What Does 'Political' Mean

What Does "Political" Mean?
Author(s): Eugene F. Miller

Source: The Review of Politics, Vol. 42, No. 1 (Jan., 1980), pp. 56-72
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What Does "Political" Mean?

Eugene F. Miller
Political is a ubiquitous and seemingly indispensable term i

the discussion of human affairs. We use it to speak of quite dif-
ferent kinds of things- institutions, actions, conflicts, expen
ditures, a type of discourse, a branch of science, and such. We ap

ply it to the life and thought of modern nations, ancient cities, an
primitive tribes. Even the internal affairs of businesses, unions,
schools and churches are sometimes called "political." In all these
cases, we assume that the term has, or at least can have, som
definite meaning. Yet it is difficult to say what, if anything
"political" signifies in its various applications and how it signifie
what it does.'
The meaning of "political" is not just a problem for semantics.

It is a question that political scientists must confront at the outset
of inquiry, for inquiry in any science "can properly begin only

after one has specified in some way, vaguely and naively, as i
may be, the kind of thing he intends to investigate."2 Politica
scientists are compelled to specify or take for granted some meaning of "political" in order simply to identify the political things.
Recent attempts to define "political" have typically followed

one or another of the rival accounts of linguistic meaning tha
dominate contemporary thought. One of these accounts hold
that scientific meaning must be established through a process of
1 A recent examination of the meaning of the word politics that takes notice of this problem is Fred M. Frohock, "The Structure of 'Politics,' " American Political Science Review, 72
(September, 1978), 859-70. As Frohock observes, "the range of things describable by th

word 'politics' is vast and uneven" (p. 865). Frohock rightly concludes that a strict "tax
onomic" definition of politics, in terms of an essential or class property that extends
"through all events describable as political," is not possible (p. 867). Such a definition
would be necessary to give "politics" or "political" what I shall speak of as univocal mean
ing. Moreover, Frohock rejects, as I do, the accounts, growing out of Wittgenstein's prin
ciple of meaning as use, that tend to make the meaning of "politics" or "political" a matter
of convention. There is a considerable difference in the way that Frohock resolves thi
problem of meaning and my own approach. Frohock looks for certain "core terms" or
"fixed structures" that are necessary, but not sufficient conditions of any concept of
"politics." These core terms, like taxonomic definitions, "state an invariant feature of
'politics' constant across references of the term" (p. 867), but they are not "essences" in the
strong sense. My approach, which interprets "political" as an equivocal term, avoids con
ventionalism without positing invariant properties or structures common to all instance
of the political.
2 Manley H. Thompson, Jr., "On the Distinction Between Thing and Property," in The
Return to Reason, ed. John Wild (Chicago, 1953), p. 140.

56
WHAT "POLITICAL" MEANS 57
verification. A scientific term shou
meaning, which is fixed by reference t

the things to which the term refers. Ef
for "political" are defeated, however, b
things called political and by the inac

things to sensory observation. The m
neither univocal nor empirical. The
linguistic meaning gives up the effort t

by reference to things or their propert
by reference to the way terms are u

terms of the principle of "meaning
however, to a thoroughgoing conventio

My essay will seek to show what "pol
how the term signifies what it does, by
signification that are developed in the w
Aristotelian tradition. I shall argue th
"political," they are being named equivo
equivocal term, but it is not one tha
The term does not carry a univocal me

plications, but the meaning that it doe
to things, so that it is not simply a mat
TYPES OF EQUIVOCALS
Aristotle's distinction between univoc

provides a valuable starting point for o
"political" means. He draws this distinc
at the beginning of the Categories. thin
nyma) have in common both the name
(logos tes ousias) answering to the nam
(hominyma) have a name in common, bu
use Aristotle's examples, "animal" is a
and an ox, for when we state in what s
statement or definition of the beingness
tities an animal is the same. If, howe

name "animal" to a living man and a
would be using the name equivocally, fo
3 I have dealt with these issues in detail in "Positiv

quiry," American Political Science Review, 66 (Septe
Questions of Political Inquiry," Review of Politics, 39
and Political Knowledge," American Political Science
58 THE REVIEW OF POLITICS
is that makes each an animal is dif
named equivocally, the same name is

common definition or form. The th
same word, but referred to in ways th
ingness of the things themselves. A

