CLEMENTE CALDE vs.

THE COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 93980 June 27, 1994

FACTS:
Calibia Lingdan Bulanglang, the decedent, left behind nine
thousand pesos (P9,000.00) worth of property. She also left a
Last Will and Testament, and a Codicil and named Nicasio
Calde the executor or the Will and Codicil. Both documents
contained the thumbmarks of decedent. They were also
signed by three (3) attesting witnesses each, and
acknowledged before Tomas A. Tolete, then the Municipal
Judge and Notary Public Ex-Officio of Bauko, Mt. Province.
The named executor filed a Petition for its allowance.
Unfortunately, he died during the pendency of the
proceedings, and was duly substituted by petitioner. Private
respondents, relatives of decedent, opposed the Petition filed
by Calde, questioning the legality and validity of the said
documents under Art. 805 of the Civil Code.
Two (2) of the six (6) witnesses testified that only one
ballpen was used in signing the two testamentary
documents and were subscribed and attested by the
instrumental witnesses during a single occasion. However,
on the face of the document, the signatures of some of the
attesting witnesses in the decedents will and its codicil were
written in blue ink while the others were in black. In addition,
Judge Tomas A. Tolete testified in narration as to how the
documents in question were subscribed and attested,
starting from decedents thumbmarking thereof, to the
alleged signing of the instrumental witnesses thereto in
consecutive order.

ISSUE:
Whether or not, based on the evidence submitted,
respondent appellate court erred in concluding that both
decedents Last Will and Testament, and its Codicil were
subscribed by the instrumental witnesses on separate
occasions.

HELD:
Evidence may generally be classified into three (3) kinds,
from which a court or tribunal may properly acquire
knowledge for making its decision, namely: real evidence or
autoptic preference, testimonial evidence and circumstantial
evidence.
In the case at bench, the autoptic proference contradicts the
testimonial evidence produced by petitioner. Thus, it was not
erroneous nor baseless for respondent court to disbelieve
petitioners claim that both testamentary documents in
question were subscribed to in accordance with the
provisions of Art. 805 of the Civil Code. Neither did
respondent court err when it did not accord great weight to
the testimony of Judge Tomas A. Tolete since nowhere in
Judge Toletes testimony is there any kind of explanation for
the different-colored signatures on the testaments. The
petition for review is denied. The Supreme Court affirmed in
toto the Decicion of the Court of Appeals.

PEOPLE vs BERAME

FACTS: According to the testimonial evidence: It was about

6:30 in the evening of April 13, 1966, that an assailant
suddenly shot Quirico Maningo, then seated on a chair
facing the main door of the sala of his rented house in Rizal
Street, Suba District Danao City. His adopted son Danilo
Maningo, was seated one meter away from his right
side. 3 Several successive shots were fired at Quirico
Maningo. He saw his father, Quirico Maningo, slump to the
floor, wounded, with blood on his neck and breast. He
looked towards the main door where the shots came from
and saw the accused holding a .38 caliber revolver. He was
easily Identifiable, as there was a "big light" at the main door
of the house. Appellant was standing on a bright spot as he
fired his gun several times at Quirico Maningo.

When the firing ceased, the witness ran towards the main
door of the house and saw two persons, one of them being
the accuse Berame scampering away. Quirico Maningo, the
victim, was rushed to the Danao City General Hospital, but
he was dead on arrival. The appealed decision did likewise
note that later that same evening, the PC Provincial
Commander of the Philippine Constabulary with a Sergeant
Armando Alfoja started the investigation of the killing of
Quirico Maningo. In a swampy area at the back of the
hospital near the cemetery of Danao City, where it was
suspected one of the alleged assailants was hiding, they saw
footprints and recovered a rubber shoe. Appellant was
required at the trial to put it on. It turned out that it
corresponded exactly with his right foot. Moreover, appellant
took flight after the killing and hid himself. He did not
surrender until almost a month later, on May 8, 1966. There
was in addition the statement from one of those accused in
the original information, Anastacio Montinola. As one of the
suspects, he was pursued by the police authorities. When
cornered, instead of surrendering, he decided to shoot it out.
He was hit, it turned out, mortally. He admitted then and
there that he was one of the killers of Quirico Maningo, and
his companions were a certain Doming and one Erning. He
made the admission anew at the Southern Islands Hospital
when he was further questioned.
 MAIN ISSUE: Whether the trial court erred in ruling that
appellant is guilty of the crime of murder

1. ISSUE: Whether the trial court erred when, after hearing

and observing the witnesses testify, and weighing what was
said by them, it did choose to believe the prosecution rather
than the defense.

EVIDENCE SUBMITTED BY THE PROSECUTION: What is

undeniable is that there was testimony coming from a
competent and credible eyewitness to the offense, Danilo
Maningo, the son of the deceased. He heard the shots being
fired and saw who perpetrated the deed. He was only a
meter away, right at the scene of the crime. He had direct
and immediate knowledge. He Identified the accused. It was
not difficult for him to do so as there was a "big light" at the
door of the house. He was subjected to an intensive cross-
examination. He stood his ground. He did not budge. His
version of the incident, as a matter of fact, was reinforced.
There was, in addition, testimony from one Carmencita
Trinidad, who, coming from the church, heard the shots after
which she saw two persons running away from the house of
the deceased, one of whom was slightly taller than she, an
assertion verified when it was shown that appellant's height
as compared to her was precisely that. At about the same
time, a certain Jorge Durano, whose house was located at
the back of the hospital near the seashore and cemetery of
Danao City, testified that he saw a person walking fast going
towards a barrio in the north near the swampy area, his
attention being called to such individual wearing rubber
shoes.

EVIDENCE SUBMITTED BY THE DEFENSE: As against that,

there was the testimony from appellant who, as noted in the
decision, claimed "that at the time of the incident, at about
6:30 in the evening of April 13, 1966, he was in Cebu City in
the house of Atty. Gabriel a neighbor, conversing with the
latter and that was the gist of the testimonies of two other
witnesses, Nene Aranas and Libbi Cudilla also his neighbors.

RULING: For such a finding to be overturned, there must be

a showing that it did overlook a material fact or
circumstance or did misinterpret its significant. What was
said in People v. Tilaon comes to mind: "Finally, the rule is
now firmly established to the point of becoming elementary
in this jurisdiction and elsewhere that where there is an
irreconcilable conflict in the testimony of witnesses, the
appellate court will not disturb the findings of the trial court
when the evidence of the successful party, considered by
itself, is adequate to sustain the judgment appealed from.

The appealed decision, moreover, finds impressive support

from circumstances that point unerringly to appellant's guilt.
They simply cannot be explained away. That could be the
reason why his counsel did not even bother to do so. As
noted in the decision, a rubber shoe left in a swampy area by
someone leaving in a hurry the scene of the crime was just
the right size. It did fit appellant's right foot. That was
demonstrative evidence of the most persuasive kind. The
appealed decision was likewise based on the fact of
appellant having been in hiding for sometime with the
evident purpose of evading arrest. He did not surrender until
after the lapse of a month. That again was a circumstance
that could not be ignored. Flight, when unexplained, is a
circumstance from which an inference of guilt may be drawn.
'The wicked flee, even when no man pursueth but the
righteous are as bold as a lion "
3. RELEVANT FACTS: There was a statement made by one of
the original co-accused, Anastacio Montinola, on his being
captured after the gunplay where he was wounded, it turned
out, mortally. He admitted his participation in the killing of
Maningo and pointed to appellant as one of his companions.
While not amounting to a dying declaration, the lower court
considered it as part of the res gestae, and rightly so.

ISSUE: That was assigned as error by appellant's counsel in

view of the nine hours that had elapsed from the time of the
killing before its utterance.

RULING: That is not enough to take it out of the operation of

the principle. The teaching of a host of cases from United
States v. David, a 1903 decision, is to the effect that it
should be given credence. As was stressed by the then Chief
Justice Concepcion in People v. Ner, All that is required for
the admissibility of a given statement as part of the res
gestae, is that it be made under the influence of a startling
event witnessed by the person who made the declaration
before he had time to think and make up a story, or to
concoct or contrive a falsehood, or to fabricate an account,
and without any undue influence in obtaining it, aside from
referring to the event in question or its immediate attending
circumstances". As far back as 1942, in People v. Nartea the
marked trend of decisions, according to Justice Ozaeta, is to
extend, rather than narrow, the scope of the doctrine
admitting declarations as part of the res gestae. Whether
specific statements are admissible as part of the res gestae
is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court, the
determination of which is ordinarily conclusive upon appeal,
in the absence of a clear abuse of discretion.

BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs. JESUSA P. REYES and

CONRADO B. REYES

[G.R. No. 157177, February 11, 2008]

FACTS:

On December 7, 1990, respondent Jesusa Reyes together

with her daughter, went to BPI Zapote Branch to open an
ATM account.

Respondent informed one of petitioners employees, Mr.

Capati, that they wanted to open an ATM account for the
amount of P200,000.00, P100,000.00 of which shall be
withdrawn from her exiting savings account with BPI bank
which is account no. 0233-2433-88 and the other
P100,000.00 will be given by her in cash.

