1
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OPERATIONS TRAINING
DP cell (flow)
Pressure switch (flow trip)
Solenoid valve
Trip valve
Total =
0.1
0.05
0.05
0.1
0.4
Solution:
For a protective system, failure rate F = 0.4/year, the blower fails once/year, so
demand rate D = 1
a. For no proof testing
Hazard rate H = FD = 0.4 1 = 0.286/year
F+D
0.4 + 1
Or once every 3.5 years.
b. With proof testing at two-monthly intervals
Fdt = 0.5 F T
= 0.5 0.4 1/6
= 0.033
Therefore hazard rate H = D fdt
= 1 0.033
= 0.033/year or once every 30 years
Not only does this example support the need for regular testing of a protective device
but it also confirms the relationship between the hazard rate and the fractional dead
time. More frequent testing will enhance the reliability but there is an optimal proof
test interval for every protective device since reducing this interval increases the
proportion of total time for which the device is disconnected from its duty for test
purposes.
CONVERTING A CAUSE TREE INTO A FAULT TREE
Figure 7 is a fault tree for the event of over pressuring of a vessel resulting in
failure of its relief valve to lift at the set pressure. But the causes of the pressure rise
could be due either to failure of a pressure controller or operator error. Depending on
the circumstances prevailing, it could be argued that the operator failed to take the
necessary manual action upon noting the controller failure or failed to respond to the
alarm. In this situation, the two branches would be joined by an AND gate instead of
an OR gate.
TOP EVENT
CONTROLLER
FAILS
0.8/YEAR
PRESSURE RISES
1/YEAR
OPERATOR
ERROR
0.2/YEAR
VESSEL OVER
PRESSURED
0.005/YEAR
RELIEF VALVE
DEAD
0.005
figure 7
7 are based on relevant plant

The figures for the relief valve, controllerFIGURE
and operator
records or taken from published data. The first ids a PROBABILITY, the others are
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OPERATIONS TRAINING
FREQUENCIES. Note that frequencies are added at the OR gates, frequencies

and probabilities are multiplied at the AND gates. A knowledge of Boolem algebra
is required to understand why but this is the extent of numeracy required for carrying
out hazard analysis on relatively simple systems. Where more than one protective
system is used for extra security in major hazard situations, the mathematics can be
more complex when handling alternative probabilities and coincident events.
Remember that estimating hazard rates is not the only use of fault trees. They
help us to think all the ways in which a hazard can arise and reveal which
branches of the tree contribute most towards the hazard rate. Hence, ways in
which the hazard rate can be reduced are indicated, together with which
methods will be most effective, technically and cost wise.
A FAULT TREE EXAMPLE
Finally we can now expand an earlier example of a control loop for which hazard
failure rates were calculated, into a fault tree. Instead of the process gas blower, a
control valve and flow controller are substituted whilst the orifice plate and trip
protection are retained.
FC
SOLENOID VALVE
PS
FT
CV
ORIFICE PLATE
TV
FIGURE 8
The flow controller, FC, actuated by flow transmitter, FT, controls the flow rate of
process fluid in the line by means of the control valve, CV. We wish to guard against
any sudden failures in the flow control loop so we introduce a protective device in the
form of a trip valve, TV, operated by a pressure switch, PS, and a solenoid valve also
working from the flow transmitter. The pressure switch would be set to operate the
trip valve at a flow rate above the range of the controller, a fault that could be caused,
for example, by the flow control valve failing in its fully open condition. This and all
the other possible events are depicted in the fault tree.
The fail to danger faults of the components making up the loop are:
Faults/year
Orifice plate
0.20
COMMON FAULTS
Flow transmitter
0.10
Flow controller
0.10
CONTROL LOOP
Control valve
0.15
Pressure switch
0.05
Solenoid valve
0.05
TRIP LOOP
Trip valve
0.10
The test interval for the high flow trip is two months.
The TOP EVENT is flow rate higher than it should be.
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OPERATIONS TRAINING
Figure 9 is the completed fault tree for this example from which it can be concluded
that an excessive flow rate may occur once every three years. If this is an
unacceptably high occurrence rate, (for example, compared to an adopted criterion or
target frequency) then the tree will indicate what design changes may be necessary or
which protective devices may be replaced by others of greater reliability.
EVALUATION OF THE FAULT TREE: NEED FOR DESIGN CHANGES
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OPERATIONS TRAINING
The principle objective of fault tree analysis is to establish whether or not a

proposed design is acceptable in terms of meting a pre-determined standard of
reliability or safety in respect of the top event under consideration. By its very nature,
the technique also highlights visually the primary causes, which contribute most
significantly to the top event. Thus, when a proposed design is found to be inadequate,
the areas need to be tackled are immediately apparent, and possible ways for reducing
the effect of the critical events thereby recognized. The benefit to be gained from each
possible design improvement can then be evaluated in order to determine the
preferred solution(s) for meeting the target, consistent with contractual requirements
and other factors, which often limit the design changes that can be implemented.
Similarly, if a proposed design falls well within the required standards, the
technique will like wise indicate the areas in which some relaxation in reliability or
safety would be permissible, thereby enabling the money saved to be spent more cost
effectively elsewhere. When all design changes have finally been agreed, the fault tree
should always be modified as necessary and re-quantified as a final check, including
re-examination of the sensitivity of the prediction to uncertain data.
It is also important to monitor subsequent on line performance in order to check that
all fundamental assumptions relating to the design, operation and maintenance of the
system, which have been made in the analysis are valid. Furthermore, if changes are
made to the system, the analysis must be re-evaluated, where necessary, to take such
changes into account.
MAIN VIRTUES AND BENEFITS OF FAULT TREE ANALYSIS.
It provides:
A systematic procedure for forcing consideration of the component

states that can exist within a system and is, therefore, a valuable aid
for identifying potential causes for any nominated top event, e.g. by
brining to light failure combinations that might otherwise not have
been recognized as potential causes of the event being analysed.
A very versatile technique, applicable to reliability and safety
problems for systems of widely differing degrees of complexity.
A useful technique for highlighting the most likely system failure
paths and is of great value as a design improvement or cost saving
tool.
A visual medium for enhancing communication between various
departments on reliability and safety matters and for enforcing a
thorough understanding of a system by all concerned.
Good documentary evidence of compliance with reliability or safety
standards.
SOME PROBLEM AREAS IN FAULT TREE ANALYSIS.

The following points indicate problem areas:
Not getting adequate information.

Logic of the tree not correct.
Not developing the tree in small steps.
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OPERATIONS TRAINING
Failing to use realistic data.

The wrong combination of data.
Not getting data in consistent or correct units
Not recognizing situations of high demand rate when simple
expression
H = D fdt does not apply.
Over estimating the reliability of protection.
Over confidence in numerical values.
Failure to check the credibility of the result.
Failure to follow through and check/verify the validity of
assumptions.
Failure to check that subsequent modifications or changes do not
invalidate the analysis.
Failure to recognize ones limitations and to seek more qualified
advice or guidance.
3.6 HAZOP
THE PURPOSE OF THE HAZOP STUDY TECHNIQUE
The need for a systematic approach to the identification of potential hazards by
means of our perceptive abilities and knowledge of the nature of the deviations to
look for has already been established.
However, the real virtue of such a system or method must be its capacity, in the
hands of suitably trained personnel, to provide an understanding of the consequences
as well as the causes of each deviation from normal. Most importantly, this procedure
facilitates decision making upon those actions required to eliminate, or reduce to an
acceptable risk level, all identified potential hazards.
It is most important to remember that the prime emphasis is upon
OPERATING INTEGRITY of a system, thereby leading methodically to most
potential and detectable DEVIATIONS, which could conceivably arise in the
course of normal operating routine, including start up and shut down procedures as
well as steady state operation.
Overall HAZOP is an IDENTIFYING technique and not devoted to problem
solving. This method is not intended to be used solely as an undisciplined means of
searching for hazardous scenarios. Thus, the question often arises:
HOW CAN ONE BE CERTAIN OF IDENTIFYING ALL POSSIBLE
DEVIATIONS?
The answer to this question is in two parts.
Firstly, there can be no absolute certainty as the study is necessarily subjective and
100% achievement in this context can have no significance. Any individual or
corporate effort will yield results directly proportional to the appropriate background
experience of those taking part.
Secondly, in light of the previous statement, to improve the credibility of the method
and the quality of the outcome, recognized practice calls for a team effort chaired or
led by an experienced HAZOP practitioner. He is primarily responsible for
progressing the study and collating the efforts of other members who should be
representative of the main contributions or faculties associated with the project or
plant under discussion.
33
OPERATIONS TRAINING
It is broadly agreed that, with the appropriate levels of individual project related
expertise, such a procedure is fully capable of identifying at least 80% of potential
deviations which could arise during normal operation and other operating modes.
In fact, once an installation is credited with the level of operating confidence endowed
by a properly conducted HAZOP study, it is these non-steady state circumstances that
benefit particularly from the technique throughout the lifetime of the installation.
Furthermore, the term OPERABILITY continually calls into question the HUMAN
FACTORS involved as well as the prediction of equipment and control system
behavior.
SOME WIDER IMPLICATIONS OF, AND THE NEED FOR THE HAZOP
METHOD
Having focused so far only on operating integrity of a process, there are other areas
to which the method is applicable, often with the stress upon human interaction.
Apart from the uniformity of day-to-day activities, hazards, which could cause
major interruptions and loss, possibly leading to costly incidents, need to be
identified. Questions, such as the following, also need to be answered:
Are there chemicals used in the plant which have not been subjected
to hazard assessments because they are handled in small quantities,
are assumed harmless, or are not considered to have long term toxic
effect upon employees?
What hazardous materials are transported to and from the site? What
routes are taken? What would be the consequence of accidental
release?
Are chemicals properly packaged, labeled and responsibly
advertised? Are the consequences of product misuse made absolutely
clear?
What effluents are generated by the operation being carried out?
What regulations require to be followed for their disposal?
Have all potential natural events; earthquakes, flooding, high winds,
etc, and man made incidents; breach of security, sabotage, etc, been
considered?
Are the codes and standards; national, company and international,
applicable to the installation, relating to its design, siting,
construction and operation being complied with?
The last point leads us to what is probably the most important attribute of HAZOP
study.
In well defined areas, usually those of major risk, a code of practice has usually been
built up and the equipment can therefore be designed safely. An example is pressure
vessel design.
However, with the rapid advances in technology it is not always possible to keep up
with developments and maintain comprehensive codes of practice, even in major
areas.
34
OPERATIONS TRAINING
A greater drawback to just relying on codes of practice, however, is that adherence to

the code of practice only ensures that the particular piece of equipment in isolation is
adequate and it does not take into account the operation of the process as a whole,
whereas HAZOP study ensures this is catered for. This is indicated in figure 10, on
the next page.
FIGURE 10
HAZOP PROCEDURE
A further problem in process design is the tendency to focus attention on those aspects
of the design for which individual departments are responsible, e.g.
35
OPERATIONS TRAINING
Suitability of materials of construction.

Adequacy of blowdown and relief facilities, although necessitating
intentional discharge to the environment.
Suitability of proposed instrumentation.
A working plant, however, is a dynamic running unit and it IS NECESSARY TO

MAKE A SYSTEMATIC EXAMINATION OF THE SYSTEM AS A WHOLE IN
ORDER TO UNCOVER AND REFER BACK TO THOSE RESPONSIBLE,
ANY INADEQUACIES IN THE DESIGN.
This will need to be directed particularly at all the obscure and unexpected
happenings which may occur during plant operation and which could give rise to
hazards.
A further need for HAZOP arises because economic pressures have led to larger
and more complex plants. These contain much larger inventories of hazardous
materials and their more complicated nature can lead to interaction between the
various units making up the whole. Any shut-down necessitated by plant failures will
also be much more expensive.
Major accidents affecting the surrounding environment have also given rise to
pressures from groups outside industry for more rigorously controlled standards of
safety.
HAZOP is, accordingly, an abbreviated form of a critical examination and is based
on the supposition that a problem can only arise when there is a deviation from what
is expected. This is equivalent to saying that the design team is competent to design
the plant for normal operating conditions and potential problems are usually
overlooked because of the complexity of the system rather than lack of knowledge
among members of the team.
STUDY PROCEDURE
The procedure can be carried out at any stage in the life of a project although the
most detailed study is carried out when the process and instrumentation line diagram
has been finalized. It is most important that the study team chosen can provide the
knowledge and experience appropriate to the project to be studied. The team also
needs to be small enough to be efficient while containing sufficient skills and
experience necessary to caver the area of study comprehensively.
A typical team composition for the study of a new plant may consist of the
following:
Team leader, whose main job is to ensure procedures are followed
properly.
Project engineer.
Design engineer.
Technical project manager.
Instrument engineer.
Commissioning manager.
Each member must have enough technical knowledge and authority to make
decisions within his own area of responsibility. Final decisions on each and every
action to be taken are not the prerogative of the tam leader. Cooperative effect means
joint agreement, or disagreement, and the leader signs off the study and its contents on
behalf of the team
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OPERATIONS TRAINING
For plant extensions and modifications the team may consist of:
Team leader.
Plant engineer.
Plant manager.
Works development manager
Instrument engineer.
Plant operator
APPLICATION OF THE METHOD
Again if we refer to fig.10, we can see that the procedure in the actual study
consists of examining the process and instrumentation line diagram (P.I.&D.), section
by section. A list of guide words, fig. 11 on page 39, is used to generate deviations
from normal operation corresponding to all conceivable possibilities.
Typical situations considered during the study are:
Normal operation
Foreseeable changes in operation, e.g. the up rating, reduced output,
plant start up and shut down.
Suitability of plant materials, equipment and instrumentation.
Provision for failure of plant services, e.g. steam, electricity, cooling
water.
Provision for maintenance.
The guide words are applied, in turn, to the process, i.e. pipework, joining pieces of
equipment, and to the equipment itself. Any problem which could arise in an item of
equipment will often show up as a cause or consequence of a deviation in a line joined
to that equipment.
One of the most important duties of a HAZOP study team leader is to try and
break all assumptions arising in the normal course of question and answer type
procedures. The recorded actions, which are decided on will therefore include further
questions, which may not be answerable in the capability of the team. So, to keep the
study moving forward, it is essential to designate the job to further specific enquiries
to individuals who may not be members of the team but who possess the relevant
knowledge. This is done by noting the outstanding problem in the ACTION column
of the report form along with the initials of the person designated to undertake that
action.
One member of the team, other than the leader, is given the responsibility of
keeping the record and taking the necessary follow up actions after the meeting. He is
also responsible for assembling replies from such expert information sources in
readiness for the next meeting of the team. A typical report form format is shown in
figure 12, page 40, but many companies design their own to suit specific plant design
and product manufacturing scenarios.
37
OPERATIONS TRAINING
FIGURE 11
38
OPERATIONS TRAINING
FIGURE 12
39
OPERATIONS TRAINING
Only points requiring action are recorded. Some of these may be decided ON THE
SPOT, in which case the agreed alterations are noted on the P&I line diagram, while
others may be deferred for action outside the meeting, as already indicated. After each
meeting the agreed changes and the names of individuals appointed to implement
each action are recorded and the record sent to each member of the team before the
next meeting.
THE APPLICATION OF EACH GUIDE WORD TO GENERATE ALL
CONCEIVABLE DEVIATIONS MUST BE THROUGH AND EXHAUSTIVE.
For each deviation generated the cause and consequences must be determined. Typical
questions which could arise:
Do we need a high liquid level alarm as well as a level indicator?
Is a single non-return valve sufficient?
Is the vent big enough?
Any potential problems highlighted in the consequences of a deviation must be
examined to see whether they are acceptable or whether further action is needed. In
the large majority of cases the need for action can be evaluated qualitively on the
basis of experience and judgment.
Need for changes = (seriousness of consequences) + (frequency of occurrence)
In the case of a major potential hazard, however, it may be necessary to carry out a
full quantitative hazard analysis (HAZAN).
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17.4 THE ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITY OF THE PLANT

MANAGER WITH REGARD TO HAZARDS
The role, job, of the Plant manager is a most important one. He is the person who
is ultimately held responsible for the Health, Safety and Welfare of all persons and
operations within the Plant. In addition to this he is also responsible for all affects the
Plant may produce on the surrounding population and the environment. He will also
be held responsible for any ill affects the products of the Plant may have on the
customers.
To be able to meet all of the above requirements, the Plant Manager needs to be
well qualified and highly experienced. Ideally, he needs an understanding of the
following:
Physics
Chemistry
Materials science
Life sciences
Statistics
Occupational Health and Safety
Engineering disciplines
Business administration
Added to this he is expected to have some knowledge of the following:
Loss prevention
Fire and explosive protection
Hazardous materials handling, transportation and disposal
Pollution abatement
Plant security
Accident investigation
Emergency response planning
Budget preparation
Training
He will also need practical experience of dealing with the following:
Employees
Union officials
Fellow management
Insurance company personnel
Consumer safety associations
Fire services and the police
Factory inspectors
This seems a lot to be required of one person, but for most subjects he will
delegate the responsibility to an under manager or specialist. However, his knowledge
of each subject should be sufficient that he understands all the salient points, as
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ultimately HE WILL BE HELD RESPONSIBLE IF ANYTHING GOES

WRONG.
4.1 MANAGING HAZARDS

In his role in managing hazards the Plant Manager relies heavily on other members
of the management Team, especially the Risk Manager and the Loss Prevention
Manager. His primary role will be that of coordinating the efforts of all the team
members.The management of hazards uses many tools, i.e. HAZAN and HAZOP to
establish the RISK CRITERIA.
RISK CRITERIA.
In the absence of any absolute scale of human performance there is an on going
search for better means of RISK EXPOSURE MEASUREMENT. However, we are
able to adopt criteria for the dependability of hardware and software systems, and this
gives us scope for enhancing our levels of confidence. Both areas can be represented
by the following examples of typical data, although it must be remembered that the
use of such figures in hazard analysis requires some measure of reservation,
judgement and experience when bearing in mind that any untoward event has a
chance of happening over the range NOW to NEVER! The usual approach to
attempted quantification of criteria is to assume that all faults and failures occur in a
random manner with respect to time.
Hazard/failure mode
Failure rate or failure at

demand probability
3.3 10-4/yr
Fire in a flammable liquid storage tank.