equivocals on occasion as "things sai
legomena).5
With this distinction between univocal and equivocal naming

in mind, we must next observe that there are different kinds of
equivocals. All meet the specifications laid down in the Categories.
they are things that have the same name, but different definitions.
Equivocals differ, however, in this respect: some things have the
same name because of a likeness or proportion that they bear to
one another, even though their "definitions" are different, while
other things have nothing at all in common to warrant the fact
that they have the same name. These latter things may be regarded as equivocals or "homonyms" in the pure or strict sense. It is
simply a matter of chance that they have a common name. A
glance at the dictionary will supply numerous instances of these

pure equivocals. For example, it seems to be merely a coincidence
that "date" refers to both the fruit of the palm tree and a day of the
month, that "dam" refers to both a female animal and a barrier
that holds back flowing water, or that "jet" refers to both a stream
of liquid or gas and a hard, black variety of lignite.
The problem that concerns us can now be stated more precisely. When we speak of various things as "political," we do not name
them univocally. A political party is a different kind of thing from
a political speech, a political expenditure, or a political science. A
party, a speech, an expenditure, and a science differ in what they
are - in their definition and beingness. Nevertheless, when we
refer to these various things as "political," we are not using the

term in a purely equivocal way. It is not merely accidental that
the common name "political" is applied to them. There is some
basis in the things themselves for giving them a common name.
The political things thus lie somewhere between univocals, on the
one hand, and pure equivocals, on the other. Just where they lie
should become clear as we examine Aristotle's treatment of those
equivocals that are not purely coincidental or by chance.

4 Categories la 1-12. The equivocity of the example that Aristotle uses here, zoon, is not
fully apparent in translation, for in Greek, the term means both "animal" and "painting."
5 On Aristotle's use of pollachos legomena, see Joseph Owens, The Doctrine of Being in the
Aristotelian Metaphysics, 2nd ed., rev. (Toronto, 1963), pp. 107-115.
In one place or another in his writ
several different types of noncoincide

example, identifies five different type
Aristotle's writings and in the Arist
types, we shall be concerned with only
"to one") equivocal; and the equivoca
In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle

types of equivocals in opposing the Pl
is one form or idea of the good in whi
and to which the term "good" refers.
against the Platonic idea of the good is
like the term "being," is predicated of
entities, qualities, quantities, relations
to some one thing that is universally
Platonists seem to grant that good thi
least two ways- the goods that ar
themselves and the goods that tend to
to prevent their contraries. Yet no
themselves are called "good" by refere
ferent definitions of the good are g
wisdom, pleasure and other things tha

sake. Aristotle thus concludes that the
mon to things in the way of one idea.
univocally, because their definitions a
How then are they called good? They su
equivocal by chance. Are they then c

from something one, or because they
towards something one (pros hen)? O
analogy? - for just as sight is good in th

soul, and similarly another thing in som
As we see, Aristotle rules out the po
are named in a purely equivocal w
somewhere between the univocals an
do not have the unity that the Platoni

idea of the good, and yet they are not
ferent things are called good because t
6 Harry Austryn Wolfson, "The Amphibolous Te

and Maimonides," Harvard Theological Review, 31
7 Nicomachean Ethics 1096b 26-30 (trans. Joseph
116-17).
mon, some likeness or proportion. Aristo

that good things are named by referenc
hen) or by analogy, but here he does n
whether either of these possibilities, or
"POLITICAL" AS A PROS HEN EQU
Let us look more closely at the pros

this type have the same name because of
relation to some one thing. "Healthy" an
favorite examples for illustrating pros
used as follows in the Metaphysics to illu
"being" is expressed in various ways, but
one thing and not as a pure equivocal:
Everything healthy is expressed in refere

through preserving health, another throu
through being a sign of health, and anoth
And the medical by reference to medical s
called medical because it possesses medical
being naturally adapted to it, and another
of medical science.8
Following up the example of "healthy," we might say that the

term is applied to exercise as something that preserves health, to
medicine as something that produces it, to a ruddy complexion as
a sign of health, and to an animate body as something receptive o
it. Each of these things has its own distinctive form or nature and
thus a definition that is different from the rest. Health, properly
speaking, is a certain disposition of the bodily organism. A body
that has this disposition would be the primary instance o
something "healthy." The form or nature of health is not found in
the exercise, the medicine, or the coloring of the skin. Never
theless, these things are of such a nature as to have some referenc

to health as found in the body, and it is for this reason that they
are called "healthy." This feature of pros hen equivocals is stated
concisely by Joseph Owens: "The nature expressed in each case is
found in only one of the instances. All the others have different
natures, but with a reference to the nature of the primary in

stance."9 As the example of "healthy" shows, there are variou
8 Metaphysics 1003a 34 - b 5 (trans. Owens, p. 119); cf. Metaphysics 1060b 36 - 1061a 7

