3

Q)- .

First Army antiaricraft in the Battle of the

Command
Bulge, by Lt Col P. C. Davis, CAC.
1946-47.
and Staff College.

This Document

9:-

IS A HOLDING OF THE

'i >,.'

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CO iiM D AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE

FORT LEAVENWORTH
So

SAS

School of Combined Arms

Regular Course
1946-1947
/

First Army Antiaircraft in the Battle of the Bulge

(Personal Experience of an Army AA Staff Officer)

Type of Operation Described:

Antiaircraft Artillery in

Primary and Secondary Roles

Lt. Col. Paul C. Davis,

...

AOC

Table of Contents

r~7 7-.-

Index
Bibliography
Introduction
Terrain
First Army Ground and AA Situation on 16 Dec., 1944
The German Counter-Offensive Begins
7
Antiaircraft in the Ground Role
8
Antiaircraft in the Primary Role
10
The Air and Airborne Attacks on V and Vii Corps
The Air Attack West of the Meuse
10
The New Year's Day Raid
11
The V-1 Attack
12
Redeployment for the Rhine Offensive
13
Lessons Learned
14
Chart 1-AA in Battle of the Bulge, showing initial
AA
dispositions, and the Areas of AT and AA action
referred to in text. Scale 1/100,000

Bibliora2

A-i

First U. S. Army Report of Operations, 1 August 1944

to 22 February 1945

A-2

Annex No. 6, Antiaircraft Section Report, to above

report (published in separate volume, with annexes
4,5,7, and 8)

A-3 Subject 0-426, School of Combined Arms, 1946-1947

Regular Course-"British-Ameriean Ground Cooperation"

1)

2.

Introduction

In the 1946-1947 Regular Course at the Command and

General Staff College, Antiaircraft instruction emphasized
employment on two levels-Air Defense and Division. Only
incidental reference was made to Corps Antiaircraft, and
Army Antiaircraft was not mentioned. The impression was
conveyed that antiaircraft artillery is largely employed
on such generalized and inflexible missions as "Protection
of Field Artillery" and "Defense of the Corps Zone".
In this monograph I propose, by historical illustration, to emphasize the flexibility
of employment of antiaircraft artillery; to bring to the attention of the
Combined Arms School that important sector of the subjectAntiaircraft on the Army level; and to refute certain
presently taught Air Defense doctrine on the basis of
combat experience.
"First

For this purpose I have chosen the subject:

Army Antiaircraft in the Battle of the Bulge".

First Army AA at its peak consisted of 56 battalions;

it is therefore manifestly impossible to discuss all AA
action with the Army. I shall therefore highlight the battle
by discussing only the following pertinent subjects and
actions:
1.

The Liege Diver Belt-(V-1 Defense)

2.

Army AA in the Ground Role

3.

AA in the Primary role, which is subdivided into:

a. The Air and Airborne Attacks on V and Vll Corps16 to 20 December.
b. The Air Attack on Communications Centers West
of the Meuse.
c. The New Year's Day Raid.

4.

The V-1 Attack.

As the Battle of the Bulge has been fully reported

elsewhere(see, for example, Subject 0-426, British-American
Ground Cooperation), I shall make only general reference to
the German plan and execution. All references to locations
may be found on Chart 1, appended hereto.

Terrain

The terrain of particular interest lies north of a

line from St. Vith to Namur, and south of Antwerp and
Brussels.
The region is drained by the Meuse, ani unfordable river, which flows north to Namur, east to Liege,
and again north into Holland.
On 16 December, it was the
First
Army Rear Boundary.
The area on the north and west of the Meuse is an
extensive low plain, highly industrialized, in which lay
the main airfields of IX TAC, supporting First Army.
To the south and east of the Meuse is a hilly,
heavily
forested region, drained by three streams, all joining the
Meuse at Liege.
These are the Vesdres, the Ambleuve, and
the Ourthe.
The ridges run generally southeast to northwest, not high, but with steep slopes down to the narrow
winding streams.
The road net is excellent. Main roads follow the rivers,
where AT defenses could be profitably employed; while good
roads run over the ridges as well. Those roads pertinent
to the discussion are:
Bullingen-Malme dy-Spa-Liege
Ma lmedy-Stoumont-Aywaille-Huy
Stavelot-Ouffet-Huy
Aachen-Eupen-Malme dy