Capati allegedly made a mistake and prepared a withdrawal

slip for P200,00.00 to be withdrawn from her existing savings
account with said bank and the respondent believing in good
faith that Capati prepared the papers with the correct
amount signed the same unaware of the mistakes in figures.

Minutes later after the slips were presented to the teller,

Capati returned to where the respondent was seating and
informed the latter that the withdrawable balance could not
accommodate P200,000.00.

Respondent explained that she is withdrawing the amount of

P100,000.00 only and then changed and correct the figure
two (2) into one (1) with her signature super-imposed thereto
signifying the change, afterwhich the amount of P100,000.00
in cash in two bundles containing 100 pieces of P500.00
peso bill were given to Capati with her daughter Joan
witnessing the same. Thereafter Capati prepared a deposit
slip for P200,000.00 in the name of resondent Jesusa Reyes
with the new account no. 0235-0767-48 and brought the
same to the teller's booth.

After a while, he returned and handed to the respondent her

duplicate copy of her deposit to account no. 0235-0767-48
reflecting the amount of P200,000.00 with receipt stamp
showing December 7, as the date.

Later on, respondent would become aware that her ATM

account only contained the amount of P100,000.00 with
interest. Hence, she filed an action before the RTC.

Petitioner claimed that there was actually no cash involved

with the transactions which happened on December 7, 1990
as contained in the banks teller tape.

On August 12, 1994, the RTC issued a Decision upholding the

versions of respondents.

Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the CA which affirmed the

RTC decision with modification

ISSUE:

Whether the CA erred in sustaining the RTC's finding that

respondent Jesusa made an initial deposit of P200,000.00 in
her newly opened Express Teller account on December 7,
1990.

HELD:
It is a basic rule in evidence that each party to a case must
prove his own affirmative allegations by the degree of
evidence required by law. In civil cases, the party having the
burden of proof must establish his case by preponderance of
evidence, or that evidence which is of greater weight or is
more convincing than that which is in opposition to it. It does
not mean absolute truth; rather, it means that the testimony
of one side is more believable than that of the other side,
and that the probability of truth is on one side than on the
other.

For a better perspective on the calibration of the evidence on

hand, it must first be stressed that the judge who had heard
and seen the witnesses testify was not the same judge who
penned the decision. Thus, not having heard the testimonies
himself, the trial judge or the appellate court would not be in
a better position than this Court to assess the credibility of
witnesses on the basis of their demeanor.

Hence, to arrive at the truth, we thoroughly reviewed the

transcripts of the witnesses' testimonies and examined the
pieces of evidence on record.

After a careful and close examination of the records and

evidence presented by the parties, we find that respondents
failed to successfully prove by preponderance of evidence
that respondent Jesusa made an initial deposit of
P200,000.00 in her Express Teller account.

STATE vs TATUM

A certain Ralph Tatum was convicted of a crime of 1 st degree

FORGERY and sentenced to life imprisonment as a habitual
criminal.
Facts of the case states that one William Tousin receives
monthly welfare checks from the state of Washington. But
one February of 1960, Tousin did not receive his check. The
mailed check was normally left on a window ledge in the
hallway room house where the appellant Tatum resides.

It was found out that the check was endorsed and cashed at
a local store by someone other than the payee.

A lady employee of the local store testified that the initial on

the face of the check was hers and thereafter submitted the
negative and print in the regiscope and was admitted as
evidence over appellants objection.

ISSUE:
One, may demonstrative evidence such as regiscope films
be admitted as evidence? Two, were the regiscope films
authenticated sufficiently in order to warrant their
admission?

RULING:

Yes. Court in many years encouraged the admission and use

of DEMONSTRATIVE EVIDENCE, including photographs.

Provided:
They be sufficiently verified and validated. And that some
witness (not necessarily the photographer) be able to give
some indication as to when, where and under what
circumstances the photo was taken.

Lady witness testified that she recognized the background

shown in the picture as that of their store and also testified
their regiscoping of the checks is one of their standard
procedures.

Therefore Yes, the regiscope films submitted as evidence

were authenticated sufficiently.

Ruling of the lower court was affirmed. Tatum's appeal

denied.

adamczuk vs Holloway

#BeginEditable "casebody"
MAXEY, J. Plaintiffs brought an action in trespass against
defendants for personal injuries and property damage arising
out of a collision between a car owned and operated by
plaintiff, Jack J. Adamczuk, and a car owned by defendant,
Morris Cohen, and driven by defendant, Elmer Holloway....
The jury returned a verdict for defendants. Plaintiffs' motion
for a new trial was refused and these appeals followed.
The assignment of error which appellant stresses is based
upon the refusal of the court to admit in evidence a certain
photograph of the locus of the accident and the approach to
it on Highway Route 6.
When plaintiff, Jack Adamczuk, was on the stand, he was
shown "Exhibit No. 3" and he identified the roads and
buildings appearing in the picture and stated, in answer to
his counsel, that "the conditions represented by that picture
truly represent the conditions of the crossing at the time of
this accident except for the fact of daylight or dark." Then
the exhibit was offered in evidence. On cross-examination it
was disclosed that the witness did not know who took the
picture or when it was taken. He stated that when the picture
was taken the location of the camera was on route 6 but he
did not know at what distance from the intersection. He had
no experience in photography. He said he did not know
whether the photographer tilted the camera up or down
when the picture was taken, and he did not know whether
the photographer "endeavored to accentuate certain parts of
the picture." The court then sustained the objection to the
picture's introduction.
It was offered in evidence again when Herbert C. Dillard, Civil
Engineer and County Surveyor, was on the stand. He was
asked on cross-examination by defendant's counsel: "If you
were taking a picture, and wanted to accentuate the curve of
route six to the west, you could accomplish that by taking
the picture farther away from the intersection, that is,
farther to the east of the intersection, could you not?" He
answered: "I think you could, yes." This witness was asked if
he took photographs and developed them. He answered:
"Very little."
At the close of plaintiff's case the picture was again offered
in evidence and was objected to and the objection sustained,
and court saying: "There is some mystery about exhibit
number three, which is not clear to the court. There is no
proof of who took it, or any identity as to the picture, other
than the physical view thereon; it isn't shown where the
camera was standing, under what conditions it was taken,
and whether it was taken with a view to distorting it or not."
The court then commented on the fact that plaintiff had two
days "since adjournment last Friday, to procure the original
taker of this photograph and thus establish it in the legal
way with the right of cross-examination to defendants'
counsel of the photographer."
The rule is well settled that a photograph may be put in
evidence if relevant to the issue and if verified. It does not
have to be verified by the taker. Its verification depends on
the competency of the verifying witness and as to that the
trial judge must in the first instance decide, subject to
reversal for substantial error.
Wigmore on Evidence (2d ed.), Vol. 2, sec. 792, p.97, says:
The objection that a photograph may be so made as to
misrepresent the object is genuinely directed against its
testimonial soundness; but it is of no validity. It is true that a
photograph can be deliberately so taken as to convey the
most false impression of the object. But so also can any
witness lie in his words. A photograph can falsify just as
much and no more than the human being who takes it or
verifies it. The fallacy of the objection occurs in assuming
that the photograph can come in testimonially without a
competent person's oath to support it. If a qualified observer
is found to say, "This photograph represents the fact as I saw
it," there is no more reason to exclude it than if he had said,
"The following words represent the fact as I saw it," which is
always in effect the tenor of a witness's oath. If no witness
has thus attached his credit to the photograph, then it
should not come in at all, any more than an anonymous
letter should be received as testimony.
Section 793:
The map or photograph must first, to be admissible, be
made a part of some qualified person's testimony. Someone
must stand forth as its testimonial sponsor; in other words, it
must be verified. There is nothing anomalous or exceptional
in this requirement of verification; it is simply the exaction of
those testimonial qualities which are required equally of all
witnesses; the application merely takes a different form.
In other words, if a witness is familiar with the scene
photographed and is competent to testify that the
photograph correctly represents it, it should, if relevant, be
admitted....
People of the Philippines v. Benjamin Amansec y Dona
G.R. No. 186131, December 14, 2011

FACTS:
Accused-appellant Amansec was charged with a violation of
Sections 5 and 11, Article II of RA 9165 or the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drug Act of 2002. The RTC found
Amansec guilty of violating Section 5 of RA 9165 or illegal
sale of prohibited drugs but was acquitted of the crime of
illegal possession of dangerous drugs. The CA affirmed the
decision of RTC.

Acting on a report by a confidential informant, PIO Villanueva

formed a team for a buy-bust operation against Amansec.
PO1 Mabutol acted as the poseur-buyer with a marked P100
peso bill. Mabutol and the informant moved ahead to the
house of Amansec while the rest of the team positioned
themselves at a strategic location, keeping Amansec within
viewing distance. The informant then introduced Mabutol to
Amansec as a drug addict, in dire need of drugs. Mabutol
had just told Amansec that he was going to purchase one
hundred pesos worth of shabu when another buyer, later
identified as Jerome Pintis, came up to Amansec to also buy
shabu. Amansec then showed both Pintis and Mabutol three
plastic sachets containing crystalline substance. Mabutol
thereafter examined the plastic sachet he obtained from
Amansec, and suspecting it to be shabu, scratched the right
side of his head with his right hand to signal his team to
approach the target. Pascua thereafter frisked Amansec and
retrieved the buy-bust money that Mabutol had given
Amansec, and another plastic sachet.