Fire/explosion in petroleum refineries
resulting in damage outside the perimeter.
Tank rupture.
Relief valve fails to open on demand.
Electronic control system failure.
Shut down device fails on demand.
Operator fails to observe.
Operator fails to take action.
1.4 10-4/yr
1.0 10-6/yr
1.0 10-5/demand
1.0 10-6/hour
1.0 10-4/demand
1.0 10-3/demand
1.0 10-4/demand
ARRIVING AT A PROBABILITY
The likelihood of the occurrence of a disastrous event derives from data, which is
specific to, for example, the site, the weather, the equipment design, the foundation
specification and the properties of the contained material. Consequently, the
probabilities of many events or failures of modern equipment are not known, if only
for want of historical records, and have to be assessed by the BEST ENGINEERING
JUDGEMENT, despite inevitable uncertainties. The probabilities of some events
also tend to change with time, e.g. corrosion fatigue failures, radioactive release and
operator stress.
4.2 ESTIMATING THE CONSEQUENCES

Any attempt at quantifying the effects of fires, explosions and the release of
contaminants to the environment requires an understanding of the physical and
chemical processes involved, e.g. thermal radiation flux, generated overpressures and
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safe distance downwind of a released chemical. To measure the severity of such

events, damage and injury criteria are needed so that the boundaries of the area
affected by each hazard scenario can be established and an estimate, however
subjective, made of fatalities, injuries and exposure, together with the potential
damage to structures, equipment and services.
We have seen how the LOGIC TREE may be used to predict the probability of a
specific event occurring by tracing all possible sequences of events and paths capable
of leading towards it. A yardstick of risk level acceptability is clearly needed,
especially considering that different sectors of society such as the employer, his
insurers, the general public and the regulatory bodies are unlikely to be in mutual
agreement. Society at large tends to tolerate one fatality a year over a considerable
period of time but reacts very differently to a single event, which results in multiple
fatalities. Risk profiles may be derived from historical data for various natural or
human related catastrophes.
Figure 13 shows that a hurricane causing ten or more fatalities occurs, on average,
with a frequency approaching once per year, whereas an earthquake that kills more
than 1000 people is expected to occur about once a century. The risk profile for an
industrial activity can be calculated and superimposed on these figures for comparison
with other risks. Such profiles may also be used to evaluate the cost benefit of
changes in a process route, plant design and location or the effect of adding protective
measures.
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FIGURE 13
FREQUENCY OF EVENTS WITH GREATER THAN 10 FATALITIES
4.3 INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIETAL RISK

THE PROBLEM OF FORMULATING RISK CRITERIA AN
ACCEPTABILITY:
The form of criterion must allow an adequate description of the possible effects of
the risk, e.g. whether they are acute or chronic, appear promptly or are delayed, cause
effects singly in the exposed population or affect more than one persom
simultaneously. If the criterion does not fulfil this requirement it may be capable of
producing anomalous conclusions. Depending on the nature of the risk an adequate
description may be simple or complex. In the case of major hazard installations
presenting a risk of acute affects to the public the risk will be variable amongst those
exposed and there may be potentaial for a range of multiple fatality accidents to occur.
In this case the risk cannot be completely described by a single parameter. An
adequate description of the totality and distribution of this type of risk can be
provided by the combination of the concepts of INDIVIDUAL and SOCIETAL
RISK.
An example of a criterion which is based on an inadequte description of the risk
pattern is AVERAGE INDIVIDUAL RISK which can produce misleading
conclusions.
Consider a plant at which an explosion could occur at frequency F per year, with
two villages, A and B, within range of significant overpressure effects Figure 14. As A
is closer than B there is a higher probability that a person at A will be affected than at
B. assuming that these probabilities are 0.5 and 0.1 respectively for fatal injury, the
individual risks at A and b are 0.5F per year and 0.1F per year: the risk contours are
also shown in figure 14. if there are 50 people living in both villages, assuming for
simplicity 100% occupancy, 505 would be killed at A, i.e. 25 people, but only 105 at
B, i.e. 5 people. The total number of off-site fatalities would be 30, occuring at a
frequency of F per year. This would be a SOCIETAL RISK.
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FIGURE 14
RISK CONTOUR PLOT
The average number of fatalities per year is 30F and the average individual risk is
this value divided by the number exposed (100), i.e.0.3F per person year.
Now, suppose there is a proposal to build new houses at B, increasing the
population by 300 to 350. The risk to any of these people is the individual risk at B,
0.1F per year, but more people are exposed and the number of people killed at B
would now be 35. The individual risk and the number killed at A are, of course,
unaltered and so the overall total for off-site fatalities is now 25 at A plus 35 at B, i.e.
60 occurring at a frequency of F per year. The average number of fatalities per year
has doubled to 60F but the number exposed is now 400 and so the average individual
risk is 0.15 per person per year, half its previous value! This contrived example,
summarized in figure 15, illustrates why average individual risk can produce
misleading conclusions. Exposing more people at low individual risk to each reduces
the average individual risk. Of course the risk is not reduced, the societal risk has
increased because more people are exposed at low individual risk, figure 16, this also
stresses the point that an F N curve, figure 13, tells nothing about risk distribution.
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN POPULATION AND AVERAGE INDIVIDUAL
RISK
Event frequency:
F yr-1
Casualty probability:
A = 0.5,
B = 0.1
Individual risk:
A = 0.5F yr-1,
B = 0.1F yr-1
Population at A:
50
50
Societal risk (A):
N = 25
= 25 at F yr-1
Population at B:
50
350
Societal risk (B):
N=5
= 35 at F yr-1
Total socieatal risk
N = 30
= 60 at F yr-1
AVERAGE INDIVIDUAL RISK 30F

50 +50
= 0.3F yr-1; 60F

50 + 350
= 0.15F yr-1
FIGURE 15
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FIGURE 16
4.4 RISK COMPARISONS

The traditional approach to formulation of risk criteria is by risk comparisons. The
basis for TARGET SETTING is that if a risk is minimal compared with other
background risks it is a waste of resources to pursue further reduction of the risk. It
has been recognized for a long time that an individuals perceptions and acceptance of
risks are affected by a number of features, e.g. whether the risk is voluntarily or
involuntarily imposed, degree of individual control over the risk, novelty of the
hazard, benefits accrued from the activity.
An example of successful target criterion for risks to employees, which illustrates
the strength of the process is the FATAL ACCIDENT RATE (FAR), see page 23. A
strength of the target setting approach is that designers will search for a low cost
means of attaining the target rather than arguing that the cost of the risk reduction is
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prohibitive. Although there advantages within industry from generating and using inhouse risk targets, any responsible organization should be prepared to defend any
decisions on a case-by-case basis. This was one of the conclusions reached by a study
group on Risk assessment in 1983, along with the recommendation that risks should
not be aggregated into a single index UNLESS THE CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS
ARE CLEARLY STATED.
LIMITATIONS OF RISK ASSESSMENT
Risk assessment has been criticized on several counts:
i)
Inaccuracy and inapplicability of some of the numerical models used,
although this is an area of progressive refinement.
ii)
Incompleteness of data used in analysis.
iii)
Use of generic or arbitrary acceptability criteria.
iv)
Difficulty in checking the final result, except against experience of
incidents.
v)
Complexity and cost of the techniques used.
However, there are areas wherein risk assessment has contributed significantly to
the formulation of general safety policy. Two such areas are nuclear power generation
and the chemical processing of nuclear fuels where risks include delayed or
distributed deaths due to accidental events, which can affect both employees and the
public.
In the case of chemical plant management, the overall impact of carcinogens is a
question best addressed in a similar way, bearing in mind that the problem may not be
purely one of occupational exposure but the more difficult issue of cumulative effect
of general environmental contamination.
Whilst various criteria have been proposed for risk to the neighbouring public from
hazardous activities, very little research has been carried out on widely spread risks.
The concept of a RISK VERSUS BENEFITS criterion is gaining acceptance and is
consistent with the REASONABLY PRACTICABLE requirement of the Health and
safety at Work Policy.
HAZARD RATING INDICES AND PLANS AN EXAMPLE OF PRACTICAL
RISK MANAGEMENT
The use of rating plans in relation to specific categories of risk for the
determination of insurance premiums has been long established in order to secure
recognition for:
a) Capital investment replacement.
b) The consequences of operational hazards.
c) The standard of protection provided for such values and hazards.
One prominent chemical manufacturing company employs three essential
calculable factors:
i)
ii)
iii)
The inherent hazard classification.

The estimated normal loss.
The combine adequacy of hardware, software and fire fighting facilities.
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Individual parameters requiring evaluation, largely subjectively based on

experience, are listed on standard working sheets to record points awarded, weighting
and penalty factors where applicable.
The inherent hazard classification distinguishes between low, medium and high
risk facilities wherein the characteristics of raw materials, products and the process
are accommodated on a points scale 0, 1, 2 and 3.
Process materials are marked principally with respect to fire, explosion and/or
toxicity properties and a process is judged according to its parameters, such as
energy/heat content, temperature, pressure, corrosion and erosion. Hardware relates to
the quality of process containment, location, spacing, control equipment and electrical
integrity, etc.
Software relates to such aspects as good housekeeping, maintenance,
communications, permit to work systems and training. Eventually, totaled points
indicate the appropriate insurance category.
Unfortunately, it is possible for this approach to risk assessment to be used for the
purpose of DISCRIMINATING BETWEEN IDENTIFIED POTENTIAL
HAZARDS so that an order of precedence may be drawn up. If the resources required
for eliminating or reducing them are limited some serious risks can remain
unattended.
This approach can, and does, also result in some hazards and risks actually
remaining undetected for want of a rigorous examination of the underlying causes, a
procedure vital to the establishment of appropriate corrective actions. Two such
dominant analytical procedures will be the subject the following material. Apart from
these, one hazard classification method has gained considerable prominence mainly
because it specifies hazard categories and defines how the numerical ratings should be
used.
THE MOND FIRE, EXPLOSION and TOXICITY INDEX has been developed
by I.C.I. from the American DOW CHEMICAL COMPANY FIRE and
EXPLOSION CLASSIFICATION METHOD (the Dow Index) into a tool, which
can be applied to the majority of component units found on a plant site. It is
particularly useful in determining plant layout and spacing.
THE METHODOLOGY OF RISK CONTROL
FIGURE 17 (PAGE 49), attempts to list all the risk sources of a typical project which
require consideration before the facility becomes a revenue earning reality. At all
stages you will see that human error is involved.
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OPERATIONS TRAINING
FIGURE 17
SOURCES OF RISK IN PROJECT MANAGEMENT
Figure 18 (following page) categorises risks to life, which are prevalent throughout
the complete life cycle of an industrial enterprise and Figure 19 (following page)
identifies some non-hazardous operational risks, which challenge management in
terms of production and cash flow continuity.
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OPERATIONS TRAINING
TYPICAL RISKS TO LIFE
FIGURE 18
TYPICAL NON-HAZARDOUS OPERATIONAL RISKS*
FIGURE 19
Some of the risks listed may also be potentially hazardous,

depending on the system.
This brings us to Figure 20, depicting the overall procedural logic for assessment.
Feedback indicates the necessity for repeating the procedure, usually a quick check, if
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changes are made which could introduce further risks at the interfaces with the
remainder of the system.
FIGURE 20
NO CHANGE implies that a decision has been made to retain an acceptable or
residual risk level because the system would not otherwise be economically viable.
The flow scheme or procedure is applicable to all stages of a project.
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LIFE CYCLE OF AN INSTALLATION
Risk management within this life cycle depends on the following factors:
Sound standards of engineering design must be used.

Quality control procedures must ensure that all equipment conforms
to design specification.
All equipment must be inspected, maintained and tested at suitable
intervals. This applies especially to equipment installed for protective
reasons, e.g. alarms, trips and safety valves.
Personnel must be experienced and trained in the use of clearly
designed procedures.
Expanding figure 20, we can now insert two techniques, which are universally
accepted for implementing risk control:
1. For risk identification, hazards and operational risks (HAZOP)
2. For risk quantification of identified risks for comparison with their
respective targets (HAZAN)
Finally, figure 21 embodies more comprehensively the guidance upon what is now
regarded as standard practice for implementing effective RISK MANAGEMENT.
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FIGURE 21
SUMMARY OF RISK ASSESSMENT PROCEDURE
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17.5 MAJOR CHEMICAL HAZARD SOURCES

All chemical substances are potentially dangerous and should always be treated
with care, whether in solid, liquid or vapour form. Special fire risks may also apply to
certain chemical substances, solvents and fuel. We can prevent potential hazards from
developing into catastrophes by ensuring that all substances are CLEARLY,
ACCURATELY and INFORMATIVELY LABELLED and by READING and
OBEYING directions on the labels BEFORE HANDLING, using, mixing,
transporting, storing or disposing of any chemical or flammable substances.
We need to be aware of the meaning of various hazard warning symbols in current
use. Remember that DIAMONDS MEAN DANGER! If a label is missing from a
container, the exact nature of the contents needs to be checked or verified, and relabelled, before handling, using or storing. Chemical substances should be stored in
their original containers and, in the case of drums and so on the lids should be
securely fitted. Care must be taken that substances, which are incompatible are not
stored together. Storage areas should be away from vehicular or pedestrian traffic
routes or any heat sources such as radiant heaters, hot reaction vessels or hot
pipework. Prominent warning notices, indicating the location, storage or handling of
dangerous chemicals or flammable material, may also need to be displayed in or
around the areas concerned. Correct procedures must always be followed regarding
proper ventilation and the use of appropriate personal protective equipment when
handling, using, mixing or disposing of chemical substances. Quantities of dangerous
or hazardous substances should always be kept to the bare minimum necessary for
operational efficiency.
Chemical Storage and Handling Regulations require employers to make a full
assessment of any work activity or operating conditions, which may be liable to
expose employees or other persons to harmful or hazardous substances. Such
assessments must seek to fully evaluate the risks and determine what precautions,
including any training needs, are necessary before any persons are exposed to
potential danger. The following points must be taken into consideration:
Special care must be given to residual chemicals in piping, vessels or

other equipment, which could be a health, safety or fire hazard.
Large inventories of hazardous chemicals must be carefully
examined to determine the actual quantities required for plant
efficiency.
High or low temperature chemicals streams may cause hot or cold
burns.
Care must be taken on effluent mixing within sewers to prevent
possible unwanted chemical reactions taking place.
Care must be taken in the use of some fire fighting agents to prevent
suffocation of the user.
Great care must be taken to ensure 100% compliance with all aspects
of the work Permit system.
All materials must be stored according to the specification of each,
avoiding the possibility of mixing incompatible chemicals in the
same location.
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OPERATIONS TRAINING
Great care must be taken to prevent the accumulation of static

electricity in areas where flammable vapours, dusts are present and
during the loading or unloading of such materials.
UNDERSTANDING PRODUCT CLASSIFICATIONS AND SYMBOLS

Because of the importance of chemical handling regulations, it is necessary that you
have a firm acquaintance with the ten standard SUPPLY classifications, which are
used to cover all products, and range from EXPLOSIVE through to VERY TOXIC
and down to IRRITANT. This information follows, and you should study it carefully.
PRODUCT CLASSIFICATION AND SYMBOLS
For substances dangerous for SUPPLY
Colour scheme: Black markings on an orange coloured background.
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HANDLING AND USE OF CHEMICALS