9 Owens, Doctrine of Being, p. 119.
ways in which the secondary instances of
related to the primary instance: "No sp

specific relations between two things is
named by reference to the other."'1
The term "political" seems to be an e
equivocal. As G. E. L. Owen says of such
meaning," i.e., it has "many senses poin
central sense."" In order to understand w
it is necessary to identify the primary in

- the thing that has the form or nature to
stances have reference. The etymology of
necessary clue to what we are looking f
from the Greek word polis, which design

of a particular type. Polls originally mean
of the city, but in time it came to mean
cluding the country dwellers who took
politics. The primary instance of somethi

central or focal meaning of the term, is
the polls. Other things are called politi

primary instance.
The Greek political vocabulary provi
amples of things that are properly terme
their relation or reference to the political co
the person who has a right to share in the

polls - the work of deliberating and judgi
of Latin derivation) the "citizen" who enj
The polits has reference to the polis as th
whole is compounded. The politeuma is th
who have the right to deliberate and ju

word politeia also refers to the body o
something more. Since the men who r
toward which political activity will be dir

the way of life of a community, its moral
ing or organization of a community w

authority and also the principle of jus
authority is assigned to some men rat
10 Miriam Therese Larkin, Language in the Philosophy o
69.
1 G. E. L. Owen, "Logic and Metaphysics in Some E
Aristotle and Plato in the Mid-Fourth Century, eds. Owe

189.
politeia has reference to the polis as the f

munity its distinctive character. The pol
statesman who under the best circumsta
tical wisdom or prudence, the politike, th
the affairs of the political community.12
The things that may properly be cal

means limited to those things whose nam
tion to the polis. In Aristotle's Rhetoric, f
count of the things that a speaker must b
course of political deliberation and de
politeiai and the laws that are suited to e

speaker must know about revenues, expe
military power, the defense of the coun
These various things are "political" by vi
reference, in one way or another, to the
taining or ennobling it, as its cause or ef
Pros hen equivocity has important i

standing the nature of science, as Ar
Metaphysics. Just as all the things named

scope of one science, so it is with the oth
cluding "being": "For not only in the case
common notion does the investigation be
also in the case of things which are relate
for even these in a sense have one common notion."'4 The focus of
inquiry in such a science, however, will be that primary instance
by reference to which the secondary instances are named: "But

everywhere science deals chiefly with that which is primary, and
on which the other things depend, and in virtue of which they get
their names."15
These considerations serve to explain why Aristotle devotes

the first book of his Politics to a discussion of the polis. Since
"political" is a pros hen equivocal, political science must first of all
make clear the nature of that primary thing, the political com-
munity, by reference to which the other political things are

named. Aristotle argues that every community aims at some
good, since every action is for the sake of something that seems
12 See Ernest Barker's Introduction to his translation of The Politics of Aristotle (New
York, 1962), pp. lxiii-lxvii.
" Rhetoric 1359a 30 - 1360b 3.
14 Metaphysics 1003b 13-15 (Oxford trans. by W. D. Ross).
11 Metaphysics 1003b 17-19 (Oxford trans. by W. D. Ross).
good. The community that aims at s
degree and, moreover, aims at the mos

is the most authoritative and inclusive
community, the polls, is such a commun
or happy life for man.16 Our taking th
stance of something "political" is not co
the major theme of Aristotle's Politics t
and more particularly the best polite

polis. The politeia is properly understoo
the way it is ordered or constituted, an
to view as formed already by some pol
thing is to see it in its complete or per
polis itself must be seen in light of the
"POLITICAL" AS EQUIVOCAL BY AN
The principle of pros hen equivocity g

accounting for the meaning of the ter
equivalent, as the term was used by
poraries. This principle is not sufficien