Accused-appellant questions the admissibility of the

evidence against him for having been obtained in violation of
section 21 of RA 9165. Accused-appellant also questions the
non-inclusion of Pintis in the case and the non-presentation
of the informant in court. He also maintains that he is a
victim of a frame-up as there was no surveillance conducted
prior to the buy-bust operation and that the marked money
used by PO1 Mabutol was not dusted with ultraviolet powder.

ISSUE:
Is the accused guilty of the crime of illegal sale of drugs
punished under RA 9165?

HELD:
YES, the prosecution has proven the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt. The acts of Pintis had nothing to
do with Amansecs own acts and the Court sees no reason
why the accused-appellant and Pintis should have been tried
jointly. Further, the presentation of an informant in an illegal
drugs case is not essential for the conviction nor is it
indispensable for a successful prosecution because the
informants testimony is not needed if the sale of the illegal
drug has been adequately proven. In this case, the
prosecution has successfully proven that an illegal sale took
place. Moreover, a prior surveillance is not required for a
valid buy-bust operation, especially if the buy-bust team is
accompanied to the target area by their informant, hence,
accused-appellants contention that he was framed up due
to lack of surveillance must fail. Lastly, the failure of the
police officers to use ultraviolet powder on the buy-bust
money is not an indication that the buy-bust operation was a
sham. In fact, the use of initials to mark the money used in
the buy-bust operation has been accepted by the Court in
numerous cases.

Accused-appellant claims that Section 21 of RA 9165 was

violated when the police officers who arrested him did not
take his picture with the shabu they confiscated from him,
and when they made no physical inventory of the shabu in
his presence, or in the presence of his representative, the
media, the department of justice, or any elected public
official. Amansec avers that his presumption of innocence
prevails over the presumption that the police officers
performed their duty in a regular manner. He also avers that
the prosecution failed to prove the chain of custody of the
evidence obtained from him as the station investigator.

A testimony about a perfect chain is not always the standard

as it is almost always impossible to obtain an unbroken
chain. Thus, even though the prosecution failed to submit in
evidence the physical inventory and photograph of the
seized drugs as required under Section 21 of Republic Act
No. 9165, this will not render Amansecs arrest illegal or the
items seized from him as inadmissible in evidence. The Court
has consistently held that what is of utmost importance is
the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of
the seized items. In this case, the prosecution was able to
demonstrate that the integrity and evidentiary value of the
evidence seized had been preserved. The presumption that
the integrity of the evidence has been preserved will remain
unless it can be shown that there was bad faith, ill will, or
tampering of the evidence. Amansec failed to overcome his
burden of showing the foregoing to overcome the
presumption that the police officers handled the seized
drugs with regularity, and that they properly discharged their
duties.

It is evident in the case at bar that the prosecution was able

to establish the elements of illegal sale of drugs. As such,
the accused is guilty of violating Section 5, Article II of RA
9165.

People of the Philippines, Appellee

vs.
Saturnino Villanueva, Appellant
GR no. 181829
September 1, 2010

FACTS:

Appellant was convicted with 3 counts of qualified rape

both in the trial court and the Court of Appeals and
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and
pay damages worth P 75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P
75,000.00 as moral damages and P 25,000.00 as exemplary
damages for each count. The victim, AAA is appellants
daughter and is allegedly is a minor. The crime was
committed in three separate occasions. During the trial, the
prosecution presented their witness who identified the
appellant as her rapist. AAAs birth certificate proving she
was under the age of 12 years old and the medical
certificate were marked as Exhibit during the pre-trial but
was not formally offer as evidence. The appellant contested
that the documentary evidence used to convict him should
not be subjected for the appreciation of the court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not appellants contention that the
documentary evidence should not be admitted in court for
the failure to formally offer it in court

RULING:
 The appeal is partly meritorious. The Supreme Court
agree with the appellant that both the medical certificate
and birth certificate of AAA though marked as exhibits
during the pre-trial should not have been considered by the
trial court and the Court of Appeals because they are not
formally offered in evidence. Rule 132 Section 34 of the
Rules of Court explicitly provide that: The court shall
consider no evidence which has not been formally offered.
The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be
specified.

The mere fact that a particular document is identified

and marked as an exhibit does not mean that it has already
been offered as part of evidence. It must be emphasized that
any evidence which a party desires to submit for the
consideration of the court must formally be offered by the
party; otherwise, it is excluded and rejected.

However it must also be considered that appellant can

still be convicted without a medical certificate. In rape cases,
the accused may be convicted solely on the testimony of
the victim provided that the testimony is credible, natural,
convincing and consistent with human nature and the
normal course of things. The trial court is bound to consider
only the testimonial evidence presented and exclude the
documents not offered.

WHEREFORE, the court find appellant GUILTY of three

counts of simple rape and accordingly sentence him to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify his victim
the amountd of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P 50,000 as
moral damages and P30,000 as exemplary damages to each
count.
PEOPLE vs MANHUYOD jr.

This is a case of a father having raped his 17-year old

daughter after the effectivity of R.A. No. 7659. [if !supportFootnotes][1]
[endif]
Accused could thus have been meted out the death
penalty pursuant to Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Section 11 of R.A. No. 7659, if found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt. However, here, the trial courts
imposition of capital punishment was not based on said
statute, but by reason of the aggravating circumstance of
relationship under Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code.
However repulsive and condemnable the act of a father
raping his daughter, yet, the Constitution mandates that an
accused is entitled to the presumption of innocence. Thus,
after a scrutiny of the record and the evidence in this case,
we find ourselves unable to affirm the judgment of the trial
court. Acquittal then is compelled by law since the
presumption of innocence was not overcome, the conviction
having been based on hearsay evidence and a
miscomprehension of the rule on statements forming part of
the res gestae.
On 6 June 1995, before the Central Visayas Office
(CEVRO) of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), a
complaint for rape was filed by Yolanda Manhuyod, accuseds
wife and mother of the offended party, Relanne S.
Manhuyod. The complaint charged accused with having
raped Relanne, then 17 years of age, on 20 April 1995 and 3
May 1995. Immediately upon the filing of the complaint,
Relanne was examined by Dr. Tomas Refe, Medico-Legal
Officer III of the CEVRO, NBI, whose findings and conclusions
in Living Case No. 95-MI-II were as follows:
GENITAL EXAMINATION:
Pubic hairs, fully grown, abundant. Labia mejora, gaping.
Labia minora, gaping posteriorly. Fourchette, tense.
Vestibular mucosa, reddish to violaceous. Hymen,
moderately thick, wide, with old healed lacerations,
superficial at 8:00 oclock and deep at 4:00 oclock positions
corresponding to the face of a wacth [sic]; edges of these
lacerations are rounded and non-coaptable. Hymenal orifice,
admits a tube 2.8 cms. in diameter with moderate
resistance. Vaginal walls, moderately tight and rugosities,
moderately prominent.
CONCLUSIONS:
1. No evidence of extragenital physical injury noted on
the body of the Subject at the time of
examination.

2. Hymenal orifice, 2.8 cms. in diameter distensible as to

allow complete penetration of an average
size adult penis in erection without
producing further laceration.

On 8 June 1995, Yolanda and Relanne gave their sworn

statements to Atty. Oscar Tomarong, Officer-in-Charge of the
NBI Sub-office in Dipolog City. Then in a letter dated 9 June
1995 to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Dipolog
City, Atty. Tomarong recommended the prosecution of
accused for rape, as charged by Yolanda and Relanne. On
even date, Relanne, assisted by Yolanda, filed a complaint
with the Provincial Prosecutors Office charging herein
accused with rape committed on 3 May 1995.
After due proceedings, the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor of Zamboanga del Norte, through Valeriano
Lagula, Second Assistant Provincial Prosecutor and Officer-in-
Charge, filed with Branch 11 of the Regional Trial Court of
Zamboanga del Norte, sitting in Sindangan, Zamboanga del
Norte, an information charging accused with rape, allegedly
committed as follows:
That, in the morning, on or about the 3rd day of May,
1995, in the Municipality of Liloy, Zamboanga del
Norte, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the said accused, moved by lewd and unchaste
desire and by means of force, violence and
intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously succeed in having sexual intercourse
with one RELANNE S. MANHUYOD, his 17 year old
daughter, against her will and without her consent,
as a result of which she became pregnant.