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All chemical substances, whether gases, liquids, dusts or solids are potentially
dangerous in one-way or another, therefore they should never be treated carelessly.
We can regard everyday substances such as fuels, medicines, solvent cleaners,
lubricants, pesticides and paints as potentially dangerous substances. When handling,
mixing or using chemical substances, we need to be fully informed of any hazards,
which could arise and the precautions necessary to avoid accident or injury to health.
There are various regulations, in many different places, concerning either indirect
exposure to, or the direct handling of dangerous or hazardous substances by persons.
The requirements of these regulations are outlined in a future lesson, but for now
we will look at a brief summary. The regulations are intended to form a framework for
the proper control and use of any substances hazardous to health. They apply to all
types of business operations. The regulations require employers to make careful
assessment of any work activity or operating conditions, which are liable to expose
employees, or the public, to hazardous substances.
Assessment means a through evaluation of any risks to health, obtaining where
necessary expert advice, and then deciding what actions are needed to remove or
reduce these risks in order to avoid danger or injury to health. Such assessments must
be carried out BEFORE Employees are exposed to any hazardous system, and must
take into account any training, instruction or information needs, hazard exposure
limitation and control or monitoring requirements, as appropriate.
Assessments normally take the form of written reports with information to show
why decisions about risks and precautions have been arrived at and to make clear
through communication to employees what their responsibilities are in terms of
observing any necessary precautions. Such assessments will need to be reviewed from
time to time, and especially if there are any changes to a process or to the substance
produced.
HARMFUL SUBSTANCES PERSONAL PROTECTION.
Detailed mention has already been made at various stages of your course of the
routes through which harmful substances can enter the human system, and of the
personal protection available to prevent the entry. We need always to be aware of the
correct operating methods and PPE to be used when handling potentially harmful
substances. We must always be on guard against COMPLACENCY, i.e. nothing
happened before when I did this job so there is no need for the protection..
Remember PPE is of no use if not used in the correct manner at all times when
required.
FLAMMABLE OR UNSTABLE SUBSTANCES.
One area of hazard that we additionally need to be fully informed is that where a
CHEMICAL FIRE OR EXPLOSION RISK MAY EXIST. A number of inorganic
substances, such as chlorates and some nitrates, whilst not flammable themselves, can
react most violently if allowed to come into contact with organic substances. Some
materials can react chemically and ignite when in intimate contact. Some metals can
react chemically with gases and become explosively unstable if knocked, e.g. copper
and acetylene. Some metals, such as sodium and calcium react and burn violently if
allowed to come into contact with water. The list goes on and on. Flammable solvents
present yet another potential fire or explosion hazard, along with flammable gases,
powders or dusts.
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Here are some general rules to be applied for safe operations:

Ensure adequate ventilation to avoid the build up of flammable
vapour concentrations.
Avoid spillages: use only enclosed, non-spill vessels, which can be
securely sealed. NEVER store flammable substances, especially
liquids in open containers. Keep the stock as low as possible and
clearly labeled.
Exclude all sources of ignition. SMOKING MUST BE BANNED in
any area where flammable liquids or vapours may be present.
Use only certified flameproof or intrinsically safe lighting.
Report any leakage promptly and evacuate the area at risk until any
leak has been safely dealt with, use monitoring devices where
available.
All flammable liquefied gas containers, including empties, must be
stored in outside storage areas, preferable the wire cage design, to
ensure adequate ventilation and shielded from any heat source.
All personnel who have to work in areas where flammable
substances are used or stored should receive regular training in fire
fighting operations.
HAZARDOUS WASTES
In addition to normal waste products industry also generates wastes which can be
injurious to health, and which are designated hazardous.
DEFINING HAZARDOUS WASTES
To identify hazardous wastes, a study of the properties of each substance must be
made, asking, IS THE SUBSTANCE:
FLAMMABLE
EXPLOSIVE
CORROSIVE
RADIOACTIVE
TOXIC
CARCINOGENIC
MUTAGENIC
INFECTIVE
LIKELY TO CAUSE ALLERGIES
HAZARDOUS WASTE DISPOSAL.

Hazardous waste disposal does not just mean delivering a lorry load of dangerous
chemical waste to a suitable waste disposal site. It includes the problem of industrial
effluent discharging in to sewers and rivers; it also includes dusts and gases ejected
into the local atmosphere via stacks or fume extraction systems. Industrial air
pollutants of current major concern include:
Oxides of nitrogen cause acid rain and lung damage.
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Fluorine and fluorides cause bone disease.

Asbestos fibres cause cancer and lung damage.
Chlorofluorocarbons cause damage to the ozone layer.
Exhaust fumes from leaded petrol cause brain damage in children.
Other pollutants of equal concern are those, which are often washed out with
industrial effluent into rivers and streams. These include chlorinated solvents, harmful
dyes, cyanides and toxic heavy metals such as cadmium and mercury.
Chemical substances are frequently disposed of carelessly and thoughtlessly
DOWN THE DRAINS. This can be detrimental in one or other of the ways outlined
in the following table.
Substance characteristic
(i) Acidic
DANGER POTENTIAL
Damage to sewer walls, release of toxic gases,
interference with biological treatment processes.
(ii) High temperature
May drive out toxic gases from other effluent
or from sewer residues.
(iii) Sulpher compound May release deadly H2S gas.
(iv) Cyanide compound May release deadly HCN gas.
(v) Contains toxic heavy Metals accumulate in sewage sludge.
metals.
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17.6 MAJOR HEALTH HAZARDS ASSOCIATED WITH

PROCESS PLANTS
THE COSTS OF GOOD HEALTH
We are informed that GOOD HEALTH IS GOOD BUSINESS and that every
year a staggering 2.2 million people, in U.K., suffer from ill health caused or made
worse by work. 13 million working days are lost as people take time off their work
because it has made them ill.
This unnecessary effect on Employees health cost industry several hundreds of
pounds every year, both the pain and suffering and financial losses can be avoided by
understanding the causes of work related ill health and the steps to manage and
prevent it.
WORK RELATED ILLNESS
Work related illness is also known as OCCUPATIONAL ILL HEALTH. This
describes any illness an employee suffers because of the hazards to which they have
been exposed at work. It is the responsibility of an employer to manage the activities
and prevent his employees being made ill as a result of their work.
There are a wide range of health risks capable of causing a variety of illnesses,
examples of which are given in the following table, on page 60. This list is by no
means exhaustive but it can be used to start thinking about the types of problems that
may exist in the work place.
HEALTH RISK
Handling heavy or awkward loads, poor
work postures; repetitive or forceful
movements; a combination, e.g. repetitive
assembly and
inspection work.
ILL HEALTH EFFECTS

Musculoskeletal disorders, e.g. bad
backs pains; strains and sprains.
Upper limb dis-orders.
Cancer; asthma; bronchitis; fibrosis;
poisoning; dermatitis; burns.
Breathing in and handling hazardous

substances, e.g. asbestos, solvents,
isocyanates, wood, grain and silica dust;
sheep dips; other chemicals.
High noise levels, e.g. from noisy tools and
machinery.
Deafness; tinnitus.
Vibrations, e.g. from hand held tools;

regularly
driving vehicles.
Vibration White Finger with loss of

grip and pain in fingers; low back
pain from whole body vibration.
Exposure to radiation, e.g. from X-ray work;

ultraviolet radiation from prolonged outdoor
work; infra red; lasers.
Burns; skin complaints; eye damage;

cancer.
Exposure to biological agents viruses,

bacteria, fungi and parasites, e.g. in health
care, agriculture and laboratory work.
Mild sickness to serious diseases, e.g.

orf (a disease contacted from sheep);
hepatitis B; legionnaires disease.
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Stressors, e.g. excessive workload or work

place;
conflicting priorities.
Can contribute to high blood pressure;

heart disease; depression.
NOISE
The potentially damaging effects of exposure to noise are less dramatic than
exposure to hazardous chemicals. Nevertheless, damage to the hearing of workers due
to exposure is common. You are probably aware that loud bangs damage your hearing,
but most hearing damage is the result of long term exposure to noise, which is loud,
but not so loud that you can get used to it.
If your hearing is good you will have no idea of what partial deafness is like. Next
time you get a chance, put on a pair of headphones but do not play any music through
them. Notice how cut off from the world around you feel, and how difficult it is to
understand what is being said to you at normal voice levels. This gives you some idea
of what partial deafness is like. But real hearing loss is much worse, because you get
distortion as well.
Noise intensity is measured in decibels, dB. The decibel scale is based on powers
of ten, it is logarithmic. So, while 10 dB is ten times intense as 1 dB, a sound
measuring 20 dB is a hundred times as intense as a sound of 1 dB, and 30 dB a
thousand times and so on. Each increase of 3 dB represents a doubling of sound
intensity. So 103 dB is not just over 100 dB, it means twice as much sound energy, i.e.
noise going into your ears. It is important to remember that even brief exposure to
very high noise levels can effect your hearing, such as exposure to cartridge operated
tools.
Partial or complete loss of hearing, however, are not the only effects of exposure to
high noise levels. Other possible effects include nausea, headaches, irritability and
tiredness. Loss of hearing in itself can be a safety hazard, as workers may not hear
alarms or safety warnings. It is, therefore, vitally important that workers use ear
protection at all times in areas where it is recommended.
RADIATION
Radiation exists in various forms, some of which are relatively harmless. But the
kind of radiation that we will deal with, IONISING RADIATION, is one of the most
dangerous of all occupational hazards.
IONISING RADIATION is well known to most people, they have heard of
Hiroshima, Nagasaki and numerous accidents and mishaps in nuclear plants around
the world. Being extremely dangerous, ionizing radiation is subject to very tight
standards of control. But workers can still, unknowingly be exposed. Except in the
case of severe over exposure, you cannot feel or see ionizing radiation. Indeed you
can feel perfectly well after receiving a dose, which later will cause serious damage to
your body.
The types of damage that ionizing radiation can cause can be grouped into three
clusters:
Burns, dermatitis and cataracts.
Cancers and leukaemia.
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Damage to reproductive cells, leading to infertility, sterility and birth

defects in later generations.
The most widespread industrial radiation hazard is in radiography. Radiography is

commonly used for examining castings, welds and other components. It is frequently
used on pipeline sites and other construction projects.
At all times it is vital that the correct procedures are followed, and you MUST
NEVER for any reason enter a site where radiography is taking place.
TEMPERATURE
Regulations require that a reasonable temperature be maintained in each
workroom. There are, however, situations where the environment cannot be controlled
and protective clothing must be provided and the patterns of work must be adapted to
reduce the effects of temperature extremes. It is very important to follow any
guidelines laid down for the use of protective clothing issued to you if you are
working in either very hot or very cold surroundings. Working in excessively hot
environment can lead to:
Dizziness, nausea, chills.

Cramps, general weakness and fatigue.
Heat stroke, which can be fatal.
All of these can, of course, lead to accidents, even at an early stage. A cold working
environment has its hazards too, although it is unlikely that workers in Libya will
have to work in extreme cold, it is important to bear in mind the possible hazards. As
cold gets more intense your body loses heat. As your brain chills, you may well start
to act irrationally. You can easily see how this leads to accidents. Working in a very
cold environment can lead to:
Rheumatism
Chronic arthritis
Bronchitis
Heart disease
CHEMICALS
It has been estimated that there are over half a million chemical substances being
manufactured today, and that a potentially harmful chemical enters industrial use
every twenty minutes.
ALL WORKERS must consider themselves AT RISK FROM CHEMICAL
HAZARDS, but it is ESPECIALLY workers in ENGINEERING AND
MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES AND TRANSPORT WHO ARE MOST AT
RISK.
Since there are so many potential harmful chemicals it is just not possible to give
details of every potential hazard. However, the major sources of risks come from oils,
corrosives, poisons, dusts, fumes, gas and asbestos. It is therefore vitally important
that you follow exactly the correct procedures whenever you are required to
come into contact with any chemical.
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The effects of these hazards are similarly very extensive and varied. Never the less
a short list of the possible effects gives you some idea of the risks involved,
particularly if you fail to follow instructions or use safety equipment.
Poisoning, dermatitis, cancers, burns, blindness, paralysis, bronchitis, silicosis, etc.
Although there are three main entry routes into your body for chemicals to take;
lungs, skin, stomach; it is worth remembering that 90% of unwanted substances enter
your body through your lungs.
ELECTRICAL HAZARDS
HOW HAZARDOUS IS ELECTRICITY
The following statistics give pause for thought:
One in every 84 electrical accidents is fatal.
An electrical accident is 12 times more likely to be fatal than any
other types of accident.
Deaths from electrocution and other electrical accidents average over
200 per year, in U.K., damaged, faulty or badly maintained portable
electrical equipment is the major source of incidents resulting in
electrocution.
Approximately 40% of all fires in the home or workplace begin with
electrical equipment.
PRINCIPLE CAUSES OF ELECTRICAL ACCIDENTS
The overloading of an electrical circuit incidents resulting in
electrocution.
Damaged or insecurely anchored trailing power leads.
Wrongly connected up electrical connections or loose connections.
Damaged or faulty plugs, sockets, switches or wiring.
Wrong type of fuse fitted, or use of improvised fuse.
Faulty earth connection or missing connection.
Unsafe wiring insulation due to age, heat effects or chemical
contamination.
Accidental severing of live trailing cables.
Interference with electrical equipment by untrained persons.
Failure to isolate, remove fuses or lock off electrical equipment
before attempting checks or maintenance.
Lack of awareness or careless attitude towards the proximity danger
of high voltage equipment.
ELECTRICAL SAFETY ZONES
Electrical energy, when at a high voltage potential, has the ability to ARC, known
as FLASHOVER. This means that it can jump across an air gap or it can short circuit
via a person or any other potential conductor which comes close. For example, it is
extremely dangerous for a person to get within 2 feet, 60 centimeters, of any noninsulated conductor carrying a voltage of 25000 volts. The hazard increases as voltage
or local humidity increases and the minimum safe air gap separation distance must be
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correspondingly increased. From this you will see why electrical safety zones are
required.
STATIC ELECTRICITY HAZARDS

Most of us have received an electric shock from static electricity when touching a
door handle after walking on a nylon carpet. Similarly static electricity is generated
when:
An electrically non-conductive liquid is pumped from one tank to
another.
Gas bubbles through a liquid.
A stream of liquid splashes into a pool.
The electrical charges may be either discharged harmlessly to earth,
passed through a BONDING WIRE so that the charges cannot arc,
or be discharged as a spark.
ACTIONS TO MINIMISE STATIC PROBLEMS
To minimize static electricity generation:
Pumping velocities should be kept down to less than 1 metre per

second.
Delivery pipes should extend below the surface of the tank contents
to minimize splashing.
All piping and hoses should be bonded.
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17.7 CHEMICAL HAZARDS CONTROL MEASURES

Health and Safety measures can be said to fall into two basic categories:
(a) PREVENTION METHODS
(b) PRECAUTIONARY METHODS
In the case of (a) we are attempting to ensure that any risks are controlled in such a
way that, hopefully, an accident cannot happen. However, the most carefully
considered prevention methods can rarely guarantee total safety against an accident or
mishap and, therefore, in (b) we must plan, in the last resort, against an accident event
and aim to control, limit or minimize any of the possible consequences, which could
arise.
A very simple example of such a two-fold, belt and braces, policy is that of the
chemical storage tank which is surrounded by a containment wall, called a BUND, see
figure 22. Strict operating practices relating to the operating of valves, plus the
installation of a high level trip or alarm systems to guard against overfilling represents
an attempt to prevent accidental loss of containment of hazardous, toxic or valuable
material.
FIGURE 22
An example of a BELT AND BRACES approach i.e. A PRECAUTIONARY
MEASURE Taken Against the Possible failure of a PREVENTATIVE MEASURE.
this precaution is commonly adopted where any loss of containment

could pose a major hazard to persons or the environment.
However, if such an unfortunate accident should occur then a bund will, if it has been
properly designed, prevent the contents of the storage vessel spreading or leaking into
drains, waterways, rivers, etc, where it may cause serious ecological damage or give
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rise to an added fire or explosion hazard, e.g. petrol leaking into drains, or
contaminate local water supplies. We have used the illustration of the bund as merely
one example of a precautionary measure. Some other precautionary measures are:
wearing suitable protective clothing or equipment, erecting protective screens,
organizing standby fire fighting equipment.
As previously mentioned, the prime areas of concern when considering potential
dangers of chemicals or other substances are:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Labelling.
Transportation.
Storage.
Handling and use.
Disposal.
We will now outline measures aimed at chemical accident prevention.