ing of the term as we use it today. The
is this: the primary instance by referen
originally were named has disappeare
experience. "Healthy" continues to
because health of the body is something

experience as it was to that of the ancie
the primary instance of something "
from view. This point has been stated
Our word "politics," although a noun, is t

tive "politic." A parallel instance is the w
the adjective "athletic." Now athletics is
noun athlt&ts - from which our athletic
survives virtually unaltered in our
athletics is because we know what an athl
crete subject of observation while the fo

characterization of his activities. But the
does not survive in our language, is to
athletics. Politics, the abstract general ch

the Greek survives, but polls, the concre
1G Politics 1252a 1-6.
17 Harry V. Jaffa, "Aristotle, in History of Politic
Joseph Cropsey (Chicago, 1963), p. 65.
Adapting Jaffa's observations to our
that "athletic" is a pros hen equivocal t

times, because the primary instance, t
disappearance of the polis makes it dou
meaning of "political" can be understo
The polis has been superseded by th
tion," and this type of association is som
the polis. Indeed, a persuasive case ca
fundamentally opposed. The most ob
polis and a state or nation is their size

and its surrounding territory, while a
entire continent and include hundreds
as the respective proponents of the

pointed out, a drastic change in size
the association. According to Aristotle
for self-sufficiency, but small enough

freedom. 18 Rousseau, one of the few m
argues that its size conforms to the na
to know and to care about others.19 W
the other hand, have preferred the na
size. Madison finds in the extende
violence of faction that is unavailable within the confines of a

city.20
The modern vocabulary of politics originates in political

theory that specifically opposes the sort of authoritative community that the polis represented. The polis was understood to aim at
the good or happy life for man, and the education of its members
in virtue was thought to be required by this aim. According to the
dominant modern view, however, the purpose of political society
is not to produce happiness, but to secure the conditions that per-
mit each individual to pursue happiness as he understands it.
"Society" is the web or network of human relationships that arise

from the striving of individuals to attain their private ends, and
the "state" is the agency that guarantees the means or conditions
for this striving. Far from having a comprehensive authority over
the life of man, the state has only the authority that is necessary to
secure the rights of individuals and the safety of the whole society.
18 Cf. Politics 1276a 25-34, 1326a 5 - 1326b 26; Leo Strauss, The City andMan (Chicago,
1964), p. 30.
19 Cf. The Social Contract, bk. II, chap. 9.
20 Cf. Federalist No. 10.
The polis was regarded as the human
within its own end the end or purpose of

munity, but as Jaffa observes, it is dou
understood as a species of the genus com
and the law of the state, can certainly b
species of contract. By polis is meant a r
ship of the political community to hum
meant by these contemporary terms."21
plicitly subsume polis and nation under
we speak of the polis as a "city-state"
"nation-state." Surely, however, it is as

polis as a species of "state" as it is to thin
community.
Given the fact that the polis has disap
by associations of a fundamentally d
"political" mean in its present-day applic
used univocally, since it is applied to
things; and it is not a pros hen equivocal

to which the term properly refers has d
ing depend simply on its use, as the follo
argued? Do we mislead ourselves whe
meaning of "political" in things to which

If what we call a "state" or "nation" we
different from a polis, the term "politic
would then be used as a pure equivocal, f
things that have nothing in common bu
sion is suggested by Fustel de Coulang
troduction to his classic work The Ancien

essential differences which at all times
peoples from modern societies."22
Nevertheless, it is not by accident or
our lives under government and law a

deliberation and debate in the polis, we
cesses that are like those which we expe
pelled to decide about such things as rev
and peace, military power, defense, the
resources, and legislation. We continue t
in accordance with some perception of w
and unjust, noble and base. Polis is no
21 Jaffa, "Aristotle," p. 66; cf. Strauss, City and Man