CONTRARY TO LAW (Viol. of Art. 335, Revised Penal

Code).[

At his arraignment on 23 June 1995 following his arrest and

commitment in the Provincial Jail, accused entered a plea of
not guilty. Pre-trial and trial were then set for 18 June 1995. [if !
supportFootnotes][8][endif]
The record, however, does not disclose if
pre-trial was actually conducted as scheduled.
On 6 July 1995, the prosecution, with conformity of the
accused, filed a Motion to Dismiss [if !supportFootnotes][9][endif] on the
ground that Relanne and Yolanda had executed a Joint
Affidavit of Desistance,[if !supportFootnotes][10][endif] declaring that they
lost interest in the further prosecution of the [case] as the
case arose out of a family conflict which was [already]
patched up; thus the prosecution declared that without the
testimonies of the complainants, the prosecution cannot
prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
In its resolution[if !supportFootnotes][11][endif] of 17 July 1995, the
trial court denied the Motion to Dismiss on the following
grounds: (1) the affidavit of desistance could not justify
dismissal of the complaint, as the so-called pardon extended
to accused by affiants in the affidavit of desistance was
made after the filing of the information, [if !supportFootnotes][12][endif]
hence could not serve as the basis for dismissing the case; [if !
supportFootnotes][13][endif]
(2) once a complaint for a private crime
was filed, the State effectively became the offended party
and any pardon given by the private complainant would be
unavailing; and (3) Section 20-A of R.A. No. 7659 provides
that any person charged under the Act for an offense where
the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua to death would
not be allowed to take advantage of the provision on plea-
bargaining. The trial court then set the case for pre-trial and
trial on 18 and 25 of August and 1 September 1995.
As Relanne and Yolanda did not appear at pre-trial on 18
August 1995, the court issued an order [if !supportFootnotes][14][endif]
declaring pre-trial terminated and ordering trial to proceed
on 25 August and 1 September 1995.
On 25 August 1995, as well as on the succeeding dates
thereafter set by the trial court for Relanne and Yolanda to
testify, to wit: 8 September 1995 22 September 1995, 6
October 1995; and 27 October 1995, mother and daughter
did not appear in court, despite the courts orders directing
the prosecutor to file a complaint to hold them for indirect
contempt and ordering NBI agents Atty. Oscar Tomarong and
Atty. Friolo Icao, Jr. to arrest them
In a 1st indorsement[ dated 6 May 1995, Atty. Tomarong
reported to the trial court that, among other things, Relanne
and Yolanda had left for Cebu probably to elude arrest after
having learned from both the print and broadcast media that
the court had ordered their arrest; Yolanda, a public school
teacher, had filed an indefinite leave of absence; and
Relanne had not been attending her classes. The NBI thus
asked for more time to arrest Relanne and Yolanda, but due
to its failure to arrest and produce them in court both at the
scheduled hearings of 6 October and 27 October 1995, the
prosecution rested its case solely on the basis of the
testimonies of NBI agent Atty. Tomarong, NBI agent Atty.
Icao, Jr. and NBI Medico-Legal Officer Dr. Refe, together with
the documents they identified or testified on. The court then
gave the prosecution 10 days to submit a formal offer of
exhibits, and announced to the parties that if the exhibits
would be admitted, the defense could file a demurrer to
evidence which, if denied, would be followed by the defense
presenting its evidence beginning 15 December 1995. [if !
supportFootnotes][22][endif]

In the prosecutions formal offer of its exhibits dated 9

November 1995,[if !supportFootnotes][23][endif] the following exhibits
were offered: (1) A, the complaint sheet accomplished and
filed by Yolanda with the NBI, CEVRO; (2) B, the sworn
statement of Yolanda given before Atty. Tomarong and
subscribed and sworn to before Atty. Icao, Jr. on 8 June 1995;
(3) C, the sworn statement of Relanne given before Atty.
Icao, Jr. on 8 June 1995; and (4) D, the medical certificate
issued by Dr. Refe. NBI agent Tomarong identified Exhibits A
and B,[if !supportFootnotes][24][endif] NBI agent Icao identified Exhibit C,
[if !supportFootnotes][25][endif]
while Dr. Refe identified Exhibit D. [if !
supportFootnotes][26][endif]

Accused objected to the admission of Exhibits A, B and C

on the ground that they were hearsay, and to Exhibit D on
the ground that the medical certificate was not conclusive as
to the commission of rape and the contents in said exhibit
were not corroborated on its material points by the offended
party since the latter did not testify. [if !supportFootnotes][27][endif]
In its order[if !supportFootnotes][28][endif] of 15 November 1995, the
trial court admitted all the foregoing exhibits as exception[s]
to the hearsay rule, and ordered that the defense commence
presenting its evidence on 15 December 1995.
On 9 November 1995, the defense filed a demurrer to
evidence,[if !supportFootnotes][29][endif] which, however, the trial court
denied in its resolution of 23 November 1995 [if !supportFootnotes][30]
[endif]
for being devoid of merit. The trial court held that
Exhibits B and C were convincing as they mentioned details
which could not have been concocted, as such, they
constitute[d] part of the res gestae, an exception to the
hearsay rule; and as to the statement of Dr. Refe in answer
to clarificatory questions (pp. 5 to 6 t.s.n. hearing on 22
September 1995), while the same may have had all the
earmarks of hearsay, the statement was admissible for not
having been objected to. Finally, the trial court held that
since it was a settled rule that an affidavit was not
considered the best evidence if the affiant was available,
then, as in this case where Relanne and Yolanda were
unavailable, their sworn statements were admissible for
being the best evidence.
The trial court likewise denied[if !supportFootnotes][31][endif] the
accuseds motion[if !supportFootnotes][32][endif] to reconsider the
resolution, and set the reception of accuseds evidence on 15
December 1995, which, however, was subsequently reset to
12 January 1996.[if !supportFootnotes][33][endif]
In his first and second manifestations, [if !supportFootnotes][34][endif]
accused informed the trial court that he was waiving his
right to present his evidence and asked that the case be
submitted for decision. He reiterated this waiver at the
hearing on 12 January 1996,[if !supportFootnotes][35][endif] which then
prompted the court to order the parties to simultaneously
submit their respective memoranda within a non-extendible
period of 20 days. The record, however, once more fails to
disclose that any of the parties so filed.
On 23 February 1996, the trial court promulgated its
decision,[if !supportFootnotes][36][endif] the decretal portion of which
read as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused, SPO2 Restituto
Manhuyod, Jr. guilty of the crime of Rape by force
and intimidation with [the] aggravating circumstance
of relationship under Article 15 of the Revised Penal
Code and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of
DEATH (R.A. 7659), and to indemnify the
complainant P50,000. (People vs. Magaluna., 205
SCRA 266 [1992]).

Pursuant to Circular No. 4-92-A of the Supreme Court

[let] accused immediately be transferred to the
Bureau of Corrections in Muntinlupa, Metro Manila.

Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

On 26 February 1996, accused filed his Notice of Appeal

We accepted the Appeal on 3 December 1996.
In his Accused-Appellants Brief filed on 30 April 1997,
accused imputes to the trial court the commission of the
following errors:
I
IN NOT DISMISSING THE CRIMINAL COMPLAINT AGAINST
APPELLANT FOR EVIDENT LACK OF INTEREST TO
PROSECUTE.

II
IN ADMITTING AS EVIDENCE THE HEARSAY TESTIMONY
OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES DESPITE THE
TIMELY AND VEHEMENT OBJECTIONS OF THE
 DEFENSE INASMUCH AS THEY HAD NO PERSONAL
KNOWLEDGE OF THE CRIME ASCRIBED AGAINST
APPELLANT.

III
IN RENDERING A VERDICT OF CONVICTION DESPITE THE
FACT THAT THE GUILT OF APPELLANT WAS NOT
PROVED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