LABELLING
Let us begin with labeling because clear, accurate and informative labeling is
absolutely fundamental to safe handling, transportation, storage, use or disposal of
any potentially hazardous substance. First let us look at some true life cases where
labeling faults have led to accidents or injury:
Case 1. Some packaged chemical had been wrongly labeled as SODIUM NITRATE
when, in fact, it was SODIUM NITRITE, which is, quite a different substance to
sodium nitrate. When the wrongly labeled chemical was added to a plant process,
toxic fumes, in the forms of oxides of nitrogen, were given off. A worker was affected
and needed hospital treatment.
Case 2. A tank, which contained methanol was wrongly labeled as containing xylene.
When this chemical was subsequently added to a reactor process, there was a runaway
reaction and the vessels bursting disc ruptured, ejecting about 600 gallons of acid up
into the air. No employees were injured but, outside the factory, a mother wheeling
her young child in a pushchair was caught in the cloud of acid and subsequently
needed hospital treatment. Pupils at a nearby primary school were also affected when
the acid mist fell onto their playground.
These examples illustrate some of the errors, and potential consequences, which
can occur when the relatively simple matter of labeling goes wrong. We tend to think
of labeling in terms of stickers on packages, drums or bottles but we must not forget
that labeling also applies to pipes conveying gases, liquids and solids, and also all
plant equipment.
RESIDUAL HAZARDS
There is another area of labeling, which relates to RESIDUAL chemical hazards
in equipment, which has been removed for maintenance, repair, servicing or
modification. Such equipment may unavoidably remain contaminated inside various
constituent parts. We need to convey information to persons who will subsequently
handle such equipment as to the appropriate safety precautions to adopt when
handling such equipment. We can best convey this information by the use of durable,
pre-printed labels, which indicate the particular chemical hazards remaining and
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recommend precautions to be adopted to avoid injury. An example of such a label is

shown in figure 23.
FIGURE 23
Example of a CERTIFICATE OF CLEANLINESS LABEL
THE CPL REGULATIONS
The vital importance of having adequate information and clear visual hazard
warning symbols when handling, storing, transporting, using or disposing of
dangerous chemical substances has now been fully recognized internationally,
endorsed by the U.N. An important aspect of safety is THE CLASSIFICATION,
PACKAGING and LABELLING of DANGEROUS SUBSTANCES
REGULATIONS.
These regulations cover labeling requirements both for (a) CONVEYANCE, i.e.
transportation, and (b) the SUPPLY, i.e. marketing, handling and use in the
workplace, of dangerous substances. These regulations are very complex and lengthy,
but we can list the principle requirements as follows.
CLASSIFICATION
Substances may be deemed DANGEROUS for SUPPLY, DANGEROUS for
CONVEYANCE or DANGEROUS for SUPPLY and CONVEYANCE.
PACKAGING
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A dangerous substance must be supplied/conveyed in a package form, which is

SUITABLE and ADEQUATE for the purpose in terms of strength, design and
materials of construction.
LABELLING
The regulations seek to ensure the provision of standardized pictorial hazard
warning symbols, see section 1.A.5, and printed warning phrases on packaged
dangerous substances for supply or conveyance.
a. Labelling for SUPPLY:
The main features of supply labels are:
The designation of the substance, i.e. the chemical name in most
cases.
The classification of the substance, i.e. toxic, with the appropriate
hazard warning symbol.
The risk phrases, e.g. MAY CAUSE FIRE.
The safety phrases, e.g. KEEP CONTAINER DRY.
The name and address of the manufacturer, importer, or supplier.
b. Labelling for CONVEYANCE;
The main features of the conveyance label are:
The name, address and telephone number of the CONSIGNOR or
some other person from whom expert advice on the dangers of the
substance may be obtained.
The designation of the substance, i.e. the chemical name.
The substance identification number, if any.
The hazard warning sign diamond as approved.
Where the quantity in any receptacle exceeds 25 litres, the label must
also give details of the substance dangers and details of the
emergency procedures which should be taken in the event of an
accident.
NOTE.
1. The regulations also cover substances such as pesticides and flammable
solvents. They also stipulate the minimum dimensions of the required
warning labels and symbols, this depends on the size of the container.
2. The regulations apply to all package products, both domestic and
industrial.
3. Substances which are known to be:
CARCINOGENIC, i.e. capable of inducing cancer in persons exposed to
the substance
or
TERATOGENIC, i.e. capable of inducing harmful effects in unborn
offspring
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Must carry the risk phrase MAY CAUSE CANCER and must also carry the safety
phrase AVOID EXPOSURE SEEK SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE USE.
These two phrases must precede all other risk and safety phrases designated to that
particular substance.
SAMPLING
You may wonder how it is possible to measure the amount of dusts, gases and
vapours in the atmosphere. There is specialized equipment for these purposes. An
occupational hygienist, whose job it is to evaluate and control several aspects of the
environment, e.g. noise, air pollution and radiation, collects samples for analysis. The
following equipment is available for this purpose:
For airborne gases/vapours a hand operated bellows pump is used

to draw a number of standard gulps of atmosphere through a detector
tube, which then gives a direct reading of the contaminant, if any, in
that atmosphere.
For dusts in the atmosphere dusts are sampled on a filter pad over a
period of time. The contents are then collected and analysed in a
specialized laboratory, the nature and quantity of the contaminant
determined.
For liquids a sample is drawn off and sent to a specialized
laboratory and analysed, the nature and quantity of the contaminant
determined
VENTILATION
Undesirable gases are released in many industrial operations, and where these
releases occur in a building, ventilation must be provided to dissipate and remove the
releases. Ventilation may be by mechanical, by fans, or natural by louvers. It is
particularly important that, where the gases released are heavier than air, the system of
ventilation is effective down to floor level
PERMANENT SMOKE AND FLAME DETECTION SYSTEMS
In plants where the risk of fire involving flammable substances is high, it is
advisable to provide permanent apparatus connected to the main control room, and
some times the fire station as well, which will give quick notification of smoke or
flame. This is particularly important on modern plants with few operators, and the
immediate notification of smoke or flame can save vital time in bringing fire
appliances to the site.
Also, special automatic SNIFFER detection equipment can be permanently
installed at ground level to detect the presence of flammable vapours, when leaks of
such vapours are prone to occur. Such equipment can be linked to an audible or visual
alarm in the main control room.
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HAZARDOUS ACTIVITY
Working in a confined space
e.g. working in a vessel or a pit
(danger of lowered oxygen levels
or build up of harmful or
flammable gases.
SOME SUITABLE PRECAUTIONS

Outside STANDBY man keeping watch from a
safe position. Gas detection equipment
continuously monitoring the atmosphere inside the
working zone.
Continuous operation electric

welding station, e.g. used in steel
pipe manufacture (creation of
dangerous fume and intense U.V.
radiation.
Local fume extraction system in operation, plus

intense glare and U.V. shielding fitted around
welding station.
The processing of nuclear fuels

(intense, lethal radiation source)
Physical manipulation of radioactive material (e.g.

fuel rods) by means of remote control, by trained
personnel operating from behind protective walls
or barriers.
Stripping out lagging material

containing asbestos fibre, from
pipework or vessels, etc. (serious
long term health hazard from
inhaled particles of asbestos
fibre).
Stripping area enclosed in polyethylene sheeting,

taped and sealed. Stripping team wearing
approved protective clothing and headgear plus
approved face masks and filters.
Stripping waste being BAGGED and SEALED
before being removed from the area. Dust particle
monitoring equipment set up at strategic points
close to stripping area to check for dust leaks.
Purpose made portable stripping, showering and
changing facility in close vicinity to scene of
asbestos stripping operations.
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17.8 THE CONTROL OF INDUSTRIAL MAJOR ACCIDENT

HAZARDS REGULATIONS (CIMAH)
The numerous major disasters, caused by industrial accidents, throughout the world
has led to many countries and organizations introducing CIMAH. For the purpose of
this lesson we will briefly look at the regulations introduced in Britain in 1984.
8.1 MAIN REQUIREMENTS OF THE REGULATIONS
The CIMAH regulations were formulated and introduced to try to prevent this
major type of accident. The key to the regulations is that they place a duty on the
PERSON IN CONTROL OF THE SITE to notify the authorities when more than
specified amounts of listed designated hazardous substances are STORED,
MANUFACTURED or PROCESSED ON THE SITE.
The list of hazardous substances covers:
Liquefied petroleum products
Phosgene
Chlorine
Hydrogen cyanide
Ammonia
Hydrogen
Ethylene oxide
Sodium chlorate
Ammonium nitrate
Flammable gases and liquids
The purpose of the regulations is to enable local authorities to be advised in order
to help them in matters such as planning applications close to notified MAJOR
HAZARD SITES, and planning applications for new major hazard sites. The
regulations do not apply to some nuclear and military sites, but do cover some
pipeline installations.
8.2 HAZARDS AND LOCAL AUTHORITIES, SITE AND OFFSITE
EMERGENCY PLAN.
NOTIFICATION
The notification to the authorities must cover:
Name and address of the person in control
Address of site
Area of site
Date on which activity will commence
General description of activity
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Name and address of planning authority

Specification of the type and maximum quantity held, of each of the
hazardous substances held on the site
METHOD OF OPERATION OF THE REGULATIONS

Regulations apply where there is a combination of:
A prescribed industrial activity.
The involvement of a dangerous substance.
The existence of an operation within the prescribed activity, which is
considered capable of offering a major incident hazard.
A major accident hazard has the following implications;
a) Major emission, fire or explosion involving a
hazardous substance.
b) Serious danger to man.
c) Danger to the environment
The regulations operate at two levels:
Level 1 Where the manufacturer must be able to prove to the authorities that he has
identified the major accident hazards, and has taken steps to prevent such accidents,
and to train and inform his staff and to provide them with equipment
Level 2 Applying to larger sites, and sites with large inventories of hazardous
substances.
Here the manufacturer must submit to the authorities a written hazard assessment;
he must prepare and submit an ON-SITE EMERGENCY PLAN, he must prepare
and submit an OFF-SITE EMERGENCY PLAN jointly with the local authority. He
must provide information on his activities to people living near his site who may be
affected by a major incident.
8.3 MAJOR DISASTERS and THEIR CAUSES
Tragic large scale accidents involving major chemical plants, and causing heavy
loss of life, injury and environmental damage occurred at Flixbourgh, 1974, Seveso,
1976 and Bhopal, 1984. In the latter two of these accidents the majority of the
casualties were amongst members of the local population. In the other case,
Flixbourgh, very extensive structural damage was caused to houses, shops and
commercial buildings outside the perimeter of the chemical complex. The Flixbourgh
accident was caused when maintenance personnel used the wrong quality of piping to
fabricate a temporary line. The resulting failure led to a massive explosion.
The Seveso accident was caused by equipment failure, which led to a major release
of chemical used in pesticide manufacture, as a result there were many instantaneous
deaths amongst the public and to date the local population still suffer from the after
effects. The Bhopal accident was caused by failure of the work force to follow the laid
down operating procedures and to carry out routine equipment checks, plant
management were also negligent in their failure to ensure proper supervision of the
work force. This accident led to a massive release of toxic gas, the number of
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casualties ran into thousands and still numerous people are suffering from the after
effects.
8.4 POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF FUTURE DESIGN OPERATION
Future requirements should be effected by answering the following questions:
What help is needed in the future?
What additional resources are required?
What areas need most attention?
How can safety be improved?
These questions will be answered by using experts to conduct HAZAN and
HAZOP studies.
8.5 ACCIDENT FREQUENCY AND SEVERITY RATES
The authorities require information on all accidents and diseases, which arise from
occupational activities. By careful analysis of such information the authorities can
assess where special health or safety problems are arising and can give priority to
enforcement or corrective measures in these areas.
In order that the necessary data can be analysed details of all accidents, within
certain cases, must be reported on the appropriate forms. These accidents are
reportable whether they should happen to employees or to some person who is
contracted for a particular job.
TERMS and DEFINITIONS FOR ACCIDENT STATISTICS
ALTERNATIVE WORK ACCIDENT (AWA)
This is an injury sustained whilst at work which does not cause absence from work
beyond the day on which the accident occurred, but nevertheless results in the
inability of the person to carry on his normal work duty after the day/shift the accident
occurred.
LOST TIME ACCIDENT (LTA)
This is an injury received whilst at work which results in the injured person being
absent from work.
MINOR ACCIDENT
His is an injury received whilst at work which results in the victim requiring some
medical treatment or examination, but which does not prevent him from carrying on
with his normal work duties.
FREQUENCY RATE
This is the cumulative total of personal accidents, in any particular category, which
can be expected to occur during the working lifetime of an individual if the current
accident performance of the work group, which he is part, remains unchanged. In
simple terms, it is a way of statistically FORECASTING THE AVERAGE TOTAL
NUMBER OF ACCIDENTS in that category, which individuals of a particular work
group can EACH be expected to suffer, based on current accident performance of the
group as a whole.
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Frequency rate (FR) is commonly used in connection with:

i)
Lost time accident (LTAFR)
ii)
Fatal accident (FAFR)
i)
LOST TIME ACCIDENT FREQUENCY RATE (LTAFR)
The rate is defined as the total LTA occurrences within the statistical period under
review, times 100000, divided by the total man hours worked during the period.
LTAFR =
number of LTA occurrences x 100000
Total man hours worked in period
The significance of the 100000 figure is that it represents a working lifetime of 50
years, each of 50 weeks at 40 hours per week.
ii)
FATAL ACCIDENT FREQUENCY RATE (FAFR)
This has already been dealt with in an earlier chapter, but let us refresh our
memory on the formula:
FAFR =
number of fatal accidents x 100 000 000
Total man hours worked in period
DURATION RATE
This describes the average number of man hours lost, per lost time accident. The
duration tare for any statistical period is calculated by dividing the total man hours
lost by the number of employees who actually returned to work during the period
under review.
SEVERITY RATE
This is supposed to provide a measure of the severity of lost time accident injuries
by using, as in the duration rate, the length of accident absence as an indicator.
However, for various reasons, it cannot be regarded as a reliable indicator of injury
severity. The calculation of severity rate is:
Total man hours lost x 100 000
Total man hours worked
INCIDENCE RATE
The use of the incidence is favoured in the publication of national industrial
accident statistics. The rate is based on groups of 100000 persons at risk. Thus the
incident rate is:
Number of accidents in category 100000
Total number of persons employed in the survey
Note; the figure of 100000 is variable, depending upon the total number of persons
employed. The causes of industrial accidents may be related to one or more of the
following factors, which may or may not be revealed as being the prime source of
accident causation.
i)
age
ii)
experience
iii)
lack of proper training
iv)
weather/environment factors
v)
job/production pressures\
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vi)
equipment factors
vii)
quality of supervision/instruction
viii) poor communication
ix)
layout of factory/working area
x)
fatigue level
Unless fully aware of these influencing factors when we are designing our methods of
data collection and statistical analysis, we will be unsuccessful in extracting the full
information potential from accident recurrence data. In considering various analysis
methods, such as discussed in the assessment of safety performance, Frequency rate is
the preferred form of assessment. It can also be applied to any or all categories of
accident.
HAZARD RATE ANALYSIS
Hazard rate analysis attempts to quantify accident risk in statistical terms by
accepting that some risk will always be present in any job, task or process. It seeks to
establish the lowest practicable accident frequency rate for that risk, then measures
current safety performance data against that accepted value.
JOB SAFETY ANALYSIS
The analysis of accident statistics can also operate in another and very practical
way, as illustrated in the following example. Accidents/injury statistics gathered over
a period of 6 months on a large chemical works and relating specifically to accidents
associated with pipebridge maintenance were as follows:
TYPE OF ACCIDENT/INJURY
NUMBER
(a) Minor hand injury (protective gloves not being worn at time)
9
Minor hand injury (protective gloves being worn)
2
(b) Injury from falling objects
1
(c) Fall from ladder
3
(d) Foreign body in eye (eye protection not being worn at time)
4
(e) Undiscovered/unrevealed (or potential) accident/injury condition
(?)
The first thing we notice is the high number of hand injury cases where protective
gloves were not being worn. Questions arise such as;
Were all the persons concerned issued with protective gloves? If so, why were they
not being worn? Were they lost/misplaced or damaged, or unsuitable? As a result
protective gloves may be discarded, with the consequent risk of suffering injury.
ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION
An important source of accident statistics is the ordinary accident investigation
report which is produced to many different designs but whose basic purpose is:
To form a record of the essential details of an accident occurrence.
To form a record of the facts surrounding the accident event.
To provide a convenient means for recording the conclusions of any
investigation into the cause(s) of an accident.
To act as a record of any plans or initiated actions for accident
preventing
accident recurrence.
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To form a potential source of data on accident/injury occurrence for

statistical compilation and analysis purposes.
To form an acceptable record for legal purposes.
The data may be used to help compile statistical data on a nationwide basis,
alternatively, it may be used inter-departmentally, as a measure of the safety
performance of a Company. safety performance
17.9 THE REQUIREMENT FOR FIRE SAFETY