22 Fustel de Coulanges, The Ancient City (Garden C
"state" or "nation" or the other associa
term "political." Perhaps it is not ev

genus. These associations have a kind
our problem is to find a kind of nam
likeness of this sort.
In the Metaphysics, Aristotle takes up the question of the ways
in which things can be "one." He observes that

some things are one in number, others in species, others in genus,
others by analogy. One in number are those whose matter is one;
one is species are those of which the definition is one; one in genus
are those whose location in a category is the same; and one by
analogy are those that are related as a third thing is to a fourth. The
later-mentioned types are always implied in the preceding ones. For
example, whatever things are one in number are also one in species,
while things that are one in species are not all one in number; but
whatever things are one in species are all one in genus, while things
that are one in genus are not all one in species, but by analogy;
while things that are one by analogy are not all one in genus.23
As we see, things can be one by analogy even when they belong to

a different genus.
By Aristotle's account, an analogous relationship involves at
least four terms, in which the second is related to the first as the
fourth is to the third.24 To illustrate: as knowledge is to the

knowable object, so is sensation to the sensible object. The proportion can also be between things that inhere in something else,
for example, as sight is in the eye so the mind is in the soul, or as a
calm is in the sea, so is stillness in the air.25 Aristotle had given an
example of this kind of proportion in speaking of the possibility
that things are called "good" by analogy: just as sight is good in the
body, so is the mind good in the soul.
As we saw earlier, there is a kind of equivocal naming that

rests on analogy. Analogical naming presupposes some sort of
proportional relation between four terms, such as when we refer

to intelligence as "sight" or speak of both sight and intelligence as
"good." A pros hen equivocal, by contrast, presupposes the relation
of only two terms - that of a secondary instance to a primary.
These considerations suggest the following solution to the
problem of the signification of "political" in present-day applications: the state or nation bears an analogical likeness to the polis;
23 Metaphysics 1016b 31 - 1017a 3 (trans. Owens, p. 124).
24 Cf. Poetics 1457b 16-18.
25 Topics 108a 7-12.
and the term "political," when applied t
analogy. Other types of association

church, an empire, a tribe - can also
analogy, even though their degree of lik

outweighed by their differences. As Ar
shows, it is possible for a name to fu
equivocal and an equivocal by analogy, d

which it is used.26 Thus the use of "polit
to refer to the things of the polis does
use to refer to things of the state or nat
It is plausible to think that laws or
know them from our experience, are th

laws or taxes or speeches as they exist
the same definition and beingness. Thus
of ancient Athens and a "law" of the

naming these things univocally. When
law, a tax, or a speech in contemporary

naming these things analogically. Whethe
suppose or imply a proportion between
things bear to a state or nation and thei
A question of great importance to pol
one finds in the modern state or n
equivalent to what the ancients spoke
doubtful that this is the case. What we c

tion" or "form of government" is not t
politeia. Moreover, modern democracy
same kinds of things as the politeiai that

mistake to equate the "regime" of a natio
nevertheless, some recognizable and sign
them. The principle of analogy offers p
counting for this likeness-in-difference
named analogically, not only when "po

but also when the name of one is applied
example, when we apply the name "dem
ing of both ancient Athens and the Unit
that the things so named are equivocal
26 Cf. Metaphysics 1075b 8-10; Owens, Doctrine of Be

ON RECOVERING THE POLITICAL
Our analysis has reached the conclusion that the term

"political" means or signifies in an equivocal way. The things
called "political" need not have an essence or properties or even
fixed structures in common to warrant this designation.27 What
makes them political is either some reference that they have to one
thing, the polis, or some proportion that they bear to the things of
the polis.
This argument implies that it is necessary somehow to know

what the polis is in order to understand and speak meaningfully of
things as "political." In this concluding section, I want to defend
this assumption and to establish its validity even for scientific or
philosophical modes of speech and inquiry. Moreover, I want to

indicate how the primary sense of the political might best be
recovered.
Edmund Husserl once observed that to speak of the crisis of a

science is to indicate "nothing less than that its genuine scientific
character, the whole manner in which it has set its task and
developed a methodology for it, has become questionable."28
Political science has experienced such a crisis in the 1970's. In the
decades following World War II, the behavioral movement had

largely set the task and provided the methodology for political
science, but by 1970, behavioralism was under attack from many
sides, and there was talk, even in behavioral circles, of a
"postbehavioral revolution." At the theoretical level,

behavioralism had produced not the expected consensus, but
rather a succession of competing theories or conceptual
frameworks, no one of which could gain long-term ascendancy. In
27 Leo Strauss writes that "every political situation contains elements which are essential to all political situations: how else could one intelligibly call all these different political
situations 'political situations'?" (What Is Political Philosophy? [Glencoe, Ill., 1959], p. 64). I
have departed from this more or less "Platonic" solution to the question of what "political"
means and proposed instead a solution based on Aristotle's doctrine of equivocal naming.
Nevertheless, I believe that this substitution makes even more compelling Strauss's argu-
ment (reproduced below) that we must return to the classics in order to recover the
prephilosophic understanding of political things out of which political science emerges. A