Accused jointly discusses these assigned errors, in the

main, reiterating his arguments in his demurrer to evidence,
i.e., the sworn statements of Relanne and Yolanda were
inadmissible hearsay and could not be part of the res gestae
under Section 42, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. Moreover,
the NBI agents and medico-legal officer had no personal
knowledge as to what actually and truthfully happened;
hence, their testimony as to what Relanne and Yolanda
narrated were likewise inadmissible hearsay. Accused further
contended that what was established during trial was that
Relanne and Yolanda were no longer interested in pursuing
the criminal complaint against him; hence the case should
have been dismissed for their lack of interest to prosecute
the same.
In its Brief for the Appellee, the Office of the Solicitor
General agreed with the trial court and prayed for the
affirmance in toto of the challenged decision. As accused
waived the filing of a Reply Brief in his Manifestation filed on
16 April 1997, this case was then deemed submitted for
decision on 3 February 1998.
As we stated at the outset, the accused must be
acquitted.
Indeed, the evidence for the prosecution failed miserably
in meeting the quantum of proof required in criminal cases
to overturn the constitutional presumption of innocence.
Section 2 of Rule 133 expressly provides that an accused in a
criminal case is entitled to an acquittal unless his guilt is
shown beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable
doubt does not mean a degree of proof as, excluding
possibility of error, produces absolute certainty; all that is
required is moral certainty, or that degree of proof which
produces a conviction in an unprejudiced mind.
In this case, in view of the desistance of the offended
party, Relanne, and her mother, Yolanda, and their failure to
appear and testify at trial, the prosecution was left with
nothing but their sworn statements (Exhibits C and B,
respectively); the sworn charge sheet (Exhibit A) of Yolanda;
and the testimonies of the NBI agents before whom the
sworn statements were given or subscribed to and the NBI
medico-legal officer who examined Relanne on 6 June 1995.
We first scrutinize the testimonies of the NBI agents and
the medico-legal officer.
NBI agent Atty. Tomarong identified the charge sheet
signed by Yolanda (Exh. A) and her sworn statement (Exh. B),
then detailed the questions he asked and information he
obtained from Yolanda as to the alleged rape. On his part,
NBI Agent Atty. Icao, Jr. identified Relannes sworn statement
(Exh. C) and testified in the same manner as Atty. Tomarong.
Finally, NBI Medico-Legal Officer Refe identified the medical
certificate he issued (Exhibit D), then testified as to the
details of his examination of Relanne and his findings.
While the defense objected to the presentation of Atty.
Tomarong and Atty. Icao on the ground that their testimonies
would be hearsay, plainly, nothing was objectionable
concerning their identification of the documents they
themselves prepared in the course of performing their official
duties. However, there can be no doubt that as regards the
alleged commission of rape as related to them by Relanne
and Yolanda, the testimonies of the NBI officials constituted
inadmissible hearsay.
It is a basic rule in evidence set forth in Section 36 of
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court that a witness can testify only
to those facts which he knows of his own personal
knowledge, i.e., which are derived from his own perception;
otherwise, such testimony would be hearsay. Hearsay
evidence is defined as evidence not of what the witness
knows himself but of what he has heard from others then,
the NBI agents testimonies touching upon what was told
them by Relanne and Yolanda concerning the events relating
to the alleged commission of rape in question was hearsay.
As a matter of fact, insofar as Yolanda was concerned, since
she was not an eyewitness to the commission of the rape,
but obtained knowledge thereof only from Relanne, the
testimony of Atty. Tomarong with respect to what Yolanda
told him, even constituted double hearsay.
It is settled that unless the affiants themselves take the
witness stand to affirm the averments in their affidavits, the
affidavits must be excluded from a judicial proceeding for
being inadmissible hearsay. The rationale for this is respect
for the accused constitutional right of confrontation, or to
meet the witnesses against him face-to-face. To safeguard
this right, Section 1 of Rule 132, of the Rules of Court thus
provides that the examination of witnesses presented in a
trial or hearing must be done in open court, and under oath
or affirmation. At bottom, admitting Exhibits A, B, and C only
as part of the testimonies of the NBI agents could validly be
done, but in light of the foregoing discussion, these exhibits
should have been excluded insofar as their contents related
to the truth of the matter concerning the commission of the
rape in question.
Anent the medical certificate (Exhibit D), we disagree
with accused, however, that the contents thereof likewise
constituted inadmissible hearsay. Exhibit D was prepared by
Dr. Refe on the basis of his actions and what he observed
during his medical examination of Relanne. Thus, as he
actually testified thereto and was cross-examined by the
defense, accuseds contention on this score must fail.
The trial court brushed aside accuseds invocation of the
hearsay rule on the ground that the sworn statements could
be considered as part of the res gestae, thus constituting
admissible hearsay pursuant to Section 42 of Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court, which reads as follows:
Sec. 42. Part of the res gestae. - Statements made by a
person while a startling occurrence is taking place or
immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect
to the circumstances thereof, may be given in
evidence as part of the res gestae. So, also,
statements accompanying an equivocal act material
to the issue, and giving it a legal significance, may
be received as part of the res gestae.

In People v. Sanchez, this Court observed:

Res gestae means the things done. It refers to those
exclamations and statements made by either the
participants, victims, or spectators to a crime immediately
before, during, or immediately after the commission of the
crime, when the circumstances are such that the statements
were made as a spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired
by the excitement of the occasion and there was no
opportunity for the declarant to deliberate and to fabricate a
false statement. A spontaneous exclamation is defined as a
statement or exclamation made immediately after some
exciting occasion by a participant or spectator and asserting
the circumstances of that occasion as it is observed by him.
The admissibility of such exclamation is based on our
experience that, under certain external circumstances of
physical or mental shock, a stress of nervous excitement
may be produced in a spectator which stills the reflective
faculties and removes their control, so that the utterance
which then occurs is a spontaneous and sincere response to
the actual sensations and perceptions already produced by
the external shock. Since this utterance is made under the
immediate and uncontrolled domination of the senses, rather
than reason and reflection, and during the brief period when
consideration of self-interest could not have been fully
brought to bear, the utterance may be taken as expressing
the real belief of the speaker as to the act just observed by
him. In a manner of speaking, the spontaneity of the
declaration is such that the declaration itself may be
regarded as the event speaking through the declarant rather
than the declarant speaking for himself. Or, stated
differently, xxx the events speak for themselves, giving out
their fullest meaning through the unprompted language of
the participants. The spontaneous character of the language
is assumed to preclude the probability of its premeditation or
fabrication. Its utterance on the spur of the moment is
regarded, with a good deal of reason, as a guarantee of its
truth.
In People v. Ner this Court stated:
All that is required for the admissibility of a given
statement as part of the res gestae, is that it be
made under the influence of a startling event
witnessed by the person who made the declaration
before he had time to think and make up a story, or
to concoct or contrive a falsehood, or to fabricate an
account, and without any undue influence in
obtaining it, aside from referring to the event in
question or its immediate attending circumstances.

In sum, there are three requisites to admit evidence as

part of the res gestae: (1) that the principal act, the res
gestae, be a startling occurrence; (2) the statements were
made before the declarant had the time to contrive or devise
a falsehood; and (3) that the statements must concern the
occurrence in question and its immediate attending
circumstances.
It goes without saying that the element of spontaneity is
critical. The following factors are then considered in
determining whether statements offered in evidence as part
of the res gestae have been made spontaneously, viz., (1)
the time that lapsed between the occurrence of the act or
transaction and the making of the statement; (2) the place
where the statement was made; (3) the condition of the
declarant when he made the statement; (4) the presence or
absence of intervening events between the occurrence and
the statement relative thereto; and (5) the nature and
circumstances of the statement itself. As to the first factor,
the following proves instructive:
T]he rule is that the statements, to be admissible, should
have been made before there had been time or
opportunity to devise or contrive anything contrary
to the real facts that occurred. What the law
altogether distrusts is not afterspeech but
afterthought.

[T]here are no limits of time within which the res gestae

can be arbitrarily confined. These limits vary in fact
with each particular case. The acts or declarations
are not required to be contemporaneous with the
primary fact, but they must be so connected with it
as to make the act or declaration and the main fact
particularly inseparable, or be generated by an
excited feeling which extends, without break or let-
down, from the moment of the event they illustrate.
 In other words, if the acts or declarations sprang out
of the principal transaction, tend to explain it, were
voluntary and spontaneous, and were made at a time
so near it as to preclude the idea of deliberate
design, they may be regarded as contemporaneous
in point of time, and are admissible.

In People v. Sanchez this Court had occasion to state

that the cases are not uniform as to the interval of time that
should separate the occurrence of the startling event and
the making of the declaration. What is important is that the
declarations were voluntarily and spontaneously made so
nearly contemporaneous as to be in the presence of the
transaction which they illustrate or explain, and were made
under such circumstances as necessarily to exclude the
ideas of design or deliberation.
As to the second factor, it may be stressed that a
statement made, or an act done, at a place some distance
from the place where the principal transaction occurred will
not ordinarily possess such spontaneity as would render it
admissible

Anent the third factor, [a] statement will ordinarily be

deemed spontaneous if, at the time when it was made, the
conditions of the declarant was such as to raise an inference
that the effect of the occurrence on his mind still continued,
as where he had just received a serious injury, was suffering
severe pain, or was under intense excitement. Conversely, a
lack of spontaneity may be inferred from the cool demeanor
of declarant, his consciousness of the absence of all danger,
his delay in making a statement until witnesses can be
procured, or from the fact that he made a different
statement prior to the one which is offered in evidence.
 With regard to the fourth factor, what is to be considered
is whether there intervened between the event or
transaction and the making of the statement relative
thereto, any circumstance calculated to divert the mind of
the declarant which would thus restore his mental balance
and afford opportunity for deliberation

The last factor needs no further elaboration.

Tested against the foregoing requisites to admit
statements as part of the res gestae and factors to test the
spontaneity of the statements, we do not hesitate to rule
that the sworn statement of Relanne (Exhibit C) fails to
qualify as part of the res gestae for these reasons: (1) it was
executed only on 8 June 1995 or, thirty-six (36) days after
the alleged rape on 3 May 1995, providing her more than
sufficient time to concoct or contrive a falsehood; (2) it was
made after she had resolved to file a case for rape against
her father, a decision which required much deliberation and
would cause her obvious pain as the filing would expose her
to public humiliation and shame, bring dishonor to her family
and visit upon her father the penalty of death; (3) she gave
the statement after three critical intervening events had
occurred, viz., her pregnancy, filing the complaint sheet and
her being referred to the NBI medico-legal officer for
examination; and (4) it was made far from the place where
the principal event -- the alleged rape -- was committed, i.e.,
the latter took place in the De la Paz, Liloy, Zamboanga del
Norte, while the statement was made in Dipolog City, at the
sub-office of the NBI, and any map of Zamboanga del Norte
will show that Tampilisan and Dipolog City do not even adjoin
each other.
Turning to the sworn statement of Yolanda (Exhibit B),
with more reason should this not qualify as forming part of
the res gestae. Yolanda did not witness the principal event
and all she knew of it was told to her by Relanne. Even if the
issue of admissibility is confined to what Relanne had told
Yolanda, the same conclusion would be reached for it clearly
appears in Exhibit A that Relanne had not spontaneously told
Yolanda of the alleged rape. In fact, the latter had to confront
the former only after the accused confessed to Yolanda that
he had molested Relanne. Moreover, the confrontation took
place on 3 June 1995, or a month after the alleged rape.