Eupen-Verviers

The First

Army Ground and Antiaircraft Situation on

16 December, 1944.

On 16 December, First
Army was attacking with its
main effort on the left, to secure the Urftalsperre,
Schwamenauel, Paulushoff and Heimbach Dams controlling
the Roer River, preparatory to launching a general offensive to the Rhine. Front line and Corps boundaries are
shown on Chart 1. (1)
Antiaircraft dispositions at this
time were as
follows(2):
Army AA troops consisted of the 49th AAA Brigade,
comprised of the 11th, 16th, 18th, and 103rd Groups.
Of
these, the 103rd Group, consisting of one gun and two AW
battalions, was defending Army Hq at Spa, the Ammunition
Depot in ithe army Maintenance Area at Herve, and the defiles in the vicinity of Verviers.
This mission was a
normal one.
llth
and 18th Groups were deployed on a special
mission, known as ithe "Liege Diver Belt", or V-1 efenses. This mission requires some explanation. The
main V-1 defenses on the western front at this time were
concentrated in front of Brussels and Antwerp, ideally
situated from a tactical and gunnery standpoint. However,
while these two centers were the main V-1 targets, Liege
had intermittently received very heavy V-1 concentrations
and required protection. Although Liege was behind the
First Army Rear Boundary, the only possible place in which
to deploy V-1 defenses for Liege was the First Army area,
and First
Army accordingly assumed this
responsibility.
Ideally, the defenses should have been situated just
south and east of Liege. However, this was a heavily populated area, and one in which the Army Maintenance Area and
vital dumps were located. As a large percentage of V-l's
when hit
by AA, were exploding on the ground, this congested
region was ruled cut as a position area and it became necessary to situate the defenses in Division sectors, a deployment
to which the V and VIII Corps Commanders agreed.
This deployment had the following disadvantages, which
prevented the Defenses ever being as effective as those at
Antwerp and Brussels.
Early warning was not possible, as
our weapons were but 4,000 to 8,000 yards behind the frontlines and because the V-1's were flying at extremely low
altitudes (900 to 1500 feet), still ascending from the
launching ramps.
Second, the altitude was so low that
90 mm radars could not make pick-ups at a reasonable range.
(Firing was at Q.E.'s around 125 mils).
Third, AW hits
were ineffective against the strongly constructed V-l,
which required about five 90 mm hits
for destruction.
To partially
overcome these disadvantages the VT fuze was
released for use in the AA role on 15 December.
Normal

(1) A-l, p.95; A-3, Sit Map A.

(2)

A-2,

p.80

et

sequ.

safety requirements would have prevented its

use against
the low-flying V-1.
Therefore special tables had to be
computed, taking a 1 in 1,000 risk of detonations due to
hill
mask, and thereby reducing the permissible Q.E. from
400 mils to about 100 mils.
As firing at this
elevation
would not permit the self-destruction feature of the fuze
to operate in case of a miss, we so situated the guns that
all misses on a V-1 would burst over the German lines-thus
accomplishing AA and FA fire
simultaneously.
So much for
these defenses, except to point out that the 11th Gp was
deployed South of Bullingen, in the 99th and 106th Division
Sectors, on the very nose of the Sixth SS Pz Army attack.
16th AAA Group, the remaining Army Group, far to the
South with 2 gun and 1 AW Battalions, was defending 12th
Army Group Hq, Radio Luxembourg, and the Differdange steel
mill.
So much for Army AA.
Each Corps had its
organic
Group and attached battalions, while each Division had a
battalion attached. This was the AA situation on 16
December.