return to the classics is necessary not only because our thinking about the political has
been affected by a tradition of political philosophy, but also because the primary entity
which embodies the essence of the political and by reference to which political things are
named - the polis - is no longer available to our direct experience.
28 E. Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduc-
tion to Phenomenological Philosophy, trans, and introduction by David Carr (Evanston, Il-
linois, 1970), p. 3.
the absence of the integration that a com
framework might have provided, par

tended to have an isolated, piecemeal
ment with behavioralism did not arise pr
develop according to expectations. Wh

tionable was behavioralism's conception
inquiry, including its methods and it

1980's, no agreement has been reac
methods of political science, and the
whether or not our political investigatio
tific character.
What is the remedy for a science in crisis? Husserl argued that
a science can recover the sense of meaning or purpose that was

evident to its founders by returning to the world of prescientific or
pretheoretical experience from which the science first emerged. In
the "life-world" (Lebenswelt), as Husserl terms it, we can recover
the originating experiences that underlie a science and provide its
meaning or significance. The life-world is the world whose givenness or reality we take for granted in all of the affairs of daily life.
It is the evident context or horizon of those familiar objects that
serve our needs and of those encounters that we have with our
fellow human beings. The life-world is known to us by immedi

experience prior to any reflection of a scientific or theoretical so
It is the world from which science arises as well as the world which
science always presupposes. The questions that give rise to

science in the first place come to view within the framework of the
life-world, and science always rests on insights or self-evidences
that are experienced there. The life-world functions constantly as
the ground or "subsoil" of scientific inquiry. When a science loses
touch with this indispensable ground, it also loses the sense of its
own meaning or significance.29
Husserl's observations help us to understand the crisis of con-
temporary political science and to see how this crisis might be

overcome. A science of politics that arises directly from political
life will reflect, in its guiding questions and concepts, the
awareness of political things that men gain from their experience
of political life and their participation in it. No doubt the
emergence of political science requires some sense of the inadequacy of ordinary political understanding - the sense that it lacks
29 Ibid. pp. 122-35.
clarity and consistency, that it is impr
for which it has no satisfactory ans

political knowledge that is clear, con
clusive, the political scientist takes f
meaning that is provided by the or
political things. Once a tradition of
established, a process that Husserl calls

take place. The possibility of political s
are taken for granted, so that we are n
on the elementary question of why t
politics in the first place. Theoretical c
of a direct awareness of political pheno
use without any requirement that thos
these phenomena themselves or re

periences that went into their ori
theoretical enterprise develops a life an

that the development of political theo
less by practical interests or questions
political awareness than by interests o
by the theoretical enterprise itself

methodology and explanatory mode
other spheres of inquiry are taken ove

applied to the study of political life.
counts of politics come to bear little r
understanding of political life. Ra
understanding of the political phenom

obscure our view of them. Some such p
this seems to be responsible for what
"apolitical" character of contemporary
Husserl's analysis suggests that a

regain a sense of purpose by return
political life - to the political things as

to men in political life - and attemptin
the insights and evidences from which
Surely there is great attraction in this
inquiry afresh from a direct confronta
political life. Can we assume, howev

phenomena from which political scie
cessible to us in our own immediate
"The Origin of Geometry," Husserl s
reactivating the primal beginnings of
may know little about the historical su

of the first geometers, our own practi
things-of bodies and their shapes, su

magnitudes- gives us a basis for rec
evidences" that underlie the science
political a permanent feature of the
material bodies are? Even assuming tha

tures of political life which are as prese
political science originated, is it poss
structure of meaning by reflecting on
perience of political life? Can we lea

presuppositions that centuries of pol
duced and confront political life as it a
consciousness?
Problems such as this led Leo Strauss to contend that a return
to the prephilosophic origins of political science is best ac-
complished through the study of classical political philosophy