Ineluctably then, the trial court erred in admitting

Exhibits B and C as part of the res gestae.
Parenthetically, before the issue of res gestae is laid to
rest, it must not be forgotten that Section 42 of Rule 130
concerns itself with admissibility of evidence and not its
weight and sufficiencywhich is covered by Rule 133. Clearly,
these two rules of evidence are not synonymous.
The trial court was, however, correct in denying the
motion to dismiss the case solely on the basis of the affidavit
of desistance. The rule supporting the denial is well
entrenched. While it may be true that under Article 344 of
the Revised Penal Code, the offenses of seduction,
abduction, rape or acts of lasciviousness shall not be
prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended
party or her parents, grandparents, or guardian, nor, in any
case, if the offender has been expressly pardoned by said
persons, as the case may be, the pardon to justify dismissal
of the case should have been granted prior to the institution
of the criminal action. Consequently, an affidavit of
desistance filed after the institution of the criminal action in
these cases, even if based on an express pardon, cannot be
a ground to dismiss the action
With stronger reason then may plain desistance not
justify dismissal of the proceedings once instituted. The
reason for this rule is that the true aggrieved party in a
criminal prosecution is the People of the Philippines whose
collective sense of morality, decency and justice has been
outraged. Once filed, control of the prosecution for any of
the aforementioned crimes is removed from the offended
partys hands

The trial court, however, once more gravely erred when

it imposed the death penalty not because of the provisions
of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A.
No. 7659, which the court a quo even cited, but due to the
alternative circumstance of relationship under Article 15 of
said Code. The pertinent portion of Article 335 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by Section 11 of R.A. No. 7659,
reads:
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of
rape is committed with any of the following attendant
circumstances:

1. Where the victim is under eighteen (18) years of

age and the offender is a parent,
ascendant, step-parent, guardian,
relative by consanguinity or affinity
within the third civil degree, or the
common-law spouse of the parent of
the victim.

Clearly then, the father-daughter relationship in rape

cases, or between accused and Relanne, in this case, has
been treated by Congress in the nature of a special
circumstance which makes the imposition of the death
penalty mandatory. Hence, relationship as an alternative
circumstance under Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code,
appreciated as an aggravating circumstance, should no
longer be applied in view of the amendments introduced by
R.A. No. 7659. It may be pointed, however, that without the
foregoing amendment, relationship would still be an
aggravating circumstance in the crimes of rape (Article 335)
and acts of lasciviousness (Article 336).

If relationship in the instant case were to be appreciated

under Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty
imposable on accused then would not be death, but merely
reclusion perpetua for, assuming that Relannes testimony in
court would have confirmed what she narrated in her sworn
statement (Exhibit C), no circumstance then attended the
commission of the rape which could bring the crime under
any provision of Article 335 which imposes a penalty higher
than reclusion perpetua or of reclusion perpetua to death.
Finally, a few words on the lack of care devoted to the
preparation of the information filed before the trial court. The
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor had in its possession
evidence that the crime was committed by a father against
his 17-year old daughter after the effectivity of R.A. No.
7659, hence the imposable penalty was death. It was then
necessary to make reference to the amendatory law to
charge the proper offense that carried the mandatory
imposition of capital punishment. Yet, the information merely
stated:
CONTRARY TO LAW (violation of Article 335, Revised Penal
Code).
Strictly speaking, this statement refers to the
unamended provisions of Article 335 of the Revised Penal
Code. However, as even a freshman student of law should
know, the original provisions of said Article had, even prior to
R.A. No. 7659, already been amended by R.A. No. 2632 and
R.A. No. 4111. Prosecutors are thus admonished to exercise
utmost care and diligence in the preparation of complaints or
informations to avert legal repercussions which may prove
prejudicial to the interest of the State and private offended
parties.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered REVERSING the
appealed decision in Criminal Case No. S-2579 of the
Regional Trial Court of the Ninth Judicial Region, Branch 11,
sitting in Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte, and, for lack of
evidence, ACQUITTING accused-appellant RESTITUTO
MANHUYOD, JR., whose immediate release from detention is
hereby ordered, unless his continued detention is justified by
any other lawful cause. The Director of the Bureau of
Corrections is directed to inform the Court within ten (10)
days from notice hereof of the fact of such release or
continued detention, as the case may be.

PEOPLE vs MANGUNE

Evidence; factual findings of trial court accorded great

respect. Accused Mangune asseverates that the lower courts
should have acquitted him based on reasonable doubt as
AAAs testimony is not worthy of belief for having been
fabricated. He supports such assertion by making much of
the fact that AAA did not sustain any external physical
marks, as shown by the medico-legal findings, despite her
testimony that he slapped her many times on the face. This,
Mangune insists, makes AAAs testimony incredible. The
Supreme Court (SC) cited People v. Paringit, where it
declared that not all blows leave marks. Thus, the fact that
the medico-legal officer found no signs of external injuries on
AAA, especially on her face, which supposedly had been
slapped several times, does not invalidate her statement
that Mangune slapped her to silence her. Mangunes attempt
to discredit AAAs testimony that he raped her on May 7,
2003 must ultimately fail as he has shown no solid grounds
to impeach it. The Regional Trial Court (RTC), which had
the opportunity to hear the testimonies live and observe the
witnesses in person, found not only AAA credible, but her
testimony as well. It even declared that AAAs testimony
alone can justify the conviction of Mangune. The foregoing
were subscribed to by the Court of Appeals as well when it
affirmed the RTCs Decision in its entirety. The SC thus found
no valid reason to depart from the time-honored doctrine
that where the issue is one of credibility of witnesses, and in
this case, their testimonies as well, the findings of the trial
court are not to be disturbed unless the consideration of
certain facts of substance and value, which have been
plainly overlooked, might affect the result of the case.
Mangune was therefore adjudged guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of rape.

HERRERA vs ALBA

In May 1998, Armi Alba, mother of minor Rosendo Alba filed

a suit against Rosendo Herrera in order for the latter to
recognize and support Rosendo as his biological son. Herrera
denied Armis allegations. In the year 2000, the trial court
ordered the parties to undergo a (deoxyribonucleic acid )
DNA testing to establish whether or not Herrera is indeed the
biological father of Rosendo Alba. However, Herrera
questioned the validity of the order as he claimed that DNA
testing has not yet garnered widespread acceptance hence
any result therefrom will not be admissible in court; and that
the said test is unconstitutional for it violates his right
against self-incrimination.
ISSUE: Whether or not Herrera is correct.
HELD: No. It is true that in 1997, the Supreme Court ruled in
Pe Lim vs CA that DNA testing is not yet recognized in the
 Philippines and at the time when he questioned the order of
the trial court, the prevailing doctrine was the Pe Lim case;
however, in 2002 there is already no question as to the
acceptability of DNA test results as admissible object
evidence in Philippine courts. This was the decisive ruling in
the case of People vs Vallejo (2002).
In the Vallejo Case, the Supreme Court recognized DNA
analysis as admissible evidence. On the other hand, as to
determining the weight and probative value of DNA test
results, the Supreme Court provides, which is now known as
the Vallejo Guidelines:
In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, therefore,
courts should consider, among other things, the following
data:
1 how the samples were collected,
2 how they were handled,
3 the possibility of contamination of the samples,
4 the procedure followed in analyzing the samples,
5 whether the proper standards and procedures were followed
in conducting the tests,
6 and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests.
The above test is derived from the Daubert Test which is a
doctrine adopted from US jurisprudence (Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.) The Daubert Test is a test to be
employed by courts before admitting scientific test results in
evidence. More specifically, the Daubert Test inquires:
1 Whether the theory or technique can be tested,
2 Whether the proffered work has been subjected to peer
review,
3 Whether the rate of error is acceptable,
4 Whether the method at issue enjoys widespread acceptance
In this case, the Supreme Court declared that in filiation
cases, before paternity inclusion can be had, the DNA test
result must state that the there is at least a 99.9%
probability that the person is the biological father. However,
a 99.9% probability of paternity (or higher but never possibly
a 100% ) does not immediately result in the DNA test result
being admitted as an overwhelming evidence. It does not
automatically become a conclusive proof that the alleged
father, in this case Herrera, is the biological father of the
child (Alba). Such result is still a disputable or a refutable
evidence which can be brought down if the Vallejo Guidelines
are not complied with.
What if the result provides that there is less than 99.9%
probability that the alleged father is the biological father?
Then the evidence is merely corroborative.
Anent the issue of self-incrimination, submitting to DNA
testing is not violative of the right against self-incrimination.
The right against self-incrimination is just a prohibition on
the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort
communication (testimonial evidence) from a defendant, not
an exclusion of evidence taken from his body when it may be
material. There is no testimonial compulsion in the getting
of DNA sample from Herrera, hence, he cannot properly
invoke self-incrimination.