The German Counter-Offensive

Begins

(1)

The German Counter-offensive, it will be remembered,

featured a drive on the Liege-Antwerp axis by Sixth SS Pz
Army on the right, with a parallel drive by Fifth SS Pz
Army on the axis Namur-Brussels, while Fifteenth and Seventh iArmies were to block the flanks and hold open the gaps.
the impact of the Sixth SS Pz Army was immediately felt
by
the llth AA Group and Battalions in the Liege Diver Belt
around Bullingen, one AA Battalion being forced to evacuate
its
position at Krinkelt early on the morning of 16 December.
All battalions came under heavy artillery and some infantry
fire that day, and being unable to effectively continue their
anti-V-l mission, they began an echeloned displacement to the
rear, at the same time going into a ground blocking role.
Authotity to assume the ground role, which must be approved
by the Army Commander, was, of course, immediately granted.
One AWlBattalion of the V-1 defenses was attached to the
106th Division and one to the 99th Division, the night of
16 December. The morning of 17 December, two 90 mm battalions of the V-1 Defenses were moved west to Steinbach and
attached to V Corps for anti-tank employment.
The firecontrol equipment was sent to Liege, and all VT fuzes were
safely evacuated and accounted for.
The 18th AAA Group
east of Camp Elsenborn, which was also part of the V-l
Defenses, was relieved from 49th AAA Brigade as well, and
attached to V Corps at this time.
49th AAA Brigade Hq at
Ligneuville was forced to evacuate by advance elements of
12 SS Pz Division, and this break in communications forced
the Army AA officer to assume direct command of all
Army
AAL Groups until the Brigade could re-establish communications
from a new CP.

(1)

A-l,

p.103 et sequ.

Antiaircraft in the Ground Role

(1)

On 17 December, the German thrust toward Malmedy and

Stavelot offered a serious threat to Liege and Huy, and
incidentally to Army Hq at Spa.
At this time the Army G-3
delegated responsibility for deployment of other than major
Army units to the Special Staff. In the next several days
the AA officer executed a piecemeal deployment of AA in the
ground role which was characterized by speed and improvisation,
and which contributed in no small measure to halting Sixth
SS Pz Army's thrust toward Liege and Huy.
On 17 December
six 90 mm guns of the 110th AAA Gun Bn defending Army Hq,
supplemented by a 40 mm battery, were attached to the Army
Hq Security Force defending a 3 million gallon gas dump and
the Army Hq at Spa, in an AT and FA role. Fire adjustment
initially was by Air OP flown by the Air Artillery Officer
of Army iHq.
Meanwhile a telephone call to 21 Army Group
obtained two gun and one AW Battalions from Antwerp X Defense; 52nd AAA Brigade of 9th Air Defense Command furnished
one gun battalion; Ninth Army to the north furnished another.
These units arrived unbriefed and untried in front-line combat. They were issued fragmentary orders by a liaison officer
from Army Hq, and in most cases were given overlays with AT
sites marked for each gun. They placed their fire-control
and administrative equipment in trains areas and deployed in
the AT role as follows:
143rd AAA Gun Bn and 563rd AAA AW Bn-vicinity Stoumont
Station-Aywaille

125th AAA Gun Bn-vicinity Ouffet-Anthisnes

141st AAA Gun Bn-Huy
The llth Group Hq, formerly deployed in the V-1 Defenses,
was assigned to command these AT Defenses. The other borrowed
units were used to augment the AA Defenses of the vital EupenVerviers defile.
Meanwhile, on 18 December, 1st SS Pz Division had broken
through south of Butgenbach, had by-passed Malmedy and was
probing for a break-through toward Spa and Stoumont. Spa was
defended by the Army Hq Security Force, consisting of 1 Cavalry
Rcn Troop, six 90 mm guns of 110th AAA Gun Bn, five M-51 halftracks (quad. 50 cal. MG's) of 639th AAA AW Bn, three M8 Aslt
guns and one medium Tk Co, 25 MD's, Hq and Hq Co 9th Armored
Group and elements of 5th and 6th Belgian Fusilier Bns. Late
on 18 December 30th Division arrived from 9th Army and deployed
in the vicinity of Stoumont-La Gleize.
At 1615 on 19 December
a 6-vehicle Rcn element of lst SS Pz Division reached to
within 2,000 yards of Spa, where AA troops deployed as infantry
supported by M-51 half-tracks destroyed this force; this ended
the German thrust at Spa. At this time the Army Hq moved.