Always the primary objective of fire safety must be to prevent the outbreak of
fires. However, in the event that there is an outbreak of fire, the number one priority
must be the SAVING OF HUMAN LIFE.
MEANS OF ESCAPE FROM FIRES
Adequate means of escape to a place of safety are essential and are required by
law. Three specific situations must be considered:
1. Movement within rooms.
2. Movement from room to stairs or building exit.
3. Movement on stairs.
A PLACE OF SAFETY can be defined as a place, or area, of relative safety to
which a person can reasonably be expected to make his way, UNAIDED. It may
simply be another room or workshop, with an exit.
The measure we need to quantify escape feasibility is the TOTAL DISTANCE
OF TRAVEL. The safety officer will evaluate the acceptability of a particular
distance figure against a background of the risk level. In general a person should not
have to walk more than 18 metres to either a place of safety, a means of escape exit or
to an outside area.
Every person in the workplace should know the way out in the event
of fire, and the point at which they should assemble for roll-call after
escape.
Doors, which form fire exits must never be locked or fastened so that
they cannot be opened from the inside.
Fire escape doors should open outwards. Sliding doors are a very
poor method of fire escape.
All exits not in normal use should be marked EMERGENCY EXIT.
Doors with fitted crash bars, panic bolts, etc, must have clearly
legible methods of operation instructions alongside.
All gangways, passageways and stairs must be kept clear of
obstructions at all times.
Where gangways etc, are not lit by natural lighting, emergency
lighting with battery back up should be installed
FIRE DRILLS
Regular fire drills should be held, and these should apply to everyone, including all
management.
FIRE ALARMS
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All workplaces should have an effective means of raising an alarm in case of fire.
The types of alarms and the cases they cover can be summed up as follows:
Manual systems, hand rung bells, gongs, whistles, etc. These are
acceptable only in small, low risk areas.
Manually triggered electric alarm systems. These are systems which
are triggered manually, but then operate continuously. Trigger points
must be clearly visible and boldly marked. Trigger points of the
BREAK GLASS IN CASE OF FIRE are the most suitable.
Alarm systems using the works communication systems. These are
acceptable under certain circumstances, but each case must be
carefully considered by the safety officer.
All fire alarm systems must be kept in good working order and regularly
tested.
FIRE ESCAPE AND ASSEMBLY POINTS
It has already been stated that an essential part of the fire escape procedure is for
everyone to know the points at which they must assemble after escape from the work
place. These assembly points should be in the open and away from the buildings.
They should be clearly marked by notices. Where a company has a large number of
employees, a person should be appointed to check against a pre-issued list that all
personnel are accounted for. Care must be taken to ensure ALL people,
INCLUDING VISITORS, are accounted for.
FIRE INSTRUCTION NOTICES
Fire instruction notices should be posted in conspicuous positions in all parts of
every plant or office complex. These printed notices should state, in concise terms, the
essential action to be taken:
a) On discovering a fire.
b) On hearing the fire alarm.
Such notices, wherever possible, should include a simple schematic diagram showing
the locations of all escape exits, fire alarm points, first aid points and assembly points.
Where possible, equipment must be shut down as persons evacuate their working
areas. Basic rules, which apply equally to visitors, should be stated clearly on the fire
instruction notice.
9.1 FIRE TYPES AND PROPERTIES OF FLAMMABLE MATERIALS
A useful way of representing the manner in which an untoward event can give rise
to one or more consequence is to draw an event tree, as shown in Figure 24. This is a
simple device to illustrate the possible outcomes of a hazardous loss of containment,
which results in the related hazards of fire or explosion or both. Earlier, we saw how
similar diagrams are vital to the way hazards can be assessed in terms of probability
and frequency.
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FIGURE 24
JET FIRE
This is the outcome of a jet discharge which, when ignited, gives a long flame
which is relatively stable and largely unaffected by the wind. For a liquid or a two
phase jet a part of the liquid may RAIN OUT of the jet and cause a pool fire on the
ground. Steady combustion is maintained by vapour, evaporated by the heat of the
flame, which behaves buoyantly and is, therefore, easily dispersed by the wind. Figure
25 shows a typical pool fire dimension ratios and serves as a guide for determining
fire separation distances required to minimize the spread of fire to neighbouring
equipment. Furthermore the heat from combustion can produce temperatures in excess
of 1000oC, which can endanger overhead lines or pipes.
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FIGURE 25
POOL FIRE CONFIGURATIONS
FLASH FIRE
The second type of fire in figure 24 is the flash fire, which occurs when an
accumulated cloud of flammable gas in a mixture with air is subjected to ignition.
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This fire is usually of short duration as the flame passes through the cloud. Flash fires
are often the means by which a distant ignition source can lead to a jet or pool fire at
the point of the flammable release. If the flame accelerates to a very high velocity
then an explosion may result.
Other types of conflagration are FIREBALLS and FIRESTORMS. A fireball is
the result of the immediate ignition of a sudden emission of liquid or gas and is a
spherical phenomenon, which ascends because of the initial momentum of the release
and the high buoyancy of the hot flames. People and combustible materials in the
vicinity of a fireball are particularly at risk because of the characteristically high
radiated heat flux. Fires covering a very large area can produce a firestorm effect by
inducing convection driven winds, which brighten the fire and extend it by spark
propagation and thermal radiation.
PROPERTIES OF FLAMMABLE SUBSTANCES
The important properties of flammable substances are:
Ignitability, how easy it is to set fire to the substance.

Rate of burning, how quickly the flame front travels.
Heat emission, how much heat it gives out when a unit mass or unit
volume of the substance burns.
Smoke emission, how much smoke it gives off as it burns.
Toxicity of combustion products.
TOXICITY OF FLAMMABLE GASES

In concentrating attention on safe handling to prevent fire, we must never forget
that some flammable gases, such as carbon monoxide, are very poisonous, even in
concentrations greatly below those at which ignition can occur.
EXPLOSION LIMITS
Mixtures of air and flammable gases are liable to burn when ignites, but this tendency
varies with the volume ratio of the gas to the air. This effect is shown for some gases
in figures 26, below, and 27, on the following page.
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FIGURE 27
FLAMMABLE GAS/AIR RATIOS
IGNITION TEMPERATURES
Ignition occurs in two ways:
At a FLASH POINT temperature, when a spark or other ignition

source is present.
At AUTO-IGNITION temperature when gas will ignite without a
naked heat source
Typical FLASH POINT temperatures and AUTO IGNITION temperatures are

given in FIGURE 28 on the following page.
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FIGURE 28
9.2 ACTIVE and PASSIVE FIRE PROTECTION
CLASSES OF FIRE
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So far in your Training Programmes you have learnt of THREE classes of fire,
now I will introduce a FOURTH class, CLASS D. Class D fires are those dealing
with burning metals, e.g. magnesium, titanium, etc. Let us refresh our memories on
all the classes of fire:
Class A combustible materials; paper, wood, cloth, etc.
Class B hydrocarbons; oil, grease, etc.
Class C energized electrical equipment.
Class D burning metals
NOTE: Fires in electrical equipment, which is not energized are usually assumed to
be Class A. (These classification are U.S.A., a separate, slightly different
classification operates in the E.E.C.)
There are two strategies available for dealing with fires:
Recommended fire fighting procedures, active protection.
Passive protection to minimize the consequence of fires.
ACTIVE PROTECTION (FIRE FIGHTING PROCEDURES)
Since we have dealt with the procedures for dealing with Class A, B and C in parts
1 and 2 we will not discuss them again, we will only look at the new material of class
D.
Class D fires (metals). The most commonly encountered metal fires are those of
magnesium and its alloys, although several powdered metals, notably aluminium, can
form explosive dust clouds, whilst sodium and potassium react vigorously and catch
fire on contact with water. The fumes from most metal fires are dangerous and some,
e.g. those from cadmium, beryllium and lead are extremely toxic. Only dry powder
extinguishers are effective on these fires.
NOTE: Whilst the handling of any fire involving chemicals is a task for the
professional, plant operators can limit the initial spread by realizing that different fuel
fires create different condition, largely determined by the emissivity or luminosity of
different flames. Pure methanol burns with a non-luminous flame, which is difficult to
see, gives off little radiation and is readily knocked out by cooling with a water spray
and applying a dry powder. Petrol burns with a luminous flame and can be drenched
with dry powder or foam, but cyclohexane has a highly luminous flame of high
radiation, which actually increases if water spray is applied. Again, dry powder or
foam can be used.
PASSIVE PROTECTION
Certain guidelines are applicable to industrial installations, particularly to the
supporting structures; girders, walls, etc, in terms of fire resistance, a period of two
hours being typical for a chemical plant. Although protective coatings only BUY
TIME, they may be damaged in an explosion. Otherwise they:
Retard the rate at which vulnerable components heat up.
Allow time for controlled process shut down and evacuation.
Materials like concrete and plaster have been displaced by the following:
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Panels of glass, foe example fibre/cement compositions, mineral

wool or calcium silicate useful for protecting fire doors and
electrical cables.
Organic coatings applied in multiple this sprayed or painted films.
They are of many propriety types for specific uses and embrace a
range of complex thermal protection mechanisms.
Inorganic coatings including cast in-situ concretes containing
prepared aggregates and vermiculate cement pre-mixes, popular for
hydrocarbon type fire conditions.
Electrical fires need a special mention. Before using any fire extinguisher, the
electricity supply must be isolated. If isolation is not possible or it is not known
whether the supply has been isolated, vaporizing liquids, dry powder or carbon
dioxide type extinguishers should be used. (NOTE: carbon dioxide may damage
sensitive equipment)
9.3 ZONING and FIRE SEPARATION DISTANCES
RECOGNITION OF FIRE RISK
From what we have learned about the need to identify different types of fire, every
industrial site should obviously have hazard data sheets, giving the relevant properties
and conditions, such as temperature and pressure, for all process fluids handled. All
fire hazard locations can then be plotted on a layout plan to assist coordination for fire
protection.
ZONING and FIRE SEPARATION DISTANCES
As a guide there are three areas:
Zone 1 is a zone in which a flammable atmosphere is continuously
present or present for long periods of time.
Zone 2 is a zone in which a flammable atmosphere is likely to occur
during normal operations.
Zone 3 is a zone in which a flammable atmosphere is not likely to
occur and, if it does occur, it will only exist for a short time.
This guide is primarily designed to establish the type of electrical equipment,
which should be located within the zone area. For establishing optimum FIRE
SEPARATION DISTANCES from and between hazardous equipment and potential
ignition sources, either radiation flux levels should be estimated by methods to be
found in various reference books on heat transfer (Figure 29, on the following page,
indicated the use made of this approach in the spacing of equipment) or from
computerized data as referred to previously.
The radiated heat from a pool fire can be calculated from knowledge of:
Pool area
Burning rate
Calorific value and density of the fuel
Flame emissivity
The heat radiated from the surface of the flame cylinder, see figure 29, for most
hydrocarbons lies between 170 kW m-2 and 240 kW m-2.
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FIGURE 29
RADIATION FLUX BASIS OF EQUIPMENT SPACING
There are two important radiation flux bands, which should be considered. A flux
of 4.7kW m-2 is the approximate threshold of pain on any exposed part of the human
body. At only a slightly higher level than this, blistering takes place. Around any fire
hazardous location, an area can be established, by calculation, into which it is
impossible for a normally clad operator to enter and be expected to operate critical
valves, which will close the plant down safely. Remotely controlled shut-off valve and
pump motor push buttons should not be placed adjacent to the equipment, but located
in the control room or at a distance commensurate with that calculated. If, for any
reason, the button location must be closer, some from of radiation shield or screen is
essential.
The second band of flux is 12.6kW m-2. This flux is the threshold limit over which
the resins in wood, building roof felt, oily rags and paper will start to emit flammable
vapours, which are ignited easily by a flying fire brand. PVC cables will be damaged
and if such a flux passes through windows into a room where such materials exist,
ignition will take place in about twenty minutes. For this reason, if windows are
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essential in a control room, then the room should be placed at least the calculated
distance from the nearest fire hazard area. Adjacent offices, plant buildings etc, should
be similarly placed. Consideration should be given to other plants and adjacent plots
in a large complex since, although 6 m or more might be considered adequate spacing
to avoid flame impingement, the distance is not adequate for radiation risk from the
same fire and 16 m is more in keeping, particularly where housekeeping is difficult or
where glass lined vessels and pumps are in the vicinity.
It follows that, wherever possible, fire hazardous locations should not be placed
opposite each other on adjacent plots without adequate spacing. Process vessels and
storage tanks containing flammable liquids and liquefied gases under pressure are
particularly vulnerable in fire environment. Consequently, their design, installation
and maintenance constitutes a highly specialized area which is subject to stringent
regulations and codes of practice. Double skinned tanks for refrigerated storage of
liquefied gases and catchment areas for limiting the consequences of a fire from
ruptured vessels are amongst the various methods available. Figure 30 is an example
of the provisions adopted for a storage sphere used for propane; pressure relief valves
must be arranged to discharge, in the event of an emergency, to the atmosphere at a
point well away from the storage area, preferably via a flare stack or, in the case of a
vent, at a velocity to ensure good jet mixing.
FIGURE 30
HOW TO PROTECT PRESSURISED VESSELS FROM FIRE
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17.10 CHARACTERISTICS OF EXPLOSION

The words FIRE and EXPLOSION and the hazards, which they imply are often
grouped together, but they are quite different. FIRE is related to HEAT and
COMBUSTION, and is often the aftermath of an explosion, whereas EXPLOSIONS
are associated with BLAST and SHOCK WAVES. Fire is usually dealt with by
human intervention but explosions are best guarded against by automatic suppression
systems. The distinction reminds us of two other words which are often used
interchangeably, PREVENTION and PROTECTION, the former relating to those
measures taken in an effort to eliminate the hazard at source and the latter to those
means available for diminishing the effects of a hazardous occurrence.
DEFINITION OF EXPLOSION
Although the technical dictionary defines explosion as the general outcome of a
rapid pressure rise in a confined space invariably due to the gaseous products of a
highly exothermic chemical reaction. It is better thought of as simply a rapid release
of energy, the dissipation of which gives rise to shock waves, fragmentation with
possible secondary effects due to missile penetration, injury and consequential
loss.
CATEGORIES OF EXPLOSION
Types of explosions can be broadly categorized. This is shown in the following
table:
PROPAGATING CHEMICAL EXPLOSIONS