ESTATE OF ROGELIO ONG VS JOANNE RODGIN DIAZ

Aldrich Lipata

Facts: Minor Diaz filed a complaint before the Regional Trial

Court for compulsory recognition with prayer for support
against Rogelio Ong, she was represented by her mother
Jinky. Before the case, Jinky married a certain Hasegawa
Katsuo, a Japanese. That same year, Jinky met Rogelio, the
fell in love. The next year, Rogelio and Jinky cohabited. After
four years, Joanna was born, Rogelio recognized Joanna as
his, however, that same year, Rogelio abandoned them and
stopped giving support to Joanna, he alleged that he is not
the father of Joanna, hence this petition.

RTC rendered a decision and declared the minor to be the

illegitimate child of Ong with Jinky Diaz, and ordering him to
support the child until she reaches the age of majority.
Ong opposed the CAs order to directing the Estate and
Joanne Rodgin Diaz for DNA analysis for determining the
paternity of the minor Joanne. During the pendency of the
case, Rogelion Died. The Estate filed a motion for
reconsideration with the Court of Appeals. They contended
that a dead person cannot be subject to testing. CA justified
that "DNA paternity testing, as current jurisprudence affirms,
would be the most reliable and effective method of settling
the present paternity dispute.

Issue: Whether or not DNA analysis can still be done even if

the person is whose DNA is the subject is dead.

Held: Yes.
The court held that The death of Rogelio does not ipso facto
negate the application of DNA analysis so long as there exist
suitable biological samples of his DNA. The New Rules on
DNA Evidence permits the manner of DNA testing by using
biological samples--organic material originating from the
person's body, for example, blood, saliva, other body fluids,
tissues, hair, bones, even inorganic materials- that is
susceptible to DNA testing.
In case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to
adequately found or would be hard to get, DNA testing,
which examines genetic codes found from body cells of the
illegitimate child and any physical remains of the long dead
parent could be resorted to.
LEJANO vs PEOPLE

FACTS:

On 30 June 1991, Estellita Vizconde and her daughters

Carmela and Jennifer were brutally slain at their home in
Paranaque City. Four years later in 1995, the NBI announced
that it had solved the crime. It presented star-witness
Jessica Alfaro, one of its informers, who claimed that she had
witnessed the crime. She pointed to Hubert Webb, Antonio
Lejano, Artemio Ventura, Michael Gatchalian, Hospicio
Fernandez, Peter Estrada, Miguel Rodriguez and Joy Filart as
the culprits. She also tagged police officer, Gerardo Biong,
as an accessory after the fact. Alfaro had been working as
an asset to the NBI by leading the agency to criminals.
Some of the said criminals had been so high-profile, that
Alfaro had become the darling of the NBI because of her
contribution to its success. The trial court and the Court of
Appeals found that Alfaros direct and spontaneous narration
of events unshaken by gruesome cross-examination should
be given a great weight in the decision of the case.

In Alfaros story, she stated that after she and the accused
got high of shabu, she was asked to see Carmela at their
residence. After Webb was informed that Carmela had a
male companion with her, Webb became piqued and
thereafter consumed more drugs and plotted the gang rape
on Carmela. Webb, on the other hand, denied all the
accusations against him with the alibi that during the whole
time that the crime had taken place, he was staying in the
United States. He had apparently left for the US on 09 March
1991 and only returned on 27 October 1992. As
 documentary evidence, he presented photocopies of his
passport with four stamps recording his entry and exit from
both the Philippines and the US, Flights Passenger Manifest
employment documents in the US during his stay there and
US-INS computer generated certification authenticated by
the Philippine DFA. Aside from these documentary alibis, he
also gave a thorough recount of his activities in the US

ISSUE:

Whether or not Webbs documented alibi of his U.S. travel

should be given more credence by the Court than the
positive identification by Alfaro.

RULING:

For a positive identification to be acceptable, it must meet at

least two criteria:

2 The positive identification of the offender must come from a

credible witness; and
3 The witness story of what she personally saw must be
believable, not inherently contrived.

The Supreme Court found that Alfaro and her testimony

failed to meet the above criteria. She did not show up at the
NBI as a spontaneous witness bothered by her conscience.
She had been hanging around the agency for sometime as a
stool pigeon, one paid for mixing up with criminals and
squealing on them. And although her testimony included
details, Alfaro had prior access to the details that the
investigators knew of the case. She took advantage of her
familiarity with these details to include in her testimony the
clearly incompatible acts of Webb hurling a stone at the front
 door glass frames, for example, just so she can
accommodate the crime scene feature.

To establish alibi, the accused must prove by positive, clear

and satisfactory evidence that:

5 He was present at another place at the time of the

perpetration of the crime, and
6 That it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene
of the crime.

The Supreme Court gave very high credence to the

compounded documentary alibi presented by Webb. This
alibi altogether impeaches Alfaros testimony not only with
respect to him, but also with respect to the other accused.
For, if the Court accepts the proposition that Webb was in
the US when the crime took place, Alfaros testimony will not
hold altogether. Webbs participation is the anchor of
Alfaros story.

MEYERS vs US

Brief Fact Summary. The defendant, Meyers (the

defendant), convicted of three counts of suborning perjury
regarding his testimony to a Senate subcommittee,
challenged his conviction by arguing the trial court used
evidence that should have been excluded by the best
evidence rule.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. In federal courts, the best
evidence rule is limited to cases where the contents of a
writing are to be proved; such writings are not the only
evidence to be used in determining perjury.

Facts. The defendant was convicted of suborning perjury

when he testified before a Senate subcommittee
investigating fraud and war profiteering. A key question in
the defendants conviction was what exactly he and his co-
defendant testified to during the subcommittee hearings.
The defendant, through counsel, argued that the best
evidence rule required that only the transcript of the
subcommittee hearing be used to determine what was said
during the hearing. Because the trial court used witness
testimony and shorthand notes from a witness present at the
hearing, the defendant argued his conviction should be
overturned.
Issue. Does the best evidence rule require official
transcripts to be the only source of evidence as to what a
person said during a trial or hearing?

Held.
No. In federal courts, the best evidence rule is limited to
cases where the contents of a writing are to be proved.
Perjurious statements may be proved by others who heard
them, or by notes recorded in shorthand, or by other means
and not exclusively by an official transcript.
Dissent. The dissent in this case does not argue whether
the best evidence rule was used properly. Rather, the dissent
argues that (1) the evidence of the co-defendants perjury
was presented too prejudicially to the jury and (2) that the
proof at trial did not support the charges made in the
underlying indictment.

Discussion. Official transcripts are made of criminal

proceedings and of sworn testimony before Congress, which
is what the defendant and his co-defendant participated in.
These transcripts were the basis for their later perjury
convictions. The defendant argued that, because what he
and his co-defendant said during the Senate hearing was
crucial to determining his guilt, the best evidence rule
required only the official transcript could be used to
determine what he and his co-defendant said. The appellate
court ruled that other methods of recording what was said.

air france vs carrascoso

In March 1958, Rafael Carrascoso and several other Filipinos

were tourists en route to Rome from Manila. Carrascoso was
issued a first class round trip ticket by Air France. But during
a stop-over in Bangkok, he was asked by the plane manager
of Air France to vacate his seat because a white man
allegedly has a better right than him. Carrascoso protested
but when things got heated and upon advise of other
Filipinos on board, Carrascoso gave up his seat and was
transferred to the planes tourist class.
After their tourist trip when Carrascoso was already in the
Philippines, he sued Air France for damages for the
embarrassment he suffered during his trip. In court,
Carrascoso testified, among others, that he when he was
forced to take the tourist class, he went to the planes pantry
where he was approached by a plane purser who told him
that he noted in the planes journal the following:
First-class passenger was forced to go to the tourist class
against his will, and that the captain refused to intervene
The said testimony was admitted in favor of Carrascoso. The
trial court eventually awarded damages in favor of
Carrascoso. This was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Air France is assailing the decision of the trial court and the
CA. It avers that the issuance of a first class ticket to
Carrascoso was not an assurance that he will be seated in
first class because allegedly in truth and in fact, that was
not the true intent between the parties.
Air France also questioned the admissibility of Carrascosos
testimony regarding the note made by the purser because
the said note was never presented in court.
ISSUE 1: Whether or not Air France is liable for damages
and on what basis.
ISSUE 2: Whether or not the testimony of Carrasoso
regarding the note which was not presented in court is
admissible in evidence.
HELD 1: Yes. It appears that Air Frances liability is based on
culpa-contractual and on culpa aquiliana.
Culpa Contractual
There exists a contract of carriage between Air France and
Carrascoso. There was a contract to furnish Carrasocoso a
first class passage; Second, That said contract was breached
when Air France failed to furnish first class transportation at
Bangkok; and Third, that there was bad faith when Air
Frances employee compelled Carrascoso to leave his first
class accommodation berth after he was already,
seated and to take a seat in the tourist class, by reason of
which he suffered inconvenience, embarrassments and
humiliations, thereby causing him mental anguish, serious
anxiety, wounded feelings and social humiliation, resulting in
moral damages.
The Supreme Court did not give credence to Air Frances
claim that the issuance of a first class ticket to a passenger
is not an assurance that he will be given a first class seat.
Such claim is simply incredible.
Culpa Aquiliana
Here, the SC ruled, even though there is a contract of
carriage between Air France and Carrascoso, there is also a
tortuous act based on culpa aquiliana. Passengers do not
contract merely for transportation. They have a right to be
treated by the carriers employees with kindness, respect,
courtesy and due consideration. They are entitled to be
protected against personal misconduct, injurious language,
indignities and abuses from such employees. So it is, that
any rule or discourteous conduct on the part of employees
towards a passenger gives the latter an action for damages
against the carrier. Air Frances contract with Carrascoso is
one attended with public duty. The stress of Carrascosos
action is placed upon his wrongful expulsion. This is a
violation of public duty by the Air France a case of quasi-
delict. Damages are proper.
HELD: 2: Yes. The testimony of Carrascoso must be
admitted based on res gestae. The subject of inquiry is not
the entry, but the ouster incident. Testimony on the entry
does not come within the proscription of the best evidence
rule. Such testimony is admissible. Besides, when the
dialogue between Carrascoso and the purser happened, the
impact of the startling occurrence was still fresh and
continued to be felt. The excitement had not as yet died
down. Statements then, in this environment, are admissible
as part of the res gestae. The utterance of the purser
regarding his entry in the notebook was spontaneous, and
related to the circumstances of the ouster incident. Its
trustworthiness has been guaranteed. It thus escapes the
operation of the hearsay rule. It forms part of the res gestae.