(1) A-2, p.81

Simultaneously, a tank column struck 30th Division at

Stoumont, where the 119th Inf, supported by the AT guns of
A 90 mm gun destroyed the
143rd AAA Gun Bn, was deployed.
first Mark VI tank at 40 yards, and 2 guns were destroyed
The AA personnel then deployed as
in turn.
by tank fire
Two of them, at the request of an Infantry officer,
infantry.
manned a bazooka (which they had never fired before) destroying two tanks at a range of 40 yards. The force (119th Inf
elms and AA) then withdrew west to Stoumont Station, closely
Here a 90 mm
followed by the remainder of the tank column.
gun destroyed two more of the tanks, effectively blocked the
road and ended the German thrust toward Aywaille and Huy.
1st SS Pz Division then sideslipped to the southwest, probtime 82nd Airborne Division
But by this
ing toward Ouffet.
had been deployed here, and Sixth Pz Army had lost its last
chance to reach the ivieuse.
When XVIII Airborne Corps arrived in this sector, the
CO llth AAA Group became the Corps AA officer and the AA
battalions in this area gradually resumed their primary
for the
The score in tanks destroyed by 90 mm fire
role.
entire battle was 19.

Antiaircraft in the

..

Primary

Role

(1)

The Air and Airborne Attacks on V and VII Corps

One of the most significant and important problems

facing the AA officer was to prevent the deployment of AA
in the ground role to such an extent as to jeopardize the
primary mission. 103rd AA Group, defending the Verviers
defile, continued in the AA role, reinforced on 18 December
by 1 Gun and 1 AW Bn from 21 Army Group;
these defenses
proved invaluable as all
reinforcements from Ninth Army, as
well as all Corps troops of VII Corps moved through this one
defile to the Marche-Aywaille area, in a large-scale tactical
movement characterized by careful traffic planning and
exceptional speed.
All VII Corps AA also remained in the AA role; and it
was here that a remarkable action occurred from 16 to 20
December, for by strange coincidence and bad German judgment,
the German air and paratroop effort was concentrated in this
heavily defended area.
On 16 December, 122 enemy sorties
were flown-the largest number since D-Day.
Almost all
air
effort on 16 December was at night, to cover the night paratroop attack across VII Corps to the V Corps sector. This
attack, consisting of 800 men under Lt. Col. Von der Heydte,
had the mission of cutting the Eupen-Malmedy road in V Corps
sector, (2) to prevent reinforcements from the m.rth until
1700, 17 December, at which time a link-up with a Panzer
Division was planned.
During that night the 116th AAA Gun
Bn engaged 87 enemy aircraft
in a period of 8 hours, exhausted and replenished its entire prescribed load of ammunition and destroyed 14 planes with 5 more probably destroyed.
(Category II)
Air action in VII Corps sector continued unabated for 4 days, the final score being 431 enemy aircraft
over the area, of which 106 were destroyed and 37 probably
destroyed. 116th AAA Gun Bn destroyed or damaged approximately 2 of the 40 plus JU-52's carrying paratroopers; and
attained the unprecedented score in 4 days' shooting of 29
planes destroyed and 11 probably destroyed.
Using the VT
fuze for the first
time, it brought down 4 planes with 40
rounds.
The failure of the German Airborne attack may be
largely attributed to the selection of a flight
route without due consideration of the disposition of AA defenses.
2.

The Air Attack West of the Meuse.

On 21 December, First Army's Rear Boundary was moved far

to the west of ;the Meuse.
Concurrently 52nd AAA Brigade, comprising 4 Groups, 9 Gun Bns, and 9 AW
Vns,
was added to First
Army'is troop list.
These units continued their previous
missions-the AA defense of Liege, Huy, Namur, Dinant, Charleroi,
and the airfields of IX TAC located in the Army area.
Inner
Artillery Zones which had formerly existed at all but Liege,
but had been cancelled when the enemy's air
could no longer
each them, were now re-established; while the one at Liege
continued in existence. The Air Force's inability to maintain and disseminate accurate information on the movements

(1) A-2, p.82

(2) Chart 1
10.