You will see from the above table that one category of chemical explosion is
referred to as PROPAGATING. The term propagating used in this context means the
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mechanisms, often very complex, by which the total energy generated by the
explosion id dissipated.
A propagating chemical explosion occurs most commonly when a combustible
gas/air mixture, of volumetric composition between characteristic flammable limits, is
ignited.
Figure 31 indicates that the severity of an explosion is usually greatest in the
vicinity of halfway between the limits.
FIGURE 31
PRESSURE EFFECTS OF CONFINED HYDROCARBON/AIR REACTIONS
A DEFLAGRATION arises from ignition of a flammable mixture when the usual
heat and mass transfer relationships govern the rate of reaction. A so-called
combustion wave travels through the mixture and it is the phenomenon, which is
variously described as a deflagration or a flame, although the latter term is usually
restricted to systems wherein the reaction zone is luminous. A deflagration is
propagated at low velocity up to about 100 ms-1 in solids, such as cordite or
gunpowder.
A DETONATION is a propagating reaction wherein the flame front travels as a
shock or supersonic pressure wave, closely followed by a combustion zone, which
releases the energy required to maintain the shock wave. Detonation velocities are in
the range of 1 to 10 kms-1, whereas the burning velocity for hydrocarbon/air mixtures
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is typically less than 1 ms-1. Pressures in a detonation wave are much higher than
those arising from deflagrations and can attain 20 atm in a mixture initially at
atmospheric pressure.
Explosion phenomena are not confined to gaseous media, they can also occur in
liquids and solids, of dispersions of one phase in another and at interfaces between
two phases in bulk. There exists considerable encouragement to avoid flammable
gas/air mixtures; substituting oxygen for air increases the pressure generated from
about 7 atm to about 16 atm when starting at atmospheric pressure; the flame speed
increases, the flammability limits broaden and the chance of detonation happening is
increased.
FIGURE 32
EXAMPLES OF FLAMMABILITY LIMITS IN AIR AND OXYGEN
(AT ATMOSPHERIC PRESSURE AND TEMPERATURE)
It can be seen from the diagram that, replacing air by oxygen in a mixture with
propane, the upper limit of flammability (UFL) is extended from 2.2% to 57%
volume of propane. These limits are, therefore, one measure of hazard potential: the
wider apart are the limits, the greater the chance of a combustible mixture being
ignited of a source of ignition is present.
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It is believed that DETONATION LIMITS lie within the flammability limits but
a more practical view is to assume that, given a sufficiently strong ignition source, the
limits are coincident Hydrocarbon oxidation reactions, when confined within
processing equipment, are especially vulnerable, particularly for mixtures richer than
stoichiometric. The ratio between maximum explosion pressure (Pe) to initial pressure
(Pi) is about 8 for hydrocarbons in air and 16 in oxygen for gas mixtures originally
within the range 1 to 40 atm and 0 to 300oC.
See figure 33.
FIGURE 33
PRESSURE PROFILE FOR A DEFLAGRATION WITHIN A VESSEL
A pressure vessel, designed and fabricated in strict accordance with established and
widely recognized procedures and codes of practice, would be expected to fail at a
bursting pressure Pb, well above its specified operating pressure Pi. However, it would
require a distinctly uneconomic wall thickness to withstand an internal deflagration
explosion capable of generating an explosion pressure, Pe, of at least eight times the
intended operating pressure as shown in figure 33.
When this ratio is compared to that of vessel bursting pressure Pb to Pi, which
equals 4 or 5 for most conventional vessels, then explosion protection philosophy
becomes more clearly defined. However, the two modes of propagation produce
markedly different overall explosions, which present hazards of different aspects.
10.1 EXPLOSION PROCESSES
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We will consider three explosion processes

a) Propagated by flames.
b) Propagated by detonation waves.
c) Propagated by a combination of flame and detonation waves.
PROPAGATION BY FLAMES
When a combustible gaseous mixture is subjected to an ignition source a spherical
flame nucleus may or may not be formed. Its formation depends on a number of
factors concerning the mixture, the source of ignition, and the configuration of the
neighbouring parts of the vessel. If ignition occurs, a flame will propagate into the
unburnt mixture as an approximately spherical shell of gas undergoing the reaction.
This combustion wave contains the spherical volume of reaction products at a
temperature similar to that of the flame. The flame will propagate through the unburnt
mixture at a velocity, which will be related to the composition, temperature and
pressure of the reactants at the flame front and at the time in question. This is shown
in figure 34.
FIGURE 34
EXPLOSION PROPAGATED BY FLAME
The velocity of the flame referred to a fixed reference, such as the ignition source,
may differ from this value because the gas through which the flame is moving may
itself have a velocity induced ahead by the combustion process. The overall
propagation rate might be further accelerated by local distortions in the flame front as
affected by the general movement of the gas and by turbulence.
The physical limits imposed by equipment confining the explosion influence the
process parameters appreciably. Whilst the pressure gradient throughout the vessel is
usually small, wide temperature variations are typical. By making certain assumptions
it is possible to interpret the rather impractical model of spherical symmetry in terms
of what takes place, for example, within a cylindrical enclosure such as that
represented by a pipeline, column or storage tank. Briefly, changes in the direction of
flame movement, traveling through unreacted combustible gas after the initial
progress from the ignition source to a vessel wall, disturb and distort the flame front
in a complex manner, so increasing the apparent flame velocity.
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He chemical reactions gain momentum, the flame accelerates and a detonation may
ultimately result. Quite clearly, explosions involving flame propagation depend upon:
i)
Initial configuration and position of ignition source.
ii)
Subsequent interaction between flame propagation and gas movement.
iii)
Influence of vessel shape on the induced flow and its turbulence.
In other words, the combustion process is influenced by events occurring ahead
and behind it. So the final pressure achieved, when all the combustible material in
the vessel has reacted, depends on the initial state of the reactants and their
composition alone, the RATE of pressure change is influenced by the vessel shape,
the position of the source of ignition and the presence of any imposed gas flow. Flame
propagation is dependant on the past history of the process and is influenced by
boundaries with which it will come into direct contact in the future. The early life of
the flame affects the later propagation by influencing the conditions throughout the
vessel of both reactants and products and by inducing flow patterns, which
distort the flame.
PROPAGATED BY DETONATION WAVES
Once a stable detonation wave has been established it travels at a velocity greater
than the speed of sound in the unburnt gas mixture. Accordingly, disturbances created
by the wave cannot be projected ahead of it and flow is not induced in the reactants.
The wave moves with respect to the container walls as if moving through infinite
space and, unlike that of a flame, the detonation wave maintains its steady velocity
IRRESPECTIVE OF THE CONFIGURATION OF THE VESSEL containing the
unreacted portion of the mixture. The reactants upstream remain unaffected, whereas
the products downstream are disturbed as the wave moves away from the source of
ignition. Conditions on neither side of the wave, therefore, have influence on it.
Unlike the explosion caused by a flame, the pressure in an explosion caused by a
detonation is not uniform. The pressure varies steadily from a possibly lower than
initial pressure at the point of ignition to a precisely defined pressure at the rear
boundary wall of the wave. A virtually instantaneous drop follows a further rapid
increase across the wave itself to the initial pressure defining the shock front. The
pressure of the undisturbed reactants ahead of the wave is then constant at the initial
value.
FIGURE 35
PRESSURE PROFILE OF A SHOCKWAVE
The complete pressure pulse is usually referred to as a shock wave or blast wave,
which is characterized by a steep pressure increase associated with the rapid release of
a large amount of energy.
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An important consequence of the steady state nature of the detonation wave is the
dominating role it displays in the explosion process. A flame is as much controlled by
as driven by the explosion in the vessel: a detonation wave is not affected by the
enclosure and virtually exists as the explosion. In this respect the detonation wave
can be disassociated from the vessel and a simpler approach to the analysis of the
explosion is possible.
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FIGURE 36
PROPAGATION BY A COMBINATION OF FLAME AND DETONATION

WAVES
This is considered to be the more general case.
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When an accelerating flame creates disturbance ahead of it, compression waves set
up and adiabatic* heating causes them to coalesce, so generating a shock wave.
adiabatic WITHIN A SYSTEM, i.e. no exchange, loss or gain, of
heat energy with the environment.
A complex sequence of events ensues and the net result is the formation of a
combustion wave some distance ahead of the flame, which travels at a speed in excess
of that of the appropriate steady state detonation wave. This over driven detonation
wave decelerates and forms the stable detonation described before.
Again the magnitude of these changes depends upon the engineering configuration
of the containing system and the character of the ignition source. The nature of the
propagation of detonation waves, being basically different, results in an entirely
different form of pressure load. The load is dynamic but may be exerted either as a
constant running load or as a transient impact load. The magnitude and specific
impulse will be different but determined in each case. The energy release of an
explosion of this type is concentrated within the detonation wave. Behind the wave
the burnt gaseous products expand and the pressure falls. In consequence of this, the
pressure in a detonation wave is considerable but transient. Further, the mass
movement of the gas in the detonation wave occurs at a high velocity and the change
in momentum when the gas is brought to rest exerts an additional load.
Pipes and ducts along which the flames and detonations may travel form a
potential network for the transmission of an explosion hazard. In this respect
knowledge of the velocities and modes of propagation of the two types of combustion
wave is essential.
10.2 PROTECTIVE MEASURES

Flame velocities associated with deflagrations are dependent upon the containing
system and state of reactants and may reach 100 ms-1, above which acceleration and
generation of detonation waves normally occur.
Thus, the time scale for protective measures can be of the order of 0.01 s m-1. This
means that a protective device, remotely actuated by the flame, using a detector place
one metre away, must operate within 0.01 s if it is to prove effective. In this case,
transmission of the operating signal can be accommodated by the reactive gases and
the protective device may be pressure operated. Pressure relief devices such as
bursting discs and explosion doors are adequate in these cases because the increase in
pressure associated with the explosion operates the diaphragm in advance of the
arrival of the flame.
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A TYPICAL BURSTING DISC

In contrast the detonation wave is isolated from its environment. The velocity of
propagation has a fundamental value, which is a function of the composition and state
of the mixture only. The detonation can be characterized by its Mach number or by the
heat release per unit mass of reactants, from which it can be demonstrated that the
pressure change cannot be used to warn of an approaching hazard.
Preventive methods for interrupting detonation waves are simply not
available, if only because of the impossibility of anticipating the source and
propagating directions.
The standard techniques for the quenching of flames in pipelines involve the
installation of pressure relief and flame traps. The former operate on the increase in
pressure associated with explosion and subsequently divert the flame by venting the
contents of the pipeline to atmosphere. The operation of the flame trap is less well
understood but involves the introduction of a restriction in the path of the flame,
which is extinguished by loss of energy to the device.
For a given pressure and gas composition a flame cannot be supported on an
orifice or vent below a certain size, sometimes termed the quenching diameter, hence
the concept of a limiting diameter or aperture size, which is approximately
proportional to the reciprocal of the pressure. This relationship is to be expected if
quenching is due to diffusion or heat transfer to the containing equipment since the
rates of both processes are inversely proportional to the pressure. Consequently, gases
with high burning velocities require small apertures for quenching and usually
insufficient attention is given to the selection of a flame trap design. Any old trap is
not necessarily a safeguard; flame propagation can only be prevented by efficient
quenching, hence the importance of mesh size of a miners lamp used in methane
atmospheres and the realization that it is virtually impossible to design traps, which
will be safe in all situations.
FLAMMABLE VAPOUR CLOUD HAZARDS
We can classify the hazards arising from flammable vapour clouds into three
categories:
i)
Unconfined vapour cloud explosions (UVCE)
ii)
Fireballs
iii)
Boiling liquid expanding vapour explosions (BLEVE)
UNCONFINED VAPOUR CLOUD EXPLOSIONS (UVCE)
These may occur when a large proportion of the cloud is premixed with air before
it encounters an ignition source. Most of these explosions have followed a leak of a
flashing liquid, i.e. liquid under pressure above its normal boiling point for example,
liquefied flammable gases (at ambient temperatures) such as propane and
cyclohexane. They leak at a high rate and then turn to vapour and spray. The trends in
frequency and the proportion of incidents producing blast are all upward. However,
loss of life resulting from vapour cloud explosions is usually relatively small
compared to the amount of property damage.
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A number of mathematical models, including computer software programmes, are

available for assessing the sensitivity of various plant layout arrangements by
endeavouring to predict the overpressure, and therefore the damage, for different radii
from the source. These models try to define the inter-relationships between such
factors as shock wave pressure, heat of combustion of the mass of flammable
material, the extent of the aerial diffusion to a concentration at the lower flammable
limit and, of course, the wind direction a
and velocity.
FIREBALLS
Fireballs are clouds, which at the moment of ignition, are at a concentration above
the upper flammable limit. Deflagration proceeds by turbulent diffusion of air into the
cloud as the cloud cannot explode. The fire at the periphery is fed from within and
constitutes a rich luminous diffusion flame from which the radiation is intense and can
cause fatal burns and secondary fires, even within buildings,
Thermal radiation hazards from fireballs.
The duration of fireballs is usually less than 10 seconds, therefore assessment of
hazards to people and property must be in terms of cumulative dosage of radiation, i.e.
the time integral of incident flux density (kWm-2).
Tolerance limit for the human body is
Tolerance limit for buildings is
Tolerance limit for process plants
And storage tanks is
4.7 kW m-2
< 12.5 kW m-2 ignitable after about 17
minutes
< 37.8 kW m-2 ignitable after about 17
minutes
BOILING LIQUID EXPANDING VAPOUR EXPLOSIONS (BLEVE)

Boling liquid expanding vapour explosions (BLEVE), essentially a combination of
(i) and (ii), are caused by bursting pressure vessels, usually heated by fire, which
contain liquefied flammable gases. Percussive effects are caused by vessel rupture and
the UVCE of up to 30% of the contents. Deflagration of most of the remaining
material produces an aerial fireball. The overpressures produced by a BLEVE are less
that those from a UVCE because the source of ignition is already present. Thus the
size of the flammable gas cloud, which explodes is limited. Nevertheless, the resultant
fireball releases intense radiation and vessel fragments, propelled by the rupture, may
spread the boiling liquid over several hundred metres.
In transportation accidents, the American National Fire Protection Association
advises evacuation of the area rather than quenching pressurized storage vessels
exposed to fire because the time of rupture cannot be predicted and blast danger is less
than the local fire hazard. On plants the situation differs because water sprays are
normally installed covering at least half of the vessel surface area.
DUST EXPLOSIONS
Most combustible solids in the form of a fine dust are capable of creating an
explosive mixture when dispersed in air. As with flammable gases and vapours, there
are lower and upper dust concentrations in air within which an explosion is possible.
The extreme limits for a wide range of dusts are between 20 and 500 grams per litre
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although the average lower explosive limit for most combustible dusts is about 40
grams/litre.
Dust explosions generate pressures up to about 8 bar. There is no meaningful lower
limit. Particle size is important in determining the force of the explosion and whether
on will occur. From this viewpoint, particle diameters between 10 and 50 microns are
the most dangerous. Above 200 microns there is little or no explosion risk. Explosive
dust clouds can be formed from almost all combustible materials, including light
metals. Plastics, agricultural products and many other materials such as coal dust,
sulpher and rubber. Poor housekeeping practice and poor plant structural design can
lead to secondary explosions in dust, which is dislodged from ledges and surfaces by
fire or the initial primary explosion. Compressed air used for cleaning can in fact
increase the probability of dust explosion.
IGNITION REQUIREMENTS
Ignition of dust clouds is less easy than flammable vapours; a flame or hot surface
is more successful than a spark. Temperatures range from about 300C for products
such as cellulose acetate to over 700C for coal tar pitch. Sulpher has a low ignition
temperature of 190C. If hot surfaces, such as steam pipes, are subjected to dust
settlement, slow combustion can occur at a much lower temperature than that of the
dust cloud. Figure 37 illustrates the ignition temperatures of some materials in finely
divided form compared to familiar temperature
FIGURE 37
EXAMPLES OF IGNITION TEMPERATURES
TYPES OF EQUIPMENT WITHIN WHICH DUST CLOUD EXPLOSIONS
ARE FEASIBLE.
Such equipment includes:
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Milling, grinding, pulverizing machinery, kilns, pneumatic driers, rotary drum and
spray driers, fluidised beds, screens, classifiers, bag filters and dust collectors,
conveyors and elevators, cyclones, silos and storage bins.
PREVENTION OF POWDER AND DUST EXPLOSIONS
Drag link type conveyors disturb powdered materials less than most other types of
material transfer modes. If permissible, wet processes are preferable for size reduction
operations and the collection of gas borne dusts. The presence of moisture not only
reduces ignition tendency but also can promote agglomeration An inert gas system
can sometimes be used in place of air, e.g. for drying operations.
PROTECTION
If equipment cannot be economically designed to withstand the effects of a dust
explosion, it should be sited away from other plant and where access is restricted.
Rotary star valves on hoppers and baffles in screw conveyors are examples of devices
used to inhibit the spread of an explosion. Designs should also limit the inventory of
material being processed. Ignition and mechanism of dust explosions is critically
dependant upon moisture content of the material, which should be as high as is
tolerable. Maximum precautions extend to bursting discs and panels, explosion doors
and explosion suppression systems.
17.11 EMERGENCY PROCEDURE REQUIREMENTS
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NOTE: THE INFORMATION GIVEN IN THIS SECTION IS