Strauss argues that modern political science "consists to a con-
siderable extent of inherited knowledge whose basis is no longer

contemporaneous or immediately accessible."31 What he means is
this: our opinions or ideas about politics are mostly abbreviations
or residues of the thought of the past rather than the products of
direct experience of political life. The modern idea of the "state,"
for example, emerged not simply from the experience of states,
but partly from "the transformation, or reinterpretation, of more
elementary ideas, of the idea of the city in particular."32 The foundations of modern political science thus tend to be "covered up."33
These foundations lie in the speculations of political science or

political philosophy in its original or classical form. Classical
political philosophy acquired its fundamental concepts by starting
from political phenomena as they present themselves to the

prephilosophic consciousness. It thus enjoyed a contemporaneity
with its basis which no longer exists in modern political thought.
If we are to transform our inherited knowledge into genuin
30 This essay is reprinted as Appendix VI to the English translation of The Crisis of Euro-
pean Sciences, pp. 353-78. For a helpful discussion of this essay, see Jacob Klein,
"Phenomenology and the History of Science," Philosophical Essays in Memory of Edmund
Husserl, ed. Marvin Farber (New York, 1968), pp. 143-63.

31 Strauss, What Is Political Philosophy?, p. 77.
32 Ibid., p. 74.
33 Ibid., p.76; compare Husserl's notion of "sedimentation."
knowledge, we must "revitaliz[e] its origi
revitalization requires us to recover th
standing of political things from which p
originates. The classical writings are ind

They display a common-sense political
unaffected by a tradition of political philo

the emergence of a science of politics out
understanding.35
These reflections on political inquiry ha
clusion as our analysis of the meaning of

order to speak intelligibly of political t
them, we are compelled to seek some insig
polis as a distinctive kind of human comm
damental differences between the po
associating to achieve common purposes

longer available to us directly from exper
tentively to the classical writings in po
theme is the polis and its right ordering.
S4 Strauss, What Is Political Philosophy?, p.77; compare H
35 See Strauss, City and Man, pp. 9-12.

What Does 'Political' Mean

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What Does 'Political' Mean

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What Does "Political" Mean?

Author(s): Eugene F. Miller

University of Notre Dame du lac on behalf of Review of Politics, Cambridge

What Does "Political" Mean?

Political is a ubiquitous and seemingly indispensable term i

ferent kinds of things- institutions, actions, conflicts, expen

ditures, a type of discourse, a branch of science, and such. We ap

"political" signifies in its various applications and how it signifie

The meaning of "political" is not just a problem for semantics.

of inquiry, for inquiry in any science "can properly begin only

Recent attempts to define "political" have typically followed

(September, 1978), 859-70. As Frohock observes, "the range of things describable by th

Return to Reason, ed. John Wild (Chicago, 1953), p. 140.

WHAT "POLITICAL" MEANS 57

verification. A scientific term shou

meaning, which is fixed by reference t

things called political and by the inac

linguistic meaning gives up the effort t

by reference to the way terms are u

however, to a thoroughgoing conventio

Aristotelian tradition. I shall argue th

"political," they are being named equivo

equivocal term, but it is not one tha

The term does not carry a univocal me

Aristotle's distinction between univoc

tities an animal is the same. If, howe

would be using the name equivocally, fo

3 I have dealt with these issues in detail in "Positiv

58 THE REVIEW OF POLITICS

is that makes each an animal is dif

named equivocally, the same name is

ingness of the things themselves. A

With this distinction between univocal and equivocal naming

simply a matter of chance that they have a common name. A

glance at the dictionary will supply numerous instances of these

month, that "dam" refers to both a female animal and a barrier

are - in their definition and beingness. Nevertheless, when we

refer to these various things as "political," we are not using the

should become clear as we examine Aristotle's treatment of those

equivocals that are not purely coincidental or by chance.

WHAT "POLITICAL" MEANS 59

In one place or another in his writ

several different types of noncoincide

Aristotle's writings and in the Arist

types, we shall be concerned with only

"to one") equivocal; and the equivoca

In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle

least two ways- the goods that ar

themselves and the goods that tend to

to prevent their contraries. Yet no

themselves are called "good" by refere

ferent definitions of the good are g

wisdom, pleasure and other things tha

How then are they called good? They su

equivocal by chance. Are they then c

analogy? - for just as sight is good in th

As we see, Aristotle rules out the po

are named in a purely equivocal w

somewhere between the univocals an