of friendly planes, and thus assure timely and accurate

identifications, made these IAZ's mandatory, and they proved
most effective. At this time, the enemy suddenly shifted
the area of his air effort, from the V and VII Corps sectors
and the area southeast of Liege, where he had hoped for a
break-through, to the communications centers and traffic of
60-70
Liege, Huy, and Namur, the bulk of it against Liege.
sorties appeared daily until 30 December, meeting with little
success and suffering the usual losses of about 20 %.
iMeanwhile, 16 AAA Group, which was deployed in the vicinity of Luxembourg, at 1000 on 17 December lost communication
with 49 AAA Brigade, and thereafter operated independently,
being transferred to Third Army along with VIII Corps on 19
December. Until that time its action was mainly in the primary role, rendering, however, artillery support to 4th Inf Div.
3.

The New Year's Day Raid

New Year's Day, in First Army AA history, was a red letter

day, remembered along with those three other air-AA battlesThe Normandy Beaches, August 6, 1944 (operation Ltttich), and
the Battle of Remagen Bridge.
This German air operation, known as "Varus", was carefully
planned well in advance. Planning was begun November 1 on
orders of Goering, who hoped to regain the Luftwaffe's lost
prestige. Like the ground operation, its aim was ambitious,
its execution mediocre, although surprise was achieved in at
least one sector of the Western Front. Its objective was
counterair-the destruction of tactical air power on its airfields.
On December 31, pinpoint strikes on the IX TAO EW radar,
the main source of early warning for First Army, and on the
AA positions along the Meuse were made, to weaken the AA
On Jan. 1, at 0855,
Defenses, but with practically no effedt.
the raid began, with Ju88 night fighters especially equipped
for navigation guiding each Staffel toward its target. On
that ddy between 800 and 900 sorties crossed the Western Front,
of which 280 attacked in the First Army area. Warning was
adequate in the First Army area, and they were met at the front
lines with such a volume of effective AW fire, that many groups
soon abandoned their primary mission or became lost and turned
to a dispersed and aimless strafing of targets of opportunity.
One group of German planes did reach its objective, airfield Y-29
50 planes attacked, and there ensued a notable
at St. Trond.
example of air-AA cooperation. Two P-47 squadrons, already
airborne, engaged them, but soon had to land to refuel and
rearm. As Me 109's flew on their tails almost to the ground,
AA defending the field engaged them, destroying seven planes
without damaging a single friendly plane.
In 2 hours and 45 minutes the raid was over. It took
30 days to process and confirm the claims of aircraft destroyed the score finally proving to be 67 Category I (destroyed) and 23 Category II (probably destroyed), or 24 %
destroyed and 8 ) probably destroyed.
To recapitulate our AA score in the Battle of the Bulge:
from 16 December to 2 January, 1198 German sorties crossed
First Army's lines; of these, 267 were destroyed by AA and
101 more were probably destroyed. (22 % Cat. I, and 8 6 Cat. II.)

11.

The V-1 Attack

(1)

In one respect the enemy attacked by air with impunity.

On 16 December he drove our V-i defenses from the Bullingen
area, and simultaneously began a serious V-1 attack on Liege.
That day 128 V-l's were launched, and they continued at a
daily rate of 40 to 70.
The effectiveness of this weapon
is well illustrated by two random instances.
On 18 December,
while First Army Hq was moving from Spa to Chaufontaine, a
direct hit was scored on a serial containing the G-4 Traffic
Control personnel, killing 16. The next day, on the same
road, a V-1 hit an M-4 tractor towing a 90 mm gun of the
125th AAA Gun Bn. It demolished both tractor and gun,
killed the 14 men of the gun crew, and blocked traffic for
one hour. It is believed that had the enemy's target been
Verviers rather than Liege, serious interruption to the
movement of units fro~t Ninth Army and VII Corps to the Marche
battle area might have resulted.

(1) A-2,

p.83

12.