BASED UPON UNITED KINGDOM REGULATIONS AND
PRACTICES, AND MAY BE SLIGHTLY DIFFERENT TO THOSE
USED IN SIRTE OIL COMPANY.
ALWAYS REFER TO THE S.O.C. SAFETY MANUAL FOR ANY
RULES/REGULATIONS PERTAINING TO S.O.C.
So far this course has been mainly concerned with ways of recognizing and
reducing hazards. The very fact that certain hazards will occur dictates the need to
prepare for handling the consequences. Our object, therefore, when making suitable
provision is to reduce the possibility of serious loss following particular identifiable
site related incidents.
This attitude towards consequences, however, is tempered with the philosophy,
which we have already considered in relation to hazards. We do not always have to
assume that the WORST consequence will always follow.
DEFINITION OF EMERGENCY
As the majority of employment related emergencies endanger people as well as
property and because this fact dominates the process industries, we will confine our
attention to the major emergency. This has the potential to:
Cause serious injury or loss of life and/or damage to property.
Cause disruption within and/or beyond the site boundary.
Require the use of outside resources.
Such an event is usually the result of a fault within the site itself, e.g. a very large
fire or an explosion or the instantaneous release of asphyxiating or toxic materials
affecting a significant number of people. Within a chemical environment these are
examples of emergencies envisaged by the ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON
MAJOR HAZARDS, a U.K. body set up after the Flixbourgh disaster. Other causes
of major emergencies may be external agencies such as lightening, flood, transport
accident or sabotage.
11.1 CATEGORIES OF EMERGENCIES AND MAJOR HAZARD SITUATIONS
EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION
There are four internationally recognized categories of emergencies, covering the
scale SMALL to CATASTROPHIC. They are:
i)
MINOR INCIDENT: an incident, which can be handled by the resources
of the unit concerned.
ii)
CATEGORY 1 INCIDENT: a major incident requiring assistance from
elsewhere in the factory, other plants, the works fire service, etc.
iii)
CATEGORY 2 INCIDENT: assistance required from outside fire service
and the police.
iv)
CATEGORY 3 INCIDENT: a major incident of disaster proportions
requiring considerable assistance from fire, police, ambulance and medical
services.
MAJOR HAZARD SITUATIONS
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There are two main types of emergency with which the process industries are
concerned, namely the WORKS EMERGENCY and the TRANSPORT
EMERGENCY.
11.2 ELEMENTS OF AN EMERGENCY PLAN
THE NEED FOR PLANNING
As far as possible, plans should be simple and flexible and allow those affected by
an emergency to use their knowledge and initiative to the best advantage. ANY
PLAN SHOULD BE FOR THE NEXT DISASTER, NOT THE LAST ONE.
OBJECTIVES OF AN EMERGENCY PLAN
The basic causes of an emergency can be expressed as:
i)
Failure of an item of equipment.
ii)
Failure or inadequacy of a system for carrying out an operation.
iii)
Human error.
The prime objectives are, therefore:
a) To eliminate the emergency at source.
b) To minimize adverse effects on people and property.
Elimination at source may consist of fire fighting to extinguish a fire, actions to cut
off the source of fuel, plugging the leak, which caused loss of containment or water
spraying to reduce a toxic gas cloud and similar actions.
Actions to minimize the effects on persons start with warnings and the removal to
safety of people likely to be affected, followed by:
a) Rescue of missing persons.
b) First aid and medical attention to casualties.
c) Care for the continual well being of evacuated people.
d) Provision of information to people involved.
e) Identification of victims and dealing with their relatives.
Other objectives will be to keep property and equipment losses to a minimum, to
minimize environmental damage, to handle public relations and the media and finally
rehabilitation and return to normal.
Depending upon the range of the emergency a number of objectives may be
achieved by, or in collaboration with, outside authorities. The plan must deal, where
appropriate, with the following questions:
Will the fire be attacked by systems already in place or by mobile
units?
Can toxic gas be removed effectively by sprays?
Will people be requested to evacuate to an upwind area of safety?
THE INFLUENCE OF LEGISLATION
Planning and practicing for emergency situations is part of the general
responsibility of the employer to protect both his employees and the public. The U.K.
Control of Industrial Major accident Hazards (CIMAH) specifically concerns the
preparation of emergency plans and requires a manufacturer to prepare an onsite plan,
the local authority to prepare an off-site plan and the manufacturer to supply enough
information to the local authority for preparation of the off-site plan.
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Further, it requires outside authorities to be advised of possible consequences so

that the may prepare an appropriate plan for outside the establishment. The OFFSITE SYSTEMS in the emergency plan require:
a) Setting up the emergency plan, particularly liaison between the company,
emergency services, area planning officers, etc.
b) Initiation and implementation of the plan.
c) Rehearsal and practice.
d) Revision.
A typical plan should cover:
i)
Key personnel.
ii)
The works emergency procedure.
iii)
Action on site.
iv)
Action off-site.
And embrace the following essential steps:
i)
Identification of the hazard, the size and nature of the perceived event.
ii)
Determination of the risk, the probability that it could occur.
iii)
Assessment of the consequences, on people and the environment, both on
and off site.
A TYPICAL PLAN STRUCTURE
A Site Emergency Plan
Covers a full range of possible incidents and their consequences.

Analyses the probable extent of events such as:
Fire/explosion.
Gas release.
Spills.
Steam line rupture.
Water main rupture.
Common mode process faults.
Power failure.
Computer failure.
Bomb threats and aerial impacts.
Natural disasters.
Concentrates on incident containment
Arranges for safe emergency plant shut down procedures.
Draws up clear evacuation instructions for each plant area.
Caters for incidents occurring at times of reduced manpower.
Nominates key personnel who should be readily identifiable,
including a Site Main Controller preferably stationed in the gate
house or communications centre.
Establishes and confirms the effectiveness of a communication
system.
Appoints a site incident controller who decides whether off-site
emergency services are required.
Resolves, publicises, tests and maintains a warning system
LIAISON WITH OUTSIDE AUTHORITIES
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Close liaison with the outside authorities is mandatory. Practice visits may be
required and drills carried out.
Other aspects of liaison are:
A properly co-ordinated and effectively controlled plan of action
Compatibility of works procedures and those developed by an
outside authority.
Compatibility of equipment used by on site and off-site services.
Mutual acquaintanceship of designated emergency personnel on and
off-site.
Provision of the correct type and number of outside services for the
emergency notified.
IDENTIFICATION OF MAJOR HAZARD SITUATIONS
The greatest damage potential is represented by any one, or combination, of the
following massive loss scenarios:
Volatile liquid present in process or in storage under pressure at
temperatures above their normal boiling point.
Liquefied hydrocarbon gases stored in bulk under pressure.
Low molecular weight hydrocarbons in process plants under pressure
at elevated temperatures.
Toxic materials up to considerable distances from the point of
release, depending on weather conditions.
Additionally, the GRADUAL RELEASE OF TOXIC MATERIALS such as
asbestos, lead, mercury, organo-phosphorous compounds and radio active wastes can
give rise to delayed effects which are not initially appreciated.
Consequently, hazard categories are listed in NOTIFIABLE INSTALLATIONS
within U.K. legislation and include installations storing or processing:
i)
Toxic material equivalent in effect to more than 10 tonnes of chlorine
when released.
ii)
Flammable materials capable of rapid emission of more than 15 tonnes.
iii)
Materials intrinsically unstable or of high exothermic reactivity in excess
of 5 tonnes.
iv)
Flammable materials having a flash point below 23oC, of total inventory
more than 10000 tonnes.
v)
Liquid oxygen of total inventory more than 135 tonnes.
vi)
Ammonium nitrate of total inventory more than 5000 tonnes.
Also are included installations with large inventories of stored pressure energy,
typically process operations above 100 bar, using gas phase reactions.
EACH OF THESE CATEGORIES QUALIFIES FOR AN EMERGENCY PLAN.
PROVISIONS FOE TOXIC MATERIALS
For these, three further points demand attention:
a) The toxicity of the gas or vapour.
b) Process parameters at the time and point of release, e.g. temperature,
pressure and volatility.
c) Whether the gas or vapour is lighter or heavier than air, if heavier than
air it will persist at low levels although eventual dispersion in the
atmosphere means that density has little further effect.
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SITE EMERGENCY ORGANISATION

No single detailed procedure is suitable for all situations, but all have certain basic
common features.
AN EMERGENCY CONTROL CENTRE
This should be located:
In a position of minimum risk.
Adjacent to works and to outside roads system access.
It should be:
Easily accessible for emergency personnel.

Remote or protected from fire, explosion or toxic escapes.
In addition it should be provided with:
Adequate telephone links, duplicated where advisable, and with a
stand by power supply because radio and bleeper systems feature in
many installations.
Plans and maps showing assembly points, fire water hydrants etc.
All necessary information for contacting personnel both on site and
off-site.
A roll of employees and shift rotas.
Personnel protective equipment.
KEY PERSONNEL
A useful control concept is a two group structure, SITE INCIDENT CONTROL
and SITE MAIN CONTROL, the key individuals being SITE INCIDENT
CONTROLLER and the SITE MAIN CONTROLLER.
INCIDENT CONTROL is intended to concentrate on the source of the emergency.
He intention is that this group concentrates on fire, loss of containment, process
malfunction and is largely freed from the distraction of protecting other plants and
off-site personnel.
SITE MAIN CONTROL takes on the responsibility concerned with the protection of
people outside the centre of the emergency, liaison and outside authorities, provision
of backing for the Site Incident controller, casualty clearance, safe shut down of other
plants, roll call, media contact and other items.
The INCIDENT CONTROLLER, who should be easily distinguishable and have
a RUNNER in attendance, is responsible for:
Assessing the scale of the emergency.
Securing the safety of personnel.
Minimising loss and damage.
Formulating and directing fire fighting, rescue operations and
evacuation if necessary, up to the arrival of specialist help.
Setting up a communications point and contact with the Emergency
Control Centre, reporting to the main controller.
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Displaying sound leadership at all times and noting the progress

made in dealing with the crisis for the benefit of the subsequent
enquiry.
The MAIN CONTROLLER is responsible for:

Taking overall control from his base in the Emergency Control
Centre.
Calling in other key personnel and the outside emergency services if
required.
Informing neighbouring site occupants and accounting for visitors
and contractors who have signed in.
Continuously monitoring developments and providing for the most
probable outcome.
Shutting down operating equipment in consultation with the Site
Controller.
Controlling site traffic movements.
Arranging for the necessary relief personnel and catering facilities.
Ensuring that casualties are receiving adequate attention and that the
news media is reliably informed.
Rehabilitation of the affected areas at the end of the emergency.
EMERGENCY RESCUE TEAM
Every responsible site operator should maintain a trained works rescue team of
experienced personnel within the workforce. The team should have its own transport
and adequate specialized equipment. Periodic drills should be carried out, in all
aspects of any potential situation they may have to deal with. After each drill a post
practice meeting should be held, to analyse the drill to identify potential problem
areas and eliminate them by whatever means is required.
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17.12
OPERATIONS TRAINING
MAJOR LEGISLATIVE REQUIREMENTS AND

CONSEQUENT ACTIONS REQUIRED UNDER COSHH
12.1 PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF THE REGULATIONS

The U.K. Control of Substances Hazardous to Health (COSHH) regulations were
introduced in 1994 to cover all areas of the work environment and are widely
accepted throughout the world as a benchmark in this subject. They lay down
essential requirements and a sensible step by step approach for the control of
hazardous substances and for the protection of people who are exposed to them. The
regulations apply to virtually all substances with the exception of asbestos, lead and
radioactive substances, which have their own regulations.
The purpose of the legislation is to safeguard the health of workers and all persons
likely to be affected by chemicals and substances used in industrial processes and
operations.
12.2 REQUIREMENTS OF THE REGULATIONS
These regulations REQUIRE the EMPLOYER to:
1. ASSESS in writing the risks to health created by substances at work.
2. Decide the precautions need to be taken.
3. Introduce measures to prevent or control risks.
4. Ensure that the control measures are used, equipment is properly
maintained and Safe Working procedures are observed.
5. Monitor the exposure of workers to substances and carry out health
surveillance, if required, in order to control the exposure. (monitoring
is carried out by measuring the amount of a substance in the workplace
environment)
6. Inform, instruct and train employees on the risks in the workplace and
the necessary precautions to be taken.
These regulations REQUIRE the EMPLOYEES to:
Wear all personal protective equipment the employer provides.
Follow all laid down precautions and procedures
Use all equipment, plant and machinery according to the operating
procedures laid down.
12.3 PROVISION OF GENERAL PERSONAL SAFETY
The aspects of this subject have already been extensively covered in this book and
in previous parts of your course, however, we will list the headlines to refresh your
memory:
GENERAL SAFETY PRECAUTIONS
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Initial job study from the safety angle.

Correction and reporting of unsafe aspects.
Good housekeeping.
Information update.
Avoidance of contaminated work areas.
Care of others.
Near misses.
Lifting weights correctly.
Marking of doors, access and escape routes.
Personal ignition sources, e.g. lighters, matches and battery powered
equipment.
BODY PROTECTION
Wearing apparel.
Safety headgear and shoes.
Respiratory protection.
Eye and ear protection.
CONTACT WITH EQUIPMENT
Use of plant controls.
Tagging and locking out.
Loss of containment of hazardous materials.
Entering confined spaces.
Working at heights.
Use of hand tools.
Ladders and scaffolding.
Electrical equipment.
Compressed gases.
Storage and stacking of goods.
Fire fighting equipment.
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SECTION 2: ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL

Planet Earth is what is called an ECOSYSTEM. It is a highly complex network of
animals, plants, bacteria, etc, plus the soil, air and water, which make up their
environment. These living organisms and their environment are constantly interacting
and are often dependant on each other in ways that man is only beginning to fully
understand.
Through our human activities, however, we can disrupt this network.
POLLUTION is one such activity. Unfortunately the Oil, Gas and Petrochemical
Industries, and their products, are major contributors to this pollution. All major
industrial processes, plus human waste, contribute to the overall problem of pollution
WHAT IS POLLUTION?
A definition of pollution that is generally accepted by scientists is:
The introduction by man into the environment of substances, or energy, which:
Are potentially harmful to human health, livestock, crops, wildlife or
ecological systems.
Damage buildings or other manmade structures.
Hamper the use or enjoyment of the environment by people.
As you can see from the above, pollution can take many forms, affect many
different things, and exist on a variety of scales. We will primarily concentrate on one
particular type of pollution often associated with industry, CHEMICAL
POLLUTION, although we will briefly look at some others.
NATURAL CYCLES
Natural cycles are an essential part of our environment, and chemicals are
necessary ingredients to many of these cycles.
It is crucial that we constantly bear in mind:
Biological processes are essential to the operation of most natural
cycles.
Natural cycles are essential to the maintenance of life.
Clearly, if our activities interfere with these biological processes, then the
consequences can be very serious. Our industrial activities can lead to disruption of
these processes by causing chemical pollution. We can basically divide types of
chemical pollution into two categories:
Chemicals being in the wrong place in the environment.
Too high a concentration of a chemical in any one place in the
environment, even though that chemical occurs naturally at lower
levels of concentration.
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POLLUTION IN OIL INDUSTRIES 17.13

Oil, Gas and Petrochemical Plants consist of many different types of units and
processes. Different plants and processes have different potential pollutants, which
have the ability to cause pollution to our environment. Following is a list of the
different Plants within S.O.C. and the pollutants, which could be potentially emitted.
13.1 GAS CLEANING (WET AND DRY CLEANING)
Effluents: Hydrogen Sulphide, Carbon dioxide and Water Vapour. Also, the spent
adsorbant/absorbant at the end of its useful life cycle.
13.2 AMMONIA PLANT
Effluents: Ammonia gas, Natural gas (at startup only). K2CO3 solution, from drains.
Activated carbon, used to absorb mercury from the natural gas, also has to be
disposed of at the end of its useful life.
13.3 UREA PLANT
Urea effluents are divided into:
1. Liquid effluents:
a) From the bottom of the second absorbers of Urea 1 and 2, this contains
a maximum of 10 ppm ammonia and 10 ppm urea.
b) Sanitary sewers are treated in a bio-oxidation unit before being sent to
the sea.
2. Effluent gases:
Source: absorbers top (for both plants), contain maximum 10 ppm ammonia
and 10 ppm urea.
13.4 FLUE GASES FROM BOILERS, FURNACES FLARES AND BURN PITS
The effluents from these sources could contain: carbon dioxide, carbon monoxide,
sulpher dioxide, water vapour, unburnt hydrocarbon gases and soot (solid particles of
partially burnt carbon.
13.5 HYDROCARBON LIQUIDS AND GASES.
The composition of these depends on the process and source of the hydrocarbons.
Apart from the hydrocarbons, hydrogen sulphide, carbon dioxide and heavy metals
may also be present.
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In some instances, such as rapidly vaporizing hydrocarbons, there may be a deficiency

of oxygen.
13.6 CATALYSTS AND PROMOTERS.
The major pollution problem from these sources, during their use is the dusts of
different minerals. However, at the end of their useful life cycle there also remains the
problem of their disposal.
13.7 SANITARY SEWER AND PLANT SEWERS
In these sewers we could encounter the problems of hydrogen sulphide, sulpher
dioxide, carbon dioxide, oils, various chemicals used in plant and laboratory
processes, as well as human waste products.
13.8 BALANCE WATER FROM SHIPS (BALLAST)
The discharge of this water from ships is strictly controlled by international
regulations. This may pollute the seas with oils, sludge, various chemicals, toxic
gases, flammable materials and human waste products.
13.9 QUALITY CONTROL LABORATORIES
The pollutants from these sources vary according to the tests being carried out. They
possibly could include hydrocarbons, acidic or alkalis, oxides of nitrogen, heavy
metals, toxic materials, biological and bacteriological materials.
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HAZARDOUS WASTE DISPOSAL 17.14

In this section of the course we must study the material from a statutory point of
view. Since the examination authority is City and Guilds of London, we will look
at the U.K. regulations.
14.1 THE CONTROL OF POLLUTION ACT
This act is wide ranging, and gives Local Authorities, under the power of the
Central Government, great powers to control pollution of land, sea and air by
industrial and other wastes.
The regulations within the Act cover a number of parts, aimed as follows:
Part 1: Solid Wastes
Part 2: Pollution of Water
Part 3: Noise
Part 4: Atmospheric pollution
Part 5: The Powers of the Act
Part 6: Miscellaneous and General
We will look at each of these parts of the Act in more detail.
PART 1 SOLID WASTES
Part 1 clearly EMPOWERS the Local Authority to take control of all solid waste
disposals arising within or brought into the area. It specifically requires the LA to set
up its own WASTE DISPOSAL AUTHORITY (WDA) and to:
Carry out an investigation, and report on what arrangements are
needed to cope with solid waste disposals in its area.
Prepare and publish a statement covering the types of solid waste
arising within its area, the quantities of these wastes and the proposed
methods of disposal. This statement must also cover the sites at
which the solid wastes disposal is carried out, the equipment to be
used and the estimated cost.
Give adequate publicity to its proposals and allow time for public
representation with respect to the proposals.
Consult with the Local Water Authority, the Waste Collection
Authority, adjacent L.As. and representatives of local industry as
may be able to help them.
Consider the recovery of valuable substances from the wastes
handled.
Control the grant of licences for solid waste disposal.
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LIMITATIONS
No one may deposit controlled waste on any land, or use any equipment for solid
waste disposal, unless the owner of the land has a disposals licence from the LA.
Fines and prison penalties can punish breach of the regulations. Any person owning
land on which illegal dumping has taken place can be required to move the waste
within 21 days.
Some exclusions are permitted for domestic waste.
The regulations specifically prohibit the sorting, picking over, or disturbing of
solid wastes by unauthorized persons.
PART 2 POLLUTION OF WATER
The regulations here aim at preventing the pollution of waterways by any means
Specifically, no noxious or poisonous polluting matter may be passed into any
controlled waters, nor must the flow of streams or rivers be impeded by the
introduction of solid wastes.
The regulations also prohibit the washing and cleaning of things in waterways, the
things being defined by local byelaws. Similarly, no sewage effluent or trade wastes
may be discharged into controlled waters without formal consent by the LA. This
consent will require approval based on:
The place at which the effluent is to be introduced.

The nature of the effluent.
The maximum quantity to be discharged per day.
The maximum rate of discharge within the day.
Consent will be dependent on the provision, by the applicant, of proper metering

facilities, the provision of sampling points, and the keeping of proper records of
discharge rates, quantities and temperature. Some existing local agreements for the
discharge of trade effluent and sewers were overridden by the new regulations. The
regulations provide for protection of flora and fauna in and along the waterways from
effluents and waste discharges.
PART 3 NOISE
Previous regulations had failed to deal properly with noise pollution, and the new
regulations gave the LA more power to take effective actions. It instructs the LA to:
Detect noise problems and decide how to deal with them.

Require the abatement of noise, or the restriction of its occurrence or
recurrence.
Exercise their powers in defined Noise Abatement Areas.
Offences possible by industrial concerns are considered under specific paragraphs.
For example:
Construction sites.
Demolition or dredging.
Works of engineering construction.
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The Act also covers noise in streets; this limits the use of loudspeakers, loud music
from premises, and other things, such as the use of cars with defective exhaust
systems.
PART 4 POLLUTION OF THE ATMOSPHERE
Under this heading, the LA is given powers to:
Specify fuels, which may or may not be used in motor vehicles.

Specify maximum sulpher content, which may exist in engine and
furnace fuels.
Prohibit the sale of fuels, which do not meet their specified
requirements.
Prohibit the burning off of insulation from scrap cables.
Undertake investigations into air pollution.
Where an undertaking is discharging industrial gases or smoke to the atmosphere,
it will need the consent of the LA, who will require to know:
The total volume of the gases discharged, whether pollutants or not.

Concentration of pollutants.
Total volume of pollutants discharged.
Height of discharge.
Hours when discharge will occur.
Concentration of pollutants at ground level
PART 5
Defines the powers within the act and is out with the scope of this course.
PART 6 - MISCELLANEOUS AND GENERAL
Although this is the last section of the Act, it is very important since it gives
powers to the Government to prevent landing, unloading, use, supply or sale of any
substance that may damage or injure:
Persons.
Animals.
Plants.
And cause pollution of land, water or air.
HAZARDOUS WASTES
In addition to normal CONTROLLED wastes, industry and medicine, in
particular also generate wastes which can be injurious to health, and which are
designated HAZARDOUS.
DEFINING HAZARDOUS WASTES
To identify hazardous wastes, a study of the properties of each substance must be
made, asking. Is the substance:
Flammable?
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Explosive?
Corrosive?
Radioactive?
Toxic?
Carcinogenic?
Mutagenic?
Infective?
Likely to cause allergies?
The following tables list various hazardous waste substances as defined by U.K.
legislation:
WASTE CLASSIFICATIONS FOR WASTE DISPOSAL SURVEYS (WMP2)
1. Household and commercial waste, litter, market waste and gully contents but not
local authority construction wastes, or wastes falling into classifications 8/10/11
or 12
2. Medical, surgical and veterinary waste.
3. Industrial waste.
4. Quarry and mine waste.
5. Radioactive waste.
6. Farm waste.
7. Waste from construction and demolition.
8
Sewage sludge.
9. Old cars, vehicles and trailers.
10. Pulverised household and commercial waste.
11. Screenings from household and commercial waste.
12. Ash from incineration.
CLASSIFICATIONS OF DIFFICULT WASTES, SHOWING MAIN GROUPS
ONLY:
GROUP
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
J
K
L
M
N
P
Q
R
S
T
TYPE OF WASTE
Inorganic acids.
Organic acids and their related compounds.
Alkalis.
Toxic metal compounds.
Non-toxic metal compounds.
Metals (elemental)
Metal oxides.
Inorganic compounds.
Other inorganic materials.
Organic compounds.
Polymeric materials and precursors.
Fuel, oils and greases.
Fine chemicals and biocides.
Miscellaneous chemical waste.
Filter materials, treatment sludge and contaminated rubbish.
Interceptor wastes, tars, paint, dyes and pigments.
Miscellaneous wastes.
Animal and food wastes.
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Medical and surgical wastes.
HAZARDOUS WASTE LEGISLATION

Throughout the years there were numerous acts of legislation on this subject, each
with varying degrees of success. Finally, in 1981, a House of Lords Select Committee
published a 3 volume work on Hazardous Waste Disposal. This is the main source of
information on this subject, and which recommends the use of the
BEST PRACTICABLE MEANS
Approach to hazardous waste disposals. Under this approach, the possible options
listed below should be evaluated in each case.
Can the waste be reduced/eliminated by process/product changes?

Can the waste be recovered for the value of its materials or energy
content?
Is the waste acceptable for landfill, and is there a suitable site within
economic transport distance?
Can the hazards of the waste be eliminated by decomposing it
thermally, chemically or biologically?
Can the waste be solidified/encapsulated so that land disposal is then
acceptable?
Can the waste be accepted for disposal at sea?
STATUTORY DUTIES OF A WASTE DISPOSAL AUTHORITY

The following is an outline of the duties of a WDA handling hazardous wastes. The
WDA, which is normally a County Council or its equivalent, must:
Research and report on wastes arising in its area.
Prepare a County waste disposal plan and update it when necessary.
Supervise the design/engineering of waste disposal sites and
equipment such as incinerators and waste fuel power plants.
Actively encourage waste recycling.
Keep in touch with international waste disposal technologies.
Organise, technically and contractually, the purchase, construction
and maintenance of all waste handling machinery.
Work with national and international bodies on development of waste
management technology.
Administer the County Waste Disposal system and monitor all
licenced waste disposal sites within the LA area.
Provide advice to industry on hazardous waste disposal.
14.2 SEA DUMPING AND WATER POLLUTION
SEA DUMPING
We have been dumping waste out at sea for almost as long as we have been
carrying out landfill disposal.
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Sea dumping was long thought to be safe, because with the sea being so big it was
thought possible that no harm could arise. We now know differently, but it has take
numerous serious events to make us realize this, such as the mercury pollution in
Minimatta Bay in Japan causing serious mutagenic damage to both marine life,
animals and the human population of the area.
The main law regulating the discharge of wastes into the sea, in U.K., is the:
DUMPING AT SEA ACT (1973)
Under the terms of this Act, a licence is required before any material can be dumped
at sea.
WATER POLLUTION
We have already discussed this topic, but we also must be aware that all control of
water and sewage disposal is the responsibility of the LOCAL WATER
AUTHORITY. In England and Wales this responsibility has been sold off to private
companies, but in Scotland it remains the responsibility of the Government. The LWA
has the right to issue permission to industry to discharge preset volumes of certain
effluents into rivers and waterways. If the industry exceeds the preset amount, or
composition of the effluent, it can be prosecuted. Various Public Health Acts cover
discharges into sewers, again responsibility for the implementation of these Acts lies
with the LWA.
14.3 LANDFILLS AND SITE LICENCES
Before any landfill waste disposal can be carried out, two main conditions have to
be fulfilled:
Planning permission has to be obtained, and the public can object as
with any other kind of planning permission.
A site licence has to be obtained.
The issue of the licence is controlled by the WDA, stringent conditions must be
followed, including consultation with the LWA as to the potential effects of any
seepage from the landfill into the local water systems.
LANDFILL
The term is used to describe dumping on land. It is the cheapest, and therefore the
most common way of disposing of waste. Landfill can pose long-term environmental
problems even though in the short term it may be quite satisfactory. One major risk
associated with landfill is LEAKAGE: dangerous substances can seep through rock
and soil into water supplies and rivers. This could happen on sites where landfill has
long been abandoned. Since record keeping on landfill in Britain was not always what
it should have been in the past, waste, which is generally not hazardous may be
dumped on top of previously dumped waste. The combination of the two, or more,
sets of substances can produce a resulting mixture far more hazardous than each set of
substances taken in isolation
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OPERATIONS TRAINING
17.15 ENVIRONMENTAL SAFETY

The responsibility for the implementation of the Legislation pertaining to
Environmental Safety, with respect to industry, both inside and outside of the work
place, lies with the Health and Safety Executive. You will recall, from sections
1.A.2.4 and 1.A.2.5, that both the Employer and the Employee have responsibilities
under the HASAWA. The HSE has a far reaching, powerful mandate to ensure
compliance with the act. We will now look at the HSE.
15.1 THE HEALTH AND SAFETY EXECUTIVE
This body is part of the Government and is answerable to the Government for the
implementation and monitoring of all Health and Safety at Work Acts. To carry this
out a force of Health and Safety Inspectors is employed.
The main duties of the HSE are:
Not only to INSPECT but also to develop Health and Safety
legislation, codes and standards which cover all aspects of safe
working throughout industry
To publish advice and guidance, as well as to continually carry out
research into ways in which Health and safety at Work can be
improved.
To ensure that all aspects of the Legislation are being adhered to, and
to take actions against any breach of the Legislation.
There are three main systems of dealing with breaches of the regulations and ensuring
they are being fully complied with.
a) Improvement Notices. These are issued when the Inspector finds a
minor breach of the regulations. The Employer is given a period of
time to correct the problem.
b) Prohibition Notice. If the Employer fails to comply with the
Improvement notice, or in the case of a serious breach of the
regulations, the Inspectorate will issue the Prohibition Notice. This
notice compels the Employer to cease his operations until the
problems identified are rectified, generally a small time period will
be allowed for the shut down. However, if the Inspectorate considers
the problem is sufficiently severe an IMMEDIATIE
117
OPERATIONS TRAINING
PROHIBITION NOTICE can be served. This compels immediate

shut down of the operations.
c) Fines or Imprisonment. Any person who fails to comply with any
of these notices or who is found guilty of a breach of the
Regulations, whether Employer or Employee, can be taken to Court
by the Inspectorate, charged with a breach of the Act, and will be
subject to an unlimited fine or imprisonment or both.
15.2 LABELLING CONTAINERS AND THEIR TRANSPORTATION
The labeling section has already been covered in Section 1.A.5, please refresh your
memory from your notes.
TRANSPORTATION
The transportation of hazardous chemicals and substances creates special problems.
Therefore, regulations require that the following be complied with:
1. The vehicle must be soundly constructed, maintained and of an appropriate
design for the substance carried.
2. Prominent hazard warning notices must be displayed on both sides of the
vehicle as well as at the rear.
3. If multi-component loads are carried, then the words MULTI-LOAD must be
clearly displayed.
4. Contact with emergency specialists must be available at all times.
5. Drivers must be fully trained and knowledgeable of the hazards of their load.
6. Vehicles with hazardous loads must not be left unattended, or parked in public
places.
7. Vehicles must avoid rush hours and residential areas as much as possible
15.3 EXPOSURE TERMS, LIMITS AND HAZARDOUS EFFECTS
EFFECTS OF SUBSTANCES ON THE BODY
Substances, which harm the body, can affect us in one of two ways. They can
cause either a long term, chronic, condition or a short term, acute, condition.
1. ACUTE EFFECTS from a hazardous substance appear within a short period.
For example, welders who are exposed to welding fumes can show influenza
like symptoms. The effects of acute exposure are usually reversible after rest
and treatment.
2. CHRONIC EFFECTS from repeated and prolonged exposure to hazardous
substances can result in severe disability and/or death. For example, it is well
known that exposure to asbestos has resulted in severe lung damage and
ultimately death.
OCCUPATIONAL EXPOSURE LIMITS
THRESHOLD EXPOSURE LIMITS. These limits are specified in a time related
human exposure to a toxic substance. They are used to regulate the proximity of
workers to materials of known toxic effects.
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OPERATIONS TRAINING
The level of airborne contaminants in the workplace is governed by two factors:

Maximum Exposure Limits (MEL)
Occupational Exposure Standards (OES)
It is important to be aware that Maximum exposure Limits have a legal status. This
means that Employers have a duty to ensure these limits are not exceeded. Whilst
Occupational Exposure Standards, although having no legal status, are considered to
represent good practice for the control of exposure. Again it is the Employers duty to
the OES value or below, although in exceptional circumstances they may be
exceeded.
The majority of substances that we are likely to encounter during our working lives
are given OES and the few high-risk chemicals to which we may be exposed are given
MEL.
UNITS OF MEASUREMENT
In order to measure the amount of a substance in the atmosphere we need a
suitable unit.
Concentrations of airborne particles (fumes, dusts, etc0 are usually measured in
milligrams per cubic metre. (mg m-3). Concentrations of gases and vapours in the
atmosphere are usually measured in parts per million (ppm). These units apply to both
OES and MEL.
LONG AND SHORT TERM EXPOSURE LIMITS (LTEL and STEL)
In almost any workplace the Employees exposure to a contaminant is never
constant. It will vary with time and the type of activity. For the majority of
contaminants, the major effect is chronic, long term exposure, but a number of
substances can give rise to acute effects, short-term exposure. These terms are known
as Long Term Exposure Limits (LTEL) and Short Term Exposure Limits (STEL).
They are both expressed as Time Weighted Average (TWA) concentrations, which are
airborne concentrations averaged a specific period of time.
The period of the LETL is normally 8 hours and the period of the STEL is 15
minutes, and can be applied to any 15 minute period throughout the working shift.
The following table is taken from the HSE Guidance Note EH40 1995 and illustrates
the LTEL and STEL for the individual substances:
Occupational Exposure Standards
(OES)
Xylene
Diethyl Ether
Butane
Acetone
Maximum Exposure Limits (MEL
Styrene
Wood Dust (hardwood)
Ppm (LTEL)
100
400
600
750
100
5 mg m-3
ppm (STEL)
150
500
750
1500
250
SAMPLING
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OPERATIONS TRAINING
You may be wondering how it is possible to measure the amount of dusts, gases
and vapours in the atmosphere. Having seen the units used, you will be aware that
these units are very small and therefore specialist equipment is necessary to measure
such small particles. An occupational hygienist, whose job it is to evaluate and control
several aspects of the environment, e.g. noise, air pollution, and radiation, collects
samples for analysis. The following equipment is available for this activity.
For airborne gases/vapours a hand operated bellows pump is used

to draw a number of standard gulps of atmosphere through a detector
tube, which then gives a direct reading of the concentration of
gas/vapour in the atmosphere.
For dusts in the atmosphere dusts are sampled on a filter pad over a
period of several hours. The contents are collected and then analysed
by a specialist laboratory, and the nature and quantity of the dusts can
then be determined.
120

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TRAINING AND DEVELOPMENT

MODULE 8670 017

ORIGINS AND GROWTH OF SAFETY AWARENESS.