Seiler v. Lucasfilm

Brief Fact Summary. Lee Seiler (Plaintiff-Appellant) sued

Lucasfilm (Defendant-Appellee), a film company that
produced the movie The Empire Strikes Back, claiming that
certain creatures that appeared in the movie impermissibly
infringed on a copyright of Plaintiff-Appellants. At trial, the
lower court applied the best evidence rule of Federal Rule of
Evidence 1004(1), and found that Plaintiff-Appellant had lost
or destroyed the originals in bad faith, and denied
admissibility of any secondary evidence. As a result,
summary judgment was awarded in favor of Defendant-
Appellee, and Plaintiff-Appellant appeals that decision here.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. When a plaintiff claims copyright

infringement of his works but cannot produce original
evidence of his works, then the plaintiff must show that the
originals were not destroyed in bad faith under the best
evidence rule of Federal Rule of Evidence 1004(1); if the
plaintiff cannot make such showing, then any secondary
evidence of his works is inadmissible.

Facts. Plaintiff-Appellant claimed that certain creatures

depicted in Defendant-Appellees file The Empire Strikes
Back, namely the characters named Imperial Walkers,
were an infringement on Plaintiff-Appellants own copyright.
Plaintiff-Appellant held a copyright on creatures called
Garthian Striders, which he obtained from the U.S.
Copyright Office in 1981. The film appeared in 1980. Plaintiff-
Appellant deposited reconstructions of the originals with
the U.S. Copyright Office, claiming the reconstructions were
of originals that he had created in 1976 and 1977.
In an evidentiary hearing that lasted seven days, the court
found that Plaintiff-Appellant had destroyed the originals in
bad faith under the best evidence rule of Federal Rule of
Evidence 1004(1). Specifically, the court found that Plaintiff-
Appellant testified falsely, purposefully destroyed or
withheld in bad faith the originals, and fabricated and
misrepresented the nature of his reconstructions.
Following the hearing, the court granted summary judgment
in favor of Defendant-Appellee.
Issue. Did the lower court properly exclude the secondary
evidence of Plaintiff-Appellants works and therefore properly
grant summary judgment in favor of Defendant-Appellee?

Held. Yes; under the best evidence rule of Federal Rule of

Evidence 1004(1), the secondary evidence was inadmissible,
as Plaintiff-Appellant had not shown that the originals were
not lost or destroyed in bad faith; accordingly, the grant of
summary judgment was proper.

Discussion. The court began its analysis by pointing out

that, [t]here can be no proof of substantial similarity and
thus of copyright infringement unless [Plaintiff-Appellant"s]
works are juxtaposed with [Defendant-Appellee"s] and their
contents compared. Since the contents are material and
must be proved, [Plaintiff-Appellant] must either produce the
original or show that it is unavailable through no fault of his
own . . . [which] he could not do. The court went on to
explain that:
The dangers of fraud in this situation are clear. The rule
would ensure that proof of the infringement claim consists of
the works alleged to be infringed. Otherwise,
reconstructions which might have no resemblance to the
purported original would suffice as proof for infringement of
the original. Furthermore, application of the rule here defers
to the rules special concern for the contents of writings.
[Plaintiff-Appellant"s] claim depends on the content of the
originals, and the rule would exclude reconstituted proof of
the originals content. Under the circumstances here, no
reconstruction can substitute for the original.
Finally, the court concluded:
Our holding is also supported by the policy served by the
best evidence rule in protecting against faulty memory.
[Plaintiff-Appellant]s] reconstructions were made four to
seven years after the alleged originals; his memory as to
specifications and dimensions may have dimmed
significantly. Furthermore, reconstructions made after the
release of the Empire Strikes Back may be tainted, even if
unintentionally, by exposure to the movie. Our holding
guards against these problems . . . In the instant case, the
condition of fact which [Plaintiff-Appellant] needed to prove
was that the originals were not lost or destroyed in bad faith.
Had he been able to prove this, his reconstructions would
have been admissible and then their accuracy would have
been a question for the jury. In sum, since admissibility of
the reconstructions was dependent upon a finding that the
originals were not lost or destroyed in bad faith, the trial
judge properly held the hearing to determine their
admissibility.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
MARIO TANDOY y LIM, Defendant-Appellant.

FACTS:
On May 27, 1986, at about 3:30 p.m. Lt. Salido, Jr. of the
Makati Police Station dispatched Pfc. Herino de la Cruz, and
Detectives Pablo R. Singayan, Nicanor Candolesas, Luisito de
la Cruz, Estanislao Dalumpines, Antonio Manalastas and
Virgilio Padua to conduct a buy-bust operation at Solchuaga
St., Barangay Singkamas, Makati.
The target area was a store along the said street, and
Singayan was to pose as the buyer. He stood alone near the
store waiting for any pusher to approach. The other
members of the team strategically positioned themselves.
Soon, three men approached Singayan. One of them was the
accused-appellant, who said without preamble: "Pare, gusto
mo bang umiskor?" Singayan said yes. The exchange was
made then and there two rolls/pieces of marijuana for one
P10.00 and two P5.00 bills marked ANU (meaning Anti-
Narcotics Unit).
The team then moved in and arrested Tandoy. Manalastas
and Candolesas made a body search of the accused-
appellant and took from him the marked money, as well as
eight more rolls/foils of marijuana and crushed leaves.: nad
The arresting officers brought Tandoy to the Office of the
Anti-Narcotics Unit, Makati Police Station, for investigation by
Detective Marvin Pajilan. The accused-appellant chose to
remain silent after having been informed of his constitutional
rights.
These events were narrated under oath by De la Cruz,
Singayan and Pajilan. Microscopic, chemical and
chromotographic examination was performed on the
confiscated marijuana by Raquel P. Angeles, forensic chemist
of the National Bureau of Investigation, who later testified
that the findings were positive. The marijuana was offered as
an exhibit.

ISSUES:
1. The Court a quo erred in finding accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged despite lack of
evidence to prove that he sold marijuana to the poseur-
buyer.
2. The Court a quo erred in admitting in evidence against the
accused Exh. "E-2-A" which is merely a xerox copy of the
P10.00 bill allegedly used as buy-bust money.

RULING:
The trial court, which had the opportunity to observe the
demeanor of the witnesses and to listen to their respective
testimonies, gave more credence to the statements of the
arresting officers. Applying the presumption that they had
performed their duties in a regular manner, it rejected
Tandoy's uncorroborated allegation that he had been
manhandled and framed. Tandoy had not submitted
sufficient evidence of his charges, let alone his admission
that he had no quarrel with the peace officers whom he had
met only on the day of his arrest.
We are convinced from the evidence on record that the
prosecution has overcome the constitutional presumption of
innocence in favor of the accused-appellant with proof
beyond reasonable doubt of his guilt. He must therefore
suffer the penalty prescribed by law for those who would
visit the scourge of drug addiction upon our people.
Under the second assigned error, the accused-appellant
invokes the best evidence rule and questions the admission
by the trial court of the xerox copy only of the marked
P10.00 bill.:This assigned error centers on the trial court's
admission of the P10.00 bill marked money (Exh. E-2-A)
which, according to the appellant, is excluded under the best
evidence rule for being a mere xerox copy. Apparently,
appellant erroneously thinks that said marked money is an
ordinary document falling under Sec. 2, Rule 130 of the
Revised Rules of Court which excludes the introduction of
secondary evidence except in the five (5) instances
mentioned therein.:-cralaw
The best evidence rule applies only when the contents of the
document are the subject of inquiry. Where the issue is only
as to whether or not such document was actually executed,
or exists, or in the circumstances relevant to or surrounding
its execution, the best evidence rule does not apply and
testimonial evidence is admissible.
Since the aforesaid marked money was presented by the
prosecution solely for the purpose of establishing its
existence and not its contents, other substitutionary
evidence, like a xerox copy thereof, is therefore admissible
without the need of accounting for the original.