Redeployment for the Rhine Offensive

(1)

The following month, the period of the allied counterattack, was featured by the release of all AA units which
had been borrowed from Ninth Army, Antwerp X Defense and
IX TAC, the return of 16th AAA Group to First
Army, reestablishment of the AA defense of the Army Maintenance Area
east of the Meuse, and the complete redeployment of First
Army AA preparatory to the Rhine offensive.
Positions
were approximately as on 16 December; the V-1 defense belt
was, however, not reestablished.

(1) A-2,

p.84

13.

Lessons Learned

The following lessons were learned or re-emphasized

by this battle:
1.

AA does not spend all

its

time defending artillery.

deployment is
of tactical
2.
ivaximum flexibility
achieved by the Group-Separate battalion organization, and
by attaching rather than assigning Ai below the Army level.
AA means, other than
divisional AA are a pool, to be concentrated at vital points, in accordance with priorities
approved by the Army commander.
3.
Antiaircraft are cannon which must be available to
the ground force commander for emergency employment in the
AT, FA, and specialized roles.
We must ever guard, however,
against unduly depleting the antiaircraft
defenses as an
enemy ground offensive will invariably be accompanied by
an :.air offensive.
4.
The Air Defense doctrine that the only positive means
As in
of identification is movement knowledge, is unsound.
the past war, it will probably always be impossible to know
where all
friendly aircraft
are at any moment.
The liberal
use of areas restricted to friendly flying(IAZ's), contrary
to Air Defense doctrine, proved to be the only effective
means of night defense.
5.
While the use of AA in strategic retrograde movement
and defense was effective, planning for this eventuality was
deficient.
The result was that some units broke communicahigher hq in
tions without plans for re-establishing them;
some instances broke communications to lower units when
moving, without issuing suitable instructions or assigning
missions; plans for the administrative reorganization of
Bns
nA for use in the AT and FA roles were inadequate, and
knowledge of secondary missions was not the equal
tactical
of technical proficiency, due largely to inadequate training
in the U.S.
6.
The best recognition means by day was the visual
recognition of an enemy type plane, b thegun crew commander.
He must not fire
simply because he sees someone else firing.
Ground troops not especially trained in recognition must not
be allowed to shoot except upon identification of enemy
markings.
Friendly-type planes must be presumed to be flown
7.
by friendly pilots.
The enemy cannot normally obtain
the opposite assumption.
sufficient u.S. planes to justify
at friendly type planes, even though they bomb your
To fire
Only
position, is a serious breach of fire discipline.
certain objectives of rare tactical importance justify an
exception to this rule. Such action confirms a friendly
in his belief he is attacking hostile troops, breeds
pilot
mistrust and destroys confidence between ground troops and
the air forces, and, if continued in combat, may completely

14.

nullify the usefulness of antiaircraft

artillery.
AA troops
must fire
recognition flares when mistakenly attacked.
The
effectiveness of this
procedure was repeatedly demonstrated.
8. The use of the V-1 as a tactical weapon against
ground troops in the battle of the Bulge marked the beginning of a new phase of military technique. Ground-toground pilotless
aircraft
and guided missiles, as their
precision increases, may larigely replace conventional
artillery, at least of the heavier calibers. As they do,
antiaircraft artillery
will take on a role analagous to
counterbattery or counter-mortar fire; it will be directed
toward interception of the missile in flight, while FA
fire will be employed to attack the missile firing sites.
We will do well to remember, therefore, that Army Ground
Forces, as well as Air Forces, must have a voice in the
future of ground-to-air and ground-to-ground missile
development and employment.
ange and tactical
use,
rather than the method of propulsion or the medium through
which the missile passes, should determine whether it is
a ground or an air weapon.
9.
Airborne flight
routes must avoid AA defenses,
expect serious casualties.

or

10.
Finally, automatic weapons fire
proved to be effective against the newer and faster types of aircraft
because of
its concentrated volume of fire and in spite of the inadequacy
of its
fire
control equipment.
Economy of force ( a smaller
number of automatic weapons and personnel) and economy of
ammunition demand radar-controlled heavier caliber automatic
weapons with VT fuzed ammunition.

15.

A ACHEFN

ST. TROND

LIEGE

HUYc

ouF-I
Sri

LUX. %

1C

l r1&1-

in the Battle of' the b~ulge

Scale:

1/100